An Island of Civility in an Ethos of Conflict:

Examining Motivation, Constraint, and Social Change in Israeli-Palestinian Shared Society Peacebuilding

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Abstract:

This thesis studies an island of civility embedded in an ethos of conflict, focusing on a shared society peacebuilding initiative between Palestinian and Jewish citizens of Israel. Undertaken in close partnership with the NGO *Hand in Hand: The Centre for Bilingual Jewish-Arab Education in Israel* using a semi-participatory approach, this research describes the evolution of Hand in Hand from a small grassroots organization to a multimillion-dollar NGO. Drawing on survey data (n = 107), personal interviews (n = 25), and key insights from a four-month ethnography, this dissertation analyzes the social change function of Hand in Hand, ordinary citizens' motivations for enrolling their children in bilingual (Hebrew/Arabic) schools, and the drivers and barriers for attending peacebuilding activities for adults.

Key words:

Peacebuilding; Peace Education; Ethos of Conflict; Collective Action; Israel; Palestine

Acronyms:

OPTs: Occupied Palestinian Territories

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization

PA: Palestinian Authority

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

CSO: Civil Society Organization

SMO: Social Movement Organization

NI: New Institutionalism

RCI: Rational Choice Institutionalism

HI: Historical Institutionalism

SI: Sociological Institutionalism

DI: Discursive Institutionalism

SIMCA: Social Identity Model of Collective Action

RMT: Resource Mobilization Theories

PPT: Political Process Theories

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1. Introduction

1.1. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Battle of Narratives

The modern Israeli-Palestinian conflict has its roots in a territorial conflict, although its current intractability is maintained by nationality and religion, compounded by conflict-supporting narratives. A simple reading of the territorial conflict can be boiled down to five separate tangible issues: control of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs: Gaza and the West Bank), Jewish settlement in the West Bank, Security, the Palestinian refugees, and the Jerusalem Question (Dowty, 2017; Caplan, 2010).

The factors hindering the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians are emotional, complex, and embedded in identity, often resulting from polarized interpretations of the same historical events (Mor-Sommerfeld et al., 2007; Salomon, 2004). Both sides claim to be righteous victims, suffering because of the actions of the other: Israelis as victims of Palestinian terror and pan-Arab hostility and non-recognition, and Palestinians as victims of Israeli occupation and violence (Halperin and Bar-Tal, 2011). Israelis' and Palestinians' collective narratives socialize each side to view the other as illegitimate. As a result, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is fought not only over the West Bank and Gaza, security, refugees, and Jerusalem, but over autonomy over the entire land between the river Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea. The spoils of this conflict are therefore not only territorial; Israelis and Palestinians fight over their national identities. Israelis fight to be recognized as the descendants of those expelled by the Roman Empire from the kingdom of Judea and as the people forced to endure millennia of persecution including the Holocaust, before reclaiming their homeland. Palestinians fight to be recognized as an indigenous population whose land, which constitutes all historic Palestine, was stolen by a belligerent colonial Zionist movement using violence and occupation while the international community watched in silence.

Since these national narratives involve contradictory interpretations of the same historical events, each side perceives its fight for the legitimacy of its national story as existential and zero-sum, wherein the winner takes all (Bar-Tal and Salomon, 2006). As Halevi articulates in his 2018 book, Israelis deny a Palestine on the ground, while Palestinians deny the idea of an Israel.

It is not in this work's scope to evaluate the moral and legal arguments posed by Israelis and Palestinians, nor will this thesis attempt to parse fact from fiction as it relates to each group's narrative. Instead, this dissertation will focus on the power that Israeli and Palestinian national stories have on those that possess them, arguing that in the Israeli/Palestinian context, narratives are powerful institutions, pouring into social life, affecting the beliefs and behaviours of those that hold them.

1.2. The State of Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding

There has been little to no progress on the political level of the Israeli-Palestinian peace file since the collapse of the Oslo accords in the later 90s. In the 21st century, Israeli policies have become more divisive, democratic institutions threatened, and the state's basic laws overshadowed by realities on the ground and the Nation State law[1] (Kretzmer, 2019). The Palestinian political landscape has also regressed since Oslo: animosity between Hamas and Fatah further separates a divided people. Corruption is common, and Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA) struggle to maintain control over its population (Shikaki, 2009). Uncertainty around the health of Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the PA, questions about his successor, ambiguity over elections, and Israel's possible annexation of parts of the West Bank and the Jordan Valley add to existing instability.

The regional politics of the Middle East and global affairs contribute to the freezing of peace efforts between Israelis and Palestinians, increase divisions, and constrain civil society. Greater cooperation between Israel, the Gulf States, and Saudi Arabia in defiance of Iran's encroachment has been perceived as a betrayal by Palestinians (Alavi, 2019). Nationalist right-wing ideologies are on the rise. Europe has been distracted from the Israeli-Palestinian file. Trump's explosive term in political office and the controversial move of the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem resulted in widespread Palestinian criticism, questioning the United States' ability to serve as an 'honest broker' between the two groups (Moten, 2018).

It is against this constraining background that over the last three decades, Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian Arab Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), academics, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and donors have made significant progress in peacebuilding and peace education. Despite debilitating constraints, today's Israel and Palestine have more diverse, better funded peacebuilding initiatives with a wider scope and greater impact than ever before (Lazarus, 2017; 2011). Notwithstanding their significant achievements, Israeli and Palestinian CSOs and NGOs face a legitimacy crisis, funding shortages, and a declining level of national political support (ALLMEP, 2019). The paradoxical dialectic of burgeoning peacebuilding efforts and overwhelming social constraints is at the heart of this thesis.

1.3. Hand in Hand: Centre for Bilingual Jewish-Arab Education in Israel

The present study was carried out in partnership with the NGO, *Hand in Hand: The Centre for Bilingual Jewish-Arab Education in Israel*. Hand in Hand opened its first two integrated, bilingual Arabic/Hebrew school in Jerusalem in 1998 with two classrooms and 50 students. Today it is a multimillion

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[1] The Nation State Law, passed in July of 2018 declares Israel as the historic homeland of the Jewish people, and that "the right to exercise national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people." It establishes Hebrew as the official language of Israel, downgrading Arabic to a "special status" language. This law is controversial, with critics arguing it undermines Israel's democratic institution for Jewish values and downgrades Israel's non-Jewish population to second class citizens (Green, 2018).

dollar NGO with six schools, seven communities, over 1850 students, and a seventh school set to open in the 2020-2021 school-year.

The goal of Hand in Hand's activities is to increase contact between Palestinian/Arab and Jewish-Israeli populations in an ethnically, religiously, and linguistically neutral setting. In a state increasingly divided along ethnic and religious lines, Hand in Hand's mission is to "create a strong, inclusive, shared society in Israel through a network of Jewish-Arab integrated bilingual schools and organized communities" (Hand in Hand, 2019). By facilitating interactions in a bilingual multicultural setting, day in and day out, Hand in Hand's schools and communities promote equality and social cohesion between Palestinian-Arab and Jewish-Israeli children and adults.

1.4. Present Research

Primary data used in this research was gathered during a four-month fieldwork period (September-December 2018) with Hand in Hand.[2] The research was funded in full by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), the Ontario Graduate Scholarship (OGS), and the University of Ottawa. I conducted all research activities in close collaboration with Hand in Hand using a semi-participatory approach, which enabled the organizations to participate as both beneficiary and co-creator of the research. One of the main objectives of the study was to answer both academic and operational questions useful to Hand in Hand.

The present thesis draws on ethnographic, interview, and survey data to answer three main research questions. Data was triangulated using grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 2017) and interpreted using a constructivist social movement theoretical framework with a new institutionalist orientation. The three main questions answered in this thesis are:

> **Research question #1:** In the context of social change, what is the function of Hand in Hand's schools and communities (if any) beyond education providers?

> **Research question #2:** What motivates Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel to enroll their children in Hand in Hand schools despite the potentially high social cost of doing so?

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[2] Hand in Hand, the organization studied, operates bilingual, multicultural schools and communities for Arab and Jewish Israelis only within the internationally recognized borders of Israel. This is an important point, as Hand in Hand's activities aim to build a pluralistic, egalitarian Israel within its internationally recognized borders. The absence of the NGO's activities connecting Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank speaks to the organization's political position relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as its core mission. The present research was therefore conducted within Israel's internationally recognized borders; no research activities were carried out in the Golan Heights, Gaza, or the West Bank, although several interviews took place in a coffee shop in East Jerusalem.

Research question #3: What are the drivers and barriers affecting Jewish-and Palestinian-Israelis' participation in adult community-building activities facilitated by Hand in Hand?

Each of the three results chapters presented in this thesis correspond to one of the research questions. The main question (research question #3) answered in this thesis was chosen as a consequence of the semi-participatory approach taken. After arriving in Jerusalem, it became apparent that Hand in Hand was interested in better understanding their community-members' motivation for attending peacebuilding activities. Answering the third research question about drivers and barriers for community-building attendance necessitates understanding participants' motivation for joining Hand in Hand, captured in the second research question. Lastly, a comparison of ethnographic findings with the literature currently available on Hand in Hand elucidated that the organization may be largely misunderstood. By answering the first research question, this thesis seeks to shift Hand in Hand's depiction as a collection of static schools to a Social Movement Organization (SMO) that challenges the Israeli status quo with an inclusive, shared vision of the future. The study's first results chapter uses interview, survey, and ethnographic data to describe Hand in Hand's theory of change, organizational structure, and participants' perception of impact. The chapter contributes to the literature on Hand in Hand by providing a data-driven analysis of perceptions of the organization's impact beyond direct participants, and an account of the NGO as an SMO, explaining the chaotic nature of the organization, its challenges and successes, difficulties recruiting parents and students, and relationship with the constraining context in which it operates.

The study's second research question and corresponding results chapter provides a 'snapshot' of participants' motivations for sending their children to Hand in Hand schools. Informed by interview, survey, and ethnographic data, the second results chapter analyzes parents' ideology through their adherence to the Ethos of Conflict, social identity, perceptions of injustice, and perceived efficacy (following Van Zomeren et al.'s Social Identity Model of Collective Action; SIMCA) to understand their motivations for enrolling their children in Hand in Hand schools.

The third and final research question discerns the drivers and barriers influencing community members'[3] attendance in peacebuilding. This question was identified as important for the organization as the answers it generates may enable Hand in Hand to attract more attendees to community-building activities. Results Chapter III uses a multivariate regression to compare the predictive potentials of the Ethos of Conflict and SIMCA in explaining community-building participation rates; applies the Needs-

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[3] I use the term 'Hand in Hand community members' throughout this dissertation. For the purpose of this thesis, community members include Hand in Hand teachers, students, alumni, NGO staff, students' parents, alumni parents, and donors- anyone that participates in Hand in Hand's schools and communities, either directly or indirectly.

Based Approach of Reconciliation to understand Jews' and Arabs' distinct emotional needs; and identifies that cultural differences between the two groups are potential barriers to shared society peacebuilding.

The present research uses a social movement theoretical framework with a new institutionalist orientation. A social movement framework lends itself well to studying motivation for collective action participation. Isolating the factors driving individuals to take part in movements has been a core element of collective action theory since the 18th century and remains an important part of this field of theorizing today (Freeman, 1978; Buechler, 2016). There is significant variance in explaining motivation for taking part in collective action: Ideology (Deaux et al., 2006), social identity (Tajfel, 1974), issue salience (Fox and Schofield, 1989), and emotional needs (Shanbel and Nadler, 2008) are some examples. The question is one of motivation: what social and material factors motivate collective action in who, and in what circumstances? Answering this question is important for activists spearheading social movements, since understanding the factors underpinning participation could enable recruitment into these initiatives.

An analysis of peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict necessitates an overview of the history of the conflict and the actors entangled in it. Much ink has been spilled on the events that make up the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The following chapter aims to capture Palestinians' and Israelis' territorial claims, national stories, collective identities, founding myths, and polar interpretations of historical events, which have together morphed into one of the world's most intractable conflicts.

2. Historical Context: Conflicting Narratives in Israel/Palestine

> Both people [Israelis and Palestinians] reach back to their ancient past as tribal and religious entities to build their contemporary national identity and consciousness, and in order to lay claim to original ownership of the contested (and divinely promised) land (Caplan, 2010, p.41).

The purpose of this section is not to add anything new about Israeli and Palestinian history, nor is it to identify any gaps in the available historical analysis. Rather, this section aims to capture each group's national story, critical to understanding the present situation in the region. Seymour (2003) argues that besides economic and political considerations, conflict analysis must also incorporate social-psychological modalities (e.g. ideologies, narratives) that acknowledge the histories of conflicting parties.

The factors hindering the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians are emotional, embedded in identity, and connected to experiences of trauma and victimhood. This history is also very complex, involving holy cities, national uprisings, colonial powers, two world wars, and religion, all complicit in the battle for the territory between the river Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea. Given the intricacy of this history, the present account can only offer a simplification of what has transpired between today's conflicting parties. The complexity of the history of Israel/Palestine compounds its contention; a history that would satisfy both Israelis and Palestinians could be a thesis in its own right- an impossible one at that.

This section therefore aims to be brief and facts-driven, recounting history not for its own sake, but to elucidate Palestinians' and Israelis' national stories, collective identities, founding myths, and polar interpretations of historical events. What follows is an account of the 1880-1948 years in the territory that is now Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs), and Jordan. These years were selected because the events that occurred in this 70-year timespan were arguably the most foundational to Palestinians' and Israelis' present narratives and identities. For more complete reviews, see Dowty (2016), Caplan (2010), Antonius (2010), and Morris (2004).

2.1. The Fundamental Tear: Zionism-as-Colonialism or Zionism-as-Legitimate-Nationalism?

Muslim, Jewish, and Christian communities co-existed in Israel/Palestine (in Jerusalem, Tsfat, and Hebron) and throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA; e.g. Syria, Yemen, and Morocco) since the 7th century. Even though contact was mostly superficial and animosity was common between the different groups, so was cooperation. While relations were sometimes unstable, and violence toward minority groups occurred sporadically in MENA throughout the centuries, minorities fared relatively well under Ottoman and Arab rulers, especially when compared to the Crusader period and relative to the treatment of minorities in Europe during this time, though this remains controversial (Baraz, 2010).

Some historians suspect that throughout the ages, religious/community leaders endorsed pro-peace messaging between the different groups to maintain stability and encourage the continuation of beneficial economic relationships. As stated in the Qu'ran, although Jews and Christians could never rule in a Muslim state, they are considered a 'protected people', whose religious freedoms should be upheld in Muslim-dominant states (Wasserstein, 2001). Contrary to common perceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as being eternal or centuries old, most historians agree that the conflict as it is known today started in the 1880s, with the rise of modern political Zionism.[4]

Zionism refers to the movement or ideology that supports establishing or maintaining a Jewish state in Zion. The biblical name of a mountain outside Jerusalem, Zion is the colloquial name for the territory from which Jews were expelled by Roman conquerors in 135CE (Chomsky and Pappé, 2015). Modern political Zionism, the late 19th early 20th century political pursuit of establishing a Jewish state in Zion, was popularized in Theodor Herzl's 1896 book, *Judenstaat* or 'Jewish State'.

Zionism invokes crucial questions about one's ideological position as it relates to the Israeli and Palestinian national narratives and is seen with polarizing favor or disdain. During the ethnographic portion of this research, the terms 'anti-Zionist' and 'post-Zionist' were used by Israeli peacebuilders to describe themselves (Ethnographic notes, 2018). Caplan (2010) explains the contention surrounding Zionism: "Was the Zionist solution to the Jewish question a Jewish variant of national revivals and struggles for liberation? Or was Zionism part of an aggressive colonialist expansion into the Middle East, whose *raison d'être* was to exploit, dispossess, or overpower the indigenous population?" (p.48).

Adherence to the *Zionism-as-colonialism* or *Zionism-as-legitimate-nationalism* arguments are reflections of one's buy-in to either the Israeli or Palestinian national narratives today. Most Israelis and their supporters view Zionism as a legitimate movement that resulted in the restoration of a Jewish homeland after thousands of years of exile. In contrast, Palestinians and their supporters view Zionism as a variant of European colonialism: illegitimate, destructive, and ultimately, evil (Chomsky and Pappé, 2015).

2.2. The Israeli Narrative Pre-1947: A History of Persecution

The Jewish-Israeli narrative posits that after their exile from the Bronze-age Judean kingdom by the ancient Romans, Jews have been the target of systematic oppression in Europe and in MENA for millennia. The late 19th and early 20th centuries were formative years for the European (Ashkenazi) Jewish national identity, which after centuries of statelessness and discrimination in Europe, was moved by

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[4]For more literature on Zionism and Palestinian/Arab reactions to it, see: Halevi, 2018; Gelber, 2007; Sa'di and Abu-Lughod (2007); Khalidi, 1987; and Antoius, 1953.

Zionist/nationalist convictions and the desire to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine, or as called by the Jews, *Eretz Israel*, the Land of Israel (Dowty, 2017). Pivotal to this growing national awakening was Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), the father of modern political Zionism.

The answer to centuries of anti-Semitism, the Soviet Pogroms, Nazi Germany, and the Holocaust, was a homeland which would promise the safety and security of the world's Jewish population. As stated by Herzl, "the present scheme [the creation of a Jewish state] includes the employment of an existing propelling force… And what is our propelling force? The misery of the Jews" (Herzl, 1896).

Hertzl advocated for a Jewish State in Uganda or Argentina, but in the first World Zionist Congress, religious Jews from Eastern Europe argued for its establishment in the location of the ancient Jewish kingdom: Palestine/the Land of Israel (Caplan, 2010). This territory contains significant religious importance to Jews, particularly the Old City of Jerusalem and its surrounding area, Hebron, and Tsfad.

2.2.1. Aliya 'to rise': The First, Second, and Third Waves of Zionism

With the growing popularity of Zionism in Europe, the early 20th century saw an increase in European Jews buying land in Palestine/Eretz Israel from its Ottoman administrators in Constantinople. The first wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine/Eretz Israel occurred during Ottoman rule. Known as the *first aliya*, between 1882-1902, this wave of Jewish immigration was unsuccessful; a significant number of the 20,000-30,000 Jewish settlers from the Russia moved back to Europe (Caplan, 2010). However, the *first aliya* increased the European Jewish community's awareness of and support for Zionism, leading to the Basel Conference of 1897, the World Zionist Congress, and the successful *second* and *third aliyot*. The extent of illegal land settlement, land grabbing, and morality (or its absence) of transactions over land during this period is an important area of historical debate[5] but out of the scope of the present work.

In 1917, there were about 56,000 Jews in Palestine/Eretz Israel, approximately 8% of the population, while the rest of the population was Muslim, with a small Christian minority (Dowty, 2017). During this time, Jews were a majority in two cities: Jerusalem and Tiberias (Brenner, 1984). Jewish immigration from Europe exploded during the mid-to-late 1920s, supported by the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, in which Britain, for the first time, declared viewing "with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" (Laqueur and Schueftan, 2010). The Balfour Declaration was seen with disdain by the Arab population in MENA, and the document and it remains controversial today (Chomsky and Pappé, 2015; Antonius, 2010). The Balfour Declaration is contested as furiously as Zionism: supported by

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[5] For resources on this issue, see Morris, 2004.

those that adhere to the *Zionist-as-legitimate-nationalism* narrative and delegitimized by *Zionist-as-colonialism* proponents.

By 1947, the Jewish population in Palestine/Eretz Israel exploded to 610,000 out of 1,900,000 (Achcar, 2010). Jewish settlers from Europe outnumbered Palestine/Eretz Israel's indigenous Jewish population, eventually assimilating it (Wasserstein, 2001). As Jewish settlement continued to increase, the new arrivals ignored the concerns of the Palestinian Christians and Muslims, or outright opposed them, either politically or by use of force (Caplan, 2010). For example, Ze'ev Jabotinsky, a pre-eminent Jewish political figure and the person credited with founding Israel's Likud party, wrote:

> Zionist colonization, even the most restricted, must either be terminated or carried out in defiance of the will of the native population. This colonization can, therefore, continue and develop only under the protection of a force independent of the local population – an iron wall which the native population cannot break through. This is, in toto, our policy towards the Arabs. To formulate it any other way would only be hypocrisy (Jabotinsky, 1923).

Reflections of this kind by one of Israel's chief architects feed Zionist-as-colonialism narratives, and represent information Zionism-as-legitimate-nationalism advocates gloss over. Although Jabotinsky's views were essential to forming Israel's political culture, they did not represent the whole of the Jewish community. Hugo Bergmann, Martin Bubber, Achad Ha'am, Henritta Szold, Brit Shalom, and Albert Einstein were influential Jews that advocated for alternative policies in Palestine/Eretz Israel based on equality and human rights for both Jews and Arabs (Chomsky and Pappé, 2015; Achcar, 2010). Ben-Gurion, the leader of the Jewish Agency, the World Zionist Congress, and the first Prime Minister of Israel, endorsed a more moderate model, writing "Palestine is not an empty country… on no account must we injure the rights of its inhabitants" (Ben Gurion as cited in Garfinkle 1991, p.542). Regardless, deep cooperation with the indigenous Arab population was broadly perceived as counter to Zionism's goals and was rare during the British mandate years.

2.3. The Palestinian Narrative Pre-1947: Threat and Displacement

The indigenous population in Palestine in the late 19th early 20th century (at the time in which the early Zionists began their settlement) was largely comprised of smallholder Muslim farmers, with small Christian, Jewish, and nomadic Bedouin populations (Caplan, 2010). Political power was exercised from Constantinople, with the remaining influence concentrated in a few families. During this time, Palestine's indigenous Muslim population's sense of collective identity centred around familial arrangements: belonging to a particular village or region; being in Palestine; being part of the Arabic-speaking world; belonging to the Ottoman empire; being part of the world's Sunni population; and last, comprising part of the larger Nation of Islam (Dowty, 2017).

Common understandings of national identity refer to social circles to which individuals belong because of race, language, ethnicity, culture; being born in a particular territory; or adhering to a specific narrative. Hegel and other constructivists famously argue that identity forms during encounters with distinct 'others'; "self-consciousness only achieves its satisfaction in another self-consciousness" (as cited in Pippin, 2010, p.45). In other words, someone cannot become aware of their individual (or collective) sense of self in isolation. Only through confrontation with others do we develop understandings of who we are.

2.3.1. Confronting Zionism and the British Mandate

During the last two millennia, Jews developed their identity because of their 'otherness' relative to Europe's predominantly Christian and MENA's largely Muslim populations. In contrast, Palestine's Sunni-Muslim population belongs to the Arab-speaking Sunni-Muslim world, which has constituted the majority group in the Levant and North Africa since the 7th century. While the Crusader period left strong negative impressions of Europeans in the region, contact was limited between different groups during the Ottoman Empire (Wasserstein, 2001). The relative homogeneity of indigenous Palestinians and their neighbours offered limited contact with ethnic and religious 'others' in a Hegelian sense, since the majority's encounters with non-Muslims, or non-Arabic speakers in 19th and early 20th century Palestine were few. Instead, encounters with different familial groups or superficial economic interactions with minority groups were common (Antonius, 2010).

Besides an absence of Hegelian confrontations with an 'other', Westphalian conceptions of nation-states were absent in the MENA during this period, in Palestine and elsewhere, since "territorial nationalism was a European idea that came only slowly and unevenly to the people of the Middle East" (Garfinkle, 1991, p.541). Importantly, the development of a Palestinian national identity began forming *before* the British Mandate and the influx of Jewish immigration to the area (Antinous, 2010). After three hundred years of rule in the region, the increasing retrenchment of the Ottoman Empire and its eventual collapse in 1918 sparked a period of rapid political and social transformation throughout MENA. The gradual Ottoman withdrawal from the region left vacuums wherein local elites could seize power. This period sowed the seeds of Arab nationalism (Antonius, 2010).

National awakenings throughout the Middle East were suppressed by Britain and France's colonial control over the region during the Sykes-Picot years. The British Mandate (1917-1947) over what is the Sinai Peninsula, Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was achieved through military conquest and legitimized by the League of Nations. The indigenous Palestinian Muslim population's confrontation with Britain and massive Jewish settlement from Europe- distinct 'others'- led to a growing national awakening in Palestine, and to the eventual demise of a unified, pan-Arab territory (Dowty, 2017).

Opposition to the European Jewry's immigration, the Balfour declaration, and the prospects of a Jewish national home in Palestine were common across the Middle East since the first aliya. For example, in 1891, 500 notable Arab families in Jerusalem asked Constantinople to halt Jewish immigration. In 1899, the Mufti of Jerusalem encouraged the use of terror to expel Zionists (Dowty, 2017, p.65). Later, Britain's 1917's Balfour Declaration "created bewilderment and dismay… It was taken to imply a denial of Arab political freedom in Palestine" (Antonius, 2010, p.267). The prospect of a Jewish homeland in the Levant stood in direct contradiction to the national and pan-Arab sentiments of the post-Ottoman empire. Below is a quote from Gamal Nasser, Egyptian president serving between 1954 and 1970:

> I remember that the first elements of Arab consciousness began to filter into my mind as a student in secondary schools, wherefrom I went out with my fellow schoolboys on strike on November 2nd of every year as a protest against the Balfour Declaration whereby England gave the Jews a national home usurped unjustly from its legal owners… and when the Palestine crisis loomed on the horizon I was firmly convinced that fighting in Palestine was not fighting on foreign territory. Nor was it inspired by sentiment. It was a duty imposed by self defence. (Gamal Abdel Nasser, 1960-1963, as cited in Laqueur and Schueftan, 2010)

Violent outbreaks between Zionists and Palestinian Muslims occurred several times, both under the Ottoman and the subsequent British rule.[6] The British were committed to the facilitation of a Jewish 'homeland' in Palestine alongside an Arab state, which both sides saw as a betrayal of Britain's promises. Owing to the conflicting commitments it made to Zionist and Arab leaders, after 1920, Arabs and Zionists complained to British colonial officials about the other side's aggression (Caplan, 2010). The British were the subject of harsh criticism by Arabs and Zionists alike in the League of Nations, and both Arab and Zionist anti-colonial militants violently targeted British soldiers and other authorities[7]. One of Israel's most celebrated authors and a pro-peace activist, Amos Oz, famously reminisces on throwing stones with Palestinian children during his childhood under the British Mandate in one of his books (Oz, 2010).

The rise of Nazi Germany created a climate in which underground Zionist paramilitary organizations trafficked an increasing number of Jews looking to escape Hitler's Third Reich into Palestine, since Jewish immigration into Palestine was illegal under British rule.[8] As the Jewish population in Palestine increased,

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[6] Pre-48 flashpoints include: Petach Tikva (1886), Gadera (1888), Yesud Ha'ma'alah (1890), Rehovot, Kastina, Jewish Jaffa (1908; 1921), Jerusalem (1920; 1921). Seemingly ancient history compared to the violence that is ongoing today, these events serve as an important bedrock for the feelings of victimhood each side perpetuates, as well as the de-legitimization of the other.

[8] During the British Mandate years, several Zionist paramilitary organizations were founded in opposition to British rule: Haganah and the more extreme Irgun and Lehi groups sabotaged Britain's activities in Palestine, bombing infrastructure and burning ships used for the deportation of illegal Jewish immigrants. Illegal smuggling of Jews to

so did Arab perceptions of threat. A maturing understanding of the implications of a successful Zionist project galvanized the then nascent Palestinian national identity, as "the Arab inhabitants of Palestine perceived the Zionist undertaking as one more avatar of European colonialism…" (Achcar, 2010, p.9). Jewish purchasing of land increased during the holocaust years, as did the number of settlements, the smuggling of arms on both sides, and violence, all in a failing British colonial rule.

The better organized, militarized European Jews outmatched the Palestinian-Arab indigenous population, who, while experiencing a nationalist renaissance, remained impoverished and consumed by internal disputes (Dowty, 2017). This crucial period resulted in the development of national identities with competitive worldviews, fueled by perceptions of an ongoing zero-sum race for the legitimate control of the same land. These developments led to significant mistrust, uncertainty, and hostility between the two groups, with little appetite for peace and coexistence, let alone desire for a pluralistic shared society.

2.4. 1948: Hatzmaot (Independence) vs. Nakba (Catastrophe)

The state of Israel! My eyes filled with tears, and my hands shook. We had done it. We had brought the Jewish state into existence... From this day on we would no longer live on sufferance in the land of our forefathers. Now we were a nation like other nations, master- for the first time in twenty centuries- of our own destiny. The dream had come true- too late to save those who had perished in the Holocaust, but not too late for the generations to come (Golda Meir, 1975, as cited in Dowty, 2017, p.71).

A Palestinian's consciousness is stuffed and devastated by images of violence. Violence that a Palestinian grows up with like he grows up with his skin. Violence that was inflicted upon him every day of his street life, camp life, and his life as a refugee, and that reduced him - like his history - to a fragment. Violence more shattering in its effects on the soul than physical violence (Turki, 1974, p.7).

After three decades of tumultuous British rule, on November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, which recommended separate Jewish and Palestinian states, with Jerusalem as a Corpus Separatum (separate body) administered by a special international regime. Zionist leaders including Ben Guiron accepted the announcement, while the world's Arab states decried it.

Following Israel's declaration of statehood on May 14, 1948, a war between Jewish and Arab populations erupted. The actors in this war were Trans-Jordanian, Egyptian, Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi, and Saudi troops, the Holy War Army and the Arab Liberation Army, and the Israel Defence Forces. This war is simultaneously celebrated as a great victory by Jewish Israelis on Yom Ha-Atzmaot, or Independence Day, and lamented by Palestinian Muslims and Christians as Al'Nakba, or the Catastrophe.

Palestine was also a core activity of these groups, which were instrumental in the 1948 war and the formation of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF; Dowty, 2017).

This war is the point of divergence which creates the seemingly irreconcilable and often diametrically opposed national identities of Israelis and Palestinians. It simultaneously represents the victory of the Zionist movement in returning its people to their homeland, and the crushing defeat of a pan-Arab movement attempting to thwart it.

The war concluded in 1949 with armistice agreements between Israel and its neighbours, solidifying the new country's control over the area it was allotted in Resolution 181, while the remaining Palestinian-Arab territories (the Gaza strip and West Bank) were occupied by Egypt and Jordan. The war resulted in Israeli control of West Jerusalem and Jordanian control over the Eastern part of the city, which includes the ancient city: home to significant Muslim, Jewish, and Christian holy sites.

Although it is unclear how many Palestinian-Arabs left voluntarily, whether some were instructed to leave by their leadership, and how many were forced to abandon their villages by the Israeli army, approximately 700,000 Palestinian-Arabs became refugees during this war, while 156,000 remained, eventually becoming the Palestinian citizens of Israel (Al-Haj, 2002). Since the Palestinian refugees predate the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR; established in 1950), its mandate does not apply to Palestinian refugees and their descendants. Palestinian refugees are provided with services by the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA, established in 1949), making up a special category of refugees. Palestinian refugees now number about five million and keep their refugee status while possessing citizenship in other states. Whether Palestinian refugees and their descendants should be granted the right of return to territory now considered part of Israel is one of the present conflict's most contentious issues.

In the years following 1948, approximately 700,000 Eastern (Mizrahi) Jews from countries all over MENA were forced to flee or left their countries of their own accord. Most of these Jewish refugees headed to Israel for refuge (Caplan, 2010). Although accepted as polity members by the largely Ashkenazi population, Mizrahi Jews faced significant barriers integrating into Israeli public life, both in economic and cultural terms. The extent to which the Ashkenazi/Mizrahi divide still affects privilege and opportunity is addressed indirectly in this research. For more reading on this topic, see Yiftachel (1998).

Israel's Palestinian population was placed under military rule between 1948- 1966, experiencing oppression and discrimination in almost every sphere: mobility was restricted, arbitrary arrests and violence were common, as were land expropriations and forced migration (Al-Haj, 2002; Grossman, 1992). Meanwhile, the wider Israeli-Arab conflict continued its downward spiral with the Suez Crisis of 1956, the occasional attacks on Israel from Gaza and the West Bank, and Israel's retaliations to these attacks. Although mistrust and hostility continued to dominate mainstream political and societal discourse, it is

against this backdrop that organized contact encounters seeking to promote inter-cultural awareness and acceptance between Jews and Palestinians began, as early as in the 1950s, only two years following the 1948 war (Maoz, 2011). Viewed as legitimizing a Zionist occupation by one side, and impeding the iron wall by the other, these encounters were viewed as counter to each group's goals when they began, and continue to face a significant legitimacy crisis today.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO; now the Palestinian Authority; PA) was founded in 1964, with the aim of liberating Palestine through armed conflict, targeting Israeli civilians on cross-border raids from Egypt or Jordan. The PLO was the first political organization created by Palestinians for Palestinians, gaining observer status at the UN and widespread international recognition as a legitimate political body. Although there was no outright war between Israelis and Palestinians during the 50s and early 60s, mounting tensions and Russian involvement led to the outbreak of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

2.5. Post 1967: The Cycle of Violence Continues

The 1967 war between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon resulted in a decisive Israeli victory in which it gained control of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Following the war, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 242, whose first clause demanded the "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" (Caplan, 2010, p.148).

After the 1967 war, Jordan transferred ownership of the annexed West Bank and East Jerusalem to the PLO, marking the first time since 1947 that Palestinians had the legal and de-facto control of their own affairs in this conflict. Following the 1973 war, the Israeli Knesset ratified the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1980, transforming the united city into the capital of Israel under Israeli law. Jewish-Israeli citizens largely supported the unification and subsequent annexation of the Old City and some of its surrounding neighbourhoods. Both the Likud and Labour parties' official policies have favoured a united Israeli Jerusalem ever since (Halevi, 2018). However, the international community and the United Nations rendered the annexation "null and void and the construction of Jewish settlements in it illegal" under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and International Law (Shash, 2011, p. 197).

2.6. Today's Israel and Palestine

> Just as the Arab world denied the right of the Jews to define themselves as a people deserving national sovereignty, so we [Israelis] denied the Palestinians the right to define themselves as a distinct people within the Arab nation, and likewise deserving national sovereignty. To solve our conflict, we must recognize not only each other's right to self-determination but also each side's right to self-definition (Halevi, 2018, p.9).

Since the 1967 war, Israel and its Arab neighbours had at least one major conflict per decade, not including the first and second Palestinian uprisings, or *intifadas*. Violence between Israelis and Palestinians, and Israelis and Arabs represents the occasional boiling over of a constantly simmering pot of tensions. Israel signed historic peace agreements with Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994, although these are tense, limited partnerships. However, despite multiple negotiation attempts (Camp David, 1978; Madrid Conference, 1991; Oslo, 1993; Oslo II 1995; and Camp David, 2000), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict persists unsolved (Roadmap for Peace, 2003). The Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995 mark the nearly successful peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, which included the mutual recognition of Israel by the PLO and the PLO by Israel, and a plan for the establishment of PA and the gradual acquiescence of Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza. These signed agreements earned leaders of both nations a Nobel Peace Prize, but their failed implementation resulted in a 25-year deadlock whose resolution seems unlikely.

The Palestinian citizens of Israel[9] are a minority group that constitutes 20% of Israel's[10] total population (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017). They are the descendants of the 156,000 Palestinians that remained within the boundaries of the State of Israel following the 1947/48 war.

Although the Palestinian citizens of Israel hold the same citizenship as Jewish Israelis, they experience systematic discrimination and are perceived as a 'threatening minority' by the Jewish majority, mostly because of their sizeable population and national, tribal, and sometimes familial relationship with the Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and all over the world (Al-Haj, 2002). The military control of the Palestinian/Arab-Israelis ended in 1966, yet the systematic physical and psychological harm inflicted on this population during this period contributed to the fragmentation of this group's identity, centered on its "collective struggle for equality and peace" (Al-Haj, 2002, p.173).

Institutionalized discrimination of Israel's Palestinian citizens began before 1948 and persists today. Perpetuated by the national government and municipal councils of cities, towns, and kibbutzes, higher

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[9] Arab-Israeli remains the domestic legal term describing Israel's indigenous Arab population, which comprises 20% of the total. This population retains a strong connection to the Palestinians governed by the PA and Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as the Palestinians in the diaspora, with which the Israeli state is entangled in an intractable conflict. Individuals from this group prefer to be called "Palestinian-Israeli", or "Palestinian citizens of Israel", or simply "Arabs" or "Palestinian", although the latter two terms are too broad and may be interpreted to encompass other groups. The term used to group Israel's Palestinian citizens is controversial, each term the subject of scrutiny for in-group members, Palestinians elsewhere, and for Israel's Jewish population (Bekerman, 2018). As such, this manuscript will refer to this population as Palestinian Israelis, Arab Israelis, and the Palestinian citizens of Israel interchangeably.

[10] This thesis refers to 'Israel' as the internationally agreed upon territory within the 'green line'. This territory thus excludes the Golan Heights, the West Bank, Gaza, and parts of East Jerusalem.

education, and the private sector, Palestinian citizens of Israel's de-facto inferior citizenship status leads to inequality that persists in every sphere of life (Dichter, 2015). Although approximately 20% of Israel's population, Israeli-Arabs account for only 8% of the country's GDP (Inter-Agency Task Force on Israeli-Arab Issues, 2019). Restrictions on building and zoning impede the natural growth of villages and neighborhoods; poorer funding for education leads to a lower-skilled, more vulnerable Palestinian -Israeli workforce; and insufficient investment in municipal services in Arab villages and Palestinian neighbourhoods of mixed cities all result in Arab/Palestinians' possession of a second-class citizenship (Watzman, 2004; Abu-Nimer, 2004; Bekerman, 2009). In 2017, 47.1% of Arab families lived below the poverty line, compared to 13.4% of Jewish families (Inter-Agency Task Force on Israeli-Arab Issues, 2019).

Because of the conflict, Palestinian citizens of Israel are isolated from Palestinian refugees, Gazans, and Palestinians in the West Bank and Jordan (Grossman, 1992). They are in a bind: viewed by Israeli Jews as a 'hostile minority' and a 'security risk', while the broader Palestinian community sometimes views them as traitors that are more Israeli than Palestinian (Grossman, 1992).

Except for in a handful of mixed cities in which Palestinian/Arab-Israeli and Jewish-Israeli populations live side by side, Palestinian and Jewish Israelis live in separate cities, villages, or towns. Outside of interactions around economic transactions, day-to-day activities offer no opportunities for meaningful contact, in both mixed cities and elsewhere (Weiss, 2019; Hager and Jabareen, 2016).

Understanding the origins of this conflict's narratives is crucial to an analysis of present and future peacebuilding efforts. The next chapter extends this historical analysis by reviewing relevant theory and empirical research on intractable conflicts and peacebuilding in the Israeli/Palestinian context.

3. Literature Review

The present chapter has two goals: first, to introduce the reader to peacebuilding and peace education between Israelis and Palestinians, particularly to *shared society* and *coexistence* movements. Second, to identify gaps in the relevant literature and articulate how the present research addresses those gaps. Informed by a four-month ethnography, over 30-hours of interview data, and a survey administered to Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli peacebuilders, this literature review previews the results of this study.

3.1. Intractable Conflicts

Intractable conflicts are often ethnocentric, long-term, zero-sum, existential, seemingly irreconcilable, involve regular clashes of violence, and are rooted in identity (Uluğ, 2017; Shahar et al., 2018; Lavi et al, 2014; Bar-Tal, 2012; 2004). Some well-known examples of intractable conflicts around the world include the Turkish-Kurdish conflict (Ulug et al., 2017), the conflict in Cyprus (Zembylas, 2011), the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir (Kriesberg, 1993), and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Intractable conflicts often involve heightened and raw feelings including anger, fear, anxiety, and uncertainty (Salomon, 2004). These emotions debilitate a group's ability to "tolerate the other side, rationally judge its stance, and perceive it in a less negative and threatening way" (Salomon, 2004, p. 260).

It is important to look beyond political and economic factors and consider history and the socio-psychological states of the conflicting parties when analyzing conflict situations, especially in intractable contexts (Seymour, 2003). In their study, Shnabel and Nadler (2008) show that emotional needs are often more significant than objective realities in conflicting parties' preparedness for reconciliation. In his study, Grosbard (2016) identifies that conflicting cultural paradigms have led to psychological and discursive incompatibilities between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators through the decades, explaining their failure. Dichter (2015) asserts that the suppression of Israeli-Palestinians' national identity through discriminatory policies is complicit in the current intractable situation. Last, Bar-Tal et al. (2009) identify that even without experiencing violence, living in the conditions of an intractable conflict leads to negative psychological effects, such as prolonged stress and anxiety.

To soften the negative effects experienced during intractable conflicts, societies develop socio-psychological repertoires to justify the seemingly endless conflict, satisfy their emotional need for predictability, maintain a positive self-image, and establish a sense of righteousness (Shahar et al., 2018; Bar-Tal et al., 2009). These needs are satisfied by widely held conflict-supporting narratives. These narratives portray the group positively and often contain elements of competitive victimhood (Ulug et al., 2017). Eidelson and Eidelson (2003) find that intractable conflict narratives contain five core elements: superiority, injustice, vulnerability, distrust, and helplessness. These narratives are "selective and biased,

and provide a simplistic, moralistic, and one-dimensional view that allows unequivocal and meaningful comprehension of the conflict" (Shahar et al., 2016, p.959). Conflict-supporting narratives present the conflict as inevitable, one's group as the victim, and the rival group as an illegitimate belligerent, helping society members come to terms with the difficulty of their circumstances.

Conflict-supporting narratives are based on myths or legends that revise history to justify the legitimacy of a group, portraying it and its actions positively. Every society has "its Alamo, its Stalingrad, its Holocaust, the conquests and victories, heroes and arch-enemies of the past- all those experiences that were crystallized into a collective narrative and identity and were transmitted through curricula, ceremonies, holidays, and rituals" (Salomon, 2004, p.258). The difference between conflict-supporting narratives in intractable and other types of conflicts is not explained in the relevant literature on this topic. It suggests that the difference stems from the centrality of narratives, associated emotionality, and the time that they are promoted by institutions like the government, media, and schools. However, this has not been studied (Bar-Tal, 2004). Bar-Tal writes that if a conflict is maintained over a long period, conflict-supporting narratives become institutionalized, taking a central role in society's educational institutions, media, politics, religious institutions, and legislation, setting the conflict on a more rigid path-dependence.

For example, consider the narrative surrounding the United States in World War Two: it promoted the justness of American involvement in the war, made the case for American victimhood following the attack on Pearl Harbor, and spread Americans' positive self-image through its military might and framing as the 'saviour' of the allies. The presence of this conflict-supporting narrative in America during the early 1940s was crucial to the United States' success in Europe and in the Pacific, ensuring 'all hands on deck' and American resilience in the face of a harsh and uncertain war.

I propose that once conflict narratives achieve a certain level of institutionalization, they become inextricable from society's fabric, putting the society at risk of vicious cycles that perpetuate the conflict. An example of a vicious cycle stemming from the institutionalization of conflict narratives is: 1) A society's conflict-supporting narratives become institutionalized; 2) Conflict-supporting narratives promote and justify violence; 3) the rival retaliates using violence; 4) the rival's retaliation validates and deepens the influence of the in-group's conflict-supporting narratives, and; 5) Conflict-supporting narratives become more deeply institutionalized.

Figure 1. The Vicious Cycle of Violence and the Institutionalization of Conflict Supporting Narratives

The Ethos of Conflict, proposed by Israeli social psychologist Daniel Bar-Tal explains the nature and function of conflict supporting narratives in intractable conflict situations by suggesting these narratives constitute a coherent system of beliefs, like an ideology (Bar-Tal, 2004).

3.1.1. The Ethos of Conflict

The Ethos of Conflict results from the institutionalization, dissemination and adoption of conflict-supporting narratives. In essence, the Ethos of Conflict is an ideology, or a frame through which people anchor meanings to interpret the world (Halperin, 2011; Bar-Tal, 2002). Those with strong adherence to the Ethos of Conflict experience "perpetual cognitive selectivity, biases, and distortion" toward confirming their ideology and toward rejecting any conflicting information (Bar-Tal, 2009). Similar to other militant ideologies, the Ethos of Conflict acts as a buffer to the negative psychological effects resulting from living in an extended conflict situation, including uncertainty, anxiety, fear, depression, and trauma (Shahar et al., 2018; Willer, 2004). Bar-Tal (2004) notes that the Ethos of Conflict popularizes beliefs, memories, and emotional orientations in which the conflict is perceived as necessary or inevitable, maintaining negative intergroup prejudice with little public discussion.

The Ethos of Conflict operationalizes conflict-supporting narratives into a clear measureable construct. The Ethos of Conflict was first made into a questionnaire by Zafran (2002), expanded by Wolf

(2004), and then refined and condensed by Bar-Tal et al. (2012). Halperin and Bar-Tal (2011) outline eight sets of beliefs that comprise the Ethos of Conflict: 1) justness of one's group's goals; 2) importance of security; 3) positive collective self-image; 4) monopoly on victimhood; 5) de-legitimization of the rival; 6) importance of nationalism; 7) importance of in-group unity; and 8) beliefs of peace.

While the literature using the Ethos of Conflict is limited, its potential seems promising. Halperin and Bar-Tal (2011) demonstrate that worldviews, societal beliefs, and intergroup emotional orientations are foundational to creating closed-mindedness. In her experimental approach, Sharvit (2014) reveals that the Ethos of Conflict is the standard mode of operation for most Israeli-Jews, and is increased in reaction to stress. In a quasi-experiment, Bar-Tal (2009) shows that high adherence to the Ethos of Conflict in the Israeli-Palestinian context contributes to confirmation bias when observing and interpreting conflict-related information. Last, using large-scale surveys, Canetti et al. (2017) find that adherence to the Ethos of Conflict can predict support for compromise in both Israelis and Palestinians. No study to date, however, has examined whether the Ethos of Conflict mediates not just belief, but behaviour. It is unclear whether some people are more resistant to the Ethos of Conflict than others, how resistance to the Ethos of Conflict develops, and how the Ethos of Conflict influences behaviour.

The next section explores the relationship between education and conflict. Relevant to the present work is the role of the education system in promoting peace and conflict.

3.2. Education in Conflict

The relationship between conflict and education is multi-layered and bi-directional. Conflict impacts governments' and civil society's capacities to deliver education, and its content and pedagogy (Brown, 2011; Harris, 2004; Smith and Vaux 2003; Bush and Saltarelli, 2000). Education has the potential to accentuate conflict, or mitigate its eruption, although this relationship is indirect (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000).

While the effects of conflict on education are tangible, the potential influence of education on conflict represents a contentious area for policy, programming and academic debate. The lack of research showing a direct link between education and conflict attenuation makes sense; the resolution of conflict can rarely if ever be directly attributed to schools. Political negotiations, ceasefires, and treaties are the events that result in peace. It has been argued, however, that formal education affects factors that influence the likelihood of conflict and/or its resolution.

3.2.1. Education in Intractable Conflict

Societies trapped in intractable conflicts often foster education curricula and pedagogies that emphasize ethnic differences, privilege certain groups over others, and contribute to perpetuating the conflict. For example, Rose (2011) asserts that biases within the curriculum and the use of enrolment quotas

were "potentially implicated in the genocide in Rwanda" (p.189). Brown (2011) provides Sri Lanka and Thailand as examples in which education systems are divided along religious lines, contributing to ethnic/religious tensions and outbreaks of violence. Dichter (2015) argues that separate systems of education for Palestinian/Arabs and Jewish-Israeli students perpetuate Israel's Palestinian citizens' discrimination, contributing to the intractability of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Donors, international NGOs, and CSOs are often unsuccessful when trying to reform national education agendas in intractable settings. A society's education program often represents one of the many institutions embedded in the Ethos of Conflict, complicit in socializing the values, beliefs, motivations, and behaviours that perpetuate the conflict. Governments and their ministries of education are often influenced by powerful officials who see reforms to the national education strategy as contrary to their interests. Rational Choice Institutionalists (RCI) explain that people make decisions based on rational calculations of utility; individuals change their behaviour if they expect to benefit from the new behaviour more than they would otherwise (Mackay et al., 2010). A certain 'ripeness' is required for influential figures to choose peace-promoting behaviours over conflict-supporting alternatives (Canetti, 2017). Without this ripeness, or what institutionalists describe as *punctuated equilibrium*, education for change is likely to fail (Andrews, 2015; Bar-Tal, 2004). Therefore, taking advantage of the potential influence of curricula and pedagogy on peacebuilding goals represents a serious challenge for donors, international NGOs, and local civil society, especially when dealing with governments influenced by conflict-supporting narratives.

The next section explores civil society initiatives often referred to as "peacebuilding" or "peace education", which attempt to educate and transform their communities to create a more peaceful society.

3.3. Peace Education Theory

Defining peace education is a complicated affair, and even more difficult is distinguishing it from peacebuilding. The OECD-DAC defines peacebuilding as:

> an overarching term for an entire range of actions designed to contribute to building a culture of peace […] peacebuilding covers a broad range of measures implemented in the context of emerging, current or post-conflict situations and which are explicitly guided and motivated by a primary commitment to the prevention of violent conflict and the promotion of a lasting and sustainable peace (OECD-DAC, 2008, p.15).

The goal of peacebuilding is to transform the factors, structures, and institutions that have led to conflict (Lederach, 2003). A subset of peacebuilding, peace education is described as "an elusive concept" (Danesh, 2006, p.55), an "invention of modern times" (Vriens, 1999), an "aim to foster change" (Bar-Tal, 2002, p. 3), the promotion of a "culture of peace" (UNESCO, 2019), and a "socializing process" that entrenches peacebuilding goals in students, teachers, parents, and society (Ben Nun, 2009).

Ian Harris (2002), a seminal figure in the study of peace education, suggests that effective peace education has ten broad, ambitious goals:

> To appreciate the richness of the concept of peace; to address fears; to provide information about security systems; to understand violent behavior; to develop intercultural understanding; to provide for a future orientation; to teach peace as a process; to promote a concept of peace accompanied by social justice; to stimulate a respect for life; and to end violence (p. 20).

One can consider peace education initiatives "educational interventions to act as preventative measures before conflict erupts", or as a peacebuilding tool used to decrease intergroup prejudice and animosity after war has ended (Paulson and Rappleye, 2007). The value of peace education depends on its ability to challenge individuals and institutions to recognize injustices and change their behaviours and beliefs in the pursuit of a more peaceful society.

Peace education initiatives differ in their ideology, curricula, objectives, and pedagogies depending on the context in which they operate, since they are a direct response to conflicts, tensions, or disharmonies that exists in a society (Harris, 2003). For example, many peace education initiatives in the United States emerged with the Black civil rights movement in the 1960s and promoted universal human rights applying American civil liberties to the country's African American population (Bar-Tal, 2002). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, since 2000, 112 schools with about 80,000 students engaged in peace education that focused on reconciliation following the ethnically motivated civil war (Danesh, 2006). Last, the recent global surge against climate change inaction is a large-scale peace education movement. The essence of peace education is that it mobilizes people, adults and/or children, and institutions, "to take part in a campaign for change" (Bar-Tal, 2002, p.3).

Found in the intersection of education and peacebuilding, peace education interacts with both macro (societal level) and micro (individual level) institutions, filtering from the bottom-up through grassroots movements and from the top-down through government policy and programming. It can be seen as operationalizing hope for a better future; what hope means, depends on the society. While all societies have visions for a better future, the details of what they seek, whether social, economic, political, environmental or otherwise, often differ. As Bar-Tal (2002) observes, "without goals and plans for a better future, a society is doomed to decadence" (p.10). Peace education movements advance particular mindsets through an iterative process of adjusting content, pedagogy, and objectives in response to an ever-changing social climate.

3.3.1. Broad vs. Narrow Peace Education

Following Bar-Tal (2004), it is useful to distinguish between *narrow* peace education initiatives from *broad* ones. *Narrow* initiatives typically refer to those taking place in schools. *Broad* peace education refers to pro-peace messages transmitted through mass-media, politics, and elites to influence broader society.

In the *narrow* sense, peace educators sustain that if used on a wide enough scale for a long enough time, schools' curricula, pedagogy, language of instruction, and administration can either reinforce or reduce the circumstances that lead to conflict (Brown 2011; Bekerman, 2005; Harris, 2004; Smith and Vaux, 2003). Schools reach an entire segment of society on an almost-daily basis with the mandate to influence children and adolescents' knowledge, values, beliefs, and behaviours. Nestled in the meso level between central governments and individuals, "schools provide a fertile ground for promotion of both large-scale change on a national level, and small-scale change at the family and community levels" (Ben Nun, 2009, p.7). Children and adolescents- the targets of formal schooling- are malleable to peace education, since "they are less influenced by the ethos of conflict and more open to new ideas and information" (Bar-Tal, 2004, p.262). In the Israeli-Palestinian case, targeting youth and adolescents is crucial, since opinion surveys demonstrate that this group is the least supportive demographic for peace (Braunold and Saltan, 2016). However, Dichter (2015) warns us of the danger of programming peacebuilding activities only for children in the Israeli-Palestinian context:

> We say to our children: 'peace with the Arabs is a complicated affair, and we won't be able to achieve it… our generation is already spoiled; you [children] are 'fresh'. Maybe you [children] will succeed…' but this is complete nonsense. It is a display of overwhelming laziness on the part of adults. Instead of making progress and transferring our knowledge and achievements on to our children, as we do in every other field, in this emotional enterprise we burden them with the responsibility of finding the solution… Out of our ignorance, we place the Israeli-Arab conflict on our children's desks, raw and bleeding. Is this not the obvious exploitation of our children? (Dichter 2015, p.95. my translation).

The goal of *narrow* peace education is therefore to foster a new generation that will be more peaceful that the one before it. Unlike Dichter, Bar-Tal (2004) claims that this is possible but would require the initiative to reach a critical mass to succeed. It is therefore unsurprising that stand-alone initiatives that reach a few students have little impact on society (Salomon, 2004).

Broad peace education approaches assume that peace education must engage with society to be successful, since an initiative taking place exclusively "in schools without a wider societal campaign is fruitless and unrelated to societal reality" (Bar-Tal, 2002, p.6). Often indistinguishable from peacebuilding and peace protests in intractable situations, *broad* approaches to peace education attempt to change socio-psychological repertoires of society members through multi-front activities. *Broad* peace education initiatives/peacebuilding attempt to change one or several of society's important institutions; political,

social, cultural, religious, and educational leaders; outlets like newspapers, television, and social media; and legislation. Like different collective action initiatives underpinned by the same movement, *broad* peace education programs often act in tandem, yet each is distinct. They interact with one another, challenging societal patterns of thought and behavior, disrupting power structures and privilege, pushing the boundaries of what beliefs and behaviours are sanctioned by society and which are deemed illegitimate.

It is unclear *which* institutions should be prioritized for the success of peace education and why. Collective action theory has some insights about this (Buechler, 2016), as do institutional theorists (Paris, 2004) but the literature on peace education and social movements has not been bridged. In addition, Israeli peace education scholars have not yet looked at the effects of *narrow* peace education in mobilizing socio-psychological change in their communities beyond direct participants. This thesis is situated in the nexus between *broad* and *narrow* peace education efforts, as it examines participants' motivation for participating in both a) a *narrow* initiative, the NGO Hand in Hand's schools in Israel, and b) a *broad* initiative, Hand in Hand's community-building activities for adults.

The rest of this review will elaborate on peace education and peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian context, beginning with an overview of the education system facilitated by Israel's Ministry of Education.

3.4. Primary and Secondary Education in Israel

Primary and secondary education in Israel [11] is segregated according to language of instruction and further subdivided according to religiosity. Broadly speaking, secular Jewish, national religious Jewish, and ultraorthodox Jews all attend different schools, as do Druze, Muslims, and Christians (Cölsch, 2011). Those schools are administered by separate boards, all of which receive funding from and comply with the standards set by Israel's Ministry of Education. Curricula differ for each group and teachers are trained according to their linguistic/religious grouping, although Jewish-Israeli perspectives of religion, geography, and history dominate the Arab curriculum, limiting the abilities of Palestinians to teach their own views (Mor-Sommerfeld et al., 2007). As suggested by Al-Haj (2002), the absence of Palestinian perspectives in the history curriculum is symptomatic of the broader exclusion and denial of Palestinian narratives and emblematic of Israel's function as a Jewish national home. Al-Haj (2002) describes, "Jewish students are to love Israel as their homeland and the state of the Jewish people. While Arab students are to internalize the message that they are not full citizens but junior partners in Israeli society and must obey the rules set by the Jewish majority and consistent with the basic ideology of the State" (p.176). Funding for and the quality of education delivered by both Christian and Muslim Palestinian/Arab-Israeli school boards lag

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[11] This thesis refers to 'Israel' as the internationally agreed upon territory within the green line. The territory referred to as Israel therefore excludes the Golan Heights, the West Bank, Gaza, and parts of East Jerusalem.

behind their Jewish counterparts (Bekerman, 2016; Bar-Tal, 2004; Watzman, 2004). An Israeli newspaper reports that Arabic-language schools receive an average of 24,000 NIS per students per year, compared to Hebrew-language schools' average allotment of 31,000 NIS per students per year (Haaretz, 2019). The yearly international PISA tests administered in OECD countries shows that in addition to their Jewish counterparts, students in Lebanon, Jordan, Indonesia, and Kazakhstan outperform Israel's Arab students demonstrating the inequality in Israel's education system (OECD, 2019).

Separate schools for Arabic and Hebrew speakers reinforce segregation between Jewish and Palestinian [12] citizens of Israel, contributing to the alienation of the 'other' (Ben Nun, 2009). Significant interaction between the two groups does not occur until adulthood, at which point contact surrounds employment or service delivery, and is typically superficial (Maoz, 2011). Only higher education is combined for all groups, although Palestinian/Arab-Israelis are under-represented in these institutions, although this gap appears to be closing (OECD, 2019; Hager and Jabareen, 2016). Significant interaction between the two groups does not occur until adulthood, at which point contact surrounds employment or service delivery, and is typically superficial (Maoz, 2011). The absence of widespread integrated education in Israel perpetuate the political, social, and economic divisions that exist between Palestinian/Arab- and Jewish-Israelis, leading to greater tension, violence, and suspicion, fueling the intractability of the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Hughes and Donnelly, 2006). As stated in the 2017-2018 annual report of *Hand in Hand: The Centre for Jewish-Arab Education in Israel,* "the next generation rarely interacts, entrenching the dominant practice of polarization deeper in our culture" (p.4).

3.5. Peace Education: A Staple in Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding

In the 1980s, following the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars and after Israel signed its first major peace treaty with Egypt, "a series of public opinion surveys indicated growing right-wing extremism and increased anti-democratic and anti-Arab tendencies among Israelis Jews" (Maoz, 2011, p. 116). In reaction, educators ramped up their involvement in and support for intergroup contact encounters, ranging from singular meetings to longer-term interventions. Yitzhak Navon's first term as Minister of Education and Culture in 1984, Navon recommended an integrated public education based on "a new type of cultural contact between Arabs and Jews- a contact on the basis of equality and cultural respect" (Bar-Tal, 2004, p.264). Although this recommendation was pursued, these efforts faded, disappearing completely in 1990

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[12] As stated by Wright (2018), "the use of the noun 'Arab' is considered by many Palestinians and most of the activists with whom I worked to be part of a Zionist erasure of Palestinian history" (x). The terms used to group Israel's Palestinian citizens are controversial, each label drawing criticism for different reasons. As described in the second results chapter, the large number of national labels used by members of this group hint at a fragmented national identity. This manuscript will uses the terms Arabs, Arab-Israelis, Palestinians, or Palestinian citizens of Israel interchangeably while referring to this population, whose members are key participants in this study.

when a new Minister of Education entered office. The gradual disappearance of co-existence education policy in the mid/late 1980s is likely related to the outbreak of the first Intifada in the West Bank in 1987. This movement involved violence between the Israeli military and Palestinians in the West Bank, leading to the re-emergence of distrust and suspicion, squashing appetite for co-existence (Bar-Tal, 2004).

The most recent large-scale peace education effort targeting Jewish- Israelis occurred during the first years following the Oslo Accords, signed by Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat in 1993. These included: the Ministry of Education declaring "peace" as the theme for the 1994-1995 school year; repealing the law forbidding contact with PLO members; the Jewish-Israeli media featuring Palestinian leaders in interviews for the first time, and; the intensification of contact encounters between Palestinian/Arab- and Jewish-Israelis (Bar-Tal, 2004). Similar to the peace education efforts of the 1980s, this momentum dissipated following Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's 1995 assassination and disappeared after three years of rule under Benjamin Netanyahu and the second Intifada in the year 2000.

Today's domestic, regional, and international political trends all "militate against the emergence of a diplomatic horizon" in Israel and Palestine (Lazarus, 2017, p.8). Decades of opaque policies and regulations weaken Israeli and Palestinian CSOs. Emboldened public opposition to contact encounters and pluralism stigmatize and de-legitimize peacebuilding in both Israeli and Palestinian societies. In addition, peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian context is chronically underfunded. Notwithstanding these significant challenges, the last three decades have witnessed growth and innovation in Israel-Palestinian peacebuilding, resulting in a robust, diverse, and vibrant industry.

A recent report found at least 164 civil society programs engaged in peace, conflict resolution, and civil and human rights in Israel and the Palestinian territories (Lazarus, 2017). In addition, over 60 veteran organizations operate in this space, which seems at odds with Israel's mandatory conscription, the high levels of trust that Jewish Israelis have for the army, and the animosity Palestinians feel toward the organization. Funding and capacity vary for peacebuilding programs. Approximately 40 peacebuilding NGOs report annual revenues over one million USD, while dozens operate with a narrow scope and a limited budget (Lazarus, 2017). Peacebuilding programs vary in their methods and approaches. Most peacebuilding activities taking place in the Israeli-Palestinian context focus on advocacy, dialogue, and civic/human rights. Initiatives that integrate peacebuilding activities into economic development, medicine, the environment, and technology are uncommon, even though some argue that they are more impactful than traditional approaches (Dichter, 2015). See table 1 below for a detailed breakdown of peacebuilding initiatives in Israel and the Palestinian territories by sector.

Table 1: Categories of Peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian Context. Data from Lazarus, 2017, p.21.

Methods Employed	Active initiatives[13]	Percentage of Field
Advocacy	67	40.85%
Dialogue	61	37.20%
Civil/Human Rights	38	23.17%
Education	38	23.17%
Arts/Culture	31	18.90%
Research	30	18.29%
Protest	27	16.46%
Hub (Meeting/Activity Site)	26	15.85%
Track Two Diplomacy	18	10.98%
Music	17	10.37%
Economic Development	15	9.15%
Media	14	8.54%
Sport	14	8.54%
Hi-Tech/IT	9	5.49%
Health/Medicine	6	3.66%
Environment	2	1.22%

Peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian space can be parsed into two streams: *cross border* and *shared society*. Initiatives between Palestinians in the West Bank and/or Gaza and Jewish and Palestinian Israelis

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[13] Note that some active initiatives were categorized under more than one method, leading to distorted percentages.

are *cross border* initiatives. This category of programming aims to improve the relationship between Israel and the OPTs. On the other hand, programming involving contact encounters between Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel is increasingly referred to as building a *shared society* between the two groups within Israel's borders.

Despite relative success, all peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian context remains underfunded. The Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALMEP), observes that after twenty years of growth, peacebuilding NGOs in Israel and Palestine "transform individuals and local communities. Yet, neither private philanthropy nor government funders have committed the resources needed to bring these projects to a scale that enables them to change the larger public conversation and attitudes at a societal level" (AMEP, 2019). It is for these reasons that ALMEP, Lazarus (2017), Dichter (2015) and others have outlined the need for an international peacebuilding fund for Israel and Palestine, following the $1.8B International fund for Ireland launched 12-years before the historic Good Friday Agreements.

Defying prevalent institutions and the current political climate, peacebuilding challenges people to re-negotiate their beliefs and behaviors to accommodate more nuanced, accepting national narratives. Visions for what these alternate narratives should look like vary, and different NGOs foster different schools of thought, resulting in varied programming on the ground. Despite the significant variety, most peacebuilding initiatives in the Israeli-Palestinian context follow Allport's (1954) seminal contact hypothesis, which suggests that shared experiences and cooperation between conflicting groups reduce negative stereotyping, lead to greater inter-group understanding and acceptance, and to reduced prejudice and hostility.

For example, Olive Oil Without Borders, a USAID-funded *cross border* initiative connects Palestinian olive oil producers from the West Bank to Jewish olive oil producers in Israel. This initiative challenges the Ethos of Conflict by enabling Israeli and Palestinian olive oil producers to work together (USAID, 2016). In other words, through increased contact, people's perceptions of one another will change.

3.6. Building a Shared Society in Israel: The Contact Hypothesis

Allport's (1954) Contact Hypothesis suggests that contact between two hostile groups can reduce animosity and increase mutual understanding and trust. He identifies four essential factors that facilitate successful contact: 1) equal status between the groups; 2) acquaintance potential; 3) engagement in collaboration during the encounter, and; 4) institutional support for the encounter. Research on the contact hypothesis typically focuses on measuring participants' attitudes toward the other group before and after a contact intervention (Maoz 2011; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008). As meta-studies demonstrate, the process and content of contact encounters, including frequency of encounters, duration of each meeting, supervision, language, and content can determine the success or failure of the encounter (Abu-Nimer,

2004). However, the conditions necessary for the facilitation of effective encounters and their potential problems is the subject of an extensive body of work, as are the questions surrounding the varying importance of each of the factors outlined above (Pettigrew, 2008; Al Haj, 2002; Maoz, 2011). Regardless, the contact hypothesis is now accepted, with one meta-study of over 500 encounters finding that overall, contact encounters between two conflicting groups result in decreased inter-group prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008).

Although a large volume of research is dedicated to analyzing contact interventions in relatively stable socio-political conditions, there is limited scholarship studying the efficacy of contact encounters between groups entangled in an intractable conflict (Hughes and Donnelly, 2006). The literature rigorously studying the effects of contact between Israeli Jews and Palestinians on both direct participants and on wider society is limited, although the prevalence of evaluation and impact studies of Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding is on the rise (Lazarus, 2017).

Qualitative accounts of the efficacy of contact encounters in the Israeli context evaluate impact by addressing pedagogies, curricula, and structures of initiatives. The subject of a disproportionate amount of study is the Hand in Hand network of bilingual Hebrew/Arabic schools. Bekerman's celebrated work on Hand in Hand's Jerusalem school suggests that this school's alumni have nuanced, complex views of identity and reconciliatory attitudes toward the other group (Bekerman, 2018). Ben Nun's (2013) study of integrated schools in Israel and Northern Ireland outlines that unless peace education initiatives focus on respect, recognition, and reconciliation, they are not likely to succeed. Lazarus' (2017) study highlights that integrated schools for Israelis and Palestinians play an important ecosystem-building and signaling role by showing that an education based on equality and human rights for Jews and Palestinians in Israel is possible, and results in good outcomes for students.

The present study contributes to quantitative and qualitative accounts to provide a 'snapshot' of the current environment of a peace education initiative in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Instead of discussing impact, this thesis attempts to uncover parents' motivations for sending their children to integrated bilingual schools for Jewish and Palestinian Israelis. An interesting area for future work would examine the impact of the integrated bilingual schools and communities for Jewish and Palestinian Israelis through either ex-ante (pre) and ex-poste (post) data collection, or randomized control trial methodologies comparing participants to broader Jewish and Palestinian-Israeli societies.

3.6.1. Criticisms of the Contact Hypothesis
An important criticism of the contact hypothesis is that unless encounters are carried out frequently and over a long period, their effects wear out (Dichter, 2015). The duration in which a contact encounter's

positive effects can be maintained poses important questions about longevity of effects, especially in an intractable conflict situation. Salomon's (2004) quasi-experimental study of five different Israeli-Palestinian contact encounters concluded that they resulted in changes to participants' beliefs and behaviours in the short term, but follow-up measures showed that over time, negative views toward the other group returned to pre-encounter levels. Rosen and Salomon (2011) demonstrate that the effects of a one-year peace education initiative between Jewish Israelis and Palestinian citizens of Israel resulted in the short-term change of peripheral beliefs of the conflict, while the more resistant-to-change core beliefs stayed the same. In this initiative too, however, the peripheral beliefs of the conflict returned to their pre-encounter levels after some time.

Another criticism of the contact hypothesis suggests that micro-level contact interventions have little to no impact on macro-level change in society. A contact encounter between conflicting groups may not result in positive outcomes in naturally occurring situations of increased diversity. Instead, increased diversity often reduces both in-group and out-group cooperation, leading to social fragmentation and decreased altruistic behaviour (Putnam, 2007). As real-world examples, Condra et al. (2019) show that contact between different ethnic groups in everyday situations in Afghanistan decreases out-group altruism. In a randomized control trial of contact between Anglophones and Spanish speakers in the United States, Enos (2014) found that increased contact led to an increase in exclusionary attitudes toward the out-group.

Intergroup encounters in the Israeli/Palestinian context represent "a paradoxical project: this is a project that aspires to generate equality and cooperation between groups that are embedded in a protracted asymmetrical conflict" where support for equality and cooperation is limited (Maoz, 2011, p.115). Public opinion surveys conducted during 2002, 2003, and 2005 show that a large number (approximately 16%) of Jewish Israelis took part in a contact encounter program with Palestinians/Arabs during their lifetime (Maoz, 2011). While research shows short-term limited effects of these kinds of programs on participants (Salomon, 2013; 2004), these results have not translated into greater social impetus for peace or the widespread development of a co-existence mindset. Dichter (2015) argues that sending youth to contact encounters in Israel creates "a limited and isolated co-existence bubble that is nothing but a fleeting moment, while the world of adults continues to contribute to separation and hostility" and is an attempt by parents to use their kids to "fill the hearts of adults with hope" (Dichter, 2015, p.93 my translation). Demonstrated by the continuation of this conflict and absence of wide-scale contact outside of planned interventions, the absence of 'real-world' effects of contact encounters puts into question the utility of this enterprise.

An interesting area of contact-related literature explores the ethics of conducting contact encounters in unequal, discriminatory societies. Maoz (2011) and Al-Haj (2002) suggest that some contact encounters between unequal groups can facilitate the entrenchment of the status quo in a way that leads marginalized groups to internalize their inferior status, justifying discriminatory practices and setting inequality on a more rigid path-dependency. The institutions that create one group's superiority over another permeate into all corridors of social life: a contact encounter is no different. For example, consider a contact encounter between Israeli-Jews and Palestinian/Arab citizens of Israel. Nearly all of Israel's Palestinian citizens speak Hebrew, the dominant language, whereas a small minority of Jewish Israelis speak Arabic (Mor-Sommerfeld et al., 2009). Contact encounters are therefore almost always conducted in Hebrew, implicitly contributing to the hegemonic status of Israeli-Jews over Arabs.

In a 2017 interview with British think tank BICOM, Ned Lazarus, an Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding scholar addresses these criticisms. Lazarus argues that contact encounters that promote equality between Jews and Arabs are a direct challenge to the segregated norm of Israeli society. Further, in a context dominated by the Hebrew language, Jewish religion, and Israeli-Jewish national narrative, contact encounters facilitate the empowerment of the Arabic language, Christian and Muslim religions, and Palestinian narratives by promoting equality between Hebrew and Arabic, all three monotheistic religions, and Israeli and Palestinian national identities. The challenges that one peacebuilding NGO faces in its attempt to level out the playing field between the different languages, religions, and nations and empower the Palestinian/Arab-Israeli minority are explored in the results chapters.

The next section of this literature review contributes to the debates on contact encounters and their goals, both generally and in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Some theorists view *co-existence* as the end-goal of contact encounters (Bar-Tal, 2004) while others see the encounters as contributing to building a *shared society* between Israelis and Palestinians (Kuttner, 2017). Although the difference may seem nuanced, both models contain implicit assumptions that warrant further investigation.

3.7. Coexistence, Reconciliation, and Shared Society
3.7.1. Coexistence
Bar-Tal (2004) argues that societies immersed in the Ethos of Conflict, like Israeli society, should aim to foster a widespread *coexistence mindset* in their populations to negate the effects of the prevailing ethos. Bar-Tal writes that a *coexistence mindset* comprises of the internalization of nonviolence toward the rival and the recognition that the rival group has the right to exist with equal rights alongside one's own group. Coexistence is a psychological state that leads to behaviours of cooperation, integration, and exchange between different groups. Coexistence is therefore the halfway point to inter-group reconciliation, and the

mechanism through which a minimal level of equality, mutual respect, and recognition can be achieved in intractable contexts.

Bar-Tal distinguishes between co-existence *within* a diverse society (like Israeli society) or coexistence *between* separate societies (like Israeli and Jordanian societies). Bar-Tal argues that co-existence is easier to achieve *between* societies than *within* them. The psychological processes of reconciliation and the cooperation required between citizens after a civil conflict is much more intrusive than following a conflict between two different countries. In a *within* society situation, the longer it takes coexistence mindsets to translate into inclusive pluralistic policies and programs, the less legitimate it becomes. For example, in the Israel, "the Arab minority considers coexistence as a way to eternalize Jewish dominance and to continue discriminating against the Arab population", precisely because it has not resulted in sufficient change so far (Bar-Tal, 2004, p.266).

3.7.2. The Needs Based Model of Reconciliation

In their analysis of the processes of reconciliation- the 'next step' to co-existence- Shnabel and Nadler (2008) argue that reconciliation between two conflicting groups must include a change in the psychological orientation one group has toward the other. The Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation articulates that parties engaged in conflict can reconcile only by satisfying both the material and emotional needs of the conflicting groups. Critically, a conflict's victims and perpetrators experience the conflict differently. As a result, these groups must satisfy different emotional needs for reconciliation.

A conflict's victims often feel inferior regarding their power and control, and typically suffer from lower self-esteem (Shnabel and Nadler, 2008). Victimized groups' emotional needs are therefore addressed through empowerment, facilitated by perpetrators' admission of culpability for atrocities. A perpetrator's admission of guilt "creates a kind of 'debt' that only the victim can cancel, and thus returns control to the hands of the victim, who may determine whether the perpetrator will be forgiven and reaccepted into the moral community" (Shnabel and Nadler, 2008, p.117). Some crimes are not forgiven, however, and the 'debt' is not settled, rendering reconciliation unlikely.

Perpetrators, on the other hand, suffer from feelings of moral vulnerability, shame, guilt, and fears of rejection from the communities to which they belong. These fears stem from anxieties over others perceiving them as immoral because of their unethical behaviour. As a result, perpetrators typically need validation, yearn for compassion, empathy, and understanding for their actions (Shnabel and Nadler, 2008). To avoid feelings of guilt, perpetrators minimize the severity of their actions, deny responsibility, or claim that their actions are justified. The emotional distress of perpetrators can be calmed if victims, bystanders, and other community members forgive them for their actions, freeing them from the guilt they feel over

their immoral behaviour. These needs often clash with victims' tendency to emphasize their suffering and perpetrators' complicity (Shnabel and Nadler, 2008).

The present thesis will return to the Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation when discussing interview data obtained from Jewish and Palestinian Israeli peacebuilders, as conversations with interviewees shows the different needs of each group: Palestinians as victims needing empowerment, and Israelis as perpetrators yearning for the reaffirmation of their morality.

3.7.3. Shared Society

Kuttner (2017), a social constructivist, argues that fixed conceptions of group identities are a convenient myth that hardly correspond to complicated realities. Further, Kuttner suggests that contact and the co-existence it espouses are shallow, and any need-based model for understanding group behaviours, beliefs, and motivations is flawed. The critique is convincing: you need only recall the Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian national identities as described in the Historical Context chapter of this dissertation to see that the national identities of these two groups (and any others) are based on selective interpretations of history and overemphasis of confirming evidence.

Kuttner argues that coexistence advances "desired respect for each side's existence in separation, defining itself in itself and for itself, thus making an effort to have its own secured sense of identity, ethos or narrative" (Kuttner, 2017, p.186). Instead, the social constructivist may argue that group and individual identities are not static or defined but are instead constructed and reconstructed *in situ,* during the unfolding of the present moment, and always through interaction. Peacebuilders, Kuttner argues, should therefore acknowledge the flaws of fixed conceptions of individual and group identity and build programming that recognizes the fluidity with which identity is constantly formed and reformed. Following Kuttner (2017), challenging fixed narratives and offering alternate co-constructed narratives should guide Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding efforts.

Initiatives aiming to build a shared society between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis (as opposed to creating co-existence) are on the rise (Lazarus, 2017). This shift comes from disappointment with the goal of coexistence, "realizing that this is a thin, unsatisfactory vision of a cohesive society" (Kuttner, 2017, p.179). As a result, practitioners and academics have borrowed from social constructivism to advance that Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilders should aim to deconstruct Jewish and Palestinian collective narratives and focus on "co-constructing their joint reality, joint future, and joint identity" (Kuttner, 2017, p.179). However, it seems unrealistic to have Jews and Palestinians "co-construct their joint reality, joint future, and joint identity", while Arab and Jewish Israelis live in segregation, the wider conflict is in a stalemate, and society's institutions and politics have embedded the Ethos of Conflict.

For peacebuilding to spur the co-construction of identity is improbable, since ethnic groups and identities are "persistent, resilient and robust, capable of eliciting deep loyalty, intense attachment and strong motivations, and, in consequence particularly resistant to change" (Ruane and Todd, 2004, p.209). It therefore appears that the shift from 'coexistence' to 'shared society' programming in Israeli peacebuilding is a discursive one. While discourse matters (e.g., Schmidt, 2010), the shift described does not represent a changing paradigm as suggested by Kuttner (2017). Instead, the goals underpinning shared society programming in Israel are preoccupied with satisfying the particular needs of Jews and Palestinians, following the same needs-based approach used in co-existence programming.

It is important to underscore the enormity of the social, political, and psychological change necessary to facilitate a *coexistence mindset* in some contexts and situations, let alone *shared society* models of co-created shared identities. Regardless, the term, 'shared society' is on the rise in the Israeli peacebuilding scene, suggesting that there might be communities of Jews and Palestinians that want to create a shared society based on reinvented identities.

3.8. Legitimacy Deficit

Peace education rarely begins with broad consensus, but "almost always begins with a small minority which is often stigmatized, marginalized, and sometimes even delegitimized by mainstream society" (Bar-Tal, 2004, p.266). Although growing in number, scope, and reach, both cross-border and shared society peacebuilding programs in the Israeli-Palestinian context suffer from a significant legitimacy deficit (Lazarus, 2017). Shared society and cross-border initiatives are often viewed by Jews and Palestinians as naïve at best, or as betrayal of one's national group at worst (Wight, 2018; Koensler, 2016; Dichter, 2015).

Some Palestinians see cooperating with Israelis on any level as 'normalizing the occupation', and Palestinian peacebuilders, both Israeli and otherwise "commonly experience harassment from anti-normalization activists, whose bullying tactics typically include blacklisting, threats and occasional disruption of Israeli-Palestinian meetings" (Lazarus, 2017, p.17). A 2014 poll of 1200 Palestinian respondents found that on average, over 50% of Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza disapprove of Palestinians engaging in any activities with Israelis (AWRAD, 2014). This is unsurprising, given the current intractable conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The same questionnaire was not administered to Palestinian citizens of Israel, but the qualitative work of Bekerman (2016) shows that views on cooperation with Jewish-Israelis are also mixed in these communities. As discussed above, whether intergroup peacebuilding activities in asymmetrical conflict situations cement power-dynamics and legitimize the superiority of one group over another is an important question.

Experiencing vandalism, verbal, and physical violence is the norm for peace activists in Israel (Fiona, 2018). One notable example is the burning of a grade one classroom in Jerusalem's Hand in Hand school in 2014 by a Jewish extremist. After his three-year prison sentence, the assailant appeared on cable TV in which he and an interviewer justified the actions and implicitly encouraged others to replicate them (Winer and Staff, 2018). Although destructive, events meant to harm the peacebuilding community can lead to its consolidation by allowing its messaging to gain traction in mainstream media. This observation relates to collective action theories' discussion of the role of the media, and the sometimes-galvanizing effects of repression (Buechler, 2016). After the event in Hand in Hand's classroom, four thousand people demonstrated in solidarity with the shared community, and the protests were aired on television (Ethnographic Notes, 2018). In addition, the interview with the assailant was followed by severe social media backlash against the channel responsible, a protest in Jerusalem, and an apology from the broadcasting company (Winer and Staff, 2018; Ethnographic Notes, 2018).

The perceived legitimacy of peacebuilding is crucial for motivating attendance, soliciting funding, and entrenching peace education in powerful institutions (Bar-Tal, 2002). The widespread rejection of peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians is a serious challenge for this sector. Since peace education's aim to change society is often perceived as threatening or unbeneficial to several groups, public consensus on peace education is often difficult to obtain. In Israel, there is a growing impetus to diversify peacebuilding and attract those outside the privileged Ashkenazi group associated with the Israeli peace camp. Today, there are more programs than ever before directed toward religious communities that facilitate interreligious dialogue between both groups. Those driving these efforts explain the failure of the historic peace process by arguing that this was a misguided attempt to impose a secular solution on two religious peoples (Halevi, 2018). Although programs for orthodox and national religious Jewish Israelis and religious Muslim and Christian Palestinians now exist, their expansion is needed for wider impact. Finding an audience for peacebuilding from this group represents a significant challenge for Israeli-Palestinians peace movements (Lazarus, 2017). As such, peacebuilding movements are increasingly interested in understanding the barriers and drivers preventing or motivating people to attend peacebuilding activities, since understanding why some people show up and others do not is critical to attracting and retaining attendees (Winsor, 2019; Gabriel and Goetschel, 2016).

This thesis contributes to the limited literature examining *why* certain individuals take part in collective action initiatives in constraining environments, like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict context, where such participation is seen as subversive or counter to the national group's interests.

3.9. Inclusive Bilingual Schools for Jewish and Palestinian Citizens of Israel: Hand in Hand

At the time of writing, there were eight integrated, bilingual Hebrew/Arabic schools and kindergartens in Israel. The NGO *Hand in Hand*: *The Centre for Jewish Arab Education in Israel,* managed six of these schools, either in partnership with the Israeli Ministry of Education or independently. Hand in Hand opened its first integrated, bilingual Arabic/Hebrew kindergarten in Jerusalem in 1998, funded by private international donors (Hand in Hand, 2019). Today, the NGO operates six schools and communities in six different cities throughout Israel: Jerusalem, Galilee, Wadi Ara, Haifa, Tel-Aviv Jaffa, and the Sharon Triangle with a mission to "create a strong, inclusive, shared society in Israel through a network of Jewish-Arab integrated bilingual schools and organized communities" (Hand in Hand, 2019). Hand in Hand expects opening another school in the 2020-2021 schoolyear in Nazareth and is frequently approached by groups of Jewish and Palestinian parents from across Israel requesting to open bilingual kindergartens and schools in their communities (Ethnographic Notes, 2018).

The objective of Hand in Hand's project is to build a shared society in Israel by providing the opportunity for lengthy, repeated, and significant contact between Palestinian/Arab- and Jewish- Israeli populations in an ethnically, religiously, nationally, and linguistically neutral setting. These schools promote equality and social cohesion by facilitating interactions between students in a bilingual setting in which all groups' religious holidays are celebrated through a shared calendar, and the Israeli and Palestinian narratives are recognized as legitimate (Bekerman, 2011). Like other *narrow* peace education initiatives, Hand in Hand's schools deliver pro-peace pedagogies and curricula customized to induce particular beliefs and/or values in students. Hand in Hand in unique since it does so day after day, month after month, for years. The work of Hand in Hand's schools has been the subject of a large quantity of academic literature and news coverage when compared to other peacebuilding initiatives in this context.

The literature on Hand in Hand includes the work of Dr. Zvi Bekerman, author to an insightful body of publications on the school in Jerusalem. Using qualitative methods, Bekerman studies the Jerusalem school's influence on collective identity structures (2002; 2007; 2011), the potential for broader reconciliation (Bekerman & Horenczyk, 2004), teaching practice (2012), alumni (2018) and more. His most recent book (2016) details the underlying theories of practice; parents', teachers' and students' perspectives on the school; the school's influence on conflicting narratives; and a chapter reporting on interviews with recent graduates and one school principal. Significantly, Hand in Hand's community-building for adults, a *broad* peace education program that began in 2013 with a $5M grant from USAID ($1M annually for five years) is absent from the academic literature on Hand in Hand (Ethnographic notes, 2018).

Other scholars studying Hand in Hand include: Shwed et al., (2018); Lazarus (2017); Cölsch (2011); Deeb et al., (2011); Ben Nun (2013; 2009); and Mor-Sommerfeld et al., (2007). It is important to note the

scholarship comparing integrated systems of education from other parts of the world to Hand in Hand. This includes comparisons of Hand in Hand to integrated schools in Macedonia (Harel-Shalev, 2013), Cyprus (Zembylas and Bekerman, 2012), and Northern Ireland (Ben Nun 2013; 2009; Hughes and Donnelly, 2006).

Despite their influence on participants (i.e. students and alumni), Bekerman (2007) admits that he "has a strong sense that these efforts do not seem to work" when contemplating the schools' abilities to foster change outside of the small circles in which they operate (p.21). Mor-Sommerfeld et al. (2007) conclude that "these bilingual schools do not approach the ongoing conflict in terms of the future, or influence the communities around them" (p. 12). Six schools with 1850 students are unlikely to induce a large change in the socio-psychological character of a country with a population of eight million citizens, not to mention the three million people living under occupation. To be successful, these efforts require wider integration with *broad* peace education efforts- as Hand in Hand does through their programming for adults.

Most of the literature on the Hand in Hand schools in Israel views them as static brick and mortar institutions. The literature has been focused on providing micro-level analyses of one Hand in Hand school, the Jerusalem flagship school, and students, teachers, and parents using qualitative methodologies and a limited scope. The literature has overlooked a critical piece of the puzzle. This thesis seeks to shift the focus of the literature discussing Hand in Hand from its depiction as a collection of static schools to a SMO that challenges the Israeli status quo of segregation and inequality with an inclusive, shared vision of the future.

An account of Hand in Hand as a SMO explains its seemingly capricious nature, its challenges, successes, and range of activities, including fundraising; lobbying; appeasing foundations; managing relationships with principals, teachers, parents, and students; organizing protests; writing donor reports; negotiating curriculum; building new schools; starting new communities; addressing enrollment shortages; and, ultimately, fighting for change in a constraining environment.

The following chapter elucidates the theoretical framework mobilized for the present research, consisting of a constructivist social movement theory with an institutionalist orientation.

4. Theoretical Framework

Survey and interview questions used in this research project were informed by diverse theoretical perspectives, including Bar-Tal's Ethos of Conflict and Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA). To better understand the data collected and the implications of its findings, the present research is embedded in a constructivist social movement framework informed by a New Institutionalist (NI) orientation. This overarching meta-level theoretical framework unifies the meso-and micro-level theories employed throughout the dissertation. Specifically, a *constructivist social movement theory* was selected since it: a) allows for a grounded analysis of Hand in Hand as a social movement organization; b) gives credence to social psychology- a major component in this thesis; and c) is fundamentally concerned with motivation for participation in movements, a major question in this research. A *New Institutionalist* orientation was included because it: a) deepens understandings of change, stasis, agency, and power; and b) identifies that institutions, broadly defined, are the most important objects of analysis when explaining phenomena – useful to understanding the Ethos of Conflict in Israel.

This chapter begins by capturing the main themes in constructivist social movement theories, particularly as they relate to opportunity and ideology. Next, it describes social identity, perceptions of injustice, and perceptions of efficacy: the three factors underpinning Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA). Third, this chapter summarizes NI theory and its four streams to make the case for deploying NI to analyze the data collected. Last, this chapter argues that institutional change is the aim of collective action efforts, and that Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding is a social movement that challenges the Ethos of Conflict, an institution in its own right.

4.1. Explaining Collective Action Using a Constructivist Approach to Social Movement Theory

Collective action, including demonstrations, protests, social movements, and revolutions, can be defined as "collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities" (Tarrow, 1994, p.3). Classical collective action theories can be grouped into four schools: Marxist/Leninist, Weberian, Millian, and Durkheimian (Tilly, 1978). Classical collective action theories are meso-level theories embellished by sociologists, philosophers, political scientists, and social psychologists, and applied to different collective action initiatives on-the-ground, using both short-term quasi-experimental studies (see Deaux et al., 2006; Gamsom, 1992) and long-term historical analyses (see Tarrow, 1994). Classical collective action theories have changed and adapted throughout the decades, mostly through Resource Mobilization (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), Political Process (McAdam, 1982), and Constructivist (Klandermans, 1997; Gamson, 1992; Snow and Benford, 1988) theories, resulting in a rich, diverse field. I chose to draw on a constructivist social movement theoretical framework for the present research given this approach's centrality in the study of social

movements, its emphasis on culture, and infusion of ideology, perception, and motivation, to explain movements (Buechler, 2016).

Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT), which later evolved into Political Process Theory (PPT), developed in the 1960s (Buechler, 2016). In contrast to earlier traditions, RMT and PPT suggest that collective action is more than the aggregated behaviour of deviant individuals (McAdam, 2007). Instead, thinkers like Tilly (1978), and McAdam (1982) argue that social movements are institutionalized, pursued by rational actors engaged in "power struggles over conflicting interests that shared many organizational dynamics with more institutionalized forms of conflict" (Buechler, 2016, p.111).

Constructivist or 'framing' theories developed in reaction to RMT and PPT, supplementing these theories' neglect of psychology in motivating collective action (Gamson, 1992). Constructivist theories of collective action should be seen as macro-level orientations that complement RMT and PPT, not displace them. The relative flexibility and applicability of constructivism in social movement theory resulted in "wide acceptance and broad recognition of the importance of framing and social constructionist processes even by supposedly 'rival' perspectives and practitioners" (Buechler, 2016, p.156). The following combines RMT and PPT using a constructivist lens to offer an integrative theory of social movements that includes opportunity, ideology, social identity, perceived injustice, and perceived efficacy.

4.1.1. The Social Construction of Collective Action: The Importance of Framing

Constructivists argue that participation in collective action does not depend only on resources, organization, and opportunity as suggested by RMT and PPT, "but also on the way these variables are framed and the degree to which they resonate with the targets of mobilization" (Snow and Benford, 1988, p.213). Goffman (1974) describes frames as cognitive blueprints used to interpret the world, classify phenomena, and guide behaviour. As it relates to social movements, framing may influence social identity, determine whether an event is interpreted as a setback or an opportunity, and if certain deprivations should be accepted or seen as unjust and warrant mobilization. Incorporating framing in social movement theory led to Relative Deprivation Theory and other models emphasizing subjectivity (Wright and Tropp, 2002). Framing is critical to spurring movements, since "without effective framing, 'objective conditions' will not generate collective action" (Buechler, 2016, p. 149). I describe framing below as it relates to opportunity, ideology (through master frames), social identity, injustice, and efficacy.

4.1.2. Opportunity and the Cycle of Protest

Collective action evolves cyclically (Tarrow, 1994). Political opportunities are openings for collective action frames, and mark an increase in the belief that change is possible. Cycles of collective action can be characterized by "opportunities early in the cycle, externalities that lower the social transaction costs of contention for even weaker actors, the high degree of interdependence among the actors in the cycle and

the closure of political opportunities at the end" (Tarrow, 1994, p.154). What Tarrow describes as political opportunity is what conflict theorists call 'ripeness' (Bar-Tal, 2004) and some NI theorists call 'punctuated equilibrium' (Andrews, 2015). These opportunities are facilitated by "any process or event that alters or destabilizes ruling alignments" through events that undermine the stability of political systems, like changing coalitions or external shock (Buechler, 2016, p.137). When ripeness appears, it changes structures and ruling alignments, making challenges to the status quo and their chances for success much more likely (Buechler, 2016).

Tilly (1978) discusses the implications of opportunity and government repression/facilitation on the costs and benefits of participating in collective action, and treats opportunity as a straightforward, objective fact that affects movement trajectories. From a constructivist lens, Gamson and Meyer (1996) argue that "political opportunities are subject to framing processes" by showing how different actors may interpret the same events as setbacks or opportunities (p.276). Klandermans (1984) describes successful SMOs as savvy framers, seizing political opportunities by convincing their audiences that participation has negligible costs, maximum benefits, and will be widespread. In other words, for the constructivist, ripeness and opportunities are socially constructed.

Protest cycles are more similar in their origins than consequences, often beginning in the same way but ending with varying results. The greatest impact of cycles, even unsuccessful ones, involve changes in political culture (Klandermans, 1984). For example, the protest cycle accompanying the Oslo years in Israel/Palestine ended with a narrowing of the peace camp and a shift in political culture toward greater nationalism and militancy. Political culture changed following the protest cycle, but not in the way Israeli and Palestinian peace supporters had hoped.

4.1.3. Master Frames: Anchoring Protest Cycles

Master frames operate like normal frames, but on a larger scale. Master frames affect society members' positions on particular issues by anchoring a range of opinions and behaviours, including collective action (Buechler, 2016). They can attribute causes of injustices to either internal or external factors; their scope can be narrow to encompass a few issues, or wide and elaborate. Last, master frames vary in their empirical validity, resonance with people's experience, and power of the narratives they advance (Buechler, 2016). Master frames can thus be thought of as ideologies, like the Ethos of Conflict and other societal myths/narratives that lead to cognitive selectivity, bias, and distortion. Cycles of collective action can be spurred by the reinvigoration of a familiar mobilizing master frame or through popularizing a new one. By the same token, the absence of a sufficiently potent master frame can explain unsuccessful mobilization (Snow and Benford, 1992). Snow and Benford (1992) explain that a protest cycle may end because of "changes in the prevailing cultural climate that render the anchoring master frame impotent" (p. 149).

4.2. Explaining Movements Using the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA)

The Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA) is a framework used to evaluate motivation for collective action participation. Following the SIMCA, an individual's social identity, their perceptions of injustice, and the perceived efficacy of the movement can predict whether that person will take part in a social movement (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Rooted in social psychology, the SIMCA suggests social identity is central to determining collective action participation, as it "directly motivates collective action and simultaneously bridges the injustice and efficacy explanations of collective action" (Van Zomeren et al., 2008, p. 505). Alternative models view different components as crucial: For example, Gamson (1992) argues that perceived injustice framing is important, while Deux et al. (2006) argue that ideology (or adherence to master frames) is most important in explaining why people participate in collective action. This thesis compares the elements of the SIMCA and adherence to Ethos of Conflict as competing explanations to measuring participants' motivation to enroll their children in bilingual 'peace schools' and attend peacebuilding activities.

4.2.1. Social Identity in Framing Movements

Tajfel, Turner, and Austin (1979) claim that social identity refers to the characteristics used for social categorization, or the factors that determine whether someone is perceived as an 'in-group' or 'out-group' member. Social Identity Theory suggests that social categorization leads to generally positive feelings toward the in-group and suspicious feelings toward the out-group. Constructivists argue that social identity categories are influenced by framing and socio-psychological processes of construction, meaning, and signification. Framing elucidates architypes and attributes them characteristics and motivations, identifying protagonists, antagonists, and audiences for collective action (Hunt, Benford, and Snow, 1994). In framing social movements, "the identity component of collective action frames refers to definitions of 'we' and 'they' that recast abstract problems are caused by an adversary that 'we' can challenge" (Buechler, 2016, p.152).

Building on Tilly's (1978) Mobilization Model, Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) meta-study suggests that social identity can predict collective action. Van Zomeren et al. (2008) identify two types of social identity: politicized and non-politicized. Politicized identities refer to "activist" identities, developed by engaging in social movements. Politicized identities turn the political into a "personal identity project that transforms individuals' identity from one defined by social circumstance into a more agentic one" (Van Zomeren et al., 2008, p.507). Political identities are socially constructed, "created in the course of social movement activity" (Taylor and Whittier, 1992, p.109). The SIMCA finds that those with politicized social identities are more likely to engage in collective action than those with non-politicized social identities. This thesis

combines quantitative and qualitative data to explain Jewish and Arab peacebuilders' social identity and its role in motivating collective action participation.

4.2.2. Perceived Injustice

Theorizing about the role of injustice or grievance in spurring collective action began well before Marx, with debates lingering today. For example, while reflecting on the revolution in France in the 18th century, Edmund Burke wrote that "radical and widespread grievance is a necessary condition of revolution" (Freeman, 1978, p. 283). Modern RMT theorists suggest that collective behaviour is a "psychological expression of discontent triggered by strain rather than a rational response to political grievances" (Buechler, 2016, p.132). PPT theorists, on the other hand, allow for a greater role of discrete grievances in their analysis, but attribute even greater weight to organization and opportunity in explaining collective action (Tarrow, 1994). Last, the socio-psychological/constructivist camp argues that objective grievances are not necessarily important; rather, the subjective interpretation of injustices is critical in motivating collective action. The constructivists argue that "even if 'objective grievances' are persistent and widespread, the subjective process of interpreting them is a variable that in turn is crucial in explaining episodic collective action" (Buechler, 2016, p. 133).

Movements' abilities to create and disseminate 'injustice frames' explain the successes and failures of different collective action efforts. Injustice frames, defined as "a belief that the unimpeded operation of the authority system… would result in an injustice" is thus central to determining the goals of a movement (Gamson et al., 1982, p.14). Framing injustice includes identifying what the problem is and who is to blame (diagnostic framing); the plan of attack, or how the problem should be addressed (prognostic framing); and the narrative that should be used for recruitment and maintaining movement membership (motivational framing; Snow and Benford, 1988). A SMO's ability to frame these three components impacts its ability to recruit and retain participants, and ultimately, its ability to spur change.

Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) SIMCA suggests that participating in collective action is more likely when subjective experiences of injustice are framed as though they are affecting a social group, as opposed to a disjointed set of individuals. Moreover, the SIMCA distinguishes between structural and incidental experiences of injustice, conveying that collection action participation is more likely in situations where the injustice experienced is incidental, rather than structural. In other words, people are more likely to mobilize if they are presented with frames about their own group suddenly affected by injustice, rather than frames about systemic or institutionalized injustices affecting a random cluster of people. The second results chapter of this dissertation examines the role of perceptions of injustice in Israel in facilitating participation in collective action.

4.2.3. Perceived Efficacy

Some constructivist theorists suggest that in addition to perceiving injustice, people must a) feel that change is possible, and b) that their movement can be the agent that catalyzes change to participate in collective action. Piven and Cloward (1979) advance this idea through their conceptualization of *cognitive liberation,* Gamson (1992) through agency, and Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) as the *perceived efficacy* of collective action. Like social identity and perceived injustice, perceived efficacy is also subject to framing. Effective framing of efficacy, agency, or cognitive liberation awakens beliefs that "problems are not insurmountable but rather subject to change through people's own efforts", and that individuals' participation in collective action can help achieve the desired outcome (Buechler, 2016, p.152). Although psychologists and constructivists underscore the importance of feelings of efficacy in mediating behaviour and performance in collective action (and otherwise), PPT thinkers emphasize opportunity, organization, and constraints, over subjective factors. The second results chapter of this dissertation uses mixed methods to examine whether perceptions of efficacy of shared society peacebuilding in Israel is related to collective action participation.

This chapter has hitherto described social movement theory and explained how it relates to constructivism through the lens of Van Zomermen et. al.'s (2008) SIMCA. Next, we will turn to reviewing New Institutionalist theory and its applicability to the present research.

4.3. Institutionalism as a Frame and Institutional Change as the Goal of Collective Action

New Institutionalist theory has four different but overlapping strands: Rational Choice Institutionalism, Historical Institutionalism, Organizational/Sociological Institutionalism, and Discursive Institutionalism. Despite the differences between these approaches, they converge in their view that institutions dictate "the rules of the game in a society or (…) the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (North, 1990, p.4). Further, most NI theorists agree that institutions are the most important factors shaping the world, explaining path dependency, change, and power relations (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016). The four strains of NI can explain social movements in substantially different ways, since they vary in their definitions of institutions, underlying logic, and views on change (Selznick, 1996).

The approach taken here is closely aligned with the Sociological Institutionalist camp due to its compatibility with constructivist social movement theory, particularly in its focus on identity, cultural norms, and ideological frames. A NI orientation was chosen to supplement this thesis' constructivist social movement framework to advance two arguments: a) that an institutionalist lens is useful in studying the NGO Hand in Hand, and b) to advance that institutional change is the aim of all collective action, and as

such, Israeli-Palestinian shared society peacebuilding initiatives (like Hand in Hand), aim to challenge the Ethos of Conflict, an institution in its own right. Before delving into these two objectives, the four strains of NI are outlined below.

4.3.1. The Four Strains of New Institutional Theory

Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) define institutions as networks of incentive structures, or "the rules, combined with their enforcement mechanisms, that constrain the choices of actors" (Ingram and Clay, 2000, p.526). RCI theorists suggest that individuals are rational actors that make decisions based on calculating each option's ability to advance preferences within existing institutions (i.e. incentive structures). Preferences and the rationality of actors are seen as largely static, leading to a view that institutions are stable and predictable. This camp argues that institutional change occurs either slowly through changing coalitions that incrementally shift networks of incentives or through external shocks that transform incentive structures. Agency, according to RCI institutionalists unfolds when individuals shift their preferences during institutional change, thus seizing new opportunities to advance their agendas.

Historical Institutionalism (HI) defines institutions as structures resulting from macro-historical processes. HI theorists view patterns of behaviour and political/organizational structures as highly resistant to change. When change does occur, it is incremental, achieved through distinct processes of 'layering', 'drift', 'conversion', and 'displacement', sometimes referred to as 'muddling through' (Andrews, 2015; Thelen, 1999). By 'muddling through', institutions can change by focusing on identifying problems and seeking appropriate solutions through processes of trial and error (Andrews, 2015; Mackay et al., 2010). Historical Institutionalists have a modest view of individual agency; arguing that what appears to be agentic choice is symptomatic of wider historical processes rather than volitional.

Sociological/organizational Institutionalists (SI) see institutions as cultural norms and ideological frames, shaping beliefs and behaviours of individuals and organizations. Identity is central to this camp, which asserts that the question "what should I do in this situation?' often flows from the questions, 'who am I, and what does someone like me do?'" (Davis and Anderson, 2008, p.7). This camp views institutional change as infrequent and difficult, since cultural norms and rules are prone to defensive self-preservation in the face of change. SI argues that institutions can change following exogenous shocks, which shift cultural norms either through leader-led approaches or incrementally.

Lastly, the fourth and newest subfield of NI is Discursive Institutionalism (DI), which defines institutions as dynamic, constantly changing meaning structures and constructs (Schmidt, 2008). Influenced by Foucault (1980) and other post-modernists, DIs explain that ideas and discourse are critical to understanding power dynamics. Carstensen and Schmidt (2016) define ideational power as "the capacity

of actors (whether individuals or collective) to influence other actors' normative and cognitive beliefs through the use of ideational elements", arguing that ideas and the ways we communicate about them are significant in shaping the world and determining power relations (p.322).

4.3.2. 'Ripeness': A Necessary but Insufficient Condition for Institutional Change

Transforming intractable conflicts can only happen "when the time is ripe. Without the ripeness, education for coexistence has a high risk of failure" (Bar-Tal, 2004, p. 267). Some NI theorists call this 'ripeness' *punctuated equilibrium*, which is a moment of rare openness, marked by "abrupt and rapid institutional innovation" while social movement theories, as depicted at the beginning of this chapter, describe periods of 'ripeness' as openings marking new protest cycles (Mackay et al., 2010, p.577; Tarrow, 1994). Moments of ripeness should be seen as openings for institutional change, sometimes achieved through collective action. Moments of ripeness are critically important because of the opportunities they offer, particularly to social movements. They are infrequent, short, and hard to predict, capable of altering or redirecting institutional trajectories, when usually these are unmoving (Mackay et al., 2010). One can look back to the near success of peace efforts in Israel in the 1980s and 1990s as moments of ripeness, spurring a significant amount of collective action activity. However, changes in government and escalating violence marked the closing of the protest cycle, and a souring of ripeness.

Ripeness is a necessary but insufficient condition for institutional change. In moments of ripeness, institutions can change either: a) through leaders' endorsement of the change or b) incrementally through adaptation resulting from encounters with problems, or through a combination of both processes (Andrew, 2015). As it applies to social movements, ripeness (or the opening of a new protest cycle) is characterized by the development and dissemination of master frames that revitalize collective action efforts.

Following an SI approach, leaders are essential for facilitating institutional change. They represent the change agenda in political struggles and are critical in building up "vital supporting coalitions for reform among narrow elites" (Andrews, 2015, p.199). As demonstrated in the first results chapter of this dissertation, the changes that transformed the NGO Hand in Hand in 2011 were a product of leadership-led changes. The importance of leadership in facilitating institutional change was also seen in the 1980s through the Israeli government's failed efforts to implement peace education, and again after the failed implementation of the Oslo Accords in the 1990s. A rare moment of decreasing violence (ripeness) led to changing master frames about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, spurring a range of collective action activity. This activity represented an opportunity that was seized by political leadership that was willing to champion peace through the implementation of potential solutions. In both the 80s and 90s, however, the champions of change (Yitzhak Navon and Yitzhak Rabin) lost political power, marking the gradual end of ripeness and the closing of the protest cycle, putting the Ethos of Conflict on a more rigid path dependency.

4.3.3. Social Movements, Institutional Change, and the Ethos of Conflict

Whether institutions are defined as structures of incentives (RCI), historical trajectories (HI), cultural norms and ideological frames (SI), or discourse (DI), the objective of social movements is to change social and political institutions. I argue that by employing a sociological institutionalist framework, the *Ethos of Conflict*, or the dominant conflict-supporting ideology in the Israeli-Palestinian context, is an institution in its own right. Classifying the Ethos of Conflict as an institution explains its stability, resistance to change, influence on beliefs and behaviour, and encroachment into virtually every aspect of political and social life. Drawing on the constructivist concept of master frames, one can argue that alternative narratives, like those underpinning *Shared Society* or *Coexistence* movements are institutions as well, which attempt to change the Ethos of Conflict institution. The power and influence of ideologies are immense, prescribing models of identity, individual and group behaviour, values, morality, and self-censorship. Following NI, altering a narrative like the Ethos of Conflict, akin to altering any other institution, is typically slow and difficult, owing to institutions' resistance to change. Social movement theory discusses at length the difficulty in achieving change through collective action.

It is possible for institutional transformation and innovations to occur rapidly, but only in rare situations following moments of ripeness or a new cycle of protest- a necessary but insufficient condition for institutional change. In a moment of ripeness, Israeli-Palestinian social movements and their anchoring master frames can challenge the Ethos of Conflict by offering alternative ideologies and narratives. In the absence of political ripeness, alternative narratives challenging the Ethos of Conflict are seen as "detrimental to the group's efforts in the struggle against the rival", and their widespread adoption is unlikely (Shahar et al., 2018, p.959). Indeed, these master frames are impotent in today's harsh climate, since they threaten the stress-reducing and emotionally gratifying effects of conflict-supporting narratives. If taken seriously, these alternative narratives could force a society to critically evaluate its role in continuing the conflict, confront its aggressions, and view its rival more humanely- all in all an emotional and threatening ordeal. Following an RCI framework, there are currently insufficient incentives in warranting the wide-scale adoption of alternative frames to the Ethos of Conflict, although this can change during a moment of ripeness.

This chapter outlined the present research's constructivist social movement framework, informed by a NI approach. It described opportunity, ideology, social identity, injustice, and efficacy from a constructivist social movement perspective, largely informed by the SIMCA. Later, it made the case for treating ideology, through the Ethos of Conflict, as an institution in its own right.

Social movement theory and NI will be references throughout the remainder of this thesis to make sense of data presented and explore the theoretical implications of the present work. Drawing on social movement theory and the concept of institutional change - particularly leader -led change - the first results chapter demonstrates that Hand in Hand is a civil society organization grounded in a social movement that challenges Israel's segregated status quo with an inclusive, shared vision of the future. Connecting social movement theory, sociological institutionalism, and Bar-Tal's Ethos of Conflict, the second chapter compares elements of the SIMCA, the Ethos of Conflict, and a cost/benefit analysis to explore participants' motivation when enrolling their children in bilingual 'peace schools'. Last, the third results chapter examines drivers and barriers to attending peacebuilding activities. It does so by calculating the influence of the three components of the SIMCA and the Ethos of Conflict on attendance using a regression, examining the different emotional needs of the two national populations, and exploring the role of cultural differences as barriers to shared society peacebuilding.

Before diving into the results, the following chapter depicts the study's research design and methodology.

5. Research Design and Methodology

The primary data used in this research was gathered during a four-month fieldwork period (September-December 2018) with the NGO *Hand in Hand: The Center for Jewish-Arab Education in Israel*. The research was undertaken in close partnership with the Hand in Hand using a semi-participatory approach, enabling Hand in Hand to participate as both beneficiary and co-creator of the research. All activities were conducted in close collaboration with the organization, since one of the study's main objectives was to answer questions useful to Hand in Hand. Consequently, a significant amount of time was spent building trust with key stakeholders and negotiating the scope, content, and methodology of the research. Findings from the present work were used to create a report for Hand in Hand.

I arrived in Jerusalem with a plan to study Hand in Hand's impact on direct participants, including alumni and community members. The goal was to conduct an impact study comparing Hand in Hand alumni to community members and evaluate the differences between the organization's six different schools and communities. However, before arriving in Israel, a few phone calls and email exchanges with Hand in Hand hinted that the NGO may not support my research. A goal of this research was to use a semi-participatory approach and answer questions useful to the NGO, and so my original plans were tentative, and hedged by a broad, permissive ethics submission.

In his *Golden Rules for the Field,* legendary geographer Barney Nietschmann stipulates that prior to leaving for the field, researchers should "carefully draw up a plot plan, list of materials, etc." Step No. 2 of Nietschmann's golden rules dictates that: "immediately upon arriving at the field, [researchers should] throw away item No. 1 above… it obviously won't work anyway" (Nietschmann, 2001, p.177). Nietschmann's wisdom proved correct in my case: needed to 'throw away' my initial plans upon arrival, as Hand in Hand was suspicious of me. When trust was established, it was clear that the organization was interested in different questions than those I had in mind. As such, the main questions driving this research differ substantially from the ones presented in the proposal written prior to the fieldwork.

This thesis draws on ethnographic, qualitative, and quantitative data to answer three questions:

Research question #1: In the context of social change, what is the function of Hand in Hand's schools and communities (if any) beyond education providers?

Research question #2: What motivates Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel to enroll their children in Hand in Hand schools despite the potentially high social cost of doing so?

Research question #3: What are the drivers and barriers effecting Jewish-and Palestinian-Israelis' participation in adult community-building activities facilitated by Hand in Hand?

This chapter first clarifies the semi-participatory approach used. Second, it describes the study's three research questions in greater detail. Third, an overview of the different forms of data gathered (ethnographic, survey, and interview) are provided, including the methodology used for each. Fourth, my positionality, challenges faced, and other observations are described. Fifth, I describe the study's sample before concluding with an explanation of the approach used to analyze and triangulate data.

5.1. Addressing the Research-Practice Gap Using a Semi-Participatory Approach

In the context of development, participatory approaches gained popularity in response to top-down methods "in which power and decision-making [was] largely in the hands of external development professionals" (Bradley and Schneider, 2004, p.7). According to Paulson and Rappleye (2007), academics and practitioners studying education and conflict "are not talking to one another", and there exists a significant divide between what is discussed in academic literature and peace education practice. The participatory approach used in this study is meant to address the theory-practice gap, ensuring the relevance of this research both to practitioners on the ground and to the literature on this topic. The methodology used was influenced by Bradley and Schneider's (2004) conception of "shared ownership of decision-making", following which beneficiaries and intermediaries are involved in the design, planning, and implementation of development projects.

The partnership between the researcher and Hand in Hand was important, as it aligned interests and expectations, increased the organization's buy-in to the research process, and ensured that the materials used were in line with the organization's needs. Shared ownership granted opportunities for relevant Hand in Hand employees to contribute to the selection of research, interview, and survey questions, research locations, and participant recruitment. It is important to note that it was repeatedly clarified that the researcher would not draw favourable conclusions unjustifiably or analyze data selectively to satisfy Hand in Hand. Instead, both the researcher and stakeholders from Hand in Hand agreed that it would be best to conduct an impartial constructive study examining Hand in Hand's activities.

The specific individuals engaged include three representatives from the NGO's executive staff, three community mobilizers, and Hand in Hand's alumni coordinator. Several of these individuals also had children enrolled in a Hand in Hand school and were effectively Hand in Hand parents as well as employees.

The Hand in Hand executives consulted include the Director of the Communities Branch, Mohamad Mazrouk, the Director of Education and Pedagogy, Inas Dibb, and the Director of Resource Development, Rebecca Bardach. In addition, all six Community Mobilizers were requested to consult on the research, however, only the Community Mobilizers from Jaffa, Jerusalem, and the outgoing Community Mobilizer from Wadi Ara participated in consultation meetings. Hand in Hand's alumni coordinator also reviewed

the survey and interview questions to evaluate the applicability of these materials to alumni participants. The main point of contact was Hand in Hand's Director of Communities, Mohamad Mazrouk.

5.2. The Research Process: Negotiating Content and Methods

I first contacted Hand in Hand in March 2018, reaching out to Hand in Hand's Director of Education and completing an online volunteer sign-up form on the Hand in Hand website. The intention was to volunteer with Hand in Hand while simultaneously conducting a research project. Hand in Hand's volunteer coordinator responded to my request. Over a skype meeting, the coordinator clarified that I would be welcome to volunteer at the Hand in Hand office and flagship school in Jerusalem, although anything related to research would be arranged with Hand in Hand's executive staff. After several attempts, I managed to get a hold of the Director of in the middle of August. She was forthcoming but clarified that the research may not be possible given my timeframe. She also asserted that I should speak to the Communities Director, Mohamad Mazrouk before coming to Israel. I tried reaching out to Mohamad, but he did not answer my request. In the meantime, I landed in Israel and began volunteering at Hand in Hand's office and school in Jerusalem, the core of this study's ethnography.

In mid-October, after several weeks of volunteering, I met with Hand in Hand's Communities Director to discuss potential research questions. After reviewing approximately ten potential questions, we selected one about drivers and barriers of attending community-building activities. After a discussion, Mr. Mazrouk suggested that all of Hand in Hand's schools and communities be included in the research, since understanding the different needs of each community is important. It was agreed that the Community Mobilizers will help disseminate a 20-minute survey to potential participants, in which participants would also be asked to sign up for personal interviews.

The present research was therefore conducted to provide a snapshot of Hand in Hand's community-building programming and make recommendations for its improvement using a data-driven approach. Both survey and interview data were gathered to understand participants' activity preferences; their definition of the term, 'community'; their goals for the shared community; their opinions on the success and failure of the community-building project; how to best perform the job of a community mobilizer; the relationship between the schools, communities, and the NGO; differences between the six communities; differences between Palestinians and Jews; and ultimately, what drives or prevents attendance in community-building activities, answered in the third results chapter.

A Hebrew-language version of the survey was drafted by the researcher and reviewed by Mr. Mazrouk, three Community Mobilizers, and the Director of Education and Pedagogy. The final version of the survey

was reviewed by a professional Hebrew-language editor and translated into Arabic and English. Final drafts were reviewed by Mr. Mazrouk, a Community Mobilizer, and Hand in Hand's administrative assistant.

In addition to key stakeholders from Hand in Hand, seven local Jewish-Israeli academics and one Palestinian/Arab academic were consulted during the fieldwork period.[14] The researcher met the academics between September-December 2018 to discuss the present research, methods used, concepts employed, and/or relevant literature on this topic. Consultation meetings were conducted in person, using videoconferencing software, on the phone, or through email. The researcher met with some of the academics several times, others only once, and a few through email. Dr. Zvi Bekerman, Dr. Ned Lazarus, Dr. Keren Sharvit Dr. Eran Halperin and Dr. Ifat Maoz directly reviewed the survey, providing comments.

5.3. The Study's Three Research Questions

As described above, the three questions driving the present research differ substantially from the impact-oriented questions presented in the original proposal, which contained four questions concerning the impact of Hand in Hand schools and communities on alumni, community-members and wider society. Given the participatory goals of the research, I wanted to study something useful to the organization. Almost immediately upon arrival, it became apparent that Hand in Hand was interested in understanding motivation for attending community-building activities rather than impact. This change in scope was fitting, since conducting an impact study during a relatively short fieldwork period (4-months) in the absence of counterfactuals would have been highly speculative.

Each of the results chapters presented in this thesis correspond to one of the three research questions described below. Hand in Hand was mostly interested in answering the study's third research question, which was the focus of the survey.

5.3.1. Research question #1

In the context of social change, what is the function of Hand in Hand's schools and communities (if any) beyond education providers?

This first results chapter extends the accounts of Hand in Hand available in the academic literature to describe its evolution from a small CSO running two classes with 50 students, to the multi-million-dollar organization that it is today. This results chapter uses interview, survey, and ethnographic data to describe Hand in Hand's theory of change, organizational structure, and participants' perception of the

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[14] The academics consulted were: Oded Adomi, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Daniel Bar-Tal, the University of Tel Aviv; Zvi Bekerman, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Ofer Grosbard, Tel Aviv University; Eran Halperin, Interdisciplinary School, Hertzeliya; Ned Lazarus, George Washington University; Keren Sharvit, Univeristy of Haifa; Ifat Maoz, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; and Assad Ghanem, Univeristy of Haifa.

organization's impact. The chapter contributes to the literature on Hand in Hand by providing a data-driven analysis of perceptions of the organization's impact beyond direct participants, and an organizational account of the NGO.

5.3.2. Research question #2

What motivates Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel to enroll their children in Hand in Hand schools despite the potentially high social cost of doing so?

The study's second research question and corresponding results chapter provides a 'snapshot' of participants' motivations for sending their children to Hand in Hand schools. Informed by interview, survey, and ethnographic data, the second results chapter analyzes parents' ideology through their adherence to the Ethos of Conflict, social identity, perceptions of injustice, and perceived efficacy to understand their motivations for enrolling their children in Hand in Hand schools.

5.3.3. Research question #3

What are the drivers and barriers effecting Jewish-and Palestinian-Israelis' participation in adult community-building activities facilitated by Hand in Hand?

The third and final research question discerns the drivers and barriers influencing community members' attendance in activities for adults. This question was identified as important for the organization as the answers it generates may enable Hand in Hand to attract more attendees to community-building activities. Results Chapter III uses a multivariate regression to compare the predictive potentials of the Ethos of Conflict and SIMCA in explaining community-building participation rates; applies the Needs-Based Approach of Reconciliation to understand Jews' and Arabs' distinct emotional needs; and identifies that cultural differences between the two groups are potential barriers to shared society peacebuilding.

5.4. Research Methods: Ethnography, Survey, and Interviews

Three distinct methods were used to answer the study's research questions: An ethnography of Hand in Hand's office and flagship school in Jerusalem, a survey administered to Hand in Hand community members, and semi-structured interviews with a sample of Hand in Hand's community members and staff. The next section will describe the three categories of data gathered in more detail.

5.4.1. Ethnography

Notes and observations made during the fieldwork period while volunteering with Hand in Hand constitute a core component of the present research. After initial conversations in April 2018 with Hand in Hand's Volunteer Coordinator, I was invited to volunteer at the Hand in Hand's office in Jerusalem, as well as Hand in Hand's elementary and high school in the city.

In total, approximately 45 workdays were spent as an integrated member of Hand in Hand's NGO office and Jerusalem school between October to December 2018, first as a volunteer, and later as a researcher. Volunteer activities included creating and uploading content for Hand in Hand's new website, providing descriptions of community activities, assisting with English language instruction in the school, and helping a group of students prepare for two model United Nations conferences. [15] I was asked to assist with a large event held at the school, [16] as well as participate in three school tours, [17] including one taken by the Canadian ambassador to Israel. Other activities include the Donor Relations branch's tour of the schools and communities in Galilee and Haifa, various Jerusalem community activities (e.g. community steering committee meetings, a movie night, and a Christmas market celebration), and an alumni community activity in Tel Aviv. I participated in countless meetings at the Hand in Hand office including lunches, Community branch meetings, and Donor Development branch meetings.

My integration into the Hand in Hand Jerusalem community during my fieldwork period led to significant exposure to the individuals that constitute this community, namely NGO staff, schoolteachers, volunteers, parents, and students. Observing community members and interacting with them provided insights into the lived experience of community members. These insights shaped the survey and interview questions and were used to contextualize the results. Detailed notes were written in a research journal, either during the various activities or immediately afterwards.

A limitation of the ethnographic component of this research is that it only included participation in and observations of the Jerusalem community and NGO office, with limited exposure to the other five Hand in Hand schools and communities operating at the time of data collection. However, a significant number of discussions between NGO staff, including Community Mobilizers from the various communities revolved around the issues facing communities in the different cities.

5.4.2. Survey
The survey contained six sections in addition to an introduction and consent pages. The first section included demographic-related questions such as *"Which community do you belong to?"* and "Which of the following best reflects your socio-economic status?" as well as a few more content-laden questions, like, "In your opinion, are Hand in Hand's community activities connected to Hand in Hand's schools?"

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[15] Hand in Hand's Model United Nations club participated in two conferences during my fieldwork period for which I helped students prepare. The first was run by Debate for Peace, (https://debateforpeace.org/), and the second took place in Oxford, England.

[16] In November, 2018, the Jerusalem Foundation funded a 'stone setting' ceremony, marking the beginning of the construction of a new high school building, expanding the current edifice of the Jerusalem school.

[17] Providing tours of the Hand in Hand Jerusalem school to foreign diplomats, NGOs, and other delegations was a common occurrence during my field research.

The second section of the survey asked participants questions relating to their level of attachment to their national group; questions aimed at understanding whether they possess a 'fixed' or a 'growth' mindset; and questions seeking to explain their motivation for participating in Hand in Hand, following Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) SIMCA.

The third section of the survey posed questions relating to contact with the other national group, following Allport's (1954) Contact Hypothesis. Section #3 concluded with the question, "How often do you attend Hand in Hand's community activities?", with fixed-choice answers varying from "I never miss a Hand in Hand community activity" to "I never attend Hand in Hand's community activities." Based on their answers, participants were categorized as either 'Frequent attendees' or 'Infrequent attendees' and directed to different versions of the fourth section of the survey, which covered Reflections on Hand in Hand's Community Activities.

The fourth section of the survey for 'Frequent attendees' asked participants closed-ended questions like, "Please rate how often you attend holiday-related activities; activities for the whole family; movies, lectures, and political talks/discussions, etc.", and open-ended questions like "What activities do you like the least? Why?" The version of the fourth section for 'Infrequent attendees' asked closed-ended questions like, "Which of the following best explain your reluctance, if any, to participate in Hand in Hand's community activities?" as well as open-ended ones, such as, "What could Hand in Hand do in order for you to attend more activities?" Answers from this section of the survey are not presented in the thesis but were used to inform the report written for Hand in Hand.

The fifth section of the survey contained Bar Tal et al.'s (2012) abbreviated 16-item Likert-scale Ethos of Conflict questionnaire to provide an insight into participants' internalization of conflict-supporting ideologies. Since the 16-item questionnaire contains different questions for Palestinian/Arabs and Jewish-Israelis, participants were first asked to self-select whether they wished to answer the questions directed at the Jewish group or the Palestinian/Arab group.

The sixth and last section asked for reflections on Hand in Hand and included Likert-type statements with which participants were asked to rate their agreement/disagreement, with answers ranging from 1, "strongly disagree" to 5, "strongly agree." Examples of these statements include, "My experiences with Hand in Hand influenced my views toward members of the other group" and "Hand in Hand's community activities contribute to the creation of a shared space between Palestinians/Arabs and Jews in Israel."

At the end of the online survey, participants were presented with the option to provide their names and contact information if they wished to participate in a personal interview. Participants' personal information

was recorded on a separate webpage, preserving the anonymity of participants' survey responses. Participants were given the option to be interviewed in Hebrew, Arabic, or English.

5.4.3. Personal Interviews

At the beginning of each interview, participants were given a written consent form which specified the study's objectives, topics of discussion, and the relationship between the researcher and Hand in Hand. Interviewees then either accepted or refused to a) begin the interview and b) have the interview recorded.

In total, the principal investigator interviewed twenty-five people (n = 25). Most interviews were conducted in the two-week period between December 10th to December 24th, 2018. Of the twenty-five interviewed, twenty-three gave their explicit written consent to have their interviews recorded on condition of anonymity. Twenty-four out of twenty-five interviews were conducted in Hebrew, which is the principal investigator's first language, while one interview was conducted in English.

Interviews varied in duration: the shortest lasting for approximately thirty minutes while the longest being close to two hours. Interviews were semi-structured, allowing the researcher to ask several predetermined questions while granting participants the flexibility to address topics not directly captured by the pre-planned questions and focus instead on themes that were important to them (Desai and Potter, 2006). Interview questions were reviewed and modified by key Hand in Hand stakeholders so that they best adhered to organizational needs. Different topics were discussed during the interviews, including Hand in Hand's schools and communities, Israeli politics, Palestinian/Arab and Jewish-Israeli culture, international relations, parenting in Israel, the public Israeli school system, and more.

Interview locations were typically public, in coffee shops or restaurants, although several interviews were conducted out of Hand in Hand's office in Jerusalem, and four interviews were conducted in participants' homes at their insistence. When meeting at coffee shops or restaurants, the interviewer paid for the participant's beverage or light snack. As requested by Hand in Hand, no other incentives or rewards were offered. The researcher largely followed Silverman (1993) when structuring questions, conducting interviews, and interpreting interview data.

5.5. Negotiating a Neutral Space

A few words on positionality and a description of profound ways that who I am, what I look like, and where I come from influence the present research are warranted. As a male, Jewish-Israeli immigrant who moved to Canada at the age of ten during the second intifada, being conscious of my biases and aware of the complexities of in/out-group belonging in Israel was useful.

The Jewish-Israeli identity is an essentialized, exclusionary group, not unlike other national groupings, in which individuals are either recognized as belonging to or denied in-group status because of their physical appearance, maternal language, country of origin, etc. Although I hold Israeli citizenship, speak Hebrew fluently, and identify as a secular Jewish person, some Jewish-Israelis would not accept me as a full member of the Jewish-Israeli national group since I moved to Canada when I was a child, did not serve in the Israeli army, and have no plans for resettling in Israel. The tacit or explicit rejection of those that do not fit the dominant Jewish-Israeli mold is not limited to emigrants, or as Israelis call it, ישראלים לשעבר or *past Israelis*. Exclusion often extends to other groups, like orthodox Jewish-Israelis, Jewish-Israelis that choose not to serve in the Israeli army, Ethiopian (Black) Jewish-Israelis, and immigrants to Israel.

My gender, ability to speak Hebrew fluently, and Israeli citizenship were advantageous when establishing relationships with both Palestinian/Arabs and Jews during the fieldwork period. Throughout the time spent in Hand in Hand's office, Jerusalem school, community activities, and while conducting interviews, I was often able to negotiate a neutral space in which I was viewed neither as fully belonging to the Jewish-Israeli group nor fully outside of it. This flexible group membership allowed me to sidestep transferring the militant nationalism sometimes expected of Jewish-Israelis, granting stakeholders and participants more space to disclose honest, nuanced views and opinions without fear of being judged as "leftist", "weak", or "sympathetic to the enemy." Although I was not able to achieve perceptions of flexible membership with every interlocutor, when this was achieved, it was through explaining my upbringing, and answering any questions about my experiences in Israel and Canada.

Prior to the field research period, I assumed that I may not be always perceived as an in-group member by Jewish-Israeli stakeholders and participants, given the exclusionary nature of the Jewish-Israeli identity group. I was worried that being denied membership could result in Jewish-Israelis viewing me with suspicion and distrust, potentially leading to their reluctance to participate in the study. This hypothesis proved mostly incorrect: Jewish-Israelis indeed possessed flexible views about my belonging to the Jewish-Israeli group. However, these flexible perceptions resulted in more open and frank dialogue, not distrust and suspicion. Since the population studied consisted of Palestinian/Arab and Jewish Israeli peacebuilders who aim to build an inclusive, multicultural pluralistic Israeli state, their criteria for in-group belonging probably proved more flexible than that of the Israeli mainstream.

Overall, I found that Palestinian/Arab-Israelis hold more general views about the Jewish-Israeli national grouping than Jewish-Israelis. In other words, because I was born in Israel, speak fluent Hebrew, have white skin, and identify as Jewish, outsiders to the Jewish-Israeli group, and in this case, Palestinian/Arab-Israeli participants mostly viewed me as wholly belonging to the Ashkenazi Jewish-Israeli

group. As an example, below is an insert from an interview that I conducted with a Palestinian/Arab participant, whose name has been anonymized for this exercise:

> *Abeer: My war today isn't with you... It's with the people that are powerful, in elevated positions.*
> *Me: Besides, I am Canadian, and I've come here from outside of the country…–*
> *Abeer: You're Israeli, understand? You're Israeli.*

In this exchange, Abeer, a Palestinian/Arab-Israeli begins to describe a group of people she is at 'war' with, and instead of referring to Jewish-Israelis, she identifies people in positions of power. In an attempt to signal to Abeer that she can feel comfortable speaking negatively about Jewish-Israelis in my presence, I tried to assert my Canadian nationality, saying that 'I am Canadian' and 'I've come here from outside of the country.' However, Abeer outright rejected my attempt to disassociate from the Jewish- Israeli group by saying 'You're Israeli, understand? You're Israeli.'

Although such frank exchanges with Palestinian/Arabs around my positionality were not an everyday occurrence, they were not rare either- I can recall a few such conversations with Hand in Hand employees. Nevertheless, the interaction with Abeer represents an especially poignant example of an attempt to leverage my Canadian identity, and a Palestinian/Arab participant's rejection thereof.

After some time, I realized that negotiating a neutral space with Palestinian citizens of Israel may not always be possible, and so I changed tactics. Palestinian citizens of Israel are a group that continues to be disadvantaged by state and municipal actors, and in many ways collectively punished for Israel's ongoing conflict with the Palestinians in the OPTs (Dichter, 2015). Therefore, instead of attempting to establish myself as distinct from the Jewish-Israeli national group, I encouraged perceptions of my belonging to the privileged Jewish-Israeli subgroup- the same group that is allied with Palestinian/Arab-Israelis around issues of social justice and pluralism in Israel, and the group that constitutes nearly all of Hand in Hand's Jewish population. Although my Canadian upbringing proved too interesting for participants to overlook, this strategy seemed to work, as it enabled Palestinian participants to group me firmly in the Israeli camp, but with the group that is perceived as sensitive to the Arab-Israeli experience and an ally in the quest for the reduction of power asymmetries.

5.6. A Brief Description of the Study Samples
5.6.1. Ethnography Sample

The Ethnographic component of this study culminated in a research diary, with 83 pages of detailed notes. Notes contain observations made during all components of the research stay, including meetings with Hand in Hand staff members; observations made during community-building activities; more general

reflections about Israeli society and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; notes from research material consultations with academics; excerpts from noteworthy conversations; and interview notes.

5.6.2. Survey Sample
5.6.2.1. Non-Probability Sampling

Random or probability sampling occurs when "all units in the population have known and positive probabilities of inclusion" (Wolf, Smith, and Fu, 2016, p.329). The absence of probability sampling (a lack of random recruitment) results in a non-probability sampling methodology, in which sampling is a product of subjective decision-making. Statistical analyses deriving from probability samples can be generalized to the entire population, while generalizing from non-probability sampling to a population is often problematic (see: Schreuder, Gregoire, and Weyer, 2001). Despite this limitation, probability sampling "is not a necessary precondition for valid statistical inference" (Wolf, Smith, and Fu, 2016, p. 335). Moreover, non-probability sampling is "useful when the researcher has limited resources, time and workforce" and "when the research does not aim to generate results that will be used to create generalizations pertaining to the entire population"; as is the case in the present research (Etikan, Musa, and Alkassim, 2016, p.1).

Given the goals of this research, time allotted, and population studied, volunteer convenience sampling (a non- probability sampling method) was used to recruit Hand in Hand community members to participate in an online, quantitative survey. The survey was distributed to potential participants from each of the six communities operated by Hand in Hand and can be found in Annex B of this dissertation. Potential survey participants were parents, alumni, and NGO staff whose names and contact information were in community mobilizers' lists of community members. Potential participants received an email invitation from their community mobilizer with the online survey, which was offered in Hebrew, Arabic, and English. The invitation to participate in the survey can be found in Annex A. Community mobilizers and the researcher also recruited potential participants informally during community activities.

The researcher did not have access to community mobilizers' contact lists, and so the total number of people invited to participate in the survey is unknown. In total, 107 people filled out the anonymous survey. At the request of Hand in Hand, no incentives or rewards were offered to participants. This decision was made to allow Hand in Hand to conduct more studies in the future without providing compensation. The absence of incentives presented a challenge for participant recruitment and increases the likelihood that only passionate or engaged individuals self-selected to participate in the study. The volunteer non-probability sampling method used limits the generalizability of the survey's results. This and other limitations are discussed in the concluding chapter of the thesis.

5.6.2.2. Demographic Information of Survey Participants

75% of the survey's 107 respondents identify as female while the remaining 25% identify as male. The majority of survey participants are Jewish (67%), while a minority identify as Muslim (19%), Christian (8%), and Other (6%). 67% of participants (n = 71) identify belonging to the Jewish-Israeli national group while 24% (n=26) belong to the Palestinians/Arab group. The over-representation of Jews in this sample compared to the Hand in Hand communities' population is a shortcoming of this research, however this trend was observed during the ethnographic component of the research. Although Palestinians/Arabs outnumber Jews in most Hand in Hand schools, Jews are over-represented in activities.

A large majority of survey respondents (82%) indicate that one or more of their children are enrolled in a Hand in Hand school, while 10% of respondents work at Hand in Hand. 4% of respondents are both employed by Hand in Hand *and* have children attending Hand in Hand schools, and 3% are alumni.

The greatest number of respondents come from the Jerusalem community, Hand in Hand's largest community and flagship school, representing 37% of total participants. 21% of respondents come from Wadi Ara; 19% from Jaffa; 15% from Galilee; 7% from South Sharon Triangle; and 1% (one participant) represents the Haifa community. The small number of attendees from Haifa and South Sharon Triangle limit the generalizability of the survey's findings, a shortcoming of this study.

This sample contains a disproportionate number of frequent attendees of Hand in Hand's community activities. Given the small number of attendees per activity generally and this survey sample's relatively high attendance rate (79% of respondents indicate that they attend 'sometimes', 'a lot', or 'never miss' a Hand in Hand community activity), it is likely that respondents comprise the bulk of Hand in Hand's core community, and are not representative of the parents, teachers, NGO staff, and others who constitute Hand in Hand's population: a shortcoming of the non-probability convenience sampling method used.

5.6.3. Interview Sample

This study's interview sample includes individuals from all six communities (Sharon Triangle, Galilee, Jaffa, Haifa, Wadi Ara, and Jerusalem), although two communities, the Sharon Triangle and Haifa, are represented by only one participant each; unsurprising given the low participation levels from these communities in the survey. The sample of interviewees included 20 Jewish and 5 Palestinian/Arabs participants. The over-representation of Jewish participants in the sample of interviewees (approximately 80% Jewish) is consistent with the survey sample. The twenty-five interviewees include fifteen parents, nine Hand in Hand employees, and one alumnus.

The nine Hand in Hand employees interviewed include a retired Hand in Hand executive, two NGO employees, and six community mobilizers: one from Jerusalem, Haifa, Galilee, and Jaffa, and two from

Kfar Kara (an outgoing mobilizer and an incumbent). Unfortunately, due to scheduling difficulties, the interview with the community mobilizer from South Sharon Triangle was cancelled.

5.7. Data Triangulation and Analysis

Following Glaser and Straus (2017), grounded theory was used to triangulate and analyze the ethnographic, survey, and interview data used in this research. Grounded theory outlines a methodology for data analysis, though significant variability exists its implementation. As shown in Figure 2 below, grounded theory uses inductive reasoning to generate theories from data. This contrasts with the deductive approach of the scientific method and the hypothesis testing used in experimental approaches.

Figure 2: The General Process of Grounded Theory

Grounded theory was chosen as it allows for the combination of qualitative and quantitative data to generate theory and derive conclusions. Grounded theory fits with the participatory goals of the research since "a grounded substantive theory that corresponds closely to the realities of an area will make sense and be understandable to the people working in the substantive area", resulting in greater utility of the research for practitioners on the ground (Glaser and Straus, 2017, p.239). Using grounded theory to combine the three categories of data informing this research was advantageous, since it provided some guidance for data triangulation, helping to ensure a consistent approach. The way that grounded theory was operationalized in the present study is depicted in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: Grounded Theory Approach for Data Triangulation and Analysis

Before any data was collected, the study's main research questions were developed in cooperation with Hand in Hand and coupled with hypotheses or initial theories about how they may be answered. After data collection, survey results were analyzed in combination with ethnographic insights to revise the initial hypotheses/theories. Informed by the revised theories, recorded interviews were transcribed by the researcher and then coded into themes for analysis. The researcher took extensive notes during and after the interviews that were not recorded. Importantly, ethnographic data recorded in journal entries was not

coded, given the richness of other sources. Instead, these observations were used in combination with survey data for the second round of theory refinement, and referred to on an as-needed basis during the writing phase. These results are depicted in Results Chapters I, II, and III, wherein the different methods are layered in an effort to present the analysis and its conclusions as clearly as possible.

6. Results Chapter I. The Nature of the Beast: Hand in Hand as a Social Movement Organization

In this first results chapter, I draw on ethnographic, interview, and survey data to answer the first research question of this thesis: *In the context of social change, what is the function of Hand in Hand's schools and communities (if any) beyond education providers?* This analysis extends the accounts of Hand in Hand available in the academic literature and media to describe its evolution from a small CSO running two classes with 50 students in 1998, to the multi-million-dollar organization that it is today. On that basis, this chapter makes the case that Hand in Hand is a SMO, and that its depiction as a static education provider mischaracterizes its work. The chapter concludes by describing Hand in Hand's social change function through survey and interview participants' perceptions of its impact on students, community members, and Israeli society.

6.1. The Evolution of Hand in Hand: From 1998 to 2020

In the turbulent post-Oslo years, pessimism and optimism walked hand in hand. The 90s and early 2000s saw the signing of the peace agreements; the iconic Nobel peace prize awarded to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat; the murder of Rabin; partitioning of areas A, B, and C in the West Bank; the second intifada; and the construction of the barrier wall. Against the backdrop of this uncertainty, groups of Arab and Jewish parents from Jerusalem and the Galilee decided that they wanted to live together.

6.1.1. 1998: Living Vicariously Through Children: Arab and Jewish Parents Dreaming of Shared Society

In 1998, with the help of Lee Gordon and Amin Khalaf, two sets of parents lobbied their municipalities to fund bilingual, integrated schools for their children. With 50 students, the two groups opened the first integrated, bilingual, Hebrew/Arabic schools for Jewish and Palestinian students. As the children grew, so did the schools; the first generation of parents and children pioneering the way for future cohorts. Jewish and Arab parents united in their political battles with municipalities for funding and recognition, and the children began living out their parents' dreams of living together.

Gordon and Khalaf's project evolved into schools and vibrant communities in six locations: the Galilee, Jerusalem, Wadi Ara, Haifa, Jaffa, and the Sharon Triangle. Hand in Hand launched a community in Nazareth Elite in 2019 and is planning on opening a school there in the 2020-2021 school year (Hand in Hand, 2019).

In 2018-2019, Hand in Hand had about 200 employees throughout the country, 1850 students, and a budget of approximately $16M dollars (Hand in Hand, 2019). Over 1000 families (mostly Palestinian) are on a waitlist to enrol their children in one of Hand in Hand's schools, and groups of parents from over a

dozen cities and towns have appealed to the organization to open a bilingual school in their districts (Ethnographic Notes, 2018). Over the coming years, Hand in Hand hopes to continue expanding, aiming to reach a mass of 12-15 schools and communities throughout Israel, with a bilingual high school in each of Israel's major cities (Ethnographic Notes, 2018). However, the growth of Hand in Hand's schools has not always been linear.

After opening a school in Wadi Ara in 2004, Hand in Hand did not open an additional school until 2012. The organization struggled to grow after its initial boom. During her interview, one NGO staff-member described the organization's mission: "we have to at all times be very good schools, we have to do the Jewish-Arab thing well at all times, and we have to scale up at all time... We have to do all three well at all times without a lot of room to fail." While the Jerusalem school grew each year since opening in 1998, Hand in Hand had to eliminate its middle schools in the Galilee and Wadi Ara because of insufficient enrollment and funding issues, scaling back grades 7, 8, and 9. Although the Jerusalem school has the only Hand in Hand high school, the organization hopes that its new schools in Haifa (opened in 2012) and Jaffa (opened in 2013) will evolve into high schools (Ethnographic Notes, 2018). The next section will discuss what encouraged the ambition and growth that now characterizes Hand in Hand.

6.1.2. New CEO, Old Ambition: Placing the Onus Back onto Parents

After opening the school in Wadi Ara in 2004, Hand in Hand focused on developing its three existing schools, a difficult endeavour considering the intractable political climate in the post-Oslo years. Each year, as the first cohort of children graduated from their grades, Hand in Hand focused on obtaining municipal support to expand its schools to the subsequent grade and recruiting families (Ethnograhpic notes, 2018).

In 2011, the organization's Board of Directors hired a new CEO, Shuli Dichter. A long-time social/political activist, Dichter worked in leadership positions with Sikkuy and Givat Haviva, both large *Shared Society* CSOs, and served as an advisor on Arab affairs to the Israeli Prime Minister. His 2014 book, "Beyond Good Intentions: A Guide for Shared Living Between Jews and Arabs in Israel", explains his vision for Hand in Hand. During personal interviews, he and other participants described the dramatic changes in the organization during his tenure as CEO.

Dichter's vision for Hand in Hand was informed by his initial infatuation with and eventual skepticism about the role of children in peacebuilding. While working as an Arabic teacher and program manager for Givat Haviva's *Children Teaching Children* program in the 1990s, Dichter visited North Ireland to diversify his knowledge of peacebuilding in other intractable contexts.

> Everywhere we went in North Ireland, they showed us 20 projects. Not one of them for kids. Farmers, ex-prisoners. Mothers of ex-prisoners. Dual-narrative historical museums. Clergy.

> And everywhere we went I was looking for the kids. I said, "but the kids are the future! If we build it in them, we'll have peace!" and everywhere they said, "the kids will follow." Kids are followers. Kids are not leaders, kids *should* follow.

Dichter describes learning two important lessons on his visits to North Ireland: First, and in line with the Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALMEP, 2019) and Lazarus (2017), he argues that peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian context must be scaled up, potentially through an international fund, following the $1.8B International fund for Ireland launched 12-years before the historic Good Friday Agreements. The second lesson Dichter learned in North Ireland is that peace, much like war, is the responsibility of adults.

During his interview, Dichter admits that before joining Hand in Hand, the organization was on the brink of collapse. It was struggling to attract new families, in deep financial trouble, and suffering from management issues. He explains that he "came with an idea, that was perceived as new, that the kids will not be the ones that bring the peace, but the adults will bring the new society, and the kids will follow." Dichter explains that his vision was based on the original mission of Hand in Hand's pioneering parents:

> When you look at how it started, in the Galilee and in Jerusalem, the *parents* started it. And you can find this written in Hand in Hand's archived documents. They didn't follow through with it organizationally; they didn't go with it because they were satisfied with the fact that they established a school, with the understanding that kids are the future. I put on the table that *we're* the future. That adults are ultimately responsible, and the kids' role is to enjoy what we have to offer them, not to lead us.

Dichter recalls that the original groups of Jewish and Arab parents are the ones that established shared schools and kindergartens for their children because they *themselves* wanted to live together. Throughout his interview, Dichter argued that before his leadership, Hand in Hand was enabling parents to fulfil their dream of living together vicariously through their children. Dichter flipped this approach: from providing education services through schools, Hand in Hand became an NGO that creates a shared society through shared institutions, which includes schools. While this difference may seem semantic, it represents a substantial shift in strategy, funding, programming, and organizational structure.

6.1.3. Hand in Hand's Institutionalist Approach to Shared Society Building

Dichter's theory of change is coherent with this thesis's theoretical framework. Before joining the organization, Hand in Hand treated education as the sole component of its shared society project, and its schools were the only institutions uniting the two segregated groups. Palestinian and Jewish parents chose to live together, yet only sent their children to a shared school, placing their hopes for a more pluralistic Israel on the shoulders of the next generation, tasked with living out its parents' dreams. Dichter explains that Hand in Hand's stagnation in its earlier days was caused by this. He argues that while a shared school is an important institution, building a shared society requires many more such institutions. Dichter

articulates a physical interpretation of institutions: a shared hospital, police department, supermarket, swimming pool, place of work, etc.

> Is the school the center of all of these? No! The school is one of these! It's not the only one, and not even the most important one! It is supported by the other institutions… from the budget of the city council to the parents' bake sale… it is the benefactor of the most crucial element, which is the community organized around it. At Hand in Hand, the school was the most crucial element, and "it's enough that we enroll our kids there, because we're creating coexistence."

Dichter suggests that creating coexistence requires more than an integrated school, since sending children to schools and hoping for social change is flawed. Instead, he wants to empower Hand in Hand community members to build a range of shared institutions, of which the school is only one.

> A permanent culture committee. A shared *Madressa*, [adult learning group], is an institution. A community garden, like they have in Jerusalem, is a community institution. A basketball team. A soccer team. These are all the community's institutions. And there are many more- that I don't know how to describe even- and I want them [the community members] to create them. But they need to be institutions, not one-off activities. A permanent group that goes on trips- they have one in Haifa. The winter party in Haifa- that's a permanent institution that happens every year. The community mobilizer that initiated it left the country! But it's happening this year, next week. That's an institution. Communities are made up of institutions, and the school is one of these institutions. You could even say it's a central one- but it's only one of the community's institutions. The defining component is the community, not the school.

Drawing on sociological institutionalism and constructivist social movement theory, I suggest that Hand in Hand represents a social movement that challenges the cultural norms and ideological frames (i.e. institutions) that keep Arabs and Jews separate in Israel. It does so by providing a shared set of norms and frames, anchored by a shared society narrative or master frame that manifests in shared learning groups, community gardens, basketball teams, and whatever other activities community members pursue together.

While some parents were eager to be involved in the shared society, some worried that transferring the onus from the kids to adults would create a political NGO at the price of the schools. One father from Wadi Ara explains:

> I met Shuli when he was the CEO of Sikkuy, and so we had conversations as friends before he was the CEO of Hand in Hand. I remember education wasn't interesting to him. He was kind of against it, actually. He institutionalized Hand in Hand and added the community element. And in my opinion, you should be really careful, and Hand in Hand needs to avoid creating standalone communities that are independent of the schools like Shuli wants. It needs to be really careful of that. The basis of this thing [Hand in Hand] *is* the schools, and the schools are very demanding. There are a ton of challenges [of operating the schools]. Especially in financial terms, especially if you want to scale-up this model, because it's not sustainable. You're essentially establishing a shadow ministry of education, and you can't really do that.

Another interviewee raised the difficulties inherent in running both communities and schools, saying "a ton of money, millions of dollars, are invested in the communities, but the schools are in terrible shape. Terrible, terrible shape. The country is in terrible shape. And if we want to bring Jews into these schools, because that's the challenge- to bring Jews into these schools- then we need to be the best schools in the country. Hand in Hand needs to have a reputation as the best schools in Israel." During his interview, Dichter identifies that despite these drawbacks, today's Hand in Hand has "*more* schools, and the schools just got better and better." Regardless, some believe that Hand in Hand's community-building programming is an inefficient use of resources, which should instead be spent on the schools.

Dichter argues that a shared community outside of the schools is crucial for long-term impact, including intergroup prejudice reduction in students and alumni (Allport, 1954), cultural fluency (Glazier, 2003), and sophisticated perceptions of nationality (Bekerman, 2016). As shown by quasi-experimental studies conducted by Salomon (2006; 2004), while impactful in the short-term, reductions in prejudice facilitated by contact encounters disappear in as little as six months. For the effects to remain over the longer term, Dichter argues that contact must exist outside of the intervention.

> When kids have a functioning [shared] community around them, their education for shared living is different. Because when they go home, they're still part of the community… even if they [the kids] go back to Katzir, or Meh-Ah-Me [Jewish towns], even though they live in a different reality there, their mom is going to a meeting for the shared community and is part of the shared community's women's volleyball team. And their dad goes to the *Madressa* [adult learning group] at night, because he's part of the shared community. That's the environment that the kid can lean on. It isn't the environment that is leaning on the kid.

Dichter explains that since "it takes a village to raise a child", then it must take "a shared community to raise a bilingual child." Schools do not build shared communities, but shared communities build schools.

> Kids are not the center of our lives. *We're* the center, and kids do what *we* tell them to do! That's the whole story. That a community-school does what the community wants. It's a school that expresses the community's desires. It's a school that functions in accordance to the community's ideology. It's a school that reflects the community's personality and perpetuates it, or produces the change that a community wants to produce.

It is not enough to have the community revolve around the school; the school should revolve around the community. A school cannot contain a community; a community contains a school. Leveraging this thinking, Dichter solicited a $5M grant from USAID to build Hand in Hand's communities branch, an essential piece of Hand in Hand's programming today, and the main object of this research.

6.2. Hand in Hand's Communities Branch: Facilitating Shared Society Peacebuilding for Adults

Funded by a five-year USAID grant beginning in 2013, Hand in Hand`s communities branch is the latest addition to the Hand in Hand organization. The branch is led by a communities' director and his

assistant, and includes a nation-wide alumni coordinator and community mobilizers in each of Hand in Hand's seven communities (the community mobilizer in Nazareth Elite was hired in September 2019). Before 2018, the communities branch was not considered a true part of the NGO, rather an externally funded pilot initiative. However, at the end of the five-year USAID program, the NGO's board of directors integrated the communities branch into Hand in Hand's core mandate. Its funding from USAID was also extended by another five years (2019-2024).

The goal of the communities branch is to facilitate shared society peacebuilding for Hand in Hand's adult members, although interview data and ethnographic observations suggest that NGO staff and others are unsure of how to best achieve this goal. Hand in Hand's agreement with USAID includes a theory of change and logic model, with the goal of "building shared society in Israel through a growing grassroots network of Jewish-Arab communities" (Hand in Hand's 2018-2019 annual report to USAID). This and other goals are operationalized into indicators, providing community mobilizers clear, measurable objectives for their programming. However, it seems that some staff members view Hand in Hand's USAID obligations as often contrary to the goals of building a community. One NGO staff-member explains, "we're kind of prisoners to the USAID grant, which asks us to do very specific things, including measuring success with numbers… so we run after numbers: number of activities, number of attendees, instead of thinking about how to build a community."

Hand in Hand's annual report to USAID indicates that more than 1750 adults attended community building activities in 2018-2019, falling 100 people below its goal for the year. Jews' participation rates in community-building activities (n = 985) were about 25% higher than Arabs' (n = 785); an interesting finding given that Palestinian students vastly outnumber Jewish students at most Hand in Hand schools. The over-representation of Jews in adult community building activities is supported by interview data. Several participants identified that "in most activities, there's a significant Jewish majority." Survey data also shows a discrepancy between Jews' and Palestinians' community-building attendance rates, with Jews self-reporting greater participation than their Palestinian counterparts.

Community-building activities organized in the 2018-2019 year include sports teams, holiday celebrations, excursions and trips, movie nights, adult language programs, cultural, social, and political lectures and discussions, inter-group dialogue sessions, and demonstrations for social/political change. political events are an area of controversy surrounding Hand in Hand's community programming. As described below, individuals' opinions about the role of Hand in Hand in facilitating political activities like demonstrations and protests seem largely informed by whether they perceive Hand in Hand as a social/political movement organization.

6.3. To Protest or Not to Protest? Existential Tensions and Collective Action

68% of survey participants (n=73) said 'yes' to the question, "Do you think Hand in Hand is a social/political movement?" During personal interviews, participants described Hand in Hand as: social activism; a platform that enables activism; educating for activism; inherently political; an organization seeking equality; and an organization trying to advance social and political change. This supports arguments made throughout this thesis that Hand in Hand's schools and communities should be treated as a social movement, not a collection of brick and mortar schools. Describing Hand in Hand as a SMO helps answer the study's first research question: *In the context of social change, what is the function of Hand in Hand's schools and communities (if any) beyond education providers?* If Hand in Hand schools and communities are a social movement, their function, like all other collective action is to spur social change through solidarity and "sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities" (Tarrow, 1994, p.3).

The present research agrees with an NGO employee, who during her interview stated that "the very existence of this school is political. To have an egalitarian, shared space [in Israel] is the most political thing ever." Based on survey data, 46% of survey participants (n = 48) were involved in social or political movements besides Hand in Hand, including organizations like "Fight Against Occupation in the Occupied Territories", "A Generation Making Peace", "Peace Now", and "Women in Black." Further, several participants identified themselves as 'activists' during personal interviews. This illustrates that many community members strive to create social/political change in Israel through their involvement with Hand in Hand and otherwise. One participant observes, "as people get more extreme on one side there is a strengthening on the other side as a kind of a reaction, or resistance", and Hand in Hand represents one such example. The ethnographic portion of this research finds that a significant number of Hand in Hand students are also involved in peacebuilding programming outside Hand in Hand geared toward children and adolescents, like 'Seeds of Peace', 'Kids for Peace', 'Debates for Peace' and others (Ethnographic notes, 2018). As one Palestinian father from Wadi Ara notes, that "the kids are also getting, probably due to their parents' background, a sort of education in political activism."

There is a lack of consensus among NGO staff, teachers, and community members on the activism facilitated by Hand in Hand. Should Hand in Hand organize protests and demonstration? In what circumstances? Should the organization make official alliances with political parties? When should Hand in Hand release statements condemning or endorsing political, social, or military actions? It appears that in the absence of a clear policy on activism and political behaviour, these decisions are largely reactive and personality-driven (Ethnographic notes, 2018). One Jewish participant suggests that Hand in Hand has "to respond to reality, which is constantly evolving… there are years that are more flammable, and there are years that are less so." Flammable years represent difficult, trying periods for the Hand in Hand

communities, as they have the potential to polarize and divide a sometimes-fragile alliance by demanding that its membership unite under one political banner. Although the specifics of what this political banner represents are unknown.

Some participants support the greater politicization of the organization, its schools, and communities: "events like the women's protest happen all the time, and they really reinforce my decision to send my kid to Hand in Hand", while some are uncomfortable with Hand in Hand playing this role. Not all community members perceive Hand in Hand's schools and communities as political, and many are uncomfortable with the politicization of the schools. One father from the Galilee community elaborates:

> It's a question of values. I sent my kids to this school because of my values… and they [Hand in Hand] explained to me that sending my kids to this school is political, and that it's a political place. So no thank you. And with that I ended my formal relationship with the NGO and the community activities. I send my kids and I love the school, but I refuse to be part of a political group- I don't think it's right, fundamentally. It's a question of values. It can't be political.

The above describes a parent's rejection of the politicization of Hand in Hand's schools and communities. This parent`s reluctance to participate in community activities stems from the political nature of the communities and the NGO. Interestingly, this parent does not see the school as political. Instead, he explains that the decision to enroll children in Hand in Hand's schools is a question of values, not politics.

If we draw on a classic definition and define politics as "who gets what, when, and how", then participating in an initiative promoting equality between Jewish and Arab Israelis is an inherently political endeavour (Lasswell, 2018; Lazarus, 2017). In a society in which two national groups live in almost complete segregation, integrated schools and adult communities facilitating contact and equality are fundamentally about the distribution of rights, services, and goods. The almost infamous phrase, "the personal is political" (Hanisch 1969) is a reminder that individuals' private or social life is both shaped by and has the power to shape politics. Arguing that a decision is apolitical since it stems from values rather than political affiliation is therefore misled.

Interview participants recounted people leaving Hand in Hand because "the school is too political", or "takes on a position that is too political." Yet ethnographic observations made throughout the fieldwork period suggest that Hand in Hand largely avoids taking official positions on political issues, sidestepping political disagreements between its community members. Sometimes however, Hand in Hand takes clear political positions, although the way it makes these decisions and the nature of the position it takes seem to be personality-driven. As one interviewee recalls, "there are those that believe it was a massacre in Gaza in May [2018]. And Danny, the CEO said, 'I'm not willing to write the word massacre. It wasn't a massacre.' And he had tears in his eyes…" In this instance, the statement, 'there was a massacre in Gaza' is seen as

politically charged, and Danny, Hand in Hand's current CEO did not want to use the loaded word. However, not using the word, just as using the word, is political. One community mobilizer provides another example of the ways in which Hand in Hand deals with political issues:

> There was a very political event in response to the Nation State Law. Merav, Mohamad's previous assistant said, 'there was no way that Hand in Hand will stay quiet about the nation state law.' And she went, contrary to what all the executives were telling her, and she organized a great event… a ton of people, and a lot of people went on stage and spoke. It was incredible. The demonstration, even though it's a political act, wasn't political, because it was connected to what we stand for, which is being together, and the kids were part of that.

This community mobilizer refers to a demonstration as political, yet Hand in Hand's participation as a-political since 'it was connected to what we stand for, which is being together'. This quote is telling of the way some Hand in Hand community members judge the organization's political behaviour. Hand in Hand's engagement with initiatives that fall directly within the realm of promoting egalitarian Jewish-Arab relations in Israel are supported, while other activity may be deemed too political. Although the majority of this study's participants see Hand in Hand as a political/social movement, this suggests that some individuals may not see Jewish-Arab relations in Israel as a political affair, but view it as a private matter. Interestingly, 73% (n = 52) of this sample's Jewish-Israeli participants said 'yes' when asked whether Hand in Hand is a social/political movement, compared to 50% (n = 13) of Palestinian- Israelis surveyed. A statistically significant correlation was found between being Jewish-Israeli and viewing Hand in Hand as a social/political movement r = .22, p<.05. While more targeted research is needed, it is possible that community members (both Jewish and Palestinians) that do not view Hand in Hand as a social movement are less committed to, or interested by the organization's social change agenda, and instead see the organization as an education provider only.

6.4. Hand in Hand's Social Change Function: Interviewees Perceptions of Impact

Attributing impact to an intervention is impossible without pre-and-post measures and a counter-factual (i.e. by using control groups), which were not part of the methodologies used here. However, an account of the social change function of Hand in Hand necessitates an account of the organization's impact. This section will provide an overview of survey and interview participants' perceptions of the impact of Hand in Hand's schools and communities on adult members, students and alumni, and wider Israeli society.

6.4.1. Shared Communities and Adult Citizens: Perceptions of Impact

Throughout their interviews, participants described the varied and sometimes profound impact of participating in Hand in Hand's adult community activities. The type of impact identified by both groups includes participants' strengthened identity, increased awareness of prejudice, greater open-mindedness, and reduced fear toward the other group. Jewish interview participants reported an increased knowledge of

Arabic and positive effects of Arabic language proficiency, and Palestinian interview participants reported greater feelings of empowerment. Nearly all interviewees, both Jewish and Palestinians described the above impacts as mediated by a significant intellectual/emotional process resulting from their membership in Hand in Hand's schools and communities.

I suggest that the process described by Jewish and Palestinian interviewees involves de-bunking national narratives through various mediators (increased empathy, decreased bias, etc.) resulting in lower ethos of conflict levels and changed worldviews. One participant explains, "it's immeasurable to know how learning about the other, understanding the other, and accepting the other strengthens your own identity and allows you to see the positives and negatives of the other…" Two Jewish interviewees described the process Jews undergo, but were skeptical about whether Palestinians experience this as well. One Jewish community mobilizer explains, "… people go through very significant experiences… I know the processes Jews go through, I rarely hear about the Arabs though. I don't know." A Jewish father from Wadi Ara expresses his perceptions of this process:

> I want to say, that especially the Jewish parents go through a process in the school, of understanding the other narrative. If they're willing to go through this process. It requires change and understanding that the truth you grew up with isn't the only truth. It takes a lot of effort, and a lot of energy to do this. Inner energy, and not all parents can commit the time and energy- the resources required. So there are years that this happens and years that it doesn't. We need to accept this and not force it… these are deep processes.

This participant explains that the process people undergo at Hand in Hand is intense, difficult, deep, and resource intensive. He explains that someone must be ready and 'willing' to go through this, and that it involves 'understanding the other narrative' and accepting that your group's narrative is not the only legitimate one. A Jewish father illustrates the difficulty in this process, "I see them [Palestinians] as human, but it's a forced cognitive process... You spend your entire life with a certain narrative. The narrative of '48, '53, '67, and '73. You live with it. Only at a certain point do you see the world differently. It's hard to then make the real change." One Jewish NGO employee illustrates the journey a community member can experience by recounting an interaction she had with an Arab father during a memorial ceremony for Yitzhak Rabin at Hand in Hand's Jerusalem school. During the ceremony, an Arab father asked her, "why don't we celebrate Arafat as well [as Rabin]? He was up there too, receiving the noble prize."

> And I was like- oh my God. This is why not everyone wants to send their kids to this school, because, that's kind of a breathtaking challenging thing for a Jewish-Israeli to hear. And I can start to comprehend, why from his perspective that's legitimate. Right then and there, the number of questions and conversations, and debates that started in my head, without even going into it with him. And understanding this new perspective. And understanding, wow that's so challenging to the Jewish side. And 'what do I think about it?' Without even having

a conversation, you're already having a whole new world of understanding. And there are a million moments like that, that leave you changed.

It appears that Palestinians experience processes similar to Jews at Hand in Hand, although the Jewish processes often lead to feelings of guilt resulting from identifying as a perpetrator, whereas for Palestinians, these processes may lead to feelings of empowerment coming from an increased awareness of their group's role as victims. Discussed in detail in Results Chapter III, Shnabel and Nadler's (2008) Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation identifies that the different roles of the two groups in conflict lead to different emotional needs whose fulfilment is required for reconciliation. One Palestinian participant describes her interpretation of the processes undergone by Palestinians at Hand in Hand:

> This place [Hand in Hand], allows someone to go through a process that enables them to understand more, know more, to strengthen them as a person. It tells them that 'you are capable' and 'you are valuable' and 'you can ask' and 'you can belong' and 'you have rights'... [Otherwise] Arabs don't feel this way. They don't like to get into arguments with Jews… for example, by speaking out about all kinds of things they disagree with.

To know whether this process leads to lower adherence to the Ethos of Conflict requires further work. The present study found no significant relationships between participants' time with Hand in Hand and the Ethos of Conflict. However, the absence of comparison groups undermines this evidence. Another important impact-related question for future work is Hand in Hand's ability to mitigate conflict-related anxiety. Extending Bar-Tal (2012), it appears that individuals with lower Ethos of Conflict levels are at greater risk of suffering from anxiety after exposure to conflict-related information. However, several participants suggested that their involvement in Hand in Hand reduces negative conflict-related emotions. For example, one NGO staff member conveys the sense of agency she feels by attempting to achieve social/political change:

> What's happening [in Israel] is so problematic, I'm so emotionally and intellectually distressed by it. But when I'm with Hand in Hand I feel this tremendous sense of agency. And I think that's true for all of people, where you can feel like 'alright, but I'm doing my bit, and I know that it's going to make a difference'. So for me that's been incredibly energizing… and in the years I've been a part of it, I've been so much better able to believe that there's something better, and that I can be a part of it, and that I can be hugely influential making that change.

Based on this employee's description, belonging to Hand in Hand increases feelings of agency and enables people to engage with hope, potentially alleviating negative conflict-related emotions.

6.4.2. Integrated Schools and Students/Alumni: Perceptions of Impact

Much of the impact ascribed to Hand in Hand during interviews involved the schools' effects on students and alumni. This includes increased outgroup knowledge and empathy; existence of outgroup friendships; strengthened personal and national identity; increased fluidity of identity; development of

cultural fluency; decreased inter-group prejudice; increased skills in the other language; reduced outgroup fear and xenophobia; and more complex worldviews. Palestinian interviewees described Hand in Hand's Palestinian students as empowered and prepared for life in Israel, a Jewish-majority country. One Palestinian parent describes his impression of the benefits of his children's Hebrew language skills resulting from their education with Hand in Hand:

> Most of the [Arab] kids that went to the Gesher on the Wadi school, or any other Hand in Hand school have a second language, which is Hebrew, in a much higher level than all other Arab kids in Israel. They don't even have an accent… in a few years no one will know that her [interviewee's daughter's] mother tongue is Arabic… and this has advantages, because language fluency is a huge advantage. When you control the language, you control everything in your environment… when you have the language, and it's like your mother tongue, you won't be stigmatized as belonging to the other group, belonging to the Arab group. Instead you go with the flow, and are like everyone else.

None of the interviewees identified that students and alumni underwent a 'process' as they experienced themselves. Instead, several interviewees expressed the complexity and nuance with which students and alumni (typically the interviewee's children) view the other side, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the world. In line with Bekerman (2016), it appears that Hand in Hand's schools shield students from the influence of the Ethos of Conflict and its underlying conflict narratives, instead nurturing alternative frames of complex systems of belief, flexible notions of identity, and tolerant views of one another. One Jewish mother from Jerusalem whose kids are Hand in Hand alumni explains, "our alumni grow up to be really sophisticated individuals with a complex understanding of reality."

The one alumnus interviewed for this study described undergoing a process resulting from his involvement with Hand in Hand. When contemplating the potential of Hand in Hand alumni becoming 'bridges' for shared society peacebuilding, the alumnus said, "ultimately, it's a process that people need to undergo with themselves. I can't open people's eyes or tell someone 'this is the way it is'. A lot of it is through reflection, and to look at yourself." This statement suggests Hand in Hands students go through a similar emotional/intellectual process as adult community members, although perhaps less consciously, since they are exposed to the other group's narratives from a younger age.

6.4.3. Hand in Hand and Israeli Society: Perceptions of Impact

Many parents (especially Jewish), join Hand in Hand because of their desire to create change in Israel. One Jewish NGO staff member says, "at the end of the day, if it's just our little school serving our little families that are a part of it, and it doesn't really have a wider impact, it's not really enough." The same interviewee compared the different levels of impact of Hand in Hand's communities to going to a swimming pool:

[Think of the Hand in Hand community] like going to the swimming pool. There are some people that dive in, and they're swimming and they're running and they don't want to get out of the water and they love it. And there are those that dip in, dip out, swim a little, and leave. There are those that just dip their toes in. And there are the people that are just watching from the fence on the outside. They're all impacted. And in a way, it's similar to the community; not everyone has to be the gung-ho hard-core in order to be impacted.

This participant claims that Hand in Hand's communities result in impact beyond direct participants. This metaphor suggests that the relationship between impact and community building is not always linear; participating in Hand in Hand's community-building activities does not necessarily lead to more impact, and conversely, lower or no participation does not always result in reduced or no impact. Although this sample represents the most dedicated community members, less frequent, or non-attendees may still experience similar impact due to their indirect exposure. Indeed, Hand in Hand may impact Israeli society by challenging casual observers to go through a process similar to the one undergone by community members. By acknowledging that a bilingual, multicultural, shared society between Palestinians and Jews exists, observers are forced to recognize this frame and its feasibility. One participant explains how infrequent attendees or those not directly involved with Hand in Hand may also experience intellectual/emotional processes like those described above: "parents that aren't ideological and don't come to community activities are still going through this. Their parents, and grandparents, and aunts and uncles, and colleagues at work, are also impacted by this. To varying degrees… they're becoming part of the Hand in Hand community because of the ripple effect." An overwhelming majority of survey respondents (92%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "Hand in Hand's community activities contribute to the creation of a shared space between Palestinians/Arabs and Jews in Israel."

Dichter's approach rejects creating societal change by directing peacebuilding interventions exclusively toward children. However, several interview participants expressed hope that Hand in Hand's alumni would influence their generation to transform the country. One Palestinian father from Wadi Ara said during his interview, "if we succeed in educating our kids, maybe they'll reach a place where they can talk in an equitable way and reach a solution. A Prime Minister won't come out of the Gesher on the Wadi school, but maybe a Member of Knesset that could make a difference."

Many parents, especially Jewish, have high hopes for Hand in Hand's alumni. During her interview, one Jewish mother says, "the kids grew up together- in the most natural way possible. So the more alumni we have that experienced this and are now adults living in Israel, that see how separate we are, will recognize how unnatural it is to live in segregation, Jews and Arabs, and it will create a sort of movement." Further, parents described the intergenerational impact Hand in Hand can have as alumni age and have their own children, "soon the first alumni are going to have kids, and we'll have a second generation at Hand in

Hand, and the schools will grow." The one alumnus interviewed recounted stories of how he challenges people to think about their own group, the other group, and the conflict, "[as a Hand in Hand] alumnus, you feel like you have to open other people's eyes. Gesher on the Wadi has given that to so many people. As an alumnus, you become a kind of an ambassador for co-existence."

Gamson (1988) suggests that the media tends to "unconsciously give official packages the benefit of the doubt", making official narratives "the starting point for discussing an issue" (Gamson, 1988, p.226). Resulting from their almost automatic support for established frames, "media are rarely supportive of collective action frames" (Buechler, 2016, p.153). Therefore, one of collective action's most important goals is to undermine official definitions, challenge established frames, and redirect media discourse (Buechler, 2016). Hand in Hand's 2018-2019 annual report to USAID outlines that its coverage by Israeli media, comprising 25 news publications in the reporting period is part of its impact.

6.5. Key Takeaways
Integrating ethnographic, interview, and survey data, this results chapter answered the first research question of this thesis: *In the context of social change, what is the function of Hand in Hand's schools and communities (if any) beyond education providers?*

6.5.1. Calling a Spade a Spade: Hand in Hand, a Social Movement Organization
The present thesis mobilizes a new approach to studying Hand in Hand by treating it as a Social Movement Organization (SMO) that tries to achieve social/political change. In the Israeli context, "bilingual education, by definition, is a socio-political act" (Mor-Sommerfeld et al, 2007, p. 17). Schools do not exist in vacuums; formal schooling has the potential to either create or support societal change if used on a large enough scale since it reaches an entire segment of society. The inverse is also true: if schools operate as 'bubbles' or 'incubators', isolated and rejected by wider society, the macro culture in which they operate will silence them. The first results chapter examined the interaction between Hand in Hand and the context in which it operates to understand its social change function.

6.5.2. A Vindicated Dichter: Shared Society Peacebuilding and Leadership-Led Change
The changes that transformed Hand in Hand in 2011 are illustrative of the importance of leaders in changing institutional trajectories. Leaders represent the change agenda in political struggles and are critical in building up "vital supporting coalitions for reform among narrow elites" (Andrews, 2015, p.199). Dichter's leadership of Hand in Hand put the organization back on track after a period of stagnation, leading to the growth and ambition that now characterizes it. Dichter was able to reorient the organization in many ways, but one factor was his solicitation of a $5M USAID grant to build shared communities for adults.

In his articulation of his vision of Hand in Hand's theory of change, Dichter asks community members to invent and formalize permanent activities for both Jews and Palestinians, thus challenging segregated alternatives. Whether one defines institutions as structures of incentives (RCI), historical trajectories (HI), cultural norms and ideological frames (SI), discourse (DI), or more concretely as Dichter does, the aim of social movements is to change and challenge institutional dynamics. Ditcher's vision shifts the responsibility of developing shared society from kids to adults, while reorienting the function of the schools from the sole shared element to one of many. Hand in Hand grew from a small movement to a multi-million-dollar NGO under Dichter's leadership, underscoring the importance of leaders in facilitating organizational change and ultimately, the success of Dichter's vision for shared society peacebuilding. However, transforming Hand in Hand from an education provider to a shared society peacebuilding SMO remains controversial, and whether the organization can survive the balancing act of juggling diverse mandates in an extremely constraining environment is yet to be seen.

6.5.3. Counter Narratives and Hobbled Impact: The Devil is in the Master Frame

Sociological institutionalism and constructivist social movement theory elucidate that Hand in Hand challenges the cultural norms and ideological frames (i.e. institutions) that keep Arabs and Jews separate in Israel. The master frame anchoring Hand in Hand and other shared society movements in Israel provides an optimistic narrative about a pluralistic Israel. This master frame is deeply constrained by the harsh cultural climate which perpetuates the Ethos of Conflict as the prevailing master frame. Hand in Hand's schools and communities need to reach a 'critical mass' for wider impact, in which the counter coexistence narrative could produce a ripple effect and significantly influence society. However, to achieve greater societal impact, Hand in Hand's counter narrative must be adopted by larger segments of the population, and because of its incompatibility with the Ethos of Conflict, this is unlikely to occur outside of moments of ripeness.

Results Chapter II answers the study's second research question, drawing on the Ethos of Conflict and the elements of the SIMCA to provide an account of Jewish and Palestinian Israeli citizens' motivations for first joining Hand in Hand.

7. Results Chapter II. Threading the Needle: Understanding Motivations for Joining Hand in Hand

The following chapter combines survey, interview, and ethnographic evidence from the six Hand in Hand communities operating at the time of data collection in late 2018 to discern what motivates ordinary Palestinian and Jewish citizens of Israel to first join Hand in Hand. This chapter provides a snapshot of competing (though complementary) explanations of what motivates both groups to join the organization by reviewing participants' ideology through the Ethos of Conflict, position relative to the three elements of the SIMCA, and perceptions of the costs of joining. Ultimately, this analysis largely confirms what one Hand in Hand community mobilizer suggested when quoting a well-known Arab-Israeli author and former community member, Sayeed Kashua: "Arabs come to the school so that their kids learn Hebrew without an accent, and the Jews come to clear their conscience."

The chapter begins by presenting qualitative and quantitative evidence to depict both groups' adherence to the Ethos of Conflict, signifying the importance of ideology in explaining parents' motivation for enrolling their children in Hand in Hand schools. Then, following the Social Identity Model for Collective Action (SIMCA), social identity, perceptions of injustice, and perceived efficacy of social/political movements in Israel are shown to be complicit in participants' decision to join Hand in Hand. Last, this chapter concludes by describing the social and other costs associated with belonging to the Hand in Hand community.

7.1. Ideology of Community Members: The Ethos of Conflict

As discussed in the literature review chapter of this dissertation, the Ethos of Conflict serves as a unified prism through which many Israelis interpret the world (Halperin, 2011; Bar-Tal, 2002). The Ethos of Conflict functions like an ideology: those that hold it experience "perpetual cognitive selectivity, biases, and distortion" toward confirming their ideology and rejecting any conflicting information (Bar-Tal, 2009). Like other militant ideologies, the Ethos of Conflict acts as a buffer to the negative psychological effects resulting from living in an extended conflict situation, including uncertainty, anxiety, fear, depression, and trauma (Shahar, 2018; Willer, 2004). Bar-Tal (2004) notes that the Ethos of Conflict popularizes beliefs, memories, and emotional orientations propagating the conflict as necessary or inevitable and maintains intergroup prejudice with little public discussion.

7.1.1. Participants' Perceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

At Hand in Hand's insistence, the survey administered in this study does not include specific questions on the issues at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or their potential solutions. Despite never being asked directly, nearly all Jewish interviewees turned to discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at some point. Only one Palestinian interviewee discussed the conflict during their personal interview.

Conversations about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were pessimistic. Participants' views on the conflict varied, although most provided empathetic views toward the other group, arguing both for Israel's complicity in perpetuating the conflict as well as the role of the Palestinians in maintaining its intractability. Solutions were discussed but were treated as pipedreams rather than concrete. Specific topics included Palestinian refugees, bi-national/two-state solutions, and settlements in the West Bank. Multiple participants shared stories about their experience of the conflict, including experiences as combat or intelligence soldiers in the Israeli army, and stories about friends and family that perished in the conflict.

While discussing the conflict, participants unknowingly communicated elements of the Ethos of Conflict they have internalized, observed, or opposed. For example, one Hand in Hand member said: "I'm from a different generation that see the army as holy, and everything that the army does as righteous, and we're always right, and the IDF spokesman is the spokesman of absolute truth. That's how I grew up… And when you wise up, you see the truth." This quote speaks to the Ethos of Conflict subcategories of Justness of Goals, Unity, Patriotism, and Positive Collective Self-Image. Further, it sheds light on the role of ideology in preventing the acceptance of conflicting evidence to one's ideology, and a 'process' that enables one to 'see the truth'. Another participant draws on the Ethos of Conflict's categories of Unity to recount: "I didn't grow up in a bilingual context that accepts the other. I grew up knowing that the other was different, and that I should always remember that."

While it appears that interviewees' ideologies, values, beliefs, and past behaviours are associated with relatively low Ethos of Conflict levels, some participants described sentiments, both reactive and volitional, symptomatic of the internalization of conflict-supporting narratives. For example, one Jewish participant recounted a recurring nightmare he had as a child, in which Arab workers used tractors to destroy his house in the Kibbutz. Another example involves a Palestinian interviewee who said, "I don't want my son to pray for the 'Jews to burn'. You know we say those words, right? In the villages, here, in Morocco, everywhere. Before the country [Israel] came into existence, we've been saying this… There's something people hate about you [Jews]. You guys [Jews] need to think about this. Anti-Semitism started before '48, before '35." One participant described the spectrum of political/ideological positions held by members of the Hand in Hand community:

> It's not perfect- our school. It's not a perfect experience. It's not a utopia. Not everyone is fully committed, and not everyone thinks the same thing from a political standpoint. There can be a lot of variety in terms of political views from the Jewish side… some don't accept the Palestinian narrative... 'there is no Palestinian nation', 'the Nakba didn't happen', all sorts of things that from a political/social point of view really don't contribute to understanding and reconciliation. Some don't even recognize the other narrative, let alone adopt the other

narrative… hey even I don't go that far, but they have difficulty conceding that the other group can think differently.

7.1.2. Measuring the Ethos of Conflict

Originally devised as a 48-question measure, the present study follows Bar-Tal et al.'s (2012) condensed 16-question Ethos of Conflict scale. The shorter scale contains two questions for each of the eight sets of beliefs comprising the Ethos of Conflict. Survey participants were asked to complete Bar-Tal et al.'s (2012) consolidated measure which contains 16 statements: two for each of the 8 themes underpinning the Ethos of Conflict. Participants were asked to rate their agreement with each question from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Half of the statements were worded in a 'dovish' orientation (e.g. Without compromise, there can be no peace), while half were worded in a 'hawkish' orientation (e.g. Peace will only be achieved after violent conflict). Dovish statements were reverse coded so that the scale for all 16 statements was in the same direction. Please see Annex B for the Ethos of Conflict scale as used in the survey.

66 participants completed the entire Jewish Ethos questionnaire, while 18 participants answered the whole Palestinian Ethos measure. Mean scores for the 16 statements for the Jewish group were calculated to create the Jewish Ethos of Conflict composite variable, with a mean of $M = 1.8$ ($SD = .48$), and an internal consistency score of $a = .86$. The mean scores for the 16 statements for the Palestinian group were calculated to create the Palestinian Ethos of Conflict composite variable, with a mean of $M = 2.8$ ($SD = .51$) and an internal consistency score of $a = .78$. In this sample, an independent samples t-test found a statistically significant difference $t(77)= .989$, $p<.000$ in the mean scores of Ethos of Conflict between participants who identified as Palestinian/Arab (M= 2.8, SD= .48) and participants who identified as Jewish-Israeli (M= 1.8, SD= .51). These findings demonstrate that on average, Hand in Hand's Palestinian/Arabs population have higher Ethos of Conflict levels than their Jewish-Israeli counterparts.

Using data from other academic work for comparison, it appears that members on average, Hand in Hand community members' adherence levels to the Ethos of Conflict are lower than those of the general population. This is true for both Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian/Arab community members. For example, in Bar-Tal et al.'s (2012) study, the Ethos of Conflict scores of a representative sample of 501 Israeli Jews was $M = 3.76$, ($SD = .77$), more than twice that of Hand in Hand's Jewish community members. In their study, Canetti et al. (2017) found that the Ethos of Conflict score of a representative sample of 781 Jewish Israelis was M= 4.56 ($SD = .97$), about two-and-a-half times greater than the Ethos of Conflict levels found in this study's Jewish participants. Based on this comparative data, Hand in Hand's Jewish community members' adherence levels to conflict-supporting narratives, beliefs, and emotional orientations are significantly lower than those of the larger Jewish-Israeli population.

No known study at the time of writing applied the Ethos of Conflict measure to Israel's Palestinian citizens. In their study, Canetti et al. (2017) found that the Ethos of Conflict score of a representative sample of 1,196 Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem was M = 4.24, (*SD* = .78). While the experiences of the Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem are different than those of Israel's Palestinian citizens, these findings offer an interesting comparison. Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem's adherence to the Ethos of Conflict is one-and-a-half times greater than that of this study's Palestinian participants. Compared to the large differences in Ethos of Conflict between this study's Jewish-Israeli participants and the general population, the difference between the Ethos levels of Palestinian-Israeli participants to those in the OPTs is surprisingly small. These comparisons indicate that differences in ideology between Hand in Hand's Jewish community members and the larger Jewish-Israeli population is greater than the differences between Hand in Hand's Palestinian community members and other populations of Palestinians.

The Palestinian community members surveyed have higher Ethos of Conflict levels when compared to their Jewish counterparts. This finding suggests that there may be an ideological mismatch between Hand in Hand's Palestinian and Jewish populations, supporting claims that Palestinians join Hand in Hand for more practical reasons (i.e. education quality) while Jews are more motivated by ideological reasons.

7.2. Social Identity Model of Collective Action

The Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA) offers an integrated framework for explaining the causal antecedents for engaging in collective action. Although Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) meta-analysis examines the relationship between social identity, injustice, and efficacy and participation in protests, this model is useful for explaining motivation to participate in other social movements, like the ones associated with Hand in Hand. The present research combines qualitative and quantitative data to describe participants' social identity, perceived injustice, and perceived efficacy of social/political movements in Israel, capturing participants' experiences and beliefs to explain their motivations for joining Hand in Hand. As described in the Methodology, data is triangulated using a grounded theory approach.

7.3. The Social Identity of Palestinian and Jewish Participants

The SIMCA advances that those with politicized social identities are more likely to engage in collective action than those with non-politicized identities (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). This is largely because politicized identities turn political goods into personal ones, ensuring buy-in to related social movement activities (for more information, see Theoretical Framework chapter). The following section describes the social identity of Palestinian-Israeli participants as fragmented and non-politicized, while Jewish-Israeli participants' as politicized.

7.3.1. Palestinian-Israeli Participants: A Non-Politicized, Fragmented Identity

The military control of Palestinian/Arab-Israelis ended in 1966, yet the systematic physical and psychological harm inflicted on this population continues today, contributing to the de-politicization and fragmentation of this group's identity (Grossman, 1991). Although some evidence exists for arguing that Palestinian-Israelis' national identity is centered on its "collective struggle for equality and peace" (Al-Haj, 2002, p.173), data from the present research shows that the structural inequality experienced by Palestinian citizens of Israel may have led to a non-politicized identity, and in-group identification rarely leads to mobilization against inequality (Dichter, 2015; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). One Jewish mobilizer describes: "many (Arab) families talk about how when they were younger they weren't allowed to talk about politics. They weren't allowed to oppose the Jewish regime… they were silenced in the schools… people were scared to talk about it… which comes from the institutions but penetrates the family." A Palestinian mobilizer shared, "I was born to parents who came from a generation that is silent, a generation that shuts up… for my father it was easier if I went to prostitution than to protests. It's scarier [to protest]."

Although never asked, Palestinian participants did not mention perceiving any complexity relating to their national identities during personal interviews. Some Jewish participants, however, described fragmentation in the Israeli-Arab national identity, arguing that this group does not belong fully to either the Palestinian ethos nor the Israeli-Jewish one. One Jewish interviewee described the apparent rejection of Israel's Palestinian citizens by Palestinians from the West Bank: "… there's a lot of dismissal of Palestinian Israelis by Palestinians from the territories, as privileged, assimilative, traitors, and more." The rejection of Palestinian membership in the Jewish-Israeli ethos is crystalized by Israel's controversial Nation State Law. Further, a Jewish father from the Galilee school discussed the Israeli anthem's explicit exclusion of non-Jewish citizens, and his support for Hand in Hand's decision not to play it: "a Jewish soul [part of the anthem] is problematic, especially in a bilingual Israeli/Palestinian school." While qualitative evidence does not sufficiently explore the national identity of Israel's Palestinian citizens, survey data clarifies this issue. First, however, we turn to discussing Hand in Hand's Jewish members' politicized identity.

7.3.2. Jewish-Israeli Participants: The Israeli Left

A Palestinian interviewee described Hand in Hand's Jewish community members as mostly Ashkenazi and privileged, as "the artists, the writers, the dog-owners, the coolest people in the world." When describing themselves, Jewish participants tended to discuss their relative position in society, for example, "I, as a Jewish-Israeli, I'm very privileged." Ethnographic observations indicate that most Jewish community members are well educated Ashkenazi Jews, typically associated with the Israeli left. All except for two Jewish interviewees identified coming from 'leftist' or 'very leftist' households. For example, during her interview, one Jewish participant said, "Jews that come to the bilingual kindergarten are

motivated by ideology and are much more left-leaning. [They are] people that believe in shared society and things like that." It appears that a majority of Hand in Hand's Jewish population belongs to the Israeli left; a highly politicized group (Wright, 2018).

Interview and ethnographic data suggest that members of the Israeli left feel increasingly isolated from the rest of the country. One Jewish interviewee from the Sharon Triangle community describes her view of Hand in Hand: "I don't think I could keep living here without co-existence. It gives me hope. The country is going in a terrible direction, and we [Jewish-Israeli progressives] are a minority. Most of the population is moving in a direction that is more hateful, and I don't want to live like that." This sentiment is consistent with the NI concept of 'binding constraints', explaining why institutions and collective behaviours do not change. However, as noted in social movement theory, constraints and repression can sometimes lead to increased solidarity and greater commitment to the movement (Buecheler, 2016; Ingram and Clay, 2000). Another interviewee from Jerusalem used more powerful language, saying "as a leftist that lives in a context of being a persecuted political minority, the fact that my daughter has the chance to learn in this ideological bubble, which isn't really a bubble, is an incredible opportunity."

One Palestinian participant identifies that Hand in Hand comprises primarily Israeli leftists, of which there are two kinds: those interested in a 'divorce' from the Palestinians on the political level "out of concern for themselves", and those "that believe in the rights of Palestinians in Israel as a historic, legitimate right." Jewish participants identified the terms 'white leftist' and 'arm-chair' leftist to describe a category of self-servingly progressive people in Israel for whom Hand in Hand represents the first meaningful interactions with Palestinians. One Jewish participant recounts, "I was always involved in the rights-movement for Palestinians, in protests, demonstrations, etc. but I never had a significant interaction with a Palestinian… I didn't even think about it…", and another, "I was always leftist, but I never had Arab friends." During interviews, some Jewish-Israelis hinted that Hand in Hand brokered a transition from arm-chair leftists to true progressives. Due to their affiliation with the Israeli political left, it appears that Hand in Hand's Jewish-Israeli population possesses a largely politicized identity. Following the SIMCA, the politicized identity of Hand in Hand's Jewish group may contribute to their motivations for first joining Hand in Hand.

### 7.3.3. National Identity Definitions and Identification

In the survey, 29 distinct answers were provided in response to the question: "what is your nationality?" Although this sample's Jewish-Israeli participants (n = 71) outnumbered Palestinian/Arab-Israelis (n = 26), 13 different categories were provided by Palestinian/Arabs describing their national identities, whereas only 9 categories were given by Jewish-Israelis. Examples of Palestinian/Arab-Israeli national identity categories provided include "Palestinian-Arab" (n = 5); "Palestinian-Arab-Israeli" (n=4); "Arab" (n = 3); "Muslim-Arab" (n = 1); "Arab-Israeli Muslim" (n = 1); and "Palestinian living in Israel"

(n = 1). The number of different national labels identified by Palestinian/Arab-Israeli respondents is indicative of the tensions and fragmentation in this group's complicated national identity. Caught in a bind between perceptions as 'traitors' by the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza and not belonging to the Jewish-Israeli ethos, Israel's Palestinian/Arab population collective identity is torn.

Answers to the open question about national identification were recoded: Participants whose answers contained the words "Jewish" or "Israeli", either alone or in combination with other nationalities (e.g. "Israeli-Romanian" or "Cosmopolitan Jewish") were recoded to create the "Jewish-Israeli" variable. 71 participants (66%) of the sample were entered into this category. Participants whose answers included the words "Palestinian", "Arab", or "Muslim" were recoded to "Palestinian/Arab." 26 participants (24%) of the sample fit into the Palestinian/Arab category. 10% of participants provided answers that did not contain reference to either category (e.g. "No Affiliation" or "British") and were excluded from this classification. As expected, the Palestinian/Arab Nationality variable is highly correlated with not being Jewish: .883 p<.000 and possessing Arabic as a mother tongue: .894 p<.000. The close relationships between these variables shows the consistency of the different measures.

In line with Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) SIMCA, the survey uses Likert-type questions to measure participants' level of identification with and commitment to their national groups. Participants were asked to rate their agreement/disagreement with three questions, with answers ranging from 1, strongly disagree to 5, strongly agree. Answers to the three questions were used to create a National Identification composite variable. The internal reliability of this composite variable is strong (a = .85). Please see Figure 4 for a visual depiction of the components of this composite variable.

Figure 4. Despite Fragmentation, Palestinian Survey Participants Identify More Strongly Than Jewish Participants with Their National Identity

On average, Palestinian/Arab participants self-report stronger identification with their national identity (M = 3.77) than Jewish participants (M = 2.96). Both Jewish and Palestinian participants' average identification with their national group appears to be moderate in absolute terms, residing either just below 'neutral' and somewhere between 'neutral' and 'agree'. An independent samples t-test found a statistically significant difference t (87) = -3.26, $p < .05$ between the mean National Identification composite scores of Palestinian/Arab (M = 3.4, SD = 1.62) and Jewish (M = 2.9, SD = 1.06) participants. Since 13 answer categories were provided by a total of 26 Palestinian/Arab participants to the question, "what is your nationality", defining *which* national group this survey's respondents find themselves committed to is not possible. Respondents could have been thinking of the wider Palestinian nation while answering this question, their affiliation with the state of Israel, or the subgroup of Palestinians living in Israel. Despite this incoherence, it appears that the survey's Palestinian respondents are more committed to their national group than Jewish-Israeli participants. Despite lackluster definitions of their national identity, Hand in Hand's Palestinian/Arab community members are somewhat committed to their national group. While this sample's Jewish population is better at articulating their national identity, they are less committed to it. This is likely a function of Palestinians' non-politicized identity and higher Ethos of Conflict levels and Jews' politicized identity and lower adherence to the Ethos of Conflict.

7.4. Perceptions of Injustice of Palestinian and Jewish Participants

Van Zomeren et al., (2008) suggest that collective action participation is more likely when entire social groups (as opposed to a disjointed set of individuals) experience injustice. Moreover, the SIMCA distinguishes between structural and incidental experiences of injustice to convey that collection action participation is more likely in situations where the injustice experienced is incidental, rather than structural. People are therefore more likely to mobilize against the appearance of a particular grievance than against systemic disadvantages. Since the inequality experienced by Israel's Palestinian population is structural, collective action is less likely.

Both Jewish and Palestinian participants discussed the inequality between Jews and Arabs during interviews, whether through acknowledging Jews' privilege, describing the poverty in Arab villages, or confirming the systematic oppression of Israel's Palestinian citizens. One Palestinian interviewee said, "I feel my lack of privilege every day, every minute, every second. Every place, in every parking lot. In everything." During interviews, Palestinian participants discussed their experiences of racism, neglect, and censorship generally and when it comes to nurturing their national identity in Israel. One Palestinian interviewee explains, "If I leave my house for a trip, I'm scared they [the Israeli government] would take my identity card. They'll take my identity card, they'll take my home, they'll take everything. So I won't leave this place. I won't move from here."

In line with Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) SIMCA, the survey used Likert-type questions to measure participants' perceptions of injustice and their subjective experience thereof in Israeli society. Participants were asked to rate their agreement/disagreement with four questions, with answers ranging from 1, strongly disagree to 5, strongly agree. One pair of questions was combined to create a Perceptions of Inequality composite variable, with an internal reliability of a = .86. The second pair was combined to create an Experience of Inequality composite variable, with an internal reliability of a = .91. Please see Figure 5 for a visual depiction of the two composite variables and their components.

Figure 5: Perceptions and Experiences of Inequality of Palestinian and Jewish Participants

Survey and qualitative accounts indicate that both Jewish and Palestinian community members are aware of the relative differences in socio-economic status and opportunities that exist between their two populations. This sample reports perceiving significant inequality in Israel. Interestingly, Jewish participants' perceptions of inequality (M = 4.7) were slightly higher than those of Palestinian participants (M = 4.5). However, there was no statistically significant difference between these results.

Less surprisingly, an independent samples t-test found a significant difference $t(87) = -4.23$, $p < .00$ between the Experience of Inequality composite scores of Palestinian/Arab (M = 3.95, SD = 1.02) and Jewish (M = 2.66, SD = 1.3) participants. Palestinian Hand in Hand community members experience inequality more so than Jewish participants, both generally and in their day-to-day life.

During personal interviews, the most prominent motivations ascribed to Palestinian parents by their Jewish counterparts for attending Hand in Hand schools include the desire for better educational quality for the child, better opportunities for the children, and to have the child speak Hebrew without an accent. In addition, a majority of Palestinian interviewees identify that empowering their child was a significant motivator for enrolling their children in Hand in Hand schools. Jewish community members recognize the

inequality this population experiences in Israel and understands that Hand in Hand can facilitate affirmative action toward this population. One Jewish interviewee from Wadi Ara shed light on this: "Arabs are fighting to escape the feeling of oppression and discrimination that they faced, and what interests them is a career. It's not from a greedy place of 'I want more money', they're coming from the angle of 'I want to help my family and myself get ahead, and education is the way to do this.'" Despite understanding the dynamic of being a marginalized group in Israel, some Jewish parents question Arab members' commitment to the shared society project, sometimes viewing Palestinians/Arabs as leveraging Hand in Hand to secure a better future for their children without supporting the social agenda. A Jewish mother from Jerusalem underscores this point: "there's a sentiment that this school will give the Arab kids an advantage of some sort for their future, which is really okay. But, there are people [Arab community members] that take this too far. They want the services of the school, but don't want to deal with the Jews' nonsense about communities."

Notwithstanding these impressions, all Palestinian parents interviewed displayed significant support to the shared society project when discussing their motivation in enrolling their children to Hand in Hand schools. One Palestinian father from Wadi Ara explains, "we didn't choose to be together, to live together. But it was forced on us. And we have to find the way." The same father explains the interaction of ideological and practical considerations when making his decision, "I had two objectives in coming to the school: the first is to further the dialogue between the two groups, and the second is that I believe in the school as an educational institution." One Palestinian community mobilizer explains the Palestinian group's predicament: "Arabs come because they don't have better alternatives. If we had alternatives that are on the same level pedagogically, and in terms of nurturing identity then Hand in Hand's schools wouldn't have wait lists of 300-400 Palestinian kids." The inequality Israel's Palestinian citizens experience is structural and profound. Although this study finds that both Jewish and Palestinian participants are keenly aware of these inequalities, it appears Jews join Hand in Hand to challenge them while Palestinians join the organization for more practical reasons.

7.5. Palestinian and Jewish Participants' Perceptions of Efficacy

The last measure used to test the SIMCA in this sample uses Likert-type questions to measure participants' perceived efficacy of social movements, bilingual education, and shared society in creating social/political change in Israel. Participants were asked to rate their agreement/disagreement with three questions, with answers ranging from 1, strongly disagree to 5, strongly agree. Answers were combined to create a Perceived Efficacy composite variable. Respondents' reactions to the first statement were reverse coded so they adhere to the direction of the other two statements. The internal reliability of this composite variable is a = .73. Please see Figure 6 for a visual depiction of the components of this composite variable.

Figure 6. Perceptions of Efficacy for Social Change Consistent Across Jewish and Palestinian Respondents

There is little difference between Jewish and Palestinian respondents' perceptions of the potential efficacy of shared society and bilingual education in creating social/political change in Israel. The average score for the Perceived Efficacy composite variable is high for groups, a surprising finding considering the pessimism about the role of Hand in Hand in facilitating social change noted during the ethnography and interviews. During interviews, participants attributed significant efficacy to Hand in Hand's influence on their children, and some efficacy to Hand in Hand's community-building activities on adult participants. However, the potential role of Hand in Hand in fostering social/political change in Israel was recognized as insufficient. One Jewish parent from Jaffa said:

> I'd love for us all to live in peace. For there to be no difference between anyone. That you wouldn't develop an entire lexicon based on how someone looks, or the language they speak or where they live… do I believe that this could happen? No. I don't think so... Definitely not in Israel in 2019. I don't believe Hand in Hand will bring this change... I think Hand in Hand is a microcosm that's very microscopic.

While the survey questions did not ask participants about their perceptions of *Hand in Hand*'s efficacy in creating wider social/political change, qualitative accounts almost exclusively addressed Hand in Hand schools and communities. It is possible that participants perceive the potential efficacy of bilingual education, shared society, and social/political movements in Israel as generally positive (survey data), but when applied to the specific case of Hand in Hand, the efforts of this organization are seen as too small to contribute to the wider change agenda (interviews and ethnographic data).

An independent samples t-test found a statistically significant difference $t(87) = 2.24$, $p < .05$ between Palestinian/Arab (M = 3.64, SD = 1.05) and Jewish (M = 4.13, SD = .85) participants over the potential of social/political movements to affect the Israeli government's decisions. The Jewish-Israeli group appears significantly more optimistic about the potential of social/political movements in Israel to influence the government. This finding connects to a branch of Social Movement theory that discusses polity and privilege, elaborated in the Key Takeaways section of this chapter.

7.6. The Costs Associated with Belonging to Hand in Hand

Both Tilly (1974) and Klandermans (1984) discuss the importance of benefits and costs in motivating or preventing collective action participation. Buechler (2016) clarifies, "collective action always costs something for contenders, and contenders count costs as best they can" acting based on their calculations (p. 129). Klanderman focuses on *perceptions* of costs and benefits rather than treating them as objective, clarifying that social movements can minimize perceived costs and maximizing perceived benefits of participation. During personal interviews, participants identified several costs of being involved with Hand in Hand. One parent said that going to a Hand in Hand school is "a decision that you pay for in many ways, and you need to really want it."

The most common costs identified by both Jewish and Palestinian participants include family disapproval and wider social disapproval. Participants described challenges, like "my parents, especially my dad, still find it really tough the whole subject around Arabs", as well as recounted interactions in which they received criticism for belonging to Hand in Hand. For example, "I'm constantly asked, 'what the hell are you doing?', and I say 'I believe in co-existence.' and people tell you you're crazy." A Palestinian Hand in Hand alumnus reflects, "it was pretty brave of them [his parents] to send their kids away from what was familiar, and they were criticized for it."

While outside of the realm of 'normal' in mainstream Israeli society, it does not seem that Hand in Hand community members experience ostracism or violence resulting from their membership to the organization. A Jewish mom from the Galilee community illuminates this point: "most people look at you weird but don't dare to say anything. It doesn't match the consensus but also doesn't blow people up..." This finding is consistent for both Jews and Palestinian community members. While the costs of enrolling in Hand in Hand appear significant, some costs are unique to each group, and both groups mediate the costs of enrolling their children in Hand in Hand schools in different ways.

7.6.1. Costs Unique to Palestinians

Costs identified uniquely by Arabs/Palestinians include concerns that their schools and communities are a medium for assimilation into the dominant Jewish-Israeli culture. A Palestinian Hand in Hand alumnus

explains, "there's a lot of fear of assimilation, and that everything would become fluid…, this fear is existential in some ways, and I can't really understand it. Like what's so terrible about people mixing?" Although this alumnus possesses open-minded views about identity and inter-religious friendships and relationships, other Hand in Hand community members may not agree. For example, one Palestinian woman from Jaffa shares her fear of assimilation: "It [Hand in Hand] is completely assimilation- there's a chance that my daughter falls in love with a Jew… it's something that happens all the time." As members of a minority group in Israel, and one that has remains largely ambivalent about the legitimacy of the Israeli state, many Palestinian citizens may not wish to assimilate into Jewish-Israeli society. One Jewish father from the Galilee situates these sentiments in a broader analysis:

> Someone said once that [in Israel] the Jews are the majority that feels like a minority, and the Arabs are the minority that feels like the majority… our mentality [as Jews], is that even though we're a majority, we are still experiencing the traumas of the holocaust and still feel persecuted, and under existential threat. We're a strong country that threatens the whole region, but we still feel constantly threatened. And the Arabs feel like they're part of the larger Arab Middle East, even though they're a minority, they feel like the majority.

This analysis explains the mentality of some Jewish and Arab Israelis relative to their histories (the Holocaust versus the Nakba), and demographic affiliations in the region (the Arab Middle East). While anecdotal, this analysis explains some of the complexity inherent in Arab-Israelis' disdain for assimilation. Ultimately, the fear of assimilation could be seen as a barrier for Palestinians' enrollment of their children in Hand in Hand. However, given that Palestinian children are a majority in most Hand in Hand schools, and that waitlists for enrolling in Hand in Hand schools mostly contain Palestinian families, this does not seem to be a significant deterrent to Palestinians' enrollment in Hand in Hand's schools.

7.6.2. Costs Unique to Jews

A significant cost identified by Jewish attendees is sacrificing their children's education at Hand in Hand. Since Israeli Jews have greater access to quality education when compared to Palestinian citizens, their choice to send their child to a Hand in Hand school bears the opportunity cost of not sending them to a better school. This is not merely opportunistic, as some Jewish parents describe their Hand in Hand school as poor and under-resourced. One Jewish interviewee explains, "you need to really want to be involved in this thing. It's not an easy choice for the Jewish parents because they have other options." Another participant agrees, "if you don't come to this school for ideological reasons, the Jewish alternatives are really good, so why should you stay?"

Another cost identified by Jewish participants is the isolation that their child experiences from wider Jewish-Israeli society consequence of their belonging to Hand in Hand. One Jewish-Israeli mother from the Galilee community confirms this point: "to be in Hand in Hand is to not belong to the wider Israeli-Jewish

community." The social isolation experienced by Jewish children is greater for communities in rural areas than in urban areas. One father belonging to the Wadi Ara community describes, "for us, from Pardes Hannah to send the kid to Kfar Kara, which is a twenty something minute drive, is to break the kid's tie from the neighborhood… It's taking them out of the bubble that exists here, and is a decision that has a price." Another father from the Galilee explains that the school "has a fundamental problem in that the distances between communities are large, and most of the Jews come from this area which is 30 minutes from the school and 40 from Sahnin… I don't want to drive that distance."

7.7. Key Takeaways

Integrating ethnographic, interview, and survey data, this results chapter answered the second research question of this thesis: *What motivates Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel to enroll their children in Hand in Hand schools despite the potentially high social cost of doing so?*

7.7.1. Ideology: A Luxury of the Privileged

When making the decision to enroll their children into Hand in Hand schools, Israeli-Arabs are often more driven by practical considerations than ideological ones. The most common reasons include the quality of education and the opportunities that this experience can offer their children. Contrastingly, qualitative and quantitative data suggests that Jewish-Israelis enroll their children in Hand in Hand for the ideology of the school. Palestinian citizens are not opposed to the change sought by the Jewish group, but are less optimistic that their involvement with Hand in Hand can create change.

The ethnically-based perceptions of efficacy found in this sample gives credence to Tilly's (1978) polity model of collective action. The polity is a small circle with privileged access to decision-makers. In today's Israel, decision-making and political power is reserved for Israeli-Jews, and historically, this was limited to the Ashkenazi group. It is therefore unsurprising that the mostly Ashkenazi Israeli Jews in this sample are more optimistic about their ability to influence politics than the Palestinian citizens typically excluded from the polity. Further, the relative optimism of this study's Jewish participants in affecting government decision supports Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) assertions about a) the link between social identity and perceived efficacy, and b) that social identity mediates both perceptions of efficacy and action-readiness for collective action.

7.7.2. The Limits of the Intangible: Concrete Costs and Benefits Matter

The costs associated with joining Hand in Hand were also reviewed in this chapter. It appears that Palestinians' more concrete considerations for joining Hand in Hand result in tangible benefits and fewer costs, while Jews' ideological motivations may not. As suggested by RCI theorists, people make decisions

based on rational calculations of utility; individuals change their behaviour if they expect to benefit from the new behaviour more than they would otherwise (Mackay et al., 2010). For most Israeli Jews, the concrete costs of belonging to Hand in Hand outweigh the benefits, leading to difficulties in recruitment and low retention rates. How Hand in Hand can change the cost/benefit calculous of belonging to Hand in Hand for privileged Israeli-Jews is an important question. A more detailed discussion of the importance of concrete benefits in ensuring student retention with Hand in Hand can be found in the conclusion.

Results Chapter III answers the study's third and main research question, examining the drivers and barriers for participation in Hand in Hand's community-building activities.

8. Results Chapter III. Jumping Hurdles: Building a Shared Society in Israel

The present chapter draws on ethnographic, interview, and survey data to answer the study's third and final research question: *What are the drivers and barriers affecting Jewish-and Palestinian-Israelis' participation in adult community-building activities facilitated by Hand in Hand?* I argue that participants' motivation for first joining Hand in Hand act as a 'primer' for their orientation toward the organization, impacting their attendance of adult peacebuilding activities. In other words, the reasons for first joining Hand in Hand and one's initial perceptions of the organization, including its social change function, influence participation rates in adult community-building. Specifically, members with low Ethos of Conflict rates, politicized social identities, high perceptions of injustice in Israel, and high perceptions of Hand in Hand's efficacy in fostering change are more likely to attend peacebuilding activities.

The first section of this chapter calculates the importance of each of the factors listed above in determining community-building attendance in this sample. Using a multiple linear regression analysis, ideology measured using the Ethos of Conflict is shown to be a better predictor of community activity attendance than social identity, perceptions of injustice, and perceived efficacy in this sample of Jewish and Palestinian peacebuilders. Second, this chapter applies the Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation to demonstrate that Jewish and Palestinian appear to be motivated by different emotional needs when attending community-building activities. Last, this chapter ends with a discussion of the cultural differences between Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel, which including conflicting conceptions of the term 'community', represent significant barriers to building a shared society in Israel.

8.1. The Power of Narratives: Predicting Peacebuilding Participation

A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict survey participants' self-reported attendance of community-building activities based on ideology, social identity, perceptions of injustice, and perceived efficacy. This model was developed based on the hypothesis that both the Ethos of Conflict and the three elements of the SIMCA are important predictors of rates of participation in community activities.

The independent variables used in the multiple linear regression model are: the Ethos of Conflict (ideology), National Identity (social identity) National Identification composite (social identity), Perceptions of Inequality composite (perceived injustice), Experience of Inequality composite (perceived injustice) and Perceived Efficacy composite (perceived efficacy). The dependent variable is Community Activities Participation Rate, comprised of a Likert-type question measuring respondents' self-reported participation rates in Hand in Hand's community activities. Answers to this question ranged from 1, 'I never attend Hand in Hand's community activities' to 5, 'I never miss an activity.' 79% of respondents indicated that they attend 'sometimes', 'a lot', or 'never miss' community activities. Unfortunately, Hand in Hand

does not collect data that would allow for the comparison of this survey sample's attendance rate with that of Hand in Hand's general community population. However, as described in the Research Design and Methodology Chapter, the high attendance rates of this survey's participants indicate that this sample represents the most dedicated community members and may not be representative of the entire Hand in Hand community.

Using Cronk's (2019) SPSS interpretation manual, the Ethos of Conflict, National Identity, National Identification, Perceptions of Inequality, Experience of Inequality, and Perceived Efficacy have a significant effect on Community Activities Participation Rate ($F_{(6, 70)}$ = 4.2, $p < .00$), with an R^2 of .266. Statistical tests show that these predictors explain 26% of variance in Community Activities Participation.

When examining the β coefficients in this model, the only single significant predictor of Community Activities Participation Rate is the Ethos of Conflict (β = -.43 t(.25) = -2.76, $p < .00$). See Table 2 for a visual depiction of the β Coefficient scores in this model. It therefore appears that social identity, perceptions of injustice, and perceptions of efficacy -SIMCA's three elements- are not significant predictors of community activity participation in this sample. Although it did not reach statistical significance, there is a positive relationship between perception of inequality and community activities participation ($p < .06$); participants who perceive high inequality attend community activities more than those who do not.

Table 2. Coefficients of the Multiple Linear Regression Model Predicting Community Activities Participation Rate

	B	Standard Error	β	T	Significance
Model	3.57	1.2	NA	2.94	.00**
Ethos of Conflict	-.68	.25	-.43	-2.76	.01**
National Identity	-.11	.34	-.04	-.33	.75
National Identification	.07	.11	.08	.66	.51
Perceptions of Inequality	.33	.17	.22	1.95	.06*
Experiences of Inequality	.04	.09	.05	.42	.68
Perceived Efficacy	-.15	.17	-.1	-.89	.38

Given these results, a post-hoc linear regression model was used to predict Community Activities Participation Rates using only the Ethos of Conflict independent variable. A significant regression equation was found, demonstrating that the Ethos of Conflict has a significant effect on Community Activities Participation Rate ($F_{(1, 80)} = 16.89$, $p < .00$), with an R^2 of .174. Therefore, this study finds that the Ethos of Conflict can explain 17% of variance in Community Activities Participation Rate. The Beta coefficient in this regression is $\beta = -.701$ $t(.17) = -4.11$, $p < .000$. As shown in the coefficient table below (table 3), the negative β predicts that for every '1' unit of increase in Ethos of Conflict, Community Activities Participation Rates decline by -.7. In other words, those with greater adherence levels to conflict-supporting ideologies participate in community activities less. Further, a strong, significant correlation was found between Ethos of Conflict and Community Activities Participation Rates ($R = -.42$, $p < .00$).

To conclude, the statistical tests performed show a strong, inverse, predictive relationship between the Ethos of Conflict and participation in peacebuilding activities. The higher a community-member's Ethos of Conflict, the less likely they are to participate in community building activities.

Table 3. Coefficients of a Linear Regression Predicting Community Activities Participation Rate Using the Ethos of Conflict

	B	Standard Error	β	T	Significance
Model	4.7	3.6	NA	13.24	.00**
Ethos of Conflict	-.7	.17	-.42	-4.11	.00**

8.2. Satisfying the Emotional Needs of Pragmatic Palestinians and Israeli Ideologues

Following the Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation, an analysis of interview transcripts suggests that Jews and Palestinians attend community-building activities to fulfil different emotional needs. Although each group's emotional needs may motivate individuals to join Hand in Hand in the first place, these needs are especially salient during community activities, and above all, during contact encounters centred around dialogue groups.[18]

8.2.1. Jewish-Israeli Peacebuilders: Managing Guilt and Yearning for Forgiveness

Most Jewish-Israelis are motivated to attend community-building activities because of their desire for change. This appears at least partially motivated by feelings of guilt. One father from Wadi Ara shares that

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[18] Dialogue groups bring together participants from both national groups to discuss various personal, social, and political topics, with the guidance of a trained professional. These can be compared to group therapy sessions.

the Jews who attend community activities are "leftists that come from an apologetic place and are about co-existence." Another parent observes, "it is people that see themselves as social activists, as progressives, that want this to be more of a social movement. But I think most of the left is acting from guilt."

When asked what she believes Jewish community members are looking for in Hand in Hand, a Jewish community mobilizer responded: "Clearing their conscience." She added, "At first, clearing your conscience was done on the backs of your children, and then when the community department was formed, the responsibility shifted to the parents." This quote confirms the evolution of Hand in Hand following Dichter's vision. Before Dichter joined the organization, Jewish and Arab parents' desire to live together was carried out by their children through the schools. Only after the community department was formed were adults offered the opportunity to participate firsthand in shared society peacebuilding.

When discussing their motivation for attending community activities, several Jewish interviewees described feelings of guilt arising from perceiving their group as the conflict's perpetrator. One parent said, "Jews feel guilty toward Arabs. There's no guilt the other way." One Jewish participant describes the importance of showing the other side that she "wants to listen", to show Palestinians that she acknowledges them and the land that was taken from them illegally. Another participant articulates that Palestinians "convey the grief, discrimination, and frustrations they experience. It's important and I want to hear it."

While explaining Jewish-Israelis' role as perpetrator, one Jewish mom from the Beir Berl school asserted that anti-Semitism is weaponized in Israel to maintain a Jewish-Israeli narrative of victimhood: "there is a nation that was a victim… and there is a moment in the psychology of victimhood when the victim becomes the perpetrator, and I feel that there are many parallels between what this nation has gone through and what it is doing to another nation… of course it's not the exact same thing and there are many differences, but still." A few participants convey that owing to their relative superiority in society and commitment to the shared society, "Jews need to try a little harder" and make more sacrifices than their Palestinian counterparts. One participant plays out her interpretation of Jews' and Palestinians' decision-making process regarding community-building activities:

> So the Jews say 'okay I'll commit and go and spend time and effort even if it's not what I want to do in this moment' and the Arabs say 'I sent the kid here so that he learns, and he's learning, and it's not my responsibility to go to this activity. Why should I force myself to go to a stupid kid's birthday on a Saturday morning?'

Some explain the scarce attendance of Palestinians by claiming that Palestinians come to the school for the quality of education provided and are not interested in the social agenda. One participant said: "the Jews are always more active, because they're coming with guilt. When people come with ideology, they want to be more active, participate more, be involved. And the Arabs, by contrast, didn't come with feelings of

guilt, or ideology. They just sign their kids up for a school and the kids will go to school." However, several interviewees identify that Palestinians join Hand in Hand because of the empowerment that it facilitates, not just for the education it provides.

8.2.2. Palestinian-Israeli Peacebuilders: A Quest for Empowerment

A Palestinian community mobilizer explains Palestinians' motivations for attending peacebuilding: "our [Palestinians'] purpose isn't that you [Jews] feel uncomfortable. Our aim is that you give us back our respect, and what you have stolen from us. You can look at is as giving back something, or you can look at it as an apology." Participating in dialogue groups seems to facilitate the empowerment of Palestinians some of the time. One Palestinian interviewee recounts:

> You hear people telling you: "we have to live together, we have to be together, we believe in your rights, we believe in your right to express your opinion, to organize yourself differently, to connect with your sense of nationalism, to express your Arab-ness, to be part of the collective." These are things that you hear from the other side. And you believe that they mean them and aren't saying them to do you any favours. It's quite meaningful… It's encouraging to hear the Israeli left sometimes, because when you lose hope, to hear something encouraging brings you back from your rut... your hope can be restored.

Despite the potential empowerment that Israel's Arab population can gain as a result of shared society peacebuilding, it appears that Palestinians participate in community activities less frequently than Israeli-Jews and may avoid dialogue groups partly because of the oppression they experience in Israel. One community mobilizer describes Palestinian community activity participants as "the strong ones; the veterans. Those that have been part of the community for a few years and have the confidence to come and speak their minds." One Arab community mobilizer explains, "they [Arabs] are not used to it. Say you take an Arab and sit him down and tell him he can say whatever he wants to whoever he wants. Even if it's insulting. Even if it's racist. He won't say it… he'll say, 'everything is all right', 'there are no problems'. 'We're doing okay'. Stuff like that." The same community mobilizer explains that Arabs' reluctance to share their feelings with outgroup members is ever-present, and calls on Palestinians to come to community activities regardless. "We live with this feeling all the time. And why is it important [to attend peacebuilding activities]? Because people willing to listen, open their minds, and share their privilege with me."

The Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation describes that a perpetrator's admission of guilt "creates a kind of 'debt' that only the victim can cancel, and thus returns control to the hands of the victim, who may determine whether the perpetrator will be forgiven and reaccepted into the moral community" (Shnabel and Nadler, 2008, p.117). Hand in Hand appears to facilitate an environment in which Palestinian community-members can express their frustration, thus positioning themselves for empowerment by demanding Jewish-Israelis' recognition of their group's wrongdoings through an apology. Some crimes are not easily

forgiven, however, and some 'debts' may never be settled, rendering reconciliation difficult. One Palestinian participant describes her interpretation of the process of emotional reconciliation:

> I think we can't start on a blank page unless we sit and straighten out the facts and acknowledge where we came from. *[Imitating an Israeli Jew]* "we caused the Nakba, and we killed you, and we're sorry." And from here, we can continue. If you begin a conversation with me in this way, our conversation will reach new ground. If we begin a conversation this way, I'll immediately calm down.

This participant describes Jewish admission of guilt as the starting point to any productive intergroup contact encounter. This may be an ambitious starting point for some Jewish-Israeli participants, depending on their adherence levels to the Ethos of Conflict. Nevertheless, many of Hand in Hand's Jewish members appear willing to perform the ritual.

8.2.3. When Needs Are Not Met: Palestinian Concrete Needs and Jews' Unresolved Guilt as Potential Barriers to Community Building

The expression of emotions during Palestinians' journey of empowerment, combined with Jewish participants' desire to absolve themselves of guilt can pave the road to reconciliation between individuals. Unfortunately, this rarely happens, since the process of asking for forgiveness and granting it can be lengthy and difficult, especially when participants' concrete needs are not met. Satisfying Palestinian citizens' emotional need for empowerment through shared society programming may be insufficient as long as their marginalization in Israeli society continues. Further, if the concrete needs of Israeli-Arabs are not met, their emotional need for empowerment may be harder to satisfy, leading to: a) apathy with the shared society project resulting in infrequent attendance of community activities, and b) unwillingness to forgive Jewish-Israelis, leaving them with unresolved guilt.

A Jewish community mobilizer reflects, "in dialogue groups, you start understanding certain things, like how angry the Arabs are… how much anger there is. How much hatred. How much disappointment…" One Jewish parent admits with implicit frustration, "we always talk about the victim and the perpetrator, and they never change sides." Another, using more direct language, "the narrative is only one way, as in the Jews are the perpetrators and Arabs are the victims… which is not dialogue in my opinion." And lastly, "dialogue is always stuck on this perpetrator and victim. I'm done with it…" A frustrated Jewish community mobilizer was visibly moved as she said the following:

> How do we get out of this loop? Because I said I was in the army. And I said I was shitty. And I said I am sorry. And I understand everything today. And I understand how horrible it all is. And they [Palestinian community members] stay angry at you. And they keep hating you- they keep humiliating you in different ways… In small ways. And they don't forgive…. For how long can I be a carpet for them to step on?

This emotionally charged description of frustration and pain illuminates one person's experience of dialogue groups, and possibly intergroup contact encounters writ large. This participant alleges that despite repeatedly apologizing to her Palestinian counterparts, she never receives their forgiveness.

Jewish-Israelis' need for forgiveness and Palestinians' need for empowerment seem to not always 'fit', and contact encounters and dialogue groups rarely result in the fulfilment of both groups' emotional needs. Once an apology is accepted, and a perpetrator is forgiven, the victim loses the power they have over the perpetrator- a perverse incentive to grant forgiveness for victims seeking empowerment. Given Palestinian citizens of Israel's marginalization, satisfying their emotional need for empowerment may take repeated and significant admission of guilt from Jewish participants. The ceremonious apologies by Jewish participants was observed during the dialogue encounter attended as part of the ethnographic component of this research. As evident in the above quote, however, some Jewish participants find this process depleting, since their emotional need for forgiveness may not be met. This turbulent dynamic sows a problematic ground for building a shared society between Jews and Arabs in Israel, presenting a barrier to peacebuilding attendance and broader reconciliation. This suggests that dialogue activities are possibly bound to fail until Arab-Israelis' concrete needs are met, reinforcing the importance of more tangible goods in reconciliation processes. NI theory clarifies that unequal institutions in Israel represent binding constraints to the shared society project, limiting Hand in Hand's ability to advance its agenda for change despite its best intentions.

8.3. A Collision of East & West: Cultural Differences as Obstacles to Shared Society Peacebuilding

Apart from one, all interview participants discussed cultural differences between Hand in Hand's Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian/Arab-Israeli community members. As said by one participant, Hand in Hand's schools and communities are "a clash of East and West."

8.3.1. Deciphering the Distinct Identities of Each Group

Before diving into the details of the cultural differences raised by participants and how these incompatibilities influence the two groups' interactions, it is important to identify that these cultural differences are specific to the subgroups that constitute the Hand in Hand communities. Palestinians are not a homogeneous group; there are profound differences between Christians and Muslims, divisions between urban and rural communities, not to mention the differences between Gazans, Palestinians in the West Bank, and Israel's Palestinian citizens. However, despite these differences, one can generalize about the traditional, religious, family-oriented nature of most members of the Palestinian national group.

The Jewish-Israeli national group is also heterogeneous, containing ultra-orthodox, national religious, and secular groups, and Ashkenazi, Sephardic, and Mizrahi subgroups (Shohat, 1999). The Jewish-Israelis

that belong to Hand in Hand mostly belong to the secular Ashkenazi sub-group, associated with the Israeli left. As said by one Jewish mom, "I believe that a different population of Jews would collide less with Palestinians, like Mizrahi or religious Jews for example. Mizrahi Jews are similar to Palestinians in the way they host." A community mobilizer recounted that "there are two Mizrahi [Jews in her community] … and it's different. It's different. They always bring up how they're Arab, and they know how to make these distinctions, of how they're more similar to Arabs than they are to other Jews at Hand in Hand…What they experienced [discrimination, marginalization] is similar to what we [Palestinian-Israelis] experienced."

General concerns about cultural differences between Jews and Palestinians at Hand in Hand include Palestinian embarrassment by the conduct of Jewish-Israelis; cultural norms as an obstacle to effective community programming; cultural differences as barriers to friendships in both kids and adults; and the shared society project threatening cultural norms in Palestinian society. Participants articulated different strategies on how to deal with cultural differences. One interviewee argued that community members need to respect differences between them and plan programs while keeping them in mind. Another said that Jews need to be more sensitive to Palestinians' needs. Last, some participants expressed significant pessimism about the potential to bridge cultural gaps. The most significant cultural incompatibility between Hand in Hand's Jewish and Palestinian community members as identified by this research is the two societies' asymmetrical conceptions of the term 'community'.

8.3.2. Fundamental Incompatibilities Between Jews and Arabs: The Concept of 'Community'

A crucial point of cultural asymmetry between Israel's Jewish and Palestinian citizens is the two groups' distinct conceptions of the term 'community'. This difference of opinion has significant bearings; a community trying to bridge two nations is bound to face serious challenges if its members cannot define the term, let alone the community's goals, priorities, and its demands. When asked to define the term 'community' during interviews, Arabs and Jews gave different answers. Some Jewish participants offered their interpretations of the Arab perspective, and some Arab participants offered interpretations of Jewish conceptions.

Hand in Hand's Jewish population adheres to western conceptions of communities and community life. For secular Jewish-Israelis, like for most western people, a community can be defined as one participant does: "a place that's comfortable for you to be in... A community is one with shared ideology and vision." When asked to define the word, one Palestinian community mobilizer recalled, "three years ago, when Hand in Hand called me and asked me to be a community mobilizer, I told them I don't know if I can do this job because I don't know what a community is." Indeed, there is no equivalent for the word 'community' in Arabic (Ethnographic notes, 2018). The same community mobilizer explains that Hand in Hand invented a word, *Mushtama Mahelee*, to represent the concept. Although as described by an Arabic-

speaking Jewish father from Wadi Ara, "the word 'community' doesn't have a replica in Arabic. There is no word that's identical. Every word that you use to translate it, is one that you can lie beside it, and really has a meaning that's a bit different." Not that Arabs exist in isolation from one another, or that community life is scarce in Arab culture: quite the contrary. In Grosbard's (2016) book, Babel, he explains that all of life is community-oriented in traditional Arab society, with little separation between community and private life. Therefore, the concept of 'community' as westerners know is not comprehensible in many Arab societies.

One Palestinian interviewee provided his interpretation of the term community: "for Arabs, the extended family is community. Brothers sisters, and the relationship with them. Grandfather, grandmother, aunts, uncles. Holidays. Strong consistent family contact. That's community. Not to mention friends…. Although the ones that don't live close are out of sight, out of mind." Another Palestinian participant offered that communities are, essentially, "*Chamoolas*… it's a big family. There's dad, mom and kids, and there's the *Chamoola*. Which is 2000 people… *Chamoola* is a big community, and what we have in common is blood. No one built it… you don't build communities in Arab society, it comes from the village- we get married. We don't build them. We have our own codes. Building a community, that's not us." This interviewee mentions that communities are not built; they are forged through familial ties. This illuminates the difficulties inherent in Hand in Hand's community-building project: how can this NGO build sustainable shared communities for two nations, when the concept is inapplicable to one of the two groups?

8.3.3. Cultural Differences and Social Costs

The cultural differences described also contribute to the costs of being a member of Hand in Hand, as examined in the second results chapter. For all Palestinian-Israelis and those Israeli Jews living in 'community-settlements' or Kibbutzes, Hand in Hand may compete with other social commitments. Those actively attending community activities may sometimes do so instead of other social roles, representing a significant cost and barrier to attending peacebuilding activities. One father explains:

> Social life in the village takes a large toll… A village is a community that you don't choose. You were born into it, and you're committed to it because you were born there and you live there. People can knock on your door without telling you ahead of time and you have to cancel your plans and host them. There are all kinds of familial/social commitments, and if you don't live up to the expectations, you pay a large social price. You're seen as impolite, not social, not nice. They make you pay a price- they stop shopping in your store… so you can't be committed to that [village life] and to come to meetings with Jews, because in that moment you want to be with your friend, or you're dead tired… Arabs' lives are structured differently [than Jews' lives] within their communities.

As observed in the ethnographic portion of this research, Hand in Hand's communities compete with Palestinians' other responsibilities. In addition, in the Galilee and Wadi Ara Hand in Hand sometimes

competes with Israeli-Jews' 'community-settlements' or Kibbutzes. For all Arab community members and Israeli-Jews that live in community-settlements/kibbutzes, participating in Hand in Hand's community activities costs social capital, since it can be perceived as a rejection of their pre-existing social obligations. An important area for Hand in Hand to explore is how to attract Jews from community-settlements/kibbutzes and Palestinians, given their already busy community lives.

8.4. Key Takeaways

Integrating ethnographic, interview, and survey data, this chapter answered the third research question of this thesis: *What are the drivers and barriers effecting Jewish-and Palestinian-Israelis' participation in adult community-building activities facilitated by Hand in Hand?*

8.4.1. The Power of Narratives: Predicting Peacebuilding Participation

One issue analyzed in this thesis is the influence of Palestinians'/Israelis' narratives on the behaviour of those that should be most resistant to them: Jewish-and Arab-Israeli peacebuilders. Missing from other models explaining collective action participation, this study demonstrates that ideology can be a substantial driver and barrier to attending peacebuilding. Specifically, this study finds that the Ethos of Conflict can explain 17% of variance in Hand in Hand community members' attendance in peacebuilding activities: the higher a community member's Ethos of Conflict levels, the less likely that individual is to participate. This finding has substantial theoretical and practical implications, discussed in the concluding chapter below.

8.4.2. Beyond Coexistence: Shared Society, Shared Identity?

In dialogue groups, Hand in Hand's mostly progressive Jewish community members take on the role of perpetrator and express the need to be personally forgiven for their group's wrongdoing. On the other hand, Arab-Israeli community members embody victims, demonstrating the need for empowerment. Participants report that these emotional needs affect their decisions to attend community-building activities and their impressions of the shared society project. Satisfying these emotional needs is exceedingly challenging because of how incompatible they might be. The solution to overcoming this barrier may be unexpected: instead of attempting to satisfy each group's emotional needs, could shared society peacebuilding draw from constructivist theories of identity to undermine the categories which lead to them in the first place? The conclusion below explores whether challenging static ethnic conceptions of identity and manufacturing new ones is a plausible solution to the impasse presented by the needs-based model.

8.4.3. A Collision of East and West: Cultural Differences as Obstacles to Shared Society Peacebuilding

Representing another binding constraint hobbling shared society peacebuilding in Israel, cultural mismatches between Palestinian/Arab-and Jewish-Israelis are often perceived as completely undermining

Hand in Hand's shared society project: "Jews and Arabs together is a fantasy. We live in different worlds." Sometimes, these cultural differences are seen as something that needs to be accepted and not necessarily challenged: "we need to accept the differences between our nations, and we need to respect them. We don't need to change them." Most commonly however, cultural differences are treated as a barrier to the successful facilitation and participation of shared society programming. Indeed, cultural incompatibilities between Hand in Hand's populations, including different conceptions of the term 'community' may be more fundamental than they may seem, bearing the potential to undermine the entire shared society project.

9. Conclusion

This dissertation studies *Hand in Hand: Center for Jewish-Arab Education in Israel* as an island of civility embedded in an ethos of conflict. It examines motivation for participation, binding constraints, and the potential for social change in shared society peacebuilding between Palestinian and Jewish citizens of Israel. Specifically, this research extends previous work (e.g. Lazarus, 2017; Bar-Tal, 2012; 2004; and Bekerman, 2007) to provide a snapshot of Hand in Hand's community-building programming and make recommendations for its improvement. Survey, interview, and ethnographic data were gathered to understand the evolution of Hand in Hand from a small grassroots organization to a multimillion-dollar NGO; capture ordinary citizens' motivation for joining Hand in Hand; and distill the drivers and barriers preventing and pushing participants to attend peacebuilding activities.

Most of the literature on Hand in Hand treats it as a network of schools. The literature has focused on providing micro-level analyses of one Hand in Hand school, the Jerusalem flagship school, using qualitative methodologies and a limited scope. This thesis shifts the focus of the literature on Hand in Hand from its depiction as a collection of static schools to a SMO that challenges the segregated Israeli status quo with an inclusive, shared vision of the future.

Progressive education in intractable conflicts almost always begins as collective action, championed by a small group of passionate individuals aiming to achieve social change (Bar-Tal, 2004). Drawing on sociological institutionalism and constructivist social movement theory, this dissertation suggests that Hand in Hand represents a social movement that challenges the cultural norms and ideological frames (i.e. institutions) that keep Arabs and Jews separate in Israel. It does so by providing a shared set of norms and frames, anchored by a shared society master frame.

This concluding chapter will review the limitations of this study and draw on the analysis provided in the main body of the thesis to explore its theoretical and practical implications.

9.1. Methodological Limitations

The results of this study are constrained by considerable methodological limitations, which limit their generalizability. First, the sample sizes were relatively small, and a larger sample would have been desirable, especially for the survey (n = 107). The limitations presented by this relatively small number are compounded by the uneven number of Jewish (n = 71) and Palestinian (n = 26) participants and inconsistent participation across Hand in Hand's different communities. Meaningfully generalizing from this sample to the wider Hand in Hand community, Israeli and Palestinian peacebuilders, and peacebuilders around the world must be qualified.

On the issue of sampling: acute time constraints and the absence of material incentives presented a challenge for participant recruitment increasing the likelihood that only passionate individuals self-selected to participate in the study. This sample contains a disproportionate number of frequent attendees of Hand in Hand's community activities. Given the small number of attendees per activity relative to Hand in Hand's entire community population, and the survey sample's relatively high attendance rate (79% of respondents indicated that they attend 'sometimes', 'a lot', or 'never miss' a Hand in Hand community activity), participants may not be representative of the broader community of parents, teachers, and NGO staff.

While mixed methods can be seen as a strength of the present study since they allowed the researcher to pull from diverse data sources, ensuring a holistic theory is constructed, they are a weakness as well. The use of mixed-methods and the large amount of data collected allowed the researcher to select what data to report and what to omit, increasing the risk of confirmation bias. While meaningfully presenting and analyzing all data collected would have been impossible, the following represents a lesson learned for future research: fewer, more carefully selected data points make for a more rigorous, precise analysis.

Lastly, there was an absence of synergies between survey and interviews. The survey was focused only on Hand in Hand's community-building activities, while the interviews were much more open ended. While this was a product of working closely with the organization (since Hand in Hand carefully vetted the survey and had no influence over the interviews), more alignment would have been beneficial. For example, the survey could have included a fixed or open-ended question asking participants why they decided to enroll their children in Hand in Hand's schools. Absent this question, the first results chapter of this dissertation was more speculative (by relying on the Ethos of Conflict and the SIMCA) when providing an explanation of participants' decision to first join Hand in Hand.

Despite these limitations, the present study is useful to understanding social movement organizations and community peacebuilding in intractable contexts, both in theoretical and practical terms.

9.2. Theoretical Implications

9.2.1. The Primacy of Ripeness: Spurring Change in Intractable Contexts

For an organization like Hand in Hand to enter the mainstream in divided and ethnocentric Israel, a certain 'ripeness' is required (Bar-Tal, 2002). Constructivist social movement theories suggest that ripeness can sometimes be achieved through collective action. During interviews, participants referred to Hand in Hand's wider social impact as creating a ripple effect by showing that a shared society between Jews and Palestinians in Israel is not mere fiction. Similarly, social movement theory suggests that "movement frames often challenge rival frames of dominant interests" (Buecheler, 2016 p.150). By demonstrating that a shared society between Jews and Palestinians in Israel is possible, Hand in Hand creates "a contested discourse… [one that] exposes frame vulnerabilities in the official package" (Gamson, 1988, p.228). Drawing from constructivist social movement theory, Hand in Hand alters the culture around an issue (Jewish/Arab coexistence), undermines official frames (that support segregation), and uses counter frames (about shared society) for future movement efforts toward related topics (Gamson, 1988). Nevertheless, this relatively optimistic depiction of movements' abilities to foster change should be accompanied by a healthy serving of skepticism, especially in the current Israeli context.

During the fieldwork period, it was noted that Hand in Hand employees were hopeful that the organization will be better positioned to catalyze more change when the current political climate or master narrative shifts, beginning with a change in the Israeli government (Ethnographic notes, 2018). Whether a change in government would lead to endogenous shock and ripeness is difficult to predict. The conditions that signal ripening or approaching political openings would be an important subject of further research, and is compatible with Tarrow's (1994) work on the cyclical nature of protest. As an example of the incremental changes that culminate in a moment of ripeness, one interviewee identifies that by being recognized as an official stream of education in Israel, Hand in Hand could have the impact it craves. This begs important theoretical questions about the potential of movements in creating change outside of moments of ripeness. For now, however, most interviewees are more concerned with Hand in Hand's survival in the short term rather than fretting about maximizing its impact on society.

9.2.2. Ideology and its Importance: Suggestions for a New Framework

Given the connection between the communities and schools, there is often significant overlap in participants' motivations for joining Hand in Hand and attending community-building activities. Answering the study's second RQ (w*hat motivates Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel to enroll their children in Hand in Hand schools despite the potentially high social cost of doing so?)* therefore provides the background to answering the third RQ (w*hat are the drivers and barriers effecting Jewish-and Palestinian-Israelis' participation in adult community-building activities facilitated by Hand in Hand?).* The motivation

to first join Hand in Hand can be seen as a primer for someone's orientation toward the organization, linked to participation in community-building activities.

Although Palestinians/Arabs are a majority in Hand in Hand's schools, Jewish community members attend community-building activities more often (Hand in Hand, 2019). Consequently, Hand in Hand is curious to understand *why*, and whether it can offset this trend to spur more equal participation. This question is important, as it speaks to broader motivation for participating in peacebuilding in other intractable conflict situations.

This thesis uses a multiple linear regression analysis to demonstrate that ideology measured using the Ethos of Conflict is a better predictor of community activity attendance than the three elements of Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) SIMNCA (social identity, perceptions of injustice, and perceived efficacy) in this sample of Jewish and Palestinian peacebuilders. That is, the higher a community-member's Ethos of Conflict, the less likely the individual is to participate in peacebuilding. This finding is a reminder that peace activism in intractable conflict contexts is attractive mostly to those already supportive of its goals. The theoretical implications of this finding are potentially significant, since it highlights that an important factor is missing from the literature on motivation for social movement participation. Especially relevant in intractable conflicts, ideology could be included in integrated models explaining collective action participation, like Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) SIMCA.

How can organizations transform incentive structures and ideological frames to spur greater participation in peacebuilding? How can organizations use peacebuilding to challenge ideologies, and undermine the Ethos of Conflict, either directly or indirectly? Future research could answer these questions by collecting baseline data on individuals' Ethos of Conflict levels before and after peacebuilding interventions, in comparison to a control. A complementary study could test the 'ripple effects' reported by several of this study's participants and examine the relationship between indirect exposure to peacebuilding (i.e. awareness of its existence), the Ethos of Conflict, and support for peace or compromise.

This finding has practical implications as well: since peace activism in intractable conflict contexts is attractive mostly to those already supportive of the goals of the intervention, its direct impact on participants' beliefs and behaviors (e.g. support for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, voting behavior) is probably limited. That ideology predicts collective action participation in this study is illustrative of the binding constraints facing peace activism in intractable contexts: How can peacebuilding challenge people's adherence to the Ethos of Conflict if only those with lower Ethos of Conflict levels attend peacebuilding? The pervasive Ethos of Conflict therefore limits the recruitment base of Israeli shared society peacebuilders to the shrinking number of individuals already ideologically aligned. This

underscores the need for recruiting diverse participants to peacebuilding, the necessity of offering tangible benefits to those that may not be ideologically aligned, and the enormous challenges of doing both of these.

9.2.3. Satisfying Irreconcilable Emotional Needs

The degree to which the Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation applies to victim vs. victim conflicts is an interesting area of social psychology research (Noor et al., 2012). In intractable conflict situations like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Ethos of Conflict and three of its components- Justness of Goals, In-Group Victimization, and Positive Collective Self-Image - are held on both sides (Bar-Tal, 2009). Neither group assumes responsibility of 'perpetrator'. Shnabel and Nadler (2008) offer little clarification on how the Need-Based Model of Reconciliation may work in this scenario. It is likely, however, that through the reconciliation process, the 'role' of each group in the conflict (i.e. victim or perpetrator) is clarified through the emotional demands posed by members of the groups. For example, in a reconciliation process between Israelis and Palestinians, even though both sides may claim to be victims at the hands of the other, the interaction between the groups will lead to the expression of the different needs of both sides. This, supposition could benefit from more empirical study.

Even in cases where there is a clear victim and perpetrator, it appears that peacebuilding rarely satisfies the two groups' emotional needs, since the process of asking for forgiveness and granting it can be lengthy and difficult, especially when concrete needs are not met. This suggests that dialogue activities may be bound to fail until Arab-Israelis' material needs are satisfied, underscoring the importance of more tangible goods in reconciliation processes. The need to improve the lives of Israel's Arab citizens is another manifestation of binding constraints resulting from the ethos of conflict, as it limits the abilities of shared society initiatives like Hand in Hand to provide a platform for emotional reconciliation. For the time being, Hand in Hand should continue trying to provide contact and dialogue encounters planned and facilitated by experts to allow for the best chances of satisfying participants' emotional needs. One Palestinian interviewee suggested that communities should try facilitating dialogue groups in separate national groups at first, later combining the two nationalities when participants feel prepared for the exchange. The optimal format and structure for effective contact encounters has been the subject of significant literature (see: Maoz, 2011), though best practices for embedding these meetings in the context of quotidian shared-society peacebuilding could be the subject of interesting future work.

9.2.4. Beyond Coexistence: Shared Society, Shared Identity?

Following the Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation, Palestinians' journey toward empowerment combined with Jewish participants' resolution of guilt can pave the road to reconciliation between individuals participating in shared society peacebuilding in Israel (Shanbel and Nadler, 2008). However, these interactions rarely satisfy participants' emotional needs, since the process of asking for forgiveness

and granting it can be lengthy and difficult. More often than not, dialogue groups where emotional needs are meant to be reconciled result in frustration and needs aired but not fulfilled.

As described in the Literature Review, Kuttner (2017) argues that fixed conceptions of group identities are myths that hardly correspond to complicated realities. Instead, social constructivists suggest that identities are constructed and reconstructed *in situ* during interactions. Constructivist social movement theorists propose that through framing, different actors are able to elucidate architypes and attribute them characteristics and motivations (Hunt, Benford, and Snow, 1994). Further, political identities, such as 'Palestinian' or 'Jewish-Israeli', and narratives of 'wounded victims', or 'immoral perpetrators' are also socially constructed, "created in the course of social movement activity" (Taylor and Whittier, 1992, p.109). Instead of buying into these moulds, Kuttner argues that peacebuilders should build programming that recognizes the fluidity with which identity is constantly formed and reformed, and deconstruct Jewish and Palestinian collective narratives to focus on "co-constructing their joint reality, joint future, and joint identity" (Kuttner, 2017, p.179). This line of thinking is intriguing: if Hand in Hand's community members cease to view themselves as Jewish or Palestinian, and instead construct a shared identity, their potentially irreconcilable emotional needs would be resolved.

Findings from this research, however, suggest that this proposition is disconnected from realities on-the-ground. As first disclosed in Results Chapter II, both Palestinian-and Jewish-Israelis in this sample report moderate attachment to their national groups. On average, Palestinian/Arab participants self-report stronger identification with their national identity (M = 3.77) than Jewish participants (M = 2.96). Crucially, an independent samples t-test found a statistically significant difference t (87) = -3.26, $p < .05$ between the mean National Identification composite scores of Palestinian/Arab (M = 3.4, SD = 1.62) and Jewish (M = 2.9, SD = 1.06) participants. National Identification is negatively correlated with the Ethos of Conflict, p <.000 R = .43. This suggests that while conceptually intriguing, having groups of Jewish and Palestinian Israelis forego their ethnic and national identities in order to co-construct an alternative is improbable, since ethnic groups and identities are "persistent, resilient and robust, capable of eliciting deep loyalty, intense attachment and strong motivations, and, in consequence particularly resistant to change" (Ruane and Todd, 2004, p.209). It does appear that progressive ideology is correlated with lower national identification, hinting that progressives that are less attached to their national identities may exhibit greater willingness to engage in co-creating an alternative identity. However, this is highly speculative and would need further study. The sequencing of more relational understandings of group identity in broader processes of reconciliation in ethno-centric conflict situations could be an interesting topic of further work.

9.3. Practical Implications

9.3.1. Limited Resources and Diverse Mandates: The Juggling Act of Change Organizations

As Mary Kaldor (2013) identifies, every conflict has 'islands of civility' that the international community should find, support, and protect. In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Hand in Hand and similar shared society peacebuilding initiatives represent such islands. The renewal of USAID's grant enables Hand in Hand to continue its community-building work, without which this area of programming may have been discontinued. This underscores the importance of international funding for resource-strapped SMOs that challenge dominant frames and promote alternatives in intractable contexts.

Mediated by the USAID grant, Hand in Hand's shift from an education provider to a facilitator of peacebuilding remains controversial. Hand in Hand's difficulties running both communities and schools were raised by several interviewees, who believe that community programming is an inefficient use of resources, when these resources should instead be spent on the schools. As one interviewee identifies, "if we want to bring Jews into these schools, because that's the challenge- to bring Jews into these schools- then we need to be the best schools in the country." Hand in Hand may have difficulty running 'the best schools in the country' if a large portion of the organization is geared toward building shared communities for adults. This finding is a lesson in the challenges facing organizations with limited resources and diverse mandates. Such organizations must sometimes sacrifice scaling or quality for more diverse programming, if they believe programmatic diversity is advantageous. Hand in Hand's raison d'être is to create social change in Israel. Presently, it does so through education and community-building. However, the ways in which Hand in Hand pursues its social change objectives will likely continue to evolve in reaction to its successes and failures, the turbulent political context, and its need for more sustainable recruitment and retention of (especially Jewish) participants. SMOs may be forced to continue juggling limited resources and diverse mandates until they fail or get taken up by society's major institutions.

9.3.2. Recruitment as Anticipating Cost/Benefit Calculations

While social movement theory tends to focus on agency and change, institutionalist theories emphasise constraint and path-dependence. This thesis' focus on motivation illustrates the enormous difficulty of recruiting for shared society peacebuilding in Israel, which comes down to calculations of costs and benefits, since "collective action always costs something for contenders, and contenders count costs as best they can", acting based on their calculations (Buechler, 2016, p. 129).

Battling against the prevailing Ethos of Conflict and other powerful institutions, SMOs like Hand in Hand are prone to de-legitimization and resistance, affecting perceived costs and benefits of participation (Klandermans, 1984). As described in Results Chapter II, it appears that Palestinians' more concrete considerations for joining Hand in Hand result in tangible benefits, while Jews' social change motivations

may not. For most Israeli Jews, the costs of belonging to Hand in Hand often outweigh the benefits, leading to difficulties in recruitment and low retention rates.

Why some people desire bilingual inclusive education for their children while others do not is an important question. Given Hand in Hand's long waitlists for Palestinians and difficulty recruiting and retaining Jews in their schools, it seems that most Israeli Jews' desire for social change is not strong enough to endure the costs of having their children enrolled in these schools. On the other hand, given their practical motivations and concrete incentives, Palestinians are tangibly rewarded to enroll and stay with Hand in Hand due to the advantages this offers: better quality of education than alternatives, excellent Hebrew language skills, better understanding of Jewish-Israeli culture, and more opportunities in their future. Judging by the low dropout rates of Palestinian children, it appears that for Palestinians, the costs of enrolling one's children in Hand in Hand are offset by the benefits (Ethnographic notes, 2018).

If Hand in Hand hopes to continue scaling up its shared schools and communities in the absence of political ripeness, it must find a way to motivate Jewish-Israelis to enroll their children for more practical reasons. As described by one NGO staff member, Hand in Hand has to "at all times be very good schools, we have to do the Jewish-Arab thing well at all times, and we have to scale up at all times…. We have to do all three well at all times without a lot of room to fail." Providing high-quality education and negotiating the difficulties of shared society peacebuilding is indeed necessary for expansion. However, to meet its goal of scaling up to 15 communities across Israel, Hand in Hand will likely need to recruit Jewish families outside the ideologically aligned peace camp, since the concrete benefits it can offer to the privileged group that makes up its Jewish membership are limited.

The need to diversify peacebuilding programming to target different demographics can be generalized to Israeli-Palestinian shared society peacebuilding writ large. Finding an audience for peacebuilding in national religious, orthodox, and Mizrahi Jews is a challenge for the Israeli-Palestinians peace movement (Lazarus, 2017). Tapping into these large sub-groups enable Hand in Hand to better attract and retain Jewish families, since it can offer them more tangible benefits, most notably, an excellent education for a relatively low cost. A more diverse Jewish-Israeli group would increase the impact of Hand in Hand, extending peacebuilding's 'ripple effect' far beyond circles of peace-camp supporters. However, recruiting from these demographics may require shared society projects to sacrifice some of the inclusivity and pluralism for which they stand – a price that may be too costly to bear. Unless it can diversify its recruitment to present more practical incentives to a broader population of Israeli Jews, Hand in Hand's scaling up is likely to remain hamstrung by its difficulty attracting and retaining Jewish students.

On the Palestinian side of the equation, Hand in Hand's challenge remains attracting its members to participate in community-building activities. During interviews, several participants suggested that Hand in Hand should mandate peacebuilding participation for adults as a condition for enrolling one's child in a Hand in Hand school. While this solution may increase attendance, it may not result in sincere buy-in to the peacebuilding programme, and may result in a reduction in the quality of programming provided, ultimately fracturing the core community. Hand in Hand should consider exploring mandatory adult participation in peacebuilding activities, although it should remain cautious of the potentially adverse effects of doing so.

9.3.3. Cultural Differences and Their Consequences

A significant barrier to the successful facilitation of and participation in shared society programming in Israel are the cultural differences found between peacebuilders' Jewish-and Arab-Israeli participants. Overcoming the cultural differences barrier involves bridging profound incompatibilities, including conflicting conceptions of the term 'community'. This incompatibility is fundamental, and has the potential to undermine the entire shared society project: if Arabs do not see communities as things that are built while Jews do, their engagement in the shared community reveals the asymmetrical power balance between the two groups. Further, this is indicative of the ownership of the Jewish group over something that is meant to be shared. The absence of comparable communities in the Arab world suggests that building a shared society is perhaps a mechanism for assimilating Arab-Israelis into Jewish-Israeli culture; by participating in community-building, this group adopts a way of seeing the world that it would not have otherwise adopted. However, by corroborating shared ownership of the community-building project between Palestinian and Jewish stakeholders, Hand in Hand can ensure that it is truly striving toward achieving its goal of creating a shared society. It is important to remember Lazarus's (2017) argument as presented in the Literature Review: in a context dominated by the Hebrew language, Jewish religion, and Israeli-Jewish national narrative, empowering the Arabic language, Christian and Muslim religions, and Palestinian narratives by promoting equality between Israeli and Palestinian national identities is better than any segregated alternative. Regardless, different conceptualizations of the concept of 'communities' and other cultural differences present constant and significant obstacles to shared society peacebuilding in Israel.

As described in the third results chapter of this dissertation, the cultural differences between Hand in Hand's Jewish and Palestinian community members are a product of the interaction between the specific sub-groups that comprise the Hand in Hand population. The Jews that belong to Hand in Hand largely come from the secular, Ashkenazi sub-group associated with the Israeli left. As said by one Jewish mom, "a different population of Jews would collide less with Palestinians, like Mizrahi Jews or religious Jews." Hand in Hand may find it easier to build communities between Palestinians and Eastern (Mizrahi) Jews

whose ancestors can be traced back to the MENA region. This represents more evidence for the need to diversify the participants of shared society peacebuilding in Israel.

9.4. Final Reflections

In an intractable conflict context like today's Israel and Palestine, widespread adoption of a coexistence mindset represents an enormous challenge. This research argues alongside Bar-Tal (2004) that transforming intractable conflicts can only happen when the time is ripe. Ripeness, however, does not happen by itself, and in its absence, conflict transformation through peacebuilding may be possible, but demands significant investment and uptake.

Trump's so-called *Deal of the Century*, while supported by some, is seen by Palestinians and Jewish-Israeli progressives as legitimizing the annexation of illegally occupied land for political gain, plundering peace through American-backed aggression (Haket, 2019). Trump's peace plan, Netanyahu's indictment, the Nation State Law, and the rise of radical militant parties like *Jewish Power* represent the boiling over of a constantly simmering pot. Covid-19 and its effects, including the physical shutdown of Israel and the OPTs (alongside the rest of the world) and its accompanying economic recession add even more uncertainty to the fray. Despite these dramatic events, however, mayhem and uncertainty are not new to Israelis and Palestinians. The freezing of meaningful progress toward equality and peace on the political level underscores the need for more bottom-up, grassroots-level intervention. The potential efficacy of these interventions in an age of physical distancing is likely limited. The effects of the pandemic on peacebuilding in Israel and Palestine as well as elsewhere is concerning, and will require careful investigation.

While mainstream political willingness to engage in peacebuilding remains low in both Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli societies, islands of civility in an Ethos of conflict have not yet stopped engaging with hope for a better future. This thesis' final assertion follows Dichter (2014), Lazarus (2017), and ALMEP (2019), to suggest that in today's intractable climate, Israeli peacebuilding organizations like Hand in Hand are likely to remain hamstrung by short term interventions and inadequate funding. The need for consistent, reliable funding and widespread programming can be addressed through an International Peacebuilding Fund for Israel and Palestine, replicating the International fund for Ireland launched 12-years before the historic Good Friday Agreements. With the help of large scale investment and adequate incentive structuring, groups of Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian peacebuilders could reach the critical mass needed to reduce binding constraints and transform today's Israel and Palestine. Otherwise, they will remain small islands of civility, slowly submerged by the surrounding Ethos of Conflict.

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Annex A: Community Questionnaire Email Invite

הזדמנות להשתתף במחקר ייחודי על הקהילה שלנו!

فرصة للمشاركة في بحث مميز عن م جتمعاتنا المحلي!

Participate in a unique research project on our community!

من يجب- يؤثّر!	مي שעונה – משפיע/ה!
للإجابة باللغة العربية، الرجاء الضغط هن	למענה בשפה העברית, נא ללחוץ כאן

ان كنت عضو/ة في يدًا بيد ومهم لك التأثير على بلورة اشكال النشاط في مجتمعاتنا المحلية-

انت مدعو/ة للمشاركة في بحث فريد من نوعه والذي يفحص أنماط مشاركة أهالي يدًا بيد فيالفعاليات الجماهيرية المختلفة. يقوم بالبحث طالب للقب الثاني, يوعاد افيتسور, من جامعة أوتوا في كندا.

نتائج البحث ستساعدنا في فهم اهتمامات عضوات واعضاء مجتمعاتنا المحلية لملائمة الفعاليات الجماهيرية لرغباتكم. للمشاركة في البحث يرجى تعبئة الاستمارة المحوسبة بالعبرية او العربية او الانجليزية, بواسطة الحاسوب او الهاتف الخلوي. مدة الاستمارة ٢٠ دقيقة.

من يرغب في التعمق, سيتواصل معه\ا الباحث لمقابلة شخصية لمدة ٤٥ دقيقة. الاجابات ستبقى سرية والمعلومات ستكون محمية. نتائج البحث هدفها عرض وفهم أنماط المشاركة العامة والتوجهات وليس اجابات شخصية او خاصة بمجتمع معين او أخر.

אם את/ה חבר/ה ביד ביד וחשוב לך להשפיע על איך תראה הקהילה שלנו – מוזמנ/ת להשתתף במחקר ייחודי שבוחן את דפוסי ההשתתפות של חברי יד ביד בפעילויות הקהילתיות השונות.

את המחקר עורך עבור עמותת יד ביד יועד אביצור סטודנט לתואר שני מקנדה. תוצאות המחקר יעזרו לנו להבין מה מעניין אותך ומה פחות במטרה להתאים את פעילות הקהילה לצרכים ולרצונות שלך. המחקר מורכב משאלון מקוון בעברית, ערבית או אנגלית, שניתן למלא במחשב או במכשיר הסלולרי. אורך השאלון הוא כ 20 דקות.

לאחר מכן, אם תהי/ה מוכנ/ה להעמיק, עורך המחקר ייצור איתך קשר ותשבו יחד לפגישה אישית של כ 45 ד'.

כמובן שכל התשובות הן חסויות וכל המידע מוגן. תוצאות המחקר יציגו מגמות ולא תשובות אישיות של אדם זו או אחר/ת.

120

We want to hear your thoughts!

If you are a Hand in Hand community member and you want to have your voice heard, this is for you!

You are invited to participate in a study conducted by Hand in Hand in collaboration with Yoad Avitzur, a Master's student from the University of Ottawa, Canada.

The study seeks to better understand the Hand in Hand community, and the results of this research will help us match our activities to your interests.

The research is comprised of a 20 minute online questionnaire that can be filled on a smartphone, tablet, or computer in the language of your choice: Hebrew, Arabic, or English. At the end of the survey you will be invited to share your contact information if you wish to participate in an anonymous 45 minute personal interview with the researcher.

Importantly, all data collected will remain completely anonymous, and only the researcher will have access to the raw data.

Annex B: English Language Survey

Hand in Hand Community Questionnaire
Welcome Page

Dear Participants,

I would like to thank you on behalf of Hand in Hand: the Center for Jewish and Arab Education in Israel for taking the time to fill out the following questionnaire.

The short-term purpose of the questionnaire is to better understand how Hand in Hand community members, like you, view themselves, Israeli society, and their experiences with Hand in Hand. The wider goal is to gain knowledge on the longer-term implications of bilingual coexistence education in Israel.

The following survey is being conducted by Yoad Avitzur, an M.A. candidate from the University of Ottawa, Canada, in association with Hand in Hand for his Master's thesis titled: "Transformative Peace Education: Looking Beyond the Classroom".

The questionnaire should take 20 minutes of your time and is completely anonymous.

At the end of the questionnaire, you will have the opportunity to provide your name, email address, and phone number if you wish to be contacted for an interview to discuss your experience with Hand in Hand in more detail. **Your personal information will be immediately disassociated from your survey responses.**

Thank you for your cooperation!

Yoad Avitzur

M.A. Candidate, the University of Ottawa, Canada

Mohamad Marzouk

Director of Communities, Hand in Hand

Consent

Your responses to the survey will be kept confidential; your answers will be collected by Surveymonkey and data will be downloaded to a secure hard drive. Due to the online nature of the data collection, security of the data cannot be guaranteed during transmission. Only Yoad Avitzur and a trained research assistant will have access to the data files. The digital data will be kept in an encrypted file and deleted seven years after the collection of this data. In order to minimize the risk of security breaches and to help ensure your confidentiality, we recommend that you use standard safety measures such as signing out of your account, closing your browser and locking your screen or device when you are no longer using them/when you have completed the study.

While completing this survey, you might experience some discomfort. Participation in the survey is voluntary and you have the right to stop the survey at any time without suffering any negative consequences. If you choose to withdraw, data gathered until the time of withdrawal will be automatically saved by Surveymonkey, and may be used by the researcher for analysis.

This survey's ethics has been approved by the University of Ottawa's Research Ethics Board. If you have any questions, please contact the Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research, University of Ottawa +1 (613) 562-5387 or by email at: ethics@uottawa.ca.

The host of the online survey (Surveymonkey) may automatically collect participant data without their knowledge (i.e., IP addresses). Although this information may be provided or made accessible to the researcher, it will not be used or saved on the researcher's system.

You are invited to continue to the survey portion of this research. By completing the survey, you are giving your consent to participate in this research study. The results will be shared with the Hand in Hand team as well as presented in a variety of formats, including reports, workshops, and lectures. Research findings may also be submitted to peer-reviewed academic journals, some of which may be open-access. Alternatively, you can request an executive summary copy of the key findings by contacting the researcher directly through email

It is recommended that you print a copy of this consent form for your records.

Hand in Hand Community Questionnaire

Background

You will be asked to answer several types of questions over the course of the survey. You are asked to answer all questions honestly. There are no right or wrong answers; the best answers are those that accurately and truthfully reflect your thoughts and/or beliefs.

* 1. What best describes your relationship with Hand in Hand?

☐ One or more of my children are enrolled in a Hand in Hand school

☐ One or more of my grandchildren are enrolled in a Hand in Hand school

☐ I am a Hand in Hand alumnus

☐ I work at Hand in Hand (in the schools/for the organization)

Other. Please describe:

[   ]

* 2. Which community do you belong to?

◯ Jerusalem

◯ Wadi Ara

◯ The Sharon Triangle (Kfar-Saba/Tira)

◯ Jaffa

◯ Galilee

◯ Haifa

3. How long have you been with Hand in Hand?

[   ]

* 4. Age:

[   ]

* 5. Gender:

◯ Male

◯ Female

◯ Other

* 6. Maternal Language:

○ Arabic ○ Hebrew ○ English

Other:

_____

* 7. City of birth:

_____

* 8. What is your nationality?:

_____

* 9. Are you an Israeli citizen?

○ Yes ○ No

* 10. Religion:

○ Judaism

○ Islam

○ Christianity

○ Other

* 11. Which of the following best reflects your socio-economic status?

○ Much below average ○ Slightly below average ○ Average ○ Slightly above average ○ Much above average

* 12. Level of education:

○ Elementary

○ High school

○ Community college

○ Bachelor's degree

○ Master's degree

○ More than two degrees

* 13. Level of religiosity:

○ Secular

○ Traditional

○ Religious

○ Very religious/ orthodox

* 14. Do you think Hand in Hand is a social/political movement?

○ Yes ○ No

* 15. Are you or have you ever been involved with a social/political movement?

○ Yes ○ No

If yes, which?

[   ]

* 16. In your opinion, are Hand in Hand's community activities connected to Hand in Hand's schools?

[   ]

* 17. What statements best describe your feelings toward Hand in Hand's community activities?

○ Hand in Hand's community activities are of no value to me

○ Hand in Hand's community activities are of little value to me

○ Neutral

○ Hand in Hand's community activities are of some value to me

○ Hand in Hand's community activities are of great value to me

Hand in Hand Community Questionnaire

Groups

18. Please rate your level of agreement/disagreement with each of the statements below.

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
I identify strongly with my national group (i.e. Jew or Palestinian)	○	○	○	○	○
I feel a great deal of commitment toward my national group	○	○	○	○	○
When I talk about my national group, I use the word "we" and not "they"	○	○	○	○	○

19. Please rate your level of agreement/disagreement with each of the statements below.

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
Some groups have essential beliefs and values that cannot be changed	○	○	○	○	○
Every society's goal should be to achieve equality between groups	○	○	○	○	○
Groups can't change their essential characteristics	○	○	○	○	○
Some groups are inferior to others	○	○	○	○	○
Society as a whole shouldn't be controlled by any one group	○	○	○	○	○
If we had equality between different groups, we would have fewer problems	○	○	○	○	○

20. Please rate your level of agreement/disagreement with each of the statements below.

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
I think that there is inequality between different groups in Israel	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
I think that there is inequality between Jewish-Israelis and Palestinian/Arab-Israelis	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
I have experienced inequality or discrimination in Israel	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
I experience inequality or discrimination in my day-to-day life in Israel	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

21. Please rate your level of agreement/disagreement with each of the statements below.

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
I do not think that social/political movements in Israel can affect the government's decisions	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
I think bilingual Hebrew/Arabic education could lead to social/political change in Israel	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
I think that the development of shared society between Jews and Arabs/Palestinians could lead to social/political change in Israel	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

Hand in Hand Community Questionnaire

Exposure to the Other Group

22. Please rank your skill level in Israel's two official languages

	Very limited	Limited	Conversational	Fluent	Native fluency
Hebrew	○	○	○	○	○
Arabic	○	○	○	○	○

23. How often do you use Israel's two official languages?

	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	All the time
Hebrew	○	○	○	○	○
Arabic	○	○	○	○	○

24. In your opinion, how important is it to learn both of Israel's official languages?

	Not at all important	Not important	Neutral	Important	Very important
Hebrew	○	○	○	○	○
Arabic	○	○	○	○	○

25. Please identify how often you experience the following types of interaction with members of the other group:

	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	All the time
I buy at a store/eat at a restaurant in which members of the other group go to/work in	○	○	○	○	○
I participate in activities in which there are both Jewish and Arab/Palestinian participants	○	○	○	○	○
A member of the other group (a colleague, friend, etc.) and I sometimes have discussions where we disagree	○	○	○	○	○
I have a good friend/partner that belongs to the other group	○	○	○	○	○

* 26. How often do you attend Hand in Hand's community activities?

○ I never miss a Hand in Hand community activity

○ I attend a lot of Hand in Hand's community activities

○ I sometimes attend Hand in Hand's community activities

○ I rarely attend Hand in Hand's community activities

○ I never attend Hand in Hand's community activities

27. How do you get notified about Hand in Hand's community activities?

☐ Facebook

☐ Whatsapp

☐ Instagram

☐ Email/Newsletter

☐ Phone

☐ Face-to-face

28. In what language do you receive event invitations?

○ Hebrew   ○ Arabic   ○ In both Hebrew and Arabic

29. What activities do you like the most? Why?

[   ]

30. What activities do you like the least? Why?

[   ]

31. Please rate how often you attend the following activities:

	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	All the time
Holiday-related activities	○	○	○	○	○
Activities for the whole family	○	○	○	○	○
Movies, lectures, and political talks/discussions	○	○	○	○	○
Political/social dialogue groups	○	○	○	○	○
National day events (e.g. Holocaust day, Memorial day, Nakba day, Earth day)	○	○	○	○	○
Adult sport leagues	○	○	○	○	○

32. Please rate your level of agreement/disagreement to the following statements regarding Hand in Hand's community activities:

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
Typically, the activities are not well organized	○	○	○	○	○
The activities normally have an equal number of Palestinian/Arab and Jewish participants	○	○	○	○	○
The activities are led in both Hebrew and Arabic	○	○	○	○	○
I don't find the activities interesting	○	○	○	○	○
The activities are fun	○	○	○	○	○
The activities are typically held in an inconvenient location	○	○	○	○	○
The activities occur at a time that normally works for me	○	○	○	○	○
I am friends with people that I met in the activities	○	○	○	○	○
I typically befriend people from my national group in the activities	○	○	○	○	○
I do not feel as though I am part of the Hand in Hand community	○	○	○	○	○

33. Please indicate how often you would like to focus on the following topics at Hand in Hand's community activities:

	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	All the time
The social/political situation in Israel	○	○	○	○	○
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict	○	○	○	○	○
The Jewish-Israeli culture or identity	○	○	○	○	○
The Palestinian/Arab culture or identity	○	○	○	○	○
Relationship-building between community members	○	○	○	○	○

34. I would come to more activities if I could bring my child/children

○ No ○ Yes

35. Please use this space for any additional thoughts or comments:

[   ]

Reflections on Hand in Hand's Community Activities

36. Which of the following best explain your reluctance, if any, to participate in Hand in Hand's community activities? Please select all of the answers that apply.

☐ I am busy/have other priorities

☐ I don't find the activities interesting

☐ I find that the activities are disconnected from Israeli reality

☐ I don't feel a sense of connection with the people that attend the events

☐ The events are poorly planned and executed

☐ Logistical reasons (e.g. the activities take place at a time/location that doesn't work for me)

☐ I feel that participating in the activities is too political

☐ Other- please describe:

[   ]

37. What type of activities would you be more likely to attend?

☐ Holiday-related activities

☐ Activities for the whole family

☐ Movies, lectures, and political talks/discussions

☐ Political/social dialogue groups

☐ National day events (e.g. Holocaust/Memorial day; Nakba/Earth day)

☐ Adult sport leagues

☐ Relationship-building between community members

38. If you've had a poor experience at a Hand in Hand community activities, please describe it:

[   ]

39. What could Hand in Hand do in order for you to attend more activities?

[   ]

40. Please use this space for any additional thoughts or comments:

[   ]

Ethos Scale: Part 1

* 41. The following section asks questions relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and contains different questions for Jewish and Palestinian/Arab participants. Please choose from the two options below based on the group to which you feel a greater sense of belonging:

( ) I want to answer the questions directed at the Jewish group

( ) I want to answer the questions directed at the Palestinian/Arab group

( ) I don't feel like I belong to either group: skip

Ethos Scale: Version for Jewish Participants

Below are 16 statements on elements relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Please rate your level of agreement/disagreement to each statement.

42. The fact that an Arab population was living in the Land of Israel at the time of the Jews' return attests to the Palestinians' right to establish their homeland there as well

( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral ( ) Agree ( ) Strongly agree

43. We should not let the Palestinians/Arabs see that there are disagreements among us regarding the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral ( ) Agree ( ) Strongly agree

44. Despite Israel's desire for peace, the Arabs have repeatedly forced war

( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral ( ) Agree ( ) Strongly agree

45. The exclusive right of Jews to the Land of Israel stems from its status as their historical homeland

( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral ( ) Agree ( ) Strongly agree

46. One can find broad moderate segments among the Arab public that wish to end the conflict

( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral ( ) Agree ( ) Strongly agree

47. Some values are more important than self-sacrifice for the homeland

( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral ( ) Agree ( ) Strongly agree

48. The intentional exercise of military force is the most efficient means for eliminating security threats to the country

( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral ( ) Agree ( ) Strongly agree

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49. The Jews have no fewer negative qualities than do the Arabs

◯ Strongly disagree ◯ Disagree ◯ Neutral ◯ Agree ◯ Strongly agree

50. Without compromise there can be no peace

◯ Strongly disagree ◯ Disagree ◯ Neutral ◯ Agree ◯ Strongly agree

51. The strength of the State of Israel lies in the diversity of opinions within its population

◯ Strongly disagree ◯ Disagree ◯ Neutral ◯ Agree ◯ Strongly agree

52. The Jewish people's ability to defend themselves against the Arab states is a testimony to their incredible quality

◯ Strongly disagree ◯ Disagree ◯ Neutral ◯ Agree ◯ Strongly agree

53. Encouraging loyalty to the Land of Israel should be one of the education system's most important goals

◯ Strongly disagree ◯ Disagree ◯ Neutral ◯ Agree ◯ Strongly agree

54. Peace will only be achieved after "the facts are set on the ground"

◯ Strongly disagree ◯ Disagree ◯ Neutral ◯ Agree ◯ Strongly agree

55. Military force alone is not enough to truly ensure the security of the State of Israel

◯ Strongly disagree ◯ Disagree ◯ Neutral ◯ Agree ◯ Strongly agree

56. Untrustworthiness has always characterized the Arabs

◯ Strongly disagree ◯ Disagree ◯ Neutral ◯ Agree ◯ Strongly agree

57. The Palestinians are victims of the Israeli-Arab conflict just like the Jews

◯ Strongly disagree ◯ Disagree ◯ Neutral ◯ Agree ◯ Strongly agree

Ethos Scale: Version for Palestinian Participants

Below are 16 statements on elements relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Please rate your level of agreement/disagreement to each statement.

58. The need for a Palestinian state, originating from the fact that Palestinians lived in Palestine for hundreds of years, does not negate the Jews' right for a different state on part of the land

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neutral ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

59. We should not let the Jews see that there is disagreement among us regarding the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neutral ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

60. Despite the Palestinians' desire for peace, the Jews have repeatedly forced occupation and war

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neutral ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

61. The exclusive right of Palestinians to the Land of Palestine stems from its status as their historical homeland

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neutral ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

62. One can find broad moderate segments among the Jewish public that wish to end the conflict

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neutral ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

63. Some values are more important than self-sacrifice for the homeland

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neutral ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

64. The intentional exercise of armed resistance is the most efficient means for eliminating security threats to the Palestinian nation

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neutral ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

65. The Palestinians have no fewer negative qualities than do the Jews

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neutral ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

66. Without compromise there can be no peace

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neutral ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

67. The strength of the Palestinians lies in the diversity of opinions within its population

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neutral ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

68. The Palestinian nation's ability to deal with the Jews is a testimony to its incredible quality

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neutral ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

69. Encouraging loyalty to the Land of Palestine should be one of the education system's most important goals

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neutral ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

70. Peace will only be achieved after violent conflict

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neutral ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

71. Military force alone is not enough to fulfill Palestinians' right to establish their own independent state

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neutral ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

72. Greed, cunning, and dishonesty have always characterized the Jews

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neutral ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

73. The Jews are victims of the Israeli-Arab conflict just like the Palestinians

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neutral ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

Hand in Hand Community Questionnaire

Final Reflections on Hand in Hand

Please rate your level of agreement/disagreement with each of the statements below.

74. Hand in Hand represents a set of schools/a place to work and nothing more

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neural ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

75. Hand in Hand represents a community whose members possess values and beliefs similar to mine

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neural ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

76. Hand in Hand's community activities can be improved

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neural ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

77. My experiences with Hand in Hand influenced my views toward members of the other group

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neural ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

78. I would recommend Hand in Hand's community programs to my family and friends

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neural ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

79. Hand in Hand's community activities contribute to the creation of a shared space between Palestinians/Arabs and Jews in Israel

○ Strongly disagree ○ Disagree ○ Neural ○ Agree ○ Strongly agree

80. Please use this space for any additional thoughts or comments:

Hand in Hand Community Questionnaire
Thank you and personal interview

Thank you for taking the time to complete the questionnaire.

We would be happy to discuss some of the topics addressed here in greater detail, and hear more about your experience with Hand in Hand. Please click the link below if you are interested in participating in a personal interview with the researcher, Yoad Avitzur.

https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/HIHInterviewENG

Please note that the identifying information presented will be disassociated from your completed questionnaire.

If you have any questions , please contact the researcher, Yoad Avitzur.