ACTIVISTS ACROSS ISSUES: FORUM MULTIPLYING AND THE NEW CLIMATE

CHANGE ACTIVISM

by

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Abstract

To a growing class of climate change activists, climate change is not only an environmental issue – it is a labour, gender, justice, indigenous rights, and faith (to name a few) issue. All starting at roughly the same time, an influx of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) made social claims on an environmental issue and changed the politics of climate governance. Their participation to advance these social claims is costly: staff retrained; information researched, analyzed, and disseminated; and relationship building undertaken. All these costs served a new frame, linking the NGOs' social issue to climate change. This sustained mobilization of a network of NGOs in a regime that is not their own is called forum multiplying. NGOs are surprisingly mobile, as environmentalists campaign on free trade and development issues, and unions and children's advocates work in the context of human rights.

Drawing on 72 interviews, seven social network analyses, and three years of participant observation, this research investigates the politics of forum multiplying as NGOs seek recognition within a new area of global governance. NGO networks engage in forum multiplying to contribute to solutions, recruit new allies to their cause, and avoid becoming mired in stalemates that characterize other areas of global governance. Motivation is insufficient to mobilize a network toward a collective end. I posit that two mechanisms help explain why some NGO networks undertake forum multiplying strategies and others do not. First, the ability of NGOs to capitalize on the authority that they hold in their traditional forum, and to bring that authority into the new forum helps them secure recognition for their claims. Second, NGOs' identification of strategic entry points in the rules and norms of the new regime facilitates forum multiplying. The rules and norms of a regime can provide a discursive "hook" for the NGOs' claims that their issue is linked to the issues of their targeted regime, showing that they belong.

Forum multiplying pollinates new ideas into old regimes, potentially bringing the "all hands on deck" approach necessary to mobilize a sufficient response to global climate change.

Preface

I am solely responsible for the identification and design of the research program, the implementation of that program, and the analysis of the data. Errors are mine alone.

Three quotes conducted in this research were used to support an argument in an article titled "Exploring the Framing Power of NGOs in Global Climate Politics" with Jennifer Hadden, which is forthcoming in *Environmental Politics.*

This research was conducted in accordance with the TriCouncil Ethics Board's standards. The research was approved by the UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board under certificate number H14-00026.

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List of Abbreviations

CJN!   Climate Justice Now!

COP   Conference of the Parties

GCHA   Global Climate and Health Alliance

GGCA   Global Gender and Climate Alliance

ICFTU   International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

ILO   International Labour Organization

IPCC   Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

ITUC   International Trade Union Confederation

NGO   Non-governmental organization

REDD+   Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation in developing countries;

            plus the role of conservation, sustainable forest management, and enhancement of

            forest carbon stocks

UNFCCC   United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNEP   United Nations Environment Programme

WHO   World Health Organization

WTO   World Trade Organization

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Thanks, Dad

Chapter 1: Activists across Issues

Copenhagen's streets filled with activists representing the environment, human rights, labour, indigenous rights, faith, gender, youth, global justice and many more marching to demand action on climate change in 2009. As the push for climate action continued, joint letters signed by labour, environmental, development, and faith groups (but not often human rights organizations) urged action. Veterans' associations and "queers for climate" joined climate marches in 2014 in New York, the latter explaining that "Our communities faced near extinction throughout the early HIV/AIDS crisis. Today we are all facing the grave threat of an unstable climate" (Lowder 2014).

Rallying a diverse cross section of non-government organizations (NGOs) and social movements on a single issue is not unique to climate change. Indeed, for reasons discussed in this chapter, climate change is representative of other regimes that experienced an influx of unlikely NGOs. Ten years before the Copenhagen climate march, a similarly diverse group from "turtles and teamsters," staged protests during the World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings in Seattle. NGOs were largely absent during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, but later NGOs advocating health, development and environmental issues starting lobbying the WTO to minimize adverse effects on developing countries (Newell 2006, p. 117). Environmental NGOs launched campaigns to green development aid. Campaigns against development banks in the 1980s aimed to reduce the number of large-scale, environmentally-destructive projects supported by the World Bank and other multilateral development banks (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2005).

Environmental groups are not the only transnational actors adept at crossing into various areas of global governance. Women's rights became human rights after a concerted campaign by

women's rights NGOs (Joachim 2004). Working within the Vienna and Beijing conferences on Women, women's advocates successfully overcame opposition and reframed violence against women using a human rights discourse and methodology (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Brown Thompson 2002). Religious organizations, trade unions and groups working on behalf of refugees, children and youth, and the environment have been actively promoting human rights, sometimes to the benefit of those they represent (Gaer 1995). NGOs are mobile, adeptly moving across the traditional boundaries and issues of global governance.

Recently, the mobility of NGOs has been evident in the context of global climate change and global efforts to address the climate crisis. Here too, an influx of new, non-environmental actors diversified the types and interests of those engaged in climate change regime. As international organizations and civil society actors that traditionally do not work on climate change related issues continue to jump on the proverbial "climate bandwagon," there is a proliferation of ways to view the climate crisis. Such climate bandwagoning occurs as actors "discursively re-fram[e] issues in a way that foregrounds the climate benefits of the original/source issue," and, as Jinnah (2011, p.3-4) explains, "involves the purposeful expansion of regime mission to include new climate-oriented goals that linking agents believe will further their own agendas, regardless of whether such linkages detract from the common good." Others have sought to explain the motivations of international organizations (Hall 2015; Jinnah 2011), and some have documented the fragmentation of the civil society presence (Muñoz Cabre, 2011; Orr 2007; Unmüßig 2011). For civil society, however, the motivations are left unexplored despite the considerable influx of religious rights groups, indigenous peoples' advocates, development NGOs, alterglobalization activists and many others to the UNFCCC.

NGOs, often networked together, are surprisingly mobile global governance actors. They move across the issues of their traditional areas of global governance, seeking to reframe old issues in new ways. The NGOs do not abandon their traditional causes, rather they multiply their efforts and their presence to advance their causes in new areas. This is forum multiplying strategy, or, the sustained mobilization of a group of NGOs in a new forum and regime, enabled by a discursive frame linking the NGO network's traditional issue to the issue governed by another forum, and is evident in global governance, but unexplored. It potentially holds important implications for global governance.

For some, diversity among civil society is welcome news, for others, a plethora of interests signals an impending impasse. Greater numbers of actors and multiple opinions can slow negotiations and can potentially prevent new decisions or agreements. NGOs often can add new issues to the agenda of international negotiations (Betsill and Corell 2008), meaning states have new issues to negotiate, perhaps detracting from the "core" work at hand. NGOs can also reframe states' interests (Betsill 2002), facilitate bargaining (Arts 1998; Lisowski 2005), provide research (Chasek 2001) and mobilize public opinion. A fragmented civil society voice can pull states in different, and possibly even contradictory, directions.

For others, greater diversity of opinions can breed better, more legitimate agreements (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2016; Bernauer and Gampfer 2013). Wider engagement of non-state actors can confer legitimacy on the outcome, or on the process used to reach the outcome (Nasiritousi, Hjerpe and Bäckstrand 2015). Further, engaging a more diverse range of stakeholders can bring the "all hands on deck" approach that global crises such as climate change require if a solution is to be found (Wapner 2011; Hale 2015). As Hale (2015) argues, international organizations can cultivate relationships with stakeholders, such as the private

sector and subnational governments, to expand the scope of actors engaging in innovation and implementation. Yet, studying international organizations' openness to transnational actors across issues over 60 years, Tallberg et al. (2013) note that the effort of international organizations is likely in part an effort to strategically heighten their legitimacy of the organization; often, as Bäckstrand (2012) reminds, legitimacy often arises in global environmental politics by states engaged in formal decision making processes. Bond (2012) however, focuses on social movements engaging in climate change activism and calls on this "movement below" to overcome the paralysis of the global climate change talks. It seems an open debate on how and whether more or more varied non-state actors can help create better global governance outcomes.

In part, it is a matter of which non-state actors one seeks to focus on, given that the term can mean everything from a multinational corporation to a social movement or city. As a greater array of non-state actors become involved, groups that never considered themselves part of a given global problem could find themselves implicated in its solutions. Their role in these solutions – and degree to which their role is encouraged by those already working on solutions – varies. By exploring a range of civil society actors, particularly social movement and NGOs representing different issues, I engage in this debate, considering the extent to which these actors are recognized and included in the community of climate change actors. There are several implications of forum multiplying strategies, for both the diversification of civil society's voice and for global governance. This research seeks to contribute to our understanding of why and how this diversification occurs.

The diversification of activists due to their migration across areas of global governance is part of the struggle for power against states. NGOs and social movements are migratory actors,

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traversing areas of global governance to lobby for their core areas of interest in several different contexts. International regimes, often viewed as the "rules, norms, principles, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given issue area" (Krasner 1983, 4) are inward looking, concerned with governing a given issue. International negotiations are focal points for contention among state, business and civil society actors (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2005; Tarrow 2001). Such negotiations become important political sites where actors communicate their ideas and assumptions about global governance, and where shared ideas about standards of governance are constructed (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2016). These negotiations usually occur within one organization, a forum of the regime. By traversing the boundaries of global governance, NGOs potentially pollinate new issues into old regimes, as they engage in forum multiplying to a new, "target" regime. By forum multiplying, connected groups of NGOs – NGO networks – can continue to challenge the power and authority of the state and influence a range of governance outcomes from trade to human rights and development to climate change.

Forum multiplying is not a simple, cost-free exercise. It involves more than showing up at an international negotiation if NGOs want to have any amount of political leverage. And, it seems influence is their aim; in a survey of several types of civil society actors at the WTO and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Hanegraaff (2015) found that the primary motivation was to influence the negotiations. NGOs within networks expend the time and resources to participate in a new area of global governance with the intent to influence the politics of that forum.

For these newcomers, influence is a lofty and expensive goal. It requires acquiring both expertise in an issue and recognition as a member of the group of governors engaged in the

collective effort (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010). When in their traditional regime, NGOs carry both the recognition and expertise to advance their issues in interstate politics. For example, environmental NGOs are legitimate and long-standing actors in global environmental politics, claiming to represent a distinct public interest, directly applicable to the issues under negotiation. To support this claim, environmental NGOs can mobilize many supporters in their activism, placing these organizations at the center of world civic politics (Wapner 1996).

Beyond activism, environmental NGOs leverage their expertise by fulfilling many roles, including implementation, standard setting, and research. Such expertise makes these NGOs more influential (Arts 1998). Expertise is a valuable resource to states lacking information (Chasek 2001; Raustaiia 1997), particularly in climate change negotiations which are characterized by a "respectable" politics between states and NGOs (Gough and Shackley 2001). Environmental NGOs are key private actors that can shape and share expectations of rules, norms, principles and decision-making procedures around environmental issues.

When undertaking forum multiplying, NGOs and social movements lack both a recognized claim to belonging in their targeted regime, and the expertise necessary to shape states' preferences. These necessary resources can be costly to acquire. To gain both recognition and expertise, the NGOs must climb a steep learning curve. They need to undertake research and information dissemination activities to establish the link between their traditional issue and the issue governed by their chosen forum. Staff may require retraining or reassigning from other duties to gain expertise in the intersections between the issues. International travel is a must. Procedurally, the NGO must learn how to participate, which encompasses challenges from securing accreditation to the new forum to learning the norms of interaction among delegates. NGO networks must convince those within the target forum that they belong, drawing on

evidence and acting as if they belong as part of the club of actors in the regime. Otherwise, NGO networks risk being labelled a "fringe group" pushing unrelated issues and wasting delegates' time.

Forum multiplying is a costly gambit, which not all NGOs undertake and some NGO groups who attempt it are indeed marginalized to the fringes among actors in the target regime. Only some NGOs undertake forum multiplying, and among those, fewer succeed, leaving a patchwork of NGO participation across regimes. Given the costs involved in forum multiplying and its uneven patterns I explore two motivating questions:

1. Why do some NGO networks expend resources to participate in negotiations on issues where they lack expertise and experience?

2. Why do some NGO networks successfully enact forum multiplying strategies and others do not?

The questions are in some ways chronological. As the forum multiplying framework advanced in chapter 2 explains, I argue there are two steps involved in an NGOs' forum multiplying strategies. First, the NGO network must have motivations to engage in a new forum, particularly given the associated costs. At this stage, several NGO networks may filter out. For others, motivation alone is insufficient. The second stage is mobilization within a forum in the target regime. Here, I argue the ability of the NGO network to carry its authority into the new regime and to align with the rules and norms of the forum are central to a successful strategy of forum multiplying. NGO networks that are able to use their authority to, as Avant, Finnemore, and Sell (2010, 6) explain, "confer deference in others" will be able to disseminate their claim to belonging and frame linking their issue with that of the target regime. Some NGOs will agree with and adopt the rules and norms governing the issue and observers' participation. These

NGOs will be viewed as "one of us," a member of the governing club, and are more likely to be heard and accepted. Others, perhaps with more critical views, often struggle.

Often, the ability of NGOs to influence interstate negotiations garners scholarly attention. Questions of where and when NGOs seek to participate are theoretically interesting because we lack an explanation of NGOs' migratory patterns across global governance forums. This research helps fill this gap.

1.1   Contributions

This research offers three contributions to our current understanding of NGO politics and the politics characterizing sets of overlapping rules and norms of global governance, known as regime complexes (Orsini, Morin and Young 2013; Raustiala and Victor 2004). First, this research documents and explores forum multiplying, an evident, yet untheorized strategy of international NGOs and social movements. In so doing, this research contributes to our understanding of NGOs' participation in global governance, whereas scholarship tends to ask questions about their influence. There are numerous studies showing NGO influence on global environmental outcomes, for issues including climate change (Betsill 2002, 2008; Ciplet 2014; Downie 2014; Lisowski 2005), biosafety (Arts and Mack 2003; Burgiel 2008), forests (Humphreys 2004, 2008), whaling (Andresen and Skodvin 2008; Sakaguchi 2013), and desertification (Corell 2008). Outside the environmental sphere, human rights NGOs have proven adept at using tactics such as shaming as a means to influence state behaviour (Murdie and Peksen 2014; Murdie and Urpelainen 2014).

While much of the literature has aptly identified reasons why and how non-state actors influence global governance, there is little scholarship on the sources of their agency and authority (Nasiritousi, Hjerpe, and Linnér 2014) despite the broad trend that global governance

institutions have become more open to non-state actors (Tallberg et al 2013). Similarly, there is little work on NGOs' participation. Muñoz Cabre (2011), Orr (2007) and Unmüßig (2011) discuss the participation of various NGOs in the UNFCCC, yet do not ask or explore why some NGO networks representing different issues took up the climate cause. Böhmelt, Koubi, and Bernauer (2014) explore the involvement of NGOs on national delegations, noting a contagion effect, that states central in the network of climate governors are more likely to take note of, and replicate, other states' invitations to civil society. As noted above, others have observed the participation of NGOs representing issues other than the one governed by a forum, often as a side note. This literature asking why NGOs participate in a given area of global governance, sometimes still puts states or international organizations at the center of the analysis, or opted to document the trends, a useful precursor to ask why these trends exist.

This is a notable gap because participation is often a necessary precursor for influence. Absent NGOs cannot influence interstate politics. Who participates can provide first clues about who may influence global governance and the potential issue linkages that may emerge. New non-state actors can introduce new ideas and strategies to influence global governance. Yet, we lack an account of why the roster of participants expands or contracts, or why issues cross-fertilize among global governance forums. Who participates is important to understand who influences global governance.

The second contribution is to add non-state actors to the emerging literature on regime complexes. Regime complexes are, broadly, inter-related regimes with overlapping mandates and membership (Raustiala and Victor 2004). Lying between a single regime and world order writ large, regime complexes are composed of elemental regimes that are autonomous, legally equal, and interdependent. Regime complexes exist on a continuum, lying between regimes

nested into a hierarchical arrangement, and, at the opposite pole, unrelated regimes that do not interact (Keohane and Victor 2011). Thus far, our understanding of how international actors move between international regimes is limited to accounts of states' strategies such as forum shopping (Busch 2007; Raustiala and Victor 2004) or forum shifting (Helfer 2004), as influenced by various attributes of the organization (Coleman 2013) in the "chessboard politics" of regime complexes (Alter and Meunier 2009). When the regime complex literature acknowledges non-state actors, they are often considered to be cooperative actors, either linking regimes, or otherwise seeking to facilitate cooperation in pursuit of their normative agendas or institutional mandates (Gómez-Mera 2015; Orsini 2013). In terms of non-state actors' participation across regimes, there are conflicting expectations. Multiplying the number of organizations could increase the number of opportunities for a non-state actor to influence policy (Alter and Meunier 2009). Yet, more organizations also multiply the costs of participation, disadvantaging weaker actors such as non-state actors (Drezner 2009).

Neglecting non-state actors overlooks important global governors. As Avant, Finnemore, and Sell (2010) argue, non-state actors possess authority that can induce deference and therefore confer power. Among the types of authority, expert-based and principled-based are most relevant for non-state actors (Stroup and Wong forthcoming). The expertise of NGOs can be particularly useful for states providing a niche that NGOs can leverage for influence (Arts 1998; Raustiala 1997). Their capacity to implement and partner for new solutions to global problems can lead to international organizations and other actors actively courting non-state actors' involvement (Hale 2015; Tallberg et al 2013; Wapner 2011). Given the authorities and influence that NGOs hold in global governance outcomes, a state-centric regime complexity is insufficient.

Ignoring those that hold power in global governance means that regime complexity theory underestimates some sources of production, reproduction, or change in regime complexes. Some argue that only states' interests and satisfaction with governance may drive change (Colgan, Keohane, and de Graaf 2011). Yet, through creating and diffusing norms, non-state actors can use their authority to create ties between regimes and in turn build or expand regime complexes. In short, if we expect that non-state actors can influence a given regime, we should anticipate that NGOs and social movements could be a route of regime complex expansion. NGOs' participation across regimes is as valid a route of inquiry as the forum shopping and shifting patterns of states.

The third contribution is to contextualize our view of NGO networks by treating them as heterogeneous groups of actors with unequal power relations. There are two tendencies prevalent in scholarship on NGOs and transnational advocacy networks. First, scholars tend to consider NGOs in their natural milieu, that is, the tendency is to study how environmental NGOs influence environmental politics and how human rights organizations influence in human rights governance. For example, in Betsill and Corell's (2008) seminal work on NGO influence in environmental politics, all the case studies limit themselves to the influence of environmental NGOs, save one which considers the role of business groups. Business groups tend to be the foil for exploring environmental NGOs' rhetorical strategies (Sell and Prakash 2004) and influence (Lund 2013).

Yet there are non-state actors representing a range of issues. By considering the civil society actors most closely connected to the governance of the regime's issue, the literature misses the potential ideas and influence of NGOs from other regimes. We further lack an

understanding of how the interplay between these networks, each striving to advance their own issues, may influence global governance outcomes.

Scholarship tends to view NGO groups and transnational advocacy networks as initially proposed by Keck and Sikkink (1998), a dense network of reciprocal relationships among actors (Carpenter 2014; Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery 2009). Yet, a growing body of work shows that some actors within the network matter more than others. Carpenter (2007, 2010, 2014) argues that actors with many connections to other actors in the network can set, vet, or block the networks' agenda. The number of ties confers advantages to some, as these "gatekeepers" can use their structural advantages to shape the advocacy agenda of the entire group (Carpenter 2007, 2014). Further, participation in multiple forums could help entrench the centrality of the gatekeeper within the network (Orsini 2013).

This research instead embraces the heterogeneity of civil society actors engaged in a single issue area and regime and joins the small, but growing literature exploring inter-NGO politics. I add two nuances to this literature. I include both brokers and gatekeepers in my analysis to show the different abilities each has available to facilitate NGO participation in a new forum. I also demonstrate gatekeepers' limits. They do not always use their connections to disseminate norms among the network regarding what issues ought to be addressed, as Carpenter (2007, 2010, 2014) suggests. Instead, they often engage in negotiations with others to develop a frame capable of entering a new regime. Gatekeepers also face limits when they seek to use their authority in other forums. In a sense, they seek to become gate*openers* rather than gate*keepers*. Those within the target regime may be reticent to admit entry. For their participation across forums, the politics among NGOs can matter in important ways.

The motivation and mobilization stages of the NGO forum multiplying framework provide insights to each of these contributions. NGO networks multiply into different regimes to advance their traditional causes, often, for normative or political reasons rather than material motives. Like states, participation in multiple regimes can serve NGOs' interests to keep their cause alive. Their participation across regimes can also be borne of normative desire to contribute to solutions in various challenges facing humankind. In this effort, some actors are better able to open the proverbial gates of the new regime, as gatekeepers and brokers provide key material and ideational resources to the network, and attempt to extend their authority into the new regime.

1.2   Approach of the Dissertation

I adopt an agent-centered approach to studying NGO forum multiplying strategies and bring together literatures from various areas of international relations and comparative politics. Often, scholars privilege the structures of global governance over the agents that design and build linkages among these structures (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010; Dellas, Pattberg and Betsill 2011; Selin and VanDeveer 2003). Global governors, or, actors that exercise power to influence international policy, are often neglected despite their role in creating issues, setting agendas, and enacting and revising outcomes (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010, 1). Here, I reverse the narrative, placing NGOs and the connections they form, use, and renegotiate at the heart of the investigation. Leveraging the insights possible by comparing across social movements (see O'Neill 2012) facilitates the contributions noted above, to help us understand how dynamics among NGOs can influence the mobility across regimes, and perhaps in turn, global governance outcomes. Here, I explain some of the key choices made in conducting research using this agent-centered approach, fundamental definitions, and implications of these

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choices and definitions for the findings. I then briefly outline the approach to conducting the research.

1.2.1 Why Climate?

Here, I use the climate change regime as the target regime of choice for several NGO networks. While there are many other documented cases of NGO networks engaging across regimes and forums within regimes, the climate change regime offers an ideal ground to explore NGO networks' forum multiplying behaviour. First, many NGO networks engaged in the UNFCCC in recent history took on the costly act of forum multiplying. The participation of these non-climate and non-environmental NGOs started at the same time and sustained themselves over time. Muñoz Cabre (2011) documents NGOs' "climate bandwagoning," identifying 22 categories of NGOs accredited, that is, seeking permission to attend, since the first Conference of the Parties (COP 1) in 1995. My original database of NGO participation in the UNFCCC – which NGOs attend – further underlines the diversification of civil society engaged in climate change.[1] As Figure 1 below shows, NGOs representing social issues rarely participated in the climate change negotiations before 2007. From then on, their numbers grew, nearly rivalling environmental NGOs in the lead up to the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015.

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[1] The database catalogues every NGO that participated in every Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC between COP 1 in 1995 and COP 21 in 2015. To determine the type of NGO, I reviewed the vision and mission statements for the organization. Environmental NGOs here are those devoted to environmental, sustainable development and forest/agriculture issues. Social NGOs are those working on indigenous rights, youth, justice, human rights, development, gender, labour, health, and religion. Few organizations cross the broad categories of environment, economic, social, climate, or other. Think tanks and universities are included in the database and excluded from Figure 1.

Figure 1-1: NGO Participation in the UNFCCC

Whereas Muñoz Cabre (2011) argues that human rights NGOs "woke up late" to climate change, my data show that they hit the snooze button. While some human rights NGOs sought accreditation, they barely participated at all. Only Amnesty International attended two meetings, in 2009 and 2015 (see Chapter 7). Instead, gender, labour, indigenous rights, youth, and many other NGOs broadly representing "social" issues attended the UNFCCC in increasing numbers. The diversification of civil society involved in climate change as shown in Figure 1-1 provides an opportune case to explore forum multiplying strategies as a range of NGOs target the climate change regime, and the UNFCCC forum within it.

I suspect that the climate change regime is in some ways a tough test for forum multiplying because the regime was in a state of stagnation at the time of NGO networks' migration. These social NGO networks could not have participated to reap the benefits of a

successful regime. When the NGO network members expended scarce resources to participate, many others deemed the climate change regime as likely to fail. Grounded in the UNFCCC, the climate regime was in state of "arrested development" (Young 2010) or even "collapse" (Victor 2001, 2011), before the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015. Yet, in recent years, starting roughly 2007, NGOs working on social issues undertook activities commonly associated with influencing negotiation processes.

The test is also made more difficult because there were nearly no connections between climate change and social issues at the time. Neither the Framework Convention nor the Kyoto Protocol are equipped to address social issues. Neither even contains a single mention of people, communities, populations, women, gender, or indigenous peoples. All these social NGOs had to undertake considerable efforts to link their issues to climate change, with little institutional affiliation or substantive connection already present in the UNFCCC.

Scientific understanding also cannot explain the connections between disparate issues, and the involvement of NGOs across areas of global governance. For example, the Lancet (Costello et al 2009; Watts et al 2015) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (IPCC 2007a, 2007b; IPCC 2014), identified numerous ways in which climate change will threaten public health, through changing geographic patterns of vector-borne disease, worsening cardiovascular health, and rising mortality from heat-related events. According to my original database of NGO participation in every climate change conference, few health organizations participated. Similarly, only one refugee NGO and no human rights NGOs routinely participated in the UNFCCC conference, despite links between climate change and migration and human rights. A natural, or scientifically grounded affiliation between the network's issue and climate change cannot explain the influx of NGO networks. Indeed, our

understanding of the interconnections between climate change and social justice may be the result of the efforts of social NGOs and social movements since the mid-2000s. What is now seen as a natural connection between climate change and social issues perhaps began as a carefully-constructed discursive frame designed to enter the climate change regime.

The diversification of civil society within the climate change regime offers the opportunity to explore the dynamics within and among networks as they encounter the same set of institutions and actors. The cases[2] of this research are NGO networks traditionally devoted to social issues, but engaged in climate change activism. They became participants in the climate change regime late in the regime's development (or, in the null cases, chose or failed to become participants at a later stage). These cases lack previous experience in and knowledge of climate change issues and policy. Instead, they devoted their efforts to advance other causes, many acting to secure progress with or for marginalized groups in society.

In essence, I bounce the actors in the network off the same set of rules and norms and examine the differing strategies and effects.[3] This strategy enables close understanding of the approaches adopted by networks and their effects on forum multiplying efforts. It is a strong approach to examine the agency of networks and interplay with the opportunities and constraints posed by institutions.

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[2] This follows George and Bennet's (2005) definition of a case as "an instance of a class of events." Events mean an instance or phenomenon of scientific interest (George and Bennet 2005, 17-18). Or, as Gerring (2014) notes, case studies, are intensive studies of a unit with the aim of understanding similar units. It is a unit broadly understood. In other words, a case need not be a country or a regime; it can be an NGO network engaging in forum multiplying.
[3] The opposite strategy would be to examine the same network across different regimes. This implicitly is the strategy adopted by Betsill and Corell (2008) in their study of NGO influence. They study environmental NGOs in the climate change, desertification, forest, whaling, and biosafety regimes. Their work is strong on the conditions under which NGOs can achieve influence and when regimes are amenable, but has less certain claims on the nature of the network that is able to influence a regime.

Controlling for several aspects of the regime can limit the inferences that this study can make, which I believe to be navigable. One may argue that there is something unique about climate change causing NGO networks to multiply into the regime. For example, networks multiplied to climate change because it became high on the international agenda.[4] Relatedly, one could argue that there are other pull factors attracting networks, such as entering a new round of negotiations. In 2007, delegates in the climate change regime agreed to the agenda for the negotiations for a new legally-binding treaty. Given the agenda setting stage can be particularly amenable to NGO influence (Betsill and Corell 2008), NGOs may have sought out this opportunity.

Yet some networks were not motivated or, if they were motivated they proved unable to participate in the climate change regime. Given this variation, such pull factors focusing on the regime are insufficient to explain the NGO forum multiplying patterns. While my research cannot directly dispute regime-centric claims because it lacks a comparative assessment of networks' forum multiplying efforts to other regimes, it offers considerable insights into the full range of NGO forum multiplying behaviour. As previously stated, there are many cases of NGO forum multiplying, meaning that the phenomenon is not unique to climate change. My research can lend insights into why the relationships among actors within networks can influence the decision and ability of NGO networks to multiply within other regimes.

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[4] As one indication, Google trends reports that there were far more news headlines about climate change during 2007-2009 than ever before. The relative interest about "climate change" at the time of the various conferences (generally late November or early December) was in: 2004, 26; 2005, 28; 2006, 32; 2007, 52; 2008, 40; 2009, 86; 2010, 35; 2012, 27; 2013, 21; 2014, 26; and 2015, 32. The numbers represent the level of search interest relative to the highest point on the chart (labelled as 100) for a given time. A value of 100 is the peak popularity, and 50 means that the term is half as popular. For this search, the peak popularity of the term was in September 2014 when media coverage spiked around the UN Climate Summit and People's Climate March, the largest climate march in history with over 2646 solidarity events in 162 countries (see http://2014.peoplesclimate.org/).

1.2.2   Why NGO Networks?

Much of the scholarship considers transnational advocacy networks (for a few examples of this scholarship, see Carpenter 2007; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Price 2003). Here I focus on the NGOs in these networks. Transnational advocacy networks include a wide range of actors, such as NGOs, international organizations and local activists. These actors will have varying incentives for participation and resources to migrate to another regime. International organizations have greater resources and access to various forums, but are constrained by the mandates given by states. Individual activists may struggle to attend international meetings, perhaps prioritizing those that are geographically proximate. Here, I refer to NGO networks as groups of NGOs that communicate among one another as part of a collective effort to advance their core issues.

The ties among actors form networks, constituting a layer between individual agency and macro-level social structures and processes (Diani and McAdam 2003, 284). The links among actors could take many forms, from personal relationships to information flows, which for Keck and Sikkink (1998, 27) are the "most valuable currency" of advocacy networks. For Price (2003), networks are an imagined community of actors all viewing themselves as part of a shared cause. They constitute structural building blocks for political entrepreneurship or activism by focusing on the power conferred by relationships among actors, rather than the attributes of individual actors.

For the study of collective behaviour, such as social movements, networks are a more appropriate unit of analysis than individual organizations (della Porta and Tarrow 2005, 240). The structure of the network, for example, if it is highly centralized or decentralized, reflects how information flows from actor to actor. Examining networks helps elucidate who has and

shares information with whom. Often, advocacy networks are viewed as horizontal, made of

equal actors struggling against repressive states (Keck and Sikkink 1998) or in contestation with

states and UN processes (Joachim 2007). Yet, hierarchies in transnational networks are evident,

as some actors are more connected than others are and as a result enjoy structural advantages. A

focus on the relational ties of NGOs that enable some NGOs to select and mobilize in the new

regime is better suited than solely studying the individual attributes of individual organizations.

Instead, this research first considers which actors in the network have structural advantages, and

explores their actions and attributes in the context of the incentives and constraints brought forth

by the internal dynamics within the network.

1.2.3   Key Definitions

Exploring the dynamics of NGO networks as they travel across global governance forums

requires drawing upon insights from social movement theorists and international relations

scholars. Four terms require definition and discussion: authority, institutions, forums, and

regimes. Forum multiplying is discussed in depth in Chapter 2.

The nature of authority is a central part of an agent-centered approach to global

governance. Authority is the "ability to induce deference in others;" it is a social relationship

embedded within the context in which actors interact (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010, 7). In

part, authority stems from recognition by governors within a given context. Tacit or direct,

formal or informal, recognition by others is a key precursor for authority (Avant, Finnemore, and

Sell 2010, 8).

There are important implications of the context-specific nature of authority for the study

of NGO forum multiplying. Authority is not an objective characteristic possessed by actors in all

contexts. An authoritative actor in one area of global governance may not be authoritative in

another. For example, the IPCC Chair is an authoritative voice on climate science; others defer to the Chair's report on the state of the climate. Yet, should the IPCC Chair speak on trade or other environmental issues such as hazardous waste, governors within those regimes would not defer to the Chair's judgement or analysis. Authority does not necessarily travel.

Actors seeking to use their authority must find recognition within their new context. The politics of recognition are at the core of NGO forum multiplying strategies. NGO networks strategize to use rules, relationships, and resources to improve their chances of recognition, and, in turn, authority in the new regime. Without authority, the NGO network cannot advance their cause in its new context. This new context is replete with institutions, forums, and regimes within which actors interact.

Following comparative politics, institutions are broadly conceived as human-made constraints on behaviour (North 1990). I align more closely with historical institutionalists rather than sociological institutionalists. The former school views institutions as formal or informal procedures, rules, norms, routines, or conventions that are embedded within an organizational structure or political economy, while sociological institutionalists expand the definition to include symbols, cognitive scripts, and moral templates (Hall and Taylor 1996). Institutions can shape actors' preferences and behaviour and facilitate alliances among some actors, while still allowing for agency (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Because they shape, but do not define behaviour, institutions can generate unintended consequences (Hall and Taylor 1996). They are notoriously sticky, difficult to change and can reinforce over time as actors have incentives to maintain the institution even if it is no longer an efficient solution to the problem it was designed to solve (North 1990; Pierson 2004).

This use differs from general practice in international relations. For international relations scholars, an institution is often used interchangeably with organization; for example, the United Nations is an international institution. Defining institutions as rules, norms, conventions or practices helps disaggregate the components of a regime. The rules, norms, principles and even decision-making procedures central to the common definition of regime are all examples of institutions.

Here, international organizations are examples of forums. Forums and venues are terms often used, but rarely defined in the regime complexity literature. Alter and Meunier (2009) cite the Convention on Biological Diversity, High Commission on Refugees, and WTO as examples of forums. By forum, I mean a formal or informal arena for interstate coordination. The goal of states' cooperation could be to negotiate or implement agreements, or informally coordinate activities such as search and rescue in the Arctic or projects to reduce indoor air pollutants. These forums become key areas for non-state actors to try to influence the agenda and process of global governance. As Tarrow (2001, 15) aptly puts it, forums are coral reefs for transnational actors.

Forums will have their own institutions that may not be shared with other forums. For example, decision making rules often vary among forums; some forums may have rules facilitating majority voting while others operate on consensus, a key difference that can influence a norm entrepreneur's decision (Coleman 2013). Forums will have their own procedural rules, such as how observers are accredited and what access they have to the negotiations. Some substantive rules could be specific to a forum, such as those specified in an international treaty negotiated and implemented under the auspices of a forum. For example, the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated under the framework of principles laid out in the UNFCCC (see Chapter 3) and has

specific rules mandating how much some developed countries are to reduce their emissions. These rules do not apply within other climate change forums, such as the IPCC or the Climate and Clean Air Coalition.

Forums are also social environments, with their own standards of socially-acceptable behaviour. Actors vary among forums. The differing constellations of actors will form their own norms to navigate their interactions within that context. Some norms may be shared among forums in a regime, such as appropriate solutions to a given problem. Other norms could be specific to a forum, such as how observers and state delegates interact and appropriate forms of contention by civil society.

This discussion intimates that regimes may have multiple forums and that the relationships among forums can vary. Some regimes may be synergistic, with one core forum and others that closely align to its norms, and at the opposite end of the spectrum are conflictive regimes characterized by unrelated forums (Biermann et al 2009).

Above the level of a single forum, regimes are commonly defined by the institutions around which actors hold expectations for how to govern an issue (Krasner 1983, 4). Others' definitions emphasize formal multilateral agreements (Haggard and Simmons 1987; Keohane 1989), social institutions (Levy, Young and Zurn 1994), and intersubjective meanings (Ruggie 1993). The actors and forums within a regime all subscribe to addressing a given issue.

Ultimately the shared cause serves as the organizing principle of the regime. It is what delineates one regime from another, the trade regime from the security regime, the biodiversity regime from the hazardous waste regime. The point of the regime complex literature is that these regimes that were originally designed for different issues may overlap; for example, the interaction between the trade and biodiversity regimes on intellectual property rights (Helfer

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2009). This shared view to addressing a given issue complicates efforts to forum multiply. The new actor must find a way to tie their issue with that addressed by the target regime, or they will not be viewed as part of that regime.

What does it mean to join a regime? At a minimum, one must accede to the shared rules, norms, principles and decision-making procedures to that the regime's actors expect. An individual can do that in the privacy of their home, yet we do not necessarily consider that individual part of a regime. Generally, states join a regime when they sign a treaty. We have no equivalent metric to determine when a non-state actor is part of a regime. Non-state actors do not sign treaties or otherwise permanently accede to multilateral law. Three aspects of a state's ascension to a treaty stand out as transferrable to non-state actors: it is a public act, directed toward others working toward the shared cause; it commits the actors to work with or leverage the institutions of the regime for change toward that shared goal; and, it is recognized and accepted by those within regime.

I suggest these aspects could signal when a non-state actor joins a regime. Non-state actors broadly include international organizations, NGOs, private sector groups, and social movements. They must undertake a public discursive act linking their work to the issue area of the regime and that act must move beyond the regular circles of the actor to address governors within the target regime. Simply issuing a press release, or giving a speech, that a given issue is important is a low bar. For an example, James Orbinski of Médecins Sans Frontières stated to the Canadian Medical Association's General Council that climate change is a significant public health issue (Picard 2016) yet the organization has no formal position on the issue and has never

attended a UNFCCC meeting.[5] The act was public, but directed internally – toward other medical professionals – and was not directed toward climate change governors. A public discursive act is insufficient without engagement with actors in the target regime.

Second, the public act must include some commitment to the shared goals or institutions that governors within the regime already ascribe to and expect. As Chapter 2 argues, non-state actors must link their issue to the institutions of the regime. Their discursive act is a frame that links these issues, often reframing the issues "in a way that foregrounds the … benefits of the original/source issue" for the target regime's issue (Jinnah 2011, 3). Finding institutional entry points can help a non-state actor demonstrate that their issue can help address the problems the target regime is designed to govern. Demonstrating this connection to the work of the regime helps position the non-state actor as a potential governor of the target regime – one that belongs within the regime and should participate in governance.

The final aspect of joining a regime is recognition, which is particularly difficult for non-state actors. Recognition involves the identification and acceptance of a given actor as a global governor for an issue area. Others recognize the authority of that actor and tacitly agree to abide that authority. Recognition is part of states' sovereignty. Other states and non-state actors view states as primary actors in global governance, deferring to their authority to govern domestically and speak on behalf of their citizens internationally. Recognition is implicit for states, but often becomes an explicit need for non-state actors.

Because non-state actors' authority is so closely tied to the issue that they represent, recognizing a non-state actor as a member of a group of governors in a regime involves

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[5] Based on the database developed for this research of all NGOs participating in every COP of the UNFCCC, Médecins Sans Frontières has not participated between 1995 and 2015.

recognizing their issue as a legitimate inclusion into the regime. NGOs rest their authority on

their ability to showcase their expertise and make principled claims for a cause (Stroup and

Wong forthcoming). NGOs cannot divorce themselves from their issue; it is the foundation of

their expert and principled authority. To be recognized by those governing another issue, NGOs

need their issue recognized as well. Governors within the regime need to see the NGO's and the

regime's issues as interconnected for the incoming NGO to gain recognition. This underlines the

need for NGOs undertaking forum multiplying strategies to construct a convincing discursive

frame connecting their issue as a cause, consequence, or potential solution to the regime's issue

(more on this in Chapter 2). Proponents cannot control whether a frame resonates, but can take

actions to increase the likelihood of recognition. The empirical chapters in this dissertation show

the many strategies actors use to increase the likelihood that their frames will be recognized,

from leveraging institutions to increase their visibility and access to using their brands and

connections to secure introductions to key actors within the target regime.

At its core, forum multiplying is about advancing NGOs' issues and, in turn, the NGOs'

relevance and authority in global governance. The payoff could be high, perhaps high enough to

justify the associated costs. Forum multiplying strategies entail identifying a target regime and a

forum within that regime. To sustain the commitment, NGO networks continue efforts to

mobilize. In the case of climate change, forum multiplying strategies ultimately led to the

sustained rise in social NGOs and the diversification of the civil society presence at the

UNFCCC.

1.2.4   Methodological Approach

Above I outlined the general approach to studying the labour, gender, justice, health, and

human rights networks seeking entry to the climate change regime. These five cases represent

significant variation. While labour, gender, and justice all managed to forum multiply, the health

and human rights networks did not. This approach helps correct for the selection bias noted in

scholarship on transnational advocacy networks, where work tends to focus on successful cases

(Price 2004), and on international organizations, where work tends to overestimate the

participatory norm in international organizations (Tallberg et al. 2013). Each network differs in

its size and degree of centralization. Within the networks, some actors possessed resources useful

to help carry authority into the climate change regime while in other networks, such as health

and human rights, well known organizations were unmotivated to migrate. The institutional rules

serving as potential entry points facilitated labour and gender, and to a lesser extent justice, while

constraining the efforts of others.

To explore these cases, I engaged in participant observation in the UNFCCC

negotiations, conducted interviews, and completed social network analyses. As a participant in

the UNFCCC, I attended 10 of the 15 meetings of the UNFCCC from 2012 to the end of 2015

(the period of negotiations for the Paris Agreement). I participated in the capacity as a writer of

the *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* for the International Institute for Sustainable Development.[6] This

capacity and access embedded me within the process, providing firsthand experience with the

norms of interaction among non-state observers, state delegates, and the Secretariat. Regular

attendance also provided opportunities to build trust and rapport with delegates.

The 72 semi-structured interviews conducted with NGOs, UNFCCC Secretariat

members, other international organizations' representatives, and state delegates help to

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[6] The Earth Negotiations Bulletin team has a Secretariat badge and an understanding with the Secretariat that we may attend and report from plenary sessions and contact groups. With the permission of parties, we may attend and often can report without attribution from informal negotiations, which are otherwise closed to NGOs and other observers. We also have access to press conferences, and other meetings sometimes closed to NGOs and other observers.

triangulate claims (see Appendix A for more information on qualitative methods). Within the NGO community, I interviewed representatives from organizations situated in various places in the network, from those on the fringes to the gatekeepers. The interviews also represent board members, policy officers and other activists holding various positions within NGOs and, as a result, different views on their organization's strategy and motivations. I also conducted key informant interviews with the pivotal NGO delegates working to bring their issues to climate change in the mid-2000s.

I chose interviews for three reasons. First, as Gamson and Meyer (1996) observe, opportunities to influence politics or mobilize a movement are shaped as much by the perception of actors as by the objective realities. Interviews provide a window into the intersubjective views of NGO delegates into what constituted a viable opening in the climate change regime, or closing doors in their traditional, "home" regime. Second, delegates were more likely to privately speak of internal rifts and negotiations within the network. Such information would not be publicly available. Third, the network itself is a form of an imagined community (Price 1998). Who is in or out of the network is a political process to control the scope of agenda (Schattschneider 1960) and belonging. Interviews also helped to confirm the findings and explore the quality of ties among actors identified by the social network analyses.

Information flows are, as Keck and Sikkink (1998, 27) point out, central to advocacy networks, and for this research are uncovered through a quantitative social network analysis (see Appendix A for explanation of social network analysis methods). The social network analysis helped make these information flows visible, revealing the structure of the network and its changes over time. The networks here are labour-climate, gender-climate, justice-climate and health-climate. It was not possible to map the entire network of a given case as it exists in its

home regime (see Appendix A). Instead, the social network analysis shows what NGOs

participated in climate change and their connections inside and outside of the climate change

regime. This approach usefully embeds those engaging in forum multiplying within the network

of their home regime and shows which actors in the home network did not participate in forum

multiplying, while also revealing their connections within climate change as reported over time.

Evidence of the information flows over time are derived from self-reported ties in the Yearbook

of International Organizations and common membership in an umbrella organization devoted to

the link between climate change and the social issue. Self-reported ties and common membership

helps ensure the veracity of the ties, and supports the notion of the network as a shared

community of actors viewing one another as part of a common endeavor. This approach also

helps identify actors in the network with structural advantages.

Changes over time can be difficult to research in a static snapshot of the network. To

overcome this challenge, I used data from two time periods to create two views of the network,

one from 2005-2008 and the other 2009-2015. The first snapshot corresponds to the network's

early efforts to forum multiply; the second captures the ensuing and sustained mobilization

efforts within the climate change regime. Particularly when coupled with the interview data, this

approach helped identify and confirm the arrival of new actors, the recruitment of allies within

the climate change regime, and the increasing centrality of gatekeepers over time.

1.3   Chapter Overview

To explore NGO forum multiplying strategies to the climate change regime, I first

forward a framework to help understand forum multiplying in general terms in Chapter two.

Chapter three outlines a brief history of institutional change in the UNFCCC, with particular

focus on the shifts in actors' framing of climate change and new institutions created to address

the new frames. Chapter three also outlines subtle shifts in institutions governing observers'

access and behaviour in the UNFCCC. Chapters four through seven present the cases of labour,

gender, justice, and human rights and health, respectively. The first two NGO networks had

ample motivation to engage in forum multiplying and successfully transmitted their authority and

aligned with the UNFCCC's institutions to mobilize within the climate change regime. The

global justice movement, also called the alterglobalization movement, is explored in Chapter six.

The movement was highly motivated to participate in climate change work and became a key

component helping form the climate justice movement. The movement transmitted its authority,

but to a limited audience. They used the neoliberal foundations and staid politics of the climate

change regime as entry points. Unlike labour and gender advocates, the justice movement sought

to overturn these substantive institutions, or as they call them "false solutions." Ultimately, the

climate justice movement lost control of its central frame, largely turning toward protest and

national movement building for climate justice. Finally, human rights and health are null cases.

Human rights NGOs were not motivated to undertake climate change work, leaving them at

stage one of the framework. Health also struggled to motivate much of the network, leaving

some environmental-health NGOs that lacked authority and alignment with the institutions to try

to take up the climate cause and motivate and uninterested public health network. Chapter eight

concludes and considers the implications of the findings for climate activism, for the expansion

of the regime complex for climate change, and for climate action more broadly.

Chapter 2: Forum Multiplying to New Regimes

NGO networks participate in multiple forums embedded within different regimes and governing issues far outside the network's traditional issue area. Some NGOs within a network select and mobilize in new forums, often attracting other NGOs from the network to the new regime. To mobilize and justify their participation within the new regime, the network members construct and defend discursive links between their traditional issue and the issue governed by their target regime. Developing this frame often involves negotiations among actors within the network or movement. Once decided, the network disseminates the discursive frame, and, if necessary, defends it from appropriation by others within the target regime, or other incoming networks seeking a link to facilitate their own participation in the target regime.

As chapter one highlighted, scholars have identified several instances showing NGOs' mobility, linking their issues to seemingly disparate problems governed by other regimes. Yet, we do not see all NGO networks migrating freely among regimes, and we do not see all regimes inundated with new NGO networks. For instance, the climate change regime has seen little or no participation from several networks, such as those advocating for health, human rights, refugees, peace, human security, and hazardous waste management. NGO forum multiplying entails selecting, gaining entry, and mobilizing within a new regime. Even if network members have a motivation to forum multiply, they may still be unable to successfully participate and mobilize in the new regime. The channels of migration – some networks to specific regimes – reflect the uneven patterns of NGO forum multiplying. Clearly, there are limits to the ability for NGO networks to identify, enter, and mobilize within a target regime.

This chapter puts forward a framework to explain these uneven patterns of forum multiplying. The framework entails a two-step process; first, NGOs in the network must be

motivated to forum multiply, and decide to undertake the costly process. Yet, as many social movement scholars point out, grievance is insufficient for a movement to occur (Tarrow 1998; Tarrow and McAdam 2005). Additional factors either facilitate or constrain the mobilization of a movement.

The mobilization stage suggests that networks that can carry their authority into the target regime and find institutional entry points are more likely to successfully forum multiply. In efforts to translate the authority that NGOs hold in their home regime to the target regime, it is useful for the network to rally around a single frame and for that frame to have powerful articulators that actors within the regime may listen to. Second, the network members use the institutions of the regime to find entry points for their claim to belonging in the regime. These institutional hooks can be substantive – the rules, principles, or norms of the regime – or procedural – decision-making procedures or norms related to observers. Creating or leveraging an institution as an entry point can provide a strong basis for the network's claim to belong in the regime. These entry points help some networks gain a foothold while others remain marginalized. Both processes help the network gain recognition for their cause and for themselves, which underlines the barriers to NGO mobility across regimes, and the reasons why they are not as free to participate across areas of global governance as one may assume.

The remaining sections of this chapter build this framework. First, the chapter clarifies the concept of NGO forum multiplying. Second, it turns to the NGO forum multiplying framework's two stages: motivations and mobilization.

2.1   Forum Multiplying

Forum multiplying is a necessary step toward joining a regime. As introduced in Chapter 1, NGO forum multiplying is the sustained mobilization of a group of NGOs in a new forum and

regime, enabled by a discursive frame linking the NGO network's traditional issue to the issue

governed by the target regime. NGO forum multiplying involves distinct activities: selecting a

target regime and an appropriate forum, and mobilizing the network and, hopefully, new actors

within that target regime. As discussed in chapter 1, joining a regime requires a public act

directed at those within the target regime, commitment to the institutions of the regime, and

recognition by others within the regime.

These aspects of joining a regime can be used to spot forum multiplying when it occurs.

First, the public act directed at governors of the target regime is evident in the continued

participation in a forum in the regime. Participation is more than showing up at a conference:

people rarely attend a meeting and speak to no one. Participating actors engage with governors in

the target regime, exchanging views and information. It is a public act that is decidedly outward

looking, designed to engage governors in the target regime rather than send a message to those

within the network.

The second aspect, commitment to work with, or leverage, the institutions of the regime

for change, is evident in the discursive frame that explicitly highlights the benefits of the

network's issue for the target regime's issue. The frame is fundamental to forum multiplying,

serving as the claim for belonging in the target regime by making the case why the network's

issue is related to the institutions of the target regime. Further, the frame showcases how the

network is an integral actor also committed to the shared cause of the regime.

The third aspect, recognition, is something of a holy grail, the ultimate ambition of forum

multiplying which is in some ways beyond the control of members of the NGO network. They

cannot control if governors within the climate change regime accept them. However, network

members can position themselves as integral actors to the work of the regime and in the process,

build new alliances. Being accepted in coalitions of other actors and having those within the

target regime use the network's frame are signals that the network has achieved recognition and

found new allies in the target regime. Together, these three measures, participation, frame

construction, and recognition, can qualitatively show when forum multiplying is present.[1]

When participating in a new forum, NGO networks do not entirely leave their home

regime, where they accrued considerable resources, expertise and authority. Instead, they

multiply into new forums, seeking forums to engage while remaining entrenched in their home

regime. This behavior is like domestic interest groups that "spend considerable amounts of time

venue shopping, looking for institutional access where they might have a competitive advantage.

They often launch offenses in several venues and defend their interests in several venues

simultaneously" (Weible 2007, 101). Moving across to forums that lie within a different regime,

opens up multiple fronts for networks to advance their issues. It also raises the costs of

participating in global governance.

Forum multiplying involves an expansion of the network's terrain. The network does not

leave their traditional forums or regime, rather it multiplies the forums and regimes in which it

operates. NGOs within networks do not seek to change where discussions occur, as with forum

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[1] A quantitative measure of forum multiplying would miss the qualitative aspects of the concept, particularly recognition and may risk over reductionism. Further, a quantitative measure is not possible due to data limitations. An absolute measure of how many NGOs or delegates participate in a given forum would ignore that some networks are larger or more geographically dispersed, which would facilitate participation at various conferences around the world. A relative measure, such as the proportion of organizations in the original network that participate in the forum in the target regime, would be more appropriate. There is no reliable and comparable way to measure the size of a network. Different social network analysts may set different boundaries to the network and use different indicators of ties among actors, which means some actors would be included by one analyst but not others (see Appendix A for a discussion of how those issues are addressed here). When looking for evidence of ties, some networks are more easily delimited. For example, labour unions, women's rights, health, and human rights are recognized categories of organizations in the Yearbook of International Organizations. The global justice, or alterglobalization, movement is not. Without a reliable measure of the size of the original network, a proportion is impossible to ascertain, particularly one that is comparable and meaningful across cases.

shopping and shifting, but to proliferate the forums in which its central issue is considered. Forum multiplying is a strategy to advance NGOs' individual and the network's collective interests and preferences in multiple regimes, and the forums within those regimes. It entails an extension of the network's interests into new forums, not a movement of interests from one forum and into another, or an attempt to unify various disparate forums.

Forum multiplying is a mobilization to advance interests, not a fleeting engagement. By "sustained," the definition explicates that the engagement of NGO networks cannot be a fleeting affair. The time scale is years, not single meetings or brief campaigns. Signing onto a single joint statement with a few other NGOs representing other issue areas does not constitute NGO forum multiplying. It is an effort of a group or network of NGOs collaborating and individually accepting considerable investment and effort over the medium to long term. This effort involves mobilizing around, and seeking to disseminate, a shared discursive frame.

Frames enable NGO forum multiplying by linking the network's core issues to the issue of the target regime. Frames are a popular concept in the social sciences, considered broadly as a schema of interpretation enabling actors to understand what is happening and salient in specific occurrences by simplifying and highlighting some issues over others (Goffman 1974, 21; Snow and Benford 1988). Frames are more than simple schema of interpretation residing individual's minds, they are actively constructed to highlight some aspects of a situation over others, or are "the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action" (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 6). Frames highlight some issues over others, simplifying issues to convey meaning in events and experiences (Snow and Benford 1988). For example, women's rights

advocates framed violence against women as a matter of human rights, rather than as a women's issue (Joachim 2004).

There are three aspects of frames useful to link the NGO network's issue to the target regimes issue. Frames have diagnostic, prognostic and mobilization aspects (Benford and Snow 2000). Diagnostic aspects of frames highlight the causes of a problem. When forum multiplying, network members could highlight their issue as a cause of the target regime's issue. This type of frame would necessitate action by governors in the target regime – to solve their problem would mean addressing the NGO network's issue. Frames can have prognostic elements, which suggest solutions to the problem. NGO networks can highlight their issue as a new solution to the target regime's problem. Governors can choose whether to accept this new solution as part of the solutions already included in the roster of institutions of the regime. Finally, frames serve to mobilize actors to action. This aspect is particularly useful to bring network members to the new forum, and to bring those in the target regime to ally with the network to address the intersection of issues encapsulated in the frame. This aspect of the frame can help move an NGO network from a potential fringe group to recognition within the regime. The motivational aspect of the frame is therefore necessary to mobilize network members and new allies, and proposing either a new solution or cause can help show the NGO network's commitment to the regime's shared cause and underline that including the network brings added value to governance efforts. The NGO forum multiplying framework below highlights the integral part of why, and whether, NGO networks forum multiply.

2.2   NGO Forum Multiplying Framework

To successfully multiply the number of forums and regimes in which a NGO network participates, several favourable conditions are required. Figure 2-1 below sketches the NGO

forum multiplying framework in two stages. The second stage, mobilization, highlights three necessary conditions[2] for successful forum multiplying by NGO networks.

Stage one: Motivation **Stage two: Mobilization**

Authority carries to new regime — Yes / No

Motivated? — Yes

Leverage regime's institutions — Yes / No

Forum multiply

No — Do not Forum Multiply

Figure 2-1: NGO Forum Multiplying Framework

The framework proceeds in two stages. First, it explores the three motivations for NGO forum multiplying. The second stage puts sand in the proverbial wheels of NGO mobility across regimes, by highlighting two dynamics that constrain some networks while facilitating others' efforts to forum multiply. The first suggests how intra-network dynamics can influence the ability of the network to achieve its goals. Key actors within the network use their connections and resources to help build consensus and articulate the frame. Through this, the network members can carry the authority that they have in their home regime into their target regime. Second, the network finds entry points within the institutions of the target regime. By linking their issue to the substantive rules of the regime, or by leveraging procedural institutions, networks can show that they belong in the target regime. This second dynamic is important for a

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[2] Necessary conditions, as Braumoeller and Goertz (2000) explain, are present when the outcome is always present (and always absent when it is the outcome does not occur), and is not trivial to the outcome (for example, gravity is always present when war occurs, but it is trivial).

NGO network to find recognition within the regime. This section explores each stage, motivations and mobilization, in turn.

2.2.1 Motivation

Forum multiplying can serve all networks' underlying motivation to keep their cause alive. Political motivations are relevance for their issues and, therefore, their organizations and networks. Weaker actors seek to expand the scope of conflict by bringing new allies into the fray, while powerful actors seek limit who participates in a conflict to control the scope of issues and, ultimately, the outcome (Schattschneider 1960). By forum multiplying NGOs can fulfill their role as counter-hegemonic forces, balancing the power and over-representation of states and business interests in global governance (Cox and Schechter 2002), or as the conduits of horizontal politics targeting states or corporations (Wapner 2002), and outmaneuver opponents blocking the network in their traditional regime. NGO networks can also use forum multiplying to avoid becoming embroiled in stalemates and ineffectual regimes. Stalled negotiations are problematic for NGO networks because they are unable to advance their issues, and because they no longer have ongoing conflict to generate media interest, or galvanize and mobilize supporters around. There are no longer targets for their contention, only routinized, circular discussions. Forum multiplying is a means for NGO networks to keep their movements moving forward, by remobilizing across areas of global governance.

Normative and material motivations are nearly always present for NGO networks. There is an ongoing debate which is more prevalent, which in part glosses over the multifaceted and myriad reasons why actors become engaged in advocacy. Some view principled motivations as a central defining feature of a transnational advocacy network (Keck and Sikkink 1998) while others point to the political acumen of movement leaders and the professional self-interest as key

factors for determining which issues are selected for campaigns within NGO networks (Bob 2005; Cooley and Ron 2002). Sundstrom (2005, 2006) offers a more nuanced view, demonstrating that frames and material resources interact to influence the strategies and success of movements. Similarly, I argue that funding alone is an insufficient motivation; mobilization may be partly driven by a need to maintain funding streams, but also by a commitment to the link between issues as expressed in the discursive frame. The network could be motivated by the strategic search for material resources, and by a normative desire to continue progress on their traditional and their newly-adopted issue. Both exist in the routine politics of NGOs, making these factors less helpful to explain why networks move to some regimes over others.

Material resources, such as funding, are an omnipresent need of NGOs of all sizes, and are required for stoking the ongoing conflicts for sustaining a movement and confronting traditional targets. Operating in a fiscally insecure environment can foster a competition influenced by donor demands ultimately shaping NGO strategies (Cooley and Ron 2002). Forum multiplying could enable NGOs to capitalize on new sources of funding, or to maneuver around changing donor priorities. When donor priorities change, NGOs are likely to engage in forum multiplying, linking their issue to the donor's new priority issue. Regimes where donors funnel large sums are therefore particularly attractive. Forum multiplying can diversify the sources of funding for individual NGOs.

Funding, however, plays a relatively minor role in the motivations for forum multiplying because NGOs reasonably foresee barriers to securing new funding in different regimes in which they do not participate. Donors may not recognize the NGOs as actors connected to the issue of the target regime. The NGO may not have sufficient information to know that funding

opportunities exist. Ideational resources, particularly a normative desire to address an important issue, also serve as motivations for forum multiplying.

For several NGOs, finding ways to link their issue to a new issue governed by a different regime is also a way to advance other normatively important causes. Wanting to contribute toward a new cause, however, is not enough to motivate forum multiplying. Individual activists can identify many issues where they would prefer to see change, yet they will not view all of these issues as something that they could work on. For a normative motivation to propel forum multiplying, activists must internalize the link between the issues, that continuing to advance their traditional cause legitimately entails tackling the new issue in its regime. Members of the network may seek to help solve the issue addressed by the target regime, to be part of the solution.

These three motivations – political, material, and normative – can be all be present in different combinations and to differing degrees. How the network proceeds is the subject of the next stage, mobilization.

2.2.2   Mobilization

While many networks may share these motivations, only some will successfully mobilize within the chosen forum in the new regime. Mobilization has internal and external aspects. Internally, members join the effort, participating in the target regime and disseminating the linking frame. Externally, networks must gain acceptance within the target regime for their members and their frame to sustain their mobilization effort. Two factors condition the ability of NGO networks to mobilize: the ability of the network to carry their authority to the target regime; and the ability to find and leverage the target regimes' institutions for the network's gain. This section explains each in turn.

2.2.2.1   Carrying Authority to the Target Regime

Not all actors gain recognition in their chosen new regime. Networks need to prove that they, and their frame, belong. Actors in the target regime are more likely to accept a linking frame when it is supported by a cohesive network able to show solidarity in support of the frame. Second, frames are more likely to resonate when they have the support of powerful articulators, actors that are central to the network, or bridge among networks.

First, the support of the network in the development, dissemination, and (when necessary) defense of the frame is vital. Competition among frames linking the network's issue to the target regime's issue constitute a series of mixed messages that can be confusing for those within the target regime. When subsets of the network vie for attention and influence, the overall message fragments into competing frames. Competing frames enable actors within the target regime to dismiss niche claims made by portions for a divided network and perhaps undermine the chances of recognition. Disseminating the frame in a new regime requires a group effort. A single NGO, even one with a known brand and sizeable budget, cannot alone interact with all the key actors and potential allies. Speaking with one voice can amplify the frame to a volume those within the target regime are more likely to hear. Even a handful of major NGOs can pool their list of contacts to expand the number of delegates able to disseminate the frame. Solidarity within a network of NGOs can heighten the strength and distribution of the message. It also helps the network defend the message from new interlocutors seeking to co-opt or add new dimensions to the frame.

Such cohesion can be difficult to achieve. The need for cohesion, perhaps even consensus, among network members can give rise to considerable negotiation within the network on how to frame its issues in the context of the new regime. One network member publicly

disagreeing with the frame can undermine the group's efforts, particularly if that dissenting voice has a known brand or reputation. In this scenario, the ability of the gatekeeper or gatekeepers to convene and coordinate discussions to develop the frame is particularly useful to NGO bandwagoning.

Second, frames need powerful articulators able to persuade actors in the target regime of the frame's validity, and that the network has a valid claim to belonging in the regime. Frames and other forms of normative suasion resonate when delivered by an actor that the audience views as credible or authoritative (Checkel 2005; Gamson 1992; Benford and Snow 2000). Busby (2010) argues that the characteristics of messengers, such as familiarity, similarity, expertise or celebrity, may enhance the persuasiveness of the message, because these characteristics are used by recipients as a shortcut to decide the appropriate course of action ("this makes sense coming from her" or "if he says so"). To articulate a linking frame to a new audience requires an actor with a known brand and resources to help convince the members of the network and the target regime of the frame's validity.

The articulators have dual roles. Internally, they can help the network reach consensus on a frame. Externally, articulators are uniquely placed to help the network gain recognition within the regime. Articulators hold specific positions within the network, either as central actors within the network (gatekeepers), or as bridging actors, with connections between the network and the target regime (brokers). Connections within the network help convene discussions regarding the frame and strategy to deploy the frame in the new regime. Connections outside the frame help to provide key introductions and resources useful to gain the recognition of governors within the target regime.

Gatekeepers possess many connections within the network. They occupy a central place in the network which enables them to set, vet, or block the network's agenda (Carpenter 2007, 2014). Others in the network take up these signals and accept the issue as part of their work (Bob 2005; Lake and Wong 2005). In social network terms, gatekeepers can be identified by the number of "degrees," that is, links, to other networks. I use the average of the in-degree and out-degree to identify gatekeepers. In-degree is how many incoming ties the actor has, that is, how many actors in the network claim to have a connection with the gatekeepers (Scott 2000). The measure speaks to the prestige of the actor, how much others seek a connection or look to the actor (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). The out-degree measures how many connections the actor in question has established with others, and indicates the influence an actor may have because it can spread information to many others (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). I take the mean of these two measures because gatekeepers able to forum multiply have both prestige and influence. Prestige means others look for implicit signals or defer to the gatekeeper's authority. Influence means that the gatekeeper can disseminate a new frame to serve as an entry ticket to a new regime.

The more others interact with an actor, the more likely that they are central to the network. Here, I complement this view of structurally-advantaged actors able to unilaterally initiate and disseminate frames among network members. However, even gatekeepers face limits. When unilateral dissemination is not possible, ties within the network can facilitate intra-network negotiation.

Gatekeepers can convene internal negotiations, or use their privileged amounts of information about the members' views to build a frame that the network can rally behind. In more centralized networks, the one very well connected gatekeeper will be able to convene the networks' internal discussions and then unilaterally disseminate the frame throughout the

network. Less centralized networks may have a few gatekeepers who will have to cooperate if the network is to rally around a shared frame. Such cooperation among gatekeepers may not be possible. Ideational differences and temptation to capture attention and resources could undermine the ability of the gatekeepers to work together to facilitate discussions on a shared frame, and in turn, undermine the likelihood of successful forum multiplying.

Externally a gatekeeper's many connections mean that they tend to possess brands that are known and recognizable to others (Carpenter 2007). Brands are shortcuts for the experience, expertise, and credibility of an actor. The reputation associated with the brand can signal if the gatekeeper's claims are trustworthy or persuasive. Gatekeepers' many connections potentially also provide information and contacts with donor agencies. Cost-benefit analyses are common tools to identify campaigns that will bring benefits with lower costs (Bob 2005; Weible 2007). Cooley and Ron (2002) underscore the fiscally-insecure environments that foster competition among NGOs. In this environment, the gatekeeper has to be not only able, but also willing to share these material resources.

Gatekeepers have the connections to work with others in the network to develop a frame to link their cause with the issue governed by the target regime. Their many connections also help them gather strategic resources and information useful to gain recognition within that regime. As outsiders, gatekeepers need assistance. Brokers are necessary due to their strategic ties among networks of actors.

Brokers may not have as many ties, but have connections to multiple networks, conferring the ability to choose, introduce, and diffuse new ideas, making brokers important norm entrepreneurs (Burt 2004; Goddard 2009; Granovetter 1973). Brokers can provide, or provide access to, material resources such as funding for participation or research. In social

network terms, brokers have a high "betweenness centrality," a measure used to indicate the number of connections an actor has in otherwise discrete areas of the network, or between different networks. For reasons explained in Appendix B, this is not a useful indication of a broker in my network. Rather, qualitative information can be used for NGOs to identify which climate actors also worked in their regime, and provided resources, if any. Beyond funding, brokers can use their status within the target regime to facilitate accreditation and secure badges for the incoming NGOs to participate in the forum. The broker can provide the first resources for participation and initial orientation within the target regime and forum.

Brokers are the first to introduce the NGO network to the new regime, and vice versa. They provide information about the target regime, from the science underpinning a given issue to the governance apparatus to address it. They can introduce the NGO network to the political history of the target regime and can signal emerging issues on the horizon. Brokers are often the first to provide a crash course in how to navigate the rules regarding observer participation, both formal and informal. Because a broker also resides in the target regime, it has information that gatekeepers will not.

Like gatekeepers, brokers can lend their authority. By associating itself with the incoming network and their ideas, the broker can provide a powerful introduction to the target regime; essentially, the broker shows "they're with me, and therefore one of us." If the broker has authority within the target regime, if it is viewed as a trusted expert, moral leader, or competent authority, it can amplify the discursive frame beyond what an outsider could articulate on its own. Through association with the broker, the network can gain material resources and authority important to its persuasive efforts in the regime.

This suggests that some brokers and gatekeepers are more useful to forum multiplying than others within the network. Gatekeepers that are also well-resourced and have recognizable, trusted brands will be able to serve as persuasive articulators able to disseminate the network's message. Brokers with authority and experience within the target regime, and preferably with resources, will similarly be particularly useful to networks undertaking forum multiplying. Not all gatekeepers and brokers can be articulators. The internal character of the network and particularly its connections with brokers to the target regime influences the network's likelihood of successfully forum multiplying.

2.2.2.2   Identifying Entry Points with the Target Regime's Institutions

When seeking admittance, the NGOs within a network need to show that they belong in the new regime; they too ascribe to the rules, norms, principles and decision-making procedures that the target regime's actors expect on the issue. This occurs in two areas. First, the NGOs within the network tie their claims to the substantive rules and norms of the target regime. Second, NGOs in the network maintain their traditional identities and strategies of action and seek to leverage the procedural rules of the target regime to show that network members are like those within the target regime and, therefore, belong. While there will likely be some NGOs within the network unwilling to play by the rules, overall, the network must present a public face to the regime's governors that they and their claims belong. Network members seek to show that their issue is integral to efforts to address the target regime's issue, to demonstrate that they belong in the regime and should be recognized. This requires fitting in, finding entry points to make claims of relevance vis-à-vis the regime's institutions. The frame developed by the network uses a substantive rule or norm of the target regime as an entry point and institutional change can make space for new claims from new networks.

On substantive entry points, the network's frame can claim political space or belonging within the target regime if it demonstrates a connection to the frames or institutions of the target regime. Making claims are central to contentious politics. Tilly and Tarrow (2015) define contention as "making claims that bear on someone else's interests," and "claims almost always involve at least one subject reaching visibly toward at least one object" (7-8). In forum multiplying, claims are directed toward governors in the target regime. The object sought by members of the NGO network is recognition within the target regime that their claims and their network belong.

Many scholars have observed that the likelihood of advocates' success increases when their ideas and frames align with the policymakers' preferences or pre-conceived views. Actors strategically align their claims with policymakers' views in a given institutional context, be it through grafting (Price 2003), congruence (Acharya 2004), or fit (Kingdon 1984). While many of these scholars underline the importance of such alignment for non-state actors influence and ability to germinate new norms, here I posit institutions as means of entry into a new regime.

Identifying and leveraging entry points facilitates participation and recognition, vital precursors to influence. The NGO network cannot control if their frame will resonate with actors, many of whom they may have yet to meet. They can reasonably claim belonging in a target regime armed with a frame that links their issue to the rules and norms of the target regime. It is the proverbial foot in the door, a signal that a new claim – and its claimants – belongs in the target regime. From there, the network's strategies to disseminate and defend their frame enhance its resonance and perhaps facilitate influence in the target regime. When seeking to multiply into a new area of global governance, the best members of the network can do is construct a frame that mobilizes their base and hooks onto the institutions of the target regime.

The frame central to the forum multiplying enterprise provides the initial claim of why a network belongs, and how its work links to the substantive institutions of the target regime. NGOs in the network construct a frame that at least in part foregrounds the substantive connections between the issue of the network and the institutions of the target regime. The substantive connections can be forged by proposing that the incoming issue is either a cause (prognostic framing) or solution (diagnostic framing) of the target regime's problem, or can motivate others to work toward the target regime's goals (motivational framing). When undertaking forum multiplying, these aspects of a frame can help connect the substance of the network and the target regime, while bringing new actors to the cause and recruiting allies. The motivational framing, therefore, is necessary. Without offering a reason to adopt the frame and join the movement, actors within an NGO network will face difficulty finding acceptance into the new regime. The motivational aspect of the frame gives governors within the target regime a reason to accept the networks' claim to belonging.

The prognostic and diagnostic elements of the frame most directly link to the substantive rules and norms of the target regime. By identifying root causes or proposing solutions, the prognostic and diagnostic elements help actors within the network highlight how their issue causes or helps solve the problem addressed by an institution in the target regime. The frame espoused by the network can show how their issue causes a problem central to the target regime, or how their issue can help solve a central problem faced by the regime. For example, framing species extinction as a matter of habitat loss implicates forests – and those working on forest conservation – in the biodiversity regime. Or, proposing that policies to protect species will be less effective without inclusion of indigenous knowledge and land tenure rights, positions indigenous peoples as central actors. Through reframing the problem and solution, the network

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can position itself as an integral part of the regime's efforts, bolstering their claim for acceptance in the target regime.

In many ways, it is advantageous to leverage the diagnostic elements of the frame to a specific institution. First, institutions generally exist to identify, support, and implement solutions to the problem. Rules are often specified ways of reducing the magnitude or eradicating a problem. They are often solutions. Norms are also often solutions, in the form of socially acceptable standards of behaviour. There will be institutions available to network members to reframe in a way that foregrounds their issue.

Second, proposing additional aspects of the solutions of the regime shows tacit acceptance of the regime's definition of the problem and their solutions. The prognostic aspect of a frame could be used to argue for overturning the status quo of the regime, by suggesting that the regime's governors conceive of their root causes of their problem incorrectly. Such a fundamental error would require a radical rethinking of the regime's framing of the problem and how the regime addresses the problem. By contrast, the diagnostic aspect of a frame remains silent on the causes of a problem and seeks to add, amend, or shift the solutions in a new direction. This silence could be read by governors in the target regime as a tacit approval for the foundations of the regime. Governors share frames of the problem. If they view a new network of actors as also sharing that framing, then governors may be more willing to accept a new network. This new network aims to support, and not overturn, the regime's efforts. By focusing on the diagnostic element of the frame, NGOs in the network position themselves as integral to the solutions, but also as like the governors of the regime and worthy of acceptance.

Finding openings in the institutions and strategically constructing a frame to link to that issue in a way that maximizes the likelihood of acceptance helps explain why not all claims of

networks can be advanced in any regime or even a forum within that regime. NGOs consistently scan for opportunities to advance their claims in other regimes. When new frames rise and gain acceptance within a target regime, actors' highlight different issues as causes or solutions to their multidimensional problem. For instance, framing health in terms of its prevention, leads to different understandings of public health problems and solutions. These new frames create opportunities for new claimants to participate in the climate regime. Outside actors able to capitalize on these frame shifts within a regime can lay claim to belonging in a regime from which they previously could not show they belonged.

Here, these changes in the discursive and institutional foundation of the target regime are treated as exogenous sources of change. Frames could change as actors strategically link issues to expand the zone of agreement (Haas 1980), or to issue credible threats for side payments (Sell 1996), such as financial concessions in exchange for the north furthering its environmental goals (Miller 1995). In so doing, actors introduce new frames of the regimes' issue; suddenly, an environmental issue is also about financial support and technology transfer. The actions of states, or even non-state actors, to introduce and diffuse new frames can make the regime more amicable to the claims of outside actors, unlocking potential for forum multiplying.

Becoming more approachable for other actors is an unintended consequence in the discursive battle among actors within the regime, and it increases the potential scope of the regime. Rules and norms change to reflect how governors understand an issue, potentially overlapping with institutions in other regimes. When governors reframe an issue, perhaps identifying a new cause or solution, they establish new rules or disseminate new norms. For example, the ozone regime phased out hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), prompting the use of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) as an alternative that does not deplete the ozone layer. In response to

the rising use of HFCs, a powerful greenhouse gas, the US, Canada, and Micronesia sought to reframe the HFC problem in terms of the consequences of action taken under the Protocol (IISD 2009). As negotiations continued, HFCs were reframed. Instead of being viewed as a cost-effective alternative that were safer for the ozone layer, governors discussed the global warming potential of HFCs and the need for action to rectify a problem exacerbated by the Protocol's action against HCFCs (IISD 2011). The frame shift led to the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol that phases down use of HFCs. Now, the same chemical is governed by two regimes. By changing how governors understand the problem, a new institution arose and created overlap between two different regimes.

When frames increase regime overlap, it can potentially implicate actors from one regime in another regime's work. An expanded roster of actors can make claims in the regime. New actors can identify a place for themselves under the auspices of an expanded discursive environment within the regime, either due to a new frame, or new institutions created to address these new frames. These actors can make claims to a place in the regime and a stake in the issue that previously seemed impossible. For instance, the proclamation of so-called "third generation" human rights by the General Assembly established new rights as parts of the human rights regime, such as the right to self-determination, healthy environment, and cultural heritage (Alston 1982). As a result, indigenous rights and environmental activists could argue their issues were human rights issues, and could engage in the human rights regime and its forums (Faruque and Begum 2004). Those advocating for specific issues can make a claim under the larger aegis of issues created by institutional change.

By implication, one should observe that regimes characterized by discursive contestation among actors will be likely to attract periodic influxes of NGO networks. Disagreement over the

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causes or solutions is ripe for actors to frame the issue in their favour, particularly during rounds of re-negotiation. Some regimes at specific time periods can be particularly conducive to NGO forum multiplying when new frames and institutions can implicate actors from other regimes.

On procedural alignment, the actors in the network and their preferred means of contention can also leverage the rules and norms regarding observer behaviour to show that they belong. There is a selection effect, where governors within the target regime may be reticent to admit or recognize new claimants that seem too unlike those already within the target regime. Others have pointed to the role of political openness, or how receptive a political system is to contentious politics and the counterclaims of social movements, to explain the creation, mobilization and success of domestic social movements (see Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). While the rules of access may not help or hinder the ability of NGOs to influence the outcomes of a given negotiation (Betsill and Corell 2008), these rules and norms provide opportunities and constraints to mobilization efforts within the forum. These rules and norms are not static, and may be open to innovative incomers aiming to position themselves as like others in the target regime.

The rules and norms constituting a polity's receptiveness have varying influence on the ability of claimants to mobilize. Political openness does not create equal opportunities for all movements. For example, Tilly (1978) outlines a curvilinear relationship: well established movements involved in the political system may need to be pushed out of institutionalized politics to incite a mobilized movement while institutions may help marginalized groups gain the footholds necessary to mobilize. Political openness holds differential effects, yet these differences are poorly understood (Meyer 2004). These differences are important to explain why

some networks mobilize while others do not; some networks may be sifted out because they are too dissimilar, or because they are unable to use or bend the rules to their advantage.

Procedural rules and norms may be open to interpretation. Actors within a network can argue that they align with a rule or norm to claim belonging and fit within the club of governors in the target regime. The procedural institutions governing observers' access and behaviour are evident in both the written rules of procedure and the behavioral norms among actors. Written rules include both the rules for becoming accredited (meaning states agree a given NGO is allowed to participate in the forum), and the rules governing participation in the forum. Gaining physical entry can be relatively straightforward, such as filling out a form. Even such simple, initial steps require providing justifications, particularly arguments why the NGOs have relevant expertise and should be admitted.[3] This is often the first step for NGOs seeking admission to make their case for belonging. Other rules and norms related to observers are less straightforward.

Once in the forum, observers face rules governing their behaviours. Rules often exist stating how and how often they may make statements in plenary and which types of meetings they can attend.[4] There are further rules constituting what are allowable forms of protest. As O'Neill (2004) documents the influence of the police on social movements, the security within the forum can likewise shape the strategies and outcomes of non-state actors in the regime.

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[3] For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the UNFCCC ask observers seeking accreditation to complete an initial form that justifies their proposal for inclusion and requests information regarding their expertise and why it is relevant to the work of the IPCC or the UNFCCC.

[4] There are several types of meetings in international environmental negotiations. Plenary meetings involve all the states and observers. Contact groups are smaller settings devoted to a single issue and are open to observers (yet, often observers do not get to speak). Informal settings, called "informals" or Friends of the Chair, are closed to observers. In climate, there are "informal informals" that are smaller still, and often devoted to drafting or having blunt political discussions on controversial issues.

Within the climate change negotiations, the impact of security concerns has held consequences for civil society's tactics and agency (Hadden 2015; Orr 2016). Often, observers must inform security of the time, location, and nature of the demonstration. The consequences for breaking these rules are also set out in procedural rules, and can include permanent exclusion from the forum.

Within these rules regarding acceptable behaviour, there may be less room for NGO networks to maneuver to align with the rules and norms. Shifting away from traditional identities and repertoires of action could marginalize actors within the network, ultimately stymying mobilization efforts. Some NGO networks will benefit from the rules governing observer engagement within the regime, as well as norms constituting appropriate observer behaviour. These rules marginalize other networks. Networks may not conform to the rules and norms because of their identity or their repertoire of action. Traditional repertoires of action, the means that the network uses to make its claims, are defining features of a network (e.g., unions strike) (Tarrow 1998). A repertoire of action conflicting with the dominant norms of how civil society engages in a given regime will marginalize the network as inappropriate or dissimilar to other, accepted civil society governors in the target regime.

Divisions among NGOs may make some more likely to be non-conformists than others. Tarrow (2005) and Smith (2008) identify divides between reform-oriented and justice-oriented "activist solitudes." Others have focused on the tactics, dividing between insider strategies, such as lobbying, and outsider strategies, such as protest and boycotts (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Orr 2006, 2007; Ciplet 2014). For Newell (2006), such justice-based NGOs and social movements are often "outsider-outsiders" with little access to international negotiations, operating outside of the institutionalized process using tactics such as civil disobedience or protest to argue that the

market is the cause of environmental problems. These social and environmental NGOs are increasingly playing the role of activists in climate change negotiations and mobilizing grassroots climate campaigns (Betsill 2015; Fisher and Galli 2015). Such nonconformists will find it difficult to mobilize in the target regime because of the norms of how observers ought to behave and interact with state delegates. Questioning the status quo, and actively protesting it, is unlikely to ingratiate outsider activists to mainstream climate governors, including states. Such noncompliant, even antisocial, behaviour given the norms of the target regime could marginalize a network and undermine their acceptance within the regime.

Their reform-oriented counterparts, by contrast, will encounter fewer difficulties. Many of these NGOs have adopted more corporate forms of governance and moderated their claims and means of contention (Dauvergne and LeBaron 2014). Such NGOs often serve to provide expertise and lobby delegates in the hallways through socially-acceptable means. In Newell's (2006) schema, such "insider-insider" NGOs have preferential access to delegates and a benign view of the market, while "insider-outsiders," have access but lie on the periphery of civil society and the negotiations in part due to their critical view of markets. Often, these NGOs take on the role of diplomat, seeking to work with countries to develop better climate politics (Betsill 2015). In insider tactics, expertise is a valuable resource to states lacking information (Chasek 2001; Raustaila 1997), opening the door for these NGOs to be viewed as welcome diplomats. Repertoires of action are deeply engrained in a movement, speak to the core of its identity, and are unlikely to change. Networks can, however, try to claim belonging and fit within other procedural institutions.

In the UN system, there are also institutions about how civil society can organize within the context of a given forum. Major groups, sometimes also called constituencies, are common

ways to categorize civil society groups and vary across forums. These groups have preferential

access to the negotiations, information and delegates. They also may receive benefits such as

invitations to meetings and organizational aids, such as meeting rooms and secretariat support.

Within the UNFCCC, the constituencies vary in how they organize. All constituencies have a

focal point, but use different mechanisms to hold that focal point accountable to how they

represent the wider group (Kuyper and Bäckstrand 2016). The rules can offer advantages to

some, but not all, NGO networks, in part based on their identity and on their ability to make a

claim to belonging in a constituency.

To a large extent, major groups or constituencies are identity based. For example, major

groups categorized in Agenda 21 include "Women," "Children," "Science and Technology," and

"NGOs." These are broad categories open to interpretation. NGOs within a network could make

a claim to belong within a given category. The claim would have to be accepted by the

Secretariat administering the rules regarding observers and by observers in that group. Making a

claim to belonging in an established group that enjoys benefits of constituency or major group

membership may be a difficult task, particularly if enlarging membership spreads the resources

more thinly. The rule may be open to interpretation, but claiming space under the aegis of a

major group or constituency may require ingenuity and relationship building.

Another strategy to align with the procedural rules and norms is to argue for the adoption

of institutions from other, similar forums. This is a considerable endeavor for an incoming NGO

network with members still unproven and accepted within the target regime. Perhaps

counterintuitively, this strategy could help new networks find recognition. By highlighting their

inclusion and alignment with procedural rules and norms in a similar forum, the NGOs in the

network appear more relevant, and perhaps less foreign, to the target regime. Associating itself

with a similar forum and related regime could help portray the NGO network as viable member of the target regime.

The ability to align with these procedural institutions is generally not an *a priori* factor in the decision whether to target a given regime or forum. Some of the formal rules regarding observer participation may be evident through some prior research. The informal norms can have powerful impacts, but are not knowable to an outsider than never participated in the forum. Once in the network, NGOs can seek to change some rules and norms in their favour. Therefore, one cannot assume afterward that a given network mobilized within the regime because, in retrospect, a forum was particularly receptive to the network's participation. These rules and norms shape the efforts of networks to mobilize within the regime, providing some with advantages, but only once they've started participating in the forum. Therefore, there are multiple sources of data required to study how aligned a network is with procedural institutions, as with the other central claims of the NGO forum multiplying framework.

2.3   Conclusion

There is motivation to expand the scope of contention and attract new audiences to advance a NGO network's issue. Until recently, many lamented the gridlocked state of multilateralism for several issues including trade and climate change (see for example Hale, Held and Young 2011). Therefore, one may expect to see a high degree of NGO mobility as NGOs migrate from a gridlocked regime for material, political, or normative reasons. Such mobility is conditioned on the capacity of the network to carry its authority into the new regime through internal solidarity and action by articulators, and their ability to leverage the institutions of the target regime to make a claim of belonging.

The following empirical chapters trace motivations and mobilization of the labour, gender, justice, health, and human rights networks to engage (or not) in the climate change regime. Before outlining these cases, a brief primer on the climate change regime is necessary. The following chapter outlines the subtle and flagrant shifts in the institutions and political openness of the climate change regime, centered on its central forum, the UNFCCC.

Chapter 3: Frames and Institutions in the Climate Change Regime

This chapter provides the historical background of the climate change regime, while also operationalizing and tracing the shifts in the climate change regime's dominant frames and the institutions that follow those understandings. These changes, I posit here and in the subsequent empirical chapters, created opportunities or presented constraints to NGO networks' effort to forum multiply to the climate change regime. The shifts in the dominant frames created new opportunities for NGOs within networks to claim belonging in the climate change regime. Among these institutions, are those related to observers, and the subtly shifting relationship between the UNFCCC and observers. This is a unique view of the twenty-five year backdrop of the climate change regime built from historical documentation, interviews, and participant observation; subsequent empirical chapters focus on the actions of the NGO networks and their interactions with the climate regime.

The chapter divides the history of the climate change regime into three periods. The first period begins with the start of negotiations for a climate change agreement in 1990 through 2005 when the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. The second period, 2006 to 2009, involves the intense negotiations for an agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol. During this period, the climate change regime took what many call the "adaptation turn." Those within the regime encountered the evident effects of climate change, and started to call for the need to build resilience to the effects of climate change. The final period, 2010 to 2015, traces the resurrection of the climate change regime from the failure of 2009 in Copenhagen through to the Paris Agreement. Others have divided the history of the regime in ways best suited to their inquiries (see Gupta 2014; Hadden and Busby 2014; Hadden 2015). Here, I highlight shifts in the accepted frames and institutions of the regime, while using major historical milestones as bookends for

each period. Primarily, I follow the history of the UNFCCC, which Biermann et al (2009) and Hoffman (2006) convincingly argue is the focal point of the climate change regime.

In the first period, the dominant framing portrayed a narrow view of climate change as an economic and environmental issue, while the burgeoning regime remained open to observers' participation and influence. Together, these factors created fertile ground for a few types of NGOs representing environmental and economic issues to participate in and influence the regime. In the second period, a new frame began to gain widespread acceptance with the adaptation turn. It is during this period that forum multiplying from other regimes intensified. In the last period, the discursive environment continued to expand, albeit at a slower pace, with one additional and still contested frame regarding irreversible effects of climate change. Some rules related to observers narrowed access in several subtle but important respects. As a result, fewer new groups of NGOs forum multiplied to the climate regime, and some of those who were present previously found the constraints imposed too burdensome and left the hallways of the UNFCCC to pursue other strategies to influence climate politic.

3.1   Frames and Institutions, 1992-2005

This period includes a rapid development of international climate change law, in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, followed by years when the regime languished waiting for the Protocol to enter into force. In this early period, the burgeoning regime was open to non-state actors providing technical and scientific advice. Yet, the regime had a limited view of the climate change problem. As a result, a limited range of non-state actors participated, mostly from businesses, and environmental groups, which, respectively, represented 34% and 48.5% of

NGOs participating in meetings between 1995-2004.[1] Excluding universities and think tanks, all other NGOs representing different issues comprised just 1.6%.[2] These actors could participate in a manner conforming to the norms of non-state actor participation, and these actors aligned with the narrow scope within which actors discussed and understood climate change.

The negotiations for the UNFCCC began in 1990, and culminated at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 where state leaders signed the Convention. The Convention quickly entered into force[3] on March 1994.[4] Shortly after entering into force at the first Conference of the Parties held in Berlin in 1995, parties agreed that the provisions in the Convention were inadequate to meet its objective to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climatic system. The resulting Berlin Mandate launched a process to strengthen commitments of developed countries through the adoption of a protocol or another legal instrument. By 1997, parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol. In eight years, states agreed to start addressing climate change through multilateral cooperation, and negotiated two legally binding agreements, one of which entered into force. From this point on, the pace slowed.

The world's largest emitter at the time, the US, walked away from the burgeoning regime at the time when the rules became stronger. President George W. Bush rebuked the Protocol in one of his first political announcements. The main reason offered was the Protocol threatened America's economic competitiveness vis-à-vis major economies that did not have targets under

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[1] This is derived from the NGO participation database.
[2] This information is derived from the NGO participation database developed for this research. I calculated the number of environmental and climate NGOs as "environmental NGOs" and traditional and renewable business NGOs as "business NGOs" for this measure.
[3] Entering into force is the moment when the provisions of the legal instrument become legally binding for those countries that ratified the treaty. Signing the Convention is a largely symbolic act that indicates that a country intends to ratify. Ratification means that a country uses domestic processes or measures to indicate that it intends to be bound by the provisions of the international treaty.
[4] For the UNFCCC to enter into force, 50 countries had to ratify the Convention. March 21, 1994 was the ninetieth day after the fiftieth country notified the UN that they had ratified the Convention.

the Protocol. America's climate abstinence created a transatlantic "climate divide," as the US

and EU took opposite approaches to the issue (Busby and Ochs 2004; Schreurs, Selin and

VanDeveer 2009).

The focus shifted to the "Gang of Four," Canada, Russia, Australia and Japan that with

the EU could tally enough emissions representing a sufficient share of global emissions for the

Protocol to enter into force.[5] The negotiations over the rulebook of the Kyoto Protocol (later

known as the Marrakesh Accords) included compromises on forest sinks to appease some Gang

of Four members, particularly Russia.[6] The generous rules for credits from forest sinks led some

NGOs to refer to the Kyoto Protocol after the 2001 Marrakesh meeting "Kyoto Lite."[7] These

concessions ultimately worked. With Canada, Japan, and finally Russia's ratification, the

Protocol entered into force February 16, 2005.

With the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and domestic action sprouting in some

states, climate change action seemed to become reality. European legislation was in place,

including the European Emissions Trading Scheme that began January 1, 2005. Carbon markets

were a significant part of the cautious optimism, as the International Emissions Trading

Association and the World Bank write in the *State and Trends of the Carbon Market, 2005*:

> The regulatory framework of the carbon market has solidified considerably in the past 12
> months, with the start of operations of EU ETS on January 1, 2005 and the entry into
> force of the Kyoto Protocol on February 16, 2005. While regulatory uncertainty
> continues, notably for the registration of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects
> by the CDM Executive Board, the approval of climate mitigation plans in Japan and
> Canada, or the allocation plans under the EU ETS for the 2008-2012 period, the very

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[5] To enter into force, the Protocol has a double threshold mechanism. It requires at least 50 countries, representing at
least 55% of global emissions to ratify. At the time, the US represented nearly 36% of global emissions.
[6] Russia at the time represented approximately 18% of global emissions. Its ratification was vital to the Protocol
entering into force.
[7] For one example of environmental NGOs using this frame to explain the otherwise technical issues, see the New
Scientist 8 November 2003: https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg18024200-300-kyoto-lite-fails/

existence of policies constraining GHG emissions up to 2012 is no longer in doubt (IETA and World Bank 2005, 3).

After years of inaction, many held hope that the future of climate action had arrived in 2005. Throughout this dramatic time, those undertaking climate change policy and holding such optimism understood and discussed the problem in strictly environmental and economic terms.

3.1.1 Dominant Frames and Institutions

Governors in the early regime understood climate change as an abstract, environmental issue with potential consequences for some economic sectors. Discussions of the links between climate change and social and other environmental problems were absent because these issues were not yet part of the dominant frame held by actors within the climate change regime.

As an environmental issue, those within the climate change regime discussed its effects as temporally distant, possibly mitigated through reducing emissions today. The Declaration from the Conference on a Changing Atmosphere in 1988 urged that "If rapid action is not taken now by the countries of the world, these problems will become progressively more serious, more difficult to reverse, and more costly to address." [8] Environmental NGOs supported the view that climate change could be mitigated (Betsill 2008). Mitigation, not adaptation or building resilience to climatic effects, was the dominant way climate change actors understood as the appropriate response to the issue.

In the effort to mitigate, actors identified two sources of climate change: the over use and inefficient use of fossil fuels and overpopulation. At the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, many speeches by heads of state and government mentioned overpopulation, particularly in the global

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[8] The Toronto Declaration cited several problems associated with climate change, including threatening: human health; global food security; fresh water resources; political instability; sustainable development; species; and ecosystems' diversity and productivity.

South. Yet, the UNFCCC does not mention overpopulation. As Rahman and Roncerel (1994, 244-247) explain, southern-based NGOs ultimately convinced Northern NGOs to abandon their proposals to address population growth in developing countries and to appreciate Southern NGOs' calls for per-capita GHG entitlement. Southern NGOs taught Northern NGOs about the realities of development, arguing that right to development included access to energy, and instead urging focus on consumption. In this way, Southern NGOs "emphasized that the debate must go beyond just the discussions of climate change as a scientific issue" (Rahman and Roncerel 1994, 246). In part based on these normative calls, rather than scientific appeals, the dominant frame contracted still more, to focus primarily on the energy sectors.

Climate change was also understood as an economic issue. The decision for the UN General Assembly, and not the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) or the World Meteorological Organization, to oversee the negotiations on climate change highlights how climate change was set apart from other environmental issues. Brazil, India and other developing countries argued that climate change is inherently tied to modes of production. Countries did not make a similar case for the other "Rio Conventions" under negotiation at the time under the auspices of UNEP.

The texts of the Convention and the Protocol reflect how actors in the climate regime understood the causes and solutions to the problem. The market mechanisms and flexibility options were intended to ease the economic burden of mitigation for developed countries. This economic understanding was widespread, a UNFCCC delegate recalls that when the Kyoto Protocol entered into force then Executive Secretary Michael Zammit Cutajar informed then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that the world had brought about one of the most significant

economic treaties in recent history.[9] The narrow scope of the understanding of climate change and the focus on mitigation led the regime to connect to only a few sectors, which ultimately limited the types of claims possible by non-state actors. Others involved in the global governance of social issues, or other environmental issues aside from forests, had no opening to claim a legitimate place within the regime.

3.1.2 Relationship with Observers

During the formative years of the climate change regime, the rules and norms of observer participation involved rather *ad hoc* arrangements later concretized into a more formal system. Few types of NGOs participated, largely environmental NGOs and business and industry NGOs, in line with the two frames of climate change dominant at the time. Toward the end of this period, other groups sought entry to the climate change regime.

Parties established the rules governing non-state actor's access to the climate regime and relationship with the Secretariat during this period. According to Article 7.6 of the Convention, NGOs and other observers "which [are] qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which [have] informed the Secretariat of [their] wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object (UNFCCC 1992). The Conference of the Parties approves these applications annually, to take effect the following year. With accreditation, observers can access plenary and contact group meetings, unless one-third of parties object.[10]

Further benefits are available to those NGOs able to participate in a constituency.

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[9] Developing country delegate, Interview with author 2013.
[10] Rule 7 of the UNFCCC draft rules of procedure specifies, "observers may, upon invitation of the President, participate without the right to vote in the proceedings of any session, unless at least one third of the Parties present at the session object. COP decision 18/CP.4 clarifies that this rule also applies to open-ended contact groups.

Constituencies are broad groups of non-state actors that choose a focal point to communicate between the group and the Secretariat. The constituency arrangement in the climate change regime started to form before Agenda 21 established "Major Groups" at the Rio Earth Summit. During the negotiations for the Convention, environmental NGOs and business and industry NGOs formed loose groupings to coordinate among themselves and with the Secretariat. Later, these groups concretized into constituencies. As a result, the UNFCCC parallels the Major Groups established in Agenda 21.[11] Parties approved additional constituencies for local government and municipal authorities in 1995, indigenous peoples in 2001, and research and independent NGOs in 2003.

Constituencies confer benefits for those NGOs able, and choosing, to participate in the group. The Secretariat furnishes constituencies with information before and during a meeting, time to speak to the plenary when all states are present, and invitations to Ministerial receptions, technical workshops, bilateral meetings with officials, and regular meetings with the Executive Secretary of the Convention and co-chairs of key negotiating groups. Particularly open relationships with NGOs in the early years of the regime complemented the benefits of the constituency arrangements.

NGOs capitalized on opportunities presented by the norms of political openness during this time. The intergovernmental negotiating committee established a uniquely open working arrangement with NGOs, in part because the complexity of issues led many negotiators to seek out NGOs' opinions, and to use NGOs to test out ideas. As Rahman and Roncerel (1994, 250) observe, "the most controversial issues were not even brought to the main forum of negotiations

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[11] The Major Groups established by Agenda 21 are: business and industry, children and youth, farmers, indigenous peoples and their communities, local authorities, non-governmental organizations, the scientific and technological community, women, and workers and trade unions

until after consultations between the delegates and NGOs." In the first historical period "closed negotiation sessions [were] historically the exception rather than the rule in the UNFCCC" (Climate Action Network 2006). Environmental NGOs could use their technical expertise, and their access, to inform the debates surrounding several contentious issues, particularly carbon trading and sinks (Betsill 2002).

This period established open rules and norms of NGO participation. Of the five established constituencies, environmental NGOs and business and industry NGOs, outnumbered the rest in terms of delegation size and influence. These two dominant constituencies aligned with the two understandings of climate change – as an environmental issue and an economic issue. The few links evident to other areas limited the participation of other actors in the regime. The frames used to think about climate change, and consequently the institutions to govern the issue, were soon set to expand rapidly with the negotiations for an agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol, from 2006 to 2009.

3.2   Frames and Institutions, 2006-2009

During this time, parties engaged in negotiations to replace the Kyoto Protocol with a new legally binding agreement. A new frame spurred expansion into new issues. More than ever, actors discussed climate change in terms of its consequences, and linked forests in developing countries to mitigation. The rules and norms for political openness largely remained unchanged, despite the influx of new groups, some of which used the rules to gain constituency status. Non-environmental NGOs increased their participation dramatically, from 1.6% between 1995-2004 to 27.2% of all NGOs participating between 2006 and 2009; social NGOs alone accounted for

much of this increase, accounting for 22% of all NGOs. During this period, environmental NGOs accounted for 50.6% and business and industry NGOs represented 22.1% of total NGOs.[12]

At the 2005 meeting in Montreal, parties agreed to convene a two-year series of roundtable workshops called the "Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention," commonly referred to as the Convention Dialogue. The Convention Dialogue roundtables discussed four issues: sustainable development, adaptation, technology, and market mechanisms.

The first three of these issues were central for developing countries, particularly because these issues opened negotiation space for developing countries to raise their key issues. Sustainable development at the time referred to assisting developing countries to develop in a sustainable manner (today, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development makes clear that the Sustainable Development Goals are universally applicable). Technology discussions unlocked calls for transfers of technology to developing countries. Adaptation was also viewed as a developing country issue, despite the need for all countries to undertake adaptation efforts (Schipper 2006). For civil society actors, adaptation was increasingly discussed in side events, far more than in the previous years, and by a broader range of NGOs, including by NGOs linking adaptation to social issues (Hjerpe and Buhr 2014).

The fourth issue, markets, represents a shift toward embracing market mechanisms as a norm of climate governance. The Clean Development Mechanism became increasingly popular;

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[12] This information is derived from the NGO participation database constructed for this research. As above, environmental NGOs are environmental and climate NGOs. Business and industry NGOs are both traditional and renewable businesses. The remaining amount reported are social NGOs and other NGOs, and excludes universities and think tanks.

62 projects were registered in 2005 compared to 427 and 433 in 2007 and 2008, respectively.[13] Countries proposed new markets, including for reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries. The idea of reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+)[14] garnered significant political attention, yet countries disagreed over the use of markets (Allan and Dauvergne 2013).

The Dialogue concluded in 2007, before the conference in Bali, where parties agreed to the Bali Action Plan. As one observer points out, anyone following the Convention Dialogue would have foreseen the key elements of the Bali Action Plan.[15]

The Bali Action Plan constituted the negotiating agenda for the legally binding agreement set to be concluded in Copenhagen in 2009. The Plan consisted of four pillars for which negotiations proceeded: mitigation, adaptation, technology, and financing. Among mitigation issues, REDD+ had a dedicated space on the agenda. The negotiations for the new agreement occurred at a feverish pace over the next two years. Parties met four times a year (twice as often as usual practice), leading into the 2009 Copenhagen conference.

The Copenhagen conference – called "Hopenhagen" by some – encountered, and ultimately disappointed, very high expectations. Negotiators walked into the meeting with a roughly 200-page negotiation text, and left having taken note of a five-page political agreement called the Copenhagen Accord.[16] In the Accord, each country is to put forward its pledge to

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[13] Derived from data publicly available at: http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Public/CDMinsights/index.html
[14] The full name of REDD+ is reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; including the role of conservation, sustainable forest management, and enhancement of carbon stocks. In 2005, it was introduced as reducing emissions from deforestation (RED). The other elements were included in 2007 as a compromise among the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, Brazil, India, and Congo Basin countries.
[15] Anonymous, Interview May 20, 2014
[16] The last two pages of the Accord contain blank tables, one for developed countries to register their quantified economy-wide emission target for 2020, and the other for developing countries to register their nationally-appropriate mitigation actions.

reduce emissions, creating a "bottom-up" approach to climate governance. Even REDD+, which to some was the most advanced text of the agenda items laid out by the Bali Action Plan, possibly even ripe for completion,[17] received only a brief paragraph with little substance.

Participants, NGOs, and the media widely considered the Copenhagen conference a failure of multilateralism. Yet, the Copenhagen debacle did not roll back any of the agenda-setting gains of developing countries. The issues of adaptation, REDD+, and means of implementation remained important in the subsequent discussions of how to move forward after multilateral failure.

3.2.1 Dominant Frames and Institutions

The "adaptation turn" and interest in deforestation in developing countries in climate governance during this period widened the scope of how actors understood and discussed climate change. With this new frame, those advocating for issues related to developing countries, such as poverty alleviation or social issues, such as gender inequality, envisioned a role for themselves in the climate regime. It was during this period that a former Secretariat member recalls that "the politics of international development arrived in the climate change arena, including the NGOs and international organizations [IOs]. Suddenly, development and other NGOs and IOs arrived, telling us that we weren't discussing an environmental issue anymore."[18]

There was still a strong, vested core discussing climate change in strictly environmental, mitigation-centric terms. Some environmental NGOs worried that discussing climate change as also an adaptation problem could divert attention from the need to reduce emissions, as one NGO delegate recalls:

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[17] Developing country delegate, Interview March 19, 2014.
[18] Anonymous former Secretariat member, Interview June 11, 2015.

CAN [Climate Action Network] didn't want to talk about it – they worried that if we talk about adaptation we are giving up on mitigation. I had trouble explaining to them that there isn't choice. For the poor it's not mitigation, it's dealing with impacts. Adaptation matters to a vast swath of the world for whom emissions are not a problem. Emissions are confined to those who are emitting, not to those who are feeling the impacts. These are different groups of people. Reducing emissions was the first, and for a long time the only framing, where people thought climate was A. environmental B. global and C. a faraway problem.[19]

Yet, the Bali Action Plan ushered adaptation to the center of climate change discourse, bolstered by the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report highlighted the impacts of climate change more than ever before, providing evidence of the emerging effects on natural and human environments, such as agriculture and forest management, human health, and Arctic activities like hunting or travel over sea ice (IPCC 2007). While there had been mentions of adaptation in the past, the 2007 Bali Conference was the turning point of adaptation for many, summarized by one NGO delegate:

Bali was the culmination. When it came to restructuring the overall agreement – which is what the Bali Action Plan does, it lays the architecture of the post-Kyoto regime – the two building blocks are mitigation and adaptation. It was the first time adaptation was a major building block of the negotiations. Kyoto Protocol was nearly entirely mitigation. In Bali, adaptation was elevated to the same level. It was a gigantic win for the IPCC, for the science to be policy relevant, and for the UNFCCC to eventually take up the science.[20]

While all countries need to take adaptation measures as seas rise, agricultural patterns change, and droughts and fires increase frequency and severity, actors in the climate change regime discussed adaptation as a developing country issue. During a high-level event convened by the UN Secretary General, several states highlighted, or expressed solidarity with, small

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[19] Saleemul Huq, IIED, Interview with author 2015
[20] Saleemul Huq, IIED, Interview with author 2015.

island developing states and least developed states as those bearing the brunt of climatic effects while contributing the least to the problem; indeed, one developing country delegate underscored that "development and adaptation efforts go hand-in-hand" (UNSG 2007). The climate frame expanded to discuss the effects of climate change in developing countries side by side with the environmental impetus to reduce emissions.

3.2.2 Relationship with Observers

The political openness of the climate regime remained largely unchanged during this period. The rules regarding constituencies and NGO access to negotiations did not change. Informal practices started to shift, presenting subtle challenges to new civil society actors, setting the stage for diminishing political openness in future years.

The constituency system of the UNFCCC admitted new groups. Using their status as a Major Group, labour unions, women and gender organizations, youth groups, and farming organizations requested constituency status during this period. Gaining this status, based on the same norm of using the Major Group system, would not prove as easy or straightforward as it did for constituencies established during the early days of the UNFCCC.

The Secretariat established a provisional process for these groups to accede to constituency status. Under the new system, the group had to first apply, and if that application was accepted, they received provisional constituency status. After two years, the group submitted another application for full constituency status. This second application was, according to several respondents,[21] detailed and lengthy, including a summary of all the activities undertaken by the group over the two-year period, a list of the organizations and individuals in the proposed

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[21] Multiple respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the reporting requirement under the provisional system: two from the labour unions; one from youth; and two from women and gender.

constituency, and a nominated organization, and an individual within that organization, to serve as the focal point.

Most constituencies cleared these hurdles. The Trade Union NGOs became an official constituency in 2008. The Youth NGOs, Farmers, and Women and Gender had their status approved in 2009. The Farmers constituency received provisional status, which it still holds. The difficulty for the Farmers constituency was, and remains, in part that the group is decentralized and that the focal points were individuals who have fewer resources than an organization for coordinating group activities to prove their active role in the UNFCCC.[22]

With these additional constituencies, there are now nine, mirroring the Major Groups while excluding others groups that are not Major Groups in the UN system. No new constituencies will be eligible. Only one group, the Climate Justice Now! (CJN!) network, managed to make room in the constituency system. By declaring themselves an environmental group, they successfully negotiated an arrangement to split the environmental NGO constituency with Climate Action Network in 2009. CJN! and Climate Action Network both communicate with the Secretariat through their respective focal points, share invitations to events and use one minute each of the two-minute speaking time in plenary. This arrangement was meant to be temporary, but remains today.[23]

CJN! brought protest and civil disobedience tactics into the climate regime (see Hadden 2015), challenging old norms of NGOs ought to behave. In the early years, civil society presented their ideas in side events, provided policy briefs to governments and engaged delegates in information exchange. Starting with a "die-in" at a World Bank event to announce the Forest

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[22] Anonymous UN employee, Interview with author 2014.
[23] Anonymous UN employee, Interview with author 2014.

Carbon Partnership Facility (designed to fund REDD+ projects) in 2007, CJN! brought new tactics, or repertoires of action, to the climate regime.

The mass mobilization at the 2009 Copenhagen conference, and further rise of civil disobedience and protest strategies sparked new, informal arrangements and tighter security at climate negotiations. The unprecedented mobilization in Copenhagen exceeded the capacity of the conference center. In response, the Danish hosts significantly curtailed civil society's access to the negotiations. The merging of movements and poor planning by the hosts contributed to the disenfranchisement of civil society (Fischer 2010). These new informal practices and rules would present new constraints on some civil society groups in the coming years, as parties tried to resurrect the climate regime.

3.3 Frames and Institutions, 2010-2015

The failure in Copenhagen to adopt a legally binding instrument, coupled with the rampant accusations of the lack of transparency for developing countries and civil society to remain involved, derailed the climate process. After Copenhagen, parties put the process back on the proverbial track as parties agreed to restart negotiations and, ultimately, adopted a new legally binding agreement in Paris in 2015. As states negotiated long-standing issues, very little changed in how actors understood climate change. During this period, the regime's political openness began to close. Participation remained roughly similar, with few new types of NGOs participating, but increasing engagement of organizations representing social issues that already were engaged. In terms of overall participation, as Orr (2007) also identifies, the modern period of the UNFCCC has witnessed significantly more participation by NGOs, from 506 in 2002 to over 1880 NGOs accredited. Of the participating NGOs, environmental NGOs comprised 39%,

business and industry NGOs were 19.2% and social NGOs represented 41.8% of total NGOs attending UNFCCC meetings between 2010 and 2015.[24]

The 2010 Cancun Agreements started the resurrection of the regime through an agreement that advanced issues including REDD+ and climate finance. There was still the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period in 2012, and there was no agreement in place to replace or extend it. In 2011, countries agreed to establish a second commitment period, the details of which settled through agreements in 2012. The 2011 decision in Durban also included agreement to "develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties" to be completed by 2015 and to enter into force in 2020.

The negotiations for the new agreement proceeded throughout 2012 to 2015. For the first two years parties again convened in roundtable, informal discussions. This process tabled several proposals and produced the concept of intended nationally determined contributions, a new, substantive version of the pledge system established by the Copenhagen Accord. These contributions would constitute the backbone of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change adopted in 2015.

The Paris Agreement on climate change sets its sights to hold "the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C" (UNFCCC 2015). It does so by creating a machinery propelled by two gears: contributions and transparency. Every five years, parties are to submit a

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[24] This information is derived from the NGO participation database constructed for this research. As above, environmental NGOs are environmental and climate NGOs, business and industry NGOs are both traditional and renewable businesses. This measure includes only social NGOs, excluding those categorized as other, universities, and think tanks.

nationally determined contribution that is more ambitious than the last. There is a legally binding

obligation to submit a more-ambitious contribution ever five years; the content of that

contribution is not legally-binding. The Agreement does not tell or expect states to live up to a

particular means of reducing emissions or adapting to climate change. In terms of transparency,

parties are also to report on their progress meeting their contribution, which help inform a

"global stock take" of collective efforts. The reporting requirement is legally binding. All parties

will report, using a common framework to facilitate aggregation and comparability. The

Agreement achieves a balance between mitigation and adaptation, in terms of its political

importance and funding, including setting a long-term global goal for resilience and reduced

vulnerability to climate change. The enthusiasm was palpable after ten years of negotiations.

Whether the fervour can spur the required, ambitious action remains an open question.

3.3.1   Dominant Frames and Institutions

During this period, the frames of climate change in terms of mitigation and adaptation

remained relatively stable, only adding further emphasis to the effects of climate change in the

form of loss and damage. Loss and damage refers to the irrevocable effects of slow and rapid

onset events caused by climate change (e.g., prolonged drought, intensified natural disasters, sea

level rise). As a newer issue on the agenda, there remain conceptual differences in how actors

understand loss and damage (see Huq, Roberts and Fenton 2013).

For developing countries, loss and damage occurs when both mitigation and adaptation

prove insufficient. For developed countries, worried about the potential for liability and

compensation claims, loss and damage is a subset of adaptation efforts. This latter view is

captured in the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate

Change adopted by the UNFCCC COP in 2013. Addressing loss and damage separate from

adaptation remained a central demand of developing countries throughout the negotiations for the Paris Agreement, right up until the final days before adoption.[25] Again, this issue revolved around compensating developing countries to cope with the slow and rapid changes wrought by climate change.[26] Actors discussed climate change in roughly the same terms, albeit acknowledging the grim reality of irrevocable damage; the political openness of the regime shifted too in subtle ways.

3.3.2   Relationship with Observers

The non-violent disobedience and mass attendance at the Copenhagen COP paved the way for subtle changes closing NGO access. After Copenhagen, the Secretariat made several changes to NGO access. The Secretariat now allots a set number of badges, with input from observer organizations requesting a given number, to each accredited observer organization, limiting the delegation size. In 2015, some NGO representatives organizing their participation suggested that the organizations received about 20% of the badges that they requested.[27]

Security around UNFCCC meetings also increased, particularly in relation to protests. Since 2010, NGOs must register their demonstrations and get the approval of Security. Failure to secure approval can have consequences, including being "debadged," which means being asked

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[25] The Paris agreement addresses mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage in separate articles, creating conceptual separation between these issues. This separation was achieved through compromise, developing countries agreed to remove any reference to liability or compensation from the Agreement, and to explicitly state in the decision accompanying the Agreement explicitly excluding liability and compensation.

[26] Examples of loss and damage in developed countries could include the pine beetle epidemic in British Columbia, and Hurricane Katrina or Superstorm Sandy in the US.

[27] Discussion with Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC

to leave the conference and not being allowed back inside.[28] In some cases, for particularly disruptive protests, the individuals deemed responsible lost their badges permanently.[29]

Further, the introduction of new forms of protest – particularly non-violent, civil disobedience outside the venue – highlighted and questioned the norm of how NGOs ought to engage in the climate process. The outsider tactics used by some movements, NGOs and individual activists were not well received by many within the climate regime. While many NGOs supported a civil society walk out of the negotiations in 2013, the Climate Action Network could not participate because some of its membership disagreed. Some Climate Action Network members even complained to the heads of some of the organizations planning the walk out, to stop it.[30] The norm that NGOs in the UNFCCC should provide information and engage more muted forms of protest inside the venue facilitated the strategies of some groups, while presenting constraints to others' organizing efforts.

3.4   Conclusion

This chapter sets the stage for the following empirical chapters by outlining the changes within the climate change regime to which actors within NGO networks responded. The changes in the frames and institutions, and political openness created opportunities for some actors, while constraining others. The interplay of developments within the climate change regime, and NGO networks' collective ability to capitalize on the opportunities, or overcome the challenges completes the narrative of NGO forum multiplying.

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[28] Some activists have been debadged temporarily. Others, such as Lord Monkton who is a long-attending, infamous climate denier, lost his badge permanently for impersonating a state and making an intervention during plenary.
[29] In 2011, Kumi Naidoo, Executive Director of Greenpeace, lost his badge for participating in a sit in (there were questions if he actually organized it, or was a late participant). It was announced that he would be barred from the UNFCCC permanently, but this was later reversed. In 2012, Lord Christopher Monckton impersonated a party and permanently lost his ability to attend UNFCCC meetings.
[30] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview March 3, 2014; Ulrike Röhr, LiFE e.V., Interview with author 2014.

Chapter 4: Labour-Climate Network

Calls for a "just transition" and green jobs for workers started to murmur in the halls of the UNFCCC in 2005 and by 2015 were installed in some institutions of the UNFCCC, included in the Paris Agreement, and used by environmental groups and states to make the case for climate action. Labour fulfills the three aspects of forum multiplying. First, the labour movement participated in the UNFCCC in greater numbers each year, from three organizations with 31 delegates in 2006, to 12 organizations bringing 195 delegates to the Paris conference in 2015. The labour movement has undertaken a long-term engagement involving public acts of participation, working with climate governors from government ministers and civil society. Second, the just transition frame underscores a deep commitment to supporting action on climate change. It is a rallying cry meant to bring together the labour movement and help climate governors achieve their goals. The frame puts climate action at its center: at the World Congress of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) in 2014 the slogan was "there are no jobs on a dead planet."

Third, labour achieved broad recognition as a climate change governor. States created space in the response measures forum for a just transition of the workforce, and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in 2010. Among civil society, labour had a central role in the C-7, an informal coalition of high-profile NGOs campaigning on climate change, including the largest civil society organizations in the development, faith, environment, and labour sectors. The point of the C-7 is to show cross-sectoral solidarity to climate action; each of the members serves as a representative of a larger cause, be it labour, development, environment, or another issue.[1] These

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[1] The C-7 recently expanded to include the CIDSE – the international alliance of Catholic development agencies.

high-level organizations forged this political alliance through mutual recognition of each other as a key organization, and interpersonal communication and trust built among the leaders of these organizations.[2] By 2015, C-7 with the B Team,[3] and We Mean Business[4] signed declaration titled "Call for Dialogue: Climate action requires just transition." The declaration includes calls for investment in jobs, guaranteed social protections (including income support, retraining and redeployment for workers in fossil-fuel industries), and social dialogue with all relevant parties (ITUC 2015).

In short, the labour movement clearly adopted and pursued a successful forum multiplying strategy to join the climate change regime. The movement engaged in a public act, directed at the climate change governors through sustained, increased participation within the UNFCCC. It linked its core issues – workers' rights and job creation and protection – to climate change through the just transition frame. Finally, these efforts found recognition by state and non-state actors. Labour became a recognized actor in the climate change regime.

This chapter traces how and why the labour movement managed to overcome considerable initial reluctance – even outright opposition – to labour's presence in the climate change talks. The labour movement's migration to climate change is not an inevitable result of the impacts of the Kyoto Protocol or other climate legislation on workers; objectively, the Protocol catalyzed little action, leaving any employment repercussions unrealized. Climate policy did not cause employment impacts forcing labour to respond. Rather, the labour

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[2] Annabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview with author 2014
[3] The B Team is a group of global business and civil society leaders, from Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland to Richard Branson, working to redefine the role of the private sector away from profit and toward social, environmental and economic benefit.
[4] We Mean Business is a coalition of 372 businesses and 182 investors seeking to promote a transition to a low-carbon economy.

movement started work in anticipation of the challenges and opportunities that climate policy could materialize. Facilitated by the UN Environment Program in the early years, the labour movement overcame internal differences and seized upon opportunities to bring their movement and find new allies within climate politics. Labour was among the first to leverage procedural rules to their advantage, while positioning the support of labour as a powerful force to make climate action politically palatable and practically feasible.

4.1   Labour-Climate Network

Trade unions hold many identities and serve several functions, as third sector organizations (Adaman and Yahya 2002), as a social partner of government and business (Pochet 2002), or as a social movement (Rucht 1999). Unions are in some ways unique, not exactly NGOs or social movements in terms of their structural place in the economy. Unlike other non-state actors, unions can withhold labour, bringing a company or a service to a halt; this power can translate into bargaining concession from businesses or governments.

Yet, the international labour unions share features with the gender NGOs and justice movement explored in subsequent chapters. First, the unions are separate entities collaborating through formal and informal means to try to reconcile differences through collaboration. Second, unions represent an issue previously foreign to those within the climate regime. Unions faced the same pressure to prove that they, and labour issues, belong in the climate change regime. While international trade unions hold a different structural place in the economy than other non-state actors, they are treated as observers to the process, rendering them largely unable to exert that structural power in the UNFCCC.

The network did not radically change through its engagement with climate change, yet there were individual gains made by the ITUC. Table 4-1 and figures 4-1 and 4-2 highlight three

aspects of the labour-climate network. First, the network grew through its engagement with climate change actors. Among the ITUC's newer connections of the ITUC in the second period are the Climate Action Network, ActionAid, Greenpeace, and the WWF. This larger network means that information about labour issues and especially about labour and climate issues could spread to more organizations than before. The ITUC is well placed to receive and distribute this information.

Figure 4-1: Labour-climate network, 2005-2008

Figure 4-2: Labour-climate network, 2009-2015

Measure	2005-2008			2009-2015		
Size (number of nodes)	481			593		
Centrality	In-Degree	Out-Degree	Average Degree	In-Degree	Out-Degree	Average Degree
ITUC	33	81	57	43	77	60
Public Services International	10	27	18.5	10	27	18.5
European Trade Union Confederation	9	16	12.5	11	14	12.5
Building and Wood Workers Union	8	16	12	9	19	14

Table 4-1: Descriptive statistics of the labour-climate network

Second, the network is centralized around the ITUC. The ITUC is both prestigious and

influential both when the labour movement started to undertake its forum multiplying strategy

and later, when it, and the movement, were becoming a recognized actor within the climate

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process. This is perhaps not surprising, given the centralized nature of the movement. The transnational labour movement is comprised of trade and labour unions in a hierarchical relationship: local chapters are part of national unions, and national unions in turn are affiliates of international federations. The international federations liaise through the Council of Global Unions. Since 2006, the international movement has been largely coordinated by the ITUC which became the world's largest trade labour union federation through the merger of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the World Confederation of Labour. The ITUC stands alone as a central actor in the network, receiving and sending information throughout the network.

ITUC's position as a peak association for labour likely facilitates the mobilization of workers more easily than less centralized networks. Unions keen to engage in the UNFCCC would not need to seek their own accreditation or devote resources to learning the procedural rules of engagement, or the substantive rules up for negotiations. Rather, affiliates of the ITUC can simply request to participate under the ITUC's accreditation, and in the process, leverage the resources, experience, and knowledge of ITUC members already engaged. In a less centralized network, there are fewer easy routes for new organizations to undertake work in the new forum while expending fewer resources.

Third, one measure of centrality increased over time. The in-degree, or prestige, of the ITUC increased as the movement's engagement continued. In the first period, the ITUC was a central actor in part because of its position as the largest international confederation of trade unions. In the second period, its central position in the network benefitted further from connections with others that looked to the ITUC for advice, and some adopted the stances of the ITUC. The BlueGreen Alliance is an organization comprised of labour and environmental NGOs

based in the US. It looks to the ITUC's for expertise and positioning on several issues in the

UNFCCC.[5] Within the broader labour movement, other global union federations adopted similar

formulations of the just transition frame as negotiated by the ITUC members (described below),

including the International Transport Workers' Federation and the International Federation of

Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions (Rosemberg 2010).

The central position of the ITUC eliminated a need for a new alliance or secretariat

devoted to the link between climate change and labour. Whereas the gender, justice and even

health networks established partnerships or alliances to convene those organizations interested

the links between their issues and climate change, labour did not. The ITUC could coordinate the

network and establish the trade union NGO constituency in the UNFCCC without creating a new

organization or loose network. For such a centralized network with a strong gatekeeper willing to

devote itself to the new cause, a new venture, with the attendant startup costs would be

redundant. Potentially, this may have helped the ITUC retain its central position, although there

may have been few other organizations willing to take on the coordinating role, and even the

focal point at the ITUC for labour "has to be diplomatic at all times" due to the differing views

of how labour could and should engage on climate change policy.[6] These differing views would

also impact

4.2   Motivations

The labour movement has a history of involvement in environmental issues. For a core

group of individuals within the labour movement, there was a strong, normative motivation to

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[5] Ashley Huago, interview with author 2014.
[6] Peter Colley, in an interview with author in 2014; anonymous labour delegate, interview with author 2014
seconded this view that the ITUC would be one of the few organizations willing and able to coordinate the labour
movemet.

take on climate-change related work. Shifts in the mid- and late- 2000s, including the conclusion

of work in other international forums, and the signals that major economies would undertake

climate change policies, provided these individuals with opportunities to convince unions of their

political motivations to participate in climate change work. In many ways, the entry into force of

the Kyoto Protocol and the signals of impending climate policy served as an exogenous shock:

unions had little foreknowledge of the events that held ramifications for their movement. Those

normatively motivated in the network to participate in climate change efforts could use the

exogenous shock to their advantage to further mobilize the network in the context of climate

change.

Funding, however, was of little motivation for many, in part due to the limited long-term

funds available but also because unions use membership dues for much of their work. Most

funding went to unions in developing countries. UNEP provided over $500,000 to SustainLabour

for a project on Strengthening Union Participation in International Environmental Processes

2007-2010 (SustainLabour 2010). SustainLabour, which is devoted to capacity building among

unions in developing countries to promote awareness of an action on climate change and sound

chemicals management, sustained a 20% reduction in grants in 2010 and 2011 before closing in

2016 (SustainLabour 2010, 2011, n.d.). Even the ITUC finds it difficult to access climate

funding. For some, using internal funds creates independence from the demands of donors:

> We [ITUC] don't have much, in the way of external funds, but this also makes us more
> resilient. We work with membership money. Funders aren't interested in funding us, they
> don't want us, and we've tried. It makes us resilient because, well for other groups that
> focus more on an outcome-based funding, they have to prove they've done something to
> get more funding later. That logic doesn't work for climate. It's a generational struggle.

We can keep going in the struggle without proving that we've accomplished something over and over just to survive.[7]

Normative desires to take up the generational struggle were strong within a core of individuals within the labour movement. For those working on health and safety, the labour movement is also an environmental movement, [8] providing a significant group of labour activists willing to work on climate change for normative reasons. For many of those involved in the early forum multiplying efforts, the public attention for the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) published in 2007 was a turning point in the awareness of climate change issues among union affiliates. In its AR4, the IPCC declared that warming in the climate system is "unequivocal," and cited observational evidence of the effects of global warming on various ecosystems on all continents (IPCC 2007). The IPCC provided the scientific clarion calls helpful to convince members to join the mobilization within climate change through educational programs and presentations provided (still today) to any interested union, with one underlining "when you know the science, how can you be silent?"[9]

There is generally a core group of unionists involved in environmental issues and it is traditionally difficult to expand an environmental issue to the wider movement.[10] Political space on labour's agenda would open up in the mid-2000s as work in other areas completed. Previously, unions were engaged at the international level working to help develop new ILO

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[7] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview March 3, 2014
[8] Peggy Nash, MP, interview 2014; Brian Kohler, IndustriALL, interview 2014.
[9] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC; Brian Kohler, IndustriALL; Philip Pearson, TUC. All were involved in the early mobilization of labour unions in the climate change regime. Ms. Rosemberg is currently responsible for training ITUC members on climate change issues. All these actors cited the IPCC as a key turning point in their thinking and desire to engage in climate change as a labour movement.
[10] Peggy Nash, MP. Ms. Nash was speaking from her experience with the Canadian Auto Workers Union in the mid-2000s, when she attended climate change meetings for the union.

standards, while also lobbying within the WTO to protect workers' rights. These challenges

overwhelmed the attention of a labour movement that was reluctant to engage in the climate

issue beyond a core group within the movement.[11] Despite getting climate change on the agenda

of the health and safety working group of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

(ICFTU) in 1995, there were many distractions and difficulties, as an ICFTU employee

responsible for its health and safety work at the time recalls:

> It was heavy slogging [to get the labour movement to pay attention to climate change], it
> was a movement that wasn't terribly open to the topic, and had a lot of other fish to fry.
> After the fall of the Berlin Wall, we saw slowly-emerging attacks on trade unions by
> national governments. These became a huge preoccupation. Then, in addition to these
> concerns were emerging trade issues, debates about the WTO, but it didn't immediately
> hit home to many unions of the impacts of the new trade rules on workers within their
> own national borders. You had trade unions coming to occupational health and safety
> committee, saying that ISO [International Organization for Standardization] standards set
> by the ILO were attacking the OHS [occupational health and safety] standards. At least
> 85% of energy of the [health and safety] Committee was devoted to OHS despite the fact
> that we had a mandate to work on the environment.[12]

In the mid-2000s, much of this work ended and attention turned toward climate change.

The ILO became involved in the ISO's work to develop a standard for social responsibility. This

standard was one example of the International Organization for Standardization trying to

establish standards for the world of work, which potentially undercut the equal say in decision

making in the ILO's tripartite decision making system (Biondi 2015). By the mid-2000s, it was

agreed that the social responsibility standard would serve as a set of guiding principles only, and

an agreement was reached between the ILO and the International Organization for

Standardization that recognized the ILO's competence over labour standards (ILO n.d.). While

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[11] Lucien Royer, Canadian Labour Congress, interview with author 2014.
[12] Lucien Royer, Canadian Labour Congress, interview with author 2014.

labour unions still watch the work of the International Organization for Standardization closely,[13] much of the labour-related work in the Organization started to wind down, creating space to consider and act on climate change issues.[14]

Other political pushes were required to bring more unions on board. For those motivated by normative reasons, the space on the agenda created by decreasing work in the ILO and WTO was enough to turn their gaze to climate change work. For other unions, it took an exogenous shock capable of threatening some workers' rights to bring other unions into the climate change arena. These signals were the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and signs that several major economies seemed poised to pass climate legislation. This put many unions in a reactionary position:

> Around the Montreal meeting [December 2005], unions were asked to react on climate-related things that they had not previously considered. They were being asked for their positions and their opinions on different things that had happened, especially now that the Protocol was in force and there was a discussion about starting to negotiate a new treaty. Unions needed a policy and we started building that.[15]

Labour members had little advance knowledge of the potential effects widespread climate policy could have for labour, positively or negatively. It sent a strong enough signal that sufficient demand among ICFTU members to agree to write a position and provide input to the first meeting of the parties of the Kyoto Protocol.[16] In the scramble to formulate a policy (these internal negotiations are detailed below) some unions, particularly in the US, assumed the positions of their national governments, while others appeared to borrow their positions from

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[13] For example, see ITUC's statement "ISO is Failing the Standard Test" regarding the work of the Organization to establish a standard for occupational health and safety systems. Available at: http://www.ituc-csi.org/iso-is-failing-the-standard-test?lang=en

[14] Lucien Royer, interview with author 2015.

[15] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview 2014

[16] Lucien Royer, Canadian Labour Congress, interview with author 2015.

environmental groups.[17] With the Bush years ending in the late 2000s, many union members anticipated a Democratic government possibly more open to climate policy.[18]

For American unions, the election of President Barack Obama in 2008 further signaled climate policy was on its way, which required reactions from unions on both sides of the climate issue.[19] Particularly in the early years of unions' engagement, unions fell into two camps: those that were "very anti-Kyoto, anti-climate" and those committed to the issue.[20] Among American unions, there was considerable conflict about the overall stance, and some powerful unions were generally against climate change policy, or denied the existence of climate change in the early 2000s. Within these large federations, such as the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the largest federation of unions in the US, views conflicted, as some sought to fight against environmental regulation, despite the presence of some progressives within the federation.[21]

These unions encountered a new administration with very different views than President George W. Bush. President Obama, who had made climate change a prominent part of his campaign, spoke of a "Green New Deal" with other world leaders.[22] Several credit this signal sent by the American election – and the considerable hope for change that accompanied it – with the more progressive stance taken by some American unions and the engagement of new unions.

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[17] Anonymous labour delegate, interview with author 2014. This delegate has written and advocated for consideration of climate change issues in his union's work, and for technological solutions since 1992. His union has been engaged sporadically in the UNFCCC since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.
[18] Anonymous, interview with author 2014.
[19] Philip Pearson, TUC, interview with author 2014; Peter Colley, interview with author 2014; Ashley Haugo, interview with author 2014.
[20] Anonymous labour delegate, interview with author 2014.
[21] Labour union delegate who asked that these comments be off the record, interview with author 2014.
[22] "Ban urges leaders at Davos to forge 'Green New Deal' to fight world recession." UN News Centre; with breaking news from the UN News Service. UN News Centre, 29 Jan 2009. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29712#.Vvm4IkeYH74

Under the President George W. Bush's administration, unions in the US were conflicted about their overall stance and the "miners were the tail that was wagging the dog."[23] President Obama's election made it clear to some unions that the US was going to change its trajectory on climate change, which created optimism among unions that were for climate policy that policies were on the way.[24] Others observed that "aside from Obama being more ready to engage with the climate issue, the ending of the Bush era gave unions more room to move with their own constituency and with less fear of being attacked by business."[25] Participating in climate change regime became a necessity for many unions, including those worried about their workers being pushed out of a fossil fuel-free economy and others seeking to outwit employers and secure worker's rights in a new context.

In the mid-2000s, those normatively motivated to participate in climate change policymaking were presented with a series of political motivations that would help mobilize other unions to engage in climate change. There was finally space on labour's international agenda for these advocates to bring climate issues to the fore. They could make the case that to continue to address labour rights would require participation in new forums. At the same time, the climate change regime provided further impetus. Unions were confronted with a potential threat to jobs, or opportunities for job creation from an area of global governance about which few had experience or policy positions.

In many ways, the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and the possibility of climate change policy forthcoming in major economies was an exogenous shock. Labour had little prior

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[23] Anonymous, interview with author 2014.
[24] Ashley Haugo, interview with author 2014; Philip Pearson, TUC, interview with author 2014. Mr. Pearson was one of the central figures of the early engagement in climate change by the labour movement. He chaired several coordination meetings of the nascent trade union NGO constituency in the UNFCCC from 2007-2009.
[25] Anonymous labour advocate, interview with author 2014.

knowledge that these events would occur and hold the potential to transform the job market. While businesses had been involved in climate change advocacy for years (see Chapter 3), labour was inexperienced and outmaneuvered. The only way to respond would be to participate in the climate change regime, and seek to influence climate policy to advance workers' rights. While funding helped unions participate in the initial years, it was not a sustaining motivation. Labour unions forum multiplied to the climate regime for normative and political reasons. Those normatively committed to the climate cause found space for the issue when openings emerged, and others saw the necessity of addressing climate change as part of their ongoing political efforts to protect members against the exploitative business practices.

4.3   Mobilization in the Climate Change Regime

Throughout the history of the UNFCCC, a small contingent of members of the labour movement would participate. As Figure 4-3 below shows, this participation rapidly and significantly increased in the mid-2000s. The figure also highlights the ability of a few associations of global unions to mobilize supporters. Throughout 2005 and 2006 a small number of unions coordinated at UNFCCC meetings, association meetings and workshops convened by UNEP (discussed more below). By 2007 at COP13, the labour movement mobilized over 80 delegates to the official negotiations and over 100 delegates overall attended the conference in Bali – roughly doubling the number of participating delegates in 2005. In 2015, 186 delegates from 12 unions officially registered in the UNFCCC and over 400 union delegates in total campaigned under the banner "there are no jobs on a dead planet."

Figure 4-3: Labour unions' participation in the UNFCCC

From 2005 to 2007, there was limited participation, mostly among individuals within the

labour movement who were interested in the climate issue, rather than those unionists who were

opposed to climate change action. Those who were committed to the issue but were not

institutionally linked to each other, or to the UNFCCC.[26] Coordination and lobbying proved

difficult. The ICFTU "sent one person [to the Montreal meeting in 2005] who was well informed

on the content but not keyed up on the process. He meandered around the first meeting

wondering what to do with this paper [an early report on green jobs] that he had."[27] Labour

advocates felt like outliers; several union advocates attended, more than previously, yet as a

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[26] Anonymous delegate who was at the Montreal meeting. Interview May 28, 2014.
[27] Lucien Royer, Interview with author 2015. Mr. Royer led the ICFTU's work on health and safety and was a key actor advocating for the inclusion of climate change in its work.

Canadian union delegate recalls, many wondered why they attended, unable to find an opening to approach delegates or navigate the process.[28]

Several ideas germinated among members of the labour movement through 2006 on how best to engage on climate change issues in a way that could be supported by all members. Within the UNFCCC, they met negative views of unions' involvement. It became clear to many in the labour movement as early as 2006 that the perception that others within the UNFCCC had of union involvement was "very far from what we thought we were bringing."[29] Commonly, unionists would be asked "you don't work on climate, why are you here?"[30] or, more positively, "wow, why is labour interested in this?"[31] Unions were confronted by negative reactions to their presence from environmental NGOs especially who worried that unions would obstruct progress in the negotiations.[32] At this time, there was sensitivity to ongoing climate denial and climate governors were skeptical of the contributions the labour movement would bring.

One way to combat this skepticism is with a united, progressive message, but internal rifts were an obstacle. Early formulations of climate-labour links articulated in 2006 called for "investments in a mix of clean, green and sustainable energy sources" and for the development of new technologies, including carbon capture and storage (ITUC 2006b). Despite this nod to fossil fuel industries, the internal rifts persisted and potentially helped to mobilize many unions to the climate change regime:

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[28] This respondent asked that these comments be kept off the record, interview with author, 2014.
[29] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, interview with author 2014. Ms. Rosemberg was at the time a key member of the ITUC and SustainLabour working on the inclusion of climate change in their agenda of the international labour movement. She is currently the Policy Officer Occupational Health & Environment at ITUC and the UNFCCC focal point for the Trade Union NGO constituency.
[30] Anonymous labour advocate, interview with author 2014
[31] Ashley Haugo, Interview with author 2014
[32] This labour advocate asked that these comments be off the record, interview with author, 2014

The crystallizing thing was before the Bali meeting [in 2007] - we are a large organization, but our work went unnoticed for the large part. Then information started oozing out among the affiliates. We got the attention of the coal unions in the US who really took objection to our work. This woke everyone up. We got a critical mass of trade unions, and everybody was overwhelmed by the apparent complexity of the discussions. This got a consensus that we needed to establish a working group specifically for climate change.

The 2007 COP in Bali was the first major mobilization of the labour movement on climate change. The ITUC had a 91-member delegation representing 23 countries (ITUC 2007). Unions actively spread their message, including through side events, plenary statements, a joint press conference with the ILO and UNEP, a training workshop for unionists to learn more about climate change issues, and daily internal coordination meetings. ITUC organized meetings with delegations of 15 countries, and with the EU delegation to brief these delegates on labour-related issues (ITUC 2007). One of the side events featured the analyses and positions of unions from the global north and south, as well as newly courted allies such as Ministers of Environment from Spain, the UK and France, business groups in clean energy, and the Sierra Club.[33]

In Copenhagen, unions were a key part of the largest demonstration ever gathered to demand action on climate change. During the civil society march held December 12, union delegates and supporters marched under the banner "Unions have Solutions." The message outside on the streets aligned with the movement's actions inside the conference venue. Within the Bella Centre, the union presence was substantial, at over 200 participants. This turn out is particularly impressive given the difficult circumstances created by the poor organization of the conference and lack of transparency (see Chapter 3). Unions convened the inaugural "Work for

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[33] For a summary of one such side event titled "Green Jobs and Skills: Drivers for Climate Transitions," see Earth Negotiations Bulletin on the Side coverage: http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop13/enbots/12dec.html

Work (WOW) Pavilion," which included 28 workshops and attracted more than 1000

participants (ITUC 2009a). Labour delegates held meetings with over 19 country delegations,

and ITUC reports show that several meetings with delegations were cancelled due to reduced

access to the venue during the second week of the negotiations (ITUC 2009a).

The response of the labour movement to the failure in Copenhagen varied. As outlined in

an unpublished memo, several American groups were satisfied that developed countries did not

take on targets while allowing major economies off the hook. For these unions, their concern was

losing jobs to countries without climate change policies. The AFL-CIO questioned the value and

legitimacy of the UN process going forward, given that a handful of states successfully blocked

the adoption of the Accord.[34] The ITUC was disappointed:

> The lack of ambition in the emission reduction targets pledged by the United States,
> coupled with a minimalist pledge subject to stringent conditionality for financing
> adaptation in developing countries, the incapacity of the European Union to move to a
> target of a 30% reduction in GHG emissions from 1990 levels, and in general the
> negative position of all developed countries to agreeing on a second commitment period
> to the Kyoto Protocol all reinforced an environment of mistrust and conservatism on the
> part of the emerging economies (ITUC 2010).

Despite multilateral failure, the ITUC concluded that their years of engagement in

climate change had proved effective because the draft negotiation texts included references to

achieving a just transition and to the creation of decent work, as well as to workforce

development and vocational training in the technology transfer section.[35] Less tangible gains

were also reported, including strengthening relationships among climate change delegates. Other

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[34] Unpublished memo cited in Sweeney (2014).
[35] The draft text going into the Copenhagen negotiations included references such as: assessing labour market impacts and adopting transition measures; promoting labour-management initiatives for greener workplaces; and using labour policies to create green jobs, green existing jobs, and phase out unsustainable jobs (UNFCCC 2009: 59)

civil society groups recognized the labour movement as a legitimate player, including by climate

change NGOs and others who could consider unions' positions conservative (ITUC 2010).

At the UNFCCC meeting in Cancun in 2010 further recognition emerged. Parties

established a forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures to climate

change.[36] One area of work in this forum was devoted to a just transition of the workforce, and

the creation of decent work and quality jobs. This forum provided an opportunity for the ITUC to

present its views directly to parties. While the response measures forum remained to some

delegates involved in the negotiations a "negative space with some baggage"[37] the labour

movement used the space provided and in 2015 argued for an institutionalized process to use the

information shared in the forum to inform decisions taken by the UNFCCC.[38] The early wins in

the Cancun Agreement proved a useful stepping stone to demand more, but fell short of the

legally-binding agreement the many in the labour movement demanded.

These wins were enough to stay in the climate change arena. Labour had a forum to

discuss and advance workers' rights in the context of climate change. Further, they had secured

support from key actors. Ministers agreed that labour's support was necessary for political will

and NGOs started to accept labour as a positive force in the negotiations.

Through 2011 to 2015, the labour movement became a mainstay of climate change

activism leadership. The movement mobilized another large presence in 2011, drawing heavily

from unions from South Africa, the host country.[39] In 2012, the labour movement was a key

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[36] The response measures forum was created as a compromise to appease some countries in the Arab Group, which pushed for a discussion of the negative impacts of climate change policies on oil-producing countries. The development of a work programme remained controversial for years.

[37] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview with author 2014.

[38] Oral statement delivered to the SBSTA opening plenary 1 December 2015.

[39] NGO participation database developed for this project.

organizer for the first ever public march in the history of the Qatar, the host for that year. Despite

the Qatari government's edict outlining that the march was only to speak about environmental

issues, local papers reported that Sharan Burrow, the General Secretary of the ITUC spoke out

on migrant rights in the context of the upcoming World Cup in Qatar and she ultimately secured

a meeting with the Acting Minister of Labour.[40] The location of the climate change conference

provided an opportunity for the labour movement to engage on another of its key issues: abuses

of migrant workers. This proved a tangible benefit of forum multiplying: by engaging on climate

change, the labour movement could advance labour rights in the context of climate change and

speak directly to actors they may otherwise not have access to.

The next year in Warsaw civil society staged a walk out of the negotiations. The ITUC

was a crucial actor in the organization and execution of the walkout on its own and as part of the

C-7. WWF came to the Warsaw conference with a mandate to undertake an action such as a

walkout, if the negotiations derailed – but only if other organizations, particularly the ITUC

agreed to participate.[41] The ITUC was seen as a linchpin because it is difficult for a large,

membership-based organization to take such an unprecedented action. The sentiment seemed to

be if the ITUC agreed, then action was warranted. Greenpeace was the last member of the C-7 to

sign on to the walkout. The Climate Action Network did not participate, and some of its

members tried to derail the walkout.[42] Still, the central role of ITUC further cemented their

relationships with civil society and recognition as a member of climate civil society actors.

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[40] Published in the Qatar Times on Monday, 3 December.

[41] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, interview with author 2014; anonymous delegate from an environmental NGO, interview with author 2015.

[42] The respondent asked that these comments be kept off the record, interview with author 2014. From personal observation, members of Climate Action Network continued to participated in the Warsaw climate change conference while other NGOs walked out. This led to some confusion among delegates.

The walkout was the first time labour unions had left any international negotiation. Rather than de-mobilize supporters uncomfortable with the new strategy, the labour movement remained mobilized. The Secretariat limited trade unions badges and the ITUC only received 65 badges to the 2014 meeting in Lima, yet 86 delegates participated inside the negotiations by sharing badges or trading with others, and 140 union delegates in total were present and many others participating through their own accredited union or on their government's delegation.[43] The ITUC continued briefing governments, but also maintained regular consultations with the other C-7 members (ITUC 2014).

The labour movement maintained these strong numbers at the 2015 conference in Paris. Nearly 200 delegates attended as formal registrants. These participants arrived at the conference having already concluded that any agreement would be likely insufficient to immediate raise the ambition of climate action to a level commensurate with the crisis. The unions' stance, which aligned with most of civil society, positioned Paris as the beginning, not the end of efforts to address climate change. In her address to the high-level segment, Burrow called on the Paris Agreement to launch "what will by necessity be the largest and most rapid systems change in human history with ambition…with civil society… we ask you to accept that this is not just an environmental agreement but a future that cannot be achieved without people" (ITUC 2015). While there is only one reference in the Paris Agreement to a just transition, union delegates viewed this as a foundation to build upon in the operationalization of the agreement, but the ITUC underlined that the Agreement only "takes us part of the way" to addressing the climate crisis (ITUC 2015).

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[43] The latter number of 140 is from ITUC internal documents.

The Paris Agreement was only part of the linkages forged between climate change and labour. Before the Paris conference convened the International Labour Organization adopted the Guidelines for a Just Transition, outlining the vision, principles, and policies and institutional arrangements, including on social dialogue and macroeconomic policies to realize the opportunities of a transition to a low-carbon, sustainable economy (ILO 2015). The Paris Agreement may have disappointed in terms of its inclusion of labour issues, but action in the labour regime provided some promise of future productive overlap between the regimes.

In sum, from 31 individuals in 2006 to nearly 200 delegates nine years later, the labour movement has sustained a large union presence at climate conferences. Unlike the gender NGOs considered in the next chapter, the labour movement has had less influence in the politics of climate, but has found other benefits. From the audience with the Qatari government on migrant workers, to the ILO's adoption of a just transition framework in 2015,[44] the movement has made gains for workers and advanced labour's thinking on how to address environmental issues. Bringing this thinking along involved a significant coordination effort to construct a discursive frame, the just transition frame, that the movement could support.

4.3.1 Carrying Authority into the Climate Change Regime

Shifts in the political environment, namely the Kyoto Protocol's entry into force and major economies' move toward climate action, prompted union's interest in climate change issues. At the time, holding authority in climate politics was not assured, largely due to deep internal divisions. The ITUC fulfilled its internal and external roles. ITUC is the sole gatekeeper in a centralized network, which enabled it to convene discussions on climate change and to

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[44] On November 5, 2015, the Governing Body of the International Labour Organization adopted a resolution called "Guidelines for a just transition towards environmentally sustainable economies and societies for all."

diffuse the just transition frame throughout the network. With that frame in place the labour

movement could speak with one voice in the climate change talks. Externally, the ITUC could

use its brand to advocate for the just transition frame within the UNFCCC. UNEP proved a key

broker, providing ideational and material resources that helped introduce the network to the

UNFCCC and vice versa. With solidarity and key actors in the network in place the labour

movement could successfully bring its authority into the climate change regime.

4.3.1.1 Constructing the Discursive Frame

The labour movement mobilized around the just transition frame. The just transition

concept was not invented for climate change, but rather was borrowed from other work linking

jobs and the environment. Initially, it was used in the context of protecting workers from

exposure to organochlorines and justified legal action against employers' "pollution abuses"

(Snell and Fairbrother 2013; Young 2003). In a Canadian union newsletter, the term was used in

the climate context to argue for the protection of jobs and the environment (Kohler 1998). Its use

increased, coinciding with the increased participation of the labour movement in the UNFCCC in

2007 (Hampton 2015, 70). The labour movement repurposed an idea that was used for a different

environmental issue and made it fit for purpose in their global advocacy efforts on climate

change.

The just transition concept avoids diagnostic framing (identifying the problem), while

stressing labour as a solution (prognostic framing) and rationale for action (motivational

framing). The combination of the prognostic and motivational aspects of the frame helped

position the labour movement as an integral part of the climate solution, able to help states and

civil society advance the case for climate change policy. As explored below, the frame helped

show labour as part of the solution to the problems of the climate change regime, and helped gain

the movement allies, both integral to forum multiplying efforts (this is a similar combination as the gender NGOs explored in the next chapter).

When the labour movement started to mobilize large numbers of delegates at climate change conferences, the term was included in statements, but not defined. A "just transition" was used to lump together the positive and negative impacts on labour of climate change and climate change policies (see ITUC 2007b). Later, by 2009, the ITUC defined as a just transition as "a tool the trade union movement shares with the international community, aimed at smoothing the shift towards a more sustainable society and providing hope for the capacity of a green economy to sustain decent jobs and livelihoods for all" (ITUC 2009b). The frame became a concrete proposal that positioned the labour movement on the same side as other climate change governors while protecting workers' rights and livelihoods.

In 2010, ITUC World Congress members agreed "to promoting an integrated approach to sustainable development through a just transition where social progress, environmental protection and economic needs are brought into a framework of democratic governance, where labour and other human rights are respected and gender equality achieved" (ITUC 2010b). The World Congress further identified six core elements of a just transition: investment in green jobs; research and early assessment of impacts on labour; consultation and social dialogue; education and training; social protection and security; and economic diversification (ITUC 2010b).

What the just transition frame does not do is propose a new cause of climate change, avoiding diagnostic framing. Those who used a just transition frame accepted that the business as usual approach to the economy based on fossil fuels constitutes the anthropogenic causes of climate change. It further accepted that some corporations have been reluctant to support climate action and change.

… unions are not experts about the science, so rather than argue that we should be inserting our views in areas that we do have expertise in – social policy, social justice, industry restructuring. Basically, saying to the climate negotiators "if you want to achieve such and such reduction, you need to look at these issues if you are going to achieve them."[45]

Instead, the just transition frame focuses on solutions. Many of the core aspects of the just transition frame found ways to redeploy a countries' labour force into the service of a green economy. Workers can be retrained to work in renewable energy, public transportation or other low-carbon intensive sectors. The term green jobs itself proposes a solution, because it posits a way to reposition the labour market toward jobs that also promotes environmental sustainability. Those workers in the fossil fuel industry nearing retirement can be offered an early retirement. A strong social protection net can catch workers lost in the transition, helping to provide for their families while the worker finds a new role in the new economy. Underpinning these changes is a series of dialogues with employers and employees at community and national levels to foresee and manage the transition. Many of the elements of the just transition framework propose solutions, other elements outlined by the ITUC provide powerful rational to help motivate the network and new allies toward labour's work on climate change, by removing the possible veto labour could have over climate policy.

The just transition frame highlights the inclusion of worker's rights to secure the political support necessary to take ambitious climate change action – that workers' support can help pass climate policies and reduce any potential risks to a politician who wishes to promote climate policies. As one of the term's originators argues:

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[45] Peter Colley, Interview February 2, 2014.

> The sequence is important. A just transition is a prerequisite to all other progress on, for example, the climate issue. Just transition measures must be in place before workers will willingly accept stringent measures to protect the climate, and while it is easy to dismiss the power of unions in many contexts, workers allied with capitalists to oppose climate measures create an insurmountable barrier to change.[46]

As a result, the frame motivates unions to become involved in the intersection of labour and climate issues because addressing workers' rights can help solve climate change. The frame can also motivate climate actors to accept and mobilize on the labour-climate connection. Even climate change actors who were initially skeptical of unions' involvement may have wanted to ally with labour, as a potentially powerful force to remove excuses for inaction on climate change.

Using the just transition frame that leveraged its diagnostic and motivational aspects provided three advantages for unions seeking entry and recognition in the climate change regime. First, it solidified the link between climate change and jobs – that climate action can both cost and create jobs with a broad enough framework that can include all unions' interests. It therefore fulfilled the first hurdle of forum multiplying – demonstrating a claim and relevance to the target regime. Unions finally had a response to the questions asking why labour is involved in climate change work while maintaining coherence in the movement.

Second, the frame's diagnostic focus on solutions helped align the labour movement with climate change governors and showed the commitment of the movement to achieving the ultimate goal of the Convention to limit dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. The just transition frame focused on solutions and assumes movement toward a low-carbon, climate-resilient future and seeks to protect workers in the transition to that future. This

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[46] Brian Kohler, IndustriALL, interview with author 2014. Mr. Kohler was one of the first architects of the term just transition.

helps silence the critics assuming the labour movement is only comprised of anti-climate change actors. The frame responded in a positive, progressive way to the claim that unions should be against climate change action, countering the claim that unions are obstructionist forces in the climate change regime. A just transition anticipates a low-carbon future and, like nearly all climate change governors, sought to help achieve it.

The focus on solutions and motivation also offered to help remove political barriers to climate change inaction. Politicians ensconced in a jobs-versus-environment debate could now point to the labour movement and their support for climate change action. Jobs "versus" the environment could transform to jobs "and" the environment according to the logic of the just transition frame. The labour movement could therefore no longer be a scapegoat for politicians, and instead stood as an ally to those willing and able to act on climate change, in the remit of the just transition frame. This helped the labour movement gain several allies, outlined more below, of national cabinet members, environmental NGOs, and others. The frame helped forum multiplying and the quest for recognition by providing a discourse that could widespread support of the workforce for climate change policy.

Third, the frame carved a unique role for the labour movement, separate from the interests of businesses and environmentalists and helped bring the movement together. The unique claim in the climate change regime protected labour from co-optation by employers and environmentalists. As one of the people who coined the term just transition explained:

> Both employers and environmentalists will try to enlist labour as allies: environmental groups will want to exploit our knowledge and political strength, while employers will want our help in fighting environmental controls on the promise of creating or preserving

jobs; therefore we must be prepared to steer our own course based on our own agenda or we will be steered by others. [47]

The just transition concept provided protection from labour being pushed or pulled in either direction. Employers could not have claimed to be protecting jobs in the fossil fuel industry. Environmentalists could not make claims to be working for green jobs. Both employers and environmentalists would have to consult with labour before either invoked the just transition frame and claimed to represent the interests of the labour movement. The concept created political space that only labour could occupy. Therefore, the labour movement became a central hub for mobilization by anyone wanting to invoke the power of the labour movement.

The broad formulation allowed the concerns of all members to be included, facilitating mobilization efforts. All unions could find a place for themselves in the frame, regardless of the different interests between unions from developed or developing countries or unions with sector-specific concerns. It further sidestepped an ongoing disagreement within the movement identified by Rosemberg (2013) regarding the extent that the just transition frame should call for paradigmatic change to develop an alternative economic model, and the extent to which this new model could include environmental issues. The broadness of the frame helped bring the network together around a shared call.

The just transition link between climate change and labour fit the broader discourses between trade union engagement and climate change identified by Räthzel and Uzzell (2011): technological fix, social transformation, mutual interests and social movement. Because the frame is about a transition to a low-carbon economy, it specified provisions to modernize and transfer technologies to reduce emissions while protecting and creating jobs. Beyond the

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[47] Brian Kohler, IndustriALL, Interview with author 2014.

technological fix, the just transition frame re-envisioned the nature of jobs in the economy (social transformation), the dialogue to achieve the transition (mutual interests), and the modes of production necessary to realize a low-carbon economy (social movement).

The frame was about a solutions-oriented process, which provided it the malleability to appeal to the diverse interests of the labour movement while also enabling partnerships with others within the climate change regime. The labour movement could make a claim that they were relevant, and indeed integral, to climate change solutions. They could mobilize new support from climate change governors eager to reduce the political barriers to climate action and to show widespread support, securing new allies. The frame also positioned labour as the "go to" authority on the links between labour and climate change, helping to ensure that they alone would be recognized as authoritative and their frame would remain in their control. With a frame combining diagnostic and motivational aspects, the task turned toward finding authoritative articulators able to help the movement's forum multiplying strategy.

4.3.1.2   Articulators

The international labour movement was divided on the issue of climate change, necessitating negotiations internally to develop a version of the just transition frame that network members could support. The ITUC used its position as a federation of labour organizations to convene these negotiations. Externally, the ITUC and UNEP together employed their connections to articulate and diffuse the just transition frame.

On internal negotiations, climate change policy represented an opportunity to some unions, such as those representing worker in the public service or renewable energy sectors, but a threat to workers in automobile or fossil fuel extraction industries. The ITUC could convene negotiations because of its standing as a peak association for labour, with a large and global

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membership. As such, it had internal spaces available to act as a coordinator, including regular World Congress meetings to debate positions and working group meetings to operationalize those decisions.

The ITUC had a structure in place to facilitate negotiations on common positions. Roughly half of ITUC affiliates nominated a member to work on the climate change working group, which has almost equal representation from developed and developing countries.[48] This group debates, drafts and approves policy statements before the UNFCCC meetings. These statements form the basis of ITUC delegates' actions.[49] Once agreed, the ITUC's position on climate change informs their actions in the climate regime and guides the delegation's strategy and key messages.

Initially, internal discussions took place at UNFCCC meetings on the targets and the just transition frame. The targets issue dominated the discussion in the first few years. By 2010, there was little discussion of the targets, and the just transition frame became the centerpiece of union's engagement. The negotiations for this frame occurred away from the climate change forum and within the ITUC. Unlike the gender NGOs explored in the next chapter, that coordinated at the UNFCCC in its constituency space, the labour movement had a single gatekeeper able to convene the network and agree on a frame outside the UNFCCC.

Targets proved an enormously divisive issue. The ITUC strongly felt that pushing for a mitigation target was a way to gain recognition as an actor committed to advancing climate change action. Support for targets could act a signal to climate change actors of the positive

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[48] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, interview with author 2014.
[49] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, interview with author 2014.

engagement of the labour movement.[50] Initial discussions considered advocating for temperature goals (e.g., 2°C), acceptable levels of carbon dioxide (350 or 450 ppm), or emissions targets against a baseline year (e.g., 40% below 1990).[51]

The lines were drawn between the ITUC and the large American federation of unions, the AFL-CIO. The ITUC's preferred position to support the IPCC targets of 25-40% reductions by 2020 below 1990 levels, and 85% by 2050 (ITUC 2007). The ITUC also pushed for a new post-Kyoto agreement with ambitious targets and establishing a programme of work in the UNFCCC to link "GHG prevention, reduction, stabilization or controlled increases to targets on renewable energy use, carbon capture, deforestation, and alternative transportation to a Green Job and Decent Work Programme" (ITUC 2007).

The AFL-CIO could not accept that those targets and timelines.[52] It had inched nearer other unions and the ITUC by accepting that climate change was a real, anthropogenic threat, but that was a far cry from supporting substantial emissions reductions. In a report titled "Jobs and Energy for the 21st Century," the AFL-CIO acknowledged, "human use of fossil fuels is undisputedly contributing to global warming, causing rising sea levels, changes in climate patterns and threats to coastal regions" (AFL-CIO 2007). In a memo to the ITUC, AFL-CIO acknowledged that the discussions of targets caused disagreements between the AFL-CIO and ITUC, and expressed concern that the IPCC targets were unattainable given the availability of technologies, such as carbon capture and storage (Sweeney 2014). In the first years, tensions were apparent, and even openly expressed at the UNFCCC.[53]

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[50] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC. interview with author 2014.
[51] Philip Pearson, TUC, interview with author 2014
[52] The labour delegate interviewed asked that this comment be kept anonymous, interview with author 2014.
[53] The labour delegate interviewed asked that this comment be kept anonymous, Interview with author 2014.

In the lead up to the Copenhagen conference there was considerable pressure to present a united front among unions. The labour movement needed to mobilize around a shared frame to gain recognition. Continuing fractures, especially public ones, would destabilize any trust labour actors had started to build with climate governors, and undermine the movement's chances for recognition. Climate change governors would listen to the anti-climate group of the labour movement and marginalize the entire network. In order to successfully forum multiply, the labour movement needed internal consensus on a frame in order to position the movement as a

> legitimate actor in the climate discussion. That we stood on the right side of history. We could not allow roaming speeches happening all over the place. The media is fantastic for noticing any differences or problems. They look to the unions for opposition to climate change and are uninterested when we're for climate action.[54]

The ITUC then sought to achieve consensus internally through its World Congress. The AFL-CIO is an ITUC affiliate. Ultimately, using the internal processes within the ITUC would bring a Congress decision in 2010 on both a just transition and targets by consensus.

At the ITUC's Second World Congress in June 2010 climate change was a central issue and the weight of many unions that supported the resolutions served to marginalize the AFL-CIO. In a resolution on "combating climate change through sustainable development and a just transition," the Congress called for "promoting an integrated approach to sustainable development through a just transition where social progress, environmental protection and economic needs are brought into a framework of democratic governance, where labour and other human rights are respected and gender equality achieved" (ITUC 2010). It was at this World Congress that the six elements of a just transition were defined.

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[54] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview with author 2014

As Rosemberg (2013) stresses, the discussions were not "hidden negotiations among a few high-powered unions." References to democracy and human rights in the definition of a just transition were inserted by unions from developing countries.[55] The Congress resolution also included language on increasing adaptation efforts in developing countries and supporting the UNFCCC's principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (ITUC 2010). These insertions were important to keep unions from developing countries on board, particularly unions from emerging economies, which tended to follow their national government's positions on climate change.[56]

With these countries' support, there was a critical mass in favour of the resolution, including its language on targets. The ITUC reiterated its support for a limiting global temperature increase to a two-degree target, reducing global emissions to 85% by the year 2050, and setting out interim targets, including a target for developed countries of 25%-40% by 2020 compared to 1990 emissions (ITUC 2010). With the unions from developing countries and many from developed countries on board, there were few unions opposing the resolution.

The support of the AFL-CIO for this resolution was surprising given their previous opposition. It was a strategic decision weighing the optics of opposing the widely-supported resolution at the international level against few domestic repercussions. The AFL-CIO did not have a change of heart. It agreed to the resolution to avoid negative reactions by its colleagues in the ITUC:

> The ITUC Congress adopted the IPCC target. AFL-CIO was the only major affiliate to oppose this. In 2010, they voted for it because a vote against the resolution would have called more, and unwanted, attention to the AFL-CIO. In the end, the ITUC doesn't

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[55] Philip Pearson, TUC, interview with author 2014.
[56] Anonymous American union delegate, interview with author 2014

matter because it doesn't have authority over its members. Many national American unions are lobbying the EPA right now to dismantle its carbon regulations. Supporting the mitigation resolution avoided reputational damage while business as usual continued on the ground.[57]

ITUC does not, as mentioned above, hold authority over its membership. Instead, it has acted as a forum for its affiliates to negotiate a common position and to, when necessary, to pressure one another into agreement. Such a forum can create peer pressure. The AFL-CIO's decision to support the ITUC Congress' position on climate change was influenced by the views of other unions, particularly those from developing countries. Without the ITUC as a central forum, the AFL-CIO and perhaps other unions would have continued to take a more conservative line on climate change.

For the ITUC the stakes were also high to maintain its position as a central hub in the movement. As one American delegate recalls, "the ITUC would have lost all legitimacy with unions in the South if the resolution had failed."[58] While the ITUC is a peak association in terms of its membership and many connections within the movement, it had reputational costs on the line with the resolution. With the Congress resolution in hand the ITUC could go to the UNFCCC meetings armed with several concrete calls and a broad frame. In time, the frame would overtake the concrete policy proposals, which is perhaps not surprising. Similar tensions exist at regional levels, such as in Europe where the European Trade Union Confederation also plays a coordination role:

> At the European level, we have time to discuss concrete proposals, such as how to implement the EU ETS [EU Emissions Trading Scheme]. The ETS could have strong impact on some sectors represented by some countries. Given the sectors, these countries

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[57] Anonymous American union delegate, interview with author 2014. This delegate was at the 2010 World Congress.
[58] Anonymous American union delegate, interview with author 2014.

could be more impacted by ETS reforms. Reaching compromise with direct and concrete impacts is more difficult than general political messages.[59]

The frame helped mask ongoing tensions hiding under the surface of the agreement achieved at the ITUC World Congress.

ITUC's work on climate issues disseminated widely in the labour-climate network. As mentioned above, the Blue Green Alliance looked to the ITUC's expertise on climate change issues, and other labour federations that were not involved in climate change adopted similar versions of the just transition frame. ITUC could disseminate a new norm within the network, after it convened considerable internal negotiations to define the frame and some key policy stances.

The ITUC's internal work to achieve a unified voice on climate change helped inform its external efforts to use its brand and connections to further unions' voice on climate change issues with in the UNFCCC. The task was considerable, given the resistance by many climate governors to unions' presence in the UNFCCC. The ITUC proved able to use the recognition of its brand and position as a peak association for the labour movement to gain recognition of the just transition frame. UNEP served as the key broker for the labour movement into the climate change regime, provided material resources and lent its credibility to the movement to help develop and disseminate the frame.

The ITUC proved an effective articulator for the just transition frame to climate change governors. It used its global standing as a central labour organization to build relationships capable of confronting and ameliorating worries that labour would undermine the climate process. Labour unionists developed connections with Ministers of Environment within their

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[59] Benjamin Denis, ETUC, interview with author 2014.

countries to bypass country delegates that viewed social issues as a distraction. This strategy

proved effective, because the Ministers would understand the inherently political message that

labour must be on board with any future climate policies if they are to succeed. Labour delegates

said that, while this strategy initially angered some state delegates – because they would be

directed by their Ministers to consider labour– it successfully secured references to a just

transition in climate change decisions in 2010.[60] Among civil society, the ITUC translated its

brand and role as the central hub for the labour movement into an influential role within the

broader climate movement.

A reputation among its C-7 colleagues for consistency derived from the ITUC's

coordination role among its members. Due to the internal negotiations that occur before each

conference in the ITUC's climate change working group, ITUC delegates have little room to

maneuver from this position, which created the view that the labour movement was more

conservative than other networks within the climate change regime.[61] The ITUC carefully

walked the line delineated by its membership. This means that others view the ITUC as a stable

organization, but also one that has difficulty taking risks unless previously sanctioned by the

leadership or membership, as the example of the walkout in Warsaw shows.[62]

The key broker for the labour movement was UNEP, which has an established position in

the climate change regime that proved useful for the labour movement. UNEP was involved in

the climate negotiations from the very beginning, before the Convention was agreed to in 1992.

The organization has an established reputation on climate change issues and internal research

staff and funding able to help generate data and information. Both these types of resources were

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[60] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview with author 2014
[61] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, Interview with author 2014
[62] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC. Interview with author 2014.

valuable for the labour movement's entry to the climate change regime. The partnership broke

down over time, but was useful in the initial years of labour's engagement.

Materially, UNEP provided training, awareness raising, research, and funding for the

labour movement. UNEP reached out to ICFTU, which was one of the main global labour

organizations at the time. The result was the Trade Union Assembly on Labour and the

Environment (referred to as the "WILL" conference) held 15-17 January 2006 convened under

the auspices of UNEP and in conjunction with several international labour organizations,[63] the

ILO and the World Health Organization. The conference brought together over 150

representatives of trade unions, UN agencies and sustainable development experts. Among the

outcomes of the conference, the three UN bodies present committed to supporting trade union

engagement on sustainable development.[64] For many, engagement with UNEP at the WILL

Conference, and subsequent workshops and projects in the mid-2000s constituted a turning point

in the labour movement's thinking on climate change, engaging and training dozens of new

unions in climate change.[65]

The collaboration between unions and UNEP continued beyond the conference,

providing initial evidence to support labour's just transition frame. An *ad hoc* working group

with the ILO, UNEP and the ITUC produced the first assessment of the implications of climate

change and transitioning to a low-carbon economy for labour and, perhaps even coined the term

green jobs (see UNEP 2007). For those involved in forming the early links between climate

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[63] Primarily these were the ICFTU, the World Confederation of Labour (WCL), the Trade Union Advisory
Committee to the OECD (TUAC) and the SustainLabour Foundation.
[64] Internal ICFTU briefing on the conference.
[65] Lucien Royer, interview with author 2015; Philip Pearson, TUC, interview with author 2014; Anonymous labour
delegate, interview with author 2014.

change and jobs, the work of that *ad hoc* group was a turning point, borne in part by the work of

the labour movement to strengthen its relationship with UNEP.[66]

UNEP also provided resources to disseminate the frame. With SustainLabour, UNEP

provided over $500,000 to SustainLabour to strengthen unions' engagement on climate change

and chemicals management issues (SustainLabour 2012). This grant included regional

workshops on climate change and chemicals management in Latin America and Asia (UNEP

2006). UNEP also provided travel funding for some unions to attend the Bali Conference in

2007.[67] The material resources provided were significant. Yet perhaps more fundamentally,

UNEP used its brand and position in both the labour regime and the climate change regime to

channel information that carried authority within both networks.

UNEP's brand travelled to both networks, signaling the viability of sustainability issues

to actors in the labour regime, and the acceptability of labour issues to actors in the climate

change regime. UNEP attended the founding ITUC Congress in 2006, in part to report on the

outcomes of the WILL conference held earlier in the year. UNEP's presence was a noticeable

addition to the conference, demonstrating to others in the labour movement that work on

sustainable development issues was a worthwhile area for the ITUC's future efforts.[68] The

ITUC's mandate coming from its founding World Congress includes environmental

sustainability, unlike its predecessor organization (Rosemberg 2010).

Within the climate change regime, by aligning itself publicly with the labour movement in

side events and press conferences, UNEP lent its climate credentials to the labour movement at a

time when many did not welcome labour's involvement. The normative capacity of UNEP to

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[66] Lucien Royer, interview with author 2015; Anonymous American union delegate, Interview July 7, 2014.
[67] Philip Pearson, interview with author 2014.
[68] Lucien Royer, interview with author 2015.

frame issues and to promote specific policies disseminated the message to the climate change

audience in a way that the labour unions alone could not achieve. As Sean Sweeney (2014), an

American labour delegate engaged in climate change issues since the mid-2000s, including the

organization of the WILL conference, observes:

> The partnership was consistent with the main climate and sustainability message of both
> the ITUC and the ILO, but UNEP's status and reach – as well as its capacity to frame and
> promote policy – would amplify this message considerably. The presence of the
> employer's organization, the IOE [International Organization of Employers], was
> politically decorative but largely superfluous (Sweeney 2014, 8).

The structural position UNEP holds, with roles in both the labour and climate change

regime enabled to it help foster the development and dissemination of the just transition regime.

The desire to strengthen ties between UNEP and labour movement organizations ran both ways.

Labour saw a need to strengthen its relationship with UNEP, as those involved in the ICFTU

wanted to raise the profile of sustainable development issues. UNEP wanted to increase its

engagement with the other, non-environmental Major Groups. UNEP recognized labour as

potentially a powerful voice for environmental action, in part because they are well organized

and active on some environmental issues at national and international levels.[69]

Yet, an ideological divide would ultimately soften the partnership. Unions were focused

on the role of government and the public sector to protect workers' rights and foster social

dialogue to facilitate a just transition. UNEP, to some in the labour movement, seemed more

focused on engaging the private sector. Further, UNEP considered labour as another civil society

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[69] Anonymous, Interview with author 2014.

actor, whereas unions sought a tripartite dialogue, with an equal place at the table as employers

and governments.[70]

The articulators for unions achieved a great deal in the first years of unions' engagement

on climate change and set the network up for success. Within three years, the ITUC had used its

connections within the network and its position as a peak association for labour to convene

negotiations on the just transition frame. The frame proved powerful, positioning the labour

movement as the go to experts on the link between climate change and labour issues and as

positive advocates for progressive action on climate change. The material resources, information,

and introductions provided by UNEP solidified these efforts. UNEP could show labour to be

"one of us" at a time when many were skeptical of unions' involvement in the UNFCCC. The

articulators fulfilled both their internal and external roles, getting agreement within the network,

and successfully employing their authority outside the network. Over time, the labour movement

would further cement itself as a climate change actor by showing that their frame mattered for

the key institutions of the climate change regime and by carving itself a place among observers.

4.3.2   Leveraging Climate Institutions

The labour movement linked the just transition frame with dominant frame and

institutions of climate change regime – mitigation (see Chapter 3). Labour advocates further

found ways to seek institutional status and fall in step with the norms of observer participation.

Despite the considerable initial pushback from climate governors, the labour movement aligned

itself closely with the push for mitigation action, and positioned itself as a moderate voice

abiding by norms of how observers ought to interact.

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[70] Anonymous American Union delegate, Interview with author 2014.

In terms of substantive institutions, the labour movement hooked the just transition frame onto the mitigation frame and its institutions. The frame highlighted how to transition to a low-carbon economy and how to secure the support of labour in this endeavor. Implicitly, the message of the just transition frame was "if you want to mitigate, let us how you how that is politically feasible." The frame linked to mitigation institutions because of the labour movement's understanding of climate change issue at the time, the concentration of research in developed countries, which were more impacted by mitigation at the time, and the identity of the labour movement as a third sector in society.

As chapter 3 outlined, the period from 2005-2007 witnessed a rebirth of hopes that the climate change regime could deliver an adequate response to climate change, which was being discussed more during this period as an emerging crisis. In 2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) launched. Other developed economies seemed poised to take climate action. The labour movement found a foothold for its frame in these mitigation institutions and emergent norms, largely leaving aside adaptation, finance, and other climate institutions.

The focus on the mitigation institutions as an entry point was to the near exclusion of other institutions of climate governance. There was early awareness of the importance of climate adaptation, particularly among American unions after Hurricane Katrina, and among unions from developing countries. [71] Southern unions highlighted, and pushed for, adaptation as an issue for the labour movement to include. Unions in Kenya hosted roundtable meetings and discussed the climate impacts they were already experiencing in agriculture, forestry and other sectors in 2006.

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[71] Anonymous labour advocate, interview with author 2014; Ashley Haugo, Interview with author 2014; Philip Pearson, TUC interview with author 2014.

These documented effects left an impression on those unionists who previously had thought of climate change in terms of mitigation.[72] While those engaged in bringing the global labour movement to climate change were empirically convinced to work on adaptation issues, one union member observed that speaking on adaptation would help achieve balance between northern and southern interests.[73]

Despite these strategic benefits and normative interest in adaptation issues, and opportunities presented by the adaptation turn discussed in Chapter 3, labour delegates chose to focus on mitigation institutions. Labour delegates did suggest advocating for adding consideration of worker's rights into the drafts of the agreement on adaptation, technology transfer and other non-mitigation areas before Copenhagen. These suggestions were placeholders, meant to show the interest and commitment of the labour movement, although there was little systemic evidence connecting labour to adaptation institutions.[74]

The just transition frame used mitigation as an entry point in part because it reflected the movement's understanding of the connections between labour and climate change when the network negotiated the just transition frame. Much of the efforts to collect information concentrated in organizations and unions in developed countries, many of which were anticipating or already addressing the impact of mitigation policies. The research at this time focused on job creation and the effects of various climate policies on employment across and within economic sectors. A collaborative report produced by UNEP, the ILO, the International Organization of Employers, and the ITUC in 2008 underlines that while many reports on climate

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[72] Philip Pearson, TUC, who attended the 2006 UNFCCC conference, and the roundtable held by Kenyan unions. Interview with author 2014.
[73] Philip Pearson, TUC, interview with author 2014.
[74] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, interview with author 2014.

change mitigation and adaptation policies "declaim a future of green jobs—but few present specifics. This is no accident. There are still huge gaps in our knowledge and available data, especially as they pertain to the developing world" (UNEP 2008, 1). Meanwhile, European Trade Union Confederation completed one of the most ambitious studies on the cross-sectoral impacts on jobs, and opportunities for jobs (ETUC 2007). The report estimated an expected 1.5% over net gain in employment by 2030 in the sectors considered a result of climate change policy (ETUC 2007). It warned, however that both the quantity and quality of these new jobs should be considered, to avoid newer jobs being of a lower quality than jobs in established sectors (ETUC 2007, 73).

As discussed above, the just transition frame had several advantages for the labour movement, it was also very focused which helped hone the message. The labour movement in the early years of its engagement focused on a discrete set of institutions as an entry point rather than try to make broad claims of relevance or scatter the network among many different institutions and sets of negotiations. This helped show commitment to a foundational issue in the climate change regime, build relationships with key climate governors, and mobilize the movement around a focused frame.

In its mobilization efforts, the labour movement leveraged a procedural institution, constituency status to gain recognition. At first, unions faced perhaps more resistance to their participation than other new networks. Labour activists involved in the early years felt they had to convince nearly everyone, from state delegates, to environmental NGOs, and the UNFCCC Secretariat:

> At its most benign, that resistance is based on the view that social policy and social justice aspects are simply complications that slow down the process of determining targets and GHG reductions in a technocratic manner. I think that was the UNFCCC

secretariat view, which refused to even recognize unions as a major grouping in climate negotiations until about 2008-2009.[75]

The labour movement's ability to secure constituency status was a symbolic and material win that facilitated their mobilization within the climate change regime. The closing of the climate regime over time, particularly limiting the number of badges for observers, had a small influence on the ability of the labour movement to mobilize large numbers of delegates because many attend under the ITUC umbrella.

Garnering constituency status involved persuasion and perseverance. The dominant perception of others within the UNFCCC was that unions were working against the aims of regime:

> At a Bonn meeting [an annual meeting for negotiations held between the conferences], right before Bali [the 2007 conference], I was kicked out of a CAN [Climate Action Network] meeting. I was used to other processes where the environmental NGO caucus meetings were open to many different groups. I didn't have a sticker on my badge to show that I was a CAN member, and I was told I was not wanted, that unions are a problem. That experience motivated our push for constituency status."[76]

To attain constituency status, labour delegates had to convince the UNFCCC Secretariat as the first gatekeeper to that system. As explained in Chapter 3, the constituency system mirrors the Major Groups system established by Agenda 21. Unlike the other multilateral environmental agreements established at the Rio Earth Summit, the UNFCCC does not have the same grouping and has admitted groups over time, rather than automatically providing space. Labour delegates argued that as a Major Group under Agenda 21 they should have constituency status.[77] The activists sought to apply a norm established in another forum within the context of the UNFCCC.

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[75] Anonymous, interview with author 2014
[76] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, nterview with author 2014
[77] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, interview with author 2014.

Anabella Rosemberg recalls that the labour unions were the first to make this argument, which later helped pave the way for youth NGOs, women and gender NGOs, and other Agenda 21 Major Groups missing from the UNFCCC constituency status to make a similar claim and establish constituency status for themselves.[78]

The Secretariat established a provisional (or as one delegate called it, the "probation") system, lasting two years, first for labour and later applied to all other social groupings. The system was labour intensive, and consisted of four reports detailing how many delegates attended from the labour movement, side events they hosted, and other activities they undertook. The intent was to prove that unions were valuable stakeholders, working for a positive outcome.[79]

For unions, constituency status was a symbol of that labour was a recognized actor in the UNFCCC. Unlike national processes, where a seat means decision-making power in a negotiation, unions recognize their seat at the climate table is that of an observer. Still, it is a symbol of recognition of unions' place in the negotiations.[80] For some, it also brought unions on equal footing to other recognized and established NGOs in the UNFCCC.

This recognition proved attractive and helped the early unions attract the attention of others in the movement. As internal meeting minutes show, those involved in securing constituency status framed it as an "acknowledgement [that] signals the importance given to our priorities and our involvement in the process" (ITUC 2008). Having a seat at the table helped make the case unions had a place in the climate negotiations and a role to play in the

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[78] As noted in Chapter 3, indigenous peoples, local government and municipalities were established as UNFCCC constituencies before 2007 (when labour applied). These groups are also Agenda 21 Major Groups.
[79] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview with author 2014; Philip Pearson, TUC, Interview with author 2014.
[80] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview with author 2014.

negotiations, which solidified their role and helped attract new unions.[81] Those involved could engage new unions working on specific issues that could be invited to the UNFCCC to speak to delegates in technical workshops. While the tensions between American and other unions to design the labour-climate link helped raise the issue within the movement, the ability to create a space for them in the UNFCCC provided a landing space for those unions become engaged in climate change-related work.

Constituency status also provides material resources to help the labour movement organize and mobilize within the climate regime. Labour delegates welcomed the provision of office space, meeting times, speaking slots, invitations to workshops, and other benefits provided to constituencies. As the labour delegation grew, so did the need for coordination to keep all the members on message, and oriented in a complex negotiation process:

> At the COPs, which are where the global gatherings are, we have to look after our own delegation – we always seem to have new people coming in. As the delegation has grown in size, new delegates bring needs that need to be respected and need to be talked through challenges of engaging in that process.[82]

The UNFCCC's practice after 2009 of limiting of badges for each organization posed a challenge for unions. Many unions sent delegates as ITUC delegates using the organization's accreditation. Few unions hold their own accreditation.

Unlike other constituencies, the limits put on delegation size can have a disproportionate impact on unions. Limits on ITUC's delegation size left interested delegates with few other options for participation. In 2015, ITUC originally received 75 tickets; but managed to bring 190 to attend through badge sharing and other compromises. This one limitation posed by the procedural

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[81] Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview with author 2014.
[82] Philip Pearson, TUC, Interview May 28, 2014

norms of the UNFCCC after 2009 still could not fully counter the mobilization of labour within the climate regime.

4.4 Conclusion

Within ten years, the labour presence in the climate change regime grew exponentially, representing a relatively straightforward case of forum multiplying. This growth brought new allies to labour's cause in the form of powerful NGOs and other climate actors also working to protect workers' rights. Without the involvement of the labour movement in the UNFCCC, it is doubtful that members of the C-7 would make declarations for a just transition, or that powerful states would include mention of worker's rights in the context of climate change. Recognition by powerful new allies and in UNFCCC decisions brought the labour movement into the climate fold.

The labour movement proved able to carry its authority into the UNFCCC. ITUC and UNEP were important articulators, able to carry their authority into the UNFCCC by provide key ideational and material resources. UNEP provided considerable resources to bring together global unions in advance of their involvement in the UNFCCC and to provide key introductions once labour started participating. Despite internal divisions, the labour movement rallied around the just transition frame in large part due to the ITUC's central role as the sole gatekeeper.

The labour movement found key entry points within the institutions of the regime, ultimately showing that they belonged in the climate club of governors. The just transition frame aligned with mitigation institutions, trying to find ways to help countries sell mitigation action domestically by securing the support of labour. They also managed to find institutions that could support their recognition in climate politics, and gaining this constituency status proved valuable to provide further mobilization resources. As the next chapter shows, gender advocates also

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managed to secure constituency status and the gatekeepers of that network could cooperate in

their efforts to uncover gender inequalities and reconcile the neglect of gender issues in

international climate policy.

Chapter 5: Gender-Climate Network

We don't want to be mainstreamed into a polluted stream

A very small contingent of women's rights groups intermittently participated in the UNFCCC before a considerable increase in their participation in the mid-2000s. In 2007, presence of gender NGOs grew, quickly becoming a sizable and sustained mobilization. In 2005, three organizations brought 23 delegates; these NGOs described themselves as environmental NGOs employing a gender lens.[1] Forum multiplying then occurred, particularly among women's rights NGOs new to climate change issues. These numbers rose exponentially, to 16 organizations bringing 183 delegates just four years later. The women's rights NGOs' presence continued through 2015, pushing for climate action that is gender responsive and facilitates women's involvement in decision making. The long-term participation was a public act, bolstered by the construction and use of a frame highlighting the disproportionate impact of climate change on women and women as important agents of climate solutions speaks directly to climate governors, showcasing gender NGOs' commitment to the institutions of the climate change regime. This frame underscored gender NGOs' commitment to contribute to climate solutions, to help reduce the negative impacts on women. As these activists continued to push for ambitious climate action, several recalled Bella Abzug's statement in 1998 that:

> women do not want to be mainstreamed into a polluted stream. We want to clean the stream and transform it into a fresh and flowing body. One that moves in a direction – a world at peace, that respects human rights for all, renders economic justice and provides a sound and healthy environment (quoted in Moghadam 2005, 105).

In their effort to push for ambitious climate change policies, gender NGOs have been among the most recognized and influential of the social NGOs engaging with climate change, the

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[1] Sabine Bock, WECF, interview with author 2014.

third aspect of forum multiplying. In total, nearly 20 decisions in the UNFCCC refer to gender, and the Lima Work Programme on Gender and Climate Change established in 2014 proved an important victory for advocates after years of effort. This victory was hard won, after some states sought to water down the decision's language from gender equal to gender sensitive, and other delegates had once openly questioned the value of bringing a social issue into the UNFCCC negotiations.

Like the labour movement, gender NGOs overcame questions posed by governors within the climate regime regarding the value of their involvement to successfully forum multiply into the climate change regime. In 2014, Wael Hmaidan, Director of the Climate Action Network would characterize gender NGOs as "one of us. They are constructively engaged, trying to solve the climate crisis."[2] This chapter outlines the journey from an at best marginal presence to an influential NGO network in the UNFCCC. Gender NGOs began divided between two groups, ultimately collaborating and building a more cohesive network. Their timing was propitious, linking to the emerging norm of adaptation and showcasing that not only were there differences in vulnerability among countries, but within countries. Using their frame, gender NGOs would find other entry points over time, and the gatekeepers in the network would collaborate to open procedural rules for the network, further entrenching their position in the UNFCCC.

5.1   Gender-Climate Network

The network of NGOs working on the intersection of climate change and gender began quite divided, but grew more cohesive over time. Figures 5-1 and 5-2 show the two principal clusters that reflect two parts of the network. First is a cluster of NGOs around LIFE e.V. called

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[2] Interview with author 2014

Gender CC – women for climate justice, which views itself as a network of environmental NGOs

that use gender as a lens. As one of the long-time participants explains,

> WECF [Women in Europe for a Common Future] has participated for so long because we
> have a different approach than other women's groups, such as WEDO [Women's
> Environment and Development Organization]. For us, the focus is the environment from
> a gender perspective. WECF is also a member of CAN [Climate Action Network].

This women's ecology movement has its roots in the anti-nuclear movement in Europe and

North America, and has engaged in the UNFCCC sporadically since the first UNFCCC

conference to bring feminist critiques to climate issues.[3]

The second cluster includes the NGOs and international organizations involved in Global

Gender and Climate Alliance (GGCA). It is centered on the WEDO, a founding member of the

GGCA. The Alliance entered the UNFCCC in 2007, much later than those NGOs in the

women's ecology movement. These two principal groupings within the gender-climate network

both formally launched their respective alliances within the UNFCCC and both maintained

distinct, albeit highly cooperative identities through, and beyond, 2015.

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[3] Eva Quistrop, former member of the EU Parliament and early anti-nuclear and women's ecology movement
activist. She founded the first parallel event at COP 1 to discuss gender issues at the UNFCCC called the Solidarity
of Women in the Greenhouse.

Women's Enviornment and Development Organization (WEDO)

International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)

Women in Europe for a Common Future (WECF)

LIFE e.V.

Figure 5-1: Gender-climate network, 2005-2008

Figure 5-2: Gender-climate network, 2009-2015

As the network maps in Figures 5-1 and 5-2 show, both the Gender CC and GGCA

clusters grew and increased their connections with one another. While there are still distinct

clusters representing the GGCA and Gender CC, there are more connections between members

of the two groups. Several Gender CC members became GGCA members in the second time

period and more members of both groups reported links to members of the other cluster in the

Yearbook of International Organizations. As their engagement in climate change continued, the

clusters within the gender-climate network grew closer together, sharing more information

among members regardless of their affiliation in either alliance.

Measure	2005-2008			2009-2015		
Size (number of nodes)	336			888		
Centrality	In-Degree	Out-Degree	Average Degree	In-Degree	Out-Degree	Average Degree
WEDO	24	49	36.5	133	141	137
Energia	24	51	37.5	97	97	97
IUCN	17	95	56	104	162	133
Population Action International	8	16	12	103	127	115
Women in Europe for a Common Future	11	23	17	100	115	107.5
Huairou Commission	17	36	26.5	100	100	100

Table 5-1: Descriptive statistics for the gender-climate network

Yet, as the 2009-2015 network map shows (Figure 5-2), a new cluster of NGOs emerged, around the International Planned Parenthood Federation. This group of NGOs called themselves the Population and Climate Change Alliance and started participating in the UNFCCC in 2009.[4] This Alliance argued that the vulnerabilities to climate change correlated with vulnerabilities regarding access to reproductive health and family planning and that upholding women's rights in this could also help build resilience to climate change and mitigate emissions. This cluster did not join with the either Gender CC or GGCA, who, as described below, in some ways sought to define the gender frame in a way that excludes reproductive health issues.

The multiple groups and alliances working on gender and climate change came to the issue independently, leading to a network with multiple gatekeepers. No one actor could claim sole ownership of central position of the network. As table 5-1 shows, several organizations held very similar numbers of connections. These organizations could not alone disseminate a frame throughout the network; their connections to one another also meant that no one organization could attempt a unilateral effort without the others finding out about their strategy. The multiple

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[4] The Population and Climate Change Alliance later changed its name to the Population and Sustainable Development Network to focus more broadly on sustainable development issues, particularly the Sustainable Development Goals and the resulting 2030 Action Agenda for Sustainable Development.

gatekeepers also mean that information was broadly available. In the labour-climate network, the ITUC has access to information from many organizations, far exceeding the breadth of information sources of other organizations. This would not be possible in the gender-climate network. Multiple organization have considerable sources of information and rosters of organizations to send their information to. No organization has a monopoly on information, or prestige or influence.

The size of the network grew considerably, through the introduction of the Population and Climate Change Alliance, growth in the GGCA and Gender CC, and new alliances with climate change governors. In the first period, 336 organizations could directly or indirectly hear of the gender-climate linkages and choose to join the movement. Between 2009 and 2015, the network's mobilization efforts were evident, 888 organizations either actively engaged in the UNFCCC or were a latent group that could be mobilized. Several women's rights organizations joined and participated in the UNFCCC, including UN Women and the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Among new climate change allies, WEDO reported links to Climate Action Network, Oxfam International, World Rainforest Movement, and CGIAR Climate Change Programme.[5]

The central actors' influence and prestige grew over time, another parallel to the labour network. Each solidified their centrality in the network and expanded its ability to receive information from, and hold the esteem of, multiple actors and send its information out widely. WEDO, Energia, and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) were early members of GGCA (WEDO and IUCN were two of the four founding members) and the reach of

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[5] CGIAR is the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research.

their connections grew considerably. Similarly, Women in Europe for a Common Future was a founding member of Gender CC and had worked with WEDO in the past. Women in Europe for a Common Future also became more influential and prestigious through its central role in a larger Gender CC, and its membership and connections with GGCA.

Population Action International spurred the most dramatic change to its prestige and influence over time. In the first period, the organization was not involved in climate change-related work. In 2009, it received a significant grant to work on the linkages between climate change, reproductive health and population dynamics, through research, communications, and advocacy.[6] The organization founded the Population and Climate Change Alliance in 2009 and used the Alliance to build a network of organizations within and outside the UNFCCC to advocate and raise awareness on the linkages between reproductive health, population dynamics and climate change.[7] While Gender CC opposed collaboration with the Population and Climate Change Alliance (more on this below), Population Action International eventually joined the GGCA. Partnership development was a key advocacy strategy in Population Action International's engagement in climate change. The strategy seems to successfully led to the organization having a wider base of knowledge and information to draw upon to help substantiate the linkages, and a larger group of organizations to send its information out to. While Population Action International had a mix of financial and normative motivations, others motives varied, including finding fresh ground for advocacy efforts to advance women's rights.

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[6] Roger-Mark DeSouza, formerly with Population Action International, interview with author 2014; Kathleen Mordegaard, interview with author 2014.
[7] Kathleen Mordegaard, interview with author 2014.

5.2   Motivations

For the part of the network of organizations working on women's rights and the
environment, there were political and normative motivations to multiply into the climate change
regime. For the environmental NGOs that use a gender approach, their work on climate change is
in part driven by their roots in the anti-nuclear movement. In the early 2000s, there were
proposals to include nuclear power generation in the Clean Development Mechanism as an
eligible project. This would provide developing countries with project funding to establish
nuclear power to avoid greenhouse gas emissions from other forms of energy production. To
advocate against the inclusion of nuclear power in the Clean Development Mechanism, some
organizations such as Women in Europe for a Common Future became involved in climate
change work.[8] For this group, their traditional area of contention, to fight against nuclear power
and other environmental injustices, was arising in the climate change regime, and required these
NGOs to follow suit.

Regarding political motivations, like labour, fewer opportunities in their traditional areas
of work influenced the motivations of NGOs working on women's rights in the context of
environmental issues. These NGOs, particularly WEDO, were heavily involved in areas outside
of environmental regimes. WEDO used its experience in the Rio Earth Summit to inform its
tactics at the Beijing Women's conference in 1995 (Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler 1998), and
participated in the reviews of the Beijing Declaration. WEDO and other women's rights
organizations participated heavily in the global trade regime, fighting against structural
adjustment programs and working in the WTO to bring gender issues into conversations of

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[8] Sabine Bock, WECF, interview with author 2014.

multilateral free trade (Moghadam 2005). After the 2000s, these women's rights organizations were also engaged to mainstream gender into the land and biodiversity regimes.

Their opportunities in the land and biodiversity regimes were dwindling, while the links between climate change and water, land, and biodiversity issues were becoming more evident. Both the Convention on Biological Diversity and UN Convention to Combat Desertification include principles recognizing gender and/or women in their respective convention texts. There were entry points for gender advocates to advocate for operationalizing this language throughout implementation and policy decisions and (in the case of the biodiversity) subsequent protocols. In the early and mid-2000s, these processes were on divergent paths, neither of which proved conducive to sustaining advocacy on gender issues.

In the desertification regime, the conferences of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification focused on implementation, but also struggled to reach agreement. The 2005 meeting of the convention established a working group to create a framework to enhance the implementation of the Convention but parties could not agree on other decisions regarding regional coordination (IISD 2009a). The ten-year strategic framework to enhance implementation was adopted in 2007. An extraordinary meeting of the conference of the parties was required to agree to and adopt the programme of work and budget (IISD 2009a).

The CBD, by contrast, had embarked on a process to negotiate a new protocol on Access to Biological Services in 2001 and had continued to reflect gender even if sometimes the references were slow to emerge. These negotiations proved slow and heavily technical regarding

the legalities of various options for a protocol, concluding in 2010.[9] Gender considerations were

largely absent from the negotiations until the final years of the negotiations, after a country

grouping called the Like-Minded in Spirit Group of Women, led by New Zealand, successfully

included references to gender (IISD 2010).

In part, due to the success of the gender network, and the slow pace of implementation in

the desertification regime and the slow, technical negotiations in the biodiversity regime, gender

advocates needed to find new opportunities. A WEDO board member and academic on the

intersection of climate change and gender explains that:

> Originally most of the emphasis was on land, water, agriculture and resources and
> biodiversity related issues, mainly because after Rio'92 most of the gender and
> environment NGOs followed the CSD [UN Commission on Sustainable Development]
> process and its themes. Also, the work portfolio of many of those organizations was
> already quite overloaded. Around 2005, the effectiveness of putting emphasis on the CSD
> and CBD and UNCCD [Convention on Biological Diversity and UN Convention to
> Combat Desertification] processes were more and more questioned by many NGOs, so
> more relevant gremia and routes needed to be identified.[10]

There was a sense that gender advocates had few new areas to advance gender issues in

the desertification and biodiversity processes. To these advocates, "there was a real sense that we

had accomplished all we could [in the biodiversity and the desertification regimes]. Meanwhile,

we'd always known that climate change was something of a black hole, one that was becoming

increasingly too hard to ignore."[11]

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[9] See IISD "A Brief History of the Convention on Biological Diversity" http://www.iisd.ca/process/biodiv_wildlife-cbdintro.htm.

[10] Irene Dankelman, WEDO, interview with author 2014. In this context, gremia is plural of gremium, a German term for a committee or caucus.

[11] Bridget Burns. Ms. Burns is the current focal point for the Women and Gender Constituency in the UNFCCC and has worked on gender and environmental issues since the mid-2000s. Interview with author 2014.

The migration to climate change made sense for activists who required new opportunities to advance gender issues in environmental forums. One gender advocate recalls a sense that much was achieved to bring gender considerations into those forums, while the UNFCCC remained "something of a black hole" because there was no consideration of gender in climate governance and, subsequently, the WEDO and other gender advocates left the forum out of their efforts.[12] The UNFCCC had few hooks for gender activists to leverage. The Convention text and Kyoto Protocol include no reference to gender and instead focused on climate as an environmental issue, as discussed in Chapter 3. Normative motivations combined with a political need to find new areas to work, leading to renewed interest in climate change.

In terms of normative motivations, many NGOs felt that climate change was an issue too important for them to ignore, and that they had something to offer to climate solutions. Many activists cited the IPCC and Stern reports in 2007 as a motivation for their climate change work, particularly the recognition of adaptation in the IPCC reports and that climate related impacts were already evident:

> Climate change manifested itself more and more in people's daily lives, and was recognized as a major challenge for human wellbeing. So, it seemed obvious that several of these gender-related NGOs and groups switched their focus towards climate related gender issues, and that specific new groups and coalitions were formed around this theme.[13]

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[12] Bridget Burns, WEDO, interview with author 2014.

[13] Irene Dankelman, WEDO, interview with author 2014. Several other respondents discussed the relevance of the IPCC's focus on the impacts of climate change in the fourth Assessment Report: Ulrike Röhr, Life e.V., interview with author 2014; Roger-Mark DeSouza, formerly Population Action International, interview with author 2014. Cate Owren, interview with author 2014.

The networks of many of these organizations provided further evidence of climate change's impacts in the Global South and on vulnerable populations. Taking on climate change campaigns seemed a "natural" extension of the work many NGOs were doing on land and water:

> WEDO wasn't specifically doing climate at the time, growing interest was borne out of other work we'd be doing on water, land, etc. WEDO is a global advocacy org, but works on multiple levels, especially with roots in the Global South at national levels. We'd hear murmuring from networks. In meetings, partners would say there is something happening and we don't know what to do – water supplies changing, crop calendars changing – and no one globally is paying attention to it. We've always focused on intersections, so our work on climate change seemed a natural evolution.[14]

From the murmuring in networks, alarm bells from the IPCC, dwindling opportunities in biodiversity and desertification work, and the threat of nuclear issues being raised in the context of climate change, gender NGOs started to explore opportunities to engage in the UNFCCC to contribute to solutions to climate change.

Regarding financial motivations, while several underlined that participating in the climate conferences was not a complete departure from their traditional issues,[15] many also highlighted the need for support for their activities. Gender work in developing countries is often funded by development donors that have priorities that "run in fads. Funding streams shift and NGOs need to adapt. It's an ebb and flow not a clean answer. Donors became interested in the intersections between gender and climate change."[16] Some organizations, often larger organizations, continually find "niches" in donor funding, the competitive funding environment.[17] In this effort, WEDO and IUCN early on secured funding for the GGCA, to continue establishing the case for

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[14] Cate Owren, interview with author 2014.
[15] Cate Owren. interview with author 2014; Goteline Alber, Gender CC, interview with author 2014, speaking about how WEDO and others could use their experience in other multilateral environmental negotiations in the UNFCCC.
[16] Cate Owren. interview with author 2014.
[17] Ulrike Röhr, Life e.V., interview with author 2014.

gender and climate, and to ensure that their participation in the Bali conference and beyond would be successful.[18]

The political, normative and material motivations all aligned for the gender NGOs, particularly those working on land and biodiversity issues. Previously, there was a "division of labour" between the NGOs in the movement,[19] but the shift in the motivations for WEDO and others working outside climate change brought the groups together. As the next section shows, this was not initially a harmonious regrouping. Two networks emerged with different ideologies and strategies. Over time, the network became more harmonious and continued to mobilize new support and find new allies – and influence – in the climate change regime.

5.3   Mobilization

There was a small showing of gender advocates within the UNFCCC before 2007, comprised of NGOs with an "environment first" lens on the link between gender and environmental issues from the beginning of the UNFCCC. As shown by Figure 5.3 below, the introduction of the women's rights organizations boosted the presence of gender NGOs in the UNFCCC to unprecedented numbers after the 2007 COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia. These women's rights NGOs coordinated beforehand to mobilize and launch new alliances at the Bali Conference, which would prove a watershed moment. Figure 5-3 below confirms the importance of COP 13 in 2007 as the beginning of gender NGOs' mobilization in climate change. The number of delegates subtly increased going into COP 13 and 14, before a rapid rise at the Copenhagen meeting. The Bali conference set the stage for the dramatic rise in gender NGOs'

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[18] Ulrike Röhr, Life e.V., interview with author 2014. Cate Owren, interview with author 2014. Finland's Sixth National Communications to the UNFCCC reports that the Government of Finland provided 6 million Euro to the Global Gender and Climate Alliance for the period of 2008-2014. Available at: http://stat.fi/tup/khkinv/fi_nc6.pdf See page 22.
[19] Ulrike Röhr, Life e.V., interview with author 2014. Bridget Burns, WEDO, interview with author 2014.

participation. From that increase, gender NGOs' would increase the number of organizations, although each would send a smaller group of delegates. Creating the conditions for this mobilization, two networks launched devoted to gender issues and continued to attract members as they worked to collaborate with one another.

Figure 5-3: Gender NGOs' participation in the UNFCCC

In 2005, the participation of women's organizations increased. Some gender activists had participated previously, but at the Montreal meeting, as Hemmati and Röhr (2009, 24) explain, "after almost ten years of discontinuous and uncoordinated participation by women's organizations, the path from COP1[20] was finally picked up again." Even at that time, activists within the network noted that

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[20] COP1 is shorthand for the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC. Such COPs are the annual conferences of the highest decision making body of the UNFCCC.

Gender NGO Participation in the UNFCCC

the "capacity of women & environment networks seems rather limited at this point. In order to

impact future policy-making, capacities would need to be pulled together, and additional

organisations and individuals would need to be engaged whenever possible" (Hemmati 2005,

21). Hemmati goes on to recommend strategic alliances with environmental NGOs, labour

unions, IUCN and others if they can effectively minimize the costs of taking on a new issue in a

new regime. New actors were already scouting opportunities, as some gender advocates

participated in the UNFCCC on the delegations of other NGOs.[21] By 2007, gender advocates

would launch two networks devoted to gender and climate change: the Global Gender and

Climate Alliance (GGCA) and Gender CC – women for climate justice.

These networks launched at the same conference, and held differing views of the causes

and solutions to climate change. Gender CC includes many of the environmental NGOs using

feminist critiques to advance gender issues. Members include LIFE e.V., WECF and others once

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[21] Cate Owren, interview with author 2014.

allied in a loose network in the mid-2000s among those adopting a more critical approach to climate policy, and among the first to raise gender issues in the process. To form Gender CC, members agreed to raise funds and create a more formal network. In part the decision to formalize the network was borne from the NGOs' experiences in the UNFCCC at previous meetings. A dialogue held at the 2005 conference in Montreal identified the many research gaps on gendered aspects of climate change adaptation, particularly on good practices or examples, and the need for a network to start advocating on these issues (Gender CC 2005). After that conference, NGOs concluded that "after almost ten years of on-off and largely uncoordinated participation by women's organizations, the direction from COP1 had finally been found again" (Gender CC n.d.).

During the Bali conference, the network planned four statements, two on forestry, one on finance and markets, and the last on biofuels. The point of the statements was similar – that relying on forests or markets to soak up or fuel climate action is not a replacement for reducing emissions at the outset. In a side event titled "Women in the Forest: No Fairy Tale," Gender CC members highlighted the various social and economic links between women and forests, and criticized REDD+ (IISD 2007). In closing, Gotelind Aber, the moderator, underlined the main point of the event was that "markets are not the one to decide on our lives" (Gender CC 2007).

The GGCA differed in its approach and structure. It emerged from the start a highly-professionalized network with a Secretariat and branding from the beginning. Its members include both NGOs and international organizations, as reflected in the four founding members and current Steering Committee members, WEDO, IUCN, UNEP and UN Development Programme. From the beginning, the idea of the GGCA was to build a diverse alliance with common goals.

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These networks had a shared cause, but differences were apparent. Gender CC held up

inequalities as the cause of climate change while GGCA took a more moderate approach arguing

for the inclusion of women, not for an overhaul of the system. Each chose different

organizational forms and each held unique strengths. Gender CC had experience in the UNFCCC

process and connections to the Climate Action Network. By contrast, GGCA had considerable

resources and backing from large development NGOs, environment NGOs, and international

organizations. Over the rest of their engagement in the UNFCCC process, these networks would

seek to find middle ground and build cohesion in the network.

For GGCA, their lack of climate experience showed as the UNFCCC would prove

fundamentally different from the other processes. Their experience in other processes such as the

Convention on Biological Diversity and UN Convention to Combat Desertification were less

applicable than perhaps they assumed. In retrospect, Cate Owren calls it:

> comical. 2008 was a tough year, we made a lot of mistakes trying to introduce gender
> issues from the floor, and to set up allied governments to introduce language. This all
> backfired. We had a big argument with the UNFCCC Secretariat. We were in the wrong
> places, making everyone's job harder.

While WEDO led the work on global activities, IUCN organized "TODs" (training of

delegate sessions, which was the informal, internal name of the events among gender advocates.

These are formally known as "delegate orientation sessions"). The sessions explained the gender

components of various issues, from adaptation to REDD+. Those involved credit the sessions

with spawning a network of delegates willing to discuss gender in the context of various issues

under negotiation. Beyond these events, the GGCA and Gender CC hosted six side events, one of

which was a high-level event hosted by the government of Finland.[22] The networks collaborated to start the application process for constituency status. The growing collaboration between the networks and increasing ties with climate change actors helped build momentum heading into the Copenhagen conference.

Advocates moved into the 2009 Copenhagen conference having secured references to gender in the draft negotiation text. The references were to gender considerations related to adaptation, and to gender-balance in decision making for adaptation action.[23] At the Copenhagen meeting, 16 gender NGOs attended, bringing 183 delegates, and convening ten side events.[24]

The Copenhagen conference presented a new challenge to the coherence of the NGO message on gender issues. NGOs working on the intersections of reproductive health and climate change formed the Population and Climate Change Alliance "to influence the climate change agenda, in particular around the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Summit."[25] Some of the key founding members were Population Action International and the International Planned Parenthood Foundation. Population Action International pivoted toward climate change-related research. It produced a film called "Weathering Change" and conducted research overlaying geographic hotspots of high climate vulnerability and population growth to show the correlation between these issues. The early successes of this work placed Population Action International as a recognized leader on the link between reproductive rights and health and climate change.[26]

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[22] From the UNFCCC SEORS database of side events: https://seors.unfccc.int/seors/reports/archive.html
[23] See draft text FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/INF.1 (22 June 2009)
[24] Based on the NGO participation database developed for this research project, and the UNFCCC SEORS side event archive.
[25] PCCA became the Population and Sustainable Development Alliance in 2012. For information on the Alliance's background, see: http://psda.org.uk/background/.
[26] Roger-Mark DeSouza interview with author 2014

The reproductive health NGOs were a diverse group of NGOs, that did not coordinate and at times worked at odds with one another. Sustainable Population Australia also started to work on climate change issues in 2009,[27] but did not join the Population and Climate Change Alliance. Instead of focusing on vulnerability, Sustainable Population Australia and Optimum Population Trust (now called Population matters) focused on mitigation, arguing that it "is axiomatic that humanity's impact on the natural environment is a product of the population size and average per capita impact" (Sustainable Population Australia 2009).

These NGOs sought out members of Gender CC and GGCA for collaboration, particularly since the established gender network has secured the benefits of provisional constituency status. Yet several Gender CC members and other gender NGOs had little interest in coordination.[28] The reproductive health group, as discussed below, remained largely marginalized.

In the aftermath of the failure in Copenhagen, 11 gender organizations brought 91 delegates to Cancun. The Women and Gender Constituency produced a shared position on REDD+ further sign of the network's growing cohesion. REDD+ had been particularly divisive, as Gender CC was opposed to market mechanisms, particularly for forests, and GGCA sought to include gender in the REDD+ debate. The Women and Gender constituency statement outlined several concerns that REDD+ will: contribute to land grabs; create perverse incentives and inequities; fail to address climate change because offset mechanisms transfer mitigation responsibility away from developed countries; and entails commercialization disconnected from traditional and indigenous cosmologies (Women and Gender Constituency 2011). This shared

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[27] From the database of NGO participation developed for this project.
[28] Katherine Mortegaard, interview with author 2014.

position came after considerable internal debate, and represented a signal that the constituency could find common ground on important issues.[29] The inclusion of gender in the Cancun REDD+ decision signaled that cohesion could yield influence.

In 2011, the Women and Gender constituency was granted full constituency status and 128 delegates from 13 organizations attended the COP. In the 14 side events on gender, some were organized by other organizations, such as the ITUC. The allies of the gender network were growing as more NGOs and governments included gender in their considerations of climate change. This recognition would prove fruitful as the negotiations entered a new phase by starting to negotiate what would become the Paris Agreement based on the Durban Platform agreed to in 2011.

In 2012, gender NGOs worked to secure a decision on gender balance in the UNFCCC. This effort was aided by powerful allies – UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres and Mary Robinson, the former Prime Minister of Ireland and founder of the Mary Robinson Foundation for Climate Justice. Mary Robinson's Foundation defines climate justice in narrower terms, speaking of the disproportionate impact of climate change on some groups and often specifies women.[30] The alliance between gender networks and the Mary Robinson Foundation was tacit. Some gender advocates recall participation by delegates from Robinson's foundation in the constituency meetings was sporadic and disconnected somewhat from the work of the

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[29] Sabine Bock, WECF, interview with author 2014.
[30] This definition of climate justice is commonplace now. However, it contrasts with the origins of the concept of climate justice in the global justice movement. These original articulators included concerns of inequities and critiques of global power structures embedded in the capitalist system. Further discussion on this is in Chapter Six.

group.[31] Some constituency members were unsatisfied with a decision merely focused on the participation of women, excluding deeper understandings of gender.[32]

In the end, the decision agrees to adopt "a goal of gender balance in bodies established pursuant to the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, in order to improve women's participation and inform more effective climate change policy that addresses the needs of women and men equally."[33] A draft of the decision referred to "gender equality," (equal numbers of women and men) rather than "gender balance" (a more ambiguous term, not necessarily meaning an equal participation of men and women).[34] This wording change was significant, and watered down the victory for some activists while others viewed it as the best possible outcome given the early stages of gender advocacy in climate change.[35] One considered making a statement against the decision in plenary, but was persuaded not to by her counterparts in the constituency.[36] The decision also included a regular report on progress, an agenda item on gender and climate change, and an in-session workshop on gender issues. Gender moved mainstream to the central agenda of the UNFCCC meetings.

In 2013 in Warsaw. the participation of gender advocates was smaller, 11 organizations and 63 delegates, but their presence outperformed their numbers on the ground. With the UNFCCC Secretariat, the Constituency hosted the second Gender Day around the theme of "Vision 50:50," an informal day where events and statements highlight the gender aspects of

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[31] This respondent asked that this comment be off the record. Interview with author 2014.
[32] Ulrike Röhr, interview with author 2014.
[33] See decision 23/CP.18
[34] A draft of the decision was circulated among negotiators, observers and others who were present in the negotiation room. It is not available publicly. I was able to read a hard copy of the draft because I was present.
[35] Ulrike Röhr, Interview with author 2014.
[36] Ulrike Röhr, Interview with author 2014.

climate change.[37] Despite few people on the ground, the Constituency members hosted 12 side events, and participated in two other side events hosted by other organizations to provide a gender perspective. In the negotiations, gender was discussed in the in-session workshop mandated by the Doha decision and in contact groups and informal negotiations. In the subsequent conclusions adopted by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the COP, parties agreed to continue to negotiations on how to improve the participation of women in the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2013).

Not resting on the gains made, many gender advocates sought to solidify their role among climate change civil society members. Many gender advocates participated in the walk out of the negotiations staged by civil society. Under the banner of "while they talk, we walk," many gender advocates shared frustrations with the slow progress to address climate change through the UNFCCC.[38] The gender decision and progress in the negotiations on gender and climate change was insufficient; the gender advocates pushed for ambitious climate action. By participating in the walk out, gender NGO further showed their commitment to climate change action and their willingness to cooperate with climate activists. The gender decisions showed states were willing to accept gender issues; participation in shared protests helped gender NGOs gain the acceptance of their civil society counterparts.

In 2014, there was again a relatively small turnout in the actual participation in COP 20 in Lima. In part, the smaller delegation was due to the travel costs and distance for gender NGO

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[37] Delegates were also given ribbons to wear as a reminder of the importance of gender considersations, which prompted several mentions of gender in the main negotiations by co-chairs and Secretariat. For more information on Gender Day, see http://unfccc.int/gender_and_climate_change/items/9398.php.
[38] Ulrike Röhr, LIFE e.V., interview with author 2014.

delegates based in Europe, with some staying home to avoid contributing GHG emissions.[39]

Nine organizations and 39 delegates attended. Local women's rights movements participated extensively in the Peoples' Climate March and the People's Summit held in parallel to the UNFCCC conference, which would not be included in official registration numbers.[40] The World March of Women engaged in the People's Summit and march to "keep fighting against green capitalism and strengthening women's alternatives" and convening several events."[41] Within the negotiations, the Women and Gender constituency members hosted six side events. Other organizations, including the Third World Network, the South Centre, and the International Institute for Environment and Development hosted five side events that included gender issues.

Within the negotiations, gender advocates secured a hard-won victory and a strong sign of recognition of the links between gender and climate change. The COP established the Lima Work Programme on Gender and Climate Change. Considerable negotiations were required around references to gender equality in the work programme. Saudi Arabia opposed references to gender equality and strongly preferred phrases such as gender balance (IISD 2014a).[42] Mexico sought clarifications that gender equal did not mean a 50/50 male to female ratio on delegations because Mexico had more women than men on its delegation and Jamaica urged references to

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[39] Ulrike Röhr, LIFE e.V., interview with author 2014

[40] Bridget Burns. WEDO. Interview with author 2015. Also see photos from 350.0rg: http://350.org/photos-largest-climate-march-in-the-history-of-latin-america/

[41] See the press release from the World March of Women:
http://www.marchemondiale.org/news/mmfnewsitem.2014-12-07.3711176917/en

[42] As explained by Bridget Burns of WEDO in a meeting of the Work Programme on 7 May 2015 in Bonn Germany, gender equal refers to equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of men and women, boys and girls. Gender balance refers to a ration of men to women in any given situation, which does not have to be 50:50; gender parity is a 50:50 balance specifically. Gender mainstreaming is the integration of gender considerations into a every stage of policy processes. Gender sensitive refers to programmes where gender norms, roles and inequalities have been considered and awareness of the issues has been raised, though appropriate actions may not have been taken. Gender responsive goes a step further to consider gender norms, roles and responsibilities, and take appropriate actions. This explanation is from my personal observation at the meeting of the Work Programme.

gender equality (IISD 2014a). As a developed country delegate recalls, the gender NGOs "really

had to teach us what these words – equality, balance, sensitive – meant and that they held

different implications. This was all a new language for us."[43]

Gender advocates found their climate allies useful in these negotiations to advance

women's rights in the context of climate change. Female delegates from the Least Developed

Countries (LDC) coalition discussed the difficulties in the gender negotiations during a

coordination meeting and, in response, some Muslim male delegates participated in the gender

negotiations to send the message that Muslim countries supported a progressive work

programme on gender and climate change.[44] The Climate Action Network awarded one of the

Fossil of the Day awards on December 6 to Saudi Arabia for blocking language on gender

equality in the negotiations.[45] The actions put some pressure on the Saudi delegation, who one

delegate heard asking around how it became known that they sought to change the language in

the gender decision.[46] Gender advocates' efforts to build a network of climate allies helped to

advance women's rights conversations in the UNFCCC.

The efforts to teach delegates the jargon of gender policy and use their network of

delegates yielded an agreement on the Lima Work Programme. In the final decision, parties

established the Lima Work Programme to promote gender balance and achieve "gender-

responsive climate policy, developed for the purpose of guiding the effective participation of

women in the bodies established under the Convention" (UNFCCC 2014, decision 18/CP.20).

The Lima Work Programme largely focuses on the improving the number and quality of

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[43] Developed country delegate. Interview June 9, 2015. This delegate was in a key position negotiations and present for all of the negotiations on gender and climate in Lima.
[44] Saleem Huq, IIED, interview with author 2014.
[45] Climate Action Network records of Fossil of the Day, for December 6, 2014: http://climatenetwork.org/node/4760
[46] Anonymous delegate from an environmental NGO. Interview with author 2015.

women's participation in the Convention, which is not fundamentally different from the Doha decision on the involvement of women. The decision also includes a series of workshops on gender and mitigation and technology development and transfer, and on adaptation and capacity building (UNFCCC 2014). The Lima Work Programme opened new opportunities for NGOs and delegates to discuss the links between gender and climate change policy. In the in-session workshops, NGO delegates were prominently involved, asked to introduce issues and give presentations and statements.[47]

Teaching gender norms to climate change delegates helped pave the way for recognition of gender-climate linkages and positioned gender NGOs as the experts on those links. Previous decisions, such as the 2012 Doha decision on gender, simply sought to include women in delegations. The Lima Work Programme, by contrast, schedules discussions and actions on the substantive overlap between gender and climate change. The Work Programme signaled the influence of the gender NGOs, and certainly their recognition as climate change governors.

Throughout 2015, gender delegates fulfilled a pivotal role in the Lima Work Programme and the negotiations for the Paris Agreement. For the Paris COP, gender delegates also worked to bring together the different UNFCCC constituencies. The 100 delegates from 18 women's organizations attended, and convened several side events that were considered a range of social issues, including the concerns of youth, labour, indigenous rights, and others. Holding these events helped maximize the few spots available for side events, and likely also helped build solidarity and shared messages among constituencies.

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[47] Personal observation from attendance in the gender in-session workshops in 2015 and 2016.

At the Paris conference, efforts to include gender in the Paris Agreement continued. In one version of the draft agreement, there were references to gender in five places: preamble, mitigation, adaptation, finance and technology.[48] Gender advocates were enthusiastic and felt that their networks of state delegates had helped to spread the message and insert gender language throughout the draft agreement text.[49] The final text of the Agreement only references gender in the preamble, alongside many other social issues (UNFCCC 2015). While gender advocates worked hard to mainstream gender into a strong agreement, in the end the Agreement was surprisingly strong on climate ambition (see IISD 2015, particularly the analysis) and weaker on gender and other social issues than many expected before the Paris Conference convened.

Still, the forum multiplying experience of the gender NGO network entailed considerable mobilization of actors in the UNFCCC. Their mobilization brought more women's rights organizations on board, including international organizations such as UN Women that was late to join the effort.[50] Reverberations back to the women's rights regime were evident in decisions and actions of key forums in that regime, including in the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women established a working group on climate change and a series of recommendations, including one under consideration in 2016 on the "gender-related dimensions of disaster risk reduction in a changing climate."[51] The successful mobilization of women's rights organizations in the UNFCCC reverberated back into the women's rights regime, creating

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[48] See draft of the Paris Agreement dated 5 December 2015.
[49] Several gender delegates stated this in conversations at the Paris Conference, including Lorena Aguilar, IUCN and Bridget Burns, WEDO, interview with author 2015.
[50] Ulrike Rohr, Life, e.V., interview with author 2014.
[51] See the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/DraftGRDisasterRisk.aspx

more overlap between the regimes, which started to consider climate change as an issue they too should work on, just as gender NGOs viewed their role in the climate change regime in the mid-2000s.

5.3.1   Carrying Authority into the Climate Regime

Members of the gender-climate network engaged with state delegates, teaching them new norms about how to incorporate gender into the climate change regime. This was accomplished by carrying the authority that these gender NGOs have in other regimes into the climate change regime. To do this, the gender NGOs had to collaborate to share the gender frame, which entailed overcoming ideological differences and the gatekeepers cooperating to help develop cohesion around the gender frame. Like the labour movement, the gender NGOs relied on international organizations as brokers, to bring resources and reputations to their work on gender and climate change.

5.3.1.1   Constructing the Discursive Frame

Stating climate change is a gender issue oversimplifies the frame constructed and disseminated by gender NGOs. Their frame highlighted two ways that gender matters when discussing climate change: first, it highlighted that women are the disproportionate victims of climate change. Second, it showcased women as agents of positive change.[52] Key gender issues are not included in the frame, such as freedom from violence[53] and access to maternal health and

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[52] See, for example, a WEDO publication in 2007 titled Changing the Climate: Why Women's Perspectives Matter in Climate Change. There are two main sections, called "Climate Change Ampifies Inequality" and "Women as Untapped Resources." Available at: http://www.wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/changing-the-climate-why-womens-perspectives-matter-2008.pdf

[53] There is potentially a case to be made linking violence against women and climate change. According to a 2010 Report to the 16th session of the Human Rights Council by Margaret Sekaggya, women environmental defenders are more at risk than male environmental defenders, and experience gender-specific forms of violence such as sexual harassment, sexual violence, and rape. Many of these women environmental defenders work on land, agriculture,

reproductive health. The latter issue related to reproductive rights and, in turn, population dynamics is also not included in the gender frame, despite the presence and advocacy work of population and reproductive rights NGOs to include reproductive health in the gender frame. The gender NGOs engaged in the UNFCCC framed gender narrowly in the context of climate change to exclude reproductive issues. In this narrower frame, the gender network made similar choices as the labour movement (see Chapter 4), avoiding diagnostic framing (identifying the problem) but identifying solutions (prognostic framing) and rationale for action (motivational framing).

The gender frame does not suggest that gender inequality causes climate change. There is little strategic benefit for a diagnostic frame linking gender and climate change. Surveying the potential entry points, some argued that there was "little to be gained by looking at the responsibility for emissions on a gendered basis" (Wamukona and Skutsch 2008). At the time, mitigation was conceived largely in terms of reducing emissions by replacing technologies in older facilities, particularly in the energy sector (Chapter 3). It would be difficult to apportion responsibility for emissions by gender, or to create incentives for technologies to be developed or used by women or men. Likely, it would be unpalatable to do so. A diagnostic frame could be seen as blaming women for climate change, in terms of their consumption patterns or resource use. Given that most governments and multinational corporations are both operated by men and responsible for most of the global emissions,[54] apportioning the causes of climate change based on gender would relocate blame from large corporations and weak government policy.

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forest, or mining-related issues. All of these issues are also implicated in various aspects of the climate change regime.

[54] According to Richard Heede, 90 companies are responsible for the two-thirds of anthropogenic carbon emissions, see a synopsis of this work in Science Magazine: http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/08/just-90-companies-are-blame-most-climate-change-carbon-accountant-says

Potentially, climate change could be a symptom of the global patriarchal system, favouring men in elite positions. This would offer a new cause of climate change, a diagnostic frame and could motivate more radical elements of the women's rights movement. Yet, it would not strategically help gender NGOs gain allies within the climate change regime. Climate change governors would be asked to tackle an issue far removed from their environmental framing of the regime's central issue. Further, such a diagnostic frame could also demotivate many women who otherwise would be interested in joining the gender-climate movement. Not all issues from the traditional regimes can be transported into the new regime when forum multiplying. Prognostic elements may be particularly useful when forum multiplying.

Instead, gender advocates chose a frame focused on the prognostic and motivational aspects. The frame positions women as an untapped reservoir of climate solutions, as Ulrike Röhr of LIFE e.V and Gender CC stated in 2007: "the lack of gender perspectives in the current climate process not only violates women's human rights … but it also leads to shortcomings in the efficiency and effectiveness of climate related measures and instruments" (Gender CC 2007). Including the knowledge and experiences of half of the world's population, largely responsible for small-scale farming, natural resource management, household health and education, and local energy and water decisions, can yield better climate solutions, according to the gender frame. Making a convincing case of why including women can lead to more efficacious climate policy required drawing on knowledge in other forums gender NGOs participated in.

NGO networks undertaking forum multiplying often lack information to support their frames and have to undertake considerable efforts to build their case. Labour unions undertook extensive quantitative research on the sector-by-sector effects and opportunities climate policy. Gender NGOs, by contrast, drew inferences from their previous work in natural resource management-

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related regimes. Gender NGOs cited the recognized role of women's empowerment to achieve environmental sustainability and the realization of the Millennium Development Goals (Aguilar et al 2009), using a norm from another, related forum. Drawing on experience in disaster relief, gender NGOs highlighted that when their families' lives were at risk, women tended to select less polluting forms of energy, share information among community members, and adapt to environmental changes more quickly (GGCA 2013). These features, the GGCA (2013, 4) argued that women are effective mobilizers for change, and therefore "women's greater participation is also likely to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of climate change projects and policies."

Whereas the labour advocates could draw on comparable economic structures (as least among OECD countries,) the context-specific nature of the links between women, development, and climate change presented challenges to substantiating the links. To meet this challenge, they drew upon norms in other forums to leverage the links between adaptation and gender, and to propose new solutions to help climate governors reach their goals.

The logic of the prognostic element of the frame becomes "help us help you," or, empower women to build climate resilience. It signals acceptance of climate policy and a shared commitment to improve climate policies' effectiveness. As Lorena Aguilar (2009), the Global Senior Gender Advisor of the IUCN urges, "interventions should pay special attention to the need to enhance women's capacity to manage risks with a view to reducing their vulnerability and maintaining or increasing their opportunities for development." The gender frame argues that leveraging the support of women can help formulate better climate policy on the ground, providing, like the just transition frame, a reason to motivate climate governors to join the gender movement.

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In terms of its motivational aspects, the frame seeks to motivate people to become involved in the gender and climate movement based on solidarity with both women's rights and the planet. Focusing on women's unique vulnerabilities to climate change resulting from gender inequalities can motivate action to protect women's rights. This aspect of the frame helps motivate those actors working on human and women's rights by warning that climate change could exacerbate gender inequalities (GGCA 2009c). It could also motivate people interested in reducing the impacts of climate change, by reducing emissions to limit the scale of the problem. The motivational aspect of the gender frame is in some ways a moral claim – that climate change disproportionately affects women and creates injustices that need to be rectified. Rather than relying solely on moral claims, however, gender advocates amassed considerable evidence of how women's positions in the family, community, economy and society affects their resilience to the effects of climate change (see Aguilar et al 2009; Dankleman 2010; GGCA 2012).

The gender frame had three advantages for the gender network. First, the frame proved malleable enough to adapt to several areas of the climate change negotiations while still offering solutions to a narrower set of institutions in the initial forum multiplying period. The frame focused on solutions in those areas where gender NGOs were more likely to draw a convincing, actionable link. The gender frame originally linked to adaptation institutions, but over time spread to other areas, including mitigation, technology and climate finance (more on this below).[55] Unlike other networks, gender is a cross-cutting issue, which could potentially be linked to many issues in principle. There is a "motherhood and apple pie" quality to women's

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[55] Gender NGOs started attending meetings of the Transitional Committee for the Green Climate Fund to advocate for gender mainstreaming during the design phase of the Fund, arguing that "gender equality and gender justice in accordance with international human rights, including women's human rights, must be the guiding principles of the Green Climate Fund" (WEDO 2011). The GGCA also provided briefings for the Technology Executive Committee (see GGCA 2014), and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (see WEDO 2014).

rights, that few want to be seen to be against rights for women. Yet, the specificity of the frame –

focusing on impacts and women's agency – narrows the field of vision away from mitigation

institutions, including market mechanisms. This helped the NGOs claim that they were

intimately linked to a set of institutions where their participation was more than a principled

stand. The frame illustrated how women's knowledge and roles in society can and already do

generate potential solutions to climate change resilience. In their initial efforts to forum multiply,

the gender NGOs used their frame to claim a clear relevance to global climate change, and to its

solutions.

Second, the frame's prognostic and motivational aspect drew in climate change governors

as allies. The frame focuses on solutions, and does not seek to overturn the status quo of the

climate change regime. It shows a commitment to the institutions developed by climate change

governors, and offers new solutions based on women's unique roles in society. Climate change

governors could benefit from local level solutions, and from mobilizing a considerable portion of

the world's population toward their cause.

Third, the frame largely incorporated the views of both GGCA and Gender CC, which

facilitated mobilization efforts and created the necessary cohesion around a shared message to

present a united front. There were disagreements on the depth of the frame (see below, in internal

negotiations). Views differed on whether the network should accept decisions encouraging

parties to include more women on their delegations and nominate women for decision making

bodies in the UNFCCC or hold out for a more nuanced understanding of gender.[56] Like the

labour movement, there were some groups pushing for more systematic change, but the frame

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[56] Ulrike Röhr, LIFE e.V., interview with author 2014; Gotelind Aber, Gender CC, interview with author 2015.

proved able to accommodate these groups differing ideologies. The coherence achieved through

a broader frame meant that climate governors could not pick and choose among messages within

the network, particularly since systemic critiques could alienate climate governors (as we will

see with the climate justice movement).

Third, like labour, the frame's solutions and promise to mobilize new agents of change

creates a space that only gender NGOs can occupy. This is a useful strategy, raising the

likelihood of the NGOs' recognition as the only group that can speak to their frame and worth

admitting, with the frame, into the target regime. With the frame, gender NGOs become the

authority on the links between gender and climate change. They are the experts on the frame and

on the evidence supporting its claims. Delegates from civil society and states must include or at

least discuss these actors when considering gender-sensitive climate policy. This authority can

confer power. Delegates deferred to gender NGOs when they taught parties about the differences

between terms such as gender balance and gender equal, and gender sensitive and gender

responsive. While not all countries wanted to see discussions on gender and other countries had

different preferences on how to incorporate gender, these delegates first recognized the authority

of gender NGOs in this area. Gender NGOs kept control of their frame, and in so doing created a

niche in the negotiations where they were the preeminent authorities.

This is not guaranteed. Frames can be adopted by others, sometimes in a way that

diverges from the original intent. (as discussed regarding the climate justice frame). The human

rights frame was used by environmental lawyers and NGOs (see Chapter 8) and gained

acceptance despite the absences of its traditional and authoritative articulators. Frames and their

articulators may not be as connected as one assumes. Building a frame that the network can rally

behind, and keeping control of that frame in a way that the network's members become the key experts is an important aspect of forum multiplying.

5.3.1.2 Articulators

To develop the broad gender frame described above, the gatekeepers of the network had to coordinate. Without a discursive frame linking the issues, the ticket for entry in the target regime, shared by all, the gender NGO network would face difficulties forum multiplying to climate change. Not as centralized as the labour network (Chapter 4), the gender network offers insight into how a decentralized network can coordinate and successfully forum multiply.

Without collaboration, multiple frames could spread because the gatekeepers each can disseminate their preferred frame. As discussed in the framework, a coherent frame espoused by all is more likely to resonate. The groups within the network had divergent views and arrived at the UNFCCC at different times, each with their own central actors and ideological views. Gender CC members sporadically participated before the setting up the Gender CC network in 2007, the same year that GGCA formed and mobilized in the UNFCCC. The Population and Climate Change Alliance arrived later, in 2009.

There was considerable potential for gender NGOs to fracture into competing frames due to their differing views, yet the groups collaborated to develop and use the gender frame in a consistent manner. Gender CC and GGCA shared similar ideas about the relationship between gender inequality and women's vulnerability to the effects of climate change, but differed on their views related to potential solutions to climate change, particularly the use of market mechanisms. Both networks linked gender inequalities to climate change outcomes. Gender CC members highlighted how gendered divisions of labour, income inequalities, and differences in power influence the resilience of women to the impacts of climate change and their ability to

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influence climate policy (for example see Aber 2009). Similarly, GGCA states in a training manual on gender and climate change that climate change impacts "affect men, women, boys and girls differently because of the inequalities between them caused by gender-based roles in society and the resulting levels of vulnerability" (UNDP 2012, 5). While both groups agree that women's roles in society ascribed by gendered norms can affect their vulnerability to climate change and that climate change policy should include women in decision making, they differed on what those climate change policies should be.

These shared views would ultimately form the backbones of the gender frame, while the ideological views on markets and commodification of nature where the two groups disagreed, would be marginalized in the frame. Gender CC opposed market mechanisms, such as REDD+ and the Clean Development Mechanism. Among the problems Gender CC cited with market mechanisms, is their failure to tackle the causes of climate change, namely, excessive consumption in developed countries, and ignorance of social issues disproportionately threatening marginalized people, particularly women (Gender CC 2011a; 2016).

Gender CC members further worried that the involvement of international organizations that were in the GGCA would dampen their ability to advance their more critical message. They viewed international organizations as a moderating force, as Sabine Bock, one of original members of Gender CC explains:

> We [Gender CC] were reluctant at first to join GGCA. Gender CC is a network of civil society organizations. We weren't sure if being part of a network with international organizations would change how we could engage and what would could say. They [IOs] are more conservative in what they can sign onto.[57]

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[57] Sabine Bock, WECF. Interview with author 2014

The organizational form of the GGCA's network was another challenge to the coherence of the network because Gender CC members felt they could not advance their critical messages if international organizations were involved in the network. It was a risk to their ability to use their voice within the network and to disseminate their preferred frame. The Women and Gender constituency, discussed below, helped ameliorate these concerns, and work continued to collaborate and develop a shared frame. Ultimately, much of the frame would more closely mirror the GGCA's messaging, at least in the areas that Gender CC could find common ground.

By contrast, GGCA took a more moderate approach and sought to mainstream gender considerations into the current negotiations, not to halt negotiations on market mechanisms. GGCA argued that women's roles as forest stewards and farmers meant that women can be agents of change in REDD+ and should be included in decision making while avoiding comment on the value of market mechanisms or on the causes of climate change. For instance, after a workshop in 2009 called "Engendering REDD+" the report highlights that:

> REDD+ clearly presents opportunities for positive outcomes for forest-dependent communities, but also risks serious negative outcomes, especially for women who rely on forest resources to sustain their families' livelihoods… Since REDD+ is performance-based, it rewards programs that are more effective and more efficient. This provides a rationale for mainstreaming gender; it is important to demonstrate cases where women's involvement has shown to make a difference in terms of effectiveness and efficiency (GGCA 2009a).

While GGCA would argue to include women in REDD+ decision making, Gender CC would not support such a position because they are critical of the concept of REDD+ particularly any discussion of a market mechanism for forests in developing countries.[58]

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[58] Gotelind Aber, Gender CC. Interview with author 2015

As Gender CC and GGCA continued to engage one another, the reproductive health NGOs arrived late to the climate scene, introducing a new issue and seeking alliances with gender NGOs. This group was internally divided between some highlighting the adaptation-based linkages and others stressing the connections between mitigation and population.

This small group provides a microcosm to view the consequences of a fragmented frame. Population Action International was the key organization making links among reproductive health and populations dynamics and climate change. Their participation was bolstered by their significant funding for a project and their centrality reinforced by their role in forming the Population and Climate Change Alliance.

> PAI [Population Action International] was then seen as "the" organization on research and it became a touchstone for the organization. Our research and films were very well received. The strong association of our brand with this work, led to new organizational positioning and networking for us. As a result, it became a core issue PAI works on.

Based on its experiences in other processes such as the Committee on the Status of Women and Commission on Population Development, some Population Action International delegates expected to be able to insert language on the need for family planning into the climate change agreement expected to be completed in 2009.[59] Starting to attend the UNFCCC at the subsidiary bodies' meeting in June to learn the process, before the large, complex conference in Copenhagen, the delegates from Population Action International realized this goal was perhaps unrealistic and instead framed Copenhagen as an opportunity to raise awareness.[60]

The frame advanced by Population Action International was based on resilience and adaptive capacity to climate change, which held potential to fall in line with the frame already

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[59] Kathleen Mordegaard, interview with author 2014.
[60] Kathleen Mordegaard, interview with author 2014.

espoused by Gender CC and GGCA. The Population and Climate Change Alliance argued that

providing universal access to family planning and the right to reproductive health reduces

vulnerability at the household and individual level and moderates population dynamics in a way

that also increases resilience to the effects of climate change.[61] This is essentially a co-benefits

argument. Yet, the frame does not provide another rational to undertake climate action (as the

health frame does, see Chapter 7), the frame highlights another reason to meet the unmet demand

for family planning resources. This logic could make it difficult to convince climate change

actors why they should recognize the links between population dynamics, reproductive health

and climate change. There was little to gain for climate change actors, and the proposed solution

was out of their control. Also, complicating matters was a controversial solution put forward by

other population-oriented NGOs.

Other organizations drew links between population dynamics and mitigation, and offered

controversial solutions that muddied the political space for the entire group. The Optimum

Population Trust undertook a campaign advocating for "PopOffsets" (now called Population

Matters, the NGO still advocates for this solution). PopOffsets is a mechanism to offset carbon

emissions through contributions to family planning projects in developed and developing

countries (Population Matters n.d.). Several interview respondents recalled this initiative, calling

it, among other characterizations, "tone deaf regarding the sensitivities between the global North

and South, especially regarding burden sharing."[62] Another delegate recalled the message was

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[61] Kathleen Mordegaard, interview with author 2014.
[62] This delegate asked that this comment be kept off the record, interview with author 2014.

received as essentially saying "rich people in the North could assuage their guilt by paying brown people to not have babies."[63]

This controversial prognostic frame created difficulties for the Population and Climate Change Alliance to make inroads with climate change governors. Members of the Alliance had to first answer questions about PopOffsets and explain why they did not agree with the approach before explaining the links between unmet demand for family planning and climate change vulnerability.[64] The message was diluted. Others could cherry pick which frame to reject or accept.

The lack of coherence presented obstacles for the frame's prospects for recognition and made it easier to vet out of the gender network's central frame. The idea of PopOffsets provided a reason for gender NGOs to dismiss the claims of reproductive health organizations entirely. One delegate working on reproductive health issues at the Copenhagen conference recalls being surprised that Gender CC was so "vehemently opposed" to the adaptation-based message many reproductive health NGOs were advocating.[65] Gender CC "rejected the coupling of increased family planning with reduced greenhouse gas emissions and [arguing] that family planning must not be reframed as a climate change solution" (Gender CC 2011b, 1). For Gender CC, the real culprit is overconsumption in developed countries and they view population dynamics discussions as shifting responsibility for reduce emissions to developing countries (Gender CC 2011b). One delegate pointed to the PopOffsets discussion as a reason why the population discussion was unacceptable to Gender CC.[66] It hit directly upon the network's concerns of

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[63] This delegate asked that this comment be kept off the record, interview with author 2014.
[64] Kathleen Mordegaard, interview with author 2014.
[65] Kathleen Mortegaard, interview with author 2014.
[66] This delegate asked that this comment be kept off the record, interview with author 2014.

shifting discussion away from consumption and shifting burdens to developing countries, and, worse, could be connected to rights abuses. PopOffsets distracted and detracted from any possible conversation on the adaptation and resilience-based links between reproductive health and climate change, although one delegate did believe that the opposition was in part principled and was always going to be difficult.[67]

Gender NGOs sidestepped the reproductive health NGOs, underscoring the ability of gatekeepers to set or vet the agenda. GGCA included Population Action International, but, Gender CC's reluctance marginalized the reproductive health issue. The gatekeepers cooperated, striking an implicit bargain that the frame would center on the issues on which they agree, highlighting women's agency and vulnerability. Where there was disagreement, on market mechanisms, family planning and population dynamics, the network sidelined those issues. Not all issues from the traditional regime make it in the target regime, and cooperation among gatekeepers may mean leaving aside issues that one feels strongly must be vetted. The stamp of legitimacy conferred by the status as a UNFCCC constituency would only extend to the issues kept in the bargain struck by the gatekeepers.

The constituency space proved an effective meeting space for the gatekeepers and others in the network to coordinate. The ITUC had the option of convening negotiations on its own. This was not available because neither Gender CC or the GGCA could offer neutral ground. Instead, gender NGOs agreed that all interested delegated would be invited to their constituency meetings, and that statements would have consensus among all the NGOs.[68] While delegates

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[67] This delegate asked that this comment be kept off the record, interview with author 2014.
[68] That NGOs reach consensus on a statement is a norm shared and practiced by most constituencies at the UNFCCC. The Environmental NGO Constituency is an exception to this. Climate Action Network represents roughly 14% of environmental NGOs and the Climate Justice Now! network represents around 4% (Anonymous UN

from states or international organizations may attend meetings, the constituency is a civil society space and the NGOs are responsible for its positioning.[69] This provided political freedom from the more conservative stances of the international organizations that were part of GGCA. As Sabine Bock, one of the founders of Gender CC, underlined, "the constituency gives an outlet that was not possible before. Within the gender constituency, we can make stronger calls for mitigation targets, etc, than we could have from within the GGCA." NGOs could say things as a constituency that they could not have advocated for from under the GGCA umbrella because the GGCA has to incorporate the sensitivities of neutral UN agencies.

The constituency and the need to negotiate shared stances facilitated learning among delegates. Constituency members drafted a shared set of principles by which the group would operate. This helped members of Gender CC and GGCA learn about each other's views and find commonalities from which they could form positions. Members of the provisional constituency set their goal to "formalize the voice of the women's and gender civil society organizations present and regularly active in UNFCCC processes, and to debate, streamline and strengthen the positions which these organizations put forth." In the same document, the Gender CC and GGCA members involved also agreed to a governance structure, including that the constituency would have two focal points, one each from the global North and the global South (Women and Gender Constituency n.d.). Several members underlined how the constituency status helped make the network more cohesive, including for Sabine Bock of Women in Europe for a Common Future, a Gender CC member:

Secretariat, interview with author 2014). Both groups give statements on behalf of their networks, as the major groups of environmental NGOs. It is unusual, however, for non-NGOs to be invited to attend the constituency meetings. The Women and Gender Constituency has an open door policy as a way to acknowledge that gender is a cross cutting issue and to build a network of women interested in advancing gender issues.
[69] All the members of the constituency are NGOs, for a list see: http://womengenderclimate.org/member/

> The network of women's NGOs has grown in terms of the cohesiveness. We had to set up these protocols to deliver statements as a group, to ensure we would all agree. It's provided a change to see what the stances and objectives of the GGCA would be. It is functioning as an alliance, in a cohesive way. So Gender CC, LIFE, WECF are now also members of the GGCA. It was a new entity that people didn't know what to make of. I've seen a sea change in terms of how we work together.[70]

Through the shared constituency space, the two gender-climate networks manage to forge closer ties, including common membership. The cohesiveness did not extend, however, to the Population and Climate Change Alliance, who were technically free to join the constituency.

Population Action International would later join the GGCA and become a steering committee member, but it ultimately decided to join the environmental NGO constituency, despite expressing interest in the Women and Gender Constituency.[71] Acceptance into the environmental NGO fold was notable for Population Action International, as Roger-Mark DeSouza, formerly of Population Action International, explains: "We became a member of a very significant climate change network, Climate Action Network US and regional networks. For them to vet a family planning organization was a sign of recognition."[72] After being marginalized by other gender NGO network members, Population Action International sought recognition into the climate regime through a domestic climate activist network.

Lobbying to create the constituency space provided numerous benefits to the gender network, but potentially created a situation where they would have to negotiation with those holding very different views. When it became clear that Population Action International would

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[70] Sabine Bock, WECF, interview with author 2014. Also, Bridget Burns of WEDO makes a similar statement, that the network has become more cohesive by using the constituency status as a forum. Interview with author 2014.
[71] Roger-Mark DeSouza, formerly with Population Action International, interview with author 2014; Gotelind Alber, founding member of Gender CC and first focal point for the Women and Gender Constituency, interview with author 2015.
[72] Interview with author 2014.

not join the women and gender constituency, some members were relieved.[73] To join a

constituency, NGOs simply need to inform the Secretariat. This raised a concern among some

delegates in the constituency that they would have to coordinate with these new members, when

there were fundamental divisions on the reproductive health issues. As Gotelind Aber, one of the

founding members of the constituency, puts it "if an organization would like to joint our

constituency that does not agree with our goals, then there is not much we can do."[74]

The forum provided by constituency status and the norm of speaking with one voice as a

constituency provided incentives for collaboration that ultimately facilitated the development of

the gender frame. Yet, there were also practical reasons for Gender CC to collaborate with the

GGCA. WEDO and IUCN could provide material resources to further work on advancing gender

issues in the context of the UNFCCC.

Early in the mobilization effort of women's rights NGOs, Gender CC saw the value of

well-resourced and well-connected actors also working on gender and climate intersections. Röhr

and Hemmati (2008) underlined that Gender CC members left the Bali Conference buoyed by

the support of IUCN and the Secretariat for the inclusion of gender issues and identified the need

for a formal Secretariat for Gender CC and sustained financing to maintain and grow their

participation in the UNFCCC. Gender CC sought funding to establish a more formalized

structure. Meanwhile, GGCA already had considerable funds from Scandinavian governments

from the outset of its work largely due to the efforts of WEDO and IUCN.[75] This discrepancy

would continue, contributing to the careful engagement of Gender CC with GGCA within the

context of the Women and Gender constituency. The practicalities of incentivizing cooperation

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[73] The respondent asked that this comment be kept off the record. Interview with author 2014.
[74] Interview with author 2014.
[75] Cate Owren, interview with author 2014.

in turn facilitated mutual learning, as Gotelind Aber of Gender CC explains, it is a step-wise

approach to collaboration:

> We have had some doubts, but we see pragmatically there is value to joining forces. We
> had good collaboration during gender day in Doha [in 2012], which is one of the reasons
> why we joined GGCA afterwards. At the moment, we don't work much with GGCA,
> we're in a phase of reflection and evaluation of last five years. We don't have the funding
> to send people to all the sessions. Once we finalize this reflection process, we'll see what
> comes then.[76]

There were multiple reasons that the gender network managed to collaborate among some

groups. The norm of speaking with one voice provided incentives for cooperation. The activities

of key articulators to gain resources augmented these incentives for Gender CC. With greater

interactions, Gender CC and GGCA members could develop a frame that they could stand

behind. For Gender CC, this meant excluding reproductive health organizations, underscoring

the power that less central actors can have in intra-network negotiations.

Externally, WEDO and IUCN proved effective articulators, creating a demand for their

expertise on gender and climate issues. Their efforts to use their authority to disseminate the

discursive frame was amplified by UNEP as a key broker, but not by the gender NGOs in Gender

CC whose participation predated GGCA members.

For WEDO, its relationships with the international organizations and its own experience

and capacity proved helpful to gain recognition of the gender frame. The length of routine

engagement with the UN made WEDO a seasoned veteran of the UN system, recognized by

those within the climate change regime and Gender CC.[77] WEDO played a pivotal role in the Rio

Earth Summit in 1992, collaborating with environmental NGOs and other civil society groups to

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[76] Gotelind Aber, Gender CC, interview with author 2014; Ulrike Röhr, LIFE e.V., interview with author 2014.
[77] Anonymous developing country delegate, interview with author 2014; Gotelind Aber, Gender CC, interview with author 2014.

secure the identification of major groups in Agenda 21, and bringing this organizational

experience into the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women (Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler

1998). Later, WEDO became the convener of the Women's Major Group in the Commission for

Sustainable Development and would organize the women's caucus at the UN Conference on

Population and Development in Cairo (WEDO n.d.). From these beginnings, WEDO continued

to lobby within the UN meetings, including for those on the UN Convention on Biological

Diversity, UN Convention to Combat Desertification, and the Beijing Conference on Women's

Rights. As a UN veteran, WEDO held several advantages when starting its work within the

UNFCCC.

WEDO's connections to state delegates, UN agencies, development organizations, and

donors facilitated material and ideational resources for the network. As noted above, WEDO,

with others in GGCA, proved able to get together the financial resources to help disseminate the

gender frame. While development donors were becoming increasingly interested in gender and

climate change work, WEDO proved uniquely adept at securing this financing.[78] In part, WEDO

had early signals that some development donors were shifting priorities and would be interested

in funding work on gender and climate intersections, which newer organizations without the

same range of experience and network found more difficult to accomplish.[79]

WEDO drew on the visibility of its founders to act as powerful articulators. WEDO

formed in 1991, founded by key feminist figures in the global North and South such as Bella

Abzug, Vandana Shiva, and Wangari Maathai (WEDO n.d.). Wangari Maathai, who won the

Nobel Peace Prize in 2004 for her work with the greenbelt movement that linked the

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[78] Cate Owren, formerly with WEDO, was a central figure to create the GGCA and secure funding. Interview with author 2014.
[79] Ulrike Röhr, LIFE e.V., interview with author 2014. Gotelind Alber, Gender CC, Interview with author 2015.

environment, peace, and development, spoke to the UN Special Session on Climate Change in

2009. Later that year she was named as a UN Messenger of Peace with a special focus on the

environment and climate change (UN News Centre 2009). Calling climate change "the next

global battlefield," she continued her work linking women's rights and forests to the context of

climate change, particularly advocating for inclusion of women in decision making around

REDD+ initiatives.[80]

     Later, other powerful articulators of the gender frame included Mary Robinson, former

President of Ireland and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and UNFCCC Executive

Secretary Christiana Figueres. These articulators were not simply saying "gender matters," they

were articulating the vulnerability of women and their potential agency – the two key facets of

the gender frame. In an article written for CNN, UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana

Figures states "Although climate change affects all people, women often bear the brunt in places

where the impacts of climate change are already being felt. This is due to their central role in

their families and communities… It's easy to label these women as victims, but what makes them

vulnerable also makes them pivotal to climate change action" (Figueres 2014). In part because of

collaboration with key gender NGOs such as WEDO, key women in the climate change regime

became powerful articulators of the gender frame developed by gender NGOs.[81]

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[80] For such statements, see an interview with the Global Call for Climate Action in 2011: Wangari Maathai presses African Union on climate change action, available at http://tcktcktck.org/2011/07/wangari-maathai-presses-african-union-climate-change-action/. Also an interview with John Vidal at the Guardian, 30 May 2009, titled "We know what to do: why don't we do it?" Available at https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/may/30/africa-women-climate-change-wangari-maathai

[81] One example of this is the live Twitter chat hosted by GGCA with Christiana Figueres in 2013. See http://wedo.org/may-14th-1000amedt-chat-with-christiana-figueres-head-of-the-un-climate-negotiations-on-putting-gender-equality-at-the-center-of-climate-policy/

WEDO's experience and networks meant that it could rely on some brokers more than others. First, there were the few NGOs that participated earlier on, those environmental NGOs based in Europe that used gender as a lens to see environmental issues. Those gender NGOs already in the UNFCCC had ties to the Climate Action Network, so qualified as brokers in the sense that they had connections to WEDO and other gender organizations and were embedded in the climate change regime since the early 2000s. While these early NGOs working on gender and environmental intersections had connections with the broader climate change movement, these connections did not help disseminate the gender frame. WEDO's experience as an NGO in UN environmental conferences also meant that there were fewer resources that these NGOs could offer. WEDO understood how to gain accreditation, and was among the first gender NGOs to push for constituency status (later achieved by working with Gender CC). Gender CC members state that they did not provide much direct assistance; for example, Gotelind Aber, a founding member of Gender CC and the first focal point of the Women and Gender constituency points out: "We didn't directly help them. They have experience working at international levels for CSD [Commission on Sustainable Development]. They know how UN processes go."[82]

Second, there were international organizations, particularly UNEP and IUCN. The international organizations proved effective articulators of the regime to others in the climate change regime, because of the recognition of their brand and ability to find resources for the network. Both IUCN and UNEP are founding members of the GGCA. IUCN has unique status in the UNFCCC as an international organization rather than an NGO. Before 2007, the gender office of the IUCN focused its work on biodiversity, later changing toward climate change and

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[82] Anonymous UN employee. Interview with author 2015.

proving adept as securing funding for climate change issues, as noted above. These resources were useful, coming at a time when the GGCA was beginning to organize itself for the 2007 UNFCCC Conference.[83] Over time, IUCN gained a more central place in the gender-climate network, largely through their involvement in the GGCA as its membership expanded.

UNEP's Gender and Environment unit undertook a significant research effort to document the linkages between gender and climate change. Many recognized the limited data available on the gender-climate connections in 2007 and sought to fill these gaps (see Röhr 2007). Among its early publications, UNEP published research on the potential connections between gender and various aspects of climate change policy, such as mitigation, adaptation, and capacity building (Wamukona and Skutsch 2008). UNEP hosted reports provided by other gender advocates, including a 2007 report by Ulrike Röhr who was a member of Gender CC on the on gender, adaptation and climate change. UNEP publications recruited high-level officials to speak on the importance of including women and gender approaches. A 2011 publication titled "Women at the Frontline of Climate Change: Gender Risks and Hopes" included an introduction from then UNEP Executive Director Achim Steiner, stating that "Women play a much stronger role than men in the management of ecosystem services and food security" (UNEP 2011, 7). An endorsement from the highest official of a UN Agency is not guaranteed. UNEP's gender and environment unit managed to secure an important figure to articulate the gender frame.

In turn, these international organizations provided access to their networks within the climate change regime. During the planning stages for what would become the GGCA, international organizations helped identify key actors in the climate change regime, and

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[83] Cate Owren, interview with author 2014.

connections they had specifically within the UNFCCC. The diversity of the GGCA including the

involvement of international organizations multiplied the networks available to spread the

message about gender and climate change.[84] As early as 2005, the early brainstorming explored

and benefitted from this diversity:

> The reason for diversity is really simple at the end of the day. In early years, we'd have
> teleconferences with an incredible array of people on the call talking about priorities,
> strategies, and contacts. It was all hands on deck, let's see where we can make an impact.
> The intergovernmental organizations are an interesting component, bringing a different
> audience, member base, access to different circles. Our combined capacity can work to
> meet a wide audience.[85]

The international organizations provided both resources and connections within the climate

change regime that proved useful to for the gender-climate network to develop the gender frame

and to engage with climate change governors.

The gender network uniquely underlines the importance of carrying authority into the

regime. While gatekeepers of the Gender CC network had already participated in the climate

change negotiations before GGCA mobilized at the UNFCCC, they struggled to find inroads.

The experience of WEDO in other multilateral forums and their access to powerful articulators

helped turn the prospects of gender NGOs' efforts to forum multiply into the UNFCCC. It took a

well-connected and motivated gatekeeper with a recognized brand and established network to

articulate the gender frame in a way that resonated with climate actors. Bolstered by the

credibility of the international organizations acting as a broker, the brand and resources of

WEDO helped the gender NGO network build alliances and gain recognition, even influence, as

a climate governor after years of effort by a small contingent of other gender NGOs.

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[84] Cate Owren, interview with author 2014.
[85] Cate Owren. interview with author 2014

5.3.2 Leveraging Climate Institutions

Entering the climate change regime involved careful planning to identify entry points. Over time, the frame proved malleable enough to align with other institutions, primarily finance, but also mitigation and technology transfer. While it was clear that the climate change regime was silent on many social issues, particularly gender, adaptation proved the only strategic entry point in the beginning. Initially, the gender network sought to bring a social issue to climate change, and attempted to influence several areas of the agreement. The few organizations incorporating gender views on climate change, as Cate Owren, one of the architects of the GGCA explains, "they weren't making any headway because climate change for decades was thought of as a science or business issue. There was no room to open the dialogue, no comprehensive conversation."[86] Ulrike Röhr described the early climate change regime as "technocratic."[87] There was a distinct need to add gender perspectives across several areas, yet many areas of the negotiations were inopportune.

Several doors were effectively closed to gender NGOs as they tested for entry points. In the negotiations over a new shared vision for the goals of the post-Kyoto regime, the GGCA provided called for a provision that "effective and responsive implementation requires that gender considerations and gender balanced participation be incorporated at all levels in all areas of the Bali Action plan" (GGCA 2009b). With Gender CC in the Women and Gender Constituency, the network members suggested a gender paragraph in the shared vision provisions, which would state that:

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[86] Cate Owren, interview with author 2014.
[87] Ulrike Röhr, LIFE e.V., interview with author 2014.

The full integration of gender perspectives is essential to effective action on all aspects of climate change, including adaptation, mitigation, technology sharing, financing, and capacity building. The advancement of women, their leadership and meaningful participation, and their engagement as equal stakeholders in all climate related processes and implementation must be guaranteed (Women and Gender Constituency n.d.)

This suggestion found little traction. Delegates were focused on emissions pathway scenarios and mitigation targets commensurate with 1.5⁰C or 2⁰C average temperature increases. An environmental NGO delegate recalls that the shared vision discussions before Copenhagen "really required us to bring our technically-minded delegates."[88] The negotiations considered emissions pathways and targets consummate with various long-term average temperature increases, depending on what parties viewed as an acceptable level of risk. Laden with technical jargons and focused on environmental goals, it was not an open space for social issues, leaving gender NGOs to focus on adaptation.[89]

The adaptation institutions and emerging norm that it should be primarily focused on developing countries (see Chapter 3) provided several opportunities to claim space in the UNFCCC. As Cate Owren recalls:

Why we engaged in and around 2007 comes down to the process – the LCA [*ad hoc* Working Group for Long Term Cooperative Action, or AWG-LCA] was established in Bali. It really cracked open the sector-specific, isolated issues to new stakeholder groups. The LCA opened it wide, wide. It was the first time at the negotiations an opportunity to talk about other issues. Just winning that kind of framework was the work of many organizations over many years. There was serendipitous surprise that LCA was established and opened up a whole new opportunity.[90]

Using adaptation as the entry point proved advantageous for two reasons. First, the adaptation norm was (and largely remains) that adaptation is principally a developing country issue

[88] Anonymous delegate of an environmental NGO. Interview with author 2015.
[89] Bridget Burns, WEDO, interview with author 2014.
[90] Cate Owren, interview with author 2014.

(Chapter 3). Many of the gender advocates identify, network, and work in solidarity with women in developing countries, which helped them align with this emerging adaptation norm. Second, much of the information at the time stressed women's vulnerabilities to climate change, which aligned with the emerging discourse on adaptation that some countries were more vulnerable than others. Local realities of women informed how gender advocates understood the link between climate change and gender.

First, adaptation seemed like a natural starting point because gender NGOs could use their expertise in development in the context of climate change. When adaptation was framed as a development issue (Chapter 3), gender NGOs recognized themselves as implicated in climate change work. Gender NGOs recognized that climate change could impact the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals, including those related to gender equality.[91] Gender NGOs viewed adaptation as the set of institutions most closely tied to development and gender issues.[92] Women's roles in providing household energy, food, water, and care for children and the elderly increased their reliance on natural systems and vulnerability to changes expected from climate change (Röhr 2007). As June Zeitlin, Executive Direction of WEDO in 2007 said in the press release launching GGCA, "Disasters, like poverty, have a woman's face," closely tying development, gender, and climate-related disasters (GGCA 2007). This identification as part of the wider development effort also influenced what information was available to gender NGOs at the time, which in turn favoured a frame aligned to adaptation and not toward other issues.

Second, much of the information available on the connections between gender and climate change were documenting women's vulnerabilities. Several gender NGOs heard from

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[91] Bridget Burns, WEDO, interview with author 2014.
[92] Bridget Burns, WEDO, interview with author 2014.

their partners in the Global South of the effects of climate change.[93] There was some early

evidence to support a link between gender and adaptation, which did not exist for other areas of

climate policy. This local level evidence was necessary because there was little systematic

research on the links between gender and climate change at first. In part, the IPCC was silent on

gender issues because of the lack of peer reviewed research on gender and climate change

undermined its ability to consider gender issues because the Panel reviews only peer-reviewed

publications (Hemmati 2005). Local evidence on the gendered effects of weather-related

disasters was becoming evident, which, as Irene Dankleman an academic and activist on gender

and climate issues explains, "is why gender and climate change first received specific attention

in adaptation policies, strategies and actions: it became obvious that to adapt adequately and in a

socially-just way one needs a clear analysis of the actual gender situation on the ground."

Documenting the local experiences of women was particularly useful for adaptation and

would form the basis of links to other areas of climate policy. Evidence linking gender to

mitigation, finance or technology was slower to emerge, well after adaptation links were

forged.[94] Many of the connections drawn between these areas of climate policy and gender still

rely on the documented vulnerabilities of women to climate change, aligned the gender frame

and supported it with an evidentiary base documenting the vulnerability and agency of women.

For example, a UNDP (2013) policy brief on gender and climate finance describes the "gender-

climate finance nexus" as:

> Political and socio-economic imbalances often render women disproportionately
> vulnerable to climate change impacts. …Further, because women's livelihoods and
> traditional roles and responsibilities tend to be more reliant on natural resources, climate

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[93] Bridget Burns, WEDO, interview with author 2014.
[94] Irene Dankelman, WEDO, interview with author 2014.

change will greatly affect their lives. Climate finance approaches should, therefore, be sensitive to the gendered aspects of climate change impacts.

As with early calls to make women visible and include gender considerations in adaptation planning, advocates also point out the lack of a gendered approach to climate finance, stressing their potential agency. Williams (2016) carefully documents to lack of mentions of gender in public and private climate finance, within and outside the UNFCCC. Yet, as she argues, the UNFCCC provides the normative framework for climate finance, and therefore, as the UNFCCC recognizes gender issues after the efforts of gender NGOs, climate finance must follow suit.

Similarly, UN Women helped link gender and mitigation through the stories of projects in Mali to use renewable energy to improve agricultural yields (UN Women 2015).[95] This connection follows the pattern of highlighting the marginalization and agency women in the Global South; it follows the gender frame and builds on the evidentiary base used to establish the links between women's agricultural activities on marginal lands and climate vulnerability. By focusing on the abilities of local women to leverage new and clean technology to reduce emissions, the network has a positive example of climate interventions that are also attuned to gender considerations. While the labour movement's research and documentation was concentrated in developed countries and largely geared toward mitigation, the gender network's narratives resided largely in the South, guiding the discursive frame to align with adaptation.

By 2015, gender advocates drew connections to several other areas of climate policy, largely building on their successful formulation of a strong link between gender and adaptation. Gender NGOs have been immensely successful in securing references to gender in UNFCCC

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[95] UN Women started climate change work very late, only starting to participate in 2014.

decisions. Part of this success is the ability of gender NGOs to almost seamlessly integrate into the UNFCCC system.

The second aspect of leveraging institutional that facilitated the successful form multiplying strategies of the gender network was establishing constituency status and reaping the benefits of the political space and official recognition. NGOs within the GGCA and Gender CC could secure constituency status, which granted them recognition within the regime and a space to coordinate among themselves, as discussed above. The gender NGOs, mostly moderate organizations, also aligned with the informal norms of observer participation held by actors in the UNFCCC.

Before the conference in Bali in 2007, there was an informal caucus for organizations and individuals interested in gender issues intended to facilitate discussion. NGOs relied on the "goodwill" of the chairpersons and the Secretariat to gain access to plenary and make statements.[96] There was no dedicated space for those organizations working on gender issues to access delegates or Secretariat services. While requests for the floor were often granted, this informal arrangement seemed too tenuous for NGOs involved in the GGCA:

> At the time [2007], there was only ENGOs and BINGOs [environmental and business and industry NGOs, respectively], and there was strong pushback that recognition of our group wouldn't happen. There was strong resistance to the idea of giving us a constituency. It was another reason we formed the GGCA. If we couldn't have a formal space, we'd make the space. At the end of the day, it was the governments that didn't want these stakeholders there.[97]

Like labour unions working to establish a constituency for trade unions, gender NGOs recall resistance on the part of the Secretariat and some countries to establishing a constituency

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[96] Ulrike Rohr, LiFE e.V., interview with author 2014.
[97] Cate Owren, interview with author 2014.

for women and gender NGOs. WEDO and some Gender CC members took the lead in applying for the status. They leveraged the same norm as the labour movement. As a Major Group under the Agenda 21 schema, gender NGOs argued they should be a constituency based on the norm that the UNFCCC constituency system mirrors the Agenda 21 system. In 2008, the Women and Gender constituency was formed on a two-year provisional basis, pending a report on the constituency's membership and activities.

Constituency status conferred tangible and intangible benefits for gender NGOs and set gender NGOs apart from the other civil society groups. For one delegate this helps get attention above the cacophony of voices vying for attention in the UNFCCC: "Because we have this constituency, some people were willing to listen to us more than other issues than have not been as recognized."[98] In particular, space was set aside for the Constituency to make statements in plenary, which afforded an opportunity to highlight that there are gendered aspects to various climate policies, from finance to adaptation, and mitigation to technology transfer. Because gender is a cross-cutting issue, plenary statements are particularly useful because they are a time when delegates consider all the agenda items and when the constituency can speak to the full range.

Constituency status also facilitated mobilization and recruitment of allies in the climate system, a vital part of their strategies for forum multiplying and influence at the UNFCCC. The gender NGOs agreed that any delegate with an interest in gender issues could attend their meetings. This helped build a network of representatives from states, international organizations, and civil society who were briefed on the links between gender and the key issues in the

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[98] Camille Risler, Asia Pacific Forum for Women, Law and Environment

negotiations. Practically, constituency status facilitates this mobilization by advertising the time and location of constituency meetings. More fundamentally, the status provides visibility and recognition of the role of gender NGOs in the UNFCCC process and a dedicated space to recruit, teach, and deploy climate governors on gender issues.

That mobilization and coordination helped build widespread support for gender issues and eventually a network of state and observers delegates that would support the gender frame. For example, gender advocates recognized opportunities laid within the development of the Paris Agreement "rule book."[99] Advocates in the Women and Gender constituency reported that early negotiations on the rules that will operationalize the Agreement lacked any reference to gender,[100] and many of these meetings limited observer access. The next day, Mexico, a regular participant in constituency and other gender-related meetings, called for addressing how the preambular references to gender and other social issues will be reflected in the subsequent negotiations (IISD 2016). The constituency status helped mobilize and recruit allies which have proved useful to advancing women's rights and gender issues in the context of climate change.

Gender NGOs aligned with the rules and informal norms of observer participation in the UNFCCC, quickly integrating into the broader civil society contingent. This alignment was not necessarily strategic. It was an outgrowth of the traditional repertoires of action of the network. WEDO, as mentioned above, has extensive experience participating in UN conferences on environmental and development issues. Even those gender NGOs empathetic to the climate justice movement and its more outsider-based tactics such as civil disobedience and protest (see

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[99] Decision 1/CP.21 (the Paris outcome) tasks several UNFCCC subsidiary and constituted bodies with work to develop a common set of rules for the provisions of the Paris Agreement. For example, the SBSTA is to develop common rules and modalities for the accounting of the provision and mobilization of financial resources to developing countries.
[100] Internal email to the Constituency in May 2016.

Chapter 6), do not help plan the actions and only sometimes participate.[101] This gives the

network a repertoire of action of insider lobbying and networking with delegates very like the

repertoires used by Climate Action Now. State delegates and the UNFCCC Secretariat are

accustomed to and prefer these methods of interaction. One UN staff member described how the

gender NGOs as knew and played by the rules of the UNFCCC from the early days of its

constituency status.[102] The ability of the NGOs to blend in wasn't lost on state delegates either,

who were impressed at their political acumen and ability to "teach" delegates about gender

issues.[103] Aligning to the norms of how observers ought to behave in the UNFCCC helped the

network find allies and openings with delegates that were willing to listen.

The gender NGOs largely aligned with and benefitted from the procedural norms of

observer behaviour simply because of who they are. Having helped to secure status for women as

a Major Group identified in Agenda 21 at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, some of these same

NGOs could use that status to acquire constituency status at the UNFCCC. Their moderate

tactics and strategies, developed through working in UN conferences on various topics over

decades, further aligned them to the norms of observer behaviour. The benefits conferred upon

the constituency certainly required effort on the part of the network, particularly to stake a claim

of belonging in the UNFCCC. Yet, their identity as gender NGOs and their traditional repertoires

of action greatly facilitated their ability to mobilize and gain recognition in the UNFCCC.

5.4 Conclusion

Several dynamics facilitating the successful forum multiplying of the gender NGO

network are like the labour movement's experience. The trigger for gender NGOs was the

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[101] Anonymous climate justice advocate, interview with author 2014.
[102] Anonymous UN staff member, interview with author 2014.
[103] Anonymous developed country delegate, interview with author 2015.

adaptation turn, unlike labour's implication in the mitigation institutions. When governors began

to reframe their thinking of climate change to include its impacts, new institutions were

establishing to discuss climate resilience and adaptation to climactic changes. In turn, gender

NGOs viewed themselves as implicated in the climate change regime as never before, and sought

to fill the "black hole" in their advocacy efforts. The gender NGOs used the knowledge,

research, and precedents in other areas to leverage these institutions, whether it was

substantiating the diagnostic element of the gender frame, or arguing for a place in the

constituency system.

Also like the labour network, the gender NGOs developed a broad frame to accommodate

most views. The gender-climate network began divided but proved able to cooperate and rally

around a common understanding of the gender frame. They set aside differences in their views

on market mechanisms and constructed a frame based on their similar views regarding women's

vulnerabilities to climate change and ability to contribute toward better climate solutions. Early

coordination efforts between the GGCA and Gender CC were successful, although the price was

keeping reproductive issues on the sidelines, as a late arrival carrying its own baggage from an

unassociated, vocal minority with a controversial message. Like labour, the gender-climate

network had powerful articulators from within the network and later from outside the network.

While carrying their authority into the climate change regime, gender advocates quickly became

accept as "one of us" by climate change governors.

The experience of the gender NGOs' forum multiplying efforts offers unique lessons. To

develop and defend a frame meant the gatekeepers had to coordinate. Neutral ground, as it were,

was useful in this coordination. The UNFCCC constituency space secured through coordination

between GGCA and Gender CC members served as a meeting place for these parts of the

network. Where the ITUC could convene negotiation at its World Congress, and use peer pressure to bring some members in line, the gender NGOs organized within physical and political space of the UNFCCC.

This frame was remarkably resonant, leading to gender advocates gaining recognition and holding influence in the climate change negotiations. Subsequent use of the gender frame in other issue areas and by other articulators in the climate change regime maintained the two pillars of the gender frame, unlike the climate justice network, whose central frame was appropriated and its meaning transformed, as explored in the next chapter.

Chapter 6: The Climate Justice Movement

System Change Not Climate Change

The climate justice movement broke away from traditional climate activism and illustrated a different way to forum multiply other than the model shown by the labour or women's rights movements. Unabashedly antagonistic, the climate justice movement sought to overturn the status quo of the capitalist system, the entrenched power relations of geopolitics, and the moderate, market-friendly approaches espoused by several mainstream climate change NGOs. This complex critique abridged under the banner "system change not climate change" and loosely united a diverse movement.

The climate justice movement began when activists from the global justice movement, also called the alterglobalization movement, joined with environmental activists and indigenous rights activists in 2007. Regarding the three aspects of forum multiplying, their public act was signaled by the participation of the alterglobalization movement that increased rapidly. The discursive frame underlined their commitment to the shared cause of addressing climate change, centered around the climate justice frame. Unlike the labour and gender advocates that committed to upholding climate change institutions, climate justice advocates sought to attain the goals of the regime, but disagreed with several of the institutions of the climate change regime. Their solutions varied from other movements, often calling for resources transfers from the North to the South. Their commitment was to solving climate change in a way that protected vulnerable communities without using market mechanisms and other "false solutions."

The third aspect, recognition, was more elusive. Several developing countries, particularly some Latin American states but also countries such as Malaysia, employed the climate justice frame. Delegates from the Like-minded Group of Developing Countries, a

significant and powerful negotiating coalition that included China, India, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and many Latin American Countries among others, participated in side events organized by members of the climate justice movement.[1]

The extent of the mobilization was limited to a certain type of ally. Countries such as Bolivia, and environmental NGOs interested in a more radical critique were on board and served as important new allies for the alterglobalization movement. Yet, the climate justice movement was unable to secure more powerful allies, which were useful for the gender and labour networks. Developed countries were reticent, even outright opposed, to the term climate justice. Their opposition is why the Paris Agreement qualifies the reference to climate justice, noting that the concept "matters for some."[2]

> the importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, including oceans, and the protection of biodiversity, recognized by some cultures as Mother Earth, and noting the importance for some of the concept of "climate justice," when taking action to address climate change (UNFCCC 2015, 21, quotes in original).

Similarly, major civil society groups opposed CJN!. As explored more below, CJN! from the outset defined itself in opposition to the Climate Action Network. While there was some degree of convergence between the groups at local-level events, the was no appetite for more formal coordination or collaboration because the ideological differences were too wide.[3] The antagonistic frame, which linked to institutions of central importance to developed countries, narrowed the scope of who would be willing to accept and recognize the frame.

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[1] Personal observation from June 2014 and 2015 and December 2015. Delegates from Venezuela and China in particular would participate on panel discussions at side events on the theme of climate justice.
[2] Anonymous developing country delegate, interview with author 2014.
[3] This environmental NGO delegate asked that this comment be off the record. Interview with author 2014.

The climate justice movement, particularly the alterglobalization movement, successfully engaged in forum multiplying strategies, in a way that kept with their identity as a critical left movement engaged in solving systemic inequalities. Their recognition is more partial than the labour or gender networks. Some support the alterglobalization movement, powerful voices oppose it, while others appropriated the term climate justice. Still, the movement mobilized a group of NGOs and states critical of climate governance at international levels and spawned dozens of regional and local climate justice movements in broader transnational movement.

While the movement gained some recognition on its own terms, its frame was appropriated by other climate change governors who changed its central message. The term climate justice is now popular, albeit as a watered-down version of the original meaning intended by climate justice activists. Now mainstream environmental NGOs and others use the term climate justice to refer to disproportionate effects developing countries face, despite contributing very little to the climate crisis, and infer that this is an injustice. Often, the climate justice frame is now used in the context of loss and damage (Allan and Hadden forthcoming), despite its original use to critique the many mitigation institutions as "false solutions." Once meant as a critique of the neoliberal system that highlighted climate change as a dangerous consequence of that system, the term is now used by those unattached to the movement, which emerged largely from the trade regime and domestic environmental justice struggles.

The climate justice movement has attracted considerable scholarly and public attention. Many commented on the mobilization of the climate justice movement at the 2009 Copenhagen conference (Chatterton et al. 2012; Fischer 2010; Hadden 2015). The climate justice movement's opposition to mainstream environmentalism has had wider implications, including challenging traditional climate activists' accountability politics (Newell 2008), and moderate, staid forms of

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activism (Hadden 2015). Often overlooked are the years of mobilization effort preceding the

movement's more visible emergence in 2009. This chapter augments these accounts by exploring

the origins of the climate justice movement and its trajectory within the climate change regime,

particularly the motives of those actors from the trade regime that became key founding

members. Internal divisions in the network and tightened security influenced the movement's

strategies, pushing the movement largely outside the halls of the UNFCCC. The diversity of the

movement provided intellectual and strategic strength to create the climate justice frame, but

their decision to remain a loose network, unlike the more coordinated gender and labour

movements, created a challenge for coordination efforts over time.

Unlike many other scholarly accounts of the climate justice movement, this chapter also

disaggregates the movement, considering the views and motives of its constituent parts. The

climate justice movement is diverse, with roots stretching back to several other movements and

groups of NGOs. Bullard and Mueller (n.d.) highlight the role of the alterglobalization

movement, environmental justice movement, and more radical environmental NGOs. Within the

broad alterglobalization movement, Bond and Dorsey (2010) further cite the role of the late

1990s Jubilee movement and 2000s justice movement in the climate justice movement's lineage.

The alterglobalization movement includes organizations such as Focus on the Global South,

ATTAC, Global Trade Watch, Jubilee South, and the Transnational Institute (della Porta and

Tarrow 2005). Nicholson and Chong (2011) highlight the intersections of human rights and

justice claims, although Bond and Dorsey (2012) and Chatterton et al. (2012) observe that human

rights advocates and claims are not involved in the work of building the climate justice

movement. While most concur that the climate justice movement is a "movement of

movements,"[4] invoking rhetoric of inclusion common with the justice movement,[5] another

activist characterizes climate justice as a campaign.[6]

Here, I take the more widely held view of the climate justice movement emerging from a

diverse set of movements. I focus on a principal progenitor of the movement from outside the

climate change regime, the global alterglobalist movement. The motives of this movement to

forum multiply largely stemmed from the stalemate in the WTO.

6.1 Climate Justice Network

The Climate Justice movement grew considerably over time, bringing more

alterglobalists into the climate change regime after 2009. The size of the network and centrality

of several actors grew dramatically, as seen in table 6-1 below.

Measure	2005-2008			2009-2015		
Size (number of nodes)	482			984		
Centrality	In-Degree	Out-Degree	Average Degree	In-Degree	Out-Degree	Average Degree
Focus on the Global South	30	42	36	60	141	100.5
Transnational Institute	27	90	58.5	46	95	70.5
World Rainforest Movement	27	43	35	47	120	83.5
La Via Campesina	21	20	20.5	49	119	84
Friends of the Earth	22	82	52	76	190	133
Jubilee South	5	17	11	77	145	111
Third World Network	21	20	20.5	68	21	44.5
International Forum on Globalization	24	26	25	69	189	129
Indigenous Environment Network	20	40	30	46	120	83

Table 6-1: Descriptive statistics on the climate justice network

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[4] Dorothy Guerrero, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2015; Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014; Sam Lund, World Development Movement, interview with author 2014.
[5] See, for example, Tom Mertes and Walden Bello. 2004. *A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?* (London: Verso, 2004)
[6] Anonymous, interview with author 2014. This interviewee was present in the early years of CJN!.

The original network, shown in figure 6-1, was relatively small with three clusters. The first cluster below Focus on the Global South is CJN! formed in 2007. Around the Corner House is the Durban Group for Climate Justice, a group of environmental NGOs that were already in the UNFCCC and critical of the use of market mechanisms and the commodification of nature that those mechanisms entail. The last group is around Jubilee South and represents the Our World is Not for Sale movement and others in the alterglobalization movement connected to Focus on the Global South, but not yet part of CJN! or the climate justice movement.

Figure 6-1 Climate justice network, 2005-2008

The early climate justice movement centered around the Durban Group for Climate Justice, which brought considerable knowledge about climate change market mechanisms and the CJN! which brought a more antagonistic approach to contentious politics. In the next period,

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however, more organizations from the alterglobal movement would join the climate justice

movement and move into central positions in the network.

Figure 6-2 Climate justice network, 2009-2015

During and after the 2009 conference in Copenhagen, the network size nearly doubled.

Previously there was 482 organizations that could hear of the burgeoning movement. As

mobilization efforts continued, 984 organizations were either directly involved or could receive

information about the climate justice movement. Growth was evident among the

alterglobalization movement, indigenous rights groups, and environmental activists upset with

the Climate Action Network. The Durban Group for Climate Justice was largely absorbed by

CJN!, the large main component in the network. Above CJN!, around the Pan African Climate

Justice Alliance is the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice. This group formed in 2011

and shares many members with CJN!. Discussed below, this new group led to tensions within

CJN!, and has been used by members of CJN!, many of whom were also in the alterglobalization movement, to mobilize national-level climate justice movements.

Mirroring the experience of the labour and gender gatekeepers, many of the central actors in the climate justice network solidified their centrality over time. Members of the alterglobalization movement increased the centrality of their role in the climate justice movement over time. Jubilee South and the International Forum on Globalization were (and remain) a central organization in the alterglobalization movement. With their engagement in the climate change-specific networks including CJN! and the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice, the organizations drastically improved their place in the climate justice movement. Jubilee South moved from a marginal place with an average degree of 11 to an influential actor with an average degree of 111. As the alterglobal movement mobilized in the climate justice movement, joining the work of the Durban Group and others, the central actors in the alterglobal movement became central figures in the climate justice movement.

La Via Campesina, a movement that has not registered for the UNFCCC, also improved its central role in the climate justice movement. The peasant movement has several connections with key members of the alterglobalization movement that did participate within the UNFCCC. Over time, these connections increased, particularly in its influence. For example, one internal planning meeting discussed the need to continue to ally with the peasant movement and support the actions of La Via Campesina in its climate caravan travelling toward the Cancun climate COP. La Via Campesina has not directly discussed these plans with those present at the meeting;

instead, the participants said they had heard of the caravan (a sign of out-degree) and wished to support it.[7]

Friends of the Earth International also became more central. In the initial stages, Friends of the Earth International had a low in-degree but one of the highest out-degree scores. This suggests that the environmental NGO had several connections within the alterglobalization movement, but far more outside of it. As discussed more below, Friends of the Earth International was a key broker for the climate justice movement, providing key introductions and navigation advice in the UNFCCC. These efforts seem to have awarded the organization with greater centrality, both in terms of its prestige (in-degree) and influence (out-degree) in the network through increasing its relationships inside the climate justice movement.

The multiple central actors could all share information and gather information from diverse sources. Successful mobilization and the emergence of multiple groups within the network increased its size, and the need for collaboration among these key actors and others in the network. Internal debates ensued on how to ensure that messages were coordinated, the frame was coherent and strategies united, as discussed below, and were difficult to resolve because CJN! and the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice were purposely kept as loose networks, without a central organizing force.[8] The climate justice movement is clearly diverse, including alterglobalists, environmental NGOs, and indigenous peoples, yet they shared primarily political motivations to participate in the climate change regime.

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[7] Notes from a planning meeting June 2011 shared by a CJN! organizer.
[8] Appendix A discusses how the social network analysis indicators varied slightly for the climate justice movement because of this difference. Because there was no formal alliance or list of members, the press releases of the Durban Group for Climate Justice, CJN!, and the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice were used as evidence of shared membership in the group.

6.2   Motivations

For the alterglobalization movement political motivations predominated. Material motivations were present, although ultimately funding was unavailable to movements questioning the status quo of climate governance. Normative motivations were present among some parts of the climate justice movement, although they were less predominant for the alterglobalization movement.

Political motivations sparked the coming together of movements into the climate justice movement. Many of these debates reflected deep divisions evident before the Doha Round launched, during debates over issues such as agricultural subsidies, labour rights, and antidumping duties; while developing countries wanted to discuss textiles and apparel, developed countries were interested in investment and competition (VanGrasstek 2013 375-85).

The alterglobalization movement had several successes in the late 1990s. In Seattle, bringing together different movements created a "phantasmagorical mix of tens of thousands of demonstrators," from "teamsters to turtles," put the issue of fair trade onto the political agenda (Cooper 1999). After raising the profile of fair trade, alterglobal activists then "helped render the WTO a pointless talk shop" (Bullard and Mueller 2012b). Stalemate in the WTO and discussions in the G8 around climate change prompted the alterglobalization movement to search for entry into the climate change regime. In the WTO, delegates repeated discussions in the Doha Round year after year.

Around the same time, the term neoliberalism lost its resonance, leaving many activists in the alterglobal movement frustrated. At the G8 in 2005, 300,000 people marched to ask the G8 to "Make Poverty History." Instead of protesting global capitalist powers conspiring together in a small, opaque process, people marched in support of the Summit and seemed convinced that

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global elites could, and would, address global poverty. Firmly holding that global poverty was a symptom of the neoliberal system, this march was a sign to those in the movement that the momentum they sparked in Seattle had been captured and turned against them, that people were for, not against, neoliberalism (Turbulence Collective 2007). When the G8 later started to discuss climate change, the alterglobal movement lacked a response to the newly greened capitalist agenda (Turbulence Collective 2007). As Nicola Bullard, a central activist in the burgeoning climate justice movement explains "movements need something to come up against, something for traction. After 9/11 and the collapse of the WTO, the wind was out of the sails of the anti-globalization movement."[9] Another climate justice activist stresses "as much as we were a movement without a story at that point, there was also a story without a movement, climate change" (quoted in Hadden 2015, 34). Politically, the trade regime offered little to the alterglobalization movement to keep its critique alive. It needed a new cause.

To bring the movement to its new story stemmed from normative convictions that addressing underlying systemic problems and hearing people from the Global South could address climate change. The problems related to climate change became more evident, including from the IPCC.[10] Several respondents cite the IPCC report on the impacts of climate change as a turning point.[11] As the IPCC's fourth Assessment Report outlined, developing countries that are among the first and worst affected by climate change. With its roots in the Global South, the alterglobal movement also came to see some climate solutions as problematic; for instance, REDD+ had some pilot projects underway and were already negatively impacting people on the

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[9] Interview with author 2014.
[10] Several climate justice activists cited the IPCC as a motivating factor, including Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014; anonymous CJN! organizing, interview with author 2014.
[11] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014; Wally Menne, TImberWatch, interview with author 2014.

ground in Indonesia and the Philippines, prompting many working in Southeast Asia within the

alterglobalization movement to seek to justice for those affected.[12] Armed with the information

from the IPCC, members of the alterglobalization movement sought to address climate change

and protect local communities from the neoliberal machinations of climate solutions.

There was a strong motivation to include perspectives from the developing world, which

many climate justice advocates viewed as excluded from the climate change dialogue.[13] The

disproportionate impact of climate change on developing countries was evident to these activists,

as justice activists reported the impacts of climate change on peoples' livelihoods.[14] For some of

these activists the solution was to make the voices of the South heard. Their principal motivation

was "to have another coalition of groups who were more representative of the CSOs [civil

society organizations] and social movement from the South, and who rallied around climate

justice."[15] Bringing representatives of the Global South to the global climate negotiations could

not happen on normative or political desires alone. There was a normative motivation to address

climate change in a way that recognized and empowered local communities.

Funding was a motivation for some organizations within the alterglobalization

movement, although there was a strong sense that principled engagement must take precedence

over the search for material support. As Wally Menne of Timberwatch explains "If you've been

in the NGO game for long enough you realize all these things are connected. It's no great

hardship to digress from the core issue, and funding is part of it, but you certainly have to be

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[12] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014.
[13] Anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014.
[14] Dorothy Guerrero, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2015.
[15] Meena Raman, Third World Network. Interview with author 2014.

genuine."[16] Similarly, while Focus on the Global South received funding to convene dialogues on climate change in the Southeast Asian region, those within the organization didn't view funding as a dominant reason to campaign on climate change issues. For them, the climate change work had to match their goals and continue their systemic critique.[17]

Others were more pragmatic than principled. Material resources are a consistent need for many of the smaller organizations involved in the alterglobalization movement or environmental justice struggles. For these NGOs, there is a need to following the funding, even changing the emphasis of local work to survive.[18] Yet, the gamble did not pay off for many. Organizations actively taking a stance against REDD+ for example lost funding, as Simone Lovera of the Global Forest Coalition explains,

> We found out the hard way that NGOs are strongly funded by a quite conservative corporative elitist sector. There are no alternatives, southern governments such as ALBA haven't been funding critical groups, and they have their own issues with funding NGOs. If people lack capacity, then simply don't have the money to work. It's a bitter reality.[19]

The struggle for funds would plague several members of the climate justice movement, which contributed to debates and divides over strategy. Many of the tasks of organizing the network fell to activists volunteering their time or staff of organizations with other duties; there was no personnel dedicated to advancing cooperation of the loose network.[20] Described more below, these debates perhaps hampered the ability of the network to advance its frame within the UNFCCC.

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[16] Timberwatch is an environmental NGO focused on forest conservation and management that is part of the Durban Group for Climate Justice and later Climate Justice Now! Interview with author 2014.
[17] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014.
[18] Wally Menne, TimberWatch, interview with author 2014.
[19] Interview with author 2014.
[20] Anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014; Anne Petermann, Global Justice Ecology Project, interview with author 2014.

Climate change represented a new manifestation of the alterglobalization movement's traditional struggle. Left without openings in the stalemate that characterized the trade regime in the mid-2000s, the alterglobalization movement found a new cause in climate change. This political calculation was buoyed by early evidence of the effects of climate change and the marginalization of local communities from market-based solutions that negatively impacted them. These motivations predominated, although funding concerns are omnipresent among smaller NGOs engaged in the struggle against corporate elites embedded in the neoliberal system.

6.3   Mobilization

Unlike the labour or gender movements, the alterglobalization movement lacked even a minimal presence in the UNFCCC prior to its rapid on start. As Figure 6.1 shows below, the only other appearance of justice-based organizations was in 2005 at the COP in Montreal when three organizations, including San Francisco-based environmental justice and global justice organizations such Redefining Progress attended. At COP 13 in Bali in 2007, a mobilization of the alterglobalization movement met with like-minded environmental NGOs and indigenous peoples activists to launch the climate justice movement and bring a social justice critique to climate change.

Figure 6-3: Alterglobalization movement's participation in the UNFCCC

As Figure 6-3 above shows, a rapid beginning and subsequent mobilization of the alterglobalization movement in the UNFCCC after the launch the Climate Justice Now! network in 2007. Still, the graph underestimates the extent of the climate justice movement's engagement in the UNFCCC perhaps more than other networks. The climate justice movement included several groups that, on their face, would be difficult to attribute to the climate justice movement. For example, the Indigenous Environmental Network served a key role in the formation of CJN!. Based on the mission of the Indigenous Environmental Network,[21] it would be difficult to categorize the Network as an alterglobalization movement member, although it is at times

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[21] The mission of the Indigenous Environmental Network is: The Indigenous Peoples of the Americas have lived for over 500 years in confrontation with an immigrant society that holds an opposing world view. As a result we are now facing an environmental crisis which threatens the survival of all natural life. See: http://www.ienearth.org/about/

affiliated with aspects of the movement. Indigenous rights groups were often divided in the climate negotiations, particularly over land-based mitigation schemes such as REDD+.[22]

Further, the participation data underestimates the size of the climate justice movement because of the outsider strategies of the group and considerable amount of national-level mobilization. This underestimation is very likely to a greater extent and more systematic than with other cases explored here. While some gender and labour activists participated outside conferences, many larger CJN! members or affiliates eschewed formal accreditation to the UNFCCC. The global peasant movement, La Via Campesina organized climate justice marches, caravans, and solidarity events around the UNFCCC conferences. Members of global climate movement active in the climate justice movement, 350.org regularly participates in climate change conferences from the outside and organizes domestic actions. Without their formal participation inside the venue, their role is missing from the data. Yet, the data still shows a rapid start of alterglobal organizations engaged in the UNFCCC starting in 2007.

The location of the 2007 meeting in Indonesia mattered for climate justice activists. One of the key mobilizing actors was the Indonesian People's Movement Against Neo-colonialism and Imperialism (Gerak Lewan).[23] Gerak Lewan reached out to its contacts within the alterglobalization movement to organize a mobilization at the UNFCCC COP.[24] Several key actors, including Focus on the Global South and the Jubilee movement located in Southeast Asia answered the call. At the time, the region was already experiencing impacts of climate change and the issue of forests was climbing the political agenda in the UNFCCC. Forests remain a vital

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[22] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014
[23] Gerak Lewan later organized the protests around the Nineteenth Ministerial of the WTO in Bali in November 2014.
[24] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014.

sector, a basis for livelihoods, and a flashpoint in the region, prompting several regional

alterglobal organizations' initial attendance.[25]

The origin of the climate justice movement was more spontaneous, illustrating that forum

multiplying may be an emergent property. Various members from the alterglobal movement and

from other groups that would form the climate justice movement arrived separately, of their own

motivations. At the Bali conference activists met in a parallel space called the Solidarity Village

for a Cool Planet. It was here that NGOs found commonalities in their approaches despite

differences in their subject. Organizations with different concerns, including forests, indigenous

rights, trade, and environment connected and discovered they shared common views and

challenges.[26] It was a synthetic process, building connections between environmental and social

issues and viewing these issues as parts of larger processes at work – globalization,

environmental destruction, impacts of climate change on local communities.[27] It was a

spontaneous formation of a movement, unlike the labour movement and the GGCA that planned

their launches at the 2007 conference, showing that forum multiplying may not necessarily be a

planned activity, but also a byproduct of the forum serving as a "coral reef" for transnational

actors to meet and organize.

In this coming together of groups, many cite the involvement of Friends of the Earth as a

turning point in the formation of CJN!. Multiple respondents retold the narrative of Friends of

the Earth severing ties from the Climate Action Network, and "walking down the hall" toward

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[25] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014; Dorothy Guerrero, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2015.

[26] Wally Menne, TimberWatch, interview with author 2014; Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014.

[27] Wally Menne, TimberWatch, interview with author 2014; Anne Petermann, Global Justice Ecology Project, interview with author 2014.

the nascent CJN! group.[28] This moment signals the importance of forming a new identity for the movement in the climate change activism space – one separate from the Climate Action Network – and the recognition of a major climate change NGO of the climate justice frame and proponents.

The importance of this origin story may be symbolic. Another climate justice activist present, however, underplays this event, citing Friends of the Earth's previous engagement with the alterglobalization movement fighting against Shell in Nigeria, coal in South Africa, deforestation in Malaysia, and collaborating with La Via Campesina in other forums. For this activist, these local movements lacked a global location, and the timing was right to discuss the linkages between climate and these local justice movements.[29] There were strategic benefits to the major environmental NGO that stood ready to serve as a broker for the climate justice movement.

CJN! made its presence felt immediately. Protesters disrupted a press conference held by Richard Branson.[30] On the last day of the negotiations, 130 protestors staged a "die in" to disrupt a World Bank press conference announcing the launch of the Forest Carbon Partnership.[31] These

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[28] Eight interviewees relayed this story, most of which used the term "walked down the hall." This group includes founding members of CJN! such as Anne Peterman, Global Justice Ecology Project, interview with author 2014; Tamra Gilbertson, Carbon Trade Watch, interview with author 2014; and Sam Lund-Harket, World Development Movement, interview with author 2014. Also others highlighting this event include: Michael Dorsey, Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, interview with author 2014; and an anonymous climate justice activist, interview with author 2014.

[29] Anonymous climate justice activist who was present at the 2007 Bali Conference and worked with the key founding members of CJN!, interview with author 2014.

[30] Anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014; Anne Peterman, Global Justice Ecology Project, interview with author 2014.

[31] Anne Peterman, Global Justice Ecology Project, interview with author 2014.

tactics would the new movement garner the attention of others, particularly environmental NGOs

that had been disenfranchised with the Climate Action Network and soon joined the CJN! fold.[32]

In the leadup to the Copenhagen conference, the climate justice contingent grew. Another

network, the Climate Justice Action formed with some CJN! members and European-based

activists to mobilize the Reclaim Power Assembly, squatter's camps, and activist trauma centers

in Copenhagen (for a complete look at the centers mobilized in Copenhagen see Chatterton et al

2012). These mobilization efforts were in response to calls for the type of summitry protests used

by the justice movement in Seattle, some climate justice activists openly called for protesters to

"Seattle" the Copenhagen conference and shut it down (Bond 2012). Some civil disobedience

occurred, but not on the scale of the Seattle WTO protests (Hadden 2015). The largest

mobilization of the climate justice movement was in the march held December 12, 2009, which

was coordinated in conjunction with environmental and other NGOs. The climate justice

movement, the labour movement, the Global Call for Climate Action,[33] and others each started in

a different city block and marched under their own banner, with their distinct messages.[34]

It was a catalytic moment for the climate justice movement. Despite multilateral failure

by states in Copenhagen, the movement earned a place as a distinct, radical force within the

climate change regime. CJN! positioned itself in contrast to parties' failure to adopt an

agreement:

> Government and corporate elites here in Copenhagen made no attempt to satisfy the
> expectations of the world... Virtually every proposal discussed in Copenhagen was based
> on a desire to create opportunities for profit rather than to reduce emissions. The only
> discussions of real solutions in Copenhagen took place in social movements. Climate

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[32] Teresa Andersen, interview with author 2014.

[33] The Global Call for Climate Action is a group founded by many of the large environmental NGOs that organized the *tcktcktck* campaign in the lead up to the Copenhagen Conference.

[34] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014.

Justice Now!, Climate Justice Action and Klimaforum09 articulated many creative ideas and attempted to deliver those ideas to the UN Climate Change Conference through the Klimaforum09 People's Declaration and the Reclaim Power People's Assembly (CJN! 2009).

Discussed more below, CJN! managed to also secure a formal place within the UNFCCC institution. CJN! negotiated "half" of a constituency spot, by convincing the UNFCCC Secretariat that Climate Action Network did not speak on behalf of all environmental NGOs and should share speaking time in plenary, among other benefits. CJN! underscored differences between the groups were irreconcilable and earned recognition as part of the environmental NGO constituency.[35]

According to internal meeting minutes, CJN! members identified several successes for the movement from the Copenhagen mobilization, including bringing an ethical perspective to the negotiations, securing a space in the UNFCCC, and including groups that previously had not worked on climate change issues.[36]

Unlike other groups that faced existential crises after the failure in Copenhagen, the climate justice movement maintained significant momentum. In 2010 and 2011, at least 125 and 75 delegates attended from the climate justice movement to try to influence the shape of the both the Cancun and Durban conferences on the inside, respectively. Outside, considerable marches were held on the streets, particularly in Durban. During these years, La Via Campesina started engaging with climate justice, and became allies of the movement, often mobilizing outside the conferences.[37] In Cancun, activists formed a human chain in front of delegates to prevent delegates from leaving. After UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres came to

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[35] Anonymous UNFCCC Secretariat member, interview with author 2014.
[36] CJN! internal meeting minutes from June 2010. Shared with author from a CJN! member.
[37] CJN! internal meeting minutes from June 2010. Shared with author from a CJN! member.

negotiate with the protesters, some lost their badges and were put on a bus to leave the venue; as a CJN! member who was at that action recalls: "They [the activists] got a lot more publicity from that. It was around that time that people really started talking about CJN!."[38]

While CJN! garnered even more attention, internal debates and divisions continued and, to some, fractured the movement. The Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice emerged in 2011, formed by many CJN! members, including Friends of the Earth, Jubilee South, ATTAC France and the World Development Movement (GCDCJ n.d.). The Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice shares a similar philosophical view, ascribing climate change to: profit-driven and growth-oriented extraction and consumption systems; unequal and exploitative economic and social structures; and policies and practices promoted by economic elites (GCDCJ n.d.).

For some members of the Global Call to Demand Climate Justice, the new forum helped mobilize national groups and did not duplicate the work happening within or around the UNFCCC conferences.[39] To some founding members of CJN! this was an "intentional undermining of prior commitments to CJN!" and which worried some that the movement may be losing steam.[40]

In 2012 through to the Paris Agreement, participation inside the venue waned somewhat before the Paris conference while national mobilizations and outside actions continued. Justice delegates numbered 36 in 2012, 49 in 2013 and 2014, before mobilizing 126 delegates inside the venue for the Paris Conference in 2015. In part, these declining numbers are a function of the location. CJN! members often struggle for funding for their participation, making their attendance more unpredictable, particularly at more difficult locations such as Qatar (the

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[38] Anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014.
[39] Dorothy Guererro, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2015.
[40] Anonymous climate justice activist, interview with author 2014.

conference location in 2012).[41] At any given conference, different members will come, often complicating efforts to plan strategies or actions.[42]

Others challenge the notion that the climate justice movement waned in the years before the Paris agreement. Instead, what changed was the visibility of the network inside the negotiations; the movement engaged in more outsider tactics than insider lobbying, while still attempting to keep the dual strategy alive. The sustained formal engagement with the UNFCCC declined, but many movements at local, national, and global scales working along the principles of the climate justice movement.[43] The formal engagement that remained proved contentious, including concerns that northern voices were occupying the space CJN! carved for marginalized groups.[44] Eschewing the performances of insider politics, the movement pivoted somewhat toward outsider strategies before the Paris Conference.

In many ways, the mobilization planning for the Paris Conference mirrored that of the Copenhagen experience. A local organization and alterglobalization movement member, ATTAC France, did much of the planning for the mobilization around Paris Conference.[45] Other campaigns and actions were planned and discussed at the World Social Forum, such as the Reclaim Power campaign led by Friends of the Earth International, the Belgian Climate Express, and the Run for Life race from Norway to Paris. There was difficulty arriving at a shared message or vision of what a 2015 agreement should look like, reflected in the diversity of messages on the CJN! listserve.[46] The Narrative Working Group reported to a planning meeting

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[41] Anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014.
[42] Anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014.
[43] Michael Dorsey, Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, interview with author 2014.
[44] A founding CJN! member who asked to be anonymous for some comments. Interview with author 2014.
[45] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014.
[46] Anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014.

held in Tunis in 2015, based on the lessons learned from Copenhagen, the movement should not

"tell a lie that Paris will fix the climate. People were arrested in Copenhagen for this lie. No

unrealistic expectations – but we need to give people hope that there is a purpose to the

mobilization" (Bond 2015). This resonated with others who felt that "no agreement is better than

a bad agreement."[47]

Like during the planning for the Copenhagen meeting, climate justice activists seemed

prepared to call a temporary truce with Climate Action Network and others to increase the size of

the demonstrations. Bond (2015) relays that the planning meeting in Tunis included CJN!,

Climate Action Network, international unions, faith-based organizations and others such as

Avaaz and 350.org. Knowing they would not agree, these groups explicitly set aside discussions

of content and focused on mobilization strategies; yet there were still disagreements, with Pat

Mooney of the etc Group[48] and others emphasizing "it [the march] should start like New York[49]

and end like Seattle.[50] Shut the thing down" (Bond 2015).

One of the plans that seemed to gain traction in the months immediately before the Paris

Conferences was to blockade the entrances to keep the delegates in the venue.[51] It is difficult to

know if this plan would have come to pass if the terrorist attacks had not taken place weeks

before the Paris meeting. In response to the attacks, the French Government declared martial law

and the military and police presence in the city was ubiquitous. Using these laws, police placed

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[47] Anne Peterman, Global Justice Ecology Project, interview with author 2014; Anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014.
[48] Etc group is an NGO with the mission of: "ETC Group works to address the socioeconomic and ecological issues surrounding new technologies that could have an impact on the world's poorest and most vulnerable people" and has six current focal areas: climate and geoengineering; biodiversity; sustainable development; corporate monopolies; synthetic biology; and technology assessment. See: http://www.etcgroup.org/mission
[49] Mooney was referencing the People's Climate March in New York in September 2014.
[50] This was an explicit reference to the Battle in Seattle protests around the WTO conference in Seattle in 1999.
[51] The CJN! member who told me of this plan asked not to be quoted or affiliated to this plan.

at least eight climate activists under house arrest and served others with restraining orders in advance of the conference (The Guardian 2015). On the last day of the conference, a human chain formed for two hours, causing only minor inconveniences, and a march was held through Paris, in defiance of martial law.[52]

The climate justice movement represented an abrupt appearance and rapid mobilization in the climate regime. From no previous presence, the alterglobalization movement participated and found like-minded environmental justice and indigenous rights groups to form a movement that would change the nature of contentious climate change politics. Their forum multiplying efforts reverberated back somewhat to their home regime. Climate change is now a major discussion topic at the World Social Forum; in 2008, there were no sessions devoted to the issue.[53] Institutional shifts toward market mechanisms implicated the alterglobalization movement in the work of the climate change regime – they saw themselves as integral to this work – as a needed voice to save climate change governors from themselves.

6.3.1 Carrying Authority to the Climate Regime

The climate justice frame is unique among other frames used in the context of climate change. It is antagonistic by design before being coopted by others. The articulators of the climate justice movement were also mainstays in the alterglobalization movement, Focus on the Global South and Friends of the Earth International, undertook considerable work to navigate internal tensions on the network's strategies in disseminating the frame. Negotiations over the frame came much more easily, characterized by a merging of different group's contributions with little compromise necessary. In external relations with climate change governors, these

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[52] Personal observation from participation in the 2015 Paris Climate Conference.
[53] Analysis of World Social Forum agendas, 2007-2016.

actors managed to carry authority into the regime and gain a degree of recognition of their cause, particularly among Latin American states and like-minded environmental NGOs.

6.3.1.1   Constructing the Discursive Frame

By 2015, many invoked the term climate justice, from French Prime Minister Francois Holland in his opening address to the Paris conference[54] to Pope Francis in his encyclical. The term's origins stretch further into climate change history, before the emergence of the international climate justice movement and the involvement of the alterglobalization movement. The term climate justice first appeared in 2001 at the UNFCCC conference in the Hague. Coined by environmental justice advocates, the term largely remained at the domestic level as environmental justice groups worked domestically, sometimes transnationally, to reconcile the unique aspects of climate change within the environmental justice frame (Schlosberg and Collins 2014).

Climate justice as a frame transformed, becoming a master frame used by many NGOs in the lead up to the Paris Agreement (Allan and Hadden forthcoming); the frame was widely used, and "meant many things to many people."[55] This widespread use of the concept of climate justice had lost the central rallying point of the systemic critique vital to climate justice activists. The originators' carefully crafted frame slipped out of their control.

As articulated by CJN! in 2008, the climate justice frame focuses on continuing the struggle against injustices that ultimately cause climate change. This reverses of the logic of other groups, such as women's rights groups, that argue that climate change can exacerbate existing inequalities. The climate justice frame fulfills the diagnostic role of framing, leaving the

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[54] Personal observation from attending the leader's summit on the first day of the Paris Conference.
[55] Anonymous delegate from an environmental NGO, interview with author 2015.

prognostic aspects aside. The founding press release of CJN! outlines the group's founding

principles as:

- leaving fossil fuels in the ground and investing instead in appropriate energy-efficiency and safe, clean and community-led renewable energy
- radically reducing wasteful consumption, first and foremost in the North, but also by Southern elites.
- huge financial transfers from North to South, based on the repayment of climate debts and subject to democratic control. The costs of adaptation and mitigation should be paid for by redirecting military budgets, innovative taxes and debt cancellation.
- rights-based resource conservation that enforces Indigenous land rights and promotes peoples' sovereignty over energy, forests, land and water.
- sustainable family farming and fishing, and peoples' food sovereignty (CJN! 2008).

Many of these issues were not on the agenda of the UNFCCC, including consumption,

rights, peoples' sovereignty, climate debt, democracy, military rollbacks, and livelihoods. CJN!

called for overturning the status quo, moving from international policy to local control and for

Northern reparations for the climatic effects that the South experiences. These principles sought

to continue the fight against rights abuses, inequalities, and injustices incurred under the auspices

of a capitalist system.[56] The climate justice frame sought to overcome existing practice

(Goodman 2009), unlike the gender or labour frames that sought to reaffirm or revise existing

climate policies. Climate justice reframed the climate issue as a systemic critique of the

neoliberal basis of the global economy which both caused climate change and served as a

foundation for the dominant approach to addressing the climate crises.

The frame questioned the status quo and was inclusive, like its predecessor in the

alterglobalization movement, the justice globalism frame (Goodman 2009). The climate justice

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[56] For one articulation, the Global Justice Ecology Project, a founding member of CJN! defines climate justice as "the understanding that we will not be able to stop climate change if we don't change the neo-liberal, corporate-based economy which stops us from achieving sustainable societies. It is the understanding that corporate globalization must be stopped." See http://globaljusticeecology.org/climate_justice.php

frame created common ground for those with more radical politics to bring their unique claims,

or as one CJN! organization put it, "there was finally a space for leftist politics, and, more

importantly space for the voices of the marginalized."[57] "Embedded within an all-encompassing

and radically challenging epistemology," Goodman (2009, 499) notes, the climate justice frame

could serve the needs of many groups, including alterglobalists, environmentalists,

environmental justice activists, and indigenous rights activists. Southern-based NGOs focused on

development and inequalities, and Northern-based NGOs that targeted large corporations[58] could

equally claim space under the climate justice banner.

The potential for inclusivity inherent in the climate justice frame also left it vulnerable to

cooptation by others. Several groups sought to claim the term climate justice unrelated to the

movement. Bond and Dorsey (2010) highlight five such claimants, including those focusing on

per capita emissions, attempting to insert climate justice into carbon markets, and pivoting

toward rights to development and rights to pollute. The proliferation of the term weakened its

power, rendering it meaningless for many in the movement.[59]

Like many others in the climate justice movement, Bond and Dorsey (2010) preserve

space to decry the role of the Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice in reformulating the

climate justice frame. Robinson's Foundation uses the term climate justice while to climate

justice activists, remaining firmly entrenched in the political and economic elite (Bond and

Dorsey 2010). The Foundation uses climate justice to tie together human rights and

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[57] Anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 20134.
[58] See for example, CorpWatch's statement that climate justice means "challenging [fossil fuel] companies at every level—from the production and marketing of fossil fuels themselves, to their underhanded political influence, to their PR prowess, to the unjust "solutions" they propose, to the fossil fuel based globalization they are driving.
[59] Anne Peterman, Global Justice Ecology Project, interview with author 2014; Dorothy Guerrero, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014; Larry Lohmann, the Corner House, interview with author 2014.

development[60] in a way anathema to the systemic critique of the climate justice frame.[61] In the

hands of the Mary Robinson Foundation, and other articulators in the elite such as French

President Hollande, Pope Francis, WWF, and even Shell,[62] the climate justice frame transformed

to highlight disproportionate impacts of climate change. Stripped of its systemic critique of the

capitalist system, climate justice is now to its progenitors a meme of its original form.

The failure to defend the climate justice frame from cooptation served a blow to the

movement. For Nicola Bullard, a central organizer in the early days of CJN! it was "the" failure

of the movement.[63] As she writes with Müller (n.d.):

> we failed to establish an anti-capitalist CJ-discourse that was visible and understandable
> beyond the subcultures of activists and policy-wonks, and thus failed to provide a visible
> alternative to despair; failed to establish a new pole of attraction that would substantially
> reconfigure the political field around climate change; and failed to do anything to
> significantly advance the fight for climate justice.

While Bullard and Müller are more pessimistic, others point to the success of the climate

justice frame as a reason for its cooptation.[64] The movement faces the task of continuing to

mobilize against those who appropriate the climate justice for different purposes.[65] The

appropriation of the frame would have consequences for wider climate change activism,

becoming a banner under which civil society could forge alliances and gain political leverage

(Allan and Hadden forthcoming). This coming together, however, largely excluded the original

articulators of the climate justice frame. Climate justice became a slogan used by even those

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[60] The Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice states "climate justice links human rights and development to achieve a human-centred approach, safeguarding the rights of the most vulnerable and sharing the burdens and benefits of climate change and its resolution equitably and fairly."
[61] Pasco Sabido, Corporate Europe Observatory, interview with author 2014.
[62] Anne Peterman, Global Justice Ecology Project, a founding member of the Durban Group for Climate Justice and CJN!, interview with author 2014.
[63] Interview with author 2014.
[64] Dorothy Guerrero, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014; Anne Peterman, Global Justice Ecology Project, interview with author 2014.
[65] Larry Lohmann, The Corner House, interview with author 2014.

espousing the "false solutions" of climate change – "carbon offsetting, carbon trading for forests, agrofuels, trade liberalization and privatization" (CJN! 2007). These "false solutions" were the original entry point for the systemic critique of the climate justice movement.

6.3.1.2   Articulators

Focus on the Global South and Friends of the Earth International helped bring together the views of the movement into a cohesive climate justice frame. Internal disputes about how to best disseminate and defend that frame were more pronounced.

At the Bali Conference, there was a coming together of groups. Within this, the Durban Group for Climate Justice provided the intellectual glue necessary to bring together the various stances and identities into the context of climate change. The Durban Group for Climate Justice is a small group of environmental NGOs and think tanks founded in 2003 by World Rainforest Movement, The Corner House, Institute for Civil Society in South Africa and South African Communities that all held a similar hard political line against carbon markets.[66] The loose network shared information and documented the negative experiences of local communities with carbon markets. This work provided a set of ideas and fact-based critiques that appealed to the other social movements under the banner of climate justice, especially the critique against capitalist solutions common to both the Durban Group and the alterglobalization movement. Perhaps more significantly, the Durban Group's small but growing membership showed there was an alternative to the dominant voice of the Climate Action Network. As Larry Lohmann of the Corner House explains:

> the formation of CJN! was stimulated by the way the Durban Group was able to articulate and bring to a head the growing frustration of many activists with the CAN [Climate

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[66] Tamra Gilbertson, Carbon Trade Watch, interview with author 2014.

Action Network] umbrella and its naive, weak, Northern middle-class-style sense of politics and movement building. The Durban Group helped activists be more confident that a more effective alternative to CAN was both necessary and possible.[67]

Within the Solidarity Village for a Cool Planet, the alterglobalists who mobilized to explore the possibilities of working on climate change found like-minded comrades.[68] Amid the alterglobalists, Focus on the Global South held a central role in mobilizing members of the alterglobal movement within the climate change regime. For some, the staff of Focus on the Global South and specifically Nicola Bullard, were "the glue that held the movement together in the early years."[69] The organization also worked with the Climate Justice Alliance to help organize the protests in Copenhagen, and liaised with the Global Call for Climate Action to secure a place in the larger march.[70]

Focus on the Global South and other members of the alterglobal movement viewed market mechanisms as an extension of their traditional critiques of neoliberalism. Commodifying nature aligned with the critique of neoliberalist globalization, premised on the idea "that we need to provide the services of nature; it's a new dimension of capitalism."[71] Climate change presented the opportunity to incorporate ecological issues into the central concepts such as deglobalization[72] coined by Walden Bello, a Philippine economist and founder of Focus on the Global South:

> Deglobalization is not a synonym for withdrawing from the world economy. It means a process of restructuring the world economic and political system so that the latter builds

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[67] Interview with author 2014.
[68] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014.
[69] Wally Menne, TimberWatch, interview with author 2014.
[70] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author.
[71] Dorothy Guerrero, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2015.
[72] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014; Dorothy Guerrero, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2015.

the capacity of local and national economies instead of degrading it. Deglobalization means the transformation of a global economy from one integrated around the needs of transnational corporations to one integrated around the needs of peoples, nations, and communities.

For the alterglobalization movement, particularly Focus on the Global South, the ecological aspect was traditionally neglected in their work.[73] To view deglobalization in a holistic manner required consideration of issues such as climate change, and how they are symptoms of corporate power and privatization.[74] Adding the ecological dimension required new expertise, which the Durban Group and other environmental groups and individual activists provided.

The term climate justice was a broad umbrella for those with shared views against capitalist responses to climate change, and for those willing to assign blame for climate change to a system privileging the wants of major corporations. As an early CJN! member characterized the days developing the climate justice frame:

> When we were looking for linkages, there was a beautiful spider's web that emerges. Beautiful in the sense that it was so cohesive. It all makes sense when you join all those issues and create a jigsaw puzzle of a picture of the problem of which climate change has become the iconic feature because it has linkages to all of these issues.[75]

Like the labour movement, the broader frame was easier to construct amid diverse network membership than identifying stances on specific issues. REDD+ was a central issue for the climate justice network for its early years, bringing together indigenous activists, environmental NGOs critical of land-based mitigation, and alterglobalists against the use of

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[73] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014.
[74] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014; Dorothy Guerrero, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2015; Tamra Gilbertson, Carbon Trade Watch, Interview with author 2014.
[75] Wally Menne, TimberWatch, interview with author 2014.

markets. Views differed regarding how much to focus on REDD+, and who could and should

speak on the issue. Nicola Bullard explains the final formulation in the CJN! principles that CJN!

"is against market-based mechanisms, such as REDD+":

> Many did not want to focus solely on REDD and wanted to keep watch over the
> development and impact of all market mechanisms. Also, the indigenous groups were
> viewed as the ones with the real legitimacy to speak on this issue. As a group, they were
> divided, some supporting insider discussions with a view to possibly making REDD
> work, while others wanted direct actions to stop REDD altogether. CJN! wanted to open
> space for those critical of REDD, but was careful to give indigenous peoples the voice on
> the issue.[76]

These substantive discussions continued, but became in some ways overwhelmed by

internal fractures over how to organize and move the movement forward. The die ins, human

chains, large-scale protests, and other demonstrations represent a contribution of the

alterglobalization movement to CJN!. CJN! developed a more confrontational form of contention

that was new to climate politics (Hadden 2015). For some of the environmental NGOs

disenfranchised with the Climate Action Network and joined CJN! it was sometimes hard to

maintain the hard line, no compromise stance of the antagonistic frame; there was temptation to

frame policy in a way that could resonate with climate change governors rather than maintain a

strong stance in line with the frame.[77] With this new toolkit of the alterglobalists, the range of

possibilities increased, and with it, debate over how to organize and leverage their protests into

influence.

Organizational form caused a degree of polemics internally. According to internal

meeting minutes from 2010, some preferred a loose network of many movements that would

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[76] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014.
[77] An environmental NGO representative that was part of CJN! and asked that these comments be kept off the record, interview with author 2014.

converge on some common activities or campaigns without everyone necessarily agreeing on every aspect. Others wanted to tighten the movement, perhaps via a Secretariat to coordinate activities and claim a representation role for the group. As one member lamented at the meeting, CJN! was not fulfilling either role effectively.[78] Concerns over accountability within the network both before and after the Copenhagen conference were evident. Some members did not complete tasks, or did not disclose that they had funding to carry out some types of work.[79] As another CJN! advocate recalls:

> There were the wrong people involved and little accountability. Some of the original people who could've played a facilitator role were discouraged by remarks from a few individuals, northern-based activists who were more interested in a radical agenda, and were incapable of working within a network. There was a group of hotshots from big organizations working to facilitate, but no one took responsibility for doing the dirty work. As a result, every now and then we send a message to try to use the space that CJN! created for the climate justice voices to be heard inside the climate debate. But, many groups are not working in CJN! anymore. Many lost faith.[80]

The divisions continued. Some original CJN! members viewed the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice as a deliberate attempt to undermine CJN!, including by organizing parallel meetings while not organizing CJN! meetings. In an open letter to the CJN! listserve, one CJN! founding member states that "it appears that behind the scenes someone was pulling the strings to ensure that CJN! was sufficiently subverted so as to render it ineffective" in advance of the 2011 meeting in Durban.[81] There was overlap between the two groups, including several members that were on the international facilitation team for CJN!, including Friends of the Earth and Jubilee South.

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[78] CJN! Internal meeting minutes from June 2010 shared with author.
[79] Anne Peterman, Global Justice Ecology Project, interview with author 2014.
[80] This CJN! member asked that these comments be off the record. The member was one of the founding members of CJN! and is still involved in the UNFCCC negotiations.
[81] A founding member of the CJN! who asked that these comments be off the record, interview with author 2014.

Whether Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice did split CJN! is disputed. GCDCJ stresses the need for mobilization and collective action at local, national, and regional levels, which for some was the raison d'etre for the group: while CJN! focused on the negotiations, GCDCJ would mobilize as other scales.[82] For those involved in both networks, CJN! was a space to share information, not to develop strategies; the GCDCJ was a platform for groups to work in a more coordinated manner to build the movement.[83] Yet, the new group adopted a tone and demands that several CJN! members found unacceptable because it seemed too moderate.[84]

Articulating an antagonistic frame can be a demanding task. Unlike the gender and labour networks, the alterglobalization movement relied on NGOs to articulate their claims in the early years without the involvement of international organizations. The movement's stance against the status quo would reasonably present barriers for international organizations to support them, particularly as CJN! would routinely criticize international organizations or label meetings failures, such as "the Durban Disaster."[85] Because the alterglobal movement largely fought against, and rarely for or with, international organizations, few international organizations could potentially articulate the climate justice frame and facilitate the new network.

Focus on the Global South successfully articulated the climate justice frame to some outside the movement, to secure a place to march under the "System Change Not Climate Change" banner. Otherwise, Focus on the Global South and others[86] struggled to find allies

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[82] Meena Raman, Third World Network, interview with author 2014; Dorothy Guerrero, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2015.

[83] Meena Raman, Third World Network, interview with author 2014.

[84] Anne Peterman, Global Justice Ecology Project, interview with author 2014; Wally Menne, TimberWatch, interview with author 2014.

[85] Anne Petermann, Global Justice Ecology Project, interview with author 2014. Also Petermann and Langelle, "UN Climate Conference: The Durban Disaster." http://www.climatejusticenow.org/un-climate-conferencethe-durban-disaster/

[86] Anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014.

willing to listen. After states failed in Copenhagen, inroads were built with some Latin American

countries, primarily Bolivia and Venezuela. Pablo Solon articulated similar ideas in 2010, when

as ambassador of Bolivia to the United Nations he famously tried to block the adoption of the

Cancun agreement calling the agreement "a giant step backward… full of loopholes for polluters,

opportunities for expanding carbon markets and similar mechanisms – like the forestry scheme

REDD – that reduces the obligation of developed countries to act" (The Guardian 2010). After

Cancun, Bolivia hosted many CJN! members and others interested at the World People's

Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth. Solon is now the Executive

Director of Focus on the Global South and has become a powerful articulator for climate justice.

Focus on the Global South was more successful articulating the climate justice frame

within the alterglobal movement, and proved able to secure funding to mobilize members of the

movement into climate change. The organization used its connections in the alterglobalization

movement and other social movements to bring new members to the climate justice movement.

Focus on the Global South secured the funding for coordinating regional meetings on climate

change in the first years of their work on the issue.[87] In later years, the organization used funding

to support the participation of people from various social movements around the world. Their

goal was to have people tell their own stories and provide their own solutions, to open space for

people from the Global South to be heard.[88] This approach drew upon the organization's

previous experience and strengths in other regimes, as Dorothy Guerrero explains:

> We really make it a point that we create a platform, that we're a flat organization, and
> that processes should be empowering. Our experiences in trade and investment and the
> work we do on land show people should meaningfully participate. Many local people

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[87] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014; Simone Lovera, Global Forest Coalition, interview with author 2014.
[88] Dorothy Guerrero, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2015.

have been working on these issues for a long time. There a big social capital to be seen as an enabler, rather than interviewing and presenting our analyses in international events.

Engaging the movement beyond the organization has helped solidify the central role of Focus on the Global South in the climate justice movement. Using its connections and ability to secure funding, Focus on the Global South could further its reputation and position as a facilitative, central actor with members of the climate justice movement. Focus on the Global South remains at the center of the movement, participating in multiple campaigns and networks, including signing onto some statements by the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice.[89]

The other principal articulator was Friends of the Earth International that was positioned within several networks, including the alterglobalization movement and climate change groups. The many groups straddled by Friends of the Earth International and its national and regional affiliates positioned the NGO to be a broker for the climate justice movement. Friends of the Earth England was a member of the Durban Group for Climate Justice. Friends of the Earth International had "strategic alliance" with the alterglobalization movement and La Via Campesina which primarily focused on trade issues.[90] Within Friends of the Earth International, there was a shift in strategy within the climate campaign to make it more social movement oriented and link that approach with lobbying efforts within the UNFCCC.[91] This decision coincided with the mobilization of the alterglobalization movement at the Bali Conference, motivating the organization's involvement in the nascent climate justice movement. The large

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[89] Focus on the Global South is not listed on the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice's website as an organization in the Campaign, but Focus on the Global South did sign on to one of the Campaign's principal statements titled "Fight for Climate Justice," see: http://demandclimatejustice.org/news-2/7-fight-for-climate-justice
[90] Anonymous climate justice activist, interview with author 2014.
[91] Anonymous climate justice activist, interview with author 2014.

environmental NGO found the social movement capable of supporting its new strategic direction.

Friends of the Earth has a globally-known brand and experience wrangling the procedures of the UNFCCC. Its brand is familiar to those engaged on climate change issues, particularly among northern-based media and UNFCCC delegates. Outside the halls of the UNFCCC, Friends of the Earth used this brand to bring attention to the movement. The arrest of Friends of the Earth delegates in Copenhagen received international media attention, more than the arrest of other CJN! members.[92] Friends of the Earth International had extensive networks in specific countries and regions and a brand that was both recognizable and that made sense for the media to highlight in the context of climate change.

Friends of the Earth used these connections to forge political space for the movement. Friends of the Earth publicly broke away from Climate Action Network after growing disagreements with the Network, particularly on REDD+ and issues around representation of southern views and voices more generally.[93] CJN! defined itself in many ways in opposition to the Climate Action Network, the movement did not want collaboration.[94] Instead of networking and lobbying established climate change actors, CJN! claimed its own political space, which Friends of the Earth affiliates used, particularly plenary time to speak to delegates.

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[92] Anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014.
[93] Simone Lovera, Global Forest Coalition, interview with author 2014.
[94] As explained more below, CJN! sought constituency status to distinguish itself from the Climate Action Network. A principal theme across all of the interviews with justice advocates is that CJN! stands in opposition to many of the Climate Action Network's positions on market mechanisms and forests. Further, many highlighted the northern-domination of the Climate Action Network. This group included Pasco Sibido, CEO, interview with author 2014; Dorothy Guerrero, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2015; Michael Dorsey, Joint Centre for Political and Economic Studies, interview with author 2014; Wally Menne, Timberwatch, interview with author 2014; and anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014.

Like other brokers for labour and gender networks, Friends of the Earth saw benefits from its association with the climate justice movement. Friends of the Earth International struck new alliances on key issues such as carbon trading, and strengthened existing collaboration with Via Campesina and Jubilee South.[95] The movement also shifted the organization's climate and energy programme somewhat, as it hired more radical, movement-oriented coordinators that addressed internal concerns over the narrow focus on the UNFCCC.[96] It was a mutual exchange, Friends of the Earth International (and some chapters) possessed characteristics able to help bring attention to the movement. The movement, in turn, helped Friends of the Earth move out of from the shadow of the Climate Action Network and pursue its own strategy.

The articulators secured some successes in disseminating the climate justice frame, or at least bringing attention to the movement. Climate justice organizers continued to pursue both inside and outside strategies. The institutions regarding how observers ought to behave, coupled with the internal divisions noted above, would ultimately hamper the mobilization of the movement as a force inside the negotiations.

6.3.2 Leveraging Climate Institutions

The alterglobalization movement found space in the climate regime by rallying against the economic framing of the climate change problem and its associated mitigation institutions, namely, real and proposed market mechanisms. The labour and gender movements claimed space by connecting their issues to a new frame and the associated emerging norm and proposing additional considerations. Rather than reify a frame or institution, the alterglobalization movement used markets as a hook for the movement's claims of belonging in the regime as a

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[95] Anonymous climate justice advocate, interview with author 2014.
[96] Anonymous climate justice advocate, interview with author 2014.

radical countermovement. In terms of procedural institutions regarding observers, the climate justice movement was innovative and adept, securing part of a constituency space. The norms of how observers ought to behave, however, proved uniquely cumbersome for the movement and stymied some their insider activities. Ultimately, the norms that facilitated labour and gender advocates' recognition and acceptance were constraints to the climate justice movement.

The substantive institution serving as the entry point for the alterglobalists and others in the climate justice movement was many climate change governors' faith in the market. CJN! applied the climate justice frame to what it saw as the neoliberal foundation of the climate change regime, reflected in its use of market mechanisms and land-based mitigation. These "false solutions" served as the first institutions CJN! aimed to end.

These institutions had powerful backers, most notably developed states who use markets heavily and seek to expand them in the climate regime. While CJN! used these institutions as a hook for their frame and a symbol of how entrenched neoliberalism is in the climate change regime, the politics of arguing against an institution, rather than seeking to reinforce is as labour and gender advocates chose, created complications for forum multiplying. Seeking to stop or undermine an institution narrows the scope of potential allies, and can split some activist groups.

When CJN! emerged, carbon markets stood as central institutions of the climate regime. For the climate justice movement, markets commodify nature, fail to reduce emissions, and reinforce the power of multinational corporations. In this view, markets allow rich countries to pay for projects in the developing countries then claim the emission reductions achieved against their substantial emissions. Instead of reducing their own emissions, developed countries can pay developing countries to do it for them, leaving a trail of environmental and social injustice. As the Transnational Institute and Carbon Trade Watch published in 2009:

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The message of all this is clear. Industrialized societies can continue to use up fossil fuels until there are none left worth recovering. At the same time, they can create new markets that make it possible to claim that others can clean up the mess, and that it will be economically efficient for them to do so…Carbon trading is aimed at the wrong target. It is not directed at reorganizing industrial societies' energy, transport and housing systems – starting today – so that they don't need coal, oil and gas. It is not contributing to the de-industrialization of agriculture or the protection of forests through the recognition of local and Indigenous Peoples' tenure rights or food sovereignty. Instead, it is organized around keeping the wheels on the fossil fuel industry for as long as possible (2009, 14-15).

Such a view was not likely to gain much traction among developed countries who used markets, and repeatedly argue that market mechanisms spur innovation and create incentives necessary to transition to a low-carbon economy (IISD 2013, 2015). Where climate justice activists negatively characterize markets as representing a "reconfiguration of capitalism," [97] powerful developed countries would view this characterization in a positive light, as using the market to the benefit of climate action. These ideological differences would delimit developed countries' support of the climate justice movement.

Land-based institutions were also false solutions the climate justice movement sought to delegitimize and these left some developed and developing countries out of the potential group of allies. The environmental NGOs and indigenous rights activists in CJN! were the strongest opponents of using forests, agricultural soils, and other lands as sinks to soak up carbon dioxide. Many CJN! members argued that markets and land-based mitigation would lead to land grabs and forced relocation of indigenous peoples from their lands for afforestation or reforestation projects or to grow crops for biofuels, in the name of what activists viewed as a dubious way of saving the climate.[98] Inclusion of afforestation and reforestation in the Clean Development

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[97] Dorothy Guerrero, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2015.
[98] Anne Peterman, Global Justice Ecology Project, interview with author 2014; Teresa Andersen, interview with author 2014.

Mechanism, and rumours of including agriculture in a market further fueled CJN!'s critique of land-based sinks.[99]

Among land-based mitigation institutions, CJN! particularly singled out REDD+. First proposed by a group of developing countries called the Coalition for Rainforest Nations as a market mechanism to reduce emissions from deforestation in developing countries, REDD+ encapsulated CJN!'s opposition to land-based mitigation and market mechanisms in one emerging institution. To CJN!, this left the door open to abuses that they viewed as common in other markets, that unscrupulous carbon traders would exploit local communities to maximize their profit in a market.[100]

For the alterglobalists, REDD+ was a reality in Southeast Asia where several organizations were based. They were already hearing of the problems associated with the REDD+ pilot projects in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines[101] and found other environmental NGOs with similar views on land-based mitigation.[102] In the negotiations, however, these three countries were strong supporters of REDD+ (Allan and Dauvergne 2013). With the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, these Southeast Asian countries would not ally with CJN! and against REDD+.

While in the WTO developing countries were quite united, the same was not the case in the UNFCCC. The many issues meant that developing countries issues were often issue specific. The interests and coalitions of countries in REDD+ talks were different from adaptation or finance, for example. Alterglobalists expected to be able to bring developing countries onside as

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[99] Teresa Andersen, Gaia Foundation, interview with author 2014.
[100] Chris Lang, REDD Monitor, interview with author 2014.
[101] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014.
[102] Teresa Andersen, Gaia Foundation, interview with author 2014.

allies, but were unable because of the shifting coalitions and interests.[103] The problem in the

WTO is that developing countries had little voice or influence,[104] and in climate change is was

that these countries were less united, and sometimes invested or in favour of issues that CJN!

fought against.

Similarly some activist groups were split on the issue, and only some joined as allies of

CJN!. Stopping REDD+ was a common area around which the facets of the movement could

mobilize. For some, it was a victory of the movement to "derail the grand REDD+ scheme. We

stopped all the land grabbing that was going to happen. REDD+ really became a focal point for

climate justice activism and collaboration with indigenous peoples.[105] Among indigenous

peoples' activists, some sought to stop REDD+ and joined CJN! while others viewed REDD+ as

an inevitability and sought a seat at the table for indigenous peoples to push for social

safeguards.[106] The indigenous peoples' caucus was divided on how to approach REDD+ and

only those opposed to the plan were willing to join the climate justice movement.

The alterglobal movement found allies among some environmental NGOs leery of land-

based mitigation, but actively sought to not ally with more mainstream NGOs. CJN! established

itself as a response to the perceived failure of mainstream climate activism to mobilize a large,

global movement and to include voices from the Global South.[107] Left to ally were the

environmental NGOs also working to dismantle markets and land-based mitigation institutions in

order to reveal the roots of the climate problem, namely: the capitalist system, corporate power,

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[103] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014.
[104] Dorothy Guerreo, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2015.
[105] Anne Peterman, Global Justice Ecology Project, interview with author 2014.
[106] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014.
[107] Michael Dorsey, Joint Centre for Political and Economic Studies, interview with author 2014; Anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014; Anne Petermann, Global Justice Ecology Project, interview with author 2014; Simone Lovera, World Rainforest Movement, interview with author 2014.

and structural inequalities that lead to continuous increases in emissions further causing climate change. When some actors in developed countries appropriated the frame, they also shifted which institution the frame seeks to leverage.

In its appropriated form, climate justice highlights the disproportionate effects of climate change, and makes a moral argument for addressing these impacts on the poorest and most vulnerable. Climate justice links to adaptation and loss and damage.[108] Both institutions reflect a reframing of climate change in terms of its impacts (see Chapter 3). Loss and damage illustrates irreversible effects of climate change, most visibly borne by those living in low lying areas or relying on marginal lands for subsistence. Using the climate justice frame proved useful for NGOs' efforts to influence loss and damage outcome in the Paris Agreement (Allan and Hadden forthcoming). Used this way, climate justice is about what happens when states fail to mitigate emissions or adequately adapt to the effects of climate change; originally, the frame illustrated the deep structural causes of climate change as revealed through the false solutions of markets and land-based mitigation policies. Arguing against the status quo is an unpopular task, particularly for a group of activists new to a forum. The articulators of the frame were useful to mobilize the movement, and shifted toward outside tactics, taking their voices outside the venue, favoring the people and largely eschewing government negotiators.

In part, the dual insider/outsider strategy of CJN! was due to the unwillingness of the movement to abide by the norms of how observers ought to behave in the UNFCCC and the tightening security within the venue. The identity of the alterglobalization movement and their repertoire of contention were too dissimilar from the tactics generally used by environmental

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[108] Anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014. See also Allan and Hadden forthcoming.

NGOs. Insider strategies were bolstered by the movement's successful procurement of part of the environmental constituency.

Through negotiations CJN! managed to share the benefits of constituency status to help mobilize their membership. This victory provided visibility in the process and helped the movement navigate the forum. The alterglobalists found the UNFCCC a difficult space to navigate originally. Like all the new movements, jargon and complexity of the climate change negotiations created initial obstacles for alterglobalists to scale in order participate in the UNFCCC. Their prior experiences in the trade regime were unhelpful to surmount the initial challenges posed by the UNFCCC. Nicola Bullard compares the processes:

> WTO is like checkers; UNFCCC is like chess. In the WTO positions are clear, the issues are clear, and the rules are known. The UNFCCC is always shifting, the ministers of agriculture, economy, and environment are all saying different things. It uses extremely technical language, which is deliberate to obfuscate and keep the public out of the negotiations.[109]

The environmental NGOs already in the climate regime were helpful to navigate the jargon, acronyms and procedural and substantive technicalities, including securing a shared space in the environmental NGO constituency. [110] In 2008, around a dozen CJN! members petitioned the UNFCCC Secretariat, saying that their membership of over 100 organizations held views irreconcilable to the Climate Action Network.[111] The discordant relationship was aggravated by negative experiences and disagreements regarding how the Climate Action Network occupied the environmental constituency space. While the Climate Action Network is an umbrella for hundreds environmental NGOs, it does not represent all environmental NGOs in

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[109] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014.
[110] Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, interview with author 2014.
[111] Michael Dorsey, Joint Centre for Political and Economic Studies, interview with author 2014.

the constituency. The Network alone used all the benefits of constituency status and excluded non-members from planning meetings.[112] This practice angered several environmental NGOs holding differing views. As Michael Dorsey explains:

> [Those who] were advocating against the use of market mechanisms, and there has been a sizeable coalition since 1992, were being purposely, physically blocked from CAN [Climate Action Network] meetings. It was a quasi-apartheid system – CAN had a badge system, selectively targeting people to not get access to rooms. CJN! isn't a coincidence, there was a critical mass of people tired of the level of assholery from CAN management that actively blocked the participation of some individuals.[113]

Finding space as half of the environmental NGO constituency was secured through negotiations. CJN!, representing roughly 4% of environmental NGOs, reached a provisional compromise with the Climate Action Network, which represented around 14% of environmental NGOs.[114] Under the arrangement, each group would speak for one of the two minutes allotted to each constituency, and invitations to technical briefings would be decided based on the proportional representativeness of each network. The arrangement was provisional, but remains unchanged.[115]

There was important value in the negotiated constituency space for CJN! activists. The space clearly and publicly distinguished CJN! from the Climate Action Network. Speaking one immediately after one another, the CJN! and Climate Action Network statements would highlight different issues in line with their different frames and take very different tones.[116] Where CJN! sought a voice for the Global South and critiqued market mechanisms and the

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[112] The Climate Action Network puts a mark on the badges of its members, either a sticker or a hole punch in the badge. This way, they can identify their members and can make sure that their members are the only ones in their strategy meetings.
[113] Michael Dorsey, Joint Centre for Political and Economic Studies, interview with author 2014.
[114] Anonymous UNFCCC Secretariat member, interview with author 2014.
[115] Anonymous UNFCCC Secretariat member, interview with author 2014.
[116] Personal observations from twelve UNFCCC meetings, each of which included several statements from CJN! and Climate Action Network.

corporate takeover of the UNFCCC, the Climate Action Network was predominantly Northern

based and helped advise on markets.[117] The Climate Action Network was part of the elite status

quo that CJN! fought against. Using the constituency space, CJN! could show themselves as an

alternative to the Climate Action Network. Securing half of their constituency spot was a victory

for the climate justice movement and facilitated mobilization efforts.

Constituency status conferred recognition to the burgeoning movement, aiding

mobilization efforts. Many environmental NGOs wanted to attend the Environmental NGO

Constituency coordination meetings in Copenhagen, but were excluded because they were not

Climate Action Network members; these NGOs found a new home within CJN![118] Climate

Action Network was surprised at the scale and speed of CJN!'s mobilization.[119] The visibility

and recognition facilitated by constituency status helped these environmental NGOs find CJN!,

and helped build cohesion in the movement:

> It's [constituency status] pretty token, but it did have an impact. It gave a sense of
> cohesion. Everyone that considered themselves part of CJN! would align themselves with
> a statement. It gave some authority to our words.[120]

How to use the benefits of constituency status for the mobilization effort fed into some of

the internal divisions. Some Northern-based members came under fire from the CJN! network

for using the allotted speaking time, which many hoped would be for Southern-based

members.[121] One CJN! member ascribes the use of constituency space to the diversity of the

network, as some organizations have to use the space to report to funders that they provided

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[117] Several CJN! members describe CJN! as a response to the Climate Action Network, including Michael Dorsey, Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, interview with author 2014; anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014; and Simone Lovera, Global Forest Coalition, interview with author 2014.
[118] Anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014.
[119] Anonymous environmental NGO, interview with author 2015.
[120] Wally Menne, TimberWatch, interview with author 2014.
[121] Anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014.

speeches in intergovernmental negotiations.[122] Meanwhile, those members interested in

continuing the confrontational contention of the alterglobalization movement found themselves

increasingly stifled.

Rules instituted after Copenhagen subtly tightened access for observers and security

restricted some types of demonstrations. Both these developments uniquely hampered the

climate justice movement in ways that did not affect the labour movement or gender-climate

network. In the post-Copenhagen rules, CJN! members reported that accreditation became more

difficult to secure, that badges were more closely controlled, and that fewer observers were

granted access to the plenary, where decisions are made.[123] As stated in Chapter 3, the UNFCCC

started to limit the number of badges in the wake of the unexpected turnout for the Copenhagen

conference, which exceeded the venue's capacity. These developments made it difficult for

newer members to access the venue, particularly those CJN! members that had not sought

accreditation before Copenhagen.

Sharing constituency space helped mobilize support around the Copenhagen conference,

but that soon waned as the rules of participation disincentivized climate justice activists from

participating in protests within the UNFCCC. For many, including Anne Peterman, a founding

CJN! member, Copenhagen was the pinnacle of CJN! actions and after Cancun actions were on

the decline. She reports that many members worried about losing their access and badges by

participating in unpermitted actions. Further, UNFCCC Security started "cracking down" on

unregistered protests, which further dampened members' enthusiasm.[124] The arrest of climate

justice activists and imposition of martial law before the Paris conference in 2015 caused a last-

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[122] Interview with author 2014.
[123] Anonymous CJN! organizer, interview with author 2014.
[124] Anne Peterman, Global Justice Ecology Project, interview with author 2014.

minute scramble to re-organize and re-envision the planned disruptions to the conference. The rules favoured those willing to lobby quietly and demonstrate undisruptively. For CJN!, such contention was not in its repertoire. The movement chose to protest *en masse* outside the walls of the UNFCCC in part because the forum's rules proved too cumbersome.

6.4   Conclusion

The climate justice movement has a distinct trajectory within the UNFCCC, and offers unique takes on forum multiplying strategies from the labour and gender cases. The climate justice movement was the most diverse and spontaneous of the cases explored here. While the ITUC organized internally, and the GGCA members organized beforehand, many CJN! members attended the Bali conference because they were regionally-based, connected to Indonesian-based Gerak Lewan that wanted to mobilize at the meeting. At the COP, these alterglobalists met with like-minded environmental NGOs and indigenous rights activists. From there, the alterglobal movement mobilized further, increasing their participation in the UNFCCC.

This diversity in many ways proved a strength. Like labour and gender networks, the climate justice movement benefitted from a broker able to provide introductions and help navigate the institutions of the UNFCCC. Here, the broker is an NGO, not an international organization. Friends of the Earth International, and to a lesser extent the other smaller environmental NGOs, helped navigate the constituency system and provided important intellectual inputs. Yet, as NGOs, they had limited resources and authority and could only provide so many introductions and assistance to their networks. Their authority carried to the media and among civil society, but less so with state delegates or others.

The limited scope of possible allies within climate change is also a unique lesson in how antagonistic contention can influence forum multiplying. While labour and gender activists

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characterized the Paris Agreement as a launching pad for future action, Lidy Nacpil of Jubilee South called it a "deliberate plan to make the rich richer and the poor poorer."[125] Essentially, the climate justice frame says "you're doing it wrong," or, that climate change governors are trying to address their central issue by focusing on the wrong causes and offering ineffective and "false solutions." Such contention showed commitment to the goals of the regime, but not necessarily all the institutions that seek to achieve the objective. Arguing to dismantle institutions, rather than improving them, pitted the movement against powerful actors in favour of those institutions. The unique constellations of interests in the climate change regime narrowed the roster of participants in the climate justice movement beyond what many in the alterglobalization movement expected.

The climate justice movement was unique in terms of recognition. Much of its success and recognition came from marginalized civil society and states in the UNFCCC process and local and transnational environmental movements. This is in part due to the limited authority carried by the brokers and the smaller roster of potential allies within the UNFCCC. But largely, this is a decision of the movement. The World Social Forum now dedicates considerable space to climate change. Naomi Klein of 350.org (a CJN! member) called for "blockadia," stopping fossil fuel development and expansion through local resistance or disobedience, starting with the Keystone XL pipeline. Stymied inside, the movement relied on traditional alterglobal tactics, mobilizing outside, spurring protests at summits and fostering transnational movements linking local struggles across borders.

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[125] See Climate Justice Groups Respond to the Paris Agreement: http://oneworld.org/2015/12/12/too-weak-too-late-says-climate-justice-campaigners/

Despite these differences, there are several common themes that also support the framework put forward in Chapter two. Like labour and gender activists, alterglobalists needed to work with others in the movement to develop an inclusive, and perhaps necessarily broad, frame. Needing purchase within the climate change regime, the frame linked to existing and emerging institutions that touched on issues central to the movement: capitalism, corporate power, and neoliberalism. By using market-based tools, the climate regime inadvertently caught the attention of the alterglobalization movement.

Their attention was peaked, on the lookout for a new target. In keeping with others' forum multiplying experiences, the closing doors in the home regime helped spur the movement across areas of global governance. Stalemate in the WTO was at least part of the motivation for all the movements thus far to stay relevant by moving to climate change.

Despite the limited roster of alliances, the gatekeepers of the alterglobal movement and broader climate justice movement became more central over time. They grew their connections with one another and with new actors in the climate change regime (and, for environmental NGOs, within the alterglobalization movement). All three cases of successful forum multiplying reveal considerable advantages for gatekeepers.

While the gatekeepers and the movement prospered, others appropriated that success, using the term climate justice as a label to describe the disproportionate effects climate change has, and will continue to have, across and within countries. The alterglobalists launched a transnational movement and lost its frame.

Chapter 7: Health-Climate and Human Rights Networks

We're saving lives, you want us to save the planet, too?

The cases of health and human rights reveal how promising discursive links could fail to incite NGOs participation in a forum within another regime. These cases also underline the importance of motivated gatekeepers and brokers serving as articulators and finding entry points within the regime's institutions. Some environmental health advocates engaged in the UNFCCC, but struggle to involve public health NGOs. Human rights NGOs are left at the first stage of the forum multiplying framework, lacking a motivation to move to the climate change regime.

Both networks are null cases, where forum multiplying did not occur. Key human rights NGOs had little motivation to engage on climate change, leaving the network at stage one of the NGO forum multiplying framework. There is no public act of participation or other sustained engagement. In terms of a commitment to the institutions and shared goal of the climate change regime, the human rights network has remained virtuously silent. Instead, environmental NGOs and environmental lawyers took up the challenge and successfully advocated for the inclusion of human rights in the Paris Agreement. This recognition is from the efforts of those already within the climate change regime; it is not a signal of recognizing human rights actors. Despite the work of these environmental NGOs and lawyers, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch remained unmotivated to participate.

Likewise, central public health NGOs as well were largely uninterested. In terms of a public act of participation or other sustained engagement, a small group of NGOs arose dedicated to the links between climate change and health in 2009. These are not per se public health NGOs, rather they are NGOs created solely to address climate change and health. They did not forum multiply from the health regime to climate change, they established themselves

with an identity and mission revolving around addressing climate change and ameliorating its

attendant health effects. These climate-health NGOs were joined by some NGOs working on

environmental health, which take a broader look at health and environmental issues. This *ad hoc*

group was largely unable to convince key public health NGOs such as the World Medical

Association to join.

While there is little in terms of a public act of public health NGOs participating in the

climate change regime, the small group of NGOs working on environmental, specifically

climate, and health issues did develop a frame linking health issues to climate change. This

frame was unfocused, split between mitigation and adaptation institutions as advocates tested

different possible entry points. The frame largely relies on the motivational component while

struggling to show commitment or novel approaches to facilitate the success of the institutions or

shared cause of addressing climate change.

While there is broad acceptance that climate change exacerbates health outcomes, as this

chapter shows, there is little understanding or recognition that the health NGOs offer anything to

help the climate cause. For a time, early drafts of the Paris Agreement included a reference to

public health. In the end, the only reference to health is in the preamble and re-framed and

clustered with other human rights as the "right to health" (UNFCCC 2015). Often, climate-health

advocates encounter delegates that question or even dismiss their presence even while showing

knowledge of the scientific basis of the links between climate change and health.[1]

Both frames have potential to link to climate change negotiations. A health frame for

climate change can elicit support and even inspire hope for climate change action in individuals

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[1] Nick Watts, Climate and Health Council and Global Climate and Health Alliance, interview with author 2014.

(Meyer et al 2012). In its Second Assessment Report, the IPCC devoted a chapter to the risks

posed to population health, and the Third Assessment Report released 2007, documented the

emergence of health impacts due to climate change (IPCC 1995; 2007a, 2007b).

Those linking human rights often rely on a legal rather than scientific basis, including a

2009 resolution on human rights and climate change by the United Nations High Commissioner

for Human Rights. Beyond the legal foundation, a human rights frame is politically attractive. As

Nicholson and Chong (2011) explain, after reviewing the legal and institutional foundations

supporting the links between human rights and climate change:

> The human rights regime … does not just provide a legal and institutional architecture of
> use to those seeking action on climate change. It also provides language, tropes, and
> framing devices that can be used to mobilize support for a new type of climate politics—
> a politics that properly recognizes, and that seeks to fully accommodate, the fact that
> traditionally marginalized nations and communities are suffering, and will continue to
> suffer from the worst impacts of climate change. (Nicholson and Chong 2011, 123)
> The health and human rights frames do not lack scientific or legal support. In other

words, there is an objective case to be made for the viability of the claims that climate change

exacerbates health and human rights concerns. As these cases underline, forum multiplying is a

political process, not a function of our increased understanding of how issues are connected.

Efforts to forum multiply are often undermined when there is little motivation among key

network actors, or, if there is motivation, if network members are unable to carry authority or

find institutional hooks for their claims. For the key actors in both the human rights and health

networks, their absence and lack of motivation is especially detrimental to the network's

prospects of forum multiplying.

7.1   Human Rights-Climate and Health-Climate Networks

The limited participation of human rights NGOs renders a social network analysis of the

human rights-climate network essentially meaningless. The highest level of attendance was four

organizations in a single year. There is not a human rights-climate network to speak of. Davis and Murdie (2012) mapped the overall transnational advocacy network for human rights, identifying Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch as the gatekeepers for the network. They found that the network is quite centralized around these two organizations, with most other NGOs having a connection to either or both of the gatekeepers. Here, I use these findings and, below, focus on the motivations of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch as well as the only two other human rights organizations that participated in climate change between 1995-2015.

Davis and Murdie (2015) also investigate the health network, arguing that it is a small network principally composed of service providers, such as NGOs that undertake water sanitation or vaccination programs. None of these organizations appear in the health-climate network. Instead, the network is populated by environmental health NGOs and NGOs created to campaign on the links between climate change and health. Very few public health NGOs appear, most notably the World Medical Association, which, as outlined below, has little incentive to participate in the climate change regime.

Despite its limited participation and motivation in the climate change regime, the World Medical Association is a gatekeeper for the relatively small and sparse network because of its connections to others in the network. Figure 7-1 below sketches the health-climate network and table 7-1 outlines its key characteristics. Besides the World Medical Association, the International Federation of Medical Students (IFMSA) is the only other actor with significant connections within the network.

Size	603
In-degree centralization	0.0056
Out-degree centralization	0.0222

Centrality	In-degree	Out-degree	Average degree
IFMSA	15	55	35
World Medical Association	14	49	31.5
International Society of Doctors for the Environment	9	20	14.5
Health and Environment Alliance	8	13	6.5

Table 7-1: Descriptive statistics on the health-climate network

Figure 7-1: Health-climate network, 2009-2015

Very few health organizations participated for more than one year before 2009. The environmental health NGO International Society of Doctors for the Environment sent delegates in 1997, 1998 and 2008. Nurses Across the Borders sent a delegate in 2005, 2007 and 2008. Other than these organizations, no other organizations routinely engaged in the UNFCCC before 2009. Therefore, it is difficult to compare the network before 2009 and after. There are too few participating organizations. After 2009, environmental health organizations and NGOs created to work on the climate-health link started participating in the UNFCCC. Figure 7-1 shows the

connections among these NGOs and their links with others in the wider health NGO network. The network's size initially seems large. The total of 603 nodes is comparable to other networks. Unlike other networks, many organizations (135 in total) have only one connection. Still, there is a sizable group of organizations that could receive information about the health and climate change links, and few choose to participate.

The network has three main groupings of organizations. First, the core of much of the advocacy work on climate change and health comes from a cluster of organizations connected to Health Care Without Harm, the IFMSA, and the Climate and Health Council. This cluster represents the Global Climate and Health Alliance (GCHA), which was founded in 2011 and by 2015 had 16 members. This group includes many of the principal advocates from environmental health NGOs and climate-health NGOs. Many of these organization, like the Alliance itself, were founded as hybrid organizations working on the intersection of health and environment, particularly climate, issues.

The second cluster is connected to the World Medical Association, principally comprised of public health NGOs. This group includes the World Health Professionals Alliance, International Hospital Federation, and International Council of Nurses. None of these organizations have attended a UNFCCC meeting, save the World Medical Association which has participated on very few occasions. Public health organizations are reticent to engage in climate change work, as discussed below. It is these organizations, in this cluster that the climate-health NGOs seek to convince.

Both these clusters have a gatekeeper for the overall network. In the case of the IFMSA, World Medical Association and the others, their in-degree scores are notably smaller than their out-degree scores. This means that the can transmit information to many other actors, but do not

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receive information from as broad of a selection of actors in the network. They have perhaps more influence, but prestige. As will be discussed more below, the ties of the IFMSA indicate are qualitatively different from those of the World Medical Association. As a student organization, many of these connections are internships and other such programs, rather than information sharing. Those connecting to IFMSA offer internships, rather than look to the organization for its prestige or authority.

Third, there is a small cluster of few environmental NGOs in this network. Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth International, and Climate Action Network appear largely due to connections that some of the environmental health NGOs forged through other campaigns. Friends of the Earth International, for example, has an in-degree of one, meaning that one actor in the health-climate network linked to the environmental NGO, and an out-degree of 50. Despite the outsized influence, Friends of the Earth International has compared to others in the health-climate network, it did not act as a broker for the network. As Isobel Braithwaite of Healthy Planet UK explains, "no environmental NGOs want to take on health and almost no health NGOs do climate advocacy. This leaves very few of us working on both."[2]

7.2   Motivations

Stage one of the framework posits that the gatekeeper and others in the network must have a political, normative, or material motivation to engage with and devote resources to new issues. The reluctance of gatekeeper organizations to engage in climate change work on a sustained basis tells much of the story of the inability of the human rights and health NGO networks to forum multiply within the climate change regime. Political, material, and, to a lesser

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[2] Izobel Braithwaite, Healthy Planet UK, interview with author 2014.

extent, normative motivations were entirely or in part absent for the gatekeeper NGOs of the World Medical Association, IFMSA, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch.

There is little political motivation to find a new regime because both the health and human rights regimes remain viable options for public health NGOs and human rights NGOs. Within the health regime, there is little political motivation to engage in climate change among public health NGOs. It is not that the health NGO network refuses to travel to other regimes: they have engaged in forum multiplying. The WMA has participated in discussions on leaded petrol, road safety, tobacco, nuclear weapons, and human rights.[3] The International Society of Doctors for the Environment has worked on nuclear weapons and small arms and light weapons, where health organizations are invited to speak and have influence.[4]

The World Medical Association issued the Delhi Declaration on climate change in 2008 after some members sought to engage on the issue in a similar way to the WMA's engagement on human rights.[5] The five areas of the Declaration are all inward looking, considering how to advocate, show leadership, undertake education and capacity building, undertake surveillance and research, and collaborate with others within the heath sector (WMA 2008). There are no references to actors outside the health sector. At a 2013 conference hosted by the World Health Organization on Climate Change and Health, the GCHA asked the WMA to sign onto their statement. This statement included calls to keep fossil fuels in the ground and references to the UNFCCC negotiations.[6] For the WMA the declaration was too focused on climate change; the

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[3] All these activities are listed on the World Medical Association website: http://www.wma.net/en/20activities/index.html
[4] Cathey Falvo, President, International Society of Doctors for the Environment, interview with author 2015.
[5] Clarisse Delorme, World Medical Association, interview with author 2014.
[6] Participant observation from attending the conference 27-29 August 2014.

Delhi Declaration was as far as the WMA was prepared to go.[7] Any discussion of climate change

and health had to keep the WMA firmly planted in the health regime and not venture into

messages that were strictly related to climate change.[8]

For human rights NGOs, there is considerable work remaining on human rights issues

and the NGOs still have considerable political heft and authority in this regime. Amnesty

International often has requests to undertake new campaigns on human rights and other issues,

and faces internal tensions between those seeking to uphold its moral authority as a witness and

those seeking to build political authority, taking a stance as an advocate (Hopgood 2006).

Climate change presents challenges to human rights NGOs using moral authority built by

documenting abuses as defined by the specific legal framework defining state responsibilities

enshrined in human rights treaties. The way that human rights NGOs work is geared toward the

specific methodology to document and prove human rights abuses, according to human rights

law. This methodology does not lend itself to climate change. As Joe Amon of Human Rights

Watch explains:

> There are some challenges to addressing climate change from perspective and
> methodology we use. We document abuses that have occurred using testimony etc.
> Speaking about potential abuses in the future involves different methodology, such as
> modelling or predictions, which we are not accustomed to using. There is a recognition
> that we need to be smarter and engaged [on climate change], but there are resource
> constraints and we have human rights violations to prioritize.

Climate change could threaten the enjoyment of some human rights, but it a probability rather

than a provable fact based on demonstrable actions by the state. In the case of climate change,

moral authority built on documentation is not possible. Such an exercise would involve

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[7] Clarisse Delorme, World Medical Association, interview with author 2014.
[8] This health and climate advocate asked that these comments be kept off the record. Interview with author 2014.

apportioning blame for an event, for example a super typhoon, to a country or countries who emitted the greenhouse gases causing that natural disaster. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have built their reputations and authority on demonstrating human rights violations occur after the fact. Climate change would extend the limits and plausibility of human rights NGOs' methods beyond what may be credible. This could undermine their expert authority.

It was unclear how climate change could fit into the legal framework of the human rights regime. The Maldives pushed the issue, hoping to add moral weight to their case for climate action heading into the Copenhagen climate conference later that year (Knox 2010). In 2009, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights undertook research and adopted a decision on the link between human rights and climate change. The decision states that climate change threatens the enjoyment of several human rights, but that climate change does not necessarily violate human rights. It further states that human rights law places duties on states concerning climate change, including an obligation of international cooperation (OHCHR 2009). Human rights law focuses on the state as a violator of human rights, not non-state actors such as large corporations. For climate change, this state-centric approach is one barrier to linking climate change and human rights in a meaningful way. As Knox (2010, 478), the current UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment explains another obstacle is the difference between magnifying or multiplying human rights problems and violating those rights:

> While the distinction between an adverse effect on the enjoyment of human rights and a violation of human rights may seem arcane, it is well grounded in human rights law. A violation of human rights is commonly understood to imply a breach of a legal duty under human rights law. Not all adverse effects on human rights necessarily imply such a breach. A mudslide that results from heavy rains, for example, may well interfere with, or even destroy, the right to life of those harmed by it, but it is not caused by a state acting in violation of its legal obligations and, in that sense, is not a violation of human rights.

As a result, it was unclear how human rights NGOs could engage in climate change work using the legal framework that their authority rests upon, further adding to their reticence. The International Council on Human Rights Policy sought to fill this gap in understanding for a time, in a climate change project undertaken in 2008 (ICHRP 2008). The author of the report, Stephen Humphreys explains that the intent was to inform human rights organizations, who were not participating in the UNFCCC:

> It was not a matter of choosing between fora: the UNFCCC is the main climate change forum and one of my recommendations in driving this research at ICHRP [International Council on Human Rights Policy] was that human rights organizations try and understand how climate change works and to feed into that process. Not many are doing so.[9]

Given the mismatch between the legal framework of the human rights regime, and the methodologies underpinning human rights NGOs' authority, human rights NGOs had little political motivation to participate in the climate change regime. Human rights issues remain the priority. Climate change was not seen as a human rights issue; its nature was viewed as too different from human rights and human rights governance where NGOs still had considerable authority and influence.

Material motivations were likewise absent. For the health NGOs, there were few resources to undertake climate change work and little funding apparent in the climate change regime. Several climate and health and environmental health NGOs reported little funding for their work and their reliance on volunteer work that ultimately impacted their ability to realize their strategies and undertake campaigns.[10] Some, such as the International Society of Doctors

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[9] Stephen Humphreys, formerly with the International Council on Human Rights Policy, and currently at the London School of Economics, interview with author 2014.

[10] This was raised by four respondents, most explicitly by Isobel Braithwaite, Healthy Planet UK, interview with author 2014; Cathey Falvo, International Society of Doctors for the Environment, interview with author 2014.

for the Environment, rely on retired doctors with time to pursue advocacy.[11] Even the World

Medical Association has limited capacity to undertake new and complex issues, particularly to

learn about the issue and the UNFCCC in order to strategize and implement an advocacy

strategy.[12] After years of trying to secure funding for their work, the GCHA received some

funding from the Global Call for Climate Action to produce a website on the health-related

aspects of the IPCC's fifth Assessment Report.[13] Lacking capacity among established public

health NGOs and the ability to secure climate change-specific funding among new NGOs

established on the climate-health link, the health sector has little material incentives to

participate. There does not seem to be interest among donors to fund work related to climate

change and health.

For human rights NGOs, it was unclear if multiplying within the climate change regime

would help secure donor funds or possibly even detract from their pool of resources. Human

Rights Watch has a strong foundation of donor support, some of these donors ask if the NGO

will take on climate change work while others do not expect the NGO to extend itself into

climate change.[14] There is concern of overextending staff and finding a niche where human

rights NGOs can show they are "in it for the long haul," which means being able to claim

expertise and establish long term relationships and engagement.[15] For other networks, most

notably the gender network, donors were a key part of network formation and the decision of the

GGCA to pursue climate change work. Without a clear signal of support from donors for

climate-human rights work, there is little incentive to take on new issues and the associated

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[11] Cathey Falvo, International Society of Doctors for the Environment, interview with author 2014.
[12] Clarisse Delorme, World Medical Association, interview with author 2014.
[13] Isobel Braithwaite, Healthy Planet UK, interview with author 2014.
[14] Joe Amon, Human Rights Watch, interview with author 2014.
[15] Joe Amon, Human Rights Watch, interview with author 2014.

costs. Building long term engagement would require normative motivations, as actors internalize the view that climate change is a health or human rights issue. Here, both actors struggled to motivate the wider network.

The major human rights NGOs were already politically and materially unmotivated to participate in the climate change regime. A few human rights NGOs working on climate change tried to entice the uninterested gatekeeper NGOs in the human rights network to campaign and disseminate a climate-related frame within the network. Some invoked climate justice to refer to human rights (for an example, see Nicholson and Chong 2011), in part because:

> it is difficult to make a good case using human rights law alone, so anyone interested in the human rights implications of climate change tends to widen the lens to 'justice', whatever that is. Anyone I have worked with has tended to use both terms, not quite interchangeably. I am aware that there are some using the term 'climate justice' who have a more radical agenda in mind than usually found among human rights people. I have always hoped the climate change issue might radicalize human rights activists a bit. Unsurprisingly, though, this doesn't seem to have happened.[16]

The climate justice frame offered a way around the strict adherence to the legal framework and methodologies of the human rights regime. Yet, while human rights discourse is invoked by environmental lawyers and by others under the rhetoric of climate justice, the principal human rights actors remain out of the climate change regime.

Among health NGOs, there was (and remains) a cadre of environmental health NGOs and other groups formed solely devoted to climate change and health linkages. The IFMSA is the only gatekeeper in the network normatively motivated to undertake climate change work. For IFMSA, their role as the future generation of doctors looms large in their motivation to address climate change:

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[16] Stephen Humphreys, International Council of Human Rights Policy, interview with author 2014.

Climate change is the most serious threat we have faced throughout human history and will put a major stress on every health system. There aren't many international communities and groups of people advocating for better health at climate change meetings. At IFMSA, we do use a broad approach, because climate change is not an issue often linked to health. We feel we must be the ones connecting the dots, and we feel future health professionals should be prepared to tackle climate change as a public health issue.[17]

Despite the normative motivations of some and support from academic work such as the Lancet, these groups struggle to convince doctors and other public health NGOs of the need to take on climate change campaigns.

The normatively committed environmental health and climate-health NGOs face pushback from doctors and some public health NGOs. Variations of the phrase "saving lives is enough, why are you asking me to save the planet as well" were recalled by several respondents and was stated by a few participants in the WHO Conference on Climate and Health held in 2014.[18] The phrase sums up doctors' responses to calls to campaign, advocate, or educate others on climate change and its impacts for health. Doctors are patient oriented, their goal is to take care of one person, and not the address effects of other people or environmental trends on the patient.[19] Those few health organizations – already devoted to environmental issues - involved in the climate change regime struggle to motivate the wider health network.

Beyond reticence to get involved in an issue that seems to be none of their business, some doctors and public health NGOs question the science linking health and climate change. At the 2013 WHO Conference, some delegates discussed what the IPCC's confidence intervals meant, including what a "moderate" increase in some health outcomes, such as vector-borne disease,

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[17] Claudel P-Deroisiers, IFMSA Coordinator, interview with author 2014.
[18] For a few, Cathey Falvo, International Society of Doctors for the Environment, interview with author 2015; Nick Watts, Climate and Health Council and GCHA, interview with author 2014; Isobel Braithwaite, Healthy Planet UK, interview with author 2014.
[19] Cathey Falvo, International Society of Doctors for the Environment, interview with author 2014.

truly means.[20] One public health NGO called Safe Observer International stressed the need to focus attention and resources to water quality and sanitation, underscoring that the health sector has expertise in handling these issues and cannot address climate change as effectively (IISD 2014b). While not questioning climate science itself, there are questions if there is a strong enough link between climate change and health to warrant action by the health sector.[21]

The World Medical Association's Delhi Declaration on Climate Change and Health reflects the reticence of some in the health sector to take up climate change issues. The Association has statements on human rights and heath, outlining how doctors are affected by and can affect human rights such as the right to health, rights for LGBT people, and prevention of torture.[22] In 2008, some members wanted the organization to treat climate change in a similar way, while many members did not want to address the issue, leading to a broad statement.[23] Few elected members of the World Medical Association have shown interest in attending UNFCCC meetings since the Delhi Declaration in 2008.[24]

Unlike the labour, gender, and justice networks, the gatekeepers for human rights were unmotivated to campaign on climate change. Similarly, only the IFMSA, one of the two health gatekeepers, showed normative motivations. Without well-connected actors motivated to use their ties throughout the network, there is little that less-connected actors can do. The doctors, public health NGOs, and human rights NGOs remain unconvinced, perhaps even unaware of the connections between health or human rights and climate change. As a result, the mobilization of

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[20] Participant observation of the WHO Conference on Health and Climate Change, 27-29 August 2014.
[21] Nick Watts, Climate and Health Council and GCHA, interview with author 2014.
[22] See the World Medical Association's webpage devoted to its work on human rights and health: http://www.wma.net/en/20activities/20humanrights/
[23] Clarisse Delorme, World Medical Association, interview with author 2014.
[24] Clarisse Delorme, World Medical Association, interview with author 2014.

these networks in the UNFCCC is a brief account. For the human rights network, the story ends at the motivations stage. For the health network, a handful of delegates participated from environmental health NGOs or climate-health NGOs, trying to mobilize their network and gain recognition in the UNFCCC.

7.3   Mobilization

Figures 7-2 and 7-3 below show how few human rights and health NGOs participated in the UNFCCC, respectively. For both groups, their limited engagement largely begins in 2009 at the Copenhagen conference.

The human rights chart reveals limited, sporadic engagement. Participation is largely limited to the historic conferences in Copenhagen or Paris when many expected treaties to result from the negotiations. The highest level of engagement was 11 delegates from four organizations. One NGO, the International Council on Human Rights Policy attended in 2007 in Bali with the delegation for Centre for Sustainable Development Law.[25] In 2009, Amnesty International participated as a partner in the Global Call to Climate Action's *tcktcktck* campaign, signing its Call to Action.[26] As one delegate recalls, the Global Call for Climate Action approached Amnesty International, which reticently agreed to sign the statement. Internally, he recalls, Amnesty International issued a memo that outlined and limited the extent to which it would engage.[27] When the three Amnesty delegates arrived in Copenhagen, they were greeted by

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[25] According to the official UNFCCC Participation list for COP 13, part two
[26] See the Global Call to Climate Actions' 2009 *tcktcktck* Call to Action here: http://tcktcktck.org/partners/partner-call-to-action/
[27] A delegate that was with a major human rights NGO in the late 2000s and who asked that these comments be anonymous, interview with author 2014.

other organizations warmly; the common sentiment was "finally, you're here."[28] The

engagement would not last. By 2010, Amnesty International internally agreed to end its

engagement with the UNFCCC and the Global Call for Climate Action to focus on its core areas

of work.[29]

Figure 7-2: Human rights NGOs' participation in the UNFCCC

The human rights NGO network would occasionally participate, usually at a historic gathering of

state and civil society in anticipation of a major international event. Otherwise, the human rights

NGOs were uninterested and disengaged. Their story ends at the first stage of the framework. A

small contingent of health NGOs continued, but struggle to mobilize, as Figure 7-3 shows. Their

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[28] A delegate that was with a major human rights NGO in the late 2000s and who asked that these comments be anonymous, interview with author 2014.
[29] A delegate that was with a major human rights NGO in the late 2000s and who asked that these comments be anonymous, interview with author 2014.

limited engagement still qualifies the health network as a null case. Their maximum presence in

2015 was 66 delegates, nearly double their previous high mark in 2011. By comparison, the

gender NGOs mobilized 63 delegates Warsaw in 2013, one of their smallest delegations since

beginning forum multiplying. Even at a historic conference with over 35000 in attendance, the

health network mobilized few people, many of whom were from environmental health

organizations, not public health NGOs.

Figure 7-3: Health NGOs' participation in the UNFCCC

The few health organizations participating in 2009 started informally collaborating. Like

the climate justice movement, many of these actors met at the UNFCCC rather than coordinating

beforehand. The group that "found" each other in 2009 was comprised of delegates interested in

health, including representatives from the WHO, health advocacy organizations, and one

environmental research institute. As that member recalls, the discussion centered on how health

could motivate policy action and how to leverage a reference to health in a footnote on one page

of the draft negotiation text.[30] Still, it was a matter of finding 10 like-minded people among the thousands participating at the conference. Unlike the gender network and labour movement coordinated their mobilizations before at their first conference, these few health advocates found each other largely through indirect personal connections while at the conference.[31]

By 2011, momentum seemed possible. The GCHA formed with the goal of minimizing the health effects of climate change and maximizing the health co-benefits of climate change action.[32] Founded by Health Care Without Harm and the Climate and Health Council, the Alliance grew to 16 members by 2015, of which three are public health NGOs without explicit reference to environmental or climate issues.[33] Other health NGOs such as Nurses Across the Borders that had participated in the UNFCCC did not join the Alliance. The Alliance held the first Global Climate and Health Summit at the 2011 Durban conference. These Summits became regular events held on the margins of UNFCCC meetings with other meetings held in 2013 and 2015.

Still, the health sector lacked critical mass. Speaking in 2014, after the 2013 Conference in Warsaw, Nick Watts, founder of the Climate and Health Council and Coordinator for the GCHA laments, "five years ago there were two of us. We get excited, but it's a bit depressing, that there are 20 of us."[34] The few health NGO delegates participating in 2014 and 2015, 25 and 67 respectively, continued to try to find inroads into the negotiations. Parties agreed to task the

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[30] Lynn Wilson, Seatrust Institute, interview with author 2014. Ms. Wilson was at this early meeting and continues working with Nurses Across the Borders on climate change and health issues.

[31] Lynn Wilson, Seatrust Institute, interview with author 2014.

[32] Health co-benefits means the beneficial effects of (in this case) climate policies. Generally, the term refers to the health benefits of mitigation policy. For example, reducing the use of coal would reduce the release of air pollutants that contribute to asthma and other respiratory and cardiovascular diseases.

[33] The membership of the GCHA can be found at: http://www.climateandhealthalliance.org/members. The public health members are the Inches Network, European Respiratory Society, and Public Health Institute.

[34] Nick Watts, Climate and Health Council and Global Health and Climate Alliance, interview with author 2014.

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Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change

integrating several new issues, including water resources and health in the implementation of the

programme[35] (UNFCCC 2013).

7.3.1 Carrying Authority into the Climate Change Regime

The small health-climate network remained quite divided. The World Medical Association was

uninvolved and did not, therefore, cooperate with the other gatekeeper, the IFMSA. For its part,

the IFMSA's connections were not conducive to disseminating a frame throughout the network.

The network worked on two fronts, trying to mobilize public health NGOs and individuals

toward the climate cause and trying to find entry points into the climate change regime. A frame

emerged among some actors, but the sporadic engagement and divisions in the network made it

difficult to connect that frame to the institutions of the climate change regime.

7.3.1.1 Constructing the Discursive Frame

The health NGO network active in climate change has an emerging frame that is

somewhat unfocused, attempting to complete all three aspects of a frame. There are three

elements to the climate-health frame: that the health sector can act to reduce its emissions; that

climate change will exacerbate health outcomes; and that mitigation policies can realize better

health outcomes. Respectively, these elements of the frame serve the diagnostic, prognostic, and

mobilization aspects of a frame. Whereas the just transition and gender frames focus on the

prognostic and motivational framing aspects, and the justice frame undertakes diagnostic

framing, the health frame attempts all three elements.

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[35] UNFCCC decision 17/CP.19.

The health sector contributes to global greenhouse gas emissions. As the WHO outlines in a discussion draft circulated in 2013, hospitals account for 10.6% of the Unites States' commercial energy consumption and healthcare buildings are the second most-energy intensive commercial sector buildings. The National Health Service (NHS) in England calculated its carbon footprint represented 25% of total public sector emissions (WHO and Health Care Without Harm 2013). Some estimates show that in the US and UK the health sector could account for 3-8% of national emissions (WHO 2014).

Calling for leadership by example in the health sector, Health Care Without Harm established the Global Green and Healthy Hospitals network to decrease the footprint of hospitals, including their greenhouse gas emissions. The Durban Declaration of the GCHA commits signatories to, among other actions, to "lead by example and reduce the carbon footprint of our own institutions, practice and activities" (GCHA 2011).

This aspect of the frame asks the health sector to undertake new investments that could include switching to renewable energy sources and retrofitting to increase buildings' energy efficiency. While showing such leadership would endear health actors to climate change governors, it asks much of health actors, most of whom are not engaged on climate change issues. In breakout sessions devoted to reducing emissions from the health sector at the 2014 WHO Conference on Climate Change and Health, there were few calls by participants for drastic action to reduce emissions, instead participants noted the need for greater information and understanding on the problem, and for external assistance to green their systems (IISD 2014b;

WHO 2014).[36] This aspect of the frame would also link health to mitigation institutions in the UNFCCC, which has not been the focus entry points of the health NGO network as discussed below.

The other elements of the health frame that draw attention to the health-related consequences of climate change and the co-benefits of climate mitigation for health tend to be discussed together. For example, in a press release, Genon Jensen, the Executive Director of the Health and Environment Alliance, stated "the GCHA can help reframe the climate debate from a "cost to industry" to a "benefit for health" (HEAL 2013). This formulation is broad, but succinctly encapsulates these two messages in the health frame:

> …not only the fact that climate change will exacerbate existing and future diseases and the social environment, but the health co-benefit side of it, where investment in, for instance, active transport will reduce obesity and thereby reduce the rates of non-communicable diseases such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease.[37]

These aspects of the health frame highlight the health effects of climate change and the ability for health rationale to drive climate action.

In terms of prognostic framing, health offers few new solutions to the climate crisis. There are few new solutions or novel takes offered in relation to adaptation, mostly, health becomes another issue, alongside gender and indigenous rights, to consider when undertaking national adaptation planning.[38] As discussed below, such a call does not change how national adaptation planning is conducted, or suggest new ways to undertake adaptation. Health advocates

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[36] Several participants spoke about the Clean Development Mechanism, Global Environment Facility and other climate finance mechanisms as possible sources of funding. No representatives of these institutions were present to explain that these mechanisms are not designed to support such initiatives. Conference participants asked for the WHO to produce a primer on climate finance, which they later suggested would require external expertise.
[37] Charlotte Holm-Hensen, IFMSA, interview with author 2014.
[38] Marina Maeiro, WHO, interview with author 2014.

add a new dimension of adaptation. Unlike gender advocates that could position women as

agents of change in adaptation efforts, health advocates struggle to make a similar claim.

In addition, the co-benefits argument posits health benefits as a positive knock-on effect

to known strategies to reduce emissions. Increasing public transportation, reducing fossil fuel

use, and other suggestions by the health community are established climate policies. Some

suggestions offered by the health NGO network, such as reducing the use of cook stoves, may

help reduce short-term climate pollutants as undertaken by the UNEP Climate and Clean Air

Coalition.

Some of these solutions stressed by the health community such as reducing coal use, car

use, and cook stove use, in some ways conflate climate change and air pollution. The WHO

summarizes the presentations of several groups, including the Health and Environment Alliance

and Health Care Without Harm that have dedicated projects on co-benefits, by stating:

> There is a particular opportunity to reduce the roughly seven million deaths a year
> associated with air pollution, while also reducing climate warming. Approximately one in
> every eight deaths globally is now attributable to ambient and household air pollution.
> Inefficient combustion of fossil fuels and biomass creates releases particles including
> black carbon, which is both a major contributor to air pollution mortality, and a short-
> lived climate pollutant (WHO 2014, 7).

The connection is that action to reduce emissions, may contribute to better air quality,

which could reduce air pollution-related mortality from strokes, and respiratory and heart

disease. It is an indirect logic that offers few new solutions to climate change. As a result, there

is little to highlight as a prognostic element to the frame that is new to climate change actors. A

health frame cannot provide new solutions, only additional rationale for known strategies to

mitigate emissions. Essentially the efforts to highlight the health-related consequences of climate

change and the co-benefits of mitigation says to climate change governors: continue to do what you've always as intended and there will be health benefits.

The motivational dimension is a strongest aspect of the health frame. It focuses on how health can motivate climate change action, rather than seeking to motivate involvement in improving health and climate outcomes. Motivational framing inspires others to join the movement; in the gender case, for action on mainstreaming gender into climate policies and to realize better outcomes for both issues. Health NGOs posit health as a driver for action on climate change.[39] NGOs, the WHO, and the IPCC highlight the negative consequences of climate change, and the positive economic and social benefits of climate action to help motivate action. For example, climate change could cause between USD 2-4 billion/year by 2030 in health-related public spending (WHO 2016). The GCHA cites health as a driver of climate action, to protect human health and save costs in the public health system, it is a key aspect of their frame.[40]

Placing the weight of the health frame in the effort to motivate climate action asks a lot of a frame that is new to climate change and faces challenges from those within the climate community and the health sector. This positions health as something of a magic bullet able to undo decades of entrenched political and economic interests. Several state delegates seem familiar with the Lancet Commission's declaration that "climate change is the biggest health threat of the 21st century" (Costello et al 2009) and other key messages around the public health

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[39] The GCHA and the Health and Environment Alliance routinely use the term driver to discuss the relationship between health and climate change. On the Global Health and Climate Alliance's website, one of the key areas is "Health as a driver for action on climate change:" http://www.climateandhealthalliance.org/climate-health/climate-change-impacts-on-health

[40] Nick Watts, Climate and Health Council and GCHA, interview with author 2014.

savings from addressing climate change, but then are reticent to take the message on board.[41]

Similarly, health advocates are reticent to take up the climate cause, asking why they must be

responsible for saving lives as well as the planet.[42] While climate delegates agree that health

matters and will be affected by climate change, neither climate delegates nor many public health

officials accept the frame.[43]

The environmental NGOs likewise are reluctant to include health messaging. When the

Climate Action Network discusses health, it focuses on the health effects occurring after climate

change, which to Nick Watts, Coordinator of the GCHA, points to the different constituencies of

the health and environment communities:

> I'd almost blame us. A lot of health people are in the field because they believe health is a
> fundamental message to send and believe for a range of reasons that a health perspective
> could be game changing on this [climate change]. The message doesn't get picked up
> anywhere near as one might expect from environment groups. I'm speculating, but it
> doesn't seem to be really where the enviros heart is – their constituencies are interested in
> protecting the environment and sublimity of nature.[44]

7.3.1.2   Articulators

Internally and externally to the network, the articulators of the network lack the

characteristics to help bring the network together and to disseminate a frame within the

UNFCCC. The gatekeepers in the health network are either absent or lack the necessary

reputation and resources. The World Medical Association has a considerable reputation,

although somewhat limited resources to take on new campaigns as noted above. Many of their

members are unwilling to engage with climate change issues. The few that attended the

Copenhagen meeting left further disenfranchised, they were unable to get access to the

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[41] Nick Watts, Climate and Health Council and GCHA, interview with author 2014.
[42] Cathey Falvo, International Society for Doctors and the Environment, interview with author 2014.
[43] Claudel P-Deroisier, IFMSA, interview with author 2014.
[44] Nick Watts, Climate and Health Council and GCHA, interview with author 2014.

conference venue and refused to attend UNFCCC meetings afterward.[45] Getting the members to

the meetings would help attract other World Medical Association members to climate change

issues, but even leading up to the historic Paris Conference, very few had signaled interest in

attending.[46] Ultimately, nine delegates from the World Medical Association participated in the

2015 conference.[47]

Without this major player in public health, only the IFMSA had the connections within

the network necessary to facilitate internal coordination. Yet, these connections are not of the

same type as in the labour, gender, and climate justice networks. The IFMSA's links to others in

the network involve internships and some research and advocacy.[48] Where ITUC, WEDO and

Focus on the Global South had connections throughout the networks based on previous

campaigns and advocacy work, the IFMSA had little history with some actors, such as the WHO

staff working on climate change.[49] The existing ties were built on professional opportunities, not

campaigning.

Outside the health community, the organization is part of the youth constituency and

often participates in the constituency's actions. This preferred repertoire of contention can create

some difficulties, as more conservative members of the network do not wish to be associated

with more colorful demonstrations.[50] Some in the network seeking to bring health into the

mainstream welcome that the IFMSA can be involved in such demonstrations, which can help

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[45] Clarisse Delorme, World Medical Association, interview with author 2014.
[46] Clarisse Delorme, World Medical Association, interview with author 2014.
[47] NGO Participation Database developed for this project.
[48] Charlotte Holm Hensen, IFMSA, interview with author 2014.
[49] Anonymous health advocate, interview with author 2014. The WHO staff working on climate change met the IFMSA delegates at the UNFCCC in 2009.
[50] Nick Watts, Climate and Health Council and GCHA, interview with author 2014. For example, the IFMSA and other Youth NGOs staged a demonstration dressed in white lab coats with stethoscopes and large cardboard cut outs of lungs at the Paris Conference.

gain visibility for the health message, but could make it difficult to get prominent doctors of public health NGOs on board. [51] The assumption is that prominent doctors would be reluctant to put on a costume or hold a sign in the hallways of an international conference. For the GCHA and others, the involvement of these high-profile actors is key to amplifying the climate-health frame.

The IFMSA also lacks resources and was unable to fund its own activities, meaning that it cannot help fund activities that would increase the network's visibility. It is a voluntary organization and some of the IFMSA delegates attend with funding from national medical associations or grants, or self-funded their participation.[52] Whereas one would expect a gatekeeper to lead the network into the climate regime, the IFMSA was eager to seek out and join the GCHA. As Claudel P-Deroisiers from IFMSA explains:

> IFMSA is a founding member of the GCHA. We joined because it was logical for us to collaborate with other organizations sharing a similar vision and objectives regarding climate change and health, as there are not many of them. The work with the Alliance has been really great so far, especially regarding the release of the IPCC Report in March 2014.

The IFMSA's lack of resources and reputation within the climate change community of governors necessitated that it joined the GCHA. The organization needed to join forces, because it could not lead on its own or provide resources or authority for use by the larger network.

The GCHA became the de facto hub for internal coordination, but does not include all the health NGOs engaged in the UNFCCC. Nurses Across the Borders is not involved. It is a small NGO based in Nigeria that sent one delegate to the UNFCCC since 2007, before many other

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[51] Nick Watts, Climate and Health Council, interview with author 2014.
[52] Claudel P-Deroisier, IFMSA, interview with author 2014.

health or environmental health organizations were involved. Nurses Across the Borders engaged in projects on the ground to train nurses and some advocacy work, using the research and partnerships with the Seatrust Institute.[53] The Alliance has to navigate several internal tensions with the membership that it has.

The frame remains focused squarely on health impacts and health co-benefits of action in part to appease the internal tensions between remaining relatively conservative in their tactics and messaging to attract doctors and becoming more engaged in climate politics. The GCHA draws attention to the IPCC's findings on health impacts of climate change, including heat-related and extreme weather-related illnesses and injuries; aggravated chronic illnesses; vector-, water-, and food-borne infectious diseases; asthma and respiratory disorders; malnutrition; and stress-related and mental health disorders (GCHA 2014). As Nick Watts of the Climate and Health Council and the GCHA, explains:

> In the Alliance, 80% of time is internal management to keep a consistent degree of messaging and that everyone is moving forward at the same level. It's a diverse group, especially when you consider national constituencies of some organizations involved. Some members we particularly value and need to act cautiously to make sure that we don't scare off the national constituencies of these organizations. They are often really good about telling us.

This means that the Alliance's messaging needs to stay firmly grounded in health. For some, the message is principally about health, and climate change is a second concern: "It isn't enough to argue that climate change will cause health effects. To some degree that was our fault, we sell into that message, but the discussion needs to be that health effects are happening now. Even if climate doesn't change, they [health effects] are ongoing now. Somehow that hasn't

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[53] Lynn Wilson, Seatrust Institute, interview with author 2015.

resonated with most people, including fellow physicians.[54] To bring physicians on board requires care not to engage too much in climate change specifically, or to venture too far into more protest oriented tactics. While the GCHA can help internally manage some of the network, it lacks powerful organizations within that can articulate the message within the UNFCCC.

Many pointed to the WHO as a potential broker with a trusted reputation and resources, but it cannot fulfill this role for the network. The WHO was an outsider to the climate process unable to bring health concerns into the UNFCCC, only starting its own climate change work in 2008 and first attending the UNFCCC in 2009.[55] Unlike UNEP, which was an effective broker for labour and gender networks, the WHO was not engaged in many environmental issues or climate change work before 2009, when the NGOs also started attending. The WHO was not well placed to be a broker. It took was on the outside, striving for recognition.

While the social network analysis showed connections between the WHO and climate change actors such as UNEP, these connections are not evident on the health-climate linkages. Internal coordination mechanisms in the UN system established informal working groups on climate change, including a task group on the social dimensions of climate change. This informal group included 20 UN agencies and organizations, including the WHO. UNEP is absent (see UN n.d.).[56] The link between the WHO and the UNEP may be from other programs, such as water sanitation, but it does not seem related to climate change.

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[54] Interview with author 2014.
[55] The WHO Congress passed a resolution on health and climate change in 2008, which recognizes that climate change is a new issue for the WHO.
[56] Anonymous UN employee, interview with author 2014. The 20 members of the task group on the social dimensions of climate change are: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Labour Organization, International Organization for Migration, International Telecommunication Union, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UNDP, UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UN Population Fund, UN Human Settlements Programme, UN Children's Fund, UN Institute for Training and Research, UN International Strategy for

Many actors in the health network looked to the WHO to assume a leadership role on

climate change issues. The group working on climate change in the WHO is quite small, two to

four staff members at various points in time. NGOs question if climate change has the support of

the organization and observe that the WHO struggles to get much recognition or respect in the

UNFCCC.[57] Internally, the WHO has few levers to address climate change. Unlike health issues,

such as vaccinations, the WHO cannot directly intervene or achieve results, on the drivers of

climate change, such as emissions from the energy sector. The inability to directly influence the

result makes it difficult to find interventions for the WHO to view as worth investing resources

toward.[58] As such, the WHO has sought and secured funding to support the inclusion of health in

the National Adaptation Plans of developing countries and are supporting students from the

IFMSA in internships.[59]

Some of these resources are of value to the NGO network. All the submissions on health

made before 2013 were from the WHO. Further, the WHO developed guidelines for Least

Developed Countries and other developing countries aimed to assist Ministers of Health to assess

the impacts of climate change on their country and find adaptation strategies for any health

impacts. As a 2012 submission by the WHO to the UNFCCC's work on adaptation underlines,

the WHO's technical work comes after the "strong political mandate" from the World Health

Assembly's 2008 resolution on climate change:

> WHO supports countries in planning and implementing health adaptation to climate
> change, contributing to the implementation of the decisions of the UNFCCC COP

Disaster Reduction, UN Research Institute for Social Development, United Nations University, UN Women, World Bank, UN World Food Programme and WHO.

[57] An environmental NGO, health-climate NGO representative, and a human rights NGO representative expressed this concern, but all asked for this comment to be off the record. Interviews were all in 2014.

[58] A health-climate NGO delegate who asked that these comments be off the record. Interview with author 2014.

[59] Anonymous health advocate, interview with author 2014.

[Conference of the Parties], and its support mechanisms, such as the Nairobi Work Programme. WHO is currently executing major projects to pilot adaptation to climate change in 14 countries in all six WHO regions, and has provided support for assessments of health vulnerability and adaptation to climate change in over 30 countries (UNFCCC 2012).

These tools were useful for some within the network. The GCHA does not include the WHO as a member, but closely collaborates with it. As the Alliance's coordinator explains, the WHO's resources and its collaboration with the GCHA, meant that the Alliance is "the first point of call for civil society who want to engage around the WHO, and work on NAPs [national adaptation plans] as a result."[60]

The WHO did not bring the IFMSA into the UNFCCC, which is what one would expect of a broker. As a health advocate who has been involved in the UNFCCC explains since 2009, the IFMSA and the WHO met "by chance" in 2009 and since then, the WHO has hosted IFMSA students as interns to complete climate change-related work. The IFMSA fulfills a liaison role, linking the WHO to public health NGOs working on climate change.[61]

We've been lucky that we met the IFMSA in Bangkok [in 2009]. They are very good, students that got involved as medical students with their own internal program on climate change. We met them by chance and started offering them internships. Now have a regular program with interns from IFMSA coming regularly. For us they are a liaison with public health NGOs working on climate change.

Rather than serving as a broker, the WHO used the connections of a gatekeeper, the IFMSA, to help increase their capacity on climate change. The WHO lacked previous connections to climate actors that would have served to provide material and ideational resources to the small health community in the UNFCCC.

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[60] Nick Watts, Climate and Health Council and GCHA, interview with author 2014.
[61] Anonymous health advocate, interview with author 2014.

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Without articulators with the necessary characteristics to convey authority, a brand or resources, the health network struggled to be heard amid the cacophony of claims in the UNFCCC. The WHO and World Medical Association faced tensions within the organization to secure interest or resources for climate-related work. The IFMSA had several connections within the network, but the ties were not forged through previous campaigns. Instead, the GCHA does what it can to rally the network, but without an articulator already recognized or recognizable by climate actors, it struggles to get the message across. Having a frame is not enough, a network needs the right actor to articulate it.

7.3.2   Leveraging Climate Institutions

The health advocates struggle to find a firm connection to the climate change institutions. The health frame highlights worsened health outcomes consequence of climate change and improving health as a co-benefit of climate action. One aspect of this bifurcated frame could link to adaptation in a similar way that the gender frame linked to adaptation – by highlighting that efforts to adapt to climate change must include health considerations to avoid climate impacts falling disproportionately on some segments of society.

The co-benefit aspect of the frame did not have a direct tie into the negotiations. There is no institution devoted to the positive aspects of mitigation or adaptation policy.[62] There is a forum called the response measures forum, which convenes annually to discuss the consequences of climate action. Originally, this forum was requested by oil producing states, which remain the strongest proponents for the forum's continuation and consideration of ways to avoid or

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[62] In the lead up to the Paris conference, the IFMSA did seek to add mention of health co-benefits to a very early draft of the agreement (UNFCCC 2014). The suggestions were detailed textual amendments to the text which was at the time largely a conceptual outline of the elements of draft agreement. Delegates had yet to agree on major aspects of the agreement. These amendments were not discussed or taken up by parties.

minimize the negative impacts that some countries may experience when climate policy is

implemented. Some have characterized this space as quite negative.[63] The WHO was invited to

present the co-benefits of climate action at one session of this forum in 2014 and met with a

somewhat terse response from some delegates asking what role health had in the forum and

requesting the Secretariat to choose the topics presented with more care to the mandate of the

forum.[64]

The small network struggled to locate an institutional foothold for their claims. Health-

climate NGO delegates tend to be split among those frustrated with the UNFCCC process and

others that are interested in the "nitty gritty of the text and the streams."[65] Among those

interested in closely following the negotiations, they divide their time between adaptation,

focusing on the Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation (commonly

called the Nairobi Work Programme), and the Clean Development Mechanism, particularly the

modalities that award emissions reductions credits to coal-fired plants.[66] The latter work is

extremely technical, looking at the rules by which the Clean Development Mechanism could

credit coal-fired plants able to demonstrate that they installed technologies to reduce emissions

that, without funding from Clean Development Mechanism credits, would not have been

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[63] Anonymous labour advocate, interview with author 2014; Anonymous UN employee, interview with author 2014.
[64] Personal observation in the June meeting of the subsidiary bodies in June, 2014, held in Bonn, Germany. A health advocate that asked that these comments be kept anonymous was also present at this meeting shared the same anecdote and interpretation of the reception that the health advocate and presentation received in the meeting of the forum.
[65] Nick Watts, Climate and Health Council and GCHA, interview with author 2014. In the quote, "streams" refers to the two workstreams of the *Ad hoc* Working Group for the Advancement of the Durban Platform, the negotiation group tasked with developing the post-2015 agreement (workstream one) and enhancing pre-2020 action (workstream two).
[66] Nick Watts, Climate and Health Council and GCHA, interview with author 2014. He was likely referring to the CDM Methodology ACM0013 which was approved in 2007.

installed otherwise. It is "technical and far removed from what else is happening in the process…

a tough sell to the health community."[67]

Almost by default, the primary link for the health network is adaptation. Unlike the

gender NGOs who linked to adaptation in the early days of the institution's formation, health

advocates started linking health and adaptation issues after the Copenhagen conference in 2009.

By that time, several of the institutions were set, primarily the Nairobi Work Programme. Gender

advocates could help shape the understanding of climate adaptation to include disproportionate

effects experienced within developing countries, namely among genders, in the institution's

formative years. Health had to find space within an already formed set of norms, rules, and

negotiation bodies devoted to adaptation.

Within adaptation, there are routine meetings and continued discussions on the

implementation of national adaptation plans, national adaptation plans of action, the Nairobi

Work Programme, and the Adaptation Fund, among others. [68] Health advocates largely ignored

the funding aspect of adaptation until 2015. Initially, their focus was national adaptation plans

and primarily the Nairobi Work Programme. Some health advocates attempted to get experts on

the review of the Work Programme, which was expected to lead to recommendations for new

focal areas for future work.[69] Still others prefer to take a broader approach to the issue, and focus

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[67] Nick Watts, Climate and Health Council and GCHA, interview with author 2014.
[68] National adaptation plans of action were established in 2001 to assist Least Developed Countries only. There is an eight step process that helps the country identify projects that will help them adapt to climate change. National adaptation plans were a process agreed to in 2010 and established in 2011. The negotiations and implementation focus on a flexible process to assist developing countries to develop medium and long term plans, rather than projects.
[69] Nick Watts, Climate and Health Council and GCHA, interview with author 2014.

less on technical aspects than on trying to get across the message that climate change and health are connected.[70]

The various directions taken, some focused on the Clean Development Mechanism, others worked on adaptation issues, while some eschewed a narrow focus on technical negotiations altogether, spread the resources and attention of the network. Further complicating matters was the network's late emergence in the UNFCCC. Their claim to belonging premised on adaptation, an institution that by 2010 was firmly established in various work programs. The health network had to take the institutions as it was, rather than try to shape them by teaching new ideas and norms as the gender advocates did to bring gender into the adaptation, and later other, areas of the UNFCCC. This left technical solutions in corners of the UNFCCC negotiations that were difficult to describe, let alone mobilize, the wider health community around. As the other cases show, broader frames can unite a network. Here, technical issues hampered mobilization efforts.

Procedurally, the heath network also found themselves at a disadvantage. Unlike any of the other and successful new NGO networks, health could not leverage the rules regarding observer participation to increase their resources for mobilization. Health was not a Major Group in Agenda 21 as established in 1992. As Chapter 3 outlines, the UNFCCC mirrors the UN Major Group system, but does not follow it precisely because environmental and business and industry constituencies had organically organized themselves during negotiations for the Convention before 1992. Still, labour and gender groups argued they, as Major Groups, also should have a role as a constituency in the UNFCCC (Chapters 4 and 5). Health had no such leverage vis-à-vis

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[70] Claudel P-Derosiers, IFMSA, interview with author 2014.

the institutions. Accepting this norm, members of the network did not seek constituency arrangements.[71]

In terms of aligning with expected norms of observer behavior, the network seems divided on what their repertoire of contention should be. Some of these organizations have not worked together before entering the UNFCCC or are new, such as the organizations created solely to address climate change and health. There is no shared identity and repertoire of contention to draw upon. Some, like the IFMSA, prefer more contentious forms of politics, such as actions within the negotiations. Others sought a strictly insider approach and faced difficulty without constituency status pursuing this tactic.

Instead, members of the health network met informally in Copenhagen. At that conference, 27 people interested in health met informally, a few NGOs, health advocates, and the WHO, and as Lynn Wilson recalls, she represented the only research organization.[72] Yet, as she explains: "it was odd, there were no developing countries represented, there was no one from the people we were talking about." While the health network tried to align itself with the adaptation institutions, they lacked any route to communicate with developing countries.

Frustration at the difficulties of gaining recognition and developing connections within the UNFCCC led to this group continuing to organize and calling themselves the "Friends of Public Health Contact Group."[73] The purpose of the Friends of Public Health Contact Group is to reach out to health organizations and "non-health people." These people were identified through a rather laborious process of selecting a few health-specific people from the list of participants

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[71] Isobel Braithwaite, Healthy Planet UK, interview with author 2014.
[72] Lynn Wilson, the Seatrust Institute, interview with author 2015.
[73] Anonymous health advocate, interview with author 2014.

sending out invitations.[74] Without the benefit of constituency status, the health network had to try to organize themselves. Even finding one another proved difficult in the large climate conferences.

However, the name for the group proved somewhat problematic and perhaps revealed a lack of understanding of the UNFCCC process. In the UNFCCC and other multilateral environmental negotiations, a contact group is a negotiation forum for states to discuss and negotiate text on discreet issues for later decision by a higher body. By calling themselves a contact group, the Friends of Public Health also created confusion. The UNFCCC Secretariat contacted some of the organizers to clarify, as one recalls:

> They saw us organizing something non-traditional. We explained that it was not anything weird, just trying to build consensus around a non-controversial topic. After some consultations with the Secretariat, they were more relaxed, but there were difficulties. There is a bureaucracy to it, we've found a lot of constraints within the UNFCCC system.[75]

Their efforts to organize initially confused climate governors, but provided a way for the members to interact.

These informal meetings did garner some resources useful for further mobilization. Several of the NGOs in the network and the WHO met through the "contact group" and some initial connections were made with a few interested countries, although often there were very few people in the room due to meetings held in parallel that had priority.[76] These initial activities helped form the network, ultimately contributing to the Global Health and Climate Alliance's

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[74] Anonymous health advocate, interview with author 2014.
[75] A member of the health network who asked that this comment be anonymous. Interview with author 2014.
[76] Anonymous health advocate, interview with author 2014.

formation and its collaboration with the WHO.[77] It was still a small group, trying to work around the institutions of the UNFCCC.

One could argue that it is only a matter of time before this small network manages to convince public health NGOs to participate in the UNFCCC. This seems unlikely. Other networks managed to mobilize quickly, rapidly increasing their numbers after key actors began participating. The first step would be to secure sustained engagement of the World Medical Association, including their commitment to articulate a health frame to their network and to climate change governors. Even then, there are barriers. Some of the organizations connected to the World Medical Association are issue-specific, such as the International Hospital Federation, International Pharmaceutical Federation, and the midwife, psychiatric or veterinary organizations. These organizations may be hard pressed to find a role for themselves under the health frame currently focused on the intensified health impacts wrought by climate change.

This may add to the sense that there is little that the health community can offer to the global effort to mitigate emissions and build resilience to climate impacts beyond (yet) another reason why these actions should be undertaken. The unique skillset and knowledge of health NGOs does not help understand how to mitigation emissions or, as in the case of the labour network, reduce political barriers to doing so. On adaptation, health becomes another issue to consider in planning. Health NGOs know how to vaccinate and even eradicate disease; they have less input to how to undertake climate change planning. If anything, health NGOs have made the reverse case: that health policy makers need to consider environmental factors, most notably climate change.

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[77] Anonymous health advocate, interview with author 2014; Nick Watts, Climate and Health Council and GCHA, interview with author 2014.

Unlike the gender NGOs, the health community cannot argue that their inclusion creates a new group of agents already on the frontlines of climate change impacts and able to contribute new solutions to the problems. While women foresters and farmers can directly participate in improving flood resistance, altering irrigation systems, or sharing knowledge about changing crop yields, doctors can only report changing disease patterns and pursue traditional ways to cope, such as sanitation practices, water quality improvements, and vaccinations. None of these are in the remit of climate change governors or directly affected by climate change policy. The health frame's prognostic and diagnostic elements will need to change or expand to find a niche that only the health network can occupy to transform the network's members from cheerleaders to integral actors necessary to include in future climate action and policy discussions.

Further, the health community continues to lack a broker. The WHO has yet to gain acceptance as a key climate change actor. Most climate and environmental NGOs have not engaged with the health NGOs. Although the Union for Concerned Scientists has produced a series of reports and hosted workshops on the health-related impacts of climate change in the United States in 2011 and 2012, this works seems to have ended.[78] Without an organization that is a recognized climate governor to provide introductions and lend their authority to the health network, these actors may remain on the outside

7.4 Conclusion

Both the human rights and health frames hold considerable promise on scientific or legal grounds. They could help motivate people who otherwise would not care about climate change to act to protect their own rights and health, or those of others. New claims can be made, if one is a

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[78] A summary of these reports can be found at:
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/impacts/climate-change-and-your-health.html#.WGxLzfkrLIU

parent of an asthmatic child or cares about the right to shelter, then they should also support

climate change policy. These claims could motivate others to engage in the issue, but have so far

only been made by a small group; environmental lawyers primarily make the human rights

claims rather than NGOs. As these cases show, who participates in global governance is

political. Some networks are not interested in participating in other areas of global governance,

while some find themselves unable to mobilize a presence.

The first lesson these null cases show is that, at least within the context of the climate

change regime, offering further motivation for action is not enough to be recognized as a

member of the governing club. Without offering new solutions or causes, health and human

rights join the long list of reasons why climate change action makes sense. Essentially, they are

speaking to the proverbial choir. This motivation, does not change the geopolitics and embedded

economic interests that traditionally stymied climate action. It also doesn't provide climate

governors with a reason to admit newcomers as climate governors.

Second, these networks do not see themselves as implicated in the climate change

regime. Labour activists saw themselves threatened, or possibly empowered, by mitigation

institutions. Gender viewed adaptation discussions as extensions of their work and alterglobalists

saw market mechanisms as another case of capitalism run amok. Few health or human rights

advocates see themselves in the climate change regime. The institutional changes creating

overlap and implications for networks from other regimes did not similarly trigger health or

human rights actors to forum multiply.

These unique lessons aside, these cases confirm many of the central dynamics of the

forum multiplying framework. First, that motivations, particularly failure in other regimes, must

first be present before a network undertakes forum multiplying. The health and human rights

regimes are still fruitful areas of work for these networks. Expanding outward is a risky endeavor that is unnecessary at this time. At this stage, the human rights NGO network filtered out.

Second, in the absence of a single gatekeeper, cooperation among the gatekeepers is necessary to rally the network and to use authority to amplify the frame's resonance. The health network was unable to bring the principle gatekeeper on board, the World Medical Association, and the IFMSA lacked authority and viable connections to make people listen to a health message in the UNFCCC.

Finally, procedural institutions matter, separating those NGOs recognized by the Secretariat and others, from those unrecognized. Leveraging these procedural institutions is borrowing the legitimacy of the regime's institutions. Backing that up with behaviour conforming to the norms can solidify a new network's place in the regime. Procedural institutions cannot alone guarantee successful forum multiplying, but the recognition these institutions provide can be a useful sign that the regime accepts the actor, and can provide resources to help the network amplify the frame and build alliances.

Chapter 8: Socializing Climate Change

NGOs are surprisingly mobile actors in global governance. Because NGOs' authority rests on their expertise in a given issue area, which does not easily move to new regimes governing different issues, they are not free to move among regimes at will. While states can enter and exit organizations in a wide range of regimes because they are recognized by others as integral actors to solve several issues, NGOs have no such recognition across regimes. Yet, through routine interactions with states and others within their target regime, NGO networks can navigate relationships and institutions and find recognition, even influence.

NGO networks are not free to move about regimes. Participation seems rather patchy, with some networks participating in some regimes for discreet periods of time. There are limits to NGO networks' mobility. This research has sought to explain both the mobility and those limits, by exploring why NGO networks participate in a forum in which they have no expertise or experience and why some networks successfully forum multiply into that regime while others do not. In exploring these questions, three contributions were made. First, I explored the observed but untheorized phenomenon of NGO forum multiplying. Second, I join a growing literature that considers NGO networks as heterogeneous groups and contribute to our understanding of how and why brokers and gatekeepers can influence the network's actions and global governance outcomes. Third, I added NGOs to the literature on regime complexes, to show that changes in one regime can reverberate to other regimes and that NGOs can be one means of expanding regime complexes.

On the first contribution, the framework advanced to help understand the complexities around forum multiplying entails two stages. First, there must be a motive to undertake forum multiplying; generally, political motivations dominated and material motivations were

secondary. That network members needed motivation to undertake forum multiplying seems intuitive, although the findings indicate that not all motivations were equally present. Funding or material motivations were underrepresented[1] while political and normative motivations were evident in all the cases where NGO networks were motivated to engage in forum multiplying.

This pattern is consistent with the logic of the framework. To receive funding within the target regime, NGOs would need to know whom to ask, and to have that donor recognize the NGOs as a good investment. A donor would be reticent to provide a grant to an organization that is new to the politics of the regime over an organization established in the regime with a standing relationship with the donor. Without recognition as an actor within the climate change regime, NGOs in a network advancing a new issue would struggle to secure funding. As a motivation before entering the regime, there may be rumors of available funds, but those within the network would not necessarily know who to ask or be guaranteed to receive funding based on new, unaccepted claims.

Often, normative and political motivations prevailed. Usually, a small number of individuals holding normative motivations, particularly in the labour and health cases, spread their views throughout the network. Political motivations were felt by all. Delegates in labour, gender, and justice from gatekeeper organizations and more marginal organizations in the network discussed frustrations in other regime, while multiple human rights organizations and public health organizations expressed satisfaction. To these latter delegates, there was more opportunity to affect and advance key issues in their home regime than in the climate change

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[1] The lack of material motivations could be due to limited data, but more likely there are theoretically-relevant reasons consistent with the framework. Such information is largely unavailable to an outsider, unless relayed by a broker. UNEP served as a broker that provided financial support for labour activists, and not necessarily for gender advocates. CJN! members struggled for funding. Health delegates also reported difficulty finding resources for climate change work.

regime. The situation in the home regime strongly affects the likelihood of whether a network undertakes forum multiplying. When regimes collapse or stagnate, one should expect to see forum multiplying as NGOs seek new regimes in which to advance their issues.

Second, in the mobilization stage, the ability to carry authority into the new regime and leverage institutions are key to gaining recognition in the forum and regime. Centralized networks or networks with cooperative gatekeepers were better able to rally around a single, coherent frame, which amplified when voiced by authoritative articulators. Using institutions as entry points for the frame was a vital help for incoming NGO networks. Linking their cause to substantive and procedural institutions helped show that the network and their issue belonged in the climate change regime; that they had a valid claim to belonging and, therefore, should be recognized.

Indeed, there were strong institutional effects to the efforts of networks to mobilize within the new forum. Constituency status conferred important strategic resources onto the labour, gender, and climate justice networks. The status brought a form of recognition of the issue and its connection to climate change, as well as the material benefits of meeting space, advertised coordination times, and invitations to workshops. Constituency status helped spread the word among state and non-state actors – all potential allies – that labour, gender and justice issues were recognized by the UNFCCC Secretariat and that advocates were meeting and would attend future meetings. The simple act of advertising the time and location of these coordination meetings helped garner new support for gender and climate justice advocates. By contrast, health delegates' informal attempt to form the "Friends of Public Health Contact Group" caused confusion among climate change actors rather than garnering recognition. The procedural rules

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of the target forum and the regime sort among categories of NGOs, influencing which may succeed in their forum multiplying efforts.

The ability to act like an official observer in the climate change regime facilitated the access of labour and gender, while leaving many in the climate justice group in the cold (at times, literally). The insider/outsider strategy of CJN! enabled actors to follow their repertoires of contention. Over time, the movement shifted more toward outsider strategies and mobilizing at the national level. Now, the climate justice movement resembles the alterglobalization movement and its transnational actions, where local sites of contention work with and inform other local groups trying to make change. The UNFCCC has become a site of annual convergence of the movement, more for mobilizing an outsider presence than trying to conform to insider lobbying tactics. They maintain their claims against the false solutions of climate change and linkages to the substantive rules of the UNFCCC, only to communicate those claims in a different way.

When seeking to leverage the institutions of the UNFCCC, few made moral claims although it was certainly possible. Instead, labour, gender, and, although unsuccessful, health networks developed frames based on expertise with clear links to climate institutions. They sought to gather and document the evidence linking their issues with the institutions of the UNFCCC. It could be that expert authority travels better among regimes than moral authority, a topic for further research discussed below. The networks using expert authority established themselves as the go to actors for anyone interested in the intersections between their issue and climate change. By contrast, justice advocates largely made moral claims. This could be a reason why their frame was more open to cooptation. Climate justice could be used by a wider range of actors.

Networks rarely became detailed when seeking institutional entry points. Generally, they linked their issues to either mitigation or adaptation (not both). Those in the gender network that had been working on issues related to the Clean Development Mechanism continued to do so, but it was a minor issue for the network, unconnected from the frame. To mobilize a network required a broader frame and narrative on how the issues were linked and why actors in the network should be involved. Focusing on technical details instead of broader, political messages proved insufficient and difficult to mobilize actors from the home network in all cases.

This perhaps reflects a tension between mobilizing the network and gaining recognition within the target regime. Governors in the target regime may respect and even demand technical acumen on their issue and solutions for their cause. Diving into details could show that a new actor aligns and fits in the regime and could facilitate recognition. Others outside the network would likely not understand or appreciate such technical details. Gatekeepers seeking to motivate the network would need to draw the connections from a technical detail in a foreign regime to the issue that those in the network care about. A wider frame can mobilize those in the network by invoking its principles, history, and themes and connecting those broad ideas to the target regime. The gatekeepers and network members negotiated frames that prioritized mobilizing their network over seeking allies through technical frames.

On the second contribution, the hierarchical relationships among network members, the structure of the network clearly matters. This finding aligns with work by Carpenter (2007, 2011) and others showing that well-connected gatekeepers set and vet the agenda for the network. It also aligns with Orsini (2013), who argues that gatekeepers participating in multiple forums further entrench their central position through their participation in these forums. Many of the central actors studied here became more central over time, including the ITUC, WEDO, IUCN,

and Focus on the Global South. There are clear benefits to undertaking forum multiplying for central actors, whether they are moving among forums within the same regime or across regimes.

My work extends these findings in three new directions. First, it extends the idea of issue selection. Carpenter (2007, 2011) considers the human security network and the human rights network in turn, asking why they select issues already within their regimes for their campaigns. For example, why child soldiers and not children born of wartime rape? My work shows that gatekeepers have more power than these previous findings suggest. Gatekeepers can select, vet and disseminate a frame in the network that links their issue to an issue governed in another regime. They can introduce an issue generally perceived to be unrelated to the core work of the network. For example, the gender NGOs in the UNFCCC struggled to mobilize a presence; when WEDO and IUCN came on board, the network quickly mobilized around the claim that addressing climate change means including women, and, importantly, advancing gender equality means tackling climate change work. This is more than selecting among issues within the broad remit of the network for a campaign: this is promoting expensive work to link disparate issues and engage in a new forum in a regime with institutions that the network does not yet understand.

Second, I elaborate on how gatekeepers disseminate these frames. While the literature tends to characterize the process as unilateral, I show considerable internal negotiations are often required. In many ways, the ideal structure of a network is like the labour network – highly centralized with a single gatekeeper. More centralized networks can convene negotiations on their own terms and, as the ITUC did, use their organization to take internal disputes out of the forum and have the conversation away from governors (and the media) perhaps eager to find fault lines among members. A single gatekeeper can then spread the frame throughout the

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network and ensure coherence of the message. Logistically, a central gatekeeper can lower the costs of entry for others in the network. The ITUC brought hundreds of delegates under its organizational affiliation and completed all the steps to secure constituency status.

Those networks with multiple gatekeepers had to cooperate to develop a coherent frame, as seen in the gender and climate justice cases. Less centralized networks can draw upon the strengths of each actor. The climate justice movement brought together the climate-specific knowledge of the Durban Group with the systemic critique of the alterglobalization movement to devise the climate justice frame. Without such collaboration or centralization, the health network struggled to mobilize actors and has a frame that lacks focus. Different actors emphasize the diagnostic, prognostic or motivational aspects linking health and climate change regardless of their links to the UNFCCC institutions. Gatekeepers have significant connections, without which a network may not mobilize around an issue in a new regime, as the human rights network illustrates.

Third, this research shows that studying only the structure of the network is insufficient. A clear benefit of the combining qualitative methods with quantitative social network analysis is facilitating the identification of why and how some gatekeepers matter. The brands and ability to provide resources to aid the 'forum multiplying' strategy can influence the ability of the network to carry authority into the new regime. Some gatekeepers lacked resources and brands able to convey authority to those outside their traditional regime. In short, it matters if the World Medical Association speaks rather than the IFMSA, or if WEDO brings Vandana Shiva to speak on climate change's impacts on women. Who the gatekeeper is matters as much as the connections that actor may have. Some actors have brands that carry authority across issue areas,

meaning that their recognition travels. Other actors may be well connected while lacking the ability to create such a messenger effect.

The quality and type of connections were as important than the number of connections. Quantitative network analysis can identify which actors have many connections, but not the quality of the connections or why those connections exist. This information can be crucial to identifying why and when a gatekeeper or broker can influence the network's strategies. For example, the IFMSA has many ties that appeared in the quantitative social network, but were based on internships, not information sharing or campaigning. Why an actor is well connected can influence whether others in the network view it as an authority worth listening to. While Carpenter (2014) argues that networks are structures that condition the actions of actors, I show that the attributes –brand recognition and resources - of those actors and the type of connections connecting actors are important caveats to remember when interpreting quantitative data and when studying the ability of network actors to influence others.

Beyond extending our understanding of gatekeepers, this research makes an original contribution by underlining the role of brokers. Gatekeepers cannot act alone in their efforts to open the proverbial gates of a new regime. The existence of brokers influences the ability of a network to realize its goals. In turn, brokers act as conduits through which some new frames and understandings enter regimes, influencing how governors understand and govern. Among the cases studied here, only those with brokers to the climate change regime successfully managed to forum multiply into the UNFCCC. The labour movement had UNEP; gender advocates worked with UNEP and IUCN; and the climate justice movement had Friends of the Earth International. Health and human rights lacked an actor to bring them into the regime, facilitating introductions and helping to navigate the jargon and procedures of the new forum. The role of international

organizations was important for the efforts to bring labour and gender considerations into the UNFCCC.

International organizations may be particularly useful brokers – or gate*openers* – in global governance. They are often well-known actors with staff able to undertake research and networks of contacts that they can use to disseminate information across regimes. Many international organizations already are involved in multiple regimes, creating connections among groups. Most importantly, international organizations often hold legitimacy; states and non-state actors already agree to obey the rules and procedures they represent (Coleman 2007; Frank 1990). This legitimacy is a resource that non-state actors can draw upon. States already view the international organization as legitimate. If it vouches for a NGO network or is part of a transnational advocacy network, that legitimacy may extend to the new actor by association. For example, if states view UNEP as a legitimate actor in climate change governance, and if UNEP is working with the labour and gender groups, then states may be more likely to view labour and gender NGOs as actors with viable claims to climate change governance. Such introductions – the "they're with me" dynamic – was important for NGO forum multiplying efforts. Brokers proved extremely important bridges to facilitate NGOs' forum multiplying efforts across regimes.

This contribution suggests another route by which brokers, particularly international organizations, influence global governance. More than doing the bidding of states or implementing projects, international organizations' ability to bring together previously unconnected actors can shape who is involved in a given discussion, and, in turn, the solution that those actors negotiate. Brokers are key actors facilitating the expansion of the roster of participants in a given regime, potentially changing the resulting governance outcomes.

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These findings contribute to our understanding of how the internal and external relationships among NGOs and with brokers can influence NGO strategies and global governance outcomes. The frame developed by NGO networks – as facilitated by their gatekeeper or through cooperation among gatekeepers – will be the tool used to try to influence states. Only issues highlighted by the frame will be included in these attempts to influence global governance outcomes. Those issues excluded by the network will be also excluded from the subsequent treaties or other outcomes, if the network succeeds in its ability to influence interstate politics. These findings also may help explain how NGOs could be one route of change in regime complexes.

On the third contribution, this research has implied that regime complexity can develop through the actions of non-state actors. Here, I demonstrated that latent regime complexity can implicate new actors from other regimes, and that NGO networks can help solidify these links. In the regime complex for climate change, institutional changes triggered NGO networks identified roles for themselves to help bring a human face to climate change governance.

Less evident is that this dynamic between regime complexity and non-state actors can go both ways. Non-state actors serve as conduits between regimes. They helped to forge ties among the climate change regime and social regimes. Chapter 4 mentioned that the International Labour Organization adopted guidelines on climate change and a just transition. The Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women adopted a decision on climate change and established a working group on the issue that continues to meet and advocate for considering climate change in the context of women's rights. The World Social Forum increasingly discusses climate change. The World Health Assembly adopted a resolution on climate change as did the UN High Commission for Human Rights.

Whether NGOs specifically influenced these interstate outcomes requires further

research, elaborated more below, yet it is plausible for some cases. In the International Labour

Organization, unions hold decision making power in the tripartite structure of the organization

and the Guy Ryder Director-General of the ILO at the time of the decision was formerly a

member of the unions who were involved in environmental and climate issues.[2] Gender NGOs

were involved in both climate and the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of

Discrimination Against Women. At the time, no other actors straddled those regimes. UN

Women had yet to be engaged in the climate change regime. Likewise, the NGOs and activists in

the alterglobalization movement were the only actors linking climate change and the progressive

politics of the World Social Forum. The World Health Assembly resolution may be a case of

Secretariat leadership given the few health NGOs working on climate change in 2008 and their

lack of connections to the WHO at the time. The Marshall Islands brought climate change on to

the human rights regime's agenda, as mentioned in chapter 7. Positing that states alone expand

regime complexes by creating overlapping rules among regimes underestimates the influence of

non-state actors. If new NGOs can influence the rules or the agendas of one regime to include

their traditional issue, they can create overlapping mandates and institutions between regimes.

Alternatively, NGOs can become conduits among regimes, cross-pollinating information from

the target regime to influence the politics of their home regime.

This underscores the dialectic relationship between state and non-state actors. The

decisions of states can create space for new claims by non-state actors to participate in a new

regime. The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the emergence of the adaptation frame and

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[2] Several respondents I spoke with suggested Guy Ryder as someone knowledgeable about how and why labour took on climate change.

institutions, and the use of market mechanisms constituted a trigger for NGOs seeking to forum multiply. They had a way to link their issues to those of a new regime which was previously unavailable. In turn, these NGOs shape state preferences and forum agendas and institutions, which can create new links among regimes if states accept the NGOs' authority and influence.

It is striking that the NGO networks studied here vary greatly in their ability to influence the politics of the climate regime, marking the most obvious area for future research. Gender NGOs proved remarkably influential, securing many references to gender and a Work Programme on Gender and Climate Change. Gender may seem like a simple issue to include, but it met with considerable opposition from some countries. Labour was less successful, with a smaller niche carved into the institutions for considering labour. Climate justice received a small mention in the Paris Agreement, which many were reluctant to approve, and was prefaced by the phrase "of importance to some." Much of the literature on influence focuses on the NGOs most closely associated with the regime. The influence of newcomers is an extension of their recognition. Labour and gender gained recognition, yet different levels of influence.

From a similar start – as newcomers to climate politics – some could exert influence while others were less successful, which suggests the strategies of the actors matter for the likelihood of gaining influence. To date, there is a considerable literature on the conditions under which NGOs can exert influence, yet influence varied despite similar structural conditions. My research suggests that building alliances with states is a vital strategy, echoing Betsill and Corell (2008); unlike their finding that "key" states matter, it seems that a critical mass of state allies or states with moral or issue-specific power may be the most potent allies, as posited by Price (1998) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). Gender and climate justice advocates forged alliances primarily with developing countries, which are objectively less powerful, but have many

cohesive negotiation coalitions and moral authority. The choice of which negotiation to affect

may also matter: some chose to insert language into the ongoing implementation of the

Convention in its subsidiary bodies, while others focused on the Paris Agreement negotiations.[3]

The former group was more successful, suggesting that smaller "asks" of states may be more

acceptable and serve as a foot in the door. These findings are suggestive, NGOs' strategies and,

possibly, the conditions facilitating influence warrant future research.

A second research question relating to NGO influence arises from a surprising finding. A

reference to human rights was included in the preamble of the Paris Agreement, despite near

total absence of human rights NGOs. Environmental lawyers, often working with environmental

NGOs within and outside the Climate Action Network, successfully convinced states to accept

the human rights frame and admit some human rights into the Agreement. This was not a given,

or a case of states accepting "easy" issues; there was considerable debate and some developing

states worked to avoid blanket references to all human rights, worrying that such a principle

could be used to tie the provision of climate funding to upholding human rights (IISD 2015).

Still, climate governors accepted a frame not articulated by the NGOs most closely associated

with it. There seems to be instances where frames can be separated from their traditional

articulators and still prove influential.

A further broad avenue of future research arises from the considerable variation among

NGOs' choices uncovered in the empirical chapters. First, these findings indicate there may be

something unique about the human rights NGO network. Carpenter (2007) notes the prevalence

of buckpassing strategies by the network. Forum multiplying is the opposite, a refusal to pass on

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[3] These areas of work convened concurrently, usually in the same venue at the same time. In 2014 and 2015, extra negotiation sessions were convened for the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Advancement of the Durban Platform, which was tasked with developing the new agreement and accelerating pre-2020 action.

an issue and leave it to another network to take up. Here, only human rights engaged in buckpassing. Labour, gender and alterglobal activists refused to buckpass. They took up climate change despite the many environmental and climate change organizations already involved. Many environmental health NGOs also tried to take up climate change, believing they had a valuable contribution to what the environmentalists were already offering. Only human rights NGOs buckpassed. The comparative nature of this project suggests that buckpassing not be a trend, or even common, but rather unique to one network. Further comparative research could focus on this trend, to determine the extent of buckpassing and the conditions facilitating isolationist choices by a NGO network.

A second area is on the nature of NGO authority. Most of the networks sought to extend expert authority into the new regime, rather than moral or capacity-based authority. It is not that these groups could not have made a moral claim; there is certainly a principled claim to be made on behalf of disadvantaged workers and vulnerable populations. It may be that expert authority travels well among regimes. Expert authority provides an air of objectivity, that the NGO is speaking about facts, not opinion while moral authority appeals and assumes a shared set of principles. Moral authority enables the actors to establish a set of core facts why those in the target regime should listen to them, establishing the members of the NGO network as the experts on the connections between their issue and the target regime's issue. Capacity-based authority requires a track record showing an NGO's ability to deliver or implement a project or policy, the basis of competence-based authority. While requiring confirmation from other regimes, it seems that the use of expert authority creates a demand for NGOs' involvement in the new regime. Expert authority could be a strategically advantageous to establish a political niche that only the network members can fill and increase their access to delegates.

While the literature posits all three types of authority as useful for NGOs, expert authority seems particularly useful in forum multiplying, perhaps even an important facilitating condition for gaining recognition in a new regime. It is an outstanding question if networks use of expert authority is because of a strategic calculation that expert-based claims are more likely to succeed, or if those claims were successful in the cases studied because they resonated with actors. In other words, there could be a selection bias for successful claims of a certain type. Future research should consider other networks engaged in forum multiplying and vary the types of authority they employ. For example, religious groups have used moral-based arguments, development NGOs expert-based arguments while indigenous rights groups have used both moral and expert-based claims. This research could provide further insight into how NGOs use framing as a strategic tool (Allan and Hadden forthcoming), or how governors within a regime select among claims for belonging.

A third strategy that varies among the networks studied here is their relationship with international organizations. Labour used the resources and connections of UNEP to facilitate its entry, then later the two collaborated less after ideological difference arose. Climate justice activists engaged little with international organizations, if at all. By contrast, many gender NGOs embraced relationships with international organizations at the outset, and others in the network also collaborated more with such organizations later. The GCHA worked closely with the WHO, but decided not to include the organization in the Alliance. International organizations can provide strategically-used resources that network members can use to increase their political heft. However, international organizations can also impose constraints. Some may be slow to join, such as UN Women's late arrival to the gender-climate network. Both international organizations and NGOs are weaker actors in interstate negotiations. The relationship between

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these actors to form coalitions could be an interesting way to approach questions of power at the margins, with implications for how these actors influence global governance.

In their efforts to claim space in the climate change regime, these incoming NGO networks have changed climate change activism. The civil society voice in the climate change sphere has never been more fragmented. At times, there have been open disagreements among groups. Other times, coordination or at least flashes of cooperation occur. It is too early to tell if such cooperation is leading to a global civil society as some observers have long hoped for. Writing on the mobilization of NGOs in the early 1990s, Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler (1998, 5) express hope that the "cross fertilization" of NGOs across conferences on the environment, women, and human rights could contribute to the growth of a global civil society able to increase political representation and safeguard public freedoms at the international level, but ultimately concede that "the construction of a global civil society is under way but is far from complete." Climate change certainly represents a case where unprecedented cross-fertilization of issues and fragmentation among civil society actors has occurred. At least for climate change governance, the notion of a single, united civil society is no longer reality, nor may it be necessarily desirable to advance climate action.

Fragmentation has in some ways helped advance climate change activism or governance. The added networks of transnational actors, linking to local and national counterparts, international organizations, and others within the reach of the network bring a range of voices calling for climate action. They may disagree on the way to a low-carbon, climate-resilient future, but they share the same aim. The diversity amplifies the message and recruits new support, drowning out deniers, obstructionists and other saboteurs. Supporters for climate action come from all sectors of society, and reside across the globe. A narrowly defined problem,

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devoid of social issues would not be able to achieve such support. By widening the scope of what issues are implicated in climate change and invoking their networks on the issue, these new NGO networks helped to widen support for ambitious climate policy.

Widespread support adds pressure on politicians to act, both domestically and internationally. So many actors speaking about the need for climate change action increases media and public scrutiny of actions, and places climate change higher on the political agenda. Policymakers must answer questions on climate change. Their responses must be active and acceptable to those demanding answers. Issues that are high on the political agenda are more difficult to ignore. There is a coercive effect, pressuring policymakers toward action.

Widespread support has also summoned new actors to engage on climate change issues locally, transnationally, and globally. Pipeline protests invoke climate concerns. The military includes climate scenarios in its risk planning. The LGBT community talks to its members about climate issues and what is at stake, linking the violence and denial directed toward LGBT people to the existential threat climate change poses for humanity. Multiple international organizations and development banks include policies and plans related to climate change. The climate crisis requires a systemic transformation in our technological landscape and economic system. It's a societal transformation too, changing the nature of how people travel, consume and work. Widespread support brings new segments of society into the discussion and toward local and global solutions. These newcomers to climate politics have invoked their networks to help bring the all hands on deck response that climate change requires.

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Appendix A Multimethod Approach to Studying NGO Forum Multiplying

The politics of non-state actors are rather notoriously difficult from a methodological standpoint. Those studying the influence of NGOs, for example, have to contend with issues of multiple causation, selection bias, and direction of bias (Allan and Hadden, forthcoming; Betsill and Corell, 2008; Arts, 1998). Transnational advocacy networks, of which NGO networks are a part, are geographically disperse, hold varying assumptions and priorities, and use different terms and language to describe similar phenomenon. As Carpenter (2014, 155) observes, "transnational ideas are both everywhere (that someone subscribes to or invokes them) and nowhere in particular. For that reason, such communities are challenging to access, and an accurate picture of their discourse and impact is difficult to capture properly through conventional "measures."" Indeed, by the time I arrived at these research questions, the social and climate change issues seemed "naturally" intertwined. It was common among colleagues and pundits to discuss climate change as a bedrock issue, that affects all other social, economic, political, and environmental issues. Through this research, I have come to understand that these links were constructed by the actors that believed in advancing climate action and sought to benefit from establishing a connection. In additional to being everywhere and nowhere at the same time, transnational ideas are also constructed and dynamic over time.

Here, I outline the multi-method approach to studying forum multiplying among NGO networks. I ascribe to a less dogmatic, more eclectic view of methods, that each method can suit a purpose. The social network analysis is a more positivist approach useful to uncover general trends and large scale social structures. Case studies provide the opportunity to uncover the "how and why" behind particular trends. Process tracing allows for a fine-grained description and

analysis of underlying mechanisms. Throughout, I was careful about my role as a participant in climate governance and as a researcher.

A.1   Capturing the NGO Networks

I began this project capturing the state of climate change activism by collecting and cataloguing data on the various NGOs attending UNFCCC meetings. I did not undertake this process on a hunch. Rather, my participation in the UNFCCC meetings gave a very good indication that much of the literature missed the full picture of climate activism and its many claims (more on this below). To create the dataset of NGO participation, I logged the name of every NGO reported on the official participation lists of the UNFCCC at the annual Conference of the Parties meetings, and the size of the delegation.

To arrive at the categories of NGOs, I used their mission statements of the organizations in a bottom-up approach. Similar to Muñoz Cabre (2011), I did not impose categories, but allowed the categories to be determined by the organizations. The clear majority of NGOs fit into discrete categories, evidence of network-level participation rather than individual NGOs participating in an *ad hoc* manner. The "other" category was something of a catch all and remained relatively small. I completed all the coding. This database confirmed my and others observation of a fragmentation among civil society. From here, I wanted to find out which organizations were most important within these new networks, and to locate these NGOs within their larger network centered on their traditional issue in their home regime.

Here, I grappled with the "boundary specification problem," that is, how to determine the extent of the network, what actors count as within the network and which do not (Laumann et al 1983; Marin and Wellman 2011; Scott 2000). Too narrow a specification risks missing key actors, too wide risks diluting the information and the density of the network. To address this

issue, I adopt a realist approach[4] where the researcher adopts the vantage point of the actors, which "by definition assumes the proposition that a social entity exists as a collectively shared subjective awareness of all, or at least most, of the actors who are members" (Laumann et al 1983, 21).

This approach successfully identified the connections among NGOs from the networks of interest that participate in the climate change regime, and actors within and outside the climate change regime connected to these NGOs. Those NGOs engaged in forum multiplying are situated within their wider network, both their traditional network and that of the target regime. Not all of the traditional network is captured by this approach due to data limitations, discussed below. The focus was on those NGOs undertaking climate advocacy, centering the analysis on the relationships that are most influential for those NGOs of interest.

Data Collection

I started with a small group of NGOs that are within the network, and expand from that initial list to identify connections amongst NGOs using self-reported ties and common membership; this approach follows the relational approach[5] to addressing network boundaries (Marin and Wellman 2011). Specifically, I used the list of NGOs working on labour, gender, climate justice, health, and human rights (if available) from the UNFCCC participation lists at

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[4] The other approach identified by Laumann et al is the nominalist approach, which imposes a conceptual framework to serve analytical purposes.

[5] The other approach is the event based approach, which uses common participation in an event as evidence of a connection between actors. While this approach has been used to study NGOs operating in different organizations by Orsini (2013) and offers several benefits, it potentially conflates participatory longevity with network centrality (an actor's relative number of connections). Greater institutional participation will appear as a greater number of network connections, even though it is possible to attend every meeting and not interact with other NGOs. Further, in climate change COPs there are often more than 3000 people, up to 40 000 people at the Paris conference. This is too large of a group to infer that NGOs interacted because they attended the same meeting.

the starting points (see Appendix B.2). The type of NGO was derived from their mission statement.

I then used two types of links. I looked at the connections identified by the starting points in the Yearbook of International Organizations in 2007 and in 2013 for the 2005-2008 and the 2009-2015 time periods, respectively. These starting points are summarized in table 8-1 below. The resulting new nodes identified were also included, to provide two degrees of separation from an original starting list node. This created a directed network, NGOs identified organizations that they worked with, regardless of whether they were reciprocated.

Organization	Year(s) Participated
Labour	
2005-2009	
Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras	2006
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union	2008
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions	2005, 2006
International Trade Union Confederation	2007, 2008
International Union of Architects	2006
Japanese Trade Union Confederation	2006
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions	2006
Union for Jobs and the Environment	2005, 2006
United Mine Workers of America	2007, 2008
2009-2015	
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations	2013-2015
BlueGreen Alliance	2011-2015
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union	2009-2015
IndustriALL Global Union	2015
International Trade Union Confederation	2009-2015
International Union of Architects	2011, 2015
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions	2010-2015
Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions	2015
Union for Jobs and the Environment	2009-2015
United Mine Workers of America	2009-2015
Work and Environment Association	2015
Gender	
2005-2009	
Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development	2006
Club UNESCO de Centre d'Action Femme et Enfant	2006
Gender CC[6]	2007-2008
International Council of Women	2007
LIFE - women develop eco-techniques	2005-2009
Women in Europe for a Common Future	2005-2008
Women's Environment and Development Organization	2008
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom	2008

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[6] Gender CC is a network of several organizations. These organizations are listed separately in the edge list, and their connections to one another in the network are indicated.

2010-2015	
Abibimman Foundation	2010-2015
All India Women's Caucus	2013-2015
Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development	2013-2015
Gender CC	2010-2015
Global Peace Initiative of Women	2009, 2015
Grassroots organizations operating together in sisterhood	2009, 2011
Huairou Commission	2009-2012
International Planned Parenthood Federation	2009, 2015
League of Women Voters in the US	2009
LIFE - women develop eco-techniques	2010-2015
National Federation of Women's Institutes	2009
Population Action International	2009, 2011, 2014, 2015
Reseau international d'information de communication et d'action pour le developpement des femmes et des enfants défavorisés	2009, 2013
Sustainable Population Australia	2009, 2012, 2013, 2015
UNANIMA International	2009-2011, 2015
Women Environmental Programme	2012-2015
Women in Europe for a Common Future	2010-2015
Women Organizing for Change in Agriculture & Natural Resource Management	2012-2015
Women's Earth Climate Caucus	2015
Women's Environment and Development Organization	2010-2015
Justice	
2006-2008	
Action pour la taxation des transactions pour l'aide aux citoyens (ATTAC)	2007-2008
Citizens' movement for environmental justice	2005-2008
Focus on the Global South Ltd	2007-2008
Gesellschaft fur Bedrochte Volker	2008
Global Humanitarian Forum	2008
Global Justice Ecology Project Inc	2006-2008
International Forum on Globalization Inc	2008
Redefining Progress	2007-2008
The Corner House	2005-2006, 2008
World Development Movement	2008
The Transnational Institute	2005-2008
2009-2015	

Action pour la taxation des transactions pour l'aide aux citoyens (ATTAC)	2009-2011, 2014-2015
Corporate Europe Observatory Foundation	2009, 2013-2014
Environmental Justice Foundation	2009
Focus on the Global South Ltd	2009-2011, 2014-2015
Gesellschaft fur Bedrochte Volker	2009-2011
Global Exchange	2009-2010
Global Humanitarian Forum	2009
Global Justice Ecology Project Inc	2009-2011, 2015
International Forum on Globalization Inc	2009-2015
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People	2013-2015
Redefining Progress	2009-2010
Society for Threatened Peoples International	2015
The Corner House	2009-2015
The Transnational Institute	2012, 2014, 2015
World Development Movement / Global Justice Now	2009, 2011, 2015
Health	
2009-2015	
Association congolaise d'education et la prevention contre les maladies et drogues	2011-2012
Climate and Health Ltd	2011-2015
Global Health Ltd	2014-2015
Hacey's Health Initiative	2014-2015
Health and Environment Alliance	2009-2015
Health Care without Harm	2011-2015
International Federation of Medical Students' Associations	2010-2015
International Society of Doctors for the Environment	2013-2015
Nurses Across the Borders	2009-2015
World Information Transfer, Inc	2010-2011
World Medical Association	2011, 2013, 2015

Table A-1: Starting Points

The Yearbook of International Organizations provided a valuable source of data on the network in the home regime. For example, without the Yearbook, the World Medical Association would not have appeared in the health network. The Yearbook identified key actors refusing to engage in climate change activism and helped locate the participating NGOs within their wider network.

Others have used different indicators of links among NGOs, notably hyperlinks (Carpenter 2011, 2014; Lake and Wong 2005), or event participation (Orsini 2013). Neither of these approaches proved fruitful for this research for practical or methodological reasons. One of Carpenter's key data sources to identify network ties and actor centrality is a hyperlink analysis, which appropriately assumes that "linking practices between organizational websites function a o academic citations, providing indicators of who is considered a member or a player within a specific community of shared knowledge and practice" (Carpenter 2014, 160). In attempting to replicate Carpenter's methods using my starting points, I found that very few of the organizations had pages listing links to other organizations, even in 2006 or 2007 (I used versions of webpages from the internet archive, the Wayback Machine). This is perhaps not surprising, given that the rise of Google in the mid-2000s signaled the end of "surfing" the web and web designers stopped including pages for links to other organizations to direct interested information consumers.

Using common event attendance made assumptions I was less confident asserting. UNFCCC meetings can be very large, often exceeding 5000 people. I was not confident assuming that mutual attendance at the same conference meant that two organizations interacted. Further this approach potentially conflates long-term attendance with centrality in the network.

Organizations that attend an event annually for years will appear to have many links to all other organizations that have attended. This may be true – a sort of "grandmother" effect where experience is a sought after commodity – but it may be that a long-attending actor attends with a narrow mandate or to engage in "side event tourism," learning much but interacting with few others.

I complemented the Yearbook data with common membership in coalitions, where applicable. This provided insight into the allies gained by climate change activism. It also provided a clearer picture of the connections among actors. Not all the NGOs were listed in the Yearbook of International Organizations, or listed the ties to other NGOs in a climate-social NGO network. Table A2 below lists the coalitions included.

Network	2005-2008	2009-2015
Labour	N/A	N/A
Gender CC	Membership list from 2008	Membership list from 2014
Global Gender and Climate Alliance	Membership list from 2008	Membership list from 2014
Climate Justice Now!	Signatories to the founding statement of the network (CJN! 2007)	Membership list from 2014, excluding national and local level organizations. I included only international, regional and transnational organizations due to the size of the coalition
Durban Group for Climate Justice	Membership list from website in 2007	Unchanged
Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice	N/A	Membership list from 2014
Global Climate and Health Alliance	N/A	Membership list from 2014

Table A-2: Data sources for coalitions for each network

Within these coalitions and the wider network, inequalities are apparent qualitatively and quantitatively. Carpenter (2011, 2014) uses in-degree density[7] to identify gatekeepers. This approach prioritizes prestige over influence. To a degree, I'm interested in both. The prestige of an actor because it indicates the brand recognition of an actor, the information available to the actor, and, possibly, the desire of other NGOs to look to that actor for signals. The out-degree, or influence, of the actor speaks to the ability to get the word out to others. An actor with prestige may have access to considerable information, but if they reciprocate few of those links and have a low out-degree score, then they may be sharing that information with very few (e.g., a Deputy Minister's role is to collate information throughout the organization and provide it to the Minster). I care about the brand recognition, but more particularly about the ability of an NGO to send messages throughout the network in order to mobilize actors. I used the average of the in-degree and the out-degree scores to identify gatekeepers, while also paying attention to the individual scores to indicate the extent to which a gatekeeper could send its message to a large group or received the attention of many or few actors.

Brokers cannot be measured quantitatively because of data limitations. Without mapping the climate change network and connecting that information to the social NGO network, it would be impossible to calculate a betweeness centrality score to identify a broker. To identify brokers, I cross-referenced the nodes in a social NGO network with the database of NGO participation to identify actors that attended UNFCCC meetings and were not social NGOs. I then cross-referenced this short list with actors mentioned in the interviews as important to facilitating the entry of the social NGOs into the UNFCCCC.

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[7] In-degree density refers to the number of in-degrees of a node, divided by all degrees, or links, of that node.

The social network analysis identified key actors in the network and helped reveal the overall structure of the hybrid social-climate network, including how that structure influences the capabilities of those key actors. Taking two snapshots illustrated changes over time, as the network grew through acquiring allies and mobilizing traditional network members. It further revealed that many of the central actors in the initial years of forum multiplying became further entrenched in the network during the second period. How these trends occurred was beyond the remit of social network analysis and required in depth case studies.

A.2 Exploring Forum Multiplying Processes: Case Study Approach

The case study tools employed have very different goals than the social network analysis. The interviews, document analysis, and participant observation seek to explore the interactions between incoming NGOs and existing climate governors, the perceptions of social NGOs regarding entry points in the climate change regime and of others within their network. For key terms such as recognition, one only knows it when they have experienced it. It is both intersubjective and personal.

The semi-structured interviews followed a similar pattern. First, I asked for a brief account of the individual's involvement (or lack of) in the UNFCCC. From there, I asked questions within four clusters, selecting questions that were the most appropriate given the individual's experience. The first cluster asked questions about the NGOs' work before starting climate change. Questions such as "what was your organization's focus before climate change came onto your radar" or "what work occupied your time from xx-xx (years before the NGO participated in the UNFCCC" were asked to people who were present in the initial years of their organization's involvement. The second cluster asked about the motivations, and included broad questions such as "tell me about the decision to undertake climate work, what was that

conversation like?" or "what were the arguments of those for and against?" and narrow questions like "was there funding available at the start?".

Clusters three and four related specifically to their experiences in the climate change regime. Cluster three asked about their experiences in the UNFCCC, including key issues ("what negotiations were you keen to follow and why?") and experiences with the institutions, such as "what was your relationship with the Secretariat?" and "what stands out for you in those early years?". The final group of questions related to interactions with others in their network "which other [social issue] NGOs did you work with most closely?" and with climate change governors "who did you speak with and how were you received?" or "did anyone particularly "get" what you were trying to say and back you up? Did anyone refuse?".

When seeking interview respondents, I initially approached the focal points for those networks with UNFCCC constituencies and for health and human rights I approached those few individuals who had attended a recent meeting. In total, I requested interviews from 107 people, of which 31 people did not respond and 3 refused. The representativeness of this sample is outlined in table A3 below.

Organizations from the networks represented in interviews (note: this excludes climate change actors listed above)	44
Organizations from networks in UNFCCC 2005-2015	77
Percentage of organizations from attending networks in the interview sample	57.1%

Table A-3: Representativeness of the Interview Sample

The 57.1% representation of the sample glosses over two important trends. First, I interviewed some actors that had not participated in the UNFCCC, but were included in the network because of their tie to another actor that had participated. Second, I interviewed multiple people from the same organization in the case of some key organizations as explained below.

I asked these focal points who the key actors were in their respective constituency, to start qualitatively reinforcing the findings of the social network analysis. From there, I sought people who had either been involved during a particularly important period (e.g., 2006-2008) and/or were from an organization that was central or marginal in the network. In some cases, I was fortunate to secure several interviews from gatekeeper or broker organizations from individuals who worked at that organization at different times, or from people with different roles in the organization, such as a board member or policy officer, who may have a different view on the NGO's strategies. Interviews were conducted in a wide range of locations, mostly at UNFCCC meetings, and varied in length from 15 minutes to 2 hours. After each interview, I followed up with the respondents to thank them for their time, to ask if anything else occurred to them after our interview, and if there were any key documents I should read. Several people provided draft or internal memos that were otherwise unpublished. These documents and interviews were invaluable for providing specific information for my cases, informing general conclusions, and rebutting alternative explanations.

The final component of the case study research was participant observation in most UNFCCC meetings leading to the Paris Agreement, from June 2012 through December 2015. In many ways, I was more observer than participant. Yet, my role as a writer for the *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* does provide privileged access to climate negotiations and a fair degree of visibility among civil society and delegates who use our publication to provide transparency to the process. This visibility provided me interviews that otherwise would very likely not been possible because I had a strong rapport with several delegates.

I had to use this trust carefully. It was clear at the beginning of each interview that I was acting in a personal academic capacity, as per the consent form, and not as an *Earth Negotiations*

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Bulletin writer. Information they provided in the interview would not appear in a *Bulletin* and information exchanged in a closed negotiation session would not appear in any publications related to this research.

Care was also taken to ensure that my role as an expert with the *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* would not influence the results of the interviews. Several respondents asked for information on how a given negotiation was developing and on three occasions I was asked for my opinion on if a given area was "fruitful" for their activities. There is a particular danger of influencing views of a potential institutional entry point or of a given climate change governor by asking about a specific institution or actor. For example, if I ask "why didn't you work on adaptation?" I may inadvertently influence future choices about institutional entry points, particularly if a respondent knows that I focus on adaptation as a *Bulletin* writer. While I do not want to overclaim my influence over a person who is well versed in their advocacy discourse, I did have to take care to ensure I reinforced boundaries between my roles as a researcher and participant in the climate change negotiations.

Appendix B   Interview respondents

The following individuals were interviewed for this research.

Patricia Glazebrook, Board of Directors, Gender CC and Professor of Philosophy, Washington State University
Marianne Marstrand, Executive Director, Global Peace Initiative of Women
Roger-Mark DeSouza, Director of Director of Population, Environmental Security and Resilience, Wilson Center. Former Vice President for Research and Director of the Climate Program, Population Action International
Ulrike Röhr, Director General, LIFE e.v., Gender CC member
Larry Lohmann, The Corner House
Cara Beasley, Coordinator, Global Gender and Climate Alliance
Bridget Burns, Director, Advocacy and Communications at Women's Environment & Development Organization. Focal point for the Women and Gender Constituency
Anabella Rosemberg, Policy Officer Environment & OHS at International Trade Union Confederation. Focal point for the Trade Union NGOs Constituency within the UNFCCC
Anonymous Climate Justice Now! organizer. The respondent was involved in organizing several of the demonstrations and actions of the Climate Justice Now! network that occur during climate meetings.
Peter Colley, labour advocate. Requested that his name not be affiliated with an organization.
Sabine Bock, Energy and Climate Change Coordinator, Women in Europe for a Common Future
Anonymous UN staff member
Anonymous UN staff member
Wael Hmaidan, Director, Climate Action Network
Anonymous UN Staff member
Teresa Anderson, Policy Officer, Climate & Resilience International, ActionAid. Formerly with Gaia Foundation, a CJN member
Isobel Braithwaite, Healthy Planet UK
Kathleen Mogelgaard. Requested that her name not be affiliated with an organization.
Anonymous UN Staff member
Tamra Gilbertson, Co-Founder, Carbon Trade Watch. Former Coordinator of the Environmental Justice Project of the Transnational Institute
Cate Owren. Requested that her name not be affiliated with an organization
Anonymous (Labour network)
Michael Dorsey, Interim Director, Program on Energy & Environment Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies
Nick Watts, Executive Director, Lancet Countdown to 2030: Public Health and Climate Change and Coordinator, Global Climate and Health Alliance
Philip Pearson, Senior Policy Officer within the Economic and Social Affairs Department of the Trades Union Congress. Chair of the ITUC working group on climate change.
Wally Menne, Project Coordinator, TimberWatch

Anonymous (Labour network). This delegate attended several UNFCCC meetings with a labour union from 2005-2010 as well as multiple ITUC Congresses.
Stephen Humphreys, Associate Professor of International Law, London School of Economics. Former Research Director at the International Council on Human Rights Policy
Joe Amon, Director of the Health and Human Rights Division, Human Rights Watch
Claudel P-Deroisiers, Think Global Coordinator, International Federation of Medical Students
Imogen Martineau, Independent Consultant
Anonymous (Health network)
Irene Dankleman, Board member, Women's Environment and Development Organization and Lecturer, Radboud University Nijmegen (the Netherlands)
Sebastien Jodoin. He requested that his name not be affiliated with an organization
Pascoe Sabido, Researcher and Campaigner, Corporate Europe Observatory
Simone Lovera, Executive Director, Global Forest Coalition
Anne Peterman, Executive Director, Global Justice Ecology Project
Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South
Muhammad Zakir Hossain Khan, Research Coordinator, Transparency International, Bangladesh
Claire Martin, Research and Capacity Building Coordinator, Transparency International
Ashley Haugo. She asked that her name not be affiliated with an organization.
Aida Ponce, Head of the Health & Safety, Working Conditions Unit, European Trade Union Institute
Kelly Dent, Economic Justice Coordinator, Head of Climate Change Delegation, Oxfam International
Anonymous delegate from Environmental NGO. This delegate represents an environmental NGO that is a member of the Climate Action Network
Gotelind Alber, Co-Founder and board member of Gender CC. Former focal point for Women and Gender Constituency
Anonymous developing country delegate
Anonymous developing country delegate
Anonymous developed country delegate
Anonymous Environmental NGO delegate
Eva Quistrop, former member of the European Parliament. One of the first gender advocates in the UNFCCC.
Christian Teriete, Communications Director, Global Call for Climate Action
Lois Barber, Co-Creator and Executive Director, EarthAction
Fergal Duff, International Society of Doctors for the Environment
Charlotte Holm-Hansen, International Federation of Medical Students
Cathey Falvo, President at International Society of Doctors for the Environment
Lynn Wilson, Executive Director, SeaTrust Institute
Clarisse Delorme, Advocacy Advisor, World Medical Association
Anonymous (Justice network)
Dorothy Guerrero, Research Associate, Focus on the Global South

Anonymous former UNFCCC Secretariat member
Tara Shine, Head of Research and Development at the Mary Robinson Foundation - Climate Justice
Chris Lang, REDD Monitor
Anonymous (Justice Network). This delegate worked with several members of Climate Justice Now! and was present at the Bali conference in 2007 when CJN! was formed.
Sam Lund-Harket, Global Justice Now (formerly the World Development Movement)
Benajmin Denis, Advisor, European Trade Union Confederation
Lucien Royer, National Director, Canadian Labour Congress
Brian Kohler, Director for Health, Safety and Sustainability at IndustriALL Global Union
Laura Martin Murillo, Executive Director, SustainLabour
Peggy Nash, MP. Formerly with Canadian Auto Workers Union
Saleemul Huq, International Institute for Environment and Development
Camille Risler, Programme Associate, Asia Pacific Forum for Women, Law and Environment