# Liberation Movements as Governments: Understanding the ANC's quality of government

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Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of *Master of Arts (Political Science) in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University*

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Octej '2015

Declaration

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Date: 11 February 2015

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Abstract

Liberation struggles and the way liberation movements are organised can leave a lasting impact on post-liberation societies. This research project was conducted in order to research liberation movements as governments and how the quality of governance is affected in post-liberation societies when liberation movements become governments. The South African liberation movement is seen as having contributed to one of the most peaceful transitions of power on the African continent. However, the stigma surrounding liberation movements prompted a study of the South African liberation movement and to establish whether or not the ANC as ruling party has made a success of its governance of South Africa. This thesis uses South Africa as a case study to determine how quality of governance is affected when liberation movements become governments.

This thesis focused on the lingering effects of the structure and organisation of liberation movements. It is thus an exploratory as well as descriptive study where the legacies of the South African liberation movement are investigated and where the ANC as a liberation movement is compared to the ANC as a ruling party. Using historical analysis to discover the structure and internal governance of the liberation movement, this thesis seeks to explain the legacies that still influence the ANC today after its transition from a liberation movement into a political party. To do this the thesis used the theoretical framework of quality of government taken from Rothstein and Teorell (2008), who define it as impartiality. These legacies of the South African liberation movement are believed to have had an impact on the quality of governance of the ANC as a ruling party in post-liberation South Africa. By researching the last twenty years of ANC rule in South Africa's post-liberation society, this thesis investigated the impartiality of government institutions in order to evaluate the quality of governance in South Africa, and thereby to discover what happens to the quality of governance when liberation movements become governments.

The findings of this thesis indicate three conclusions. First, the legacies of the South African liberation movement still have a great influence on the modus operandi, the structure and the goals of the ANC today. Second, these legacies have contributed to the decline of the impartiality of government institutions, in particular through the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) project and its cadre deployment strategy, where appointments are made without the consideration of the principle of impartiality. The legacies of the South African liberation movement have thus had a negative impact on the quality of the ANC's governance. Finally, this thesis has found that in the case of South Africa, when the ANC as

liberation movement took over as the ruling party in a post-liberation society, it negatively affected the quality of governance. Further research in this field is needed in order to compare these findings with other countries that have liberation histories so as to be able to generalise about other liberation movements and to improve the quality of governance in other countries.

Opsomming

Bevrydingstryde en die manier waarop bevrydingsbewegings georganiseer is kan 'n blywende impak op post-bevryding samelewings laat. Hierdie studie is uitgevoer om bevrydingsbewegings as regerings na te vors en ondersoek in te stel oor hoe die kwaliteit van staatsbestuur beïnvloed word in post-bevryding samelewings wanneer bevrydingsbewegings regerings word. Die Suid-Afrikaanse bevrydingsbeweging het bygedra tot een van die mees vreedsame oorgange van mag op die Afrika-kontinent. Die stigma rondom bevrydingsbewegings het egter gelei tot die implementering van 'n studie oor die Suid-Afrikaanse bevrydingsbeweging en of die ANC as regerende party wel 'n sukses van sy staatsbestuur van Suid-Afrika gemaak het. Hierdie tesis gebruik Suid-Afrika as 'n gevallestudie om te bepaal hoe die kwaliteit van bestuur beïnvloed word wanneer bevrydingsbewegings regerings word.

Hierdie tesis is gefokus op die voortslepende gevolge van die struktuur en organisasie van bevrydingsbewegings. Dit is dus 'n verkennende asook beskrywende studie waar die nalatenskappe van die Suid-Afrikaanse bevrydingsbeweging ondersoek word en waar die ANC as 'n bevrydingsbeweging staan in vergelyking met die ANC as 'n regerende party. Die gebruik van historiese ontleding om die struktuur en interne bestuur van die bevrydingsbeweging te ontdek, is in hierdie tesis gebruik om die nalatenskappe, wat vandag nog 'n invloed het op die ANC selfs ná sy oorgang van 'n bevrydingsbeweging na 'n politieke party, te verduidelik. Om dit te kan doen het die tesis gebruik gemaak van Rothstein en Teorell (2008) se teoretiese raamwerk van die gehalte van bestuur wat gedefineer word as onpartydigheid. Hierdie nalatenskappe van die Suid-Afrikaanse bevrydingsbeweging het kwansuis 'n impak op die gehalte van die staatsbestuur van die ANC as 'n regerende party in 'n post-bevryding Suid-Afrika gehad. Deur navorsing te doen oor die laaste twintig jaar van die ANC-regering in Suid-Afrika se post-bevryding gemeenskap, ondersoek hierdie tesis die onpartydigheid van staatsinstellings om sodoende die gehalte van regering in Suid-Afrika te evalueer, en om daardeur te ontdek wat word van die kwaliteit van staatsbestuur wanneer bevrydingsbewegings regerings word.

Die bevindings van hierdie studie dui aan op drie gevolgtrekkings. Eerstens, die nalatenskappe van die Suid-Afrikaanse bevrydingsbeweging het vandag nog 'n groot invloed op die modus operandi, die struktuur en die doelwitte van die ANC. Tweedens, hierdie nalatenskappe het bygedra tot die agteruitgang van die onpartydigheid van staatsinstellings, in die besonder as gevolg van die Nasionale Demokratiese Revolusie (NDR) projek en sy

kaderontplooiing strategie waar aanstellings gemaak is sonder om die beginsel van onpartydigheid in ag te neem. Die nalatenskappe van die Suid-Afrikaanse bevrydingsbeweging het dus 'n negatiewe impak op die gehalte van die ANC se staatsbestuur. Laastens het hierdie tesis bevind dat in die geval van Suid-Afrika, toe die ANC as bevrydingsbeweging oorgeneem het as die regerende party in 'n post-bevryding samelewing, die gehalte van bestuur negatiewelik geaffekteer is. Verdere navorsing in hierdie gebied word benodig om hierdie bevindinge met ander lande wat 'n soortgelyke geskiedenis deel te vergelyk en om sodoende te veralgemeen oor ander bevrydingsbewegings en gevolglik die kwaliteit van bestuur in ander lande te verbeter.

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge my supervisor, Dr. Nicola de Jager, without whom I would not have come this far. Your support, feedback, hard work and enthusiasm provided me with the structure and stability that I needed. Working with you has been an opportunity for which I will be forever grateful.

To my friends who have supported me and had patience with me, I appreciate all the upliftment, motivation and guidance that you provided me with during the course of this thesis. A special thanks to Caitlin Schippers and Brent van Rooyen who were my pillars and without whom I would not have been able to endure.

Lastly, I would like to thank my family for being there when I needed them and for providing me with emotional support. To my mother and brother, thank you for understanding and taking the time out to proof-read my work.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated in loving memory to my father. He was my guide, my inspiration, my strength and the driving force behind my ambition. The only reason I did not give up when he passed away earlier this year was because I knew how disappointed he would be that I did not finish what I had started. His memory gave me the strength to persevere and the will-power to delay my mourning until I had finished this thesis.

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To my father,

William Henry October

24.11.1962 – 28.02.2014

</div>

Thank you for teaching me to stand on my own two feet, to take pride in what I do, and to never give up.

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List of Abbreviations

AAC	All Africa Convention
ANC	African National Congress
ANCYL	African National Congress Youth League
AU	African Union
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement
BMC	Black Middle Class
COPE	Congress of the People
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DA	Democratic Alliance
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
MK	*Umkhonto we Sizwe*
NDP	National Development Plan
NDR	National Democratic Revolution
NEC	National Executive Committee
NLM	National Liberation Movement
NP	National Party
NPC	National Planning Commission
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress
POIB	Protection of Information Bill
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADF	South African Defence Force
SANNC	South African Native National Congress

TRC   Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UDF   United Democratic Front

Chapter 1
Research Plan

1.1. Introduction

The liberation movement in South Africa has been much celebrated for contributing to a peaceful transition to democracy. After 1994, South Africa was hailed as a shining example to the African continent and the rest of the world. However, as the elation about the end of Apartheid died down, the pressure was on the African National Congress (ANC) as the key role-player of the former liberation movement and present ruling party, to make a success of the country. As the twentieth year of South African democracy is being celebrated, now is the time to ask: has the ANC as a former liberation movement made a success of its governance over South Africa? If the answer is "No", then the reasons for this failure need to be determined. When considering this question, it is important to understand that liberation movements as governments can have a large influence on the quality of government of post-liberation societies. This will be studied in more detail during the course of this thesis.

1.2. Background and rationale to the study

The liberation of South Africa from the Apartheid regime is one of the most successful examples of a peaceful transition of power in history (Cheema, 2005:30). The South African liberation movement was not the only factor which contributed towards South Africa's transition to democracy; yet the liberation movement went through long, arduous processes, which included having to act covertly, in order to gain this freedom. Considering the important role that the liberation movement played in South Africa's democracy, it should be noted that according to Clapham, liberation movements in Africa all have the same problem: none of them have transformed themselves seamlessly into government (Clapham, 2012:3). This statement prompted an interest in the South African liberation movement and its transition to government.

The South African liberation movement did not only consist of the African National Congress (ANC) but also of numerous other actors, such as the South African Communist Party (SACP); the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC); the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP); and in the later years the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and the United

Democratic Front (UDF), which also contributed to the end of Apartheid (Ellis, 2012:6). However, the key role player in the liberation movement, and the one most credited with the success of the liberation movement, is arguably the ANC and therefore it had a great deal of influence over the direction of the liberation movement (Gibson, 2001; Ottoway, 1991; Treiman, 2005; Ellis, 2012; Welsh, 2010).

The ANC, which was founded by Christian liberal democrats, started out utilising non-violent methods to defend African civil and political rights. By the time the Apartheid regime was instituted in 1948, the ANC was further being influenced by both Africanist and Communist ideologies (de Jager, 2009:275-276) whose followers were more militant than the Christian liberals who had started the ANC. However, the Christian liberal democrats still played a large role in influencing the liberation movement to protest against the regime using non-violent methods such as boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience. Some of the Africanist interests within the ANC, who argued that the multiracialism of the ANC was undermining the struggle for nationalism, broke away from the ANC to form the PAC (Ellis, 2012:5). The SACP also disagreed with the non-violent methods of the ANC. After the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, the SACP heavily influenced members of the ANC to form *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK) in 1961 as a militant wing which could react to the Apartheid government's methods (Ellis, 2012:18).

Thus it was that the ANC's modus operandi was converted from methods of non-violence to an armed struggle. They became more lawless, more violent and more cunning in order to achieve their goals. There was an increase in radicalism such as sabotage and terrorism (Ellis, 2012:18). Yet, South Africa's transition to democracy was unexpectedly successful with fewer casualties and protests than were foreseen.

After the ANC took power, there were debates about whether democracy could survive in a country governed by a liberation party (see Adolfo, 2009; Dorman, 2006; Leftwich, 1993). Liberation movements leave behind legacies, whether they were successful in their liberation goals or not. There is now a question of whether these legacies possibly affect the way the liberation movement is structured as a government and the way this government rules in modern society. It might be possible that the way the ANC was organised during the liberation movement is affecting the way it operates today, and thereby affects the quality of governance that exists in South Africa today.

The inspiration for this research project was the 2014 elections, in which the ANC was continually attacked by opposition parties as being corrupt, weak, and not the same party that achieved freedom for all races in 1994. There was also the question of the similarities between the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, and the Marikana massacre of 2012, where the South African Police Service opened fire on striking mineworkers, leaving 34 dead and 78 wounded (South Africa History Online, 2013). Both cases included police brutality and a strong international outcry. The Sharpeville massacre symbolises the beginning of the armed struggle within the liberation movement; therefore the similarities between Marikana and Sharpeville cannot be overlooked. Due to the fact that the Marikana Massacre was the largest incident of police brutality since the Apartheid era, it shines a spotlight on the governance of the ruling party and therefore could still have far-reaching consequences for the ANC (South Africa History Online: 2013).

This being the twentieth year of South Africa's democracy guarantees that much analytical work will be done with regards to how the country has fared since 1994. However, the rationale of this thesis is not to evaluate the democracy of South Africa, but it is rather to evaluate the ANC as a government.

The fact that the ANC is still in power after twenty years of democracy is not necessarily indicative of a successful government. In fact, the lack of democratic consolidation in South Africa is leading to thoughts that the ANC is backsliding and becoming increasingly neo-patrimonial where officials use their public powers to serve their own interests (Lodge, 2014:1). Therefore, instead of looking at what has changed from the governance of the ANC as a liberation movement to the governance of the ANC as a democratic government, it seems more reasonable to look at what has stayed the same. It was expected that the legacies of the ANC as a liberation movement would still be present in contemporary society and it was therefore necessary to investigate what those legacies are and how they affect South African society as a whole.

Most studies of the legacies of South Africa are based on the legacies of the Apartheid movement and how they were or are being overcome (see Welsh, 2010; Gibson, 2003; Treiman, 2005; Clark and Worger, 2004), thus emphasising the need for studies on the legacies of the liberation movement as well. After twenty years of the ANC being in power more literature about the ANC is starting to emerge (see Lodge, 2014; Southall, 2013; Ellis, 2012; Jeffreys, 2009). It is necessary, however, to look at the past as well as the present when

dealing with liberation movements. Therefore, a study of the legacies of the ANC liberation movement will enable a better understanding of the past and present South Africa.

These legacies can be both good and bad; and they can both strengthen and weaken the position of the ANC in South Africa. It might, however, be interesting to research the way in which these legacies affect the everyday decisions that the ANC makes with regards to the governance of the country.

1.3.   Research question

The key research question that this thesis seeks to answer is: How is the quality of governance in South Africa affected by a liberation movement that becomes a government?

The research question is answered by using South Africa as a case study. The focus of this research is thus on the modus operandi of the post-liberation ANC compared to the pre-liberation ANC. This is done by answering two sub-questions. The first question that is addressed is: what are the legacies of the liberation movement in South Africa? The second question asks: to what extent have the legacies of the ANC's struggle-era mode impacted the quality of governance in South Africa by the ANC? By answering these two questions, a contribution is made to the broader research question.

1.4.   Research objectives

In order to contribute towards awareness of the modus operandi of the ANC one of the objectives of this thesis is to investigate the history and the current governance of the ANC in order to discover patterns in the actions and behaviour of the ANC.

Another objective is to determine the quality of South Africa's governance and how far South Africa has come since 1994, in order to discover whether the legacies of the ANC liberation movement have had lasting consequences for the quality of South Africa's governance.

The final objective is to determine to what extent the legacies of the ANC as a liberation party have impacted on the quality of governance in South African society. This will be done in order to provoke further research on how liberation movements can affect post-liberation societies in the rest of the world.

1.5.   Analytical Framework: Quality of Governance

When researching liberation movements as governments, it is important to determine the quality of governance by the governing party. There are numerous definitions of governance (see Cheema, 2005; Sundaram and Chowdhury, 2013; Moore, 2004), some of which are broad; others only define governance for a specific function, or only focus on corruption (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008:168-169). Therefore, there are some definitions which are more useful than others (see Fukuyama, 2013; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). Fukuyama's definition of governance, which states that governance is: "a government's ability to make and enforce rules and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not" is useful and informative (Fukuyama, 2013:3). This definition is useful because liberation movements do not necessarily all end in democratic governments; therefore it is useful to understand what quality of governance occurs in non-democratic states. However, South Africa is a democracy and this thesis is a study of South Africa's quality of governance so Fukuyama's definition is insufficient by itself.

The quality of a country's governance can impact on economic growth, poverty reduction, conflict resolution, the exposure of corruption and mismanagement, as well as the will of government to adopt policies and utilise resources for long-term socio-economic development (Hodzi et al, 2012:80). Cheema believes that good governance involves free and fair elections; the promotion of human rights through an inclusive democracy; decentralisation; strong parliamentary processes; judicial reform; strong civil society and political parties; good public sector management; integrity in governance; good governance in crisis and post-crisis situations; and sustainability (Cheema, 2005:16). The World Bank has different but similar indicators of good governance. Their six Worldwide Governance Indicators include: political stability and the absence of violence; voice and accountability; government effectiveness; rule of law; regulatory quality; and control of corruption (Hodzi et al, 2012:80).

These indicators are useful, but broad and thus insufficient for a more focused understanding of the quality of governance. The framework that will be used for the rest of this thesis will therefore be taken from Rothstein and Teorell (2008), who focus specifically on quality of governance and on what makes certain governments better than others. They argue that quality of government is defined as "the impartiality of institutions that exercise government authority" and therefore government institutions must be "unmoved by certain sorts of

considerations such as special relationships and personal preferences" (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008:170).

They argue that definitions of good governance should differentiate between the *input* of governments, meaning the access that civilians have to governments based on political equality; and the *output* of governments, meaning the way in which that authority is exercised and the way in which governments operate (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008:169). Their definition therefore agrees with Fukuyama's as they believe democracy is not necessary to measure governance. This thesis will be based on Rothstein and Teorell's argument that quality of governance can only be maintained through impartiality in the *output* of government (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008:170).

An example of an *input-based* definition is when Cheema argues that the quality of a country's governance is determined by the levels of transparency of institutions and processes, as well as whether these institutions and processes are accountable to society and include platforms for civil society to participate (Cheema, 2005:5). Cheema argues that there are many aspects that contribute to good governance, however, the main aspect to look out for is if the government is based on the will of the people and is responsive to them (Cheema, 2005:5). Rothstein and Teorell, however, disagree, and argue that measuring governance simply on the quality of democracy is insufficient. With regards to Africa, for example, the presence of democracy does not necessarily indicate a sustainable environment for good governance. Africa is still suffering from 'a crisis of governance' due to poor political and economic governance institutions (Hodzi et al, 2012:81). For this reason, Rothstein and Teorell argue that quality of governance can only be defined through differentiating between *input* and *output*.

Rothstein and Teorell's definition of quality of governance is an especially relevant definition when observing the quality of governance of liberation movements as governments. This is because this thesis aims to discover whether the legacies of the South African liberation movements affect the ANC's quality of governance. Certain legacies, such as corruption and elitism, which will be expanded on in Chapter Two, allow for special relationships and personal preferences. It is therefore necessary to identify the legacies of liberation movements in order to determine the impact they have on the impartiality of the ANC's governance.

1.6.   Preliminary Literature Review: Legacies of Liberation Movements

Numerous authors have recently taken to studying the side-effects that liberation movements can have on post-liberation societies (see Clapham, 2012; Jeffreys, 2009; Ottoway, 1991; Southall, 2013). Most work done on liberation movements (see Ottoway, 1991; Clapham, 2012; Melber, 2009; Southall, 2013) agree that the states that emerge from liberation movements tend to be more complex and tend to maintain certain characteristics of those liberation movements.

Ottoway (1991) argues that majority rule in post-liberation societies can sometimes lead to "the creation of authoritarian, single-party regimes that proved as unwilling as their white predecessors to allow the population to have a meaningful say in political decisions" (Ottoway, 1991:62). According to Clapham (2012) the problem is that often the demands of government clash with what was usually expected from a liberation movement. He argues that running a liberation movement is not the same as running a government, and therefore liberation movements that have attained power always face certain challenges (Clapham, 2012:3).

These challenges are a result of the behaviours and actions of liberation movements; and there are some legacies that are prevalent in most cases of post-liberation societies. The most common advantageous legacy is that liberation credentials involve the inheritance of a sense of legitimacy (Clapham, 2012:4). In agreement with this, Mashamaite argues that society feels a sense of gratitude towards the liberators for giving them freedom (Mashamaite, 2009:58). The more intense the struggle was, the more advantageous this legitimacy is for the new government.

However, this gratitude often leads to a mind-set of entitlement, which Clapham (2012) argues is one of the negative legacies of liberation movements. It leads to the government having a sense of conviction and a sense of rightness in their actions. Once in power, feelings arise that they deserve this power and that it is 'African' and 'kingly' to be in such a powerful position (Mashamaite, 2009:35). Clapham agrees and argues that the struggle is still fresh in their minds and opposition parties have no equivalent right to the power that they fought for. In time, those who were not part of the struggle and those too young to be a part of or remember the struggle are also treated as second class citizens (Clapham, 2012:6). For example, the ANC as a government uses its liberation credentials to regenerate its hegemonic

power and to maintain its dominant party rule (Southall, 2013:7). This is a threat to democracy due to the fact that dominant party rule and democracy can be counter-effective as a combination of the two can lead to a façade democracy, which stimulates authoritarianism (Southall, 2013:7). Mashamaite, however, argues: "The fathers of African liberation should understand that we are grateful without demanding us to pay, especially with our newly gained freedom" (Mashamaite, 2009:58).

Another negative legacy is related to this sense of entitlement, and that is the liberators own unfamiliarity with government. Clapham (2012) argues that liberation movements have a single goal, which promotes unity, devotion and discipline; while in government there are many goals, interests, participants and priorities. Victory against oppression does then not mean possible victory against socio-economic issues. The single-mindedness of the liberation movement has ensured that liberators enter government with tunnel vision and a limited ability to face the multiple challenges that come with government (Clapham, 2012:8).

Mashamaite argues for another legacy that is specific to South Africa and that is the lack of transparency (Mashamaite, 2009:69). As mentioned earlier, liberation movements depend on discipline and top-down commands. Stephen Ellis calls this "the habit of strategic deception", where the ANC did not reveal its internal factionalism and repression to the media, and this created an atmosphere within the ANC that was not conducive to debate (Ellis, 2012:289). Mashamaite regards this as "not letting dirty laundry out to dry" and argues that the reason is that Africans do not like to be criticised (Mashamaite, 2009:69).

With regards to the operations of the South African liberation movement that are still present in contemporary South Africa, manipulating civilians is another important legacy. Jeffreys (2009) argues that the South African liberation movement initiated mass action from civilians as a tactic to gain freedom. She argues that many civilians, as part of the people's war, were involved in the liberation struggle and were made combatants; sometimes against their will. The liberation movement used civilians to make apartheid institutions non-functional and to make the country ungovernable (Jeffreys, 2009:67). This call for united action by the masses and sanctioning of vigilante activity still takes place in post-liberation South Africa, as evidenced by the ANC asking civilians to make the Western Cape ungovernable (Nzimande, 2013).

Finally, Clapham argues for the legacy of corruption. He argues that nepotism and corruption often take place in post-liberation societies where the former senior fighters within the

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liberation movement are allowed into the bureaucracy and the corporate world and then join with other interested parties to form a monolithic power bloc (Clapham, 2012:11). This elite group then serves the interests of its own members over the interests of ordinary people, which led Mashamaite to argue that "a better life for all soon translated into a bitter life for all" (Mashamaite, 2009:239). Lodge agrees, arguing that the ANC has transformed from a mass-based party into a party where private interests shape the internal dynamics of the party (Lodge, 2014:1).

Further legacies of liberation movements will be discussed in the more extensive literature review in Chapter Two.

1.7.   Research design and methodology

The purpose of this thesis is to discover how the quality of governance is affected when liberation movements become governments. This thesis will not be undertaken with an explanatory aim as there are too many broad independent variables involved to imply total causality between liberation movements and quality of governance (Mouton, 2010:43). It does aim to contribute to new hypotheses about an existing phenomenon, namely the influence of liberation movements as governments on quality of government; and therefore this is an exploratory study (Mouton, 2010:45). The aim of this thesis is also to contribute towards an understanding of liberation movements as governments through descriptive analysis.

This research design utilises historical analysis and involves using South Africa as a case study in order to answer the research questions. A case study was chosen as the research design because it provides an intensive description and analysis of a single individual, group or situation (Mouton, 2010:56). The detailed nature of the case study research design is advantageous for this thesis because it can generate ideas about behaviour (Mouton, 2010:56). For similar reasons historical analysis was chosen as a research method for this thesis. Historical analysis entails interpreting and understanding various historical events, documents and processes (Hofstee, 2006: 69). During the course of this thesis historical analysis will allow the author to review and interpret sources in order to achieve the first objective of discovering patterns in the actions and behaviour of the ANC by investigating the history of the ANC. Historical analysis will therefore create an overview of the ANC's

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struggle-era mode in order to answer the research question. Therefore, the unit of analysis is institutional: the ANC as a government.

In order to provide a more focused understanding of the ANC's struggle-era mode, the historical overview in Chapter Three will explore the time period of 1912 to 1994. The reason for this is that the ANC was involved in two liberation movements. The first liberation movement took place from 1912 to 1948 and was an anti-segregation movement aimed at the liberation of African people in the Union of South Africa. The second liberation movement took place from 1948 to 1994 and stood for the end of Apartheid. However, this thesis will focus on and be delineated primarily to two periods. The first time period is from 1960 to 1994, which will be emphasised in Chapter Three, as this was when the ANC was banned and embarked on an armed struggle. The second time period focuses on the ANC as a government, which is an analysis of the last twenty years of post-liberation South Africa from 1994 to the present and will be emphasised in Chapter Four.

Qualitative methodology will be used as the research problem involves a local population and a qualitative study will thus be useful in obtaining information about the political behaviour and actions of the ANC as a government (Burnham et al, 2008:20). As such, this thesis will not contain a measurement of the variables as such operationalization is not useful when undertaking a qualitative study (Mouton, 2010: 70). However, although the key concepts in this research cannot be measured reliably, they will still maintain validity by being represented by a qualitative framework which will use specific indicators that were discovered through a literature survey of key authors in Chapter Two. A complete conceptualisation of the independent variable *legacies of liberation movements* will thus only be possible after the literature review, when all the indicators have been discovered. These indicators will then be applied to the case of South Africa in Chapter Four in order to determine the impartiality of its governance in accordance with the analytical framework of quality of governance provided in section 1.5. The dependent variable is thus *quality of governance*.

The research method that will be used for this thesis is a desktop literature survey using published work, indices and reports in order to answer the research question. A desktop literature survey is sufficient for the research that will be attempted. This thesis will therefore utilise research done by others and apply it to the research question in order to provide more detail and quality surrounding the answering of the research question (Mouton, 2010:48).

1.8. Limitations and delimitations

In order to answer the research question in a well-rounded manner, it is necessary to state and to be critically aware of the limitations of this research as well as to delimit the research boundaries.

One of the limitations is the research design. Case study research is useful in that it allows for a lot of detail from various sources that are easily and quickly obtained. As this thesis is a desktop literature survey, case study research will provide richer and deeper data than that found in experimental designs (Burnham et al, 2008:78). However, as the author is the only person collecting this data, there is often the risk of bias in data collection where the researchers' prejudice can influence the data that is included in the study (Britz, 2011:9). In order to reduce the risk of personal bias, the author will consult a broad spectrum of sources, including from the ANC itself. The other major limitation is that the findings from data collected through case studies and subsequently analysed cannot always be generalised to the wider population (Burnham et al, 2008:80). Therefore this thesis will be based solely on the South African liberation movement and cannot be used to generalize about all liberation movements.

The thesis will also be delimited. South Africa is a dominant party democracy led by the ANC. The ANC is receiving criticism that their dominance and mass support is based mostly on liberation credentials Therefore, the liberation history of the ANC will fall within the scope of this thesis in order to investigate how it became the dominant party. There will be three time periods that will be studied in this thesis. The first is a brief review of the time period from 1912 to 1948, detailing the first liberation movement against segregation and the time period when the ANC used non-violent methods for their liberation goals. The second time period from 1948 to 1994 represents the anti-Apartheid struggle and emphasises the period after 1960 detailing the armed struggle and the people's war that led to the liberation of South Africa from the Apartheid system. These first two time periods will be focused on in the historical overview of the South African liberation movement in Chapter Three. The third time period is from 1994 to 2014, as this time-frame takes place in the post-Apartheid era and will contribute the most to studies about the governance of South Africa with the ANC at the helm.

Although numerous legacies of liberation movements will be identified and discussed in chapter two, the focus of this thesis will only be on two of the legacies due to the space limitations of this thesis. There are many other things that will not be studied within this thesis. The focus of this research project will be delimited to the ANC and not any other parties in the South African liberation movement because the ANC is the party that is currently in power. For similar reasons, this thesis will not include future prospects for South Africa, as it is an evaluation of the present state of governance. Therefore, this is not a study of the prospects for democratic consolidation in South Africa.

1.9. Significance of the research

During the initial literature review it was noticed that the research on liberation movements most often concerns roots, methods, and outcomes of liberation movements after liberation.

This thesis attempts to fill a research gap by focusing on the governance consequences of liberation movements on post-liberation societies. It will focus on South Africa in order to gain an in-depth understanding of one of these cases.

In doing so, this thesis may have a narrow significance on the improvement of governance in South Africa as well as a broader significance for the stimulation of further research about post-liberation Africa.

1.10. Chapter overview

The rest of the thesis is described in the following Chapter overview:

An overview of the existing literature on liberation movements is presented in Chapter Two. This will be an in-depth study of what has already been done in the field of liberation movements as governments; focusing specifically on South Africa's liberation movement. This literature review will analyse the research done on the modus operandi of liberation movements and thereby generate indicators for the most common legacies of liberation movements. This chapter will also identify gaps in the literature, which this thesis will attempt to fill.

Chapter Three involves a historical overview of the South African liberation movement. It will briefly focus on the non-violent era of the ANC, being 1912-1948. However, this Chapter will focus more on the period from 1948 to 1994 which details the liberation

movement that ended with the ANC becoming the governing party of South Africa. The emphasis of the Chapter will, however, be on the period of the ANC's armed struggle and the people's war from 1960 onwards.

The key chapter is Chapter Four, which includes an analysis of the ANC as a governing party and thus takes place within the timeframe of 1994 to 2014. The chapter will utilise the indicators in Chapter Two and apply it to post-liberation South Africa in order to determine what the legacies are of South Africa's liberation movement as well as how South Africa fares in terms of quality of governance.

Finally, Chapter Five will review all the conclusions that have been reached throughout the thesis. This Chapter will also include recommendations for future study within the field of this research.

Chapter 2
Legacies of liberation movements

2.1. Introduction

This chapter provides an analysis of the existing literature surrounding liberation movements. First, it will consult the various definitions that key authors have used for liberation movements and through these, provide a conceptualization of National Liberation Movements that is acceptable for this thesis. Second, a study of how the key authors describe, praise and criticise liberation movements as governments will be provided. Third, the author will identify those legacies of liberation movements which many of the key authors have noticed and mentioned and these will be the indicators that will be used for the rest of this thesis regarding the legacies of National Liberation Movements. Lastly, an analysis and criticism of the literature will be provided which will identify the gaps in the literature that this thesis is attempting to fill.

2.2. Conceptualising National Liberation Movements

There are contrasting definitions of national liberation movements. Some authors agree that there are different types of liberation movements (see Southall, 2013; Wallerstein, 1996; Salih, 2007). Wallerstein (1996), however, argues that all types of national liberation movements share the view that the people were not currently free or in power and that there was a specific group of people who were responsible for this oppression (Wallerstein, 1996:2695). All types of national liberation movements also presume two distinct concepts: 'liberation' and 'nation' (Wallerstein, 1996:2695). This thesis will be using Wallerstein's presupposition; therefore, those definitions of liberation movements where both concepts are not present are insufficient for this study. These concepts need to be combined in order to create an accurate conceptualization of national liberation movements.

Regarding definitions which include the distinct concept of 'liberation', Britz (2011) argues that a liberation movement is a type of social movement which is committed to radical social change. Liberation movements use revolutionary tactics and rhetoric in order to achieve their liberation goals (Britz, 2011:21). In the case of Southern Africa, Johnson agrees and argues that these tactics include a variety of revolutionary struggles such as the use of guerrilla

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warfare, insurrection, and a revolutionary seizure of power which would lead to the transition to people's power and thereby to social transformation (Johnson, 2003:321). Lodge (2014) also agrees and argues that liberation movements take place when oppressed groups form a mass organization based on broad social solidarities and mobilise a popular following (Lodge, 2014:23). However, Lodge and Britz do not specify that the aim of liberation movements is to seize power and establish rule by the people. Johnson's definition is more useful, yet neither Johnson nor the rest of these authors argue that a nationalist sentiment is necessary for liberation.

On the other hand there are other authors who argue that there are specialised liberation movements which need to include the concept of 'nation', which Southall (2013) refers to as National Liberation Movements (NLMs). Southall argues that when liberation movements are combined with nationalist movements they become NLMs (Southall, 2013:2). He argues that their specific liberation goals are to overthrow an authoritarian government on behalf of the majority population in a nation (Southall, 2013:2). This is a useful definition for this thesis; however, these NLMs are specific to colonialism, which makes it inapplicable to the case of the anti-Apartheid movement of South Africa. According to Southall, NLMs are thus specifically a product of the reaction to colonialism and are anti-colonial national movements who partook in an armed struggle to liberate their nations from colonial rulers (Southall, 2013:2). Southall does, however, mention South Africa as an NLM that is an exception to the decolonisation rule because it was a struggle for racial equality rather than a struggle for national independence from a colonial power. Dorman supports Southall's definition by arguing that liberation insurgencies attempt to take over control of the state from colonial powers and to advance competing claims about the shape and governance of postcolonial nations and states through political means (Dorman, 2006:1085). These definitions would then be useful if they were not specific to anti-colonial movements. Gibson (1972), although he also argues that liberation movements emerged as struggles against oppressive and foreign rulers in order to emancipate the indigenous people or the majority of society (Gibson, 1972:3), he does distinguish between foreign rulers and oppressive rulers and argues that liberation movements can be a struggle against either.

As Wallerstein (1996) suggested, the major themes that each definition includes is social transformation, a transition to rule of the people, and freedom from oppression. Yet, in order to be an all-inclusive definition of national liberation movements in compliance with Wallerstein's (1996) argument, a definition needs to include the concepts of both 'nation' and

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'liberation'. In accordance with this, Clapham argues that liberation movements are the struggle to free people and territories from oppressive regimes, whether these regimes are colonialists, domestic dictatorships or oligarchies (Clapham, 2012:4). This grouping together of all forms of oppressive regimes is important to this study as it allows for the inclusion of South Africa, which is usually excluded from the group of NLMs due to the fact that the Apartheid government was not a colonial power. Salih's definition of liberation movements is also useful as it differentiates between liberation movements that occur for decolonization purposes and second liberation movements, the latter of which takes place in order to free the country from the authoritarian parties that emerge in post-liberation societies after decolonization (Salih, 2007:669). The former are some of the longest serving governments in Africa as most have ruled their individual countries since independence (Salih, 2007:671). He also argues that it was hoped that the latter movements would breed new kinds of leaders and democracies (Salih, 2007:671). He places South Africa in the latter group as it is a unique case, but argues that South Africa's uniqueness did not separate it from the democratisation failures experienced by other African countries (Salih, 2007:671). However, since Salih groups South Africa into the latter simply because its liberation movement took place as a struggle for social equality and not because it fits into the category of second liberation movements, this definition is useful but not sufficient for this thesis.

After taking all of the above defining characteristics of liberation movements into consideration, the conceptualization that will be used for the rest of this thesis will be the following: Liberation movements are driving elements in a struggle to free people and territories from oppressive regimes in order to achieve social transformation and the transition to people's power (adapted from Clapham, 2012 and Johnson 2003). Nevertheless, even though this thesis will not be using Southall's definition of national liberation movements, it will still be using his acronym for the sake of convenience. The reader should therefore note that for the rest of this thesis the acronym 'NLM' will refer to the above conceptualization of national liberation movements that was adapted from Clapham (2012) and Johnson (2003).

2.3. NLM's as Governments

The governments that were formed from NLMs, the majority of which were decolonization movements, reorganised themselves as political parties and took control of the state machinery (Melber, 2002:162). Their legitimacy stems from their post-liberation emergence

as democratically elected representatives of the majority of the people (Melber, 2002:162). It is this legitimacy that allows them to strengthen their political dominance and maintain control over the state (Melber, 2002:162). However, Clapham points out that in Africa; no liberation movement has had a smooth transition into government. This is because governing a state is so different from waging a liberation struggle that the challenges are unfamiliar and often clash with the principles of the liberation movement (Clapham, 2012:3). Therefore, although these NLMs were deemed as successful in ending racial minority rule; it is widely believed that these movements, once they became legitimate governments, disappointed the majority of people over whom they governed (Southall, 2013:1). Southall agrees with Clapham about the case of Africa and argues that liberation movements as governments are increasingly becoming seen as the problem in Africa, where they were once seen as the saviours (Southall, 2013:1).

Most authors have a negative input about liberation movements as governments (see Melber, 2003; Clapham, 2012; Dorman, 2006; Salih, 2007; Southall, 2013; Lodge, 2014). The stigma attached to liberation movements is such that even South Africa, which, it was hoped, would be the exception to the rule, is being criticised as eventually being likely to succumb to the liberation movement trap. Melber (2003) refers to this trap when he argues that the reputations of liberation movements are negative and that victims who become liberators often turn into oppressors (Melber, 2003:149). In fact, Mohamed Salih (2007) argues that most African countries emerged from colonial rule as benign democracies which were soon blighted with authoritarian and military tendencies and eventually became one-party states (Salih, 2007:669). Soon after independence many African states had either obliterated democratic consolidation or erected new authoritarian regimes (Salih, 2007:669).

Melber (2003) argues that this descent to authoritarianism begins when liberation movements start out with specific goals to reduce the wealth imbalances in society, yet when they come into power they tend to deviate from their original plans of socio-economic transformation (Melber, 2003:149). Clapham (2012) argues that the next stage is when dissent starts to grow from within society because the liberation government has not provided these transformations and developments that were promised (Clapham, 2012:10). The challenge is then for the liberation party in government to try to maintain the levels of popular support; which becomes harder as time passes because within a few decades most of the population will only have a secondary understanding of the liberation struggle (Clapham, 2012:10). Dorman (2006) also makes this point by arguing that liberation movements in government come with

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an inevitable expiry date due to the mortality of struggle heroes and complex electoral dynamics (Dorman, 2006:1096). The very fact that liberation parties in government are reluctant to hand over power to a new generation without liberation credentials means the possible descent into institutional practices of memorialisation, autocracy and patrimonialism in order to maintain power (Dorman, 2006:1096). After this dissent occurs, liberation governments will be tempted to use state power in order to repress dissent and to control the media and the population (Clapham, 2012:10).

NLM's have increasingly been coming under criticism in this manner. The promises that they made for social transformation have fallen short. Many authors attempt to discover the reason for this (see Southall, 2013; Wallerstein, 1996; Dorman, 2006). Roger Southall's attempt included the exploration of what implications the liberation movement status had for the character of governance in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. In this way he aimed to understand how each country's individual histories and legacies have influenced the nature and quality of their rule (Southall, 2013:1). Wallerstein argues that the reason for the lack of social transformation is because the NLM's had to make a choice when they became governments of whether to continue attempting true fundamental change or to conform to the world system (Wallerstein, 1996:2697). He found that the impatience of NLM leaders to reap the benefits of liberation and the desire to stay in power usually caused NLM's to postpone their socialist ideals in favour of catching up with the rest of the world (Wallerstein, 1996:2697). Dorman, however, argues that social transformation has fallen short due to the fact that the liberation movement separates after they take control of the state and one liberation party from within the liberation movement becomes dominant, takes over government and shapes post-liberation societies according to its own goals (Dorman, 2006:1085).

Basedau (2005) and Ottoway (1991) are in agreement with Dorman that one party within the liberation movement becomes dominant and that this is bad for governance. Basedau (2005), argues that political parties, when dominant, in a governmental capacity have a negative impact on democracy and governance (Basedau, 2005:21). He argues that weak political parties are bad for governance and vice versa because governance and political parties are interdependent. He bases this on the reasoning that the effect of certain characteristics of political parties depends on how inter- and intra-party politics is managed (Basedau 2005:23). Ottoway (1991), on the other hand, argues that the dominant party that emerges from a liberation movement struggles with governance because it chooses to still be seen as a part of

the liberation movement rather than to commit to being an actual political party (Ottoway, 1991:67). She mentions differences between political parties and the dominant party that emerges from a liberation movement in government. Political parties are democratically elected and thus represent only those constituencies who voted for them, yet the dominant party still claims to represent the entire nation (Ottoway, 1991:67). Political parties also aim for democratic victory and wish to reign for as long as possible, but they accept that eventually they will have to step down (Ottoway, 1991:67); liberation movements, on the other hand, can only understand victory or death and therefore can accept no loss at the polls as they deem themselves the only legitimate power (Ottoway, 1991:67). She uses South Africa as an example and references this quote from Nelson Mandela in 1990[1]:

> *The ANC has never been a political party. It was formed as a parliament of the African people. Right from the start, up to now, the ANC is a coalition, if you want, of people of various political affiliations. Some will support free enterprise, others socialism. Some are conservatives, others are liberals. We are united solely by our determination to oppose racial oppression. That is the only thing that unites us. There is no question of ideology as far as the odyssey of the ANC is concerned, because any question approaching ideology would split the organization from top to bottom. Because we have no connection whatsoever except this one, our determination to dismantle apartheid.* (Mandela in Ottoway, 1991:68).

Ottoway uses this quote to indicate that the ANC has always seen and continues to see itself as an entire liberation movement in itself rather than as a political party. The ANC's belief in itself as a spokesman for the oppressed peoples of South Africa makes it difficult for it to transform into a democratic party (Ottoway, 1991:69). Since the ANC as a political party could not stand for the entire nation and also only for those that voted for them, it chose unity as being the most important so that the nation could continue to speak with one voice (Ottoway, 1991:69). Ottoway points out that the continued alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP) showed that the ANC chose unity over ideological and political clarity (Ottoway, 1991:77). This blurring of liberation movement, party, government and state is a common feature of liberation movements. Southall also makes note of the NLM that becomes a 'party state' where those who lead the NLM rule both the party, which is mass-

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[1] Transcript of interview with Nelson Mandela at The Washington Post, 26 June I990 – not published in its entirety

based, united and disciplined as well as the state bureaucracy, which is alien and unfamiliar to them (Southall, 2013:14)

These blurred lines are only one of the reasons good governance is so scarce in post-liberation societies. Henning Melber (2002) blames the socio-political environment that emerged as an aftermath of decolonization. He states that it is not unusual for liberators to turn into oppressors because they tend to reproduce the past rather than offer true transformation and thus a new regime can quickly come to resemble an old one (Melber, 2009:452). Southall (2013) also points out that after liberation the NLM begins to diminish as a vehicle for collective freedom and becomes a machine which subordinates individualism and individual freedom (Southall, 2013:13). Melber (2002) and Southall (2012) both agree that party loyalism plays a large role in post-liberation societies. Melber argues that those who took part in the liberation movement became loyal to the party rather than the democratic principles (Melber, 2002:165). Southall argues that the shortage of educated personnel within the party meant that many capable party loyalists were thrust into government, leaving the party machine weak and the government vulnerable to become embedded with NLM characteristics (Southall, 2013:15). Due to this, the governments of post-liberation societies tend to look like this:

> *Today, the reality of NLMs as governments has given rise to widespread feelings of disappointment. This arises not only from their failure to live up to expectations; rather it is that NLMs as governments have come to be widely perceived as embodying alarming post-liberation pathologies. They have become authoritarian, intolerant, careless if not actively abusive of human rights, and ironically, often racist. Worse, they are also seen as having become corrupt, consumptionist, classist and anti-developmental (Southall, 2013:4).*

Melber (2002) is in agreement with this quote from Southall and he argues that the oppressed tend to make the worst democrats (Melber, 2002:165). Wallerstein also notes that eventually corruption, arrogance and petty oppression become the post-liberation norm (Wallerstein, 1996:2697). Wallerstein argues that it may take a while before the cadres of the new regime begin to resemble or become worse than the cadres of the old regime, but it occurs repeatedly when liberation movements become governments (Wallerstein, 1996:2697).

Clapham (2012) argues that these and other problems are characteristically traced back to the liberation movement itself. The more problematic liberation governments become, the easier

it is to begin recognising the legacies that are left over from the liberation movement that have continued as the liberation party moved into government and to view these legacies as a curse (Clapham, 2012:5). Dorman (2006) argues that these legacies emerge when more attention is given to demobilisation and reconciliation than to the forms of politics that emerge after the liberation. As a result, tensions between the new liberal norms of state-society relations and the legacies of warfare begin to emerge (Dorman, 2006:1086). Through these legacies victorious liberation movements can become just as oppressive as the regimes they defeated. Southall points out that when liberation parties transition to government they can use history as tools of propaganda where they emphasise aspects of the past to impose a hegemonic view of the liberation struggle as a glorious, continuous revolutionary tradition (Southall, 2013:6). When this misrepresentation of history accompanies feelings of legitimacy and entitlement as a guiding theology of the liberation movement as a government, then democracy begins to diminish (Southall, 2013:7). The recurring patterns that took place in the behaviour of liberation parties continue as legacies in post-liberation societies, and uphold the most undemocratic practices (Melber, 2002:165). The following section is an investigation into the most commonly recognized legacies of liberation movements as identified by the major scholars.

2.4.   Indicators of liberation legacies

The following section describes the most commonly noticed legacies of liberation movements. Each legacy is supported by at least three key authors. It should be noted that an overlap between the indicators is likely to occur as many of the legacies influence each other.

2.4.1. Centralisation and Elitism

Most liberation parties as governments are structured based on patronage networks as well as ethnic, regional and religious cleavages. These parties have also become exclusivist, elitist and non-transparent (Adolfo, 2009:35). Stephen Ellis (2012) reports that during the liberation struggle, ANC members complained that the leaders in exile were too focused on international dealings and that leaders gave little or no information to the membership on the outcomes of their international dealings or conclave meetings (Ellis, 2012:103). Southall argues that most liberation movements realised that their liberation goals could not be achieved by peaceful means alone and so they resorted to an armed struggle, which implied the need for military hierarchy, discipline and security (Southall, 2013:2). In exile, the ANC adopted totalitarian tendencies which created an atmosphere that was not friendly to debate

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and dialogue. Ellis even states that ordinary cadres who voiced critical or unusual opinions were liable to be detained and even killed (Ellis, 2012:289). This repression of criticism and lack of transparency is something that the liberation party maintained after they went from ruling a movement to ruling as government. The fact is that this lack of transparency, centralisation, hierarchy, loyalty and secrecy are all a result of the organisation and structure of the liberation struggle; therefore they will all be combined as one legacy which will be called Centralisation and Elitism.

Adolfo (2009) argues that democratic deficits stem from this form of elitism due to the undemocratic and authoritarian internal practices of the liberation movement. These practices in post-liberation societies have translated into the intolerance of criticism and non-conformity, which are viewed as signs of disloyalty (Adolfo, 2009:9). Johnson (2003) supports this by arguing that national liberation parties tend to centralise power in order to promote greater party and government unity in order to carry out complex and controversial reforms. In this way they have transformed themselves into a "new ruling conservative elite, often becoming the post-colonial enemies of democracy and freedom" (Johnson, 2003:322). Southall specifically points out that it is as a result of the change to an armed struggle that the liberation movement became a centralised movement with elitist tendencies and very little political openness and accountability (Southall, 2013:2). Adolfo similarly blames the Marxist tendencies of liberation movements which mean that they adhere to a strict ideological discipline and that they have well-structured internal organisations in place that are in line with the principles of democratic centralism (Adolfo, 2009:35). Johnson agrees and argues that the ANC took a Leninist approach in that centralised political leadership and organisation takes primacy over spontaneous actions (Johnson, 2003:329). Therefore, the ANC came to be run by an elite which eventually lost the confidence of their mass voters because they grew distant from them and stopped listening to their voices (Johnson, 2003:329).

Gibson (2001), however, argues that the ANC betrayed its Marxist roots and became westernised after liberation; and thus politics was no longer left to the unpredictability of mass mobilisation but taken to elite groups whose desire to privatise has exacerbated the dire situation of the poor (Gibson, 2001:373). The ANC has failed to decrease poverty due to bad policy choices and not simply to a lack of resources. These policy choices have ensured that development either excludes the poor or adds to their spiral of indebtedness (Gibson, 2001:373). Gibson blames this on the "depoliticisation in the negotiation process" where the

calculable and instrumental process of negotiation is left to the elites within the ANC and not to the population (Gibson, 2001:373). Gibson argues that the ANC has been pervaded by a lack of vision and an "anti-intellectualism" which prevents dialogue and allows them to provide an unrealistic sense that the new society already exists and all that is needed is more action (Gibson, 2001:375). In this way, the bourgeoisie becomes a dictatorship as they do not confront problems through the deepening of dialogue, but through slogan and rhetoric (Gibson, 2001:378).

Adolfo (2009) argues that elitism is stimulated by cadre politics within the party. He argues that liberation parties are cadre parties in that membership requires specific political and ideological grounds. Success within the liberation party is not based on intellectual or creative prowess but on the loyalty that members have towards their command and comply structures (Adolfo, 2009:35). In the case of the ANC, this elitism and cadre system came about because the ANC in exile had operated clandestinely and hierarchically for years during the liberation struggle and it was difficult to let go of that top-down leadership in order to adapt to democratic practices and legality after the unbanning of the ANC in 1990 (Johnson, 2003:331). Suddenly, the NLM had to use political and diplomatic tactics rather than military ones, and it struggled to make the transition.

2.4.2. Entitlement

Entitlement is another legacy. Southall refers to this as Exclusive Nationalism, where liberation movements use their struggle credentials to claim the right to rule and manipulate it in order to stay in power (Southall, 2013:5). An important statement that Melber makes is that "in a governmental office, liberation movements tend to mark an end of history" as any alternative that does not emerge from within the liberation movement will be disregarded (Melber, 2009:454). Mashamaite argues that those members of the ANC who fought in the struggle expect the general population to be beholden to them and to withhold criticism from the ruling party out of gratitude for the freedom they fought for (Mashamaite, 2009:58). Mashamaite feels strongly that the ANC is manipulating and emotionally blackmailing the general population (Mashamaite, 2009:66). In accordance with this, Lodge argues that the ANC mobilises public support by relying on patron-client relations and reminding the public that patrimonial power must involve reciprocal exchanges (Lodge, 2014:2).

Johnson (2001) explains this as due to the NLM's belief in its own righteousness because the NLM is and represents the masses; which also means that if any group succeeds the NLM as

ruling party this would mean that that group has "overthrown the masses". These groups would then be painted as racist and colonial groups, who regrouped and are trying to take back power (Johnson, 2001). Political competition is also discouraged due to this sense of entitlement. Mashamaite (2009) argues that those who were not part of the struggle are disregarded and not deemed fit to lead or rule (2009:58). Clapham agrees and notes that it is difficult for those who were active in the liberation struggle to recognise that anyone else can rule better than they can, as being a part of the liberation struggle weighs more than actual performance in government and veterans of the struggle are valued more than the educated youth who want to govern but were not part of the struggle (Clapham, 2012:6).

Liberation movements can adapt history to suit their needs. NLMs use what Southall (2013) calls 'patriotic history' as another symbol of entitlement; where a divide occurs between those who fought in the struggle and those who compromised and are therefore seen as unpatriotic sell-outs who should be denounced (Southall, 2013:6). Dorman (2006) describes this process as 'memorialisation', where many of the performative acts of statehood in post-liberation societies are used in order to replay the struggle and to keep it fresh in the minds of their constituents (Dorman, 2006:1089). Therefore, military parades; national festivals; official histories; renaming streets after liberation war heroes; and school curricula were designed to reinforce national identity and the reformed structures of the state that came with victory over oppression (Dorman, 2006:1089).

Clapham (2012) argues that this sense of entitlement is caused by the 'struggle mentality' where the struggle remains vivid in the minds of those who fought for liberation even after liberation was achieved (Clapham, 2012:5). This brings with it a deep sense of conviction in the rightness of the liberation movement and a sense of entitlement to the power that came with it (Clapham, 2012:5). Melber (2002) agrees that liberation movements in governments have a sense of entitlement, and he points out the danger of that entitlement. He argues that in post-liberation societies, those in control of political power tend to feel unaccountable to anyone but themselves (Melber, 2002:168). They fail to realise that just because the majority of the population deems them legitimate and that this formally entitles them to make decisions, it does not mean that every decision they make is correct or that those decisions can be justified from a moral point of view (Melber, 2002:169).

2.4.3. Sense of legitimacy

The sense of legitimacy which liberation movements as governments experience is closely linked to the sense of entitlement. If entitlement refers to the liberation movement's belief in its own righteousness, legitimacy refers to the populace's belief in the righteousness of the liberation movement (Johnson, 2001). Southall (2013) argues that this legitimacy stems from the fact that NLMs gain their authority from history. Because of this, challenges to their rule were deemed as politically and morally illegitimate (Southall, 2013:6). Those who disagree are viewed as disloyal to the nation. De Jager (2009) also claims that dominant parties like the ANC gain their legitimacy from a significant historic event such as a liberation struggle and they tend to perpetuate their dominance by continually referring to and memorializing this event (de Jager, 2009:281).

The liberation party in government thus maintains this legitimacy by utilising selective narratives and memories related to the war of liberation. Melber believes they do this in order to establish an exclusive post-colonial legitimacy under the sole authority of one particular agency of social forces (Melber, 2002:163). Clapham (2012) also argues this and adds that this legitimacy is stronger in proportion to how intense the struggle was. The liberation government thus gains an advantage by using its liberation credentials to imbue itself with legitimacy; however, it brings into government those ideals that shaped the struggle and becomes stuck in the past, until eventually its history becomes a disadvantage (Clapham, 2012:4).

Clapham uses the example of South Africa by stating that the anti-apartheid liberation movement is one of the most well-known and admired liberation movements; and yet it is facing criticism from inside and outside South Africa over its quality of governance. Clapham argues that the ANC failed to move beyond its struggle mind-set and it is still partaking in liberation politics (Clapham, 2012:4). Suttner (2006) argues that this is because the liberation movement views itself as a state within the state and as the only legitimate source of power. In the case of South Africa, the ideology and the rhetoric of the ANC do not distinguish between the liberation movement and the people because the underground structure of the liberation movement enforced a sense of family (Suttner, 2006:5). This sentiment helped to maintain ideas of legitimacy among its members even if it was a family where individual and independent-minded thinking was discouraged and where democratic centralism was used as a guiding principle to argue that discipline, loyalty and conformity was necessary in order to survive and to be victorious (Suttner, 2008:22).

2.4.4. Africanism and African NLM solidarity

Liberation states in Southern Africa are still very young and most of the people who were involved in the liberation struggles are still alive today. There is a large amount of solidarity among these groups, especially at the leadership level. Adolfo (2009) notes that during the Zimbabwean crisis in 2001, senior members of the ANC formed a regional coalition made up of different liberation movements whose aim was to strengthen their solidarity and to garner support for Zimbabwe (Adolfo, 2009:7). He links this to the tendency of liberation movements towards self-preservation. Liberation parties tend to be the dominant parties in their countries and victory over Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe would mean that the legitimacy of liberation parties would be challenged and demystified in their individual countries (Adolfo, 2009:33). Hence, Adolfo argues, it is the natural urge for self-preservation which causes liberation parties to support and stand by other liberation parties throughout the rest of Africa (Adolfo, 2009:33). If Mugabe managed to stay in power in Zimbabwe, their legitimacy would stay intact and they would be more likely to hold onto political power in their own national constituencies (Adolfo, 2009:9). Dorman (2006) describes this as the ideological baggage that surrounds governments of former guerrilla movements. She argues that relationships between and within liberation movements are a significant legacy which can affect the mode of governance (Dorman, 2006:1087).

In a lecture celebrating 100 years since the beginning of the ANC Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, the South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, specifically mentioned that Africa was unique in that independent African countries tended to conduct their diplomacy based on a collective continental allegiance rather than on national interests (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2012). This tendency resulted from joining forces with other African countries and from other pan-African practices that took place during various liberation struggles (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2012). Nkoana-Mashabane's lecture seems to contain a distinct Africanist rhetoric and a subtle form of propaganda in support of other African countries. This is clear when she states that:

> *Some of the newly independent states would later crumble internally partly because the first generation of our leaders focused intensively on foreign affairs, mainly in the support of the liberation struggles of colonial territories in Africa. In this way, they sacrificed their own national interests and neglected to invest all their energies to deal with huge domestic challenges in their pursuit for the liberation of not-yet-liberated countries* (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2012).

She also argues that the ANC is an active member of the family of liberation movements on this continent and that South Africa owes its allegiance to Africa as it is a product of African support and diplomacy (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2012). She calls for South Africa to assume more responsibility with regards to development in Africa and to play a more active role in the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in order to contribute towards peace, security, stability and development on the continent (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2012).

Ellis (2012) does not place much emphasis on Africanism as a legacy that affects governance. He does, however, argue that it is natural for the ANC to conform to African solidarity because many of the separate forces within the liberation movement, such as the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), stood for African Nationalism (Ellis, 2012:55). When the ANC was in exile during the liberation struggle they sought refuge in African countries, such as Tanzania. Ellis therefore argues that there are strong African roots within the ANC and that within the ANC there is the view that the ANC does not only belong to South Africa (Ellis, 2012:55). Adolfo, however, argues that South Africa is especially dedicated to African solidarity in order to build its credentials within Africa and to guarantee the acceptance of South Africa by the continent that is missing due to the stigma that South Africa is a Westernised liberal country (Adolfo, 2009:30). Lodge also argues that in South Africa, moral legitimation is sought through appeals to Africanist racial solidarity and nostalgic recollections of patriarchal social order rather than on the basis of the quality of government performance (Lodge, 2014:1).

By maintaining solidarity with other southern African liberation countries, Lodge (2014) argues that South Africa is becoming more and more like these countries. Although the ANC is still a mass-based party with horizontal ties of solidarity, its patrimonial characteristics are becoming more pronounced (Lodge, 2014:3). As a result, the argument that South Africa is the exception to the instability and authoritarianism that occurs in the rest of post-liberation southern Africa is becoming less substantial (Lodge, 2014:3). Melber agrees and argues that although South Africa has a comparative advantage in terms of being a complex and differentiated society that provides a space for civil society actors; it is turning out to be just another African country (Melber, 2003:150). Apart from that, Lodge (2014) also points out that the behaviour of the ANC leaders and their followers is beginning to mimic the behaviour associated with clientilistic organisations that are common throughout southern

Africa where specific public resources and services are offered to particular groups in exchange for political support (Lodge, 2014:3).

2.4.5. Party Dominance

Party dominance is a legacy that is particularly prevalent in Africa and it is a legacy which Southall relates specifically to South Africa due to the overwhelming majority and apparent invincibility of the ANC at the electoral poll (Southall, 2013:7). Southall argues that with regards to the ANC, dominance as a legacy shows itself in numerous instances of mass popular support and specific instances of corruption, where preferential treatment is shown (Southall, 2013:8). This legacy allows liberation movements as governments to dominate the formation of government and the determination of the public agenda. In this way dominant party rule can be dangerous for semi-industrial countries, as it can lead to façade democracy or authoritarianism (Southall, 2013:7). Nevertheless, Southall argues that the thesis of the ANC as a dominant ruling party has been exaggerated to assume that the ANC is not accountable to the Constitutional Court (Southall, 2013:8). This is inaccurate as Southall points out that the ANC was the primary force responsible for the human-rights based nature of the Constitution and that the ANC "continues to secure its electoral dominance because it retains the organisational capacity to mobilise popular support at election time" (Southall, 2013:8). Therefore, the 'tidy' thesis of the ANC's quasi-totalitarianism ignores the complex reality of South Africa's institutional context and the South African society. Yet Southall argues that the dominance of the ANC means that it holds itself largely unaccountable and constitutes a threat to democracy regardless of its regular return to power (Southall, 2013:8). De Jager and Steenekamp also argue that the ANC continues to attempt to control state institutions and the judiciary, leading to increasing state corruption and an overall decline in democratic governance (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:2-3). Although there is a system of checks and balances to hold the ANC accountable, the prolonged concentration of power stimulates corruption and other forms of abuse of that power (Southall, 2013:8).

In 2006 Dorman argued that the ANC's dominance could be blamed on weak opposition parties; however as time passes and opposition parties become stronger it is clear that this is not the sole reason for the ANC's dominance (Dorman, 2006:1092). Once opposition powers become stronger and challenge dominant parties from outside the liberation coalition, the exclusive rhetoric of liberation starts to re-emerge. Opposition parties are made out to be traitors and spies who want to bring back white oppressive government (Dorman, 2006:1092). De Jager supports this by arguing that the ANC encourages its dominance by

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insisting that primarily white institutions are remnants of Apartheid and are motivated by racism. In this way it is able to undermine those institutions that provide a check on its power (de Jager, 2009:281). In South Africa, the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA) is represented as the white party which will bring back Apartheid and this rhetoric increases in frequency as the DA gets stronger. Others who refuse to join the liberation coalition are seen as working outside and against the national interest (Dorman, 2006:1092).

The ANC has also encouraged its own dominance by generating narratives and histories which give overall credence to the ANC as being the entire liberation movement and therefore not acknowledging the roles that churches, student organisations or other political parties played in the liberation struggle (Adolfo, 2009:31). Ottoway (1991) argues that it is characteristic of liberation movements to emphasise unity and to create the illusion that an entire country could have a single purpose and accept a single representative to speak as the mouthpiece of an oppressed nation (Ottoway, 1991:66). De Jager supports this by arguing that the ANC does not conceive itself to be a mere political party, but rather the personification of the national will and the leader of the South African society (de Jager, 2009:279). Adolfo also argues that the ANC as the liberation party in power claims to be the only party credited with the struggle victory and therefore is the only legitimate leadership. Adolfo argues that as a result, the party came to represent the nation as a whole. The party became omnipresent and the lines between party, state, government and nation became blurred (Adolfo, 2009:31). Melber (2002) calls this the "we-they divide" where the blurred boundaries between party, government and state under a one-party dominant system subordinates the state and gives power to the party, allowing any opposition or dissent to be viewed as hostile to the people and the national interest (Melber, 2002:163). The problem that Ottoway forecast would occur with the ANC as a liberation party in government is that it would still see itself as a liberation movement that represents the entire country rather than as a mere, albeit dominant, political party which only represents the specific constituencies which voted for it (Ottoway, 1991:66). De Jager supports this by arguing that the ANC sees itself as the personification of national will and not simply a political party (de Jager, 2009:279).

2.4.6. Unfamiliarity with government

In the case of South Africa, the liberation was more about defeating Apartheid than it was about achieving democracy (Southall, 2013:5). The South African liberation movement in exile was run in a military, authoritarian style, which worked for the clandestine nature of the

struggle. However, when liberation parties become governments, this is often the only way they know how to run an organization (Adolfo, 2009; Southall, 2013; Clapham, 2012). Melber (2009) argues that socialisation factors and attitudes from the armed struggle have influenced the liberation movement as a government and its understanding of government and politics as well as its ideas on how to wield power (Melber, 2009:454). Adolfo states that liberation parties "had faith in this type of governance and their faith was backed up by the success that this system yielded throughout the liberation struggle" (Adolfo, 2009:34). Ottoway (1991), however, argues that in South Africa, the ANC made a conscious choice to enter into negotiations and still maintain its liberation characteristics. Ottoway (1991) argues that the ANC's history and the conditions under which it operated during the liberation struggle created a sense that success would only come with the retention of the liberation characteristics and surmised that these characteristics would hinder it from becoming a political party rather than a liberation party (Ottoway, 1991:63).

Clapham argues that managing a liberation movement is vastly different to the governance of a country. Clapham (2012) compares the two by explaining that a liberation movement's only goal is victory, which allows it to utilise hierarchy, discipline and unity through top-down command in order to achieve this; while government has many goals which call for diplomacy, prioritisation, communication and agenda setting (Clapham, 2012:8). Therefore, due to the complexity of government, victory against a visible oppressor does not imply possible victory against socio-economic issues. Hierarchy and military-style discipline cannot work in a democracy where many people who represent many issues each have a say in shaping government policy. Clapham succinctly argues that: "the single-minded concentration of power and priorities required by the struggle readily converts into a limited and blinkered vision in the face of the multiple challenges of governance" (Clapham, 2012:8).

Frantz Fanon (1974) argues that because these liberation movements lacked intellectual resources when they became governments, they then simply stepped into the infrastructure and systems left behind by the regime they had ousted. They sought to accumulate existing resources through strategies such as nationalisation and Africanisation (Fanon, 1974:122). Adolfo is in agreement and argues that liberation movements did not properly attend to resource redistribution and that they often simply moved towards a rights-based system without addressing the socio-economic inequalities and imbalances that were present during

the old regime. He states that doing so has merely meant the maintenance of the colonial status quo under the guise of black majority rule (Adolfo, 2009:10).

Clapham argues that when liberation movements take power in post-liberation societies the governments are usually ruled by an underdeveloped class, lacking economic power and located more in service than production (Clapham, 2012:10). These rulers become ministers, who often become dependent on specialist knowledge because they were given the position for their loyalty and struggle experience rather than their actual ability or knowledge of the position (Clapham, 2012:10). This is why the newly liberated state becomes economically unsustainable on its own and tends to lean towards neo-colonialism, becoming dependent on external capital, foreign direct investment, and hand-outs (Fanon, 1974:134).

Melber (2009) points out that these governments do not consider that it is their own unfamiliarity with government and other shortcomings that are allowing opposition forces to become stronger. They only think along militaristic lines of us/them and therefore leave no legitimate alternative to their own hegemony (Melber, 2009:454).

2.4.7. Marxism/Leninism

The anti-Apartheid movement and numerous other liberation struggles took place within the context of the Cold War and many of these struggles were financed and supported by either communist China, or the Soviet Union, which brought with it Marxist-Leninist ideals (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:5). The Soviet Union supplied *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK) with arms, equipment, ammunition and military training for three decades (Filatova, 2011). For the armed struggle, Soviet financial assistance was a make-or-break matter for both the ANC and the SACP in exile and therefore the collapse of the Soviet Union was a massive blow for South Africa's liberation movement (Filatova, 2011). Filatova argues that for the ANC and SACP leadership, the Soviet Union was seen as the embodiment of progress and justice (Filatova, 2011). As a result, the influence of the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Soviet Union is still present in the behaviour and culture of the present day ANC.

There are two different understandings of how the legacy of Marxism/Leninism influences the ANC in post-liberation South Africa. According to Gagiano and du Toit (1996), post-liberation South Africa can be understood through either a *liberal* perspective or a *liberationist* perspective.

The *liberal* perspective argues that the state needs to be subject to institutionalised checks and balances, as well as public scrutiny. This perspective places emphasis on multiple centres of power with clearly delineated jurisdictions (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:8). This perspective supports the view that NLM's have disappointed the masses by supposedly turning away from their socialist roots in favour of neoliberalism. In section 2.3 it was mentioned that Wallerstein (1996) takes note of the choice that liberation movements had to face when entering government between continuing with social transformation and conforming to the world system. Johnson (2003) supports this by arguing that global pressures and compromise have ensured that the ANC adopted neoliberal global capitalism, which has led many critics to lament the ANC's leap to the right as a betrayal of their socialist ideals (Johnson, 2003:322). NLM's as governments still tend to think they can manipulate the masses into supporting their decisions by arguing that it is for the good of the socialist ideal; yet they often continue to carry out a capitalistic government (Southall, 2013:10). NLM's in government expect the public to support it and always stand by it. However, although the NLM is still in power, Southall argues that the socialist ideals they advertise have degenerated (Southall, 2013:11). According to Filatova (2011), from a Marxist-Leninist ideology and revolutionary theory point of view, South Africa was perceived as the country in sub-Saharan Africa which offered the greatest potential for fundamental changes in the direction of socialism because of its level of development (Filatova, 2011). However, in South Africa this is the most disappointing aspect for the masses, as the ANC has enthusiastically embraced capitalism even though the South African Communist Party (SACP) is one-third of their Tripartite Alliance and they have Marxist origins (Southall, 2013:11). Mashamaite argues that the ANC expects the general population to feel lucky that they can criticise the government at all, when in other African countries people would be killed for it (Mashamaite, 2009:69). Southall also argues that the NLM, in hopes that the bond between the masses and the liberation movement would remain strong enough to build a popular democracy, utilises propaganda to ensure that civilians know that the NLM is responsible for their freedom and manipulates them into feeling gratitude (Southall, 2013:10).

The *liberationist* perspective, on the other hand, views a socialist state as the end goal and views the state as a public resource or an instrument of social transformation (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:8). This perspective supports the combining of society and state and is therefore resistant to an autonomous and vibrant civil society (de Jager and Steenekamp,

2014:7). This perspective adheres to the Marxism/Leninism ideology as it emphasises the need to take over the state because radical social transformation can only be achieved through the utilisation of state apparatus (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:8). Those who support this perspective mostly argue that the Marxist-Leninist roots that were present during the liberation struggle have remained in the culture of NLM's bringing with it concerning consequences. According to Fanon (1974), liberation struggles in Southern Africa inspired high levels of popular participation. Liberation movements politicised the masses by calling, not only for the end of an oppressive regime, but for socialism. The liberation party in government attempts to control the masses and expects obedience and discipline from them rather than making sure they participate in governance (Fanon, 1974:156). The NLM as a ruling party gives forth an image of being for the people, yet it forbids the free flow of ideas from people to the government and makes no move to welcome popular discontent (Fanon, 1974:156). Shubin argues that this lack of broad discussion before making crucial decisions, and the limitations of inner-party democracy displayed by the ANC are as a result of the influence of the Soviet Union during the ANC's period in exile (Shubin, 2008:312).

From the 1960s onwards, the SACP became highly organised and influential, with its centralised structure drawn from the Leninist model (Ellis, 2012:623). Ellis argues that during the ANC's years in exile, it had come under the effective control of the SACP, and that this Marxist-Leninist influence on the ANC had affected the ANC's ideology and its attitude towards internal debate (Ellis, 2012:623). Johnson (2003) argues that the ANC's commitment to a Leninist strategy of democratic centralism and top-down command was useful during the liberation movement as it provided strong co-ordination, discipline and direction for the anti-apartheid struggle (Johnson, 2003:331). Yet, twenty years after liberation was achieved democratic centralism, tight internal discipline and strong central co-ordination continue to be the main organising principles of the ANC (Johnson, 2003:331). The continuation of these authoritarian principles has prompted criticism that the boundaries for dialogue and debate have diminished within government and within the ANC and the Tripartite Alliance (Johnson, 2003:33). Johnson (2003) argues that these were early indicators that the ANC leadership was developing intolerance for divergent perspectives from within its ranks (Johnson, 2003:333).

The SACP and the influence of Marxism/Leninism provided the ANC in exile not only with military resources, but also with organisational discipline, revolutionary theory and ideological conviction. However, it was not the only ideological influence in the ANC. De

Jager notes the three key ideological influences that contribute to the complexity of the ANC. The three different types of ANC members are Christian liberal democrats, Africanists, and Communists (de Jager, 2009:275-276). This ideological diversity has led to disagreements and factionalism within the party. The ANC emerges in contemporary society more as neoliberalists than socialists. Nevertheless, the ANC still uses the discourse of revolution and counter-revolution and Marxist liberation concepts in order to bind the populace to them whenever the populace challenges the government (Johnson, 2003:336). In South African post-liberation society, the differences in ideology are causing contradictions between the socialist goals and views of the ANC and their actual practice in government (de Jager, 2009:279). South Africa is thus run by a Marxist liberation party which strongly believes in the centralization of power; yet the country is a liberal democracy, with a Constitution which emphasises the separation of powers and accountability (de Jager, 2009:284).

The ANC appears to be made up of a broad range of ideas and beliefs; therefore, there are those within the ANC who support the *liberal* perspective as well as those who support the liberationist perspective. However, this thesis leans towards the *liberationist* perspective because the Soviet concept of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) remains a guiding strategy with regards to the modus operandi of the ANC. This will be further elaborated on in Chapter Four.

2.4.8. Undemocratic and Corrupt tendencies

Many authors (see Southall, 2013; Johnson, 2003; Dorman, 2006; Melber, 2010) argue that the very nature of liberation movements meant that in order to challenge authoritarian rule, the movement had to adopt authoritarian characteristics. Britz (2011) argues that the militaristic and violent nature of liberation struggles forced liberation movements to adopt certain strategies and behaviours that caused these movements to maintain an authoritarian political culture, which made them reluctant to engage with democracy (Britz, 2011:5). Likewise, Adolfo argues that the internal practices of the liberation movement during the struggle were non-democratic, hierarchical, disciplined, authoritarian and often displayed signs of vigilantism and lawlessness (Adolfo, 2009:32). Even though the liberation movements embraced multiparty democracy when they became governments and NLM's are supposed to value human and civic rights, as well as good governance; the formal positions of liberation governments are not necessarily reconcilable with their actual practices (Adolfo, 2009:32). Dorman (2006) argues that this is because these liberation movement resorted to arms during the struggle for liberation, again highlighting the pervading influence of

Marxism-Leninism, which created political practices that promote undemocratic behaviour from the liberation movement as a government in post-liberation societies (Dorman, 2006:1086).

Indeed, in most cases corruption is highly likely in post-liberation societies. Clapham (2012) argues that when liberation movements become government they embrace corporatism through cadre systems where former senior liberation fighters form an elite power bloc of self-enrichment (Clapham, 2012:11). They serve the interests of their own elite members while ignoring the demands and needs of ordinary people (Clapham, 2012:11). Lodge (2014) goes so far as to describe these authoritarian and corrupt tendencies as the beginning of neopatrimonialism in South Africa (Lodge, 2014:1). He argues that the current President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, has had his term dogged with rumours of escalating corruption and the personalisation of power and has contributed to the ANC's apparent transformation from a rule-regulated, mass-based party into an organisation where the internal dynamics are shaped by personal interests (Lodge, 2014:1).

Although there are clear distinctions between public and private interests; often the ANC officials use their public powers for private purposes. Lodge (2014) argues that this blur between public and private interests; combined with the acquisition of business interests by leading politicians and their families; as well as the increasing growth of the presidential family's business concerns since Zuma became president are all indicators of neopatrimonialism (Lodge, 2014:2). Earlier indicators also include local office holders enriching themselves through municipal and provincial tendering procedures as well as increasing competition for posts in government and within the party organisation. Lodge argues that this is eroding the dignity of the internal procedures of the ANC (Lodge, 2014:2). The ANC also reinforces its authority and demonstrates its power through ostentation and elaborate security procedures.

Melber (2002) agrees that the post-liberation politics of the ruling party are often autocratic, clientilistic, and patrimonial, showing a blatant disregard for democracy. Salih argues that second liberation movements eventually also adopted the corruption, abuse of civic and human rights and developmental failures which became synonymous with decolonisation movements (Salih, 2007:672). He argues that once second liberation movements became governments they replaced high-ranking government officials with their own cadres and loyalists (Salih, 2007:672). They also moved to replace the imagery and symbolism of the

previous movement. Therefore, flags, national anthems and even official languages that represented the old regime were changed (Salih, 2007:6720. In this manner the second liberation movement was able to enhance its control of government by demoting the opposition and promoting only its own cadres (Salih, 2007:672).

Dorman (2006) also argues that these undemocratic and corrupt tendencies are as a result of the hardships and brutality that were experienced during the struggle. The structure of the liberation movement meant that hierarchies were developed and that links with external supporters and arms dealers stayed strong and relevant (Dorman, 2006:1085). This influences the bonds between liberation fighters, the style of governance that the liberation party provides in government and the institutional reforms and civilian relations that take place in post-liberation societies (Dorman, 2006:1085).

2.4.9. Factionalism

Lodge describes factionalism as "the emergence of internal rival groups constituted by loyalty rather than shared ideological beliefs" and argues that it is present within the ANC (Lodge, 2014:1). Dorman (2006) argues that the alliances made during liberation often dissolve into factionalism with the passage of time. The relationships and alliances formed during the liberation movement are the most lasting impact of liberation movements (Dorman, 2006:1092). She argues that the internal dynamics of the governance of the liberation movement during the struggle may be reflected in the patterns of policy and reform in the post-liberation state (Dorman, 2006:1092). Yet the implementation of these policies is often contested due to the internal divisions of the liberation party in government because different entities have different interests (Dorman, 2006:1092). These internal divisions seriously impacted experiences during the struggle and are an important legacy of the liberation movement which impacts on politics in post-liberation states (Dorman, 2006:1092).

Melber argues that during the first decade of post-liberation, the liberation party as a government goes through certain challenges when the interests of the different coalitions which were united during the liberation movement start to diverge (Melber, 2009:455). In agreement with Melber, Dorman argues that liberation movements are mostly a coalition of separate forces which therefore had to use a strict rhetoric of unity in order to maintain control over these disparate forces (Dorman, 2006:1093). Thus, the liberation movement did not only have to protect itself from outside forces, but also from possible threats and enemies within the movement (Dorman, 2006:1093). This occurs in post-liberation society as well.

Melber points to the aggressive polarisation that is emerging under former liberation movements when they are challenged by new political opposition parties (Melber, 2009:454). This aggression is worse when the opposition comes from former comrades who are seen as traitors for dissenting and establishing new parties. This is a feature characterising Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa (Melber, 2009:454).

Johnson notes that the ANC comprises multiple, and often competing, political tendencies and beliefs. When the ANC was unbanned these various tendencies clashed with some of the practices and ideologies of the ANC in exile (Johnson, 2003:328). Despite all these alternative ideologies, the practices of the ANC in exile became dominant and continue to affect the possibilities for transformation in South Africa (Johnson, 2003:328). Dorman also describes the rise of the ANC as the dominant liberation party when, shortly after liberation was achieved in South Africa, a significant divide took place in the battle for the control of the liberation credentials in order to govern South Africa (Dorman, 2006:1093). Although the ANC was able to maintain its dominance over the Black Consciousness Movement, the veterans of the internal movement, particularly the United Democratic Front (UDF), engaged in a power struggle with the exiled movement and military wings to gain control of the country (Dorman, 2006:1093). Raymond Suttner has written much about how the anti-opposition tendencies of the ANC excluded the UDF. He argues that the UDF fought the South African government internally on a daily basis while the ANC was in exile, only for the UDF members to be pushed aside and the ANC to be proclaimed the liberation heroes (Suttner, 2005:60). During this power struggle, the ANC attempted to balance the competing interests and perspectives of those groups that were allied with the ANC during the liberation movement, such as the UDF and the SACP (Dorman, 2006:1094). The ANC won the struggle for dominance and became the favourites to win the first democratic elections in 1994 (Dorman, 2006:1093). More recently, Melber (2009) pointed out that in South Africa, factionalism has increased with the internal divisions that took place with the rivalry between Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki, as well as the breakaway of the Congress of the People (COPE) (Melber, 2009:452), and more recently the breakaway of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) from the ANC in 2013.

This legacy deserves to be a section on its own as it has played a major role in the historical and current development of the South African political system. NLMs contain continuing factionalism. There exists within them debates between nationalist and socialist tendencies; debates between those who support populist or political agendas; as well as arguments over

how collaborative relationships with foreign and domestic capital should be (Southall, 2013:12).

2.5. Literature Analysis

There are not many experts in the field of liberation movements; however, the majority of the authors tend to have negative input about liberation movements and tend to criticize the impact liberation movements as governments have on governance.

Many of the legacies that different authors mention are similar. The legacies that were mentioned in 2.4 are those that were found to recur in the literature and each legacy is mentioned by at least three different authors. Legacies such as Authoritarianism, Elitism, the sense of entitlement and the sense of legitimacy were agreed upon by most of the authors. On the other hand, Africanism was viewed as a legacy specific to the decolonization liberation movements and second liberation movements of Africa. Some authors (see Ellis, 2012; Nkoana-Mashabane, 2012) also disagree that Africanism as a legacy hinders governance. Therefore, it was only added as a legacy due to this thesis using South Africa as a case study. Another legacy where there was disagreement was unfamiliarity with government, where Ottoway (1991) argued that some governments were not unable to govern as political parties, but rather chose to govern as liberation parties.

Most of the arguments made by the above mentioned authors are strong and well-presented. There are, however, a few criticisms. For instance, studies on the political culture of NLMs tend to overlook the fact that change can occur within them over time. This can be due to a death; the fading out of the struggle generation; the rise of the youth; or challenges to their power. NLM's do not stay the same forever. Only Clapham (2012) and Dorman (2006) mention this. Another criticism is in agreement with Southall, that a few of the sources (see Johnson, 2003; Melber, 2003; Lodge, 2014) tend to exaggerate the state of South Africa; especially when it comes to authoritarian tendencies and accountability. South Africa's democracy and constitution is still strong and the ANC still have to adhere to the separation of powers that is a prerequisite for a liberal democracy. These exaggerations appear to be written based on their ideas for future prospects rather than on present conditions.

Few authors have done clear research where the legacies of liberation movements in government are their main focus. Most of the literature focuses on the legacies of liberation movements as an abstract and mention the legacies in passing but do not study them as

having an especially large impact on governance. They place more emphasis on the comparison between the liberation movement in power and the previous oppressive regime, arguing that the NLM in government adopts similar authoritarian tendencies. The characteristics of liberation movements are not often viewed as legacies which continue in post-liberation societies. Most of the authors focus on elitism and authoritarianism and argue that liberation movements are reluctant to let go of power. The side-effects of this elitism and authoritarianism, such as corruption, the lack of transparency and the lack of accountability then have a large impact on governance.

However, it is not only the authoritarian tendencies of liberation movements that affects the quality of governance in post-liberation states; there are other legacies that originate from the organization and tactics of liberation movements, which said liberation movements may not be aware of, that can cause difficulties for liberation movements in power. Only Fanon (1974), Melber (2009), Adolfo (2009), and Clapham (2012) argue that there were unintended consequences from transitioning straight from a country run by an oppressive government into a country run by a liberation party government. These consequences include: insufficient resource redistribution; improperly addressing the wealth gap; and the low education levels of members of the struggle who became ministers, causing them to have to hire specialists to help them do their jobs. These four authors argued that the lack of intellectual resources and economic power of the liberation movement meant that after achieving freedom, liberators often stepped into the infrastructure and systems left behind by the oppressive government and thus improperly addressed socio-economic inequalities. That being said, there are consequences that come with a hierarchically and militarily organised liberation movement becoming a government; some of which are only becoming problematic decades after liberation, when the liberation rhetoric and legitimacy of liberation movements are no longer effective at curbing criticism. These consequences are legacies which have not been studied by many authors as having an impact on the quality of governance, but they have been briefly listed by some as characteristics of liberation movements in government. Sections 2.4.2; 2.4.4; 2.4.6; and 2.4.7 have thus been included in order to fill a gap in the liberation movement literature and are examples of these legacies.

There is another specific gap in the literature that this thesis aims to fill. Not enough has been done on South Africa as a specific case for studying liberation movements. This is because most of the authors, when studying Africa, claim decolonization liberation movements as the norm, and South Africa as the exception. For this reason it is difficult to generalize about

South Africa as a liberation movement and it is difficult to generalize about liberation movements based on South Africa because its liberation movement is unique. Therefore, this thesis aims to further investigate the legacies of South Africa's liberation movement to see what impact they have on the quality of governance.

2.6. Conclusion

South Africa's anti-Apartheid movement was a struggle for social justice and not for decolonisation, and so South Africa is excluded from some of the work done on liberation movements in Africa. There is, however, a burgeoning body of literature on South Africa and since the country is now twenty years into its democracy, further research is needed. Specific attention needs to be paid to the impact of the Marxism/Leninism legacy on governance as insufficient attention has been given to this legacy. Therefore, the analysis in Chapter Four will utilise the legacies which adhere to the principles of socialism, namely 2.4.1 and 2.4.7, to investigate the effect that these legacies have had on the ANC's impartiality in adopting the National Democratic Revolution and its Cadre Development and Deployment Strategy.

There is also very little praise among key authors for liberation movements in government. Most of these authors mention South Africa as being the exception to the rule; however, some authors (Ottoway, 1991; Melber, 2009; Southall, 2013) argue that the longer the ANC stays in power the more South Africa backslides and becomes more like the rest of the African countries where liberation movements govern. The major characteristics of liberation movements in Africa that still occur in post-liberation societies that were mentioned by at least three of all of these authors then stand as the indicators for the legacies of liberation movements which have an impact on governance. These indicators form a framework which characterizes the practices of liberation movements when they become governments. Already these legacies point to the conclusion that liberation movements in government have an internal elitist rule and a mind-set of entitlement which causes liberation party leaders to be stuck in the past. The remainder of this thesis aims to investigate how these legacies impact on the governance of South Africa.

The following chapter provides a historical overview of the ANC's struggle-mode era in order to discover patterns in the actions and behaviour of the ANC. This will be done in order to determine past and present modus operandi of the ANC in terms of governance in order to answer the research question.

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Chapter 3
Historical Overview

3.1. Introduction

This Chapter will provide an overview of the history of the ANC as a liberation movement. It will look at the origins and development of the ANC from its foundation in 1912 to its victory as ruling party in 1994. First, an insight into the origins of the ANC will be provided. Since the ANC was founded in order to promote African rights; it did not include as many alliances as when it became an anti-Apartheid movement. The period from 1912 to 1948 will be focused on so as to provide insight into the ANC as a liberation movement before Apartheid was established. The second section will then be based on the ANC as an anti-Apartheid liberation movement and will thus focus on the period from 1948 to 1994. This section will include the beginning of the anti-Apartheid movement and its transition towards an armed struggle, as well as the transition to a people's war. Finally, this chapter will describe the period of the 1990s when negotiations were beginning and the ANC had to transition from a liberation movement into a political party.

3.2. The first liberation movement (1912-1948)

In January 1912 the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) was created by a prominent group of African men. This group consisted mostly of aspiring members of the African middle class who subscribed to a Christian Liberal Democratic ideology (de Jager, 2009:276). It was established in reaction to the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 and the principal purpose of the SANNC was to defend and promote African civil and political rights in its wake (Britz, 2011:42). Several hundred members of South Africa's black educated elite thus met in Bloemfontein in 1912 in order to establish a national organization to protest against racial discrimination and to appeal for equal treatment before the law. The SANNC (which became the ANC in 1923) was then significant due to the realisation that black interests could best be promoted by blacks themselves, rather than through sympathetic intermediaries (South Africa History Online, 2014).

The ANC represents a broad church of members who represent a wide range of interests and prescribe to various ideologies. However, the early ANC was influenced by a liberal tradition

which appealed to a moral authority and its founders represented mostly Christian liberal democrats from the emerging black petty bourgeoisie, such as lawyers, doctors, and journalists (Britz, 2011:74). The ANC was very ineffective in its early years. It was started to protect African rights and therefore for Africans the ANC was an organisation defending them from an oppressive government. Whereas Indian and Coloured political movements expressed resistance to local or particular concerns mostly within churches and through wide non-compliance with the law; African political movements mostly used forms of traditional authority and religious belief to defend land rights and grazing in order to advance local interests in urban situations (Butler, 2004:15). The ANC played a secondary role during the social agitation of the 1920s, because it was elitist and separated from labour and radical protest; it was thus ineffectual from a broad national perspective and was outpaced by more popular movements (Southall, 2013:31).

Towards the 1920s, the ANC became more inclusive and started to gain significance. Until the 1920s, the ANC was ruled by a particular class who were influenced strongly by a Christian education and corresponding social morals (Britz, 2011:80). For this reason, the ANC emerged as a non-violent organisation that stressed responsible citizenship, was bound to constitutionalism and which frowned upon popular agitation. It was also based on the Christian notions of humanity and justice; therefore it called for the inclusion of all South Africans (Britz, 2011:80). However, from the 1920s onwards, the ANC included pan-Africanists and Communists; both of which had a strong influence on the direction of the ANC. The pan-Africanists emphasised African self-sufficiency and the superiority of the racial struggle and disagreed with the inclusion of all races. On the other hand, the Communists emphasised class unity, inclusion and non-racialism (Britz, 2011:81). Despite these contradictions they both dedicated themselves to the struggle for an independent Native Republic. The pan-Africanists inspired the ANC with images of an existence free from white influence; while the Communists committed to working with the ANC in order to transform it into a fighting nationalist revolutionary organisation against the white middle class and British imperialists (Southall, 2013:31).

However, towards the 1930s, the ANC was weakened by divisions along factional, regional and ethnic lines. During this decade the ANC was viewed as largely irrelevant with uneven successes (Southall, 2013:41). When the Native Bills were incorporated into South Africa in 1936, the ANC was eclipsed by a specially constituted All Africa Convention (AAC). This convention was ineffective as it made a compromise with Hertzog which involved the

sacrifice of the principle of the African franchise (Southall, 2013:32). Although the ANC worked closely with the AAC, it was spared major criticism and it emerged in the aftermath as a stronger movement. The failure of the politics of negotiation to prevent the passage of the Native Bills opened the way to intellectual and political renewal. The ANC as an elitist bourgeois organisation was not making any headway in the fight for African rights. Therefore, although the urban masses were mostly excluded from the ANC in its early history; bolder government attempts to further restrict the rights of Africans galvanised the ANC into action (Southall, 2013:32).

It was in response to stricter government actions of the 1930s and early 1940s that the ANC began its transition from elitism to mass-based politics. The urban youth favoured the ideals of pan-Africanism and thus it became a prominent ideological influence on the ANC and the ANC Youth League (ANCYL). The ANC in the 1940s was dominated by the ANCYL, who were more militant, radical and racially exclusive than the ANCYL of previous generations. Although the leadership of the ANC was still influenced by communism to a large extent, the pan-Africanist ANCYL played an important role in transforming the ANC into a vigorous, modern mass movement (Britz, 2011:82). The ANCYL of 1944 was the most notable of the formal structures of African politics that began to organise deliberately integrative protests to draw together the opponents of segregation. Bus boycotts became a major instrument of protest and strikes escalated throughout the 1940s (Butler, 2004:15). The ANC, however, preferred to remain aloof from numerous expressions of social unrest and to campaign for specific issues to gain small victories. The communists cooperated with the ANC on these various issues; notably the formation of an African mineworkers union and an anti-pass law campaign during 1943-44. The Communist Party started to gain a major foothold in the echelons of the ANC when leading members were elected to the ANCs National Executive Committee (NEC) (Southall, 2013:33). This collaboration was strengthened in 1946 by the massive strike by 100 000 African mineworkers. The strike was ineffective, yet represented a significant moment in the ANCs move towards mass politics. These and other broad alliances were strengthened when the NP came to power in 1948 on the back of its Apartheid policies and dedicated itself to implementing white supremacy. This defeat for African rights led to the formation of the Congress Alliance and the mass-based protests of the 1950s (Southall, 2013:33).

3.3. The second liberation movement (1948-1994)

After Apartheid was introduced the ANC fought it through different methods, evolving from peaceful and non-violent mass protest to armed struggle and violent mass action. The first step the ANC took against the Apartheid regime was the Youth League Program of Action, which called for non-violent mass action such as boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience (Britz, 2011:42). In 1953, the Congress Alliance was formed and went on to construct the Freedom Charter, which became the ANC's basic policy document. The strategic approach of this alliance was both a nationalist combination of all social forces against Apartheid as well as a revolutionary struggle for radical socio-economic transformation. This allowed for all the diverging interests within the ANC and the broader liberation movement to be represented (Britz, 2011:43).

When the state adopted unusual emergency powers in 1952 and banned many urban African leaders, the ANC was forced to operate as a cell-based organisation. The more pressure that was placed on the ANC to act clandestinely, the more frustration grew from within the alliance. Factionalism started to emerge; many Africanist groups thought there was too much communist influence in the ANC (Landau, 2012:451). A small group of pan-Africanists, who in the early stages compromised their values in order to form an alliance with the ANC, grew dissatisfied with the multiracialism of the ANC and its cooperation with the South African Communist Party (SACP). These Africanists argued that the ideological ambiguity of the ANC was undermining radical nationalism. They then split from the ANC in 1959 to form the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) (Britz, 2011:44). This impacted on the direction the struggle would take in the next decade as young ANC members became particularly frustrated with their organisation's policy of non-violence after the PAC broke away (Ellis, 2011:665).

3.3.1. Armed Struggle and People's War (1960-1994)

A year after the PAC was formed, it ran an anti-pass protest on 18 March 1960 in Sharpeville, where the state police killed 69 people. This massacre was the turning point as many neutral parties faced the true nature of the state for the first time. People sympathised with the liberation movement and started small acts of sabotage and personal violence (Landau, 2012:545). The Sharpeville shootings led to a shift in the Apartheid struggle. International outcry meant that sympathy for the liberation movement increased, while on the domestic front there was an outburst of anger and an increasing desire to forego peaceful

protest in favour of armed confrontation. There was a swift reaction from the black population to the Sharpeville shootings, with riots breaking out in Soweto, Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth (Jeffreys, 2009:1). The NP government continued to delegitimise itself by killing activists and declaring a state of emergency in 1960. The state then criminalised the ANC and other opposition groups; itself behaving lawlessly by catching ANC and SACP leaders unawares at home and imprisoning them (Landau, 2012:539-540). Surviving this onslaught by non-violence was unlikely.

In June 1961, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC met to discuss an armed struggle. It was there that Chief Luthuli, then President of the ANC, recognised that there was a substantial amount of opinion within the movement in favour of taking up arms. He was still committed to a non-violent ANC, having just won the Nobel Peace Prize, but he reneged slightly by accepting that a military organisation could be formed provided that it was separate from and independent of the ANC (Ellis, 2011:669). The NEC agreed to this condition and thus it was that the ANC remained committed to non-violence, even when some of its leading members were preparing violent activities on behalf of a separate organisation, which would become Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) (Ellis, 2011:669). Nelson Mandela later said that he and his colleagues had decided that violence in this country was inevitable and therefore, it would be unrealistic for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence (Ellis, 2011:658). The first phase of the armed struggle was to use sabotage; later a wider campaign of taking lives and general insurrection against the state would begin. Mandela assumed the lead, grasping the need for directing, controlling and monopolising violence (Landau, 2012:540).

The SACP played a leading role in the formation of MK and it is argued that the SACP's international hierarchy lay behind the decision to embrace an armed struggle (Landau, 2012:240). The ANC had come under the effective control of the SACP during its years in exile. It was argued that the ANC's security structures had created a culture of intolerance and repression that was largely influenced by the SACP. This had an effect not only on the ideology of the ANC, but also on its attitude towards internal debate (Ellis, 2012:623). The ANC-SACP alliance thus also stimulated authoritarian democratic centralist practices and attitudes. It was based on the two-stage theory of revolution: first democracy, then socialism (de Jager, 2009:279). This is the basis of the ANC National Democratic Revolution project, which will be further elaborated on in Chapter Four.

During its years in exile, the ANC formulated a strategy for liberation that was based on four pillars. One pillar was an armed struggle, another was the international isolation of the South African regime, a third was organising through underground structures and operations, and the final pillar was mass mobilisation and mass action (Ellis, 2012:625). In order to properly organise around the four pillars, the Morogoro conference was held in April 1969 and was particularly significant. The three most important outcomes of this conference were as follows: Firstly, a special body called the Revolutionary Council was created to co-ordinate the armed struggle and underground work (Jeffreys, 2009:8). Secondly, the ANC agreed to admit Whites, Coloureds and Indians to its general membership in exile, as well as to all its decision-making bodies with the exception of the NEC. Third, a document called the Strategy and Tactics of the South African Revolution was adopted, which outlined the political and military tactics essential to a successful revolution (Jeffreys, 2009:8). The document emphasised the need for planned rather than spontaneous action and urged the political mobilisation of the masses as the life-blood of a struggle that was now to take on the characteristics of a people's war (Jeffreys, 2009:8).

By the 1970s, the armed struggle was in full swing. "If the 1960s were characterised by the successful oppression of internal opposition to Apartheid; the 1970s represented resurgence in the struggle against the system" (Britz, 2011:46). The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) played a large role in the struggle against Apartheid during the 1970s (Britz, 2011:47). The BCM was aimed mostly at the psychology of black people and it prioritised struggles around culture and identity. The ideological rejuvenation of the BCM with its emphasis on self-reliance and non-violent militancy aimed to increase the sense of self-worth in the larger black psyche (Marais, 2010:40).

The BCM's emphasis on black pride led to protest action when the government tried to force Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in black high schools in 1976 (Britz, 2012:47). On the morning of 16 June 1976, some 20 000 Soweto school children marched in protest against the new language rule. The march was initially deemed to be peaceful, yet the police ordered the marchers to disperse. Although no such order was heard, nor any warning shots fired, a 13 year old schoolboy named Hector Petersen was shot in the head from behind by a policeman (Jeffreys, 2009:17). Several other school children were shot by the police and in response violence spread throughout Soweto, Cape Town, Nelspruit and Kimberley (Jeffreys, 2009:18). The events in Soweto led to an uprising which spread throughout the country; to

which the state responded with mass arrests and detentions. After 1976, many youths left the country to join MK (Britz, 2011:47).

The 1976 uprising was also a key factor in providing a space for the United Democratic Front (UDF) to emerge. The UDF was formed largely on the basis of internal dynamics that were organisationally independent of the ANC (Marais, 2010:52). Domestically, the UDF started to play a larger role as the ANC had virtually no presence or role inside South Africa due to it being banned in the 1960s. Therefore, the UDF took responsibility for the internal struggle while the ANC was in exile (Suttner, 2005:71). With the ANC in exile, there was not a well-organised structure to direct the anger that swept through South Africa after the Soweto riots. Therefore, by the end of the 1970s, the ANC introduced a fundamental change in strategy and policy. In 1979, the Green Book policy was introduced which indicated a shift in guerrilla warfare from a rural focus to an urban, and specifically township orientation (Britz, 2011:48). The Green Book states the ANC's intention to seize power through a protracted people's war, in which partial and general uprisings by citizens would play a vital role. This would involve a broad spectrum of insurgency that included links to legal and semi-legal mass political organisations as well as embarking on a campaign of armed propaganda and other efforts to popularise the movement (Britz, 2011:48). By the mid-1970s the Apartheid state was starting to lose hegemonic control over South African society and the ANC/SACP alliance took advantage of this in order to launch the people's war (Ellis, 2012:635).

In 1984, the ANC called for a people's war that would make South Africa ungovernable (Jeffreys, 2009:85). The primary objective was to destroy local administration in black townships across the country. This would turn the affected areas into semi-liberated zones where new revolutionary organisations led by structures of people's power, would emerge to fill the political vacuum. The strategy would also give the liberation movement a significant measure of control over township residents (Jeffreys, 2009:85). In response, the most intense, violent and sustained mass struggle in South African history started a period of ungovernability. Townships erupted in violent protests and vigilante attacks against the local Apartheid authorities by taking to the streets, setting up roadblocks, burning down businesses and government buildings, setting up kangaroo courts as well as attacking municipal councillors (Britz, 2011:49). The struggle thus entered a new phase where the political landscape in South Africa was immersed in protest marches, boycotts and violent unrest. Township civic and youth organisations often took over community councils, leading to acts

of severe violence. Vigilante groups necklaced[2] police informers, political opponents, local councillors and anyone who stood in their way (Jeffreys, 2009:68). The ANC, however, claims that these violent methods were never part of the liberation movement's strategy. The ANC argues that it did not call for a people's war in order to defeat the South African defence forces, but rather to create an atmosphere of social turmoil, economic malaise and such a level of unrest that would put enormous pressure on the National Party (NP) government to advocate for peace (Jeffreys, 2009:67). In response to the vigilante killings, black on black violence and clandestine assassination squads, the NP government deployed South African Defence Force (SADF) troops into the townships aiming to pacify the population not through conventional methods of military involvement, but through low intensity warfare via clandestine grassroots operations (Britz, 2011:50).

The combination of ferocious state repression and the ANC's strategy of insurrectionism pushed the resistance campaigns of the 1980s to the frontlines. Coercive tactics and revolutionary violence had become the norm by 1986 and were acceptable methods of struggle among the youth involved (Marais, 2010:55). Ellis argues that the People's War had far-reaching consequences for the psychology of the youth and might even be responsible for the social ills affecting the country today (Ellis, 2012:635). The youth were driving the struggle at the local level, but their "millenarian determination placed many of them beyond the discipline of coherent, strategized initiatives that could consolidate and extend gains" (Marais, 2010:55). A struggle ideology had emerged that had begun to mirror the tactics of the NP government that it was fighting as any engagement with the enemy that did not involve outright confrontation was deemed a betrayal (Marais, 2010:55).

Although the insurrectionary climate prevailed during the mid-1980s, the forces of resistance allied to the ANC did not have the capacity to overthrow the government. Withering state repression as well as organisational and strategic dysfunction by the liberation movement meant that overthrowing the Apartheid state by force was not possible (Marais, 2010:61). The armed struggle had never advanced to a point where it militarily threatened white rule and the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that the armed struggle was no longer backed by a superpower (Marais, 2010:61). Yet the insurrectionary atmosphere in South Africa meant that the possibility of NP governability was no longer there (Suttner, 2005:61). Therefore, the four

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[2] Necklacing refers to the act of 'Necklace killings', which describes a tyre being placed around the victims neck, that tire then being filled with some form of oil and then set on fire (Jeffreys, 2009:110)

pillars of the ANC's struggle strategy; namely, the people's war together with international isolation, attacks by MK, and underground ANC propaganda, created conditions that made the NP regime's agenda non-viable. Towards the 1990s there was a stalemate where both sides were able to prevent the other side attaining its goals but could not fully achieve their own and this made a negotiated settlement possible (Suttner, 2005:61). The people's war had, however, allowed the ANC to achieve a substantial ideological hegemony among the popular masses and their main forces (Marais, 2010:61); which gave the ANC legitimacy to claim to be the government in waiting during the new post-liberation era.

3.4. Transition from liberation movement to government

It is important to note that as mentioned in 2.4.1 the current political culture of the ANC is rooted in its exile structure which emphasised centralisation of power, secrecy, elitism and discipline. According to numerous authors (Southall, 2013; Ellis, 2012; Britz, 2011; Johnson, 2003; Adolfo, 2009) the politics of exile have been responsible for the declining internal democracy of the party. Internal debate has been stifled, criticism of the ANC leadership is not tolerated; and decisions are made by an elite group within the ANC; which originates from the earlier reluctance to rely on urban masses and the reinforcement of bourgeoisie leadership (Britz, 2011;78). Yet, the ANC has gone from being merely one part of the liberation struggle against Apartheid to being South Africa's dominant ruling party. This section will investigate how the ANC transitioned from a liberation party into a political party in order to contest the first democratic elections in 1994.

As a political party, the ANC remains an organisation that accommodates various groups with various interests and ideologies. It still operates within a system of alliances as it did during the liberation struggle; the most important of which was the tripartite alliance, between the ANC, SACP and COSATU, which endured after the liberation movement (Britz, 2011:78). Contrarily, it also still had to deal with and attempt to force together the various factions that developed throughout the course of the liberation struggle. During exile, the ANC enjoyed an autocratic and disciplined leadership, with no elections held between 1959 and 1985. When the ANC was unbanned in 1990, it could no longer maintain this exclusive form of rule because compromises had to be made among the different factions (Britz, 2011:76). The three competing centres of power were the exiled leadership; the internal leadership; and the imprisoned leadership (de Jager, 2009:278). These factions competed for influence over and dominance of the organisation. These three centres of power largely

influenced the character of the ANC during the negotiations, the transition to democracy, as well as the post-liberation era (Britz, 2011:76).

Eventually in the 1990s, the ANC decided to combine these three influences and transition from a party in exile to a "mass movement with a large membership that combines the hierarchy and democratic centralism of an exile movement with the mass organisational politics that once characterised the domestic anti-Apartheid struggle" (Britz, 2011:76). This culture emerged due to the need to represent the entire 'broad church' with all its divergent groups, interests and ideologies. It was thus necessary for the movement to combine central discipline and inclusive discussion so that political unity could be maintained (Britz, 200:77). The ANC has had difficulty in transitioning to a political party; some within the ANC go so far as to argue that the ANC is still a liberation movement and was not meant to be a political party[3]. Regardless, several attempts were made in the 1990s (mostly under President Thabo Mbeki) to transform the ANC from an extra parliamentary liberation movement to an effective ruling party. This transformation process led to the increasing centralisation of power in the hands of party leadership and had serious implications for the relationship between the ANC and its alliance partners (Britz, 2011:77). Mbeki sought to realign the ANC with governmental structures, restructure the ANC into a more technocratic organisation with its regional and branch aligned to the government. In this way the party grassroots were controlled by the party headquarters and the government (Britz, 2011:77).

Despite all this effort, after thirty years of exile and clandestine operations, the ANC was still a liberation movement trying to dismantle Apartheid with a political culture dominated by an exile culture. The ANC needed to open its membership to a broad range of people in order to fight Apartheid, but it also needed to formulate policies and make choices for when it would govern South Africa. Ottoway argues that the two actions were incompatible (Ottoway, 1991:69). Liberation movements have armies and political or military cadres. However, in a democratic society, the monopoly over legitimate force belongs to the state. Therefore, political parties do not have armies, and thus in order to become a political party, the ANC had to separate itself from *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK); which was extremely difficult to do (Ottoway, 1991:71). The ANC also had to separate itself from other liberation parties in order to contest the elections as a political party. The ANC chose to retain its alliance with the SACP and COSATU; which reveals that the ANC chose unity over ideological and political

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[3] Mandela quoted in Ottoway (1991:68) in section 1.2.3

clarity. On the other hand, it ignored the UDF (while absorbing some of the UDF cadres into its own structures) and had tense relations with the IFP, which reveals that the ANC was intolerant of competition and determined to crush political rivals (Ottoway, 1991: 72-77). Ottoway argues that both the merger with the SACP and the rivalry with the IFP were signs that a poor democracy would emerge after 1994.

The negotiation process also showed the difficulties for the ANC transitioning from a liberation movement to a political party. The NP government singled the ANC out as the dominant actor that would speak on behalf of the opposition; which was a scenario disliked by rival organisations (Ottoway, 1991:80). In order for a deal to stick, negotiations required the existence of a coherent political force with sufficient legitimacy and authority among the excluded majority (Marais, 2010:60). The ANC had clearly emerged as that force; therefore, negotiations encouraged the ANC to represent the entire liberation movement for South Africa. It also reinforced the trend towards the emergence of a national alliance led by the ANC. Ottoway argues that this was detrimental to the emergence of a pluralistic partisan democracy because pluralism had a better chance to emerge from competition for votes rather than from the creation of a united front (Ottoway, 1991:80). By late 1992 the ANC was attempting to forge political consensus by retreating from previously held positions which would create a breakthrough in negotiations without hampering democratic advance. The most significant of these was the suggestion of compulsory power-sharing in the form of the Government of National Unity (Marais, 2010:72). Through this initiative genuine majority rule would only be in place in 1999 and until then "a government of National Unity would govern the country, with executive power shared between political parties that would win more than 5% of the popular vote" which ended up being the NP, the ANC and the IFP (Marais, 2010:75).

When the exiled ANC leaders returned to South Africa, the internal organisation of the ANC changed. Due to the complex organisational structure of the ANC, there was a crisis of identity and ideological confusion that worsened due to disagreement over future leadership (Britz, 2011:52). The SACP were worried that the representation of the masses in the ANC was decreasing and that negotiations would instead produce an elite compromise of the ANC's contemporary values (Marais, 2010:72). This was a concern due to the argument that three of the four pillars of the ANCs struggle movement were weakened by the suspension of the armed struggle, the reorganisation of underground structures into legal entities, and the international pressure to end sanctions. By early 1991 mass mobilisation was the only

remaining form of pressure on the state and therefore the interests of the masses had to be properly represented (Marx, 1992:264).

In the 1994 elections, the ANC received a large number of votes in every province with the exception of Kwazulu Natal and the Western Cape, where the IFP and NP ruled respectively. Overall, the ANC was confirmed as the most popular and only truly national party in South Africa. Even where it did not win a majority, it still won a third of the votes; no other party could claim this (Marais, 2010:77). Thus, the ANC emerged after 1994, not only as the national ruling party, but already as a dominant ruling party.

3.5. Conclusion

The history of the ANC as a liberation movement shows that many factors allowed the ANC to emerge as the dominant party of South Africa after the 1994 elections. The period that the ANC was in exile considerably influenced the structure of the liberation movement after the 1960s to become more exclusive, centralised and authoritarian. Numerous influences from allied organisations such as the PAC, SACP and the UDF mean that the ANC has to cater to various interests, groups and ideological beliefs in its decisions. Despite or due to the complex structure of the ANC during liberation, it managed to emerge in the 1990s as the party with the most support from various sources and the one most likely to take over the mantle of ruling party. However, it is also clear that the various legacies within the ANC, such as mass mobilisation, communism, as well as the elitism of the exiled ANC leaders meant that it would be difficult for the ANC to transition from a liberation movement into a political party. Therefore, the ideological confusion, non-transparency, and centralisation that dominated the ANC structure during exile could impact on the quality of its governance after liberation.

Chapter 4
An Analysis of the quality
of the ANC's governance

4.1. Introduction

The present state of the ANC's quality of governance will be analysed in this Chapter. This analysis takes place within the timeframe of 1994 to 2014. Utilising Rothstein and Teorell's (2008) definition of quality of governance as impartiality of government institutions; this Chapter will use some of the legacies in Chapter Two as indicators and apply them to the modus operandi of the ANC in post-liberation South Africa. The indicators of liberation legacies from Chapter Two, which will be used to analyse their influence on the quality of governance of the ANC, are the 'Marxism/Leninism' as well as the 'Centralisation and Elitism' legacies. The major strategy which guides the ANC after liberation is the attainment of a National Democratic Revolution (NDR), which aims to achieve its goals through the Cadre Development and deployment strategy. The NDR stands out as a clear example of a strategy that has transcended the liberation movement into the ANC's plans as government. The NDR will therefore be a key focus of this Chapter.

This Chapter will discuss whether or not the modus operandi of the ANC is impartial, and thus analyse whether the legacies of the liberation movement have affected the ANC's quality of governance. It will do so by first describing the structure of the ANC as a government. Second, it will discuss what the NDR entails as the guiding strategy of the ANC. Third; it will describe the impact that the legacies of liberation have had on adopting the NDR. Finally, it will examine whether the governance of the ANC has been impartial or not and to what extent the legacies of liberation have impacted the governance of the ANC.

4.2. The ANC in government

4.2.1. First Decade (1994-2004)

By 2004 the major concern about South Africa's democracy was the danger of an emergent dominant-party regime because the outcomes of elections have been dominated by the ANC since 1994 despite being vigorously contested (Alence, 2004:79). The other trends that

emerged were political centralization and the weakening of the agents of political accountability, which de Jager (2006) claims either emerged as a result of co-optive power or as a result of the ANC's striving towards ideological hegemony (de Jager, 2006:61). Alence argues on a positive note that although election outcomes had become less competitive, democratic institutions became stronger and electoral dominance was not used as a tool to dismantle those institutions (Alence, 2004:80).

However, government's responsiveness to public needs and aspirations started to come under scrutiny due to the top-down pattern of executive-legislative relations in South Africa. Centralisation started to rise as representative parliament members directly depended on the backing of party leaders over voter support and the executive relied on its senior appointees in the public bureaucracy for technical policy advice (Alence, 2004:83). When Thabo Mbeki took over from Nelson Mandela as the President of the ANC and South Africa, he sustained this trend of centralization and surrounded himself with a close circle of loyal and high ranking ANC and South African Communist Party (SACP) political appointees (Butler, 2000:199). He also subscribed to Leninist approaches, which encouraged party members to be involved in internal elections and policy-making; but stated that members must respect the decisions of the party hierarchies once policy had been agreed on (Butler, 2000:199).

This centralisation, hierarchy, and loyalty that were indicative of the liberation movement's practices in exile still affected the way the ANC was organized as a political party. Alence (2004) notes that parliamentary voting has revealed strict party discipline: "No ANC member has voted against a bill" and without veto power, opposition parties have little influence to counter a disciplined ANC delegation (Alence, 2004:84). By 2004, the ANC government had thus already shown a distaste for multi-party democracy by displaying intolerance of criticism (both from opposition parties and within its own ranks), as well as viewing opposition parties as enemies of the transformation project (Brooks, 2004:15). It was suggested that after ten years of democracy, a formal split within the Tripartite Alliance would create a healthier democracy and more representative government (Brooks, 2004:18). However, this was not deemed likely because numerous positions within the ANC had been filled by individuals from the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the SACP through which they attempt to achieve their social-democratic goals, even when those goals oppose the goals of the ANC (Brooks, 2004:18).

Despite the ANC's dominance in parliament and its dislike of opposition, in the first decade of democracy, the National Assembly was not especially polarised and the ANC did not

resort to relentlessly steamrolling opposition resistance in parliament (Alence, 2004:84). With regards to governance, there was little institutional separation of power between executive and legislative branches, as the legislative authority was highly centralised in the executive; and thus the judiciary provided the only means of holding government accountable (Alence, 2004:87). By 2004, of the 220 cases that the Constitutional Court had reviewed, 58 tested its willingness to restrain the ANC-led government and 23 of those were cases where the Court ruled against the government; proving that the judiciary was still impartial (Alence, 2004:87). In 2004 Alence reached the conclusion that "democratic contestation and constitutional government provide[s] a solid institutional platform for developmental governance - especially when combined with an active civil society" (Alence, 2004:90).

4.2.2. Second Decade (2004-2014)

A democracy where a single political party is consistently dominant has structural vulnerabilities (Alence, 2004:90). During the second decade of democracy in South Africa, such a dominant-party system had emerged. This was seen as problematic because dominant parties face stronger temptations to transgress formal limits on their authority, which could lead to democratic erosion (Alence, 2004:90). Single party dominance can create conditions such as declining government response to public opinion, loss of accountability and the overall erosion of democratic principles. It becomes even more necessary that rules and institutions administer checks and balances on abuses of power and that those institutions are independent and autonomous (Brooks, 2004:3). A former liberation movement that becomes a dominant party is potentially hazardous as its symbolic identity and its historically significant role gives it the legitimacy to consume the national political agenda at large (Brooks, 2004:4). Due to the ANC's centrality in the political system, the internal workings of the ANC have had significant implications for the quality of the South African government (Alence, 2004:90). According to Southall (2013), the impact of ANC dominance on governance in the second decade of democracy has been fivefold:

First, as a result of electoral dominance, the ANC may use the elections as a 'racial census' to measure how many of the overwhelmingly black majority still pledge their support to the ANC. The results tend to increase their sense of entitlement (Southall, 2013:8). However, the existence of this racial census is highly contested. Second, the ANC has attempted greater centralization as a goal, disregarding the 1996 Constitution which distributes power between the national state and the nine provinces (Southall, 2013:8). Third, although the Constitution

insists upon public service being impartial the ANC has undermined the independence of the state machinery by deploying those loyal to the party to public positions and thereby discarding the impartiality and independence of the state machinery. As a result, parliament has been marginalized, the separation of powers has been undermined, and the lines between party, government and state has been blurred (Southall, 2013:8). Fourth, the ANC has used its majority, which has been deemed as legitimate, in order to delegitimize opposition and alienate the minority. This often occurs within a racial context, where the opposition is accused of promoting white interests. Fifth, the ANC uses the principles of democratic centralism in order to curb internal dissent (Southall, 2013:8).

In the second decade of democracy, the centralised leadership, the strong organisational structures and the influence of the ANC have thus allowed the party to extend its ideological influence and moral authority in order to incorporate the varying viewpoints and policy stances within it (Brooks, 2004:8). It was believed that this would strengthen and retain the cohesion and authority of the party. However, after the Polokwane Conference in 2007, the cohesion of the party was shown to be imperfect and the internal composition of the ANC remained heterogeneous (de Jager, 2009:285). A coalition of aggrieved ANC members came together to oust Thabo Mbeki and support current President Jacob Zuma as his replacement, although the majority of Zuma's supporters were those on the left who thought that Mbeki had compromised the socialist ideals of the ANC (de Jager, 2009:285).

However, under Zuma's presidency, corruption, nepotism, centralization, and the personalization of power have increased in frequency (Lodge, 2014:1). Lodge (2014) argues that by the end of the second decade of democracy the ANC had degenerated from a rule-regulated mass-based party into an organization where the internal dynamics are influenced mostly by personal interests (Lodge, 2014:1). Lodge argues for the danger of the ANC sliding into neopatrimonial rule due to the increase in nepotism, clientilism, and most notably the "proliferation of the presidential family's business concerns since Jacob Zuma's accession to the presidency" (Lodge, 2014:2). Lodge also expresses concern about the ANC's mobilization of public support which is increasingly becoming reliant on patron-client relations and reciprocal exchanges (Lodge, 2014:2). The ANC's patrimonial tendencies are thus becoming more pronounced and the behaviour of its leaders is starting to resemble the clientilistic organisations commonly found in other post-liberation African countries, where public services and resources are offered to certain groups in exchange for political support (Lodge, 2014:3).

4.3. The National Democratic Revolution (NDR)

In 1969 the NDR was officially adopted as the heart of the ANC's *Strategy and Tactics* document, which was introduced at the Morogoro Conference. It has been argued that the Conference had been 'hijacked' by the communists and that the NDR had originated as the SACP's first stage towards attaining socialism (Dubow in de Jager, 2009:282). The NDR was adopted in order to break-down Apartheid, which was seen as 'colonialism of a special type', through national liberation and socialist revolutions (Filatova, 2011). During the conference proceedings, the ANC made specific reference to the struggle against Apartheid, which was taking place "within an international context of transition to the Socialist system" (Filatova, 2011). The NDR was thus an attempt to reconcile the long-term goal of international socialism and the immediate task of national liberation (Britz, 2011:82). It is therefore important to note the influence of Marxism/Leninism on the adoption and structure of the ANC's national project – the NDR. The NDR originated from Lenin's work on the national liberation movement and it was theorized that if the NDR were correctly implemented, socialism would be the only outcome (Filatova, 2011). Socialism would then either emerge from a radical anti-colonial revolution or through radical transformation in the post-colonial transitional period (Filatova, 2011). The NDR first appeared in theoretical works in the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and did not mention any need for checks and balances or other means of restraining the power of the central government (Filatova, 2011). Filatova (2011) emphasizes that "all attempts to follow these recipes in the Third World context ended in disaster". It is therefore important to note that even though the NDR theory died in Russia before the Soviet Union fell, the ANC is still committed to upholding the principles of the NDR (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:12).

The central objective of the NDR in South Africa is the creation of a united, non-sexist, non-racial, democratic society (ANC, 2012:5). However, while the goals of the NDR are admirable, the ANC's means of achieving those goals are problematic. One of the ways that the ANC will achieve this transformation of the state and the South African society is by ensuring that all institutions in South Africa are demographically representative and that the economy, society and state reflect the racial composition of the South African society (de Jager, 2009:282). The NDR thus requires that the ANC acts as the strategic political centre and contributes to transforming the state and society by directing and guiding ANC cadres who are deployed in various spheres of South African society (de Jager, 2009:279). In order to transform the state the ANC intends to extend its power over all levels of society,

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"including the army, the police, the bureaucracy, intelligence structures, the judiciary, the media, parastatals and agencies such as regulatory bodies and the central bank" (Britz, 2011:84).

The transition towards a National Democratic Society was re-affirmed at the 53rd Conference of the ANC's *Strategy and Tactics* document in 2012. Challenges to the NDR thus far include poor conduct on the part of sections of the ANC leadership which include expressions of corruption and greed, which the ANC states: "not only result in the wastage of public resources, but also undermine the confidence of our people in government and in our movement" (ANC, 2012:7). According to the ANC, the NDR requires a united revolutionary movement "rooted amongst the people, with a corps of cadres and organisational capabilities to strategise, coordinate and implement the programme of transformation" (ANC, 2012:10). This unity has been difficult to achieve due to factionalism, poor discipline, the decline in political consciousness, as well as the abuse of state resources by some. For this reason the 2007 National Conference called for organisational renewal (ANC, 2012:11). One of the central tasks of this organisational renewal was the development and systematic implementation of cadre[4] and leadership policy (ANC, 2012:12).

The NDR emphasizes the centralization of power and urges the ruling party to control the state so as to manage the transformation of state and society by penetrating society as a whole. One of the most significant ways the ANC plans to implement the NDR is through the Cadre Development and Deployment strategy (shortened throughout this thesis to Cadre Deployment), through which those cadres loyal to the ruling party are assigned to key areas of influence in economy, civil society and government (Britz, 2011:84). Britz argues that Cadre Deployment is fundamentally undemocratic "because the ANC is determined to control all levers of power – even if it entails the encroachment of the Constitution" (Britz, 2011:84). Unfortunately, the cadre deployment strategy blurs the distinction between state, party and government because it allows members of the ANC to be given strategic positions in the public service and essentially sets up a massive patronage network (du Toit and de Jager, 2014:19).

As mentioned in 2.4.5, the ANC does not see itself as merely a political party, but as the embodiment of the national will and to this day describes itself as a liberation movement. The

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[4] Those party members who are trained and disciplined in the ideology of the party and are expected to exhibit high levels of political commitment and doctrinal discipline (Heywood in de Jager, 2009:282).

NDR is a means of promoting the ANC as a liberation movement and involving ANC cadres in all centres of power in order to achieve the core pillars of the 2007 *Strategy and Tactics* document (de Jager, 2009:280). These pillars remain the same in 2012, namely: building a democratic development state, transforming the economy, ideological work and the battle of ideas, international work, mass mobilisation and organisation (ANC, 2012:15). The role that the state will play in leading the initiatives of the NDR is central. The NDR requires an NLM which "masters the terrain of electoral contest, utilises political power to advance the objectives of the NDR and wields instruments of state in line with these ideals" (ANC, 2012:430). The ANC places emphasis on the involvement of its cadres in all centres of power, including the presence of ANC members and supporters in state institutions as well as in the intellectual and ideological terrain to help shape the value systems of society. Cadres must be involved in state, universities, the media, as well as business in order to help shape a national democratic society (ANC, 2012:45).

The ANC also commits itself to extending its power over those independent institutions that are responsible for holding the government accountable. The ANC thus aims to counteract the *Chapter 9* institutions that are supposed to be free from interference in accordance with the Constitution that the ANC played a major role in drafting (de Jager, 2009:283). According to section 181(2) in Chapter Nine of the 1996 Constitution, those state institutions that support constitutional democracy "are independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the law, and they must be impartial and must exercise their powers and perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice" (The Government of South Africa, 1996). The ANC, through the NDR and the implementation of cadre deployment, will effectively remove power from these institutions and ultimately give that power to the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) so that the loyalty and accountability of those institutions would be first and foremost to the ruling party (de Jager, 2009:283). While the trend towards centralisation is an ideal for some within the ANC, it has not yet been fully realised. The judiciary remains an independent and robust form of the separation of powers, and the media, civil society and opposition parties are still vocal and provide a check on the power of the executive. If the ANC were to succeed in penetrating all spheres of political and civil society by its ideology and cadres, including the *Chapter 9* institutions, the media and the judiciary, South Africa would become centralized around the ANC with few institutions providing a check on its power. However, the ANC cannot fully achieve the NDR because South Africa

is a democratic society with independent institutions that provide checks and balances on its power.

4.4. The influence of the legacies of NLMs

The NDR is significant to this study because it is a clear example of a strategy which has been carried over from the ANC's struggle era to the ANC's post-Apartheid era. The legacies, mentioned in Chapter Two, which have arguably had the most impact on the adoption of the NDR are 'Marxism/Leninism' and 'Centralisation and Elitism'. The NDR can indeed be seen as a key policy outcome of the 'Marxist/Leninist' and 'Centralisation and Elitism' legacies. In sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.7, these legacies were discussed in detail. The two legacies are closely linked as centralization is prescribed as effective by Marxist-Leninist standards. However, elitism means that political power is taken out of the hands of the masses and controlled by a hierarchy, which supposedly goes against Marxist standards, but is the usual manifestation of it. For this reason, the impact of the two legacies on the quality of governance may overlap in some cases, yet they still need to be researched individually.

4.4.1. Marxism/Leninism

The influence of ideology is prevalent within liberation movement histories and still guides much of the behaviour of the ruling elite. With regard to the liberation movements on the African continent, they were heavily influenced by the Cold War, where much of their financial, military and often ideological support came from communist countries such as China or the Soviet Union (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:5). The Soviet Union was initially the largest supporter of the ANC during its liberation movement.

Filatova (2011) argues that there are many traits inherent in the ANC's political behaviour, which originates from the Soviet Union. The ANC inherited a distaste for an independent media and judiciary; intolerance of opposition; limited inner-party democracy; the urge to control and centralize; the lack of broad discussions before taking crucial decisions; its patronage system and the resulting endemic corruption; as well as leader-worship and the desire never to step down, or to rule 'until Jesus comes back' (Filatova, 2011). However, the most important Soviet legacy that the ANC has retained is the NDR and the way the ANC and its allies have interpreted and attempted to implement this policy in South Africa today (Filatova, 2011). Butler (2005) argues that from 1994, the NDR content and interpretation became a focus of ANC internal politics and performed two closely related roles for the ANC.

First, the NDR allows the ANC to maintain unity by prolonging the teleology of the liberation struggle (Butler, 2005:75). Second, the NDR creates an enabling intellectual framework through which argument and accommodation can take place between "exceptionally diverse intellectual and ideological protagonists" (Butler, 2005:75). The NDR is at the heart of all of the ANCs *Strategy and Tactics* documents and is thus the fundamental strategy of the ANC. However, the NDR cannot be separated from socialism as the Soviet theory goes that if the NDR is properly implemented; socialism can be the only outcome (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:12).

It was mentioned in 2.7 that because of South Africa's development, it offered the greatest potential for fundamental changes in the direction of socialism, but it was also noted in 4.3 that any attempts to implement the NDR in the developing world eventually failed. Despite this, the Leninist legacy of the NDR continues in South Africa (Filatova, 2011). The ANC did not seize power through a socialist revolution, and thus it plans to achieve the NDR's goals through a slow transition to socialism after liberation (Filatova, 2011). The majority of the ANC are passionate about the NDR, however, there are also those within the ANC who oppose the NDR "perhaps remembering those who tried and failed to implement it before, or realizing that without the Soviet assistance the NDR's socialist-orientated goals would be even more difficult to achieve" (Filatova, 2011).

Within the first decade of South Africa's democracy the ANC government, led by Mbeki, moved from a socialist agenda towards a neoliberal approach as far as the economy is concerned (Binns and Robinson, 2002:26). South Africa thus provides the most disappointing case of false decolonization by fighting in the name of socialism, yet adopting capitalism almost as soon as the ANC came into power (Southall, 2013:11). Southall (2013) argues that the ANC could have opted for a reformist version of capitalism in order to provide enough surplus to help decrease or alleviate social inequality. However, the ANC's act of embracing capitalism while representing socialism has alienated many of the populace (Southall, 2013:11). The ANC elite were seen to have overpowered the SACP and to have sold out the revolution by comfortably adapting to neo-colonialism and the adoption of consumerism.

Nevertheless, within the latter half of the second decade of democracy, the ANC reverted to a socialist plan of action by ousting Mbeki in favour of the communist-oriented Zuma at the Polokwane Conference in 2007 (de Jager, 2009:275). This return to a more socialist-based leadership of the ANC shows that ideology plays a larger role in the ANC's thinking and policy than economic reality. In South Africa, therefore, the Soviet legacy of the NDR and

the loyalty to the liberation legacy of Marxist-Leninist ideology stands, even though Filatova (2011) notes that the "fixation with ideology at the expense of reality was one of the most important factors that killed the Soviet economy" (Filatova, 2011).

4.4.2. Centralisation and Elitism

The legacies of entitlement and legitimacy mentioned in 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 means that the ANC can control the debate surrounding the NDR. Those critical of the NDR and its tactics are portrayed as illegitimate because the NDR and the ANC have for the most part been placed outside the boundaries of acceptable political debate (de Jager, 2009:281). By utilizing the legitimacy from its liberation credentials, the ANC has managed to "suppress or discredit criticism over the extension of party control" and thereby "justifying its increasing centralization over all institutions of the state as part of the NDR's transformation of the state" (Gilomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer in de Jager, 2009:281).

The legacy of centralization and elitism is as a result of the exile culture of the ANC and the Marxist-Leninist ideology present during its liberation movement:

> *The ANC looks to political power to transform South African society. This strategy of transformation by increased state intervention, and control by a core elite is explainable by the ANC's historical role as a liberation movement, which required secrecy and decision-making by a small core group of people, and the influence of communism, which tends to spawn a highly centralized system of government* (de Jager, 2009:282).

Therefore, the root cause of this increase in centralization and elitism in the ANC today is because the ANC is attempting to implement the NDR. The increase was, however, aided by Thabo Mbeki's restructured presidency, South Africa's dominant party system, as well as the inefficient competition from opposition parties (de Jager, 2006:61). When Mbeki became president, he placed a lot of focus on centralization in order to achieve the NDR; however, under his guidance centralization came to promote elitism. For that reason Butler argues that Mbeki's experiments in centralisation "weakens leaders' links with their support base, and promotes a spirit of rebellion rather than acquiescence" (Butler, 2000:194).

As a result of the increase in centralization, conflict has grown between national leaders, regional premiers, and local memberships due to the "heavy-handed leadership interventions in provincial politics, including a committee to 're-deploy' ANC cadres, National Executive

Committee powers of regional premier appointment, and the suspension of local party structures" (Butler, 2000:200). However, it is important to note that the centralization and elitism within the ANC is not all-encompassing. On particular issues, the lower echelons of the organisation may overpower the incumbent elites. This is evidenced by the removal of Thabo Mbeki as President of the ANC at Polokwane in 2007, when the popular forces from below challenged the elite in support of their favoured candidate, Jacob Zuma, who eventually took over as President of the ANC (Southall, 2013:9).

The outcome of the Polokwane Conference was interpreted in two ways: some thought it was an indication of the fading out of the liberation elite, while others thought it was a symbol of the rise of communism in contemporary society (Southall, 2013:9). The outcome of the Polokwane Conference was viewed by COSATU and the SACP leaders as the latter interpretation, as a return to the socialist values that were in place before Mbeki. They viewed the conference as an opening for the Tripartite Alliance to re-emerge as a central player in the political process (de Jager, 2009:284). Those ANC leaders who were in exile are more likely to embrace the communist claim that Marxism/Leninism and the inheritance of an unmatched wealth of revolutionary experience makes the Tripartite Alliance uniquely qualified to lead in a social democratic society (Butler, 2005:728). Therefore, as Butler states, the "ANC leaders may have thrown out the baby of revolutionary socialist transformation, but they have retained the bathwater of democratic centralism" (Butler, 2005:728). The Tripartite Alliance and its Marxist-Leninist roots are still important to the ANC to this day because even electorally dominant elite parties need street level organisation in order to mobilise supporters (Butler, 2005:729).

This apparent rise to dominance of the communist strand within the ANC after Polokwane meant that more effort would be extended by the ANC to achieve the goals of the NDR (de Jager, 2009:285). Butler (2005) argues that the two legacies that play an important role in the NDR are a result of the ANC's organisational traditions derived both from "the hierarchy and cadre deployment of exile and from a domestic mass movement politics that mirrors some organisational and structural features of the classic social democratic party" (Butler, 2005:729). Butler (2005) warned that cadre deployment could lead to nepotism and corruption in government subcontracting and procurement and also that political centralisation is undemocratic in its immediate implications (Butler, 2005:730). He notes that the NDR has stemmed the ideological polarisation within the movement and helped to maintain a collective self-consciousness (Butler, 2005:735). However, as long as the NDR remains the guiding and

principle strategy of the ANC, the processes of centralization and elite control will remain (de Jager, 2009:285).

4.5.   Is the governance of the ANC impartial?

4.5.1. Governance as impartiality

Rothstein and Teorell (2008) make it clear that impartiality is necessary for quality of governance. In their understanding of this definition, du Toit and de Jager (2014) argue that impartiality "rules out corruption, clientilism, patronage, nepotism, political favouritism and discrimination and in doing so, counters populism and radicalism" (du Toit and de Jager, 2014:18). They also add that a clear separation needs to be in place between the state and government in order for there to be quality of government. It is important that those institutions which hold government accountable be independent, autonomous and impartial, for if they are not, it compromises the entire democratic process (du Toit and de Jager, 2014:18).

The strategy of the ANC is contradictory, as the goal of the NDR is to strengthen the hold of the ANC on state power by having the ANC play a leading role in all centres of power; however, the ANC also argues that its relationship with the state should be guided by the South African Constitution and that all organs of the state should serve in an impartial manner as an organ of the people as a whole rather than as a party political instrument (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:13). With regards to Rothstein and Teorell's definition of quality of governance as the impartiality of government institutions, it is clear that so long as the ANC aims to control all spheres of state and society through the NDR, there can be no impartiality in output and therefore no quality of governance.

4.5.2. The impact of NLM legacies on the impartiality of government

The constant battle between neoliberalism and socialism that takes place within the ANC is why the stance and the strategies of the ANC often contradict each other. The ANC does not have a liberal conception of the State and of politics in general because relinquishing its Marxist-Leninist conception of the State and politics would mean relinquishing the goals of the NDR and the means of attainting those goals, particularly the Cadre Deployment programme (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:22). The ANC is thus loyal to the Marxist-Leninist legacy which influenced the adoption of the NDR in 1969 because the ANC still sees itself as a liberation movement; however, the present conditions of South Africa steadily

became more neoliberal during the first decade of democracy under the reign of President Thabo Mbeki, in line with the global trend of neoliberalism after the end of the Cold War (Southall, 2013:11). This battle of ideas within the ANC means that while the ANC acknowledges and accepts the importance of the separation of powers, an impartial public service sector and a mixed economy with a private sector on the one hand; on the other hand, it aims to convert the state into a hub where every other part of society and the economy rotates around the ANC at the centre, and calls for ANC cadres to enter all sectors of the state in order to take the ideological struggle forward (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:15).

The ANC has various divisions within its ranks due to historical influences; not only ideologically between the Christian liberal democrats, pan-Africanists and Communists, but also factionally, between the 'University' (Robben Island Prisoners), those in exile, and those who took part in the internal struggle (mostly UDF) (de Jager, 2009:278). These divisions have not disappeared after the liberation movement ended. Within the ANC there are those who support and oppose various goals of the NDR. Those who oppose the NDR are especially critical of the cadre deployment strategy and the blurring of the separation of powers that occurs with centralization. The National Planning Commission (NPC), which drafted the government's National Development Plan (NDP) acknowledges the shortcomings of the cadre deployment policy and argues that the way in which Director-Generals are appointed through cabinet blurs the line of accountability (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:22). The success of the NDP depends on an "effective state with a clear separation between state-party-government" and cadre deployment and the NDR interferes with the NDP by emphasizing that cadres of the ANC in all institutions are accountable to the ruling party (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:22).

However, there are many within the ANC and the Tripartite Alliance, who do not agree with the NDP. They emphasise loyalty to the party over the interests of institutions and the functions and autonomy of the state (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:22). This loyalty, top-down hierarchy, and inclination to state intervention is a legacy of the liberation movement and a by-product of the NDR, which blurs the state-government-party lines and ensures that the state is no longer impartial, but acts in the interests of the centralized party (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:22). Impartiality in governance relies on state autonomy and the independence of state institutions. However, the increasing centralization of the ANC ensures that where state institutions act independently and provide a check on government power, their efforts are sometimes obstructed by the executive, as was the case with the Public

Protector's[5] investigation into the approximate amount of R200 million that was spent on President Zuma's private residence in Nkandla (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:21).

Instances of centralisation and elitism will increase as the NDR attempts to involve cadres of the ANC in all levels of power, leading to the creation of a massive patronage system (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014: 21). Centring all levels of power around ANC control not only stimulates patronage and nepotism, but also increases the chances of instances of corruption and clientilism occurring. The legacies highlighted in this discussion of the liberation movement are therefore negative for impartiality and for governance.

4.5.3. The NDR as a case study of the ANC's partiality

When combining Rothstein and Teorell (2008) with du Toit and de Jager (2014) it is clear that if implementing the NDR allows the ANC to succeed in placing cadres into state institutions, the *Chapter 9* institutions in particular, there will be no impartiality in state and government institutions and therefore quality of governance will decline. The NDR and its cadre deployment strategy are thus a concern for impartiality because it is not only unconstitutional, but also sets up a massive patronage system. De Jager and Steenekamp (2014) elaborate:

> *[The NDR] is unconstitutional as it circumvents the Constitution and allows the ANC to appoint its members and those loyal to the party to key positions within the state machinery, including the so-called Chapter 9 institutions, which are supposed to be independent in accordance with the Constitution. […] Secondly, the NDR sets up a massive patronage network where cadre deployment means members of the ANC are given strategic positions within the public service, blurring the state-government-party lines* (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:20-21).

Deploying ANC members into the public service contradicts section 195(1d) of the 1996 Constitution which requires that public services "must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias" (The Government of South Africa, 1996). For this reason Franks (2014) finds that "the contradiction between the responsibility to the constitution and that to the national democratic revolution has compromised the ANC Government's ability to maintain well-functioning management" (Franks, 2014:49).

It was mentioned in 4.5.2 that within the ANC there are those who oppose the NDR and those who support the NDR. However, there are also those within the ANC who support the NDR,

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[5] Public Protector Thuli Madonsela

but argue that the ANC is not doing a good job in achieving the goals of the NDR. The provincial ANC in Limpopo realises that the ANC's ability to lead society depends on its ability to co-operate with the popular classes and to meet their material interests; as this is the only way to strengthen the ANC's hold of the state apparatus (ANC Limpopo, 2012:5). However, they argue that the ANC's ascendancy to state power has a downside in that members struggle over organisational leadership positions in the ANC in order to gain access to the state and that leaders contest for the access to material resources that is associated with being in the ANC (ANC Limpopo, 2012:7). In some cases the levers of the state are used for narrow economic interests, "including dispensing patronage and corruption, as opposed to promoting the developmental agenda" of the people of South Africa (ANC Limpopo, 2012:7). At this moment in time, the governance of the ANC is not impartial, as the NDR is its main strategy and the NDR is not impartial. De Jager and Steenekamp argue that as long as state corruption and ANC attempts to control state institutions and the judiciary increase, democratic governance in South Africa declines (de Jager and Steenekamp, 2014:2-3).

It is, however, important to note that careerism, patronage and corruption did not only start when the ANC entered into state power, but was present within the liberation movement as well. The ascendancy to state power has just increased these occurrences (ANC Limpopo, 2012:7). ANC Limpopo argues that strong leadership is necessary in the ANC and that a developmental state, which is one of the critical tasks of the NDR, cannot emerge if the state revenue is channelled towards these narrow economic interests and controlled by a patrimonial connected business, state bureaucratic and political elite (ANC Limpopo, 2012:7). Another condition that the ANC in Limpopo deems necessary for the NDR to be realised is mass mobilisation, which would enable the working class and other popular forces to mobilise against the instrumental capture of the state for narrow, personal business interests. When there are low levels of organisation and mobilisation, it becomes easier for the state to be instrumentally captured by narrow business interests without developmentalist outcomes (ANC Limpopo, 2012:7). For this reason, the ANC leadership needs to be fully responsive to the mass population and commit to countering elitist tendencies. To do this it needs to tolerate revolutionary dissent and political differences, including from within its ranks, and foster a conducive environment for different views to be discussed and debated without fear of disciplinary action being taken (ANC Limpopo, 2012:8).

4.5.4. Findings

The 1996 Constitution of South Africa states in section 181(2) that *Chapter 9* institutions must be "independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the law, and they must be impartial and must exercise their powers and perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice" and also that no person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the *Chapter 9* institutions (The Government of South Africa, 1996). Furthermore, Chapter Ten of the Constitution emphasises in section 195(1) that Public Service management should be professional, accountable and impartial (The Government of South Africa, 1996). This means that the NDR's plan to target all levers of power to be controlled by the ANC is unconstitutional and negative for governance because the NDR's goals of centralization and cadre deployment interfere with the impartiality of these institutions.

Therefore, if quality of governance is the presence of impartiality in government, and if the NDR aims to centralize power away from the impartial independent institutions that hold a check on the ANC's power, then the process of centralization is impeding the impartiality of the South African government. Furthermore, if we are to accept du Toit and de Jagers' argument that impartiality is the absence of corruption, clientilism, patronage, nepotism, political favouritism and discrimination and it has been shown over the course of this chapter that the presence of these variables is clear in the NDR, then the NDR is not impartial. This implies that impartiality cannot take place so long as the ANC still sees itself as a Marxist liberation movement and is guided by the achievement of an NDR which centralizes power to the ANC, blurs the lines between party, government and state and deploys cadres into all sections of government based on loyalty rather than prowess.

ANC efforts to realize a national democratic society are based on the liberation ideals of Marxism and are as a result of the legacies of centralization and elitism that were a part of the ANC's structure during the South African liberation movement. Since the NDR and its strategy of cadre deployment is the guiding principle and strategy of the ANC's reign over the South African government, and both the NDR and government institutions are compromised by centralization and elitism, then the ANC as a government is not impartial and the legacies of its liberation movement are affecting its quality of governance.

4.6. Conclusion

The further the time period from the South African liberation movement, the more the ANC seems to cling to its liberation credentials. The NDR was adopted in keeping with the

Marxist-Leninist legacy of the liberation movement. However, instead of adapting to the changing global environment and the modern South African society, the ANC clings to the Marxist-Leninist ideal of the NDR, after it was proven to have failed in the Soviet Union even before the collapse of the Cold War. The division within the ANC means that the ANC is constantly fighting the 'ideological battle' and fighting to control the internal workings of the ANC as an organisation. Despite this, there has been disagreement from within the ANC about the NDR, where some claim that it is unconstitutional and undemocratic, others claim that it is the only way to achieve social transformation, and yet others who claim that the NDR is a force for good but that the ANC is going about implementing it in a way that stimulates nepotism, corruption and patronage.

The legacies of 'Centralisation and Elitism' and 'Marxism/Leninism' that the ANC gained during the liberation movement and still uphold in modern society result in poor governance because those legacies have influenced the ANC's strategies and modus operandi in a way that is unconstitutional and undemocratic. The NDR and its programme of Cadre Deployment are in themselves legacies of the liberation movement and as long as the ANC clings to the NDR as its guiding strategy and continues to view itself as a liberation movement, centralisation and elitism will continue. It is thus concluded that the legacies of the liberation movement promote partiality in government institutions as they emphasise centring all levels of power in the hands of the ANC, which blurs the state-party-government lines, is negative for impartiality and thus leads to decline in the quality of governance.

Chapter 5
Conclusion

5.1   Introduction

As South Africa is in its twentieth year of democracy, this study aimed to investigate the quality of the ANC's governance. Due to debates about whether democracy could survive in a country governed by a liberation party, emphasis was placed on the legacies that remain after liberation movements become governments. Although South Africa successfully transitioned into a democracy, the structure and practices of the ANC during its period as a liberation movement still play a role in the structure of the ANC as a political party and the way that it governs South African society. The aim of this thesis was thus to research the effect that the legacies of liberation movements can have on the governance of post-liberation societies in order to investigate what happens to the quality of governance when liberation movements become governments. This chapter provides an overview of the findings of this thesis as well as the implications of the thesis for future research. First, the chapter will provide a summary of the findings. Second, the key conclusions that were reached will be provided. Third, the significance of this study and its contributions to increasing the knowledge surrounding liberation movements will be discussed. Finally, recommendations for future research will be provided.

5.2   Summary of Findings

This section provides a summary of what has been discovered during this thesis. Each chapter will be analysed by summarising what is included in that chapter and what the findings for each chapter are:

Chapter one served as an introduction to the research project and provided the research plan for answering the broader question: what happened to the quality of governance in South Africa when its liberation movement became government? A background study and a preliminary literature review were undertaken in order to provide an understanding of the ANC as a government in post-liberation society as well as to investigate what key authors had found regarding the side-effects that having a liberation movement as a government can have on the quality of governance of post-liberation societies. This chapter also introduced

the analytical framework for quality of governance that would be used in the body of the thesis. This analytical framework is Rothstein and Teorell's (2008:170) definition of quality of governance as "the impartiality of institutions that exercise government authority". This chapter also included the research design for this thesis which would comprise of an exploratory and descriptive study which used, as a case study, a historical analysis of the ANC as a liberation movement and then as government in South Africa in order to determine if quality of governance is affected when liberation movements become governments.

Chapter two provided a review of the existing literature surrounding liberation movements. This included providing a conceptualisation of National Liberation Movements (NLMs); describing the major characteristics of NLMs when they become governments; as well as indicating the most common legacies of liberation movements. This chapter revealed that there are different types of liberation movements and thus a standard definition is hard to come by. After analysing various definitions, this thesis defined a liberation movement as the struggle to free people and territories from oppressive regimes in order to achieve social transformation and the transition to people's power, which is a conceptualisation that was adapted from Clapham (2012) and Johnson (2003). Furthermore, it was found that when NLM's become governments, most revert to oppressive and authoritarian tendencies. In Africa, liberation movements were not found to have transitioned smoothly into government. In South Africa, it was hoped that the ANC would be the exception to the liberation trap; however, this chapter demonstrated that South Africa is now being criticised by many key authors as a post-liberation government that is slowly degenerating.

It was demonstrated in chapter two that the reason these NLM's perform poorly in government is that the legacies of liberation movements continue to play a role in the structure of post-liberation governments. In the case of the ANC, these nine legacies were found to be prevalent in the post-liberation structure of the ANC government: 1. A centralised and elitist structure based on the ANC's structure during exile. 2. A sense of entitlement owing to their credentials as liberators. 3. A sense of legitimacy that the ANC is the only viable option to rule South Africa. 4. A sense of solidarity with and loyalty to the rest of the African continent and its NLM's. 5. Electoral and party dominance owing to a lack of strong opposition. 6. Unfamiliarity with government as a result of the military and authoritarian nature and structure of the liberation movement and being excluded by the previous authoritarian regime from legal participation in the political society. 7. The ideological influence of Marxism/Leninism which was a result of its alliance with the SACP.

8. Undemocratic and corrupt practices due to the clandestine and lawless operations of the liberation movement, particularly during exile. 9. Occurrences of factionalism as a result of the ANC's incorporation of a variety of members, interests, and ideologies in order to strengthen the liberation movement. Altogether it was found that these legacies create a post-liberation society where the lines between state, party and government are being blurred; where loyalty is valued over performance; and where the NLM believes itself to be the highest and often only legitimate authority.

Chapter three focused on the history of the ANC and explained why and how the ANC became such an NLM. This chapter included a description of the ANC during its first liberation movement from 1912 to 1948, which was focused on anti-segregation and promoting the civil and political rights of Africans. It went on to describe the ANC during its second liberation movement, from 1948 to 1994, which was an anti-apartheid movement and involved an armed struggle and a people's war. Finally, this chapter focused on the ANC's transition from a liberation movement to a political party, emphasising that the ANC chose to retain its status as a liberation movement.

In chapter three it was noted that ideological influences, lawlessness, and an exile culture contributed to the formation of the structure of the ANC today. It was found that the ANC is struggling as a government because it chose to be identified as a liberation movement rather than as a political party. The fact that the ANC as a liberation movement included a broad range of members with various interests and ideologies meant that the ANC chose unity over ideological and political clarity. The ideologically complex structure of the ANC as a liberation movement has therefore led to its emergence in post-liberation society as a dominant party with support from various sources. Chapter three has revealed that the current political culture of the ANC is rooted in its liberation and exile structure. The legacies of the South African liberation movement were thus found to be not only responsible for the decline of the ANC's internal democracy, but also to have aided the ANC to become more elitist, centralised and authoritarian.

Chapter four set out to discover how these legacies have impacted the quality of the ANC's governance using Rothstein and Teorell's analytical approach of impartiality. First, this chapter analysed the two decades of ANC governance in South Africa's post-liberation society. This Chapter focused specifically on the modus operandi of the ANC, in particular on the NDR since it is the ANC's national project and policy from which all other policies and actions emanate. This chapter focussed on two legacies from South Africa's liberation

movement that have largely contributed towards the adoption of the NDR. These legacies were found to be the ideological influences of 'Marxism/Leninism' and the tendencies towards 'Centralisation and Elitism'. Lastly, this chapter set out to investigate whether the governance of the ANC was partial or impartial as a measure of the quality of its governance, by investigating the impact of the legacies of the NLM on the impartiality of the NDR, and thus on the quality of the ANC's governance.

It was found in chapter four that the NDR is a direct product of the 'Marxist/Leninist' legacy of the liberation movement, and that the Cadre Deployment strategy, which is one of the means of achieving the NDR, is a direct result of the 'Centralisation and Elitism' legacy. The NDR emphasises the central role of the state in transforming society by promoting increased state intervention and the control of all levels of power by a core elite. This chapter found that the legacies of the liberation movement have influenced the ANC's modus operandi in an unconstitutional and undemocratic manner. This is because these legacies contribute to increased instances of corruption, clientilism, patronage, nepotism, political favouritism and discrimination therefore hindering the impartiality of government institutions. It was also found that since the guiding strategy of the ANC, the NDR, emphasises centring all levels of power in the hands of the ANC it contradicts the requirements of the *Chapter 9* institutions which were established by the 1996 South African Constitution and which were intended to remain impartial and independent in order to strengthen constitutional democracy as contained in in *Chapter 9* section 181(2). The NDR, by contradicting this, compromises the independence and impartiality of state institutions by blurring the state-party-government lines, and thus decreases the quality of governance.

5.3   Conclusions

This thesis set out to discover how quality of governance is affected when liberation movements become governments. It was discovered that, in the case of South Africa, when liberation movements become governments, the legacies of their liberation cultures pervade their government structures in post-liberation society. South Africa's liberation movement – the ANC in particular - was used as a case study and therefore the modus operandi of the ANC before and after liberation was studied. In order to answer the research question, this thesis aimed to investigate which legacies from the South African liberation movement remained in the structure of the ANC today and to what extent those legacies have impacted

the quality of the ANC's governance. By the end of this thesis the following conclusions have been reached:

First, the legacies that the ANC retained after it became a government still have a great influence on the structure of the ANC today. The following legacies of the South African liberation movement have been recognised as the most prevalent in the post-liberation structure of the ANC: Centralisation and Elitism; Entitlement; Sense of legitimacy; Africanism and African NLM solidarity; Party Dominance; Unfamiliarity with government; Undemocratic and corrupt tendencies as well as Factionalism.

Second, the legacies of the South African liberation movement have impacted the quality of the ANC's governance by contributing towards a decline in the impartiality of government institutions, in particular through the NDR project and process of cadre deployment, where deployment is based on loyalty to the ANC (partiality) rather than merit or professionalism.

Finally, this thesis concludes that the case of South Africa shows that the quality of governance is likely to be negatively impacted when the legacies of the ANC's struggle-era mode are taken through into government.

5.4   Summary of Contributions

Investigating and understanding liberation movements and their legacies is a relatively new field of research and therefore an extensive list of the legacies of liberation movements has not been attempted thus far. This is because most key authors who study liberation movements each study a few of the legacies and do not make the legacies of liberation movements the main focus of their research. The identification of the legacies mentioned in chapter two is significant for the study of liberation movements as they can be used as an example to determine the legacies present in other liberation movements that govern as governments in post-liberation countries.

The presence of these legacies implies that there may be a decline in the impartiality of government institutions and therefore, a decline in quality of governance. This is significant as these legacies can be used as a framework against which to measure quality of governance. The legacies in chapter two were compared with the strategies and practices of the post-liberation ANC government in order to determine whether the ANC has succeeded in promoting good governance in South Africa. By checking for their presence and the impact

that they have on impartiality, these legacies can be used to determine the quality of governance of other post-liberation countries.

The main conclusion presented in this thesis is that quality of governance is potentially negatively impacted when liberation movements become governments. This has significance not only for the study of liberation movements, governance and democracy, but can also be useful for research on the developing world and specifically for Africa. By providing an explanation as to why liberation movements as governments are a concern for the quality of governance, this thesis promotes awareness regarding the dangers of retaining liberation characteristics in post-liberation societies.

This thesis contributes to the understanding of the quality of governance in South Africa and may prove significant for further research on improving quality of governance.

5.5   Suggestions for Further Research

This thesis is limited in that it was designed as a case study and therefore could not provide any broader generalisations about what occurs when liberation movements become governments in other countries, although it provides 'clues' as to what may happen. This thesis therefore provides a possible hypothesis for further testing. The possible hypothesis is: poor quality of governance results when liberation movements become governments. In order for this research to have a greater impact, this thesis should be tested against other post-liberation countries in Africa and beyond. In order to be able to generalise about all liberation movements and to improve the governance of post-liberation societies, further research needs to be conducted on a comparative basis.

Another suggestion is that further research be conducted on the distinction between first and second liberation movements mentioned in 2.2 where, according to Salih (2007), first liberation movements are decolonisation movements, while second liberation movements are movements to free liberated countries from the authoritarian regimes that often emerge after decolonisation. Research needs to be conducted on the possibility of South Africa heading for a third liberation movement. This research is becoming increasingly necessary as the second decade of ANC rule comes to an end and dissatisfaction with the ANC increases.

The possibility that the legacies of the liberation movement could be leading to neopatrimonialism needs to be further researched. Lodge (2014) argues that the ANC is descending into neopatrimonial rule and this can also be traced back to the structure of the

ANC as a liberation movement. The theory that neopatrimonialism can be the result of the legacies of liberation movements needs to be tested in South Africa and other African countries.

Finally, it is important that further research should be conducted on how dominant party systems affect the quality of governance. One of the legacies, 'Party Dominance' has played, and continues to play, an important role in South Africa. The author recommends that further research be done on dominant party systems in post-liberation societies and whether dominance is the result of the sense of legitimacy surrounding parties involved in liberation movements.

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