**ARE CANADIANS MORE COSMOPOLITIAN THAN AMERICANS? EVIDENCE**

**FROM STUDY ABROAD PROGRAMS**

by

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B.A., University of Toronto, 2015

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES

(Political Science)

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

(Vancouver)

May 2017

## Abstract

This thesis examines how cross-boarder contact affects Americans and Canadians. It argues that the specific national identity one has influences how she is affected by interactions with other cultures. It argues that key differences in the American and Canadian identities might influence how individuals from those two countries respond to cross-cultural interactions.

Specifically, it argues that the different outlooks Canadians and Americans have towards multiculturalism and the different views they have about their county's place in the world will influence how individuals from both countries respond to cross-board contact. Canadians, with their support for multiculturalism and the expectation that they should be "good global citizens," will be more likely to see commonalities between their country and others. They feel more warmly towards, and more trusting of, individuals from other countries. At the same time, they will be less likely to see their country as superior to others. Americans, with their emphasis on assimilation and exceptionalism, will experience the opposite.

To test these hypotheses, this thesis employs a natural experiment that measures how Canadian and American students were affected by studying abroad. It looks at how studying abroad changes students' attitudes towards other countries, as well as their own, and whether these changes are different for Canadians and Americans. Ultimately, it finds little differences in the affects of studying abroad for Canadians and Americans. Studying abroad seems to cause both American and Canadian students to see greater differences between their country and others, and to feel more attached to their country.

## Lay Summary

How does studying abroad affect students' attitudes towards other countries, as well as their own country, and are these effects different for Canadians than Americans?  These are the question my thesis aims to answer.  I argue that cross-border contact, and studying abroad, should affect students differently, depending on their national identity.  The Canadian identity, with its focus on multiculturalism and being a "good global citizen" should induce students to come away from a study abroad experience as better cosmopolitans.  This is in contrast to the American identity, with its emphasis on assimilation and exceptionalism.  I use a natural experiment design to test these hypotheses.

## Preface

This thesis is an original intellectual product of the author, Megan Dias.  Research was approved by the UBC Behavourial Research Ethics Board, certificate number H15-02879.

This thesis relies heavily on the work of Dr. Calvert Jones, and her 2014 article "Exploring the Microfoundations of International Community: Toward a Theory of Enlightened Nationalism" in the *International Studies Quarterly*.  Data is used with author's permission.

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## Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Richard Johnston, for his guidance and patience in every stage of this project. My thesis benefited greatly from his insight and depth of knowledge. I would also like to thank Dr. Andrew Owen for his comments and advice on the research design and analysis. Thank you also to Dr. Calvert Jones, for her encouragement, and interest. Thank you to Dr. Teresa Bejan for introducing me to Dr. Jones' article, and suggesting that pursuing this further was worthwhile. To the Canadian universities and study abroad coordinators who distributed my survey, thank you. This research would not be possible without your efforts. Finally, thanks are owed to Rachele Benjamin and Zachary Witkower, for being my go-to sources for statistics problems, and for answering seemingly never-ending questions with patience.

Thank you and love to my parents, siblings, family, and friends, for their continued support. To my friends and colleagues from UBC, thanks for putting up with two years of this.

# Dedication

To my parents and siblings.

# Chapter 1: Introduction

*"When you open your heart to patriotism, there is no room for prejudice."*
Donald Trump, Inaugural Address

There are competing theories about how cross-boarder contact affects individuals' attitudes towards other countries, as well as their own. In line with Allport's social contact hypothesis (1954), it has been argued that, when individuals from different nations come into contact with each other, they will come to an understanding of shared values and shared sense of community (Deutsch 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998). Conversely, it has been argued that increased contact between individuals from different nations will heighten individuals' senses of differences between their cultures and others (Huntington 2012). This will lead to individuals retreating more into their own culture, and work against creating a global community.

Study abroad programs have been used to test these theories. Study abroad programs occur in most large universities. They allow students to spend a semester living abroad and studying at a foreign university. They are often advertised as programs that will make students "good global citizens" (Desjardins & Rennick, 2013).

A 2014 study found that studying abroad had surprising effects on American students (Jones, 2014). Studying abroad led American students to see greater differences between the US and other countries. At the same time, it caused them to feel more attached to, and proud of, their country. This suggests that studying abroad has outcomes that go against its goal of

creating better global citizens. Rather than fostering attachment to the global community, studying abroad seems to do the opposite.

In this thesis, I argue that these findings (Jones, 2014) might be unique to American students, and the result of specific aspects of the American identity. I argue that research on studying abroad ignores the nuances and contingencies of love of country and the importance of national identities. Literature on love of country suggests that there are two distinct aspects: an inclusionary aspect and an exclusionary one. The extent to which one aspect is favoured over the other is partially dependent on the national identity in questions. Different nations can be more or less inclusive.

All of these factors might influence how people of different nationalities respond to cross-boarder contact and studying abroad. Studying abroad can cause individuals with a more exclusive nationality to see differences between cultures, and to believe their culture is better. At the same time, it can have a more positive influence on individuals from a country with a more inclusive nationality.

In light of this, I argue that American identity might incline students to see differences between themselves and others, and see themselves as superior to others. If this is the case, it might be the interaction of the specific American national identity with the treatment of studying abroad that causes Americans to react in a certain way to studying abroad. Students from other countries might react differently.

To test these this, I compare the results from American students to Canadian students. The Canadian identity is, ostensibly, more inclusive than the American one. It highlights diversity and being a good global citizen. Because of this, Canadian students who participate in study abroad programs might experience different effects than American students. The

interaction between the Canadian identity and studying abroad might cause Canadian students to see commonalities between their countries and others, and to decrease their sense of uniqueness and superiority.

In this thesis, I will review the literature on national identity, and attachment to one's nation. I will examine the two sides of love of country: the inclusionary side, and the exclusionary side. I will then argue that the Canadian and American identities differ in two key ways: they have different conceptions of multiculturalism, and different views of their nation's place in relation to others. These differences make the Canadian identity more inclusive and incline Canadians to see similarities between their culture and others.

I argue that these differences affect the way Canadian and American students respond to interacting with other cultures through study abroad programs. I use the natural experiment method employed by Jones (2014) to test this theory.

# Chapter 2: National Identities and Love of Country

## 2.1    Overview of Love of Country

At its most basic, love of country is identifying with, feeling proud of, and attached to, one's nation (Miller 1995; Schatz, Staub & Levine 1999).  It is also the "feeling of similarity and emotional closeness" to others who share the same national identity (Citrin, Johnston, Wright, 2012, 533).

Love of country was largely decried in the mid-to-late 1900s.  It was blamed for the world wars of the 1900s, and was declared "the starkest political shame of the twentieth century" (Dunn, 1979).  Politicians and academics alike called for a movement towards a post-national world.  Cosmopolitanism was held up as the alternative to love of country.  Cosmopolitanism holds that people should think of humanity as a whole, instead of dividing us into nation-states (Brubaker 2004).  Many see institutions such as the European Parliament and the United Nations as steps towards a post-national, cosmopolitan ideal.

Recently, scholars have moved way from a strict dichotomy between love of country and cosmopolitanism.  Many argue that attachment to one's country is not always negative, and does not always imply prejudice or bigotry.  Instead, love of country is multifaceted.  There are many cases in which it actually induces community and charity.

## 2.2    Patriotism versus Nationalism

Nations are "always simultaneously inclusive and exclusive" (Brubaker 2004).  Some people are part of the nation, and others are not.  Those that are not in the nation are designated as an "out-group."  Members of this "out-group" are considered different from co-nationals.

They are often seen as inferior to co-nationals, and not entitled to the same benefits and rights. This exclusionary aspect of nationalism is what many decry.

At the same time, national identity draws all co-nationals together and designates them as an "in-group." This can be an extremely positive thing. It encourages co-nationals to believe that they have something in common, and can downplay the emphasis on individual differences (Miller, 1995; Johnston et al. 2010). Differences in political leanings, occupation, education, and other demographic factors seem less important, as all nationals are united under the same overarching identity.

Shared national identity makes individuals believe they have a shared fate with their co-nationals, and introduces an idea of communal wellbeing (Miller 1995). It also encourages trust. All this can work together to increase a society's social capital. Indeed, Miller (1995) argues that love of country can induce individuals to support social programs. The more attached to her nation an individual is, the more she would be willing to support programs that benefit co-nationals. [1]

Recognizing that there are two sides to national love and attachment to country, scholars have termed the inward-looking, inclusionary aspect "patriotism," and the discriminatory creation of out-groups "nationalism." Patriotism is "attachment to one's nation as characterized by love of one's nation and pride in one's national identification" (Feshbach, 1994, 281). Nationalism "entails feelings of national superiority, of competitiveness with other nations, and of the importance of power over other nations" (Ibid).

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[1] Research on this question is mixed. Johnston et al (2010) find that greater identification with Canada is correlated with greater support for redistributive programs. Higher identification with the nation is not correlated with support for redistributive programs, however. Moreover, this relationship does not appear to exist in the United States (Johnston et al. 2017)

Nationalism is correlated with anti-immigrant sentiments, preferences for discriminatory policies, and the exclusionary aspects of love of country (Kosterman & Feshbach 1986; deFigueiredo & Elkins 2003). Patriotism, however, seems to have little to no relationship with these discriminatory tendencies (Ibid).

While patriotism and nationalism are distinct, they are also closely and inextricably related. There cannot be an in-group without an out-group. Feeling close to your in-group because of a sense of shared identity implies that you believe the out-group does not share this. Thus, while they do describe different things, and have different implications, patriotism and nationalism are related to, and to some extent dependent on, each other.[2]


## 2.3 National Identities

Patriotism and nationalism are closely connected to national identities. What it means to be attached to one's nation and co-nationals depends on how the nation is defined, and, by extension, who is included in the "co-nationals" group. Thus, being patriotic or nationalistic implies different things, depending on the nation in question.

Before going into the types of national identities, it is worth noting that I am drawing a distinction between "being a part of national 'in-group'" and having citizenship in a country. Citizenship in a country legally makes one a national. However, one can have citizenship in a country and still not be accepted by fellow-nationals.

Bloemraad notes this with her distinction between "citizenship" and "full citizenship" (Bloemraad 2006). The former is the legal definition of citizenship. The latter means that one is

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[2] Indeed, Kosterman and Feshbach (1986) used factor analysis to show that measures of both patriotism and nationalism are both highly correlated, but also distinct.

a part of the national community, feels like she belongs and is welcomed, and has the ability to participate fully in civic life.

Thus, an individual can hold citizenship in a country, and still be considered a member of an out-group. This distinction is relevant for members of minority groups within countries. While they may hold citizenship, they are not always considered to be part of the national in-group, and therefore not entitled to share in the rights and privileges that come along with that community.[3]

Efforts to incorporate minority groups into the national in-groups take on different forms. This will be discussed in more detail further on. Essentially, though, what minority groups are included, and how easily this inclusion happens, depends partially on how the national identity is defined: are they based on ethnic or civic qualities, and what values do they promote?

## 2.4    Ethnic versus Civic

National identities can be either "ethnic" or "civic" (Bloemraad, 2011; Wright, 2011). Ethnic identities are rooted in demographic characteristics. Members of the nation all have the same ethnic or racial background. To be a part of such a nation, one must have this background. If someone does not share this background, she is part of the "out-group" and simply cannot share in the national identity.

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[3] This phenomenon is analogous for immigrants. Immigrants pose an interesting problem in terms of nationalism. Patriotism animates citizens to feel an affinity towards their fellow citizens that they do not share with citizens from another country. Additionally, patriotism animates citizens of one country to view citizens from another as somehow fundamentally different. Immigration, then, requires nationals to conceptually move immigrants from the "out-group" category, to the "in-group" category.

Ethnic national identities are highly exclusionary. If one does not share the same ethnic or racial background, one cannot be part of the nation. Moreover, there is nothing an individual can do to change that. This matters a lot for immigrants who migrate to a nation that has a strong ethnic identity, or ethnic minority groups already living in the nation. Although these individuals might gain or already have citizenship in the country, they will never be considered co-nationals by their fellow citizens.

Civic national identities are "rooted in loyalty to certain political ideals and institutions" (Bloemraad, 2011, 1137). They are not related to an ethnicity. Instead, these national identities are based on certain ideas and beliefs. To be a part of this kind of nation, one must subscribe to the same set of values.

This type of national identity is much more inclusive. Membership in this nation is not determined by fixed ethnic characteristics. Instead, one becomes a full member by sharing the set of norms and beliefs to which the nation ascribes. It is therefore much easier for immigrants to take on the national identity of nations with civic identities, rather than ethnic ones. Moreover, ethnic minorities should be already included in the nation.

While civic national identities are more inclusive than ethnic ones, they are still exclusionary. Individuals who perceived to reject the values of the nation cannot be part of it. Moreover, values that are not part of, or at least tolerated by, the civic identity are considered inferior or even less moral.

There are also variations within civic identities. Civic identities can be more or less inclusive, depending on what ideals or set of values they demand nationals accept (Breton 2015). Some civic identities can be very inclusive – one has to believe in a vaguely-defined concept of

"justice," for example.  Other civic identities can be more demanding.  To be part of a nation, one must subscribe to a certain religion, for example.

Civic identities can also explicitly promote inclusive values (Breton 2015).  A civic identity can be comprised of values such as tolerance, celebration of difference, and so on.  Such an identity would be more inclusive than one that does not promote these values.  Moreover, being a patriot of such a country would mean that one is tolerant, and accepting of diversity.


## 2.5   Malleability

As Benedict Anderson famously said, all nations are "imagined" (Anderson 1982).  Nations and national identities are not natural.  They are shaped through historical events, elite actions, popular movements, and institutions (Anderson 1982; Citrin, Johnston, Wright, 2012; Brubaker 2004).

Because of this, national identities are also malleable.  A change in events, different decisions by elites, new movements, and reformed institutions can cause a change in the national identity.  Thus, what it means to be a member of a certain nation can change over time (Brubaker 2004).  What it means to be a British citizen today is very different than what it meant in the 1600s, for example.  These changes to national identity are either the result of deliberate decisions made by elites, or the indirect result of more organic events or actions.

The extent to which a national identity is malleable is dependent on the national identity, as well.  Nations with civic identities are more open to change than nations based on ethnicities.  Moreover, settler societies are more malleable than nations that have hundreds of years of

entrenched history and culture. Canadian and American identities might therefore be more amenable to change than established European identities.[4]

## 2.6    Summary

Thus, national identities are both inclusive and exclusive. They designate an in-group of co-nationals, and hold that these co-nationals share fundamental things in common, and are owed certain rights and privileges. National identity, and love of country, can evoke the better angels of our nature, making us more inclined to be charitable to our neighbours.

At the same time, national identities designate out-groups. These out-groups are considered to be outside of the national community, not sharing the same identity, and not owed the same rights and privileges as co-nationals. Moreover, sometimes merely having citizenship is not enough to be considered a co-national. Nationals often view immigrants and members of minority groups as an out-group, whether or not members of these groups hold citizenship. This aspect of national identity and love of country can encourage discrimination and bigotry.

National identities can be based on ethnic characteristic, or on civic values. Identities based on ethnicity are more exclusive than ones based on civic values. Those based on civic values can be more or less inclusive, depending on what list of values are included in the identity.

Finally, national identities are malleable. They are shaped by factors that can change over time. Thus, what it means to be a member of a nation at one point, might not be the same as what it means to be a member of a nation later on.

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[4] Quebec may be an outlier here. An example of the difficulties in changing European identity can be see in relation to research on the European Erasmus program. It is argued that this exchange program was created to foster a sense of shared European identity, with mixed success (King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003).

As national identities change and can be based on different things, patriotism and nationalism means different things in different contexts. What it means to love your country, to identify with co-nationals, and to believe that your country is better than others depends the national identity of your country. Someone with a high level of patriotism or nationalism in a country based on an ethnic identity might act very differently, and believe different things about out-groups, than someone from a country with a civic identity. Moreover, a patriot from a country whose national identity is based on tolerance and accepting diversity might be qualitatively different from a patriot in a country that is based on different values.

# Chapter 3: The Effects of Studying Abroad on Patriotism, Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism

There have been many studies on how travelling or studying abroad impacts individuals' attitudes towards other countries, as well as their levels of nationalism and patriotism. Cross-boarder travel has long been thought to be a positive factor in fostering a shared international community. Kant famously argued that cross-border contact and exchange, through travel and foreign trade, would eventually lead to "perpetual peace" (Kant [1784] 1991)

There have been several studies that assess the impact of travel on attitudes towards patriotism, nationalism and cosmopolitanism (Kelman 1975; Tims & Miller 1986). Such research tries to see how cross-boarder contact effects the way individuals feel towards both other countries and their own country. After coming into contact with other cultures through travel, are individuals more likely to feel positively towards, and trusting of, other cultures? Are they more likely to believe other cultures share their values? Or are they more likely to believe other cultures are distinct from, and inferior to their own? Are they more likely to feel more closely connected to their country after studying abroad?

Many researchers utilize study abroad programs to try to get at these questions. Such programs give researchers an easily accessible population to draw upon. Researchers will compare the attitudes of students who have just returned from a semester abroad to those of a control group.

Such research has found mixed results. Some studies find that studying abroad increases students' appreciation for other countries and cultures (Carlson & Widamin, 1998; Flack, 1976;

Douglas & Jones-Rikkers 2001). These studies find that students who studied abroad report higher levels of cultural awareness, and interest in other cultures than a control group.

At the same time, they find that study abroad programs cause students to develop a greater love for, and attachment to, their own country. Thus, rather than causing students to feel attached to the global community, studying abroad seemed to have caused students to double-down on their attachment to their own country.

Jones (2014) argues that research on studying abroad has been limited in several ways. Past studies have generally relied on two research methods to assess the effects of studying abroad on students' attitudes towards both their host countries, and their own country. One method is to students compare the attitudes of students who have studied abroad to a control group. This control group is usually a group of students from the same university who have not gone abroad. Some studies, however, use the general population of the country as a control group. The other common research method used is a longitudinal research design, where students are surveyed before and after going abroad.

Both these methods have significant flaws (Jones 2014). The first method does not control for self-selection. Students who chose to study abroad likely have different personal and demographic characteristics than who do not. They probably have a prior interest in international issues and different cultures, which is why they chose to go abroad in the first place. Students who choose to go abroad would also likely be more outgoing and open to new experiences, making them more accepting of other cultures. Because of these factors, students who select into study abroad programs might also have past international experience. This would mean that there was less of a culture-shock when they did study abroad.

It is even more problematic to compare the attitudes of students who go abroad to the attitudes of individuals in the home country at large. Students are likely younger, more educated, more affluent, and more liberal than citizens of the country at large. Thus, when comparing the attitudes of students who have studied abroad to the general attitudes of the country, it is difficult to say whether any discrepancy is due to the treatment of going abroad, or whether it is simply a result of these demographic differences.

Studies that use a longitudinal design also have flaws (Jones 2014). This design does survey only the students who have selecting into study abroad programs. Thus, they all have similar demographic characteristics. Such a design does not control for other potential intervening variables, however.

A longitudinal study cannot control for the possibility that any change in attitudes is the result of a changing political climate, either at home or abroad, occurring during the student's term abroad. Perhaps the relationship between the student's host country and home country changed at some point during the student's time abroad, and it was this change, not the treatment of studying abroad, that effected the student's attitudes. This design also cannot control for the possibility that a change in attitudes is the result of a maturation process in the student, or events in the student's personal life that have nothing to do with studying abroad.

To deal with the limitations in these research designs, Jones employed a natural experiment to test the effects of studying abroad on students' attitudes towards their host and home countries. Over the 2008 winter break, she surveyed students who had just returned from the fall term abroad, and students who were just about to go abroad for the winter term. This method neutralized problems of self-selection, as all students surveyed had chosen to go abroad, and therefore had similar personal and demographic traits. It also dealt with the concern that any

attitudinal change was due to changing political circumstances or changing life circumstances for the student. Since students were all surveyed at the same time, neither of these factors were possibilities.

Jones tested to two outcomes. First, she examined how studying abroad affects students' attitudes towards their host country. She tested whether studying abroad caused students to believe individuals in their host country holds similar values as Americans. She also tested how studying abroad affects whether students believe individuals in their host country are trustworthy, and whether they feel warmly towards their host country.

Second, Jones examined how studying abroad affected students attitudes towards their home country. She tested whether studying abroad changes their levels of nationalism or patriotism.[5] She also tested the relationship between studying abroad and student's identification with, and feelings of warmth toward, the US.

Jones' results are slightly different to those of past studies. She found that students who had studied abroad did not believe that the countries they studied at held similar values as Americans. Thus, studying abroad seemed to heighten students' senses of differences between their country and others.

At the same time, she found that students who had studied abroad reported higher levels of patriotism than those who had not yet studied abroad; they loved their country more, and were more proud of it than students who had not gone abroad. Students who had studied abroad also

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[5] Although Jones did not make the patriotism versus nationalism distinction in her research, her measures seem to reflect them pretty closely. The first few measures – how attached, proud of, and warm one feels towards one's country – seems to be measuring patriotism, as was defined earlier. The second measure – national superiority – seems to be measuring nationalism. Thus, I will use these terms to discuss her results.

reported higher feelings of "warmth" towards America, and higher levels of identification with America.

There were mixed results on studying abroad's impact on trust. Jones measured two different types of trust – generalized and situational trust. Generalized trust measures how trustworthy students believe citizens of their host country are as a whole. Situational trust measures whether students would trust citizens of their host country in a specific circumstance.

Jones found that studying abroad seemed to have no effect on students' generalized trust, although it did have an impact on their sense of situational trust. Studying abroad seemed to reduce students' levels of situational trust towards individuals of other countries. She did find, however, that students who had studied abroad were less likely to see their host country as a potential military, or economic threat to the United States.

While Jones found a strong, positive correlation between studying abroad and high levels of nationalism, she found only a slight, positive correlation between studying abroad and a moderately higher belief in national superiority. This latter result was not statistically significant, however ($p=0.60$). Thus, studying abroad seems to increase patriotism, but not nationalism. There is no evidence that studying abroad reduces nationalism, however, as one might expect or hope.

Ultimately, these results suggest that studying abroad causes Americans to see greater differences between themselves and the rest of the world. It also caused them to trust individuals in other countries less. Finally, it caused American students to love their country more. These seem to go against the goals of studying abroad, of having students see shared global values, and having a cosmopolitan sense of global community.

This increase in patriotism and a sense of American distinctiveness was was not accompanied by an increase in nationalism, or a decrease in general trust. Because of this, Jones argues we need to approach questions about the relationship between patriotism, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism with more nuance. Perhaps they are not mutually exclusive.

# Chapter 4: Nationalism in American versus Canada

## 4.1   Overview

Past research on studying abroad do not take into account the contingencies of different national identities.  Specifically, these studies do not consider that the effects of studying abroad on students might be dependent on the specific national identity espoused by the students.

Jones (2014) briefly acknowledges that her results might be specific to the *American* students she surveyed.  As discussed earlier, patriotism and nationalism are related to, and contingent on, the identity of the nation.  Nations with different national identities have qualitatively different manifestations of patriotism, and nationalism.

Comparing Canada and the US is an ideal way to try to understand some of these questions and nuances.[6]  On a macro-level, Canada and the US are extremely similar.  Both are North American federations.  Both are settler societies, and former British colonies.  Both are geographically large and diverse.   They are also ethnically diverse.  Both Canada and the US have high levels of immigration.  In 2015, the US ranked first on the list of countries that host the largest number of immigrants; Canada places eighth (UN 2015).  Immigrants make up 20.7% of the Canadian population, and 14.3% of American population (UN 2015).

Moreover, Canada and the US are defined by civic national identities.  Neither country defines themselves as a certain race or ethnicity.  Instead, nationals are those who hold "Canadian" or "American" ideals.  In addition to other things, this means that Canada and the US

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[6] Note, my discussion is focused the national identity of "the rest of Canada," omitting Quebec.  Quebec presents a different question here, as its identity is based on a different culture and history.  For the sake of comparison with the US, I confine my analysis and discussion to "the rest of Canada."

should both be amenable to immigrants naturalizing and becoming full citizens and co-nationals.[7]

While both Canada and the US have civic identities, the details of those identities still differ. Because of this, what nationalism means in Canada can be a very different thing from what it means in the US. In particular, Canadian and American identities differ in two ways that directly impact my research question. First, the Canadian and American identities adopt different approaches to multiculturalism. Second, Canadians and Americans have different ways they view themselves in relation to the rest of the world.

## 4.2    The American Identity

The American identity is fairly easy to define, and generally agreed upon. In describing it, scholars and pundits alike fall back on truisms and overused metaphors. To be American is to believe in "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." It is to believe that "we the people" should have government "of the people, for the people, and by the people." Or, as FDR put it, "Americanism is a matter of mind and heart… A good American is one who is loyal to this country and our creed of liberty and democracy" (quoted in Theiss-Morse 2009, 19).

While trite, this description of American identity seems to be widely accepted by scholars (Smith 1988; Theiss-Morse 2009). To be American is to believe in these principles. While these are considered the core of what it means to be American, there are other cultural practices that are considered to be distinctly and crucially American.[8]

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[7] Indeed, for all these reasons, Bloemraad (2011) argues that Canada and the US are ideal countries to do cross-national comparisons on.

[8] Stereotypes about baseball being America's pastime, and apple pie being as American as it gets come to mind.

Americans adopt a policy of assimilation towards immigrants and minority groups of other cultures. To be considered an "American," one must renounce their origin culture, and instead take on American beliefs and practices. One cannot be an American if she does not believe in the principles upon which America was founded, for example. Additionally, one cannot be an American if she immigrates to the US, but wants to keep her native language, cuisine, or other practices. These must ultimately be subsumed by the American culture.

Again, all of this is overused and trite in popular commentary about the US. Research shows this to be generally true, however, with some nuances. A 1994 study found that Americans were pretty evenly split on the question of whether immigrants should assimilate or maintain their own culture (Citrin et al 2001). When asked about more specific policies that would advance multiculturalism, Americans are overwhelmingly opposed. A substantial majority of Americans do not want the government funding programs that would help advance multiculturalism. They disagree with the idea that individuals are best represented politically by a member of their own cultural group, and they do not recognize group rights (Citrin et al 2001).

Americans also have a specific outlook towards other countries and the international community generally. From its beginning, the American project was one seen as "exceptional" (Huntington 2004; Lipset 1996) Americans saw the country they were creating as fundamentally different from other countries, both in its institutions and ideals. Not only did Americans see themselves as different from the rest of the world, they saw themselves as better than the rest of the world. They were a "city upon a hill" that the rest of the world should look to for inspiration.

This idea of American exceptionalism permeates American history. From the world wars, to the cold war, to more recent times, Americans have seen themselves as distinct and removed from the rest of the world, while also being an example for others. Exceptionalism has

justified seemingly contradictory policy decisions.  It has has motivated interventionist foreign policy decisions, such as the Marshall Plan and the Iraq War.  These decisions were partially based on the idea is distinct from, and superior to, the rest of the world, and that America can play a role in improving other countries.  Exceptionalism has also justified isolationist policies.  The feeling that they are distinct from the rest of the world has caused many Americans to view international intervention, or even participation in international organizations, with unease.

## 4.3    The Canadian Identity

The Canadian identity is harder to define than the American one.  Traditionally, Canadians have had a hard time defining what exactly makes them distinct (Griffiths 2014; Resnick 2009; Wiseman 2009) Books with titles such as "In Search of a Canadian Political Culture" are emblematic of this phenomenon (Wiseman 2007).

Over the last fifty years, however, there has been a concerted, elite-driven effort to define Canada in terms of multiculturalism.  In 1971, Pierre Trudeau announced that Canada would be adopting an official policy of multiculturalism and bilingualism.  This was the first time a country had adopted multiculturalism as official policy (Government of Canada 2012).

The Multiculturalism Act of 1988 set out Canada's recognition of multiculturalism further.  This act "recognizes" that "multiculturalism is a fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage and identity and that it provides an invaluable resource in the shaping of Canada's future."  Moreover, it states that "all members of Canadian society" have the freedom to "preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage" (Canadian Multiculturalism Act 1988).

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms also recognizes multiculturalism. Moreover, Section 27 of the Charter states that "this Charter shall be interpreted in a manner

consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians" (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982). This means that the courts should interpret the Charter rights with reference to multiculturalism.

The type of multiculturalism espoused by the Canadian identity is different from that endorsed by the American one. While Americans welcome immigrants, they also expect them to take on American ideals and customs. Americans expect immigrants to assimilate – to melt into their host cultural (Bloemraad 2006; Thesiss-Morse 2009)

As stated in the Multiculturalism Act, Canadians allow immigrants to keep their native customs and culture. The Canadian brand of multiculturalism says "you can be yourself and still belong to us" (Citrin, Johnston & Wright 2012, 532). It promotes diversity, as each unique culture adds to the piece of art that is Canada.

The multicultural project of the early 1970s seems to largely have won out. Canadians believe multiculturalism is an integral part of their national identity and what it means to be a Canadian. (Griffiths 2014; Resnick 2009) 54% of Canadians say that their country's multiculturalism makes then "very proud" to be a Canadian, while only 8% says it makes them not proud (Parkin & Mendelsohn 2003).

It is telling that Justin Trudeau got elected using rhetoric that explicitly ties multiculturalism to the Canadian identity. Canada is strong "not in spite of our differences, but because of them." In a 2015 speech in at the McGill Institute for the Study of Canada, Trudeau stated that "diversity is at the very heart of Canada. It is who we are and what we do" (Trudeau 2015).

Thus, multiculturalism is defined in Canada as the ability for anyone to be Canadian, and still maintain their distinct culture. This view of multiculturalism is seen as a crucial part of what it means to be a Canadian.[9]

The differences between the American and Canadian identities and approaches to multiculturalism are highlighted in study done by Citrin, Johnston, and Wright (2012). Their study found that respondents who have high levels of national pride, also have high support for multiculturalism in Canada. This means that Canadians associate being a Canadian, and being proud of their country, with supporting multiculturalism. This is not the case in the US, where multiculturalism is defined differently and not a central part of their identity.

Another study found that Canada was an outlier in terms of attitudes towards immigrants. The general trend is that countries that accept more immigrants experience a kind of "rebellion" among their citizens (Wright 2011). As countries take in more immigrants, citizens begin to reshape their conceptions of nationalities more narrowly. This excludes immigrants from becoming fully part of the nation. This did not happen in Canada, however. Instead, as immigration increased in Canada in the 1970s, Canadians definition of what it means to be a national actually became wider (Wright 2011). Although not mentioned in this particular study, it is possible that the reason for this was the elite-driven multicultural push that tied "being Canadian" in with "being accepting of multiculturalism." Again, this was not the case in the US

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[9] There are various arguments as to why the multiculturalism project seems to have been successful in Canada. Some argue that the Canadian experience with Quebec has made Canada more amenable to multiculturalism. Since Canada's beginning, it has been incorporating and accepting a different culture, with a different language and religion. This has made Canada more open to the multiculturalism, as such aspects have been long built-in.

Others argue that the difficulty in defining Canadian identity actually makes Canadians more welcoming and makes it easier to become a Canadian. There is an "unbearable lightness" to the Canadian identity; it is easy to take on as one's own, and those who have it can easy ascribe it to others (Gwyn 1995; Citrin, Johnston, Wright 2012). This is in contrast to the American identity, which is so well defined that it is easy to notice when anyone differs from the "typical" American at all.

and the definition of what it means to be an American become somewhat narrower as immigration increased.

Unlike Americans, Canadians do not have a sense of being fundamentally separate from the rest of the world. There is no isolationism tendency in Canada. Instead, many argue that to be a "good Canadian" means to be a "good citizen of the world" (Kymlicka 2003, 367). Canadians generally support participation in international organizations. They see themselves as having a role to play in global affairs. Canadians are not an unwilling superpower, like the Americans. Instead, they see themselves as a helpful middle power, promoting cooperation and compromise in the international arena.

Kymlicka (2003) argues that there is a Canadian brand of exceptionalism, but that it is different from that of America. Canadians believe that they are exceptionally tolerant, accepting, and cosmopolitan. Thus, Canadian exceptionalism is not something that separates Canada from the rest of the world, like American exceptionalism often does. Instead, it encourages Canadians to be "good global citizens" and to be accepting of other countries and cultures.

The picture is not perfect for Canadians, however. While Canadians have a "moral righteousness" (Resnick, 2009, 63) about their multicultural exceptionalism, some findings suggest there might be a discrepancy between the ideals of multiculturalism build into the Canadian identity, and the values and preferences that individual Canadians actually hold.

While Citrin, Johnston and Wright (2012) found that patriotism was positively correlated with multiculturalism in Canada, they also found that the average support for multiculturalism in Canada and the US were similar. This might suggest that, on average, Canadians and Americans actually have similar preferences when it comes to multiculturalism and multicultural policies. They do differ in that Canadians see their nationality as positively related to multiculturalism; the

more one loves Canada and feels connected to it, the more she approves of multiculturalism. Americans experience the opposite.

This highlights the fact that Canadians see multiculturalism as a fundamental part of their national identity, whereas Americans see it as opposed to theirs. This is a key difference between the two countries. It does not appear as though Canadians are always better multiculturalists than Americans, however.

Similarly, Banting (2010) found mixed results when comparing Canadian's attitudes towards immigration with other OECD countries. In line with Wright's (2011) findings, Banting found that Canadians do not want to reduce the number of immigrants. This is in contrast to other countries. At the same time, Canadians not want to increase the number of immigrants. Additionally, majority of Canadians believe immigrants should "adapt" (Banting, 2010).

Thus, there seems to be a tension between how Canadians define themselves, and the preferences they actually hold. Multiculturalism is built into the Canadian identity. To be a Canadian is to be a good multiculturalist. At the same time, however, Canadians do not always live up to their multiculturalist ideals. The average support for multicultural policies in Canada is not necessarily that different from the support in America (Citrin, Johnston, Wright, 2012). Thus, despite the fact that multiculturalism is built into the Canadian identity in a way that it is not in the American identity, and despite the fact that Canadians want to believe that they are "different from, and morally superior to, 'being American,'" (Kymlicka 2003, 365) differences in values between Canadians and Americans are not always borne out by research.

## 4.4 Implications for Studying Abroad

The fact that the Canadian and American identities have different orientations towards multiculturalism might impact how studying abroad effects Canadian and American students. Canadians, with their emphasis on multiculturalism, might be used to looking at different peoples and cultures and seeing how they are similar to their own. Canadian multiculturalism holds that someone can maintain a different religion, customs, and even language, and still be a Canadian. They are able to see a common value set that unites Canadians, even if it is not readily apparent. This might make Canadian students more likely to look at other nations and find commonalities, even though the religions, customs, and languages are different.

Canadians, believing that being a "good Canadian" is synonymous with being a "good global citizen," might more inclined to immerse themselves in other cultures. When they do so, they might also be inclined to be tolerant and accepting of these cultures, as that is what Canadians do.

Americans' focus on assimilation might make them less likely to search for commonalities with other cultures. Instead, it might make them focus on the differences between other cultures. American assimilation on a domestic level holds that different cultures should be absorbed by the American culture. On an international level, this impulse might make Americans first notice the differences between their cultures and another, and then incline them to feel that their culture is superior to the other.

American exceptionalism might incline Americans to view themselves as distinct from, and superior to, other cultures, as well. This might make them less inclined to actually immerse themselves in another culture.

All these factors could lead to studying abroad impacted Canadian and American students differently. Alternatively, this could be a case where the differences between Canadians and Americans are exaggerated. For all their emphasis on multiculturalism, Canadians could respond similarly to studying abroad as Americans did.

## Chapter 5: Hypothesis

All of this leads to testable hypotheses. Following Jones' methods, I test how studying abroad influences Canadians students' attitudes toward their host country as well as toward Canada. I am specifically interested in how the interaction between studying abroad is different for Canadian and Americans. I expect the interaction will be different in the following ways.

**Hypothesis 1**: Canadian students who have studied abroad will report a higher belief in shared values with members of their host country than their Canadian counterparts who have not yet studied abroad. They will also report higher levels of trust in, and warmth towards, members of their host country. This will be in contrast with the American students who studied abroad. This will also hold true when other factors are controlled for.

This hypothesis can be expressed with the following equation:

$Y_{Host} = \beta_0 + \beta_1\text{Treatment} + \beta_2\text{Canadian} + \beta_3\text{Treatment*Canadian} + \beta_4\text{InternationalExperience} + \beta_5\text{PriorExperienceHost} + \beta_6\text{Non-EnglishSpeakingHostCountry} + \beta_7\text{PoliticalLeanings} + \beta_8\text{UniversityYear} + \beta_9\text{Gender} + \varepsilon$

Where $Y$ is the dependent variable of interest related to perceptions of and attitudes towards the host country.

The expectation is that $\beta_3 > 0$. This will indicate that studying abroad affects Canadians differently than Americans. Unlike Americans, Canadian who go abroad come back with a greater belief in shared values between their host countries and Canada. They will also come back with more trust in, and warmth towards, their host country.

**Hypothesis 2**: When compared to Canadian students who have not yet gone abroad, Canadian students who have studied abroad will report lower nationalistic and patriotic sentiments than their Canadian counterparts who have not yet studied abroad. They will also report lower identification with, and feelings of warmth toward, Canada. This will be in contrast with American students, and will also hold true when other factors are controlled for.

This hypothesis can be expressed with the same equation as Hypothesis 1:

$Y_{Home} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treatment + \beta_2 Canadian + \beta_3 Treatment*Canadian + \beta_4 InternationalExperience + \beta_5 PriorExperienceHost + \beta_6 Non EnglishSpeakingHostCountry + \beta_7 PoliticalLeanings + \beta_8 UniversityYear \beta_9 Gender + \varepsilon$

Where $Y$ is the dependent variable of interest related to perceptions of and attitudes towards the home country.

The expectation for this hypothesis that $\beta_3 < 0$. Studying abroad will affect Canadians in such a way that makes them less patriotic and nationalistic. This is in contrast to Americans. This will also hold true when other factors are controlled for.

# Chapter 6: Data and Methods

To test these hypotheses, I employed the natural experiment design Jones used. I surveyed Canadian students who had returned from their semester abroad, and those who were going to depart abroad in the next year. Students were asked to fill out the questionnaire electronically, via email. My survey primarily contained the same questions as Jones', assessing students' beliefs in shared understandings and values between their host country and Canada, as well as their attitudes towards Canada.

My research design differed from Jones' in a few key ways, however. First, Jones ran her survey over a two-week period corresponding with the December school break. She surveyed students who had just returned from studying abroad during the Fall Term (September-December), and those who were about to depart abroad for the Winter Term (January-April).

Because of time restrictions, I sent my survey out in June. I surveyed students who had studied abroad for the Winter Term, and those who were going to study abroad in the Fall Term. Within the first few days of running the survey, it became clear that there was a much higher response rate among students who had already studied abroad. To try to balance that, I also sent the survey out to students who would study abroad in the 2017 Winter Term.

Because of low response rates, I kept my survey running for four weeks, instead of two. I had 118 responses to my survey. 65 respondents had gone abroad already, while 53 had yet to depart. Only 85 respondents completed the entire survey, however.

In order to preserve cases and power, I used multiple imputation to compute values for the missing cases. I imputed values for 33 cases. Thus, I used 118 cases in my analysis. I

compared these to 309 complete cases from Jones's sample of American students.  The number

of imputations for each variable is displayed in Table 1.

## Table 1: Multiple Imputation of Missing Data

| Variable | Complete | Incomplete | Imputed | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Shared Values | 106 | 12 | 12 | 118 |
| Generalized Trust | 111 | 7 | 7 | 118 |
| Situational Trust | 106 | 12 | 12 | 118 |
| Warmth to Host | 104 | 14 | 14 | 118 |
| Patriotism | 101 | 17 | 17 | 118 |
| Nationalism | 101 | 17 | 17 | 118 |
| Identification with Home | 100 | 18 | 18 | 118 |
| Warmth to Home | 103 | 15 | 15 | 118 |
| International | 99 | 19 | 19 | 118 |
| Prior Exposure | 99 | 19 | 19 | 118 |
| Non-English | 117 | 1 | 1 | 118 |
| Political | 96 | 22 | 22 | 118 |
| Senior | 113 | 5 | 5 | 118 |
| Gender | 99 | 19 | 19 | 118 |

I used the same survey as Jones, with a few exceptions. To test the first hypothesis and how studying abroad effects students' attitudes towards other countries, Jones used five dependent variables: *Shared Values, Shared Understandings, Generalized Trust, Situational Trust, Warmth towards Host Country.*

The first variable, *Shared Values*, measures whether respondents believed their host country held similar values as their home country. This variable was created from items used in the World Values survey. These items asked respondents whether individuals in their host

country hold the same values as individuals from their home country. It asked respondents specifically about values such as "democracy," "family," "the rule of law," and similar items.

In second dependent variable, *Shared Understandings*, Jones also asked students whether individuals in their host country understood concepts the same way that individuals from the home country did. These concepts included "democracy," "a successful life," and "what's right and wrong."

It struck me that *Shared Values* and *Shared Understandings* seem to measure more or less the same thing. Indeed, in Jones' analysis, their trends were almost identical. Jones did not provide any theoretical reason why there is a distinction between the two measures. I could not find one either. I therefore excluded this variable from my analysis, and just compared the *Shared Values* results.

*Generalized Trust* assesses how much a respondent trusts their host country in general. Jones had respondents rate the population of their host country from "not trustworthy at all" to "very trustworthy." Jones had respondents rank these values on a seven-point scale. In replicating her survey for Canadian students, I made a mistake, and had respondents rank these values on a four-point scale. The distributions between the two scales were very similar (see Appendix A, Table 2). I therefore rescaled both measures on a 0-1 scale for analysis.

*Situational Trust* assesses how much a respondent trusts an individual in their host country in a specific circumstance. To measure this, Jones asked students to imagine they were going to the restroom in a café in their host country. Would they feel comfortable asking another patron to watch over their laptop? Respondents answered this on a scale from "very comfortable" to "very uncomfortable."

For the purposes of comparison, I use this measure in my analysis. I do have some concerns with it, however. This measure might be getting at whether students are trusting of other individuals, generally, rather than individuals from their host country, specifically. Students who are "uncomfortable" with this situation might be so for reasons that have nothing to do with how trustworthy they believe individuals from their host country are; they might be just as uncomfortable leaving their laptop in a coffee shop in Vancouver.

Thus, the situational trust measure used might not really get at whether students trust individuals in their host country. It might have been necessary to include another question, asking whether students would fee comfortable leaving their laptop unattended in their home country, to at least have a baseline measure of trust. Neither Jones' data nor mine has this, however.

Finally, *Warmth towards Host* assesses how positively or "warmly" a respondent feels towards their host country at large. Jones measures this by asking respondents to rate how warmly they felt towards their host country, using a "feeling thermometer" that ran from 1-100. This has also been used in the World Values Survey.

To measure Hypothesis 2 and how studying abroad impacts students' attitudes towards their own country, Jones uses *Nationalism, National Pride, National Superiority, Warmth towards Home,* and *Identification with Home*.

Jones's first had three measures try to get at national attachment, love, pride, and belief of superiority. The first measure, which she termed *Nationalism,* was measured by using Kosterman and Feshbach's scale (Kosterman & Feshbach 1989). Respondents were asked whether they agreed with statements such as "I love my country," and "I am proud to be an American." Jones also measured what she termed *National Pride.* She used survey questions

from the International Social Survey Program ("ISSP") that asked respondents whether they were proud of specific aspects of their country. Also using ISSP questions, Jones measured *National Superiority*. Respondents were asked the extent to which they believed their country was better than others.

As discussed earlier, Jones did not make a distinction between patriotism and nationalism. However, her measures seem to reflect them pretty closely. *Nationalism* and *National Pride* seem to be measuring patriotism, as was defined earlier. *National Superiority* seems to be measuring nationalism.

For my analysis, I combined the *Nationalism* and *National Pride* scales (alpha=0.69 for combined dataset; 0.72 for Canadian dataset; 0.70 for American dataset) and renamed it *Patriotism.* I used the same *National Superiority* scale, but renamed it *Nationalism*.

Jones measured *Warmth Towards Home* using the same "feeling thermometer" employed before. I did the same. *Identification with Home* was measured by asking respondents to rank how closely they identified with their home country.

To assess how these dependent variables were impacted by studying abroad, and whether this impact was affected by being Canadian or American, I used dummy variables for whether or not a student was Canadian or American (1=Canadian;0=American) and whether or not a student had studied abroad yet (1=had studied abroad; 0=had not yet studied abroad).

I used a series of controls in my models as well. I controlled for the amount of international experience a student had prior to the study abroad program. Responses were placed on an eight-point scale, with higher values indicating more experience. I also controlled for whether or not a student had been to the country they were studying at prior to the study abroad program. I used a dummy variable for this (1=had been to country; 0=had never been).

I also controlled for whether or not students were studying at a country were English was not one of the official languages. I assumed that such countries would be harder for students to immerse themselves in. Moreover, the language-barrier would likely highlight the differences between the host and home countries more. I used a dummy variable for this (1=country with English is not an official language; 0=country where English is an official language).

Students' political leanings were controlled for, as well. Higher values indicate more liberal students. There were a few differences in my and Jones' measurement of this variable, however. Firstly, Jones used the terms "liberal" and "conservative" on her survey. These terms do not always translate the same way for Canadian audiences, so I used "left" and "right." Jones used a seven-point scale; I made a mistake and used an eleven-point scale. The distributions are similar (see Appendix A, Table 2), with Canadians leaning slightly more to the left, as expected. I therefore scaled both variables from 0-1.

Finally, students' year of study and gender was controlled for. Most students were in their 3$^{rd}$ or 4$^{th}$ year. A few outliers were in their 5$^{th}$ year or in grad-school. They were so few, however, that counted these a students in their 4$^{th}$ year.

Summary statistics of the variables are displayed in Table 2.

## Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

|  | Canadian | | | American | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | **Total** | **Control** | **Treatment** | **Total** | **Control** | **Treatment** |
| **Hypothesis 1** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Shared Values | 0.60 (0.24) | 0.68 (0.23) | 0.54 (0.23) | 0.68 (0.19) | 0.71 (0.17) | 0.65 (0.20) |
| Generalized Trust | 0.64 (0.34) | 0.69 (0.31) | 0.59 (0.35) | 0.64 (0.23) | 0.65 (0.20) | 0.64 (0.26) |
| Situational Trust | 0.57 (0.32) | 0.54 (0.30) | 0.60 (0.32) | 0.59 (0.32) | 0.63 (0.30) | 0.57 (0.34) |
| Warmth to Host | 0.73 (0.22) | 0.73 (0.21) | 0.73 (0.22) | 0.79 (0.16) | 0.79 (0.13) | 0.79 (0.18) |
| **Hypothesis 2** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Patriotism | 0.61 (0.19) | 0.61 (0.19) | 0.62 (0.19) | 0.63 (0.16) | 0.60 (0.17) | 0.65 (0.15) |
| Nationalism | 0.50 (0.23) | 0.49 (0.22) | 0.52 (0.23) | 0.39 (0.17) | 0.39 (0.18) | 0.39 (0.16) |
| Warmth to Home | 0.78 (0.19) | 0.76 (0.21) | 0.79 (0.23) | 0.76 (0.18) | 0.74 (0.20) | 0.77 (0.17) |
| Identification with Home | 0.78 (0.22) | 0.77 (0.24) | 0.80 (0.21) | 0.59 (0.20) | 0.56 (0.19) | 0.62 (0.19) |
| **Controls** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| International | 0.60 (0.30) | 0.58 (0.30) | 0.63 (0.30) | 0.46 (0.32) | 0.47 (0.32) | 0.46 (0.32) |
| Prior Exposure | 0.29 (0.48) | 0.33 (0.49) | 0.26 (0.46) | 0.39 (0.49) | 0.45 (0.50) | 0.34 (0.48) |
| Non-English | 0.66 (0.47) | 0.58 (0.49) | 0.72 (0.45) | 0.70 (0.46) | 0.72 (0.45) | 0.70 (0.46) |
| Political | 0.64 (0.24) | 0.62 (0.26) | 0.68 (0.22) | 0.54 (0.22) | 0.52 (0.22) | 0.55 (0.22) |
| Senior | 0.44 (0.50) | 0.44 (0.50) | 0.44 (0.50) | 0.23 (0.42) | 0.18 (0.39) | 0.27 (0.44) |
| Gender | 0.79 (0.42) | 0.81 (0.42) | 0.78 (0.43) | 0.74 (0.44) | 0.71 (0.46) | 0.77 (0.42) |

$N = 440$

$N_{American} = 322$

$N_{Canadian} = 118$

Data for Canadians based on dataset made of 33 multiple imputations.

To analyze the data, and assess the effects of studying abroad and its interaction with nationality, I used Ordinary Least Squares regression. I followed the same equations outlined in my hypothesis. Results are displayed in Tables 2 and 3. The interaction term (TreatmentXCanadian) is the one most relevant to my hypotheses, as it indicates whether studying abroad impacts Canadians and Americans differently. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these differences.

## Chapter 7: Results

First, I examine the results for Hypothesis 1. I look at how studying abroad effects students' perceptions of their host country. According to my hypothesis, studying abroad should have a positive effect of Canadian students' belief in shared values between their host country and Canada. We should also see an increase in general and situational trust. Finally, we should see an increase in warmth towards their host country after Canadian students have studied abroad. This should all be in contrast to American students' experiences. Results are displayed in Table 3 and Figure 1.[10]

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[10] Note that Figure 1 does not display the confidence intervals for variables, as STATA does not allow this for MI data. Appendix A, Figure 1 displays the margins plots from the dataset without any imputations. This figure has the confidence intervals included.

## Table 3: Perceptions of Host Country

|  | Shared Values | General Trust | Situational Trust | Warmth to Host |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | -0.067*** | -0.017 | -0.062* | -0.002 |
|  | (0.022) | (0.026) | (0.036) | (0.020) |
| Canadian | -0.075** | -0.092 | -0.118** | -0.097*** |
|  | (0.036) | (0.041) | (0.058) | (0.033) |
| TreatmentXCanadian | -0.048 | -0.044 | 0.100 | 0.009 |
|  | (0.043) | (0.052) | (0.071) | (0.041) |
| International Experience | -0.042 | -0.045 | 0.039 | -0.014 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.038) | (0.054) | (0.029) |
| Prior Exposure Host | 0.011 | 0.023 | -0.079** | 0.018 |
|  | (0.020) | (0.024) | (0.034) | (0.019) |
| Non-English Country | -0.143*** | -0.127*** | 0.091*** | -0.048** |
|  | (0.020) | (0.024) | (0.034) | (0.019) |
| Political | 0.060 | 0.111** | 0.011 | 0.089** |
|  | (0.044) | (0.052) | (0.075) | (0.040) |
| Senior | -0.035 | -0.049* | -0.062 | -0.048* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.035) | (0.048) | (0.028) |
| Gender | 0.033 | -0.002 | -0.061* | 0.015 |
|  | (0.022) | (0.027) | (0.037) | (0.020) |
| Constant | 0.808*** | 0.741*** | 0.676*** | 0.809*** |
|  | (0.042) | (0.050) | (0.071) | (0.040) |
| *N* | 440 | 440 | 440 | 440 |

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Estimates based on 34 multiple imputations of dataset

**Figure 1: Attitudes towards Home Country**



As seen here, my hypothesis did not hold true. Studying abroad effected Canadians and Americans very similarly. Any differences in the attitudes of Canadians and Americans seem to be a result of the fact that Canadian and American students hold different attitudes towards their host country before they go abroad.

Contrary to expectations, Canadians start out with a lower perception of shared values than Americans do. Like Americans studying abroad seems to further depress Canadian students' belief in shared values. This depression is slightly more pronounced for Canadians than Americans (TreatmentXCanadian=-0.048).

Canadians do start out with higher levels of generalized trust than Americans. However, Canadians' levels of generalized trust falls more after studying abroad than does Americans' (TreatmentXCanadian=-0.044).

Situational trust follows a different path. Canadian students started off being less trusting

of leaving their belongings unattended in a coffeeshop than Americans. After studying abroad, however, Canadians became more trusting, while Americans became less trusting (TreatmentXCanadian=-0.100).

Finally, studying abroad had no significant impact on students' feelings of warmth towards their host country. This is true of both Canadians and Americans. Contrary to expectations, however, Canadians started off as rating their host country lower than Americans did.

Whether or not students were studying at non-English speaking countries, and the political leanings of students had an impact on students' perceptions of and attitudes towards their host countries. Note that these measures are averages of both Canadians and Americans, as well as those who have and have not studied abroad. Thus, these coefficients do not indicate whether studying abroad impacts students differently depending on whether or not they are going to a non-English speaking country, or whether they are liberal or conservative. Moreover, it does not tell us whether or not these interactions between treatment and the language of the host country, or treatment and political leanings are different for Canadians versus Americans.[11]

Next, we examine the effects studying abroad has for Canadian and Americans' perceptions of their own country. Results are displayed in Table 4 and Figure 2.[12]

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[11] Because of my limited sample size, these interactions could not be assessed here. Moreover, these interactions are not fundamental to the relationships I am interested in here. Further research is required to see whether these factors impact Canadians and Americans differently.

[12] Margins plots with the confidence intervals included are in Appendix A, Figure 2.

## Table 4: Attachment to Home Country

|  | Patriotism | Nationalism | Warmth to Home | Identification with Home |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | 0.060*** | 0.012 | 0.034* | 0.066*** |
|  | (0.017) | (0.019) | (0.020) | (0.022) |
| Canadian | 0.057** | 0.178*** | 0.037 | 0.221*** |
|  | (0.029) | (0.031) | (0.033) | (0.036) |
| TreatmentXCanadian | -0.034 | 0.029 | 0.010 | -0.011 |
|  | (0.036) | (0.040) | (0.042) | (0.046) |
| International Experience | -0.015 | -0.015 | -0.001 | -0.060* |
|  | (0.025) | (0.028) | (0.030) | (0.032) |
| Prior Exposure Host | -0.013 | -0.012 | -0.033* | -0.015 |
|  | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.019) | (0.021) |
| Non-English Country | -0.016 | -0.011 | -0.011 | -0.039* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.019) | (0.021) |
| Political | -0.323*** | -0.341*** | -0.209*** | -0.230*** |
|  | (0.037) | (0.038) | (0.042) | (0.044) |
| Senior | 0.037 | 0.073*** | 0.006 | -0.022 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.026) | (0.028) | (0.030) |
| Gender | -0.050*** | -0.065*** | 0.012 | -0.030 |
|  | (0.017) | (0.019) | (0.021) | (0.023) |
| Constant | 0.79*** | 0.57*** | 0.86*** | 0.79*** |
|  | (0.034) | (0.036) | (0.040) | (0.043) |
| *N* | 440 | 440 | 440 | 440 |

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Estimates based on 34 multiple imputations of dataset

**Figure 2: Attitudes towards Host Country**



Again, these results do not confirm any of my hypotheses. Studying abroad affects Canadians and Americans very similarly. Like the results for attitudes towards host country, any differences between Canadians and Americans seems to be a product of differences in attitudes before the students went abroad.

Canadians students had higher levels of patriotism than American students. Studying abroad seems to increase both Canadians and Americans levels of patriotism, although this increase is slightly greater for Americans than Canadians (TreatmentXCanadian= -0.034).

Canadian students in both the treatment and control groups were more nationalistic than their American counterparts. Studying abroad did not have a statistically significant impact on levels of patriotism for either group, although the coefficient for patriotism suggests a slight

increase after studying abroad. The increase is slightly greater for Canadians than Americans (TreatmentXCanadian=0.029).

Studying abroad had a slight, positive impact on how warmly students felt towards their home country. It also increased how the level to which both Canadian and American students identified with their home. Again, Canadian students in both treatment and control categories felt more warmly towards Canada, and more closely identified with it, than American students did towards America.

These measures had similar results for non-English speaking countries, and for political leanings as in Table 2. The same disclaimers in interpreting these results apply as before.

# Chapter 8: Limitations

There are several limitations to the research design, and the resulting findings, that need to be taken into account.

First, the differences between my research design and Jones' might have had an effect on the results. Jones surveyed students over a two-week period in December. I surveyed students over a four-week period in June. The difference has several possible impacts.

Firstly, the time since students had returned from being abroad, and the time before they would go abroad, is longer in my study than in Jones'. In Jones' study, students who had gone abroad returned home within two weeks of taking the survey. In my study, students might have returned home up to a month prior to taking my survey. This leaves open the possibility that the effects of studying abroad might have "worn off" more for the students I surveyed than the ones Jones surveyed, since more time had passed. However, I did ask Canadian students to report when they returned home. Only 26 out of the 49 students who had turned from being abroad answered this question. 15 of them had been home for less than 2 weeks.

For students who had not yet gone abroad yet, Jones was surveying them two-weeks prior to their departure date. I was surveying them at least 2 months prior to their departure date, and up to 7 months in advance. This means that, for the students Jones surveyed, their departure was much more imminent than it was for the students I surveyed. The students Jones surveyed might have been more anxious or excited about the entire experience than the ones I surveyed. Moreover, they might have had more of a chance to research the country they were going to. Conversely, for the students I surveyed, their departure might have been far from their minds, and they might not have yet really researched their host country. All this might affect the kinds of answers they gave to the questionnaire.

Additionally, the different time frame meant that there were different groups in the "treatment" and "control" groups for Jones and my research. For Jones, the "treatment" group was students who had studied abroad in the Fall Term. For me, students who studied abroad in the Winter Term comprised the "treatment" group. For Jones, the "control" group was those who were going to go abroad in the Winter Term. For me, the "control" group was those were going to go abroad in the Fall Term, plus those who were going to go abroad in the Winter Term. There seems to be no theoretical reason why students in these groups would be fundamentally different. Indeed, students in all groups shared the same demographic categories – there were the same proportion of males and females in each category, and a similar distribution of years of study, major, and countries of study in each group. However, it is again worth noting as a discrepancy between my design and Jones'.

There was also a significant time lapse between when Jones conducted her research and when I did. Jones surveyed American students in 2008; I surveyed Canadian students in 2016. It is possible that the difference in results between students of the two countries is due to changes in the political and international climate that occurred over the past eight years, rather than differences in the outlooks of the different nationalities.

There is also a substantial concern with the sample size for the Canadian students. 118 Canadian students responded to my survey. When I restricted my analysis to students who had completed the entire survey, I only had 85 cases. This is in comparison to the 309 complete cases I had of American students. Thus, there was a significant imbalance in the data. Using multiple imputation for the missing data allowed me to offset this a little, but there were still roughly double the number of American cases used in analysis than American cases.

Moreover, there were concerning trends in the missingness of my data. 53 students who had not gone abroad, and 65 students who had gone abroad, responded to my survey. However, only 37 students who had not studied abroad completed the entire survey, while 49 students who studied abroad did. Thus, there were more students in the treatment group than the control group. Moreover, students who had not yet gone abroad were more likely to drop out of the survey than those who had. This introduces self-selection and bias in the data.

Jones' data suffers from a similar problem. 285 students who had not gone abroad, and 286 who had, responded to her survey. Only 141 students who had not gone abroad, and 181 who had completed the survey, however.

Finally, there are limitations to both Jones' and my findings and data that are the result of the research design and population surveyed generally. Primarily, it is unclear how generalizable these findings are to the Canadian or American population at large. Both Jones and I used university students as our sample. This raises questions about whether our findings are generalizable to the Canadian and American populations at large, or whether they are really only specific to students who study abroad. Ultimately, however, this comparison does show that there is a difference between Canadians and Americans of the same demographic group, which might suggest that there would be differences in other demographic groups as well. Additionally, the fact that we see these trends among students, who are likely more educated, affluent, liberal, and younger than the countries average, is notable.

## Chapter 9: Discussion

Because of the limitations of the data and analysis, it is entirely possible that the results are skewed and not reflecting the reality of how Canadian students perceive their host country and Canada, and how studying abroad impacts this. However, for the sake of discussion, I will assume my results have some bearing and capture true population trends. Assuming this, I will consider their possible explanations and implications.

Ultimately, none of my hypotheses were confirmed. Instead, my results showed almost the exact opposite. As was the case with American students, studying abroad seems to make Canadian students more nationalistic and patriotic. It made them see greater differences between Canada and other countries. It made them trust other countries less, and identify with Canada more.

Even more surprising, Canadians students *started out* more nationalistic and patriotic than American students. Even before studying abroad, Canadian students saw greater differences between Canada and the rest of the world. They started off feeling more attached to, and proud of, Canada than Americans do to America.

All of this goes against my expectations. Given Canada's acceptance of other cultures, its view of itself and its place in the world, these findings are surprising. I will examine a few possible ways to try to make sense of them.

Perhaps the simplest, although most personally uncomfortable, explanation is that this is a case where Canadians are not as cosmopolitan as we would like to think. As discussed earlier, Canadians set high expectations for themselves. Canada is sometimes referred to as a "utopia," in academic literature (Heath 2001). This is often borne out by empirical studies. Sometimes,

however, it is not. This may be a case where Canadians are actually not as multicultural or cosmopolitan as we would hope.

However, before we brand Canadians as intolerant, frauds, or "worse than Americans," I think there is evidence that the picture is more complicated and nuanced than that. It is first necessary to revisit the measures we were using.

We used a *Shared Values* measure to assess whether students believe their host country and home country shared the same values. Canadians saw these similarities less than Americans. Moreover, students who had more international experience before studying abroad were also more likely to see this. As seen in Table 1, Canadian students actually have substantially more international experience than American students. Thus, Canadian students were coming in with more international experience that was likely colouring how they perceived different countries.

The question still remains why international experience would make students see more differences between their country and others. As set out in the beginning, travel has long been thought to foster senses of shared community and values. Seeing differences between one's home countries and other countries is presumed to be a hindrance to this.

However, perhaps this is too idealistic. Maybe it is simply the case that individuals in different countries hold different values and priorities. Travelling, and studying abroad, would and should serve to highlight these. Thus, students who studied abroad would see a greater difference between their host and home cultures than those who had not.

Maybe seeing differences in countries after studying abroad is not necessarily a negative thing. Seeing differences does not necessarily mean individuals dislike other countries, or feel superior to them. Indeed, the principle of multiculturalism itself does not try to downplay

differences between cultures, but rather holds that we should be accepting and respectful of them, regardless of differences.

In a sense, this is what the data suggests students did. Studying abroad had a significant, negative impact on Canadians' and Americans' perception of shared global values. It did not have a statistically significant impact on the general levels of trust or warmth they felt towards their host country, however. Thus, while studying abroad highlighted differences between countries, it did not seem to negatively impact how students perceived other countries.

The outlier here is situational trust. For Canadian students, studying abroad increased situational trust. For Americans, it depressed it. It may be the case that studying abroad impacts Canadians and Americans differently in this aspect. However, given that the effects were the same in every other aspect, this seems questionable. Perhaps the discrepancy here is due to the concerns with how situational trust was operationalized and measured that I discussed earlier.

There is also room for nuance in interpreting the results of studying abroad on nationalism and patriotism. Studying abroad had a statistically significant, positive impact on how nationalistic both Canadians and Americans were. It also had a statistically significant, positive impact on how much they identified with, and how warmly they felt towards, their respective countries.

As discussed before, this might not be a negative thing. Feeling attached to one's country does not necessarily imply hostility towards another country. Moreover, as Breton (2015) noted, the content of a country's national identity, and *why*, exactly, individuals are proud of their country matters.

I was not able to include this measure in the analysis, as Jones' data did not include it. I did ask respondents whether they believed other countries valued multiculturalism, and how

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proud they were of Canada's multiculturalism, however.  Running the same model used early, I find that studying abroad has a statistically significant, negative effect on Canadian's beliefs that other countries share Canada's multicultural values.  Perhaps relatedly, studying abroad has a statistically significant, positive effect on proud Canadian students are of their country's multiculturalism.  These results are displayed in Table 4.

**Table 5: Studying Abroad and Multiculturalism**

|  | Host Country's Multiculturalism | Proud of Canadian Multiculturalism |
|---|---|---|
| Treatment | -0.094* | 0.087* |
|  | (0.062) | (0.052) |
| International | 0.018 | 0.008 |
|  | (0.104) | (0.088) |
| Prior Exposure | 0.083 | 0.042 |
|  | (0.068) | (0.057) |
| Non-English | -0.038 | -0.025 |
|  | (0.066) | (0.053) |
| Political | -0.073 | 0.090 |
|  | (0.142) | (0.113) |
| Senior | -0.039 | 0.011 |
|  | (0.065) | (0.051) |
| Gender | 0.020 | 0.021 |
|  | (0.073) | (0.063) |
| Constant | 0.608*** | 0.701*** |
|  | (0.131) | (0.110) |
| *N* | 118 | 118 |

\* $p<0.1$; \*\* $p<0.05$; \*\*\* $p<0.01$

Estimates based on 34 multiple imputations of dataset

This suggests that studying abroad highlights how Canada is different from other countries in terms of multicultural values. This in turn makes Canadian students more proud of their country's record with multiculturalism. This feeds into Kymlicka's theory of "Canadian exceptionalism." Moreover, it seems less negative. Studying abroad increases patriotism for Canadians. This increase can perhaps partially be explained by an increase in Canadians' pride of specific, positive aspects of their country.

Jones did not ask American students about multiculturalism. Thus, I cannot make a comparison between the two groups on this question.[13] However, it may be the case that the picture is just as nuanced for Americans. Increase in American patriotism might also be related to an increase in pride in multiculturalism.

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[13] She did, however, ask them how proud they were of American "democracy" and "government." Answers to these questions are included in the *Patriotism* measure I used for both Canadian and American students.

Finally, as discussed earlier, many see patriotism as a benign, or even positive, force. Nationalism, however, is seen as the negative, chauvinistic counterpart. In my results, studying abroad had a positive impact on both Canadian and Americans levels of nationalism, although this result was not significant. Canadians in both the control and treatment groups were more nationalistic than their American counterparts. This was significant.

On the one hand, this is not surprising. Canadians were more patriotic than Americans. As Kosterman and Fleshbach (1989) showed, patriotism and nationalism are distinct, but highly correlated. Thus, it is not surprising that, as Canadians love their country more, they also believe their country is superior to others.

There may be some error in how nationalism is measured here, however. The measure of nationalism I used aggregated responses to questions such as "I believe Canada is the better than most countries," "I would rather be a Canadian citizen than any other," or "The world would be better if more countries were like Canada."

These questions might assess an aspect of nationalism and miss another. Nationalism does involve believing one's national group is better than others. The questions seem to get at that. However, nationalism also involves believing others should be excluded from certain rights or privileges, or that they are somehow morally inferior (Fleshbach 1994). These questions really do not assess this.

Additionally, the wording of the questions makes the focus about *Canada,* and not other countries. So it is almost as though respondents are being primed to think about the positive aspects of their country and how much they love it, rather than really considering the implications of these questions for other countries.

Finally, it also matters *why* individuals believe their country is superior.  Similar to the case with nationalism, if individuals believe Canada is better than other countries because it has a good record of accommodating diversity, or if they believe other countries should imitate Canada's example in this respect, is this a bad thing?  Unfortunately, I did not include a measure to ask students why*, exactly,* they believed Canada was superior.  Given the case with nationalism, however, it does no seem unreasonable to suspect this.

## Chapter 10: Lessons Learned and Possibilities for Future Research

It is hard to assess the veracity of some of my explanations, given the limitations of my data. Having never conducted a survey before, or even worked with quantitative data, I encountered some difficulties, and made some mistakes, that I would avoid if I were to do this again.

My sample size, and the trends in the missingness of the data, were the biggest downfall. If I were to do this again, I would try to increase the number of cases by contacting study abroad programs earlier. As it was, the time constraint precluded certain universities from participating. I would also take more time to explain my study and foster relationships with the study abroad coordinators, as I believe that might have made some more willing to participate.

I would also try to find funding to entice students to complete the survey. Jones held a draw for several $100 Amazon gift cards. Students who completed the entire survey were entered into the draw. This likely increased participation, and induced students to actually completed the entire survey – many of my respondents dropped off towards the end.

While I do not think the timing of the survey had a significant impact, I would also try to do the survey over the Christmas holidays, instead of the summer. This would make the comparison between my data and Jones' more complete.

I would also include certain questions in my survey to try to assess what is motivating students' levels of nationalism or patriotism. It would be interesting to see whether the specific aspects students loved about their country was affected by studying abroad.

I also would like to include a more complex model to assess how patriotism and nationalism influence perception of shared values. I would like to see how this influence is different for students who have and have not studied abroad, and for Canadians and Americans.

This would require a three-way interaction between nationalism or patriotism, studying abroad, and citizenship, which would have over-fit my data. However, it would really explain whether Canadian and Americans have qualitatively different brands of nationalism, and whether these differences influence how they interact with, and view other cultures.

Finally, I would also consider following up with students who were in my control group after they had studied abroad. I would like to conduct interviews with them. This might give me a fuller sense of their perspectives than a survey allows for. Moreover, it would be interesting to see whether using a different research design effects my findings and results.

## Chapter 11: Conclusions

Studying abroad influences Canadian and American students similarly. Students who study abroad have less of a belief in shared values between their home and host countries than those who have not studied abroad. They also have higher levels of patriotism than those who have not studied abroad. This is true of Canadians and Americans.

Studying abroad did not have a significant effect on how warmly students felt towards their host countries, or how trustworthy they thought individuals in the countries generally were. This suggests that while studying abroad highlighted differences between cultures, and caused students to appreciate their own culture more, it did not cause them to feel more negatively towards other cultures or individuals.

Thus, seeing and acknowledging differences, as well as loving and feeling attached to one's country, does not necessarily imply prejudice towards others, or anti-cosmopolitan sentiments. This should be taken into account in research and discussions of the interplay between patriotism and cosmopolitanism. It is yet another piece of evidence that, in certain contexts, patriotism is not antithetical to global community.

These results also point to a need to discuss perceived differences between national groups with more nuance. Nations create in-groups and out-groups. Out-groups are seen to have different values, traits, beliefs, and so on than the in-group. This is viewed as a negative result that leads to prejudice and discrimination.

This result does not always seem to be true, however. As evidenced from study abroad results, individuals can appreciate that members of the out-group are different from them, and still feel trusting of and warmly towards them.

The exact nature of this relationship, and what factors affect it, requires further research. For Canadians and Americans, this relationship seems to be similar, despite Canadian's emphasis on multiculturalism.

Canadians do seem to have higher patriotic and nationalistic sentiments than Americans. This was contrary to expectations, but also not necessarily a negative thing. Patriotism and nationalism are contingent, implying different things for different nations. For Canadians, at least, an increase in patriotism was also accompanied by an increase in how proud Canadians were of their country's multicultural values.

In many ways, my results confirm Kylmicka's notion of "Canadian exceptionalism." Canadians do seem to see themselves as distinct from the rest of the world, and they are distinct in how multicultural and accepting they are. Studying abroad seems to further highlight this sense of exceptionalism.

More research is needed to assess the implications of this. It would also be worth exploring whether Americans have similar results. Do American students who study abroad come back with a greater appreciation of their country's multiculturalism and diversity? Or do they come back believing American is superior to other countries, and therefore should not accommodate diversity or difference? Answers to these questions would give us a fuller picture of how much Canadians and Americans really differ, and how the effects of cross-boarder contact are affected by this difference.

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    Conceptions of National Identity. *Political Psychology*. 32(5), 837-862.

# Appendix

## Table 6: Scales

|  | Cronbach's Alpha |
|---|---|
| Shared Values | 0.696 |
| Patriotism | 0.866 |
| Nationalism | 0.647 |

**Table 7: Distributions of Trust and Political Leanings**

| Trust | Canadian | | American | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Value | Frequency | Value | Frequency |
| | 0.33 | 13 | 0 | 9 |
| | 0.66 | 53 | 0.2 | 30 |
| | 1 | 45 | 0.4 | 99 |
| | | | 0.6 | 140 |
| | | | 0.8 | 170 |
| | | | 1 | 47 |
| Political | | | | |
| | 0 | 1 | 0 | 9 |
| | 0.1 | 1 | 0.2 | 72 |
| | 0.2 | 3 | 0.4 | 94 |
| | 0.3 | 7 | 0.6 | 177 |
| | 0.4 | 8 | 0.8 | 99 |
| | 0.5 | 15 | 1 | 17 |
| | 0.6 | 5 | | |
| | 0.7 | 17 | | |
| | 0.8 | 22 | | |
| | 0.9 | 10 | | |
| | 1 | 7 | | |

## Table 8: Attitudes towards Home with no MI

|  | Patriotism | Nationalism | Warmth to Home | Identification with Home |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | 0.061 | 0.012 | 0.034 | 0.066 |
|  | (0.017)*** | (0.018) | (0.020)* | (0.021)*** |
| Canadian | 0.084 | 0.209 | 0.065 | 0.253 |
|  | (0.029)*** | (0.032)*** | (0.035)* | (0.038)*** |
| TreatmentXCanadian | -0.051 | 0.005 | 0.006 | -0.035 |
|  | (0.036) | (0.039) | (0.044) | (0.047) |
| International Experience | -0.008 | -0.014 | -0.005 | -0.057 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.026) | (0.029) | (0.031)* |
| Prior Exposure Host | -0.014 | -0.014 | -0.035 | -0.018 |
|  | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.019)* | (0.020) |
| Non-English Country | -0.015 | -0.011 | -0.004 | -0.034 |
|  | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.019) | (0.021) |
| Political | -0.346 | -0.353 | -0.224 | -0.251 |
|  | (0.033)*** | (0.036)*** | (0.040)*** | (0.043)*** |
| Senior | 0.029 | 0.071 | 0.009 | -0.030 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.025)*** | (0.028) | (0.030) |
| Gender | -0.045 | -0.060 | 0.009 | -0.032 |
|  | (0.017)*** | (0.018)*** | (0.020) | (0.022) |
| Constant | 0.807 | 0.573 | 0.862 | 0.800 |
|  | (0.033)*** | (0.036)*** | (0.040)*** | (0.042)*** |
| N | 408 | 408 | 408 | 408 |

* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Estimates based off 322 American cases and 86 Canadian cases.

**Table 9: Attitudes towards Host with no MI**

|  | Shared Values | General Trust | Situational Trust | Warmth to Host |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | -0.067 | -0.018 | -0.061 | -0.002 |
|  | (0.021)*** | (0.025) | (0.036)* | (0.020) |
| Canadian | -0.069 | 0.106 | -0.099 | -0.088 |
|  | (0.038)* | (0.045)** | (0.064) | (0.035)** |
| TreatmentXCanadian | -0.046 | -0.045 | 0.111 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.047) | (0.055) | (0.078) | (0.043) |
| International Experience | -0.048 | -0.065 | 0.045 | -0.010 |
|  | (0.031) | (0.037)* | (0.052) | (0.029) |
| Prior Exposure Host | 0.011 | 0.025 | -0.081 | 0.024 |
|  | (0.020) | (0.024) | (0.033)** | (0.019) |
| Non-English Country | -0.138 | -0.123 | 0.108 | -0.049 |
|  | (0.021)*** | (0.024)*** | (0.034)*** | (0.019)** |
| Political | 0.070 | 0.118 | -0.015 | 0.092 |
|  | (0.043) | (0.051)** | (0.072) | (0.040)** |
| Senior | -0.039 | -0.047 | -0.094 | -0.043 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.035) | (0.050)* | (0.028) |
| Gender | 0.033 | 0.011 | -0.043 | 0.016 |
|  | (0.022) | (0.026) | (0.036) | (0.020) |
| Constant | 0.806 | 0.733 | 0.691 | 0.798 |
|  | (0.042)*** | (0.050)*** | (0.071)*** | (0.039)*** |
| N | 408 | 408 | 407 | 408 |

*$p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Estimates based off 322 American cases and 86 Canadian cases.

**Figure 3: Attitudes Towards Host With CIs**

# Figure 4: Attitudes Towards Home With CIs