


**A comparative study of governance and state development in post-colonial
Botswana and Zaire/ DRC**

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Thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Arts (International Studies) at the University of Stellenbosch



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Declaration

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Abstract

The aim of this research was to explore the interaction between governance and development in post-colonial Africa. The departure point of the thesis was the understanding that the state remains a pre-eminent actor in the international system. Keeping this assumption in mind, the study made use of a comparative analysis; comparing governance and development in Botswana with governance and development in Zaire/the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), focusing on the post-colonial era. The importance of this research lies in its contribution to the debate on the role of the state in post-colonial Africa. It explores the influence of institution formation and policy implementation by governments (in other words, governance) on development. Understanding the effect of governance on development can have invaluable lessons for other African states in their efforts to develop further. The research question, which guided the thesis thus, was: in the era of the pre-eminence of the state, making use of a comparison between Botswana and Zaire/DRC, what is the influence and effect, of state institution formation and policy implementation (governance) by governments, on state development in terms of economical-, political- and social development?

The two main variables were governance and development. Development was subdivided into three indicators: political, economic and social development. Governance was evaluated in terms of being seen as poor or good governance, as per the World Bank's definition and understanding of governance. Zaire/DRC, as an example of a failed state, was analysed first, followed by Botswana, selected for its arguably "best practice" experience. For each country the analysis was subdivided into three phases as per the theoretical framework of Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, and Stedman's book, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (1999). Their book describes three stages of change in African state development in the post-colonial era (Chazan-framework). This framework uses the Chazan-framework and thus subdivides the post-colonial era into: the concentration (centralisation) phase, the elaboration phase, and finally the reconsideration of state power phase.

The research found that Zaire/DRC followed a process of state collapse in the post-colonial era, whereas in sharp contrast Botswana experienced positive state development. Since independence Zaire continuously practised poor governance whilst Botswana largely practised good governance. This was true in all three phases of the Chazan-framework. At the same time, or perhaps due to poor governance, Zaire continuously experienced negative development in all three development categories whilst Botswana continuously experienced positive development in all three development categories, again perhaps due to good governance.

The research concludes that even though Botswana is not necessarily an example of a perfect state, it is special in an African context, because of its good governance record. This study does not draw direct relationships between good governance and development, but finds that Botswana probably benefited greatly in development due to the implementation of good institutions, good government policies and general good governance. The research also found that states benefit when their governments practice and adopt policies that are anti-corruption, pro-democracy, pro-competition, pro public-private partnerships, and pro market-orientated economics. In addition, the following are also conducive to good governance: leadership with integrity, peaceful

and regular leadership changes, clear distinction between government (party) and the state, and empowered government oversight institutions that act, even against the government itself when needed. The practice of good governance is thus shown to be supportive of long-term development.

Opsomming

Die doel van hierdie navorsing was om die interaksie tussen regering en ontwikkeling in post-koloniale Afrika te ondersoek. Die tesis gaan uit vanuit die oogpunt dat die staat steeds 'n dominante akteur in die internasionale stelsel is. Die studie het gebruik gemaak van 'n vergelykende ontleding. Regeringstyl en ontwikkeling in post-koloniale Afrika is met mekaar vergelyk. Die vergelyking is getrek tussen Botswana en Zaïre/Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo (DRK). Die belangrikheid van die navorsing lê in die bydrae tot die debat oor die rol van die staat in Afrika in die post-koloniale era. Dit bekyk die belangrikheid van instellingskepping en beleidsimplementering (met ander woorde, regeerstyl of regering) deur regerings in terme van invloed op die ontwikkeling van state in Afrika. Beter begrip van hierdie verhouding kan waardevolle lesse bevat vir ander Afrikastate in hul pogings om verder te ontwikkel. Die navorsingsvraag wat die tesis gelei het was dus: in die era van die voorrang van die staat, en deur gebruikmaking van 'n vergelykende studie tussen Botswana en Zaïre/DRK, wat is die invloed en effek van staatsinstellingsvorming en van beleidsimplementering (regering) deur regerings, op staatsontwikkeling in terme van ekonomiese-, politieke- en sosiale ontwikkeling?

In hierdie studie was regering en ontwikkeling die twee belangrikste veranderlikes gewees. Ontwikkeling is onderverdeel in drie aanwysers: politieke, ekonomiese en maatskaplike ontwikkeling. Regering is geëvalueer in terme van wat gesien word as swak of goeie regering, volgens die Wêreldbank se definisie en begrip van goeie regering. Zaïre/DRK is eerste as 'n voorbeeld van 'n mislukte staat ontleed, gevolg deur Botswana, gekies vir sy veronderstelde "beste praktyk"-ervaring. Die analise vir elk van hierdie lande is onderverdeel in drie fases, soos gebaseer op die teoretiese raamwerk van Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, en Stedman in, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (1999) (die Chazan-raamwerk). Hierdie raamwerk onderverdeel die post-koloniale era in: die konsentrasiefase (sentraliseringsfase), die uitbreidingsfase en uiteindelik die fase van die heroorweging van staatsmag.

Die navorsing bevind dat Zaïre 'n proses van ineenstorting van die staat in die post-koloniale era ervaar het, terwyl Botswana in skrilte kontras positiewe staatsontwikkeling ervaar het. Hierdie tendens was aanwesig in al drie fases van die Chazan-raamwerk. Sedert onafhanklikheid het Botswana ook goeie regering toegepas terwyl Zaïre/DRK meestal swak regering toegepas het. Terselfdertyd, dalk ook weens swak regering, het Zaïre/DRK voortdurend negatiewe ontwikkeling ervaar in al drie van die ontwikkelings kategorieë, terwyl Botswana voortdurend, moontlik te danke goeie regering, positiewe ontwikkeling in al drie die ontwikkelingskategorieë ervaar het.

Die navorsing kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat, selfs al is Botswana nie noodwendig 'n voorbeeld van 'n perfekte staat nie, dit steeds weens 'n goeie regeringstradisie, uniek is in Afrika-konteks. Alhoewel hierdie studie nie 'n direkte verhouding tussen goeie regering en ontwikkeling probeer bevestig het nie, bevind dit wel dat Botswana moontlik in terme van ontwikkeling, weens die implementering van goeie instellings, goeie regeringsbeleid en algemene goeie regering, baie voordeel getrek het. Die navorsing bevind ook dat state voordeel trek wanneer hul regerings beleid aanvaar en toepas wat teen korrupsie is, maar wat demokratiese ideale, markkompetisie, openbare-private vennootskappe en markgeoriënteerde ekonomiese aktiwiteite

bevorder. Goeie regering word ook bevorder deur leierskap met integriteit, vreedsame en gereelde verandering van leierskap, duidelike onderskeid tussen die regering (party) en die staat, sowel as nie-regeringsinstellings met die mag om as oorsigliggame oor die regering te funksioneer. Die praktyk van goeie regering blyk dus langtermyn staatsontwikkeling te bevoordeel en te ondersteun.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFDL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire
AIA	International African Association
AIC	International Association of the Congo
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
BMC	Botswana Meat Company
DCEC	Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
FNLC	Front for the National Liberation of the Congo
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HDI	Human Development Index
MFDP	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
MPR	Popular Movement of the Revolution
MVIF	Motor Vehicle Insurance Fund
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RSF	Revenue Stabilisation Fund
PDSF	Public Debt Service Fund
SNC	Sovereign National Council
UN	United Nations
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHDI	United Nations Human Development Index
UPDF	Ugandan's Peoples Defence Force
WDI	World Development Indicators
WGI	World Governance Indicators

Chapter 1: Research Design

1.1 Introduction

It is often said that the state is a foreign concept to Africa, a continent made up of tribes and ethnic groups, arguably not suitable for state formation (Herbst, 2000:13; Mazrui, 1986:67;). However, there was a time in history where state structures in Africa developed out of own accord. States are not as foreign to Africa as many presume. In the time of the Egyptian empire, it was an African state that led the world in the spheres of economics, technology and ideology (Allen, 1997:135-137; Mazrui, 1986:68). There are other examples apart from Egypt; in Eastern Africa there developed Swahili city states and in Western Africa the Mali and Songhai empires rose to prominence (Arhin, 1967:65, 6; Dixon, 1964:121;). In modern history however, Africa has long been on the periphery of the international system, falling easy prey to colonial powers and other external influences, but also suffering from struggles within.

Some argue that it is the incapacity of the state or even the lack of relevance of the state in Africa that is responsible for this African situation. For this reason, the post-colonial Berlinist¹ state has been the topic of many academic discussions and debates (Kieh, 2007a:3). Even though there is general agreement that the state has some role to play in the development of a country, ideas on how a government should mobilise the power of the state vary widely (Bremmer, 2009). This paper will begin by looking at the literature on states and state development, focusing on the state in Africa. The study will take the form of a comparative study, contrasting the experience in state development of Zaire/the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)² with that of Botswana. A comparison between the DRC and Botswana makes a very interesting contrast due to Botswana arguably being a case of 'best practice' and the Zaire largely

¹ The Berlinist state refers to the colonially imposed state (Kieh, 2007a:7). The name derives from that of a conference, the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, in which the major colonial powers decided on the rules for the partitioning of Africa (Griffiths, 1986:204). The Berlinist state is a state benefiting the political and politically connected elites removed from society and societal needs (Kieh, 2007a:7).

² The Democratic Republic of the Congo was known as Zaire after its independence from Belgium in 1960. With the fall of Mobutu in 1997, Laurent Kabila renamed Zaire to the République Démocratique du Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo). Between 1885-1908 it had been called the Congo Free State and between 1908-1960 it was called the Belgian Congo (also referred to as Congo or the Congo) (Clark, 1998:109; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 13).

being seen as a failed state , as will be shown in the literature review. The purpose of this comparison is to try and account for the successes experienced by Botswana as well as to try and explain Zaire/DRC's failures.

1.2 Preliminary Study and Rationale

1.2.1 Literature Review

The literature review is divided into three sections. The first section looks at theories and ideas on the state, state development, and good governance in an African context. The second part of the literature review shifts the focus to research on the case studies of Botswana and Zaire and their experiences of the state. Much has been written on the state and state development in Africa from pre-colonial, to colonial to post-colonial times. This study will focus on post-colonial state development. It should be noted that state development is different from state building; development is the evolving of an existing structure whilst building would be the creation of a structure.

State development can be either seen as the development of the state or it can be seen as the state facilitating development. State development, the former, refers to growth of the state in terms of growing legitimacy. It is the increase in the state's ability to project power, but also the acceptance of the society governed by the state of the state's authority (Thomson, 2004:15). Legitimacy of a state is strong when the state does not have to use coercion to be obeyed. The opposite shows state weakness (Thomson, 2004:107). The second form of state development is the growth of a state in political, social and economic spheres. In Africa economic development often means the growth of structurally weak and dependent economies, forming them into independent creators of prosperity. Social development is the growth and development of society, the increase of quality of life. Political development is the strengthening and creation of free political institutions (Thomson, 2004:16, 20, 22).

It is widely accepted today that political governance influences development in a state. In all, "good governance", is said to influence development positively (Ikome, 2007:148). Good governance is seen to be the manner of ruling a state in such a way as to create strong, open and equal political institutions. It is creating security in a state, the delivery of services, the absence of corruption and the upholding and strengthening of checks and balances on power (Ikome, 2007:147-148). Ikome

continues stating that good governance is to allow the strengthening of civil society, increasing respect for human rights, the creation of press freedoms and the general empowering of the voiceless (Ikome, 2007:150). Thus if the state facilitates development through good governance, it will grow in legitimacy and thus there will be state development. We will now look at the state in Africa in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times.

Pre-colonial African society was originally organised into small groups of hunter gatherers. Based on who was allowed to forage in a certain area and who was not, a distinction between insiders and outsiders developed (Mazrui, 1986:63). According to Mazrui, African society in time could be distinguished between what he calls *lovers of land* and *lovers of animals*. The lovers of animals such as the Masai of Eastern Africa valued their cattle, and lovers of land such as the Kikuyu, from Kenya, valued agricultural land (Mazrui, 1986:63). The agriculturalists were more inclined to state building and at times “states” formed such as the Baganda kingdom, or the Egyptian Empire. Whilst some settled societies kept order through “state power”, others, also agricultural in nature, kept order through tradition and custom, without taxation or centralisation of power (Mazrui, 1986:68-69). In Somalia the nation was united through clan lines and language, not through a central state (Mazrui, 1986:70). Pastoralists in contrast to agriculturalists were historically mostly organised into stateless groupings. Religion such as Islam was able to unify communities into central structures through shared values and laws such as the Shari’a, but even this strong unifying force mostly could not bring pastoralists (lovers of animals) into state structures (Mazrui, 1986:69). The importance of Mazrui’s arguments is that it shows that Africa was not a blank slate for development when European colonisers arrived. It was complex with a range of power structures.

The main concern of the state in Africa under colonialism was the extraction of resources (Musah, 2003:160). Most institutions were either fashioned for the purpose of securing raw materials and resources, or to ensure pacification (Musah, 2003:160). There is broad consensus that the state fashioned by colonialism, but which remained intact after the colonial era ended, not only restricted policy but was also faced by a range of other inherent problems (Clapham, 1993:424; Clark, 1998:110; Englebert, 2000:1822; Kieh, 2007a:3; Musah, 2003:160). The state was created for the colonisers

and not for the original African populations living within its borders, nor did it take account of the pre-colonial systems as mentioned by Mazrui (Clapham, 1993:424; Mazrui, 1986:63-70). Kieh (2007a:3) argues that after colonisation, the state remained a continuation of the Berlinist model formed during colonialism; an extracting or rent seeking force, rather than a benevolent facilitator of development benefiting the majority of the population.

At the end of the colonial era, colonial governments, used a general model of decolonisation for many of their colonies. They implemented a once-off system of elections, multiple political parties, parliaments, written constitutions and a bill of rights. These generic models were ‘enhanced’ by brief training of local elites. The result frequently was “one man, one vote, once” (Chapham, 1993:425). As soon as the colonisers evacuated/retracted, rivals faced one another directly, often with one group dominating government and the state. This led to a sharp increase in ethnic violence which led to governments violently crushing opposition groups in the name of nationalism, unity and consolidation (Clapham, 1993:425). The new states were not embedded into African society (or related to African ‘states’ of the past), but rather remained foreign tools, to be used in the struggle for power and resources by the new elites (Kieh, 2007a:3; Musah, 2003:160-161). It was a colonially imposed state poorly adapted for the African society, environment and context.

Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, and Stedman, in their book, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (1999), describe three stages of change in African state development in the post-colonial era. During phase one, roughly the period of the 1950s and 1960s, African rulers tried to overcome colonial problems and its legacy by centralising state power (Chazan *et al*, 1999:46). Centralisation took the form of curtailment of political competition, the formation and strengthening of dominant political parties, the expansion of the state administration to increase state control and often the monopolisation of decision making by the president and his executive (Chazan *et al*, 1999:46). In phase two, roughly the 1960s and 1970s, state structures were expanded further, leading to an overexpansion of the state with a significant fall in state effectiveness. There developed a gray-zone between the party and the state, with a merging of the two taking place. The state became a class on its own, acting as a rent seeking class, whilst being ineffective in the managing of the state apparatus

and the protection of citizens (Chazan *et al*, 1999:54-55; Musah, 2003:161). Phase three, visible around the 1970s and 1980s, saw the state at a point of crisis. Government by this time had lost the trust of its population, it had become overstaffed, and the public and private domains had become blurred. Abuse of public office had reduced the legitimacy of these offices, and there was a complete inability by formal institutions to fulfil their even most basic functions (Chazan *et al*, 1999:65-66; Doornbos, 2010:52). Thomson summarises the African state in what we can identify as Chazan's third stage as: overly centralised, one-party dominated and suffering under personal rule and clientelism (Thomson, 2004:108-113). Chazan *et al's* three phases of state development forms the theoretical foundation of this research.

There are also other ways of looking at the state, and especially state development. One of the main theories as such on state development is modernization theory. This theory became popular after World War II, but due to the changing nature of the term modernization is often difficult to define, even though it is clear how the term modernization is important to the study, as it looks at the modernization of two states in Africa (Tipps, 1973:199). Modernization theory remains popular due to the fact that the term modern always evokes an idea or understanding based on the present (Bendix, 1967:292). Modernization theory developed from the study of economic development, political stability and social/cultural change in the developing world by academics predominately from the United States. The theory was strongly influenced by the ideas of social evolution and functionalism, especially by the belief that the state is continuously altering to adapt to gradual change (Tipps, 1973:201). Modernization theory according to Bendix (1967:292) is a very useful term that encompasses all of "modern times", according to him beginning around the year 1750 lasting till the present. Due to this time frame Bendix argues that modernization should be seen to encompass the values of the times, including the idea of democracy, the destruction of inherited privilege, the visible decrease in the percentage of the population who are directly involved in agriculture and the declaration of equal rights of citizenship (Bendix, 1967:292-295). We now turn to the state and state formation in Zaire/DRC.

Zaire received independence from Belgium in 1960 after 80 years of brutal exploitative repression and colonialism (Clark, 1998:110; Coleman & Ngokwey, 1993:306). The colonial authority made little to no effort whilst in power to unite the ethnically diverse and geographically large country (it is the 10th largest country on Earth); nor did they train an elite to take power after independence (Clark, 1998:110; Coleman & Ngokwey, 1993:306; Fairhead, 1992:17). By the time of independence there were only 16 indigenous university graduates in the Congo (Botswana would reach independence with 22) (Reno, 2006:45; Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:4). According to Coleman and Ngokwey (1993:306), the Congo suffered more than any other state from the brutality of colonialism. After political instability and the assassination of the first elected post-colonial president, Patrice Lumumba, Colonel Mobutu took power in a bloodless *coup d'état* in 1965. Under the monarchic president, Mobutu Sese Seko (1965-1997), Zaire was turned into a kleptocracy (Clark, 1998:109-110; Coleman & Ngokwey, 1993:306).

During the late 1960's and the 1970's Mobutu centralised power on himself as the president (Clark, 1998:112). Mobutu went as far as to declare, "*l'état c'est moi*" (I am the state) (Coleman & Ngokwey, 1993:307). Mobutu launched a process of unification, centralisation, pacification and stabilisation (Coleman & Ngokwey, 1993:307). Throughout the 1960's and 1970's Mobutu was seen as a fairly successful state builder, reuniting Africa's first failed state after its 1960's collapse (Reno, 2006:43). By 1980 Mobutu had however become less interested in the welfare of his country as he became more paranoid and obsessed with keeping power (Musah, 2003:164; Reno, 2006:45). His regime began to cling to power through the use of violence, divide and rule tactics and the elimination and corrupting of any opposition forces. Mobutu was toppled in 1997 by Laurent Kabila. The country however did not recover after Mobutu's fall. The World Health Organization estimated that 3.5 million people died as a result of war in the DRC between 1998 and 2001, that is 70 000 people per month (Montague, 2002:103). The Congolese state suffered from chronic economic, political and social vulnerability. The question then is, how much of this can be explained by governance?

Botswana's experience in the post-colonial era sharply contrasts with that of the Zaire's unstable and authoritarian example. The area today known as Botswana

emerged with the declaration by Britain in 1885 that it was turning Bechuanaland into a protectorate (Narayana *et al*, 2005:19; Parson, 1981:239). Pre-colonial society in Botswana consisted of chiefs, who were the major cattle owners and the political elite, and the peasantry which comprised the rest of the population (Parson, 1981:239-240; Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:8). The peasantry were mostly subsistence farmers and paid tribute to the elite with any surplus production. The elite supplied the peasantry with access to cattle which was used for milk and meat, as well as for ploughing in later years. In colonial times this 'cattle' link between the classes was never broken (Parson, 1981:239-240). This connection between political elite and governed is almost unique to Botswana. The authority of the Botswana elite who took power after independence had evolved through an enduring relationship between governed and elite (Samatar, 1999:28). Democracy in Botswana today is a mixture of modern and traditional, keeping the Tswana traditions of consultation, participation and consensus building and blending them with modern liberal democracy (Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:8). Botswana currently has a dominant party state, but holds regular free and fair elections (Narayana, *et al*, 2005:21; Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:5).

After independence in 1966 Botswana started to experience continuous high growth (Narayana *et al*, 2005:20; Samatar: 1999:3). The country moved from having a Gross National Product (GNP) of US\$60-US\$80 per capita in 1966, to a GNP of US\$1,800 per capita in 1996 (Samatar, 1999:3; Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:4). Unlike many other modern African countries, Botswana has been able to keep corruption low, transparency high and patrimonialism to a minimum (Samatar, 1999:4; Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:8). Botswana ranks as the 30th least corrupt country in the world (Narayana, *et al*, 2005:21). It has largely avoided poor governance, poor leadership and poor management. This is even more praise worthy due to Botswana's diamond wealth (Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:4). Botswana's economic growth was led by strict planning, policy analysis and the careful use of limited state reserves (Samatar, 1999:4; Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:6-7). Botswana has always made use of liberal economics with decentralisation, a free market economy and free enterprise, with government as an economic facilitator, not an active participant (Narayana *et al*, 2005:21; Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:6). Mineral revenues are used for development of infrastructure and delivering of government promises (Samatar,

1999:4; Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:7). Botswana's elite have been collectively united in their striving for economic growth (Samatar, 1999:6). Due to lack of local capital, the government supplied development capacity (Samatar, 1996:8). The key aspect of interest in Botswana is however that it is considered to be an economic and political success story in Africa. Compared to Botswana, the DRC is a clear failure. This begs one to once more ask, how much of the DRC's failure, just like Botswana's success, can be contributed to its state development 'model' or governance?

1.2.2 Research Rationale

From the literature reviewed it is clear that the importance of the government in state development is not in doubt. The state is needed to supply public goods such as security and stability whilst providing needed resources such as capital in developing markets. This study will clarify the link between government actions (good governance versus poor governance) and its effect on the state's development. Understanding governance and its effect on the development of the state and on societal development has been studied in an African context, but it needs further study. This study brings African best practice in state development into contrast with an African example of state failure. By contrasting Botswana, which is seen as a success story, with Zaire/DRC, which is seen as a failure, it is expected that possible reasons for Botswana's success versus Zaire/DRC's failure will become evident. This study will investigate the importance of governance to try and determine if the reason for Botswana's success can be found in its state development process. Finding a best practice for African development can have very important lessons for the rest of Africa.

The study will use the work of Chazan *et al*, 1999, and their three phases of the state as a theoretical background and tool for analysis and comparison. Their work is especially useful for understanding governance, both in regards to policy formulation and institution creation.

1.2.3 Problem Statement

In the era of the pre-eminence of the state, making use of a comparison between Botswana and Zaire/DRC, what is the influence and effect, of state institution

formation and policy implementation (governance) by governments, on state development in terms of economical-, political- and social development?

1.2.4 Contribution to Field

The research done by this study will make a variety of contributions. Firstly it will add to the overall debate on the role of the state. It will seek to show how certain governance choices made by government have possible effects on development, including social-, economical- and political development, with increased returns over time. Increased returns can be both positive and negative. In other words, it will clarify the role that state structure and policy shaped by government plays in the development of a state. Furthermore this study will be of value to future research, especially for topics focused on democratisation and policy analysis. Democracy is not a necessity for growth, but some aspects of democracy are indeed beneficial to growth and development. Showing what policies work best in a certain context aids in shaping ideas on and understanding of best practice. Thus, most importantly, this study will try to find a possible best practice for African development, which will hold very important lessons for African states.

This study does nonetheless remain descriptive in nature and will not be determining causality. Rather its value will be in exposing processes in the past from which modern states, especially African states, can benefit if they understand and learn from the experiences of the case studies.

1.3 Research Design

1.3.1 Research Design and Research Methodology

This is a descriptive study, using the research design of a comparative cross-national study. The two case studies are compared to one another and conclusions are drawn from the differences between the two (Mouton, 2004:154). Differences in government practice and the consequential outcomes in development become evident when the governance style of Botswana is compared to the governance style of the DRC. Governance in Botswana leads to positive development and governance in the DRC leads seemingly to state collapse. The comparative nature of the study thus allows for conclusions to be drawn on what seems to be best practice. The case studies in this

research were selected on grounds of theoretical persuasion, with Botswana being best practice and the DRC being a failed state (Mouton, 2004:154).

This study makes use of two main variables, governance and development. Development is the dependent variable and governance is the independent variable. Governance is defined by the World Bank's definition, which states that governance is:

“the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them” (Kaufman & Kraay, 2008:6).

This study defines good governance as being a governance style that promotes the creation of strong, open, equal and free political and economic institutions (Ikome, 2007:147). It supports the maintenance of checks and balances on power, it is anti-corruption geared and improves and maintains the delivery of services normally associated with state governments (Ikome, 2007:148). Good governance in this study is measured by making use of the good governance indicators of the World Bank, either directly or through qualitative analyses strongly based on the indicators as a guideline (Kaufman & Kraay, 2008:7). The six indicators are: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and lastly, control of corruption.

Development is measured in three groups in this study, as political-, economic- and social development; this is done in the context of state legitimacy. State legitimacy is the acceptance of the society governed that the state is the natural centre of power in a territory (Thomas, 2004:15-16). Legitimacy is high when state coercion is low and when the state is able to project its power in the entirety of its territory.

Socio-economic development is defined with the United Nations Human Development Index (UNHDI) in mind. This means that development abides by three values: sustenance, the ability to meet basic needs such as shelter, freedom, security and health; self-esteem, to be used for the communal good and lastly; freedom from servitude, which increases people's ability to choose and to increase the range of

human choice (Todaro & Smith, 2009:20-21). This study further accepts the definition that development should have three objectives, loosely based on the three values of development. The first objective of development, based on the value of sustenance, is the increase in the delivery by the state of basic life sustaining goods. The second objective is the raising of living standards by increasing incomes, job creation and better education. This meets the values of self-esteem and freedom from servitude. The third and final objective of development is the expanding of economic and social choices available to individuals, freeing them from servitude (Todaro & Smith, 2009:22). Thus development in the case studies will be measured in political, economic and social development as these encompass all three values and objectives of development as defined (Todaro & Smith, 2009:20-22). The indicators for economic-, political- and social development will be looked at in chapter two.

1.3.2 Limitations and Delimitations

This study is complicated by the fact that it requires data in diverse fields, for two countries, over roughly 50 years. The DRC has much less readily accessible data especially from government sources, yet there is a wide range of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that have compiled databases on the DRC. Care has also been taken in the selection of variables so as to ensure that they remain researchable. However it should clearly be stated that some of the data sources used do not go back further than the 1990's which puts a clear limitation on the use of these sources for use in only phase three of Chazan *et al*'s (1999) framework. For the other two phases data will be supplemented with qualitative research.

The use of these data bases in phase three if correlated to the trajectory of phases one and two will also clearly establish validity. The ratings for social development in phase three for example is rated by using the Human Development Index (HDI). Thus the HDI is used throughout as a guideline for analysis. Political development is again measured by making use of Freedom House ratings which are once more used as a measure of analysis throughout. Thus qualitative analyses will not limit the validity of the study, as supplementary research is clearly based on the indicators used in the data bases that will be used in phase three.

This study is delineated to a focus on the post-colonial era, between the 1950s and the 1990s. Although earlier periods such as the pre-colonial and the colonial eras are

briefly looked at, the focus remains on the post-colonial era. As Zaire received independence in 1960 it is analysed mainly from 1960 to the middle of the 1990s (Freund, 1998:198-199). Botswana received independence in 1966 and thus the focus of analysis for Botswana is between 1966 and the 1990s (Parson, 1981:240-241).

This study is further limited by being mostly descriptive in nature. It will relay events along with possible observations but causality between governance and development will not be tested or proven.

1.3.3 Chapter Overview

This research is presented in six chapters. The first is the introduction, having presented the scope of research in the field so far. The second chapter provides an overview of the theoretical framework used in this research. It will also further discuss the indicators for the variables. Chapter three will be looking at the case of Zaire. It will be the first case study discussed because it is a classic example of African state failure. Botswana is the second case study and is discussed in chapter four. This chapter looks at how Botswana was able to achieve reasonable success in development through good governance. Chapter five will compare the two case studies, allowing for conclusions to be made on good governance and development. It will also include a general concluding summary.

1.4 Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the research in the field of development, governance and the state in Africa, with a focus on the postcolonial era. Even though the state is not a completely foreign concept to Africa, it has been shown that the current state system and its borders are in many regards remnants of the colonial era. There are studies that have looked at the different fields investigated, such as good governance, development and the state in Africa, but this study brings African best practice in state development into contrast with an African example of state failure. The results of this study will help in understanding processes in the past from which states can benefit, in terms of development.

Chapter 2: Evaluating Governance and Measuring Development

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will define and elaborate on the frameworks, variables and concepts used in the research. The main framework is the three developmental phases of the state, as described by Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, and Stedman (1999). The two most important variables are governance and development. Governance is the independent variable and development is the dependent variable. Both governance and development are measured by evaluating indicators. The listing and explanation of these indicators are amongst the most important aspects discussed in this chapter. Governance is measured as either “good” or “poor” by making use of the World Bank Group’s *Worldwide Governance Indicators* (WGI) (Kaufman & Kraay, 2008). Development on its part is divided into three sub-variables; political-, economic- and social development, with each having its own set of indicators.

This chapter will be organised into three sections. Section one looks at the pre-colonial and colonial era. This creates a context for the period leading up to independence and for the post-colonial years. The second section follows the trajectory of development of the African state as discussed by Chazan *et al.* It broadens on the framework thus far presented. The third section looks at the variables and their indicators, presenting these in detail and explaining the methodology. We now turn to the challenges faced by the state in Africa.

2.2 Challenges to the State in Africa

It is important to briefly look at some of the problems experienced during state building in Africa. This section helps to provide the context in which state development occurs in Africa, illuminating some of the challenges to state development, with a clear focus on pre-colonial and colonial times. Furthermore this section aims to expand upon the literature review provided in chapter one.

According to Mazrui (1986:63-79) pre-colonial or traditional African society naturally evolved into two groupings. The one was sedentary and based its survival on the growing of crops. The other sector of society followed a nomadic life, herding their

cattle and livestock from graze land to graze land, never settling permanently. It is important to note that both of these cultures evolved from the hunter gatherer groups of which a few examples still exist today, such as the Khoisan of the Kalahari and the BaMbuti or “Pygmies” of the DRC. The groups that originated from the hunter-gatherers were either lovers of land or lovers of animals. The agriculturalists were lovers of land and valued it as their prime source of wealth because they needed it for crop growing. The lovers of animals valued animals such as camels and cattle as a means of increasing social standing. For the lovers of animals, land was only important as a temporary source of food for their animals, they never settled permanently. The Masai for example believe that they are the chosen people by god as custodians of all the cattle on earth. For this reason they have traditionally “not (been) animated by a territorial imperative; they (have been) animated by a cattle imperative, regardless of territorial boundaries” (Mazrui, 1986:64). The Masai thus became infamous for their cattle raiding across territorial boundaries, a clear contrast to the agriculturalist groups who operated within borders. The Masai, like other lovers of animals, were less preoccupied with boundaries and lived in societies governed by consensus with decentralised power (Mazrui, 1986:64-67).

The agriculturists with their need for land were generally more inclined to state formation, and all groupings that could today be classified as states that developed in pre-colonial Africa were agriculture based sedentary societies (even though they also additionally reared animals). These states did not necessarily look exactly like European states. Some had elaborate governance structures with clear arrangements of authority and coercion whilst others were much less centralised. Nonetheless, there existed societies of political organisation with centralised access to power and force which was used for political control (Mazrui, 1986:67). It is interesting to note that even though all states were based on agriculturalists, not all agriculturalist societies formed into states. The Tiv of Nigeria for example were agriculturalist in nature but they had no centralised authority, no taxation, no codified law or forms of tribute (Mazrui, 1986:69).

Other than agriculture, African societies also experienced centralisation tendencies when they were confronted with Islam (religion). Islam brought with it its codified law, the Shari'a and its taxation, Islamic Zakat, which were naturally disposed to the

promotion of official political organisation. Islam led to the creation of city states such as the Swahili city states in East Africa, and the empire states such as the ancient Mali and Songhay in West Africa. However, not even Islam was able to unite pastoralists into states. The Somalis in the Horn of Africa resisted state formation even with the spread of Islam until the arrival of European powers (Mazrui, 1986:69).

Africa in the pre-colonial era not only included hunter-gatherer societies, but also settled agricultural societies and semi-nomadic herding societies. The first had almost no concept of borders; the second was the closest in likeness to the European societies that developed states in Europe. During colonialism it was the lovers of animals, such as the Masai that refused to be lured by the Western imperialism. The Masai could not be lured by the cash crops sold by the agriculturalists and refused to enter the capitalist system. Interestingly some believe that commercialising Africa's cattle farming would go a long way to solving many famine related problems on the continent. However, into the modern era groups such as the Masai have remained stubbornly idealistic. It is said that some Masai would rather let their cattle starve and die in times of drought than sell them (Mazrui, 1986:66). In contrast the agriculturalists often embraced the education and economic possibilities made available by the European colonisers. They started planting cash crops, and the Kikuyu of Kenya even started building their own schools and collecting money for the hiring of European missionaries as teachers (Mazrui, 1986:66-69).

Nevertheless Herbst (2000:11-12) argues that the African state could never have 'evolved' in the same way as the state did in Europe due to differing contexts. Comparing African and European states he notes that the most of Africa comprised (and comprises) out of large areas with low population densities. The higher the population density of a territory the cheaper it is to govern a state, thus African states were and are more expensive and difficult to govern than European states. African states have had to overcome their difficult natural environments as well. Mountain ranges, jungles and large rivers have made ordinary activities such as transport difficult. The main political problems or problems of political geography in Africa are summarised in five factors by Herbst. He believes that African states struggled to impose themselves on their territories because they have had low population densities that have made it expensive to govern the large territories. Secondly states often did

not have access to large economic surpluses and this meant that they have been unable to be stimulated by trade surpluses as happened in Europe. In the third place African states have almost always had an abundance of land. In Europe competition for land meant that states needed to secure their border lands, strengthen their physical borders and ensure that power was exerted throughout the countryside. This was done to prevent neighbouring countries/states from conquering territory. African states did not have much incentive to go to war over land. The benefit of more territory for African states has often seemed limited. This reduced feeling of insecurity for African states has led to a reduced need for solidifying power throughout state territories (Herbst, 2000:13).

A fourth challenge to African states has been inhospitable territories and a fifth environmentally diverse areas. African states often govern areas that are not suitable for large populations. Around 50 per cent of Africa is not suitable for large populations due to inadequate rainfall. Africa has a third of all arid land in the world. This means that it has been unlikely and even impossible for African population density to increase enough to become comparable to that of Europe as the environment does not make this possible. Lastly European states are mostly made up out of geographically similar territories. African states on the other hand can have areas of jungle, desert, coastland, mountain ranges, deserts, savannahs and deltas, all in the same country. As each of these areas requires a different model of governance the cost of governance but also the cost to the physical expansion of state power (building roads and establishing service providing municipalities for example) has been drastically increased (Herbst, 2000:11-13).

Colonialism and its legacies have also provided a number of challenges for state development in Africa. Clapham in his article, *Democratisation in Africa: obstacles and prospects* (1993:424), looks at how the colonisation and later decolonisation process led to the politicising of ethnicity and identity. In the post-colonial era the focus on ethnicity and race would often remain a cause of concern reducing the unity in African states. Added to this problem are the unnatural borders in Africa. These borders combine ethnic groupings that have been rivals since before the colonial era into single governed areas. During colonialism, with its use of divide and rule, there were almost no attempts to create unity amongst ethnic groups, which means that with

the added politicising of ethnicity, escalation in tension was to be expected (Clapham, 1993:424).

Kieh (2007) argues that the colonial state was built with the need for power and wealth acquisition as central. Colonial rule rested upon oppression in various forms and the elimination of democracy. The state used the population for accumulation, but did not deliver services (Kieh, 2007a:5-7; Musah, 2003:160). The post-colonial state was to follow this example set by the colonial powers. The state was not new to Africa, but the Berlinist State model that was implemented was. Having taken control of the state structures after independence the new African elite acted in the same way as their colonial predecessors, often with one ethnic group oppressing others. As in colonial times, the post-colonial state remained absolutist, violent, predatory and imposed (Kieh, 2007a:7).

The colonial period created or acted as the example of how a state, and in particular the Berlinist or centralised state, functioned and was administered. Engelbrecht (2000:1822) claims that the “arbitrary imposing” of the state in Africa without respecting pre-colonial institutions, norms and authorities has led to a decrease in growth. Growth was not intended for the good of the population but for the benefit of the coloniser and the extraction economy. This colonial mentality and governance style was to carry over to the post-colonial times.

2.3 Framework: Phases of State Development

Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, and Stedman (1999) developed a theory based on the development trajectories that African states followed in post-colonial years. In their book they describe what they call the “constructions of the public arena since independence”, or as it is called here, the three phases of state development in the post-colonial era (Chazan *et al*, 1999:46-68). These three phases serve as the theoretical base for the research of this study and will be referred to as the Chazan-framework.

Phase one: “The concentration of State Power” (1950/60-1960/1970). Phase one is the time frame directly after independence during which the new African governments took power for the first time. In general the main characteristic of this phase was the

centralisation of state power. There were a number of factors which came together in the post-independence era which created a political atmosphere conducive to centralisation. The first of these was the power held by liberation movements. Regularly after successfully opposing a colonial government, the organisation that was seen as responsible for the granting of independence, transformed itself into a political party. This political party also often enjoyed wide flexibility in policy choices with little opposition due to its liberation history. In other words the liberation party had the political leeway to concentrate power on itself if it saw fit. Clapham (1993:424) has done a study looking at what he calls the “freedom fighter presidents”. He found that these presidents in general centralised power on themselves and did not allow opposition in their countries but rather claimed that centralisation was in the national interest. This argument is similar to that presented by Chazan *et al* (1999).

In a recent study Melber (2009) found that parties which take power after liberating a country are often incapable of accepting normalisation and loss of power after the liberation war is won. These liberation movements turn the liberation struggle into a myth and fall back to it in times of opposition. They see themselves as the only ones entitled to power and portray it as being in the national and public interest that all who oppose them should be removed or silenced (part of the process of impedance, as discussed by Chazan *et al*). Where opposition becomes strong, the liberation struggle (after independence) becomes a permanent ‘phenomenon’. In this process, the liberation movement itself becomes the oppressor by “tend(ing) to reproduce the past rather than offer true alternatives... it becomes questionable whether there is a true difference between the political systems they manage to throw out and what they establish in their place” (Melber, 2009:452-453). In other words the liberation movement in time begins to cling to power even when it is suffering from loss of legitimacy. Due to this these governments become oppressive because they limit the political freedom in their countries as a way to secure power. By limiting freedom and competition the liberation movements become the oppressors. Having taken control of the state structures after independence the new African elite acted in the same way as their colonial predecessors. As in colonial times, the post-colonial state thus remained absolutist, violent, predatory and imposed (Kieh, 2007a:7).

A second reason for centralisation was that the systems used by governments after independence were largely colonial in origin. There was thus no moral obligation for liberation governments to keep the government structures in place left by the colonisers. First constitutions in the early post-colonial African states also carried very little value. These constitutions were merely regarded as aids in the rapid transfer of power; they were never seen as a true reflection of the needs and values of the African populations. Secondly, the Westminster system, dominant in British areas, and the presidential system dominant in French areas, were inadequately adapted for local African circumstances (Musah, 2003:161). There was also a lack of local expertise to operate these systems. This caused other options to be explored more readily. Weak independent middle classes were the third reason. The state and its structures were the only real viable source of capital for the newly independent populations. There were no social conditions for political competition and the state remained the primary source of power and wealth. Thus if one wanted to increase your wealth or position, there was almost no other option than going into government and joining the ruling elite. The fourth reason is seen by Chazan *et al*, to be the most important; the threat of a failing system. Destabilisation after independence was easily blamed on the remaining colonial state structures by the new political elites. This, according to them, led to a 'need' for centralisation and curtailment of liberty in the name of regaining control of the state "in the interest of the public good" (Musah, 2003:161).

In phase one, after consolidation and centralisation of political power, state administration was enlarged promoting elite rule. Legislatures became sanctioning bodies, following the will of the dominant political elites. Parastatals were frequently created at this time with the stated intent, true or not, that they would increase development. According to Chang (2003:199-206) parastatals do have or can some economic benefits. Public enterprises can supply the capital needed for the creation of competitive enterprises in countries where private capital is low. Public enterprise is also a logical choice for capital intensive industries such as electricity, transport and telecommunications. These industries need such vast sums of investment that private investors can often not afford to fund them, leaving the state as the supplier of capital. Lastly, public enterprises can be used very successfully if implemented and used within a national plan where the different companies complement one another and the

national plan. This mostly requires oversight by the government. However, the creation of parastatals in Africa very often did not have these beneficial effects. Instead they contributed to the overextension of the state which led to decreases in the creation of public goods, economic growth, skilled manpower and organisational capacity (Chang, 2003:199). African public enterprises in general have been economically and socially unprofitable causing little if any positive change. This has often been due to rent seeking, corruption, lack of coordinated planning and the politicising of economics (Chang, 2003:200).

Armies and police forces were also enlarged and modernised to increase state power. The state thus was increasing its power and presence on all levels. State positions, as mentioned, became the access point to state resources. This led to an increase in the number of state personnel and higher administration costs. Very often the main political party increased in significance, with party members filling civil service, police, army and local government positions. What was created was a state that limited political pluralism, emphasised statism, bureaucratic structures, politicisation of administrative institutions and with fragile power and legitimacy (Nafziger & Auvinen, 2002:154). The state became distant from its subjects with elite politics turning into a patrimonial system (Doornbos, 2010:51). Thus the state in phase one experienced the processes of impedance and facilitation (Chazan *et al*, 1999:47).

The process of impedance is the implementation of measures that are limiting to opportunities of opposition. It often involves the outlawing of rival political organisations and a reduction in opportunities for people to raise issues they are unsatisfied with. During impedance the government equates unity with uniformity. Disagreeing with the political elite becomes an act viewed as treason. Impedance leads to the dismantling of multiparty politics. The process of facilitation is the augmenting of state power through the strengthening of the central administration, the military and police (coercive apparatus) and of the executive.

Phase two: “Elaboration of State Power” (1960/70-1970/80). Phase two saw the state and its structures expand further. In time, state expansion led to an overextension of the state. When this happened there was a clear fall in the effectiveness of the state. The state and the political party fused into one with the state and positions in it being

the reward for loyalty to the party, the political elite or the executive. Even when there were no qualified individuals, state positions, old and newly created, were continuously filled by unqualified and semi-trained individuals due to calls for the Africanisation of the bureaucracy and the needs of the political elites. A bureaucratic bourgeoisie was formed with their own needs as their priority.

The colonial state was built around the acquisition of wealth, rarely with any attempt to economically or socially uplift the colonised; the post-colonial state continued this tradition with the civil service bourgeoisie taking the place of the colonisers (Kieh, 2007a:5). Government posts and parastatal revenues became absorbed into the patrimonial network. The state became an unwieldy structure with interests removed from its population's. State dependence in this phase reached alarmingly high levels. During the 1960's the civil service in Africa annually grew by 7 per cent. By 1970, 60 per cent of all wage earners were government employees and by 1980, on average between 50 per cent and 80 per cent of government revenues were spent on supporting the civil service (Chazan *et al*, 1999:55). The state-owned enterprises in phase two lost most of their pretence to be operating for the benefit of all, but rather became the domain of political leaders who used parastatals for making political appointments and to enrich themselves and their cronies. These structures which were meant as centres of growth became obstacles to effective economic expansion.

Legal order was also attacked in phase two. This is because the courts were the only structures remaining outside of government influence. In general, court structures initially withstood government led assaults. Where government was however unable to change the courts, it often started to change the laws. The dominance of the state and its coercive power thus strongly and adversely affected the judiciary and separation of powers. The state expanded its coercive powers through increases in the police and military. Where the loyalty of troops became uncertain, use was made of personal paramilitary forces. The military as a result become more important, leading to even greater complexity in keeping control of the state. In Africa it was in time often the enlarged military that became politically active and destabilising leading to the more frequent occurrence of *coups d'états*. Towards the end of phase two but also during it, control of the state by its leaders become increasingly uncertain.

The political machinery of the state was by now subjected to the executive, which limited political manoeuvring severely. Single and one party systems still had parliaments, but these were no longer free in any way and merely represented the western idea without the values. Some states even became no party states and the mixed state/“party” relationship led to higher patronage. In some states Marxism was used to feign legitimacy. Thus phase two saw the erosion of African government’s popular foundations. Control for leaders became uncertain due to an exclusion of channels to political involvement, loss of legitimacy and the need for large military forces to keep control of the state.

Phase three: “The Reconsideration of State Power” (1970/80-1980/90). Government by this time, through the favouring of groups and patrimonial networks, had lost the trust of its population. Government structures had become overstaffed and very costly to run. Government over consumed on taxes in salaries reducing state capacity; thus it took much but gave very little in return. The public and private domains had become blurred with the state serving as a source of personal enrichment. Abuse of public office had reduced the legitimacy of these offices. Government in phase three suffered from an inability to fulfil its most basic functions (Chazan *et al*, 1999:65-66; Doornbos, 2010:52).

The state in phase three faced dwindling resources, increasing violence and decreasing capabilities, all contributing to possible state collapse (Nafziger & Auvinen, 2002:154). Kieh, (2007a:9-12) further extends phase three and the understanding thereof by looking at state failure. He shows that the state in Africa failed in five ways. The first of these was cultural failure, which was the failure of creating nation bonds. Instead of working towards unity personal agendas were forwarded for example by playing on ethnicity; this led to disunity in society. Secondly, economic failure was the inability of the African state to reduce economic vulnerability. States too often relied (and rely) on single commodities or industries for income and thus become vulnerable to international price changes. Political failure, thirdly, looked at the strength of authoritarianism in Africa. Authoritarianism reduced or eliminated freedom of speech and the press, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and even in the extreme freedom of movement. Security failure was the fourth state failure. It was the inability of the state to maintain peace and stability. The

military was often too important, leading to the militarisation of politics. Further, security failure was due to all the other state failures combined thus in the end causing African states to suffer from endemic suspicion, mistrust and conflict. The last state failure was social failure. Social failure was the general failure of the state to deliver in addressing social needs such as education, health, and sanitation (Kieh, 2007a:9-12).

Carment, Prest and Samy (2010), describe state collapse as when the state “is unable to perform the most basic functions” expected of it. State collapse occurs after a long process of deterioration, decline and erosion of the state and its foundations (Carment *et al*, 2010:47). Ethnic grievances due to unequal access to power, including access to resources, leads to conflict which at times leads to state collapse (Carment *et al*, 2010:48). There are however a range of reasons that could lead to or contribute to state collapse, these include internal factors such as a weak linkage between state and society, greed for resources, excessive concentration of power and political and economic mismanagement (Carment *et al*, 2010:49). External factors include destabilisation by a neighbouring country for geopolitical or economic gain and general forces emanating from the world economy such as the financial crisis of 2008 (Carment *et al*, 2010:50). Carment *et al* also list a variety of danger signs for when a state is at risk of collapse. We will now briefly look at a few of these.

The first danger sign is when the corrupt usage of state assets and the power of state rulers have become so extreme that old allies are beginning to show opposition. An example of this is Somalia under Barre or Zaire under Mobutu where the state became the private domain of the ruler and opposition began to build. A second danger sign is when it becomes clear that state institutions are no longer in touch with the socio-economic needs of their citizens and that the state has therefore institutionalised the wrong values (Carment *et al*, 2010:51). In a state where there is strong competition for resources and where this competition has become violence based there is also a risk of state collapse. This is especially true for countries where there is a dispersion of violence, private armies and rebel groups leading to state institutions becoming irrelevant. Further if the state suffers from conflict based on political and cultural orientation due to different cultural and ethnic interests, risk is increased. Secession attempts can also affect a country detrimentally, leading to widespread violence.

Deterioration of economic conditions leading to the breakdown of state institutions along with the states inability to provide security, including physical, health and nutritional security, is a further sign of collapse (Carment *et al*, 2010:52). States can collapse due to one or more of these reasons. Often the risks overlap, as one leads to the creation of another increasing the chances for collapse.

An interesting analysis of state collapse is presented by Zartman (1995). According to him state collapse is more than just coups, rioting and rebellion (Zartman, 1995:1). State collapse is a situation in which the authority, structures, laws and political organization of a state has fallen apart. But it does not necessarily mean that there is anarchy. However Zartman claims that when a state collapses it does not necessarily mean that the state has lost legitimacy (one must clearly remember that there is a big difference between state and governance), but rather power and order are “up for grabs”. Legitimacy can nonetheless also be lost. When a state collapses it does go into a period in which legitimate central authority and order does not exist. In Africa state collapse is often associated with colonialism. Zartman agrees that the first collapse of Zaire in 1960/61 was colonial in origin, as it was rather a colonial state collapsing than a post-colonial state. However most African states that collapse are not a result of colonialism but either due to regime change between first and second generations in the second decade after independence; or secondly around the late 1980s and early 1990s where governments are overthrown because they have centralised power too much and excluded the rest of the population from power and wealth (Zartman, 1995:2-5). This links up with phase three in the framework presented by Chazan *et al*. State collapse is ultimately marked by the collapse of control over the political and economic spheres. The economic influence of the state retracts until it is limited around capital cities. The formal economy is overtaken by the informal and economic life in rural areas begins to connect to neighbouring countries even using foreign or neighbouring currency. At the same time the political arena increases in size as neighbours begin to house dissident groups and allow them to launch raids from their territories often supported by national troops from those countries. In essence Zartman claims that to restore a state, the national economy should “flow” throughout a state’s territory and national politics should once more be limited to the national physical territory (Zartman, 1995:9).

By the beginning of the 1990's African states faced very weak economies. African militaries were reduced in size due to low revenue and aid. Government salaries were reduced at this time leading to increased corruption as officials looked for new sources of income. This again led to further loss of state legitimacy. Due to this endemic state weakness governments were forced to democratise (Clapham, 1993:434). However, this often did not happen due to a change in democratic values, but rather it was an attempt to keep power. The problem is that democracy is not a form of government for keeping the weak in power. With the state reduced in phase three, implementation of democracy and development became excessively hard (Clapham, 1993:434). For democracy there is a need for popular consensus, acceptance of responsibility by leaders and measures to ensure accountability; this however was missing (Clapham, 1993:423; Williams, 2003:3). Where there is low or no state legitimacy, not only is the government illegitimate, but the whole state structure can become illegitimate. It makes an unstable foundation for democracy.

Nafziger and Auvinen (2002:154-155) summarise the interaction of different processes on development in Africa. According to them the policies implemented by elites are most often the reasons behind humanitarian emergencies and violence. Undemocratic and destructive systems benefit the rule of the political elites, who would have lost power in a system where the economy and political freedom was improving. When Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth slows or declines due to poor policies the elite through their rent-seeking practices cause further stagnation. This in turn leads to a loss of legitimacy, which in turn leads to the need for increased use of force to maintain power. This predator rule creates circumstance under which the institutions and foundations of the state and the economy begin to degrade. Elites and their clients position themselves to maximise their own short term profits without planning for the future. State collapse is often accelerated by rent-seeking in predatory states which erupt into violence due to the unequal distribution between regional and ethnic divisions.

We will now briefly look at the theory of modernization. Modernization came to prominence after World War II. However what is meant by modernization is often confused as it is difficult to attach any constant meaning to variables that can test modernization; due to the nature of the word "modern", change is inevitable (Bendix,

1967:292; Tipps, 1973:199). For this reason it is important that we look at what modernization theory is, because even though it is not directly used as a tool of analyses by the research it does look at the changes occurring in a state that are beneficial to its population in general. The first important aspect of modernization is that it occurs on many levels. It is not only something that is determined by one variable on an individual level or one variable on a state level, but rather something that can only be measured when looking at a complete picture (Tipps, 1973:202). Nonetheless it is mostly studied at a state level and focuses on industrialization, political development and economic growth. It would logically be impossible to include all possible variables in a given study. For this reason most studies only focus on a limited number of variables, knowing that the analyses would miss one or another variable (Tipps, 1973:202-203). The mistake that is however often made is equating modernization to only one or two variables, for example stating that industrialization or economic growth alone show modernization is occurring, what is needed is some broader confirmation (Tipps, 1973:203).

According to Bendix (1967), as stated in the previous chapter, modernization has to be seen as a theory with its roots in the time of the American and French Revolutions (Bendix, 1967:292). Modernization theory is a theory on the modernization of a society or state, and even though it happens on many levels (state, individual, communal), there are some identifiable characteristics that are important. Bendix argues that the advent of the modern era is comparable to the Neolithic revolution and of similar importance. When a society or state modernizes, there is a transformation away from divine providence towards science as an analytical tool. Modern societies (once more according to Bendix) is made up out of people who deserve their status and wealth based on the work that they have done and not as in medieval and older societies based on inherited privilege. The modern state is one in which the percentage of the population who are engaged in agriculture has also dropped significantly. It is a society where rights are inherent in citizenship and where democratic values are strengthening (Bendix, 1967:292-293).

State development is thus something that can be measured in different ways, and one such method is modernization. Modernization theorists however do not hold to one single definition of modernization. Rather, and Bendix admits this, historical and

geographic factors can heavily influence a study. For many cases specific exceptions are needed, as modernization is limited (Bendix, 1967:317). It runs the risk of becoming western centric and it is almost undeniably influenced by western ideas and values. Thus this study acknowledges the theories and ideas of modernization, but applies these only loosely, based on the African and case specific challenges, in analysing state progress and state development. Political development as a case in point, as will be discussed later in the chapter, is for example analyzed by making use of variables that test democratisation, but not pure democracy as such.

2.4 Variables

2.4.1 Governance

For this research the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) were selected to measure governance. The WGI is a project that has been measuring governance for the World Bank since 1996. It makes use of six main indicators, which are in turn based on a number of variables (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010:2). Due to the complexity of measuring something as intangible as governance this research decided to use the already established WGI, since it brings together diverse sources creating the opportunity for comparing two countries. The WGI with its six main indicators also gives a broad overview of the entire 'range' of possible governance indicators. Since this research does not focus on a specific sub-section under the term governance, the WGI is thus very useful for a complete overview (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010:3).

Governance, as mentioned in chapter one, is defined in this study according to the World Bank's definition, which states that governance is:

“the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them" (Kaufman & Kraay, 2008:6).

Good governance is a governance style that promotes the creation of strong, open, equal and free political and economic institutions (Ikome, 2007:147). Governance is measure by looking at six indicators, these are: voice and accountability, political

stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and lastly, control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010:4).

In this study the official WGI ratings will be used for measuring political development. These are the results that have been quantified and then analysed by the World Bank. In addition to this the research makes use of qualitative analyses based on the WGI indicators but analysed from data collected based on the indicators. The combination of the two will improve understanding and usefulness of the analysis since it increases insight. To do this the understanding of the indicators as listed below are qualitatively measured against the data available for the countries in the case study. We will now look at the different indicators. The definitions provided are taken from work done for the World Bank Group by Kaufman *et al* (2010). Qualitative analysis based on the WGI is used for the years preceding 1996 or for the first two phases of state development.

Voice and Accountability

Voice and accountability is the measuring of the extent of participation allowed to citizens of a country in the selecting of their governments. This also includes freedom of association, freedom of expression and the freedom of the media (Kaufmann *et al*, 2010:4).

Political Stability and Absence of Violence

Political stability and absence of violence is the measuring of the likelihood or in other words risk that government power will be transferred along unconstitutional or through violent means. It also includes destabilisation, terrorism and politically motivated violence or aggressive acts (Kaufmann *et al*, 2010:4).

Government Effectiveness

Government effectiveness measures the quality of public services, the civil service and how independent the civil service is from government or political pressure. It also measures the implementation and formulation of policy, along with the commitment of the government to the implementation of these policies (Kaufmann *et al*, 2010:4).

Regulatory Quality

Regulatory quality refers to the measuring of the ability of the government to create, implement and maintain beneficial policies; also policies and regulations that increase and benefit private sector development (Kaufmann *et al*, 2010:4).

Rule of Law

Rule of law analyses the degree of adherence to the laws of a country and the enforcement there of. This includes the protection of property rights, the quality of policing, the integrity of the court system as well as the risk of crime and violence (Kaufmann *et al*, 2010:4).

Control of Corruption/Terrorism

Control of corruption measures in what manner public power is used for public good, or in contrast for private gain. This includes both what is known as petty corruption and 'grand forms' of corruption. The difference is essentially in the size of corruption involved. This indicator also measures the extent to which elites and private interests have taken over the state (Kaufmann *et al*, 2010:4).

A combined analysis made from the findings of the official WGI research and findings based on the qualitative analysis of data will allow the research to interpret the state of governance in the countries used in the comparative study. We will now look at development and the understanding thereof.

2.4.2 Development

The ideological aims of the term development as used in this study is understood as being based on three objectives; increasing delivery by the state of life sustaining goods, the raising of living standards and lastly the expansion of economic and social choice (Todaro & Smith, 2009:22). The three indicators of development for this study were thus selected based on the three objectives named above. These three indicators are political-, economic- and social development. The United Nations Human Development Index (UNHDI) also played a role in the selection of the three indicators. The UNHDI looks at the interaction of economic and social development. It is seen as a breakthrough in the measuring of development by giving a combined statistic for the economic and social progress in a country (UN, 2011).

After taking into account the literature surveyed, this study defines development as:

the political, economic and social progress made in a state by increasing the delivery of public goods and services, increasing life expectancy and by increasing the economic and political choice of its citizens and inhabitants.

2.4.2.1 Political Development

Political development refers to the process of creating an equal or fair society which can make decisions to benefit society as a whole. Political development in this study is measured by making use of data from Freedom House and presented in their Freedom ratings for countries (Puddington, 2011). In addition to the analysis given by Freedom House, supplementary data collected relating to the variables and their indicators used by Freedom House will be used. There are two variables; political rights and civil liberties. Political rights are measured by looking at three sub-categories; electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. For civil liberties there are four subcategories, these are; freedom of expression and belief, associational and organisational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights (Puddington, 2011).

2.4.2.2 Economic Development

Economic development looks at how well a country is doing in real financial terms. This is useful because it shows whether a government policy, possibly even a highly criticised policy, is delivering financial benefit. In general economic development also gives us some indication of the wealth of a country and whether it is increasing. Economic development is measured by making use of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures where available (EIU, 2011). In addition, Gross National Product (GNP), foreign debt, trade statistics and related data is used to create an understanding of the economic situation of the case studies.

2.4.2.3 Social Development

Social development measures the quality of life of the majority. This is done by making use of a selection of Social Indicators drawn up by the Statistics Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (UN, 1989). The selection is made by comparing the usage of social indicators in the list of UN Social Indicators to that of social indicators used by the World Bank in their

World Development Indicators (World Bank Group, 2010). From the World Bank this research finds child health, mother's health, educational attainment and combating disease to be applicable (World Bank Group, 2010). From the UN Social Indicators this study will use education, health, housing, literacy and water supply and sanitation (UN, 1975). Out of these indicators we then form three broad categories; education, healthcare and service delivery. These three indicators will be used to qualitatively determine the state of social development in the case studies at different times. Social development in phase three (and in other phases if data is available) is measured by making use of the Human Development Index (HDI) used by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The HDI rating measures both economic and social development, but since it focuses on individuals it is more useful in social development. The HDI rates countries and then assigns a number between one and zero. Zero is the lowest and represents very low social development, with one being the highest showing strong social (human) development. The three HDI dimensions used in analysis also correlate to the selected themes as these are health, education and living standards (UNDP, 2011). With the qualitative and quantitative measures correlating the integrity of analysis can be ensured and the lack of HDI analyses of phases one and two does not jeopardise the validity of the research.

2.5 Conclusion

Africa has had a long history of state structure formation and political organisation. Colonialism in a sense interrupted many of the processes that were taking place and imposed its own structures on Africa. In the post-colonial era the influence of colonialism remained. The state in Africa and its development after colonialism, though influenced by it at times, cannot be understood solely by looking at the colonial past. Old processes started before colonists ever arrived and process began after colonialism had ended, and these have also influenced state development. This chapter has relayed the framework presented by Chazan *et al*, and given academic support for the three phase development argument. The Chazan-framework will thus give the research the context in which to analyse the post-colonial era, its' trajectories of state development and the interaction between governance and development. We will look at the case studies in the next two chapters.

Chapter 3: State Development and Governance in Zaire

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will look at the history of state development in Zaire/the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The aim of the research is to determine whether there is a correlation between governance and development in the country. The DRC³ is the first case study studied in this research since it is seen as to have followed the classic trajectory of development as described in the Chazan-framework. The DRC is a country in central Africa that has historically and ethnic culturally little to no reason for being united into one single governed territory. Its origins as a united political unit is based on the greed of colonial Europe and arguably one of its cruellest colonial monarchs, king Leopold II of the Belgians. By 1900 most of the current day DRC had been united into one territory through imperialist design (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 13).

This chapter will firstly examine the origins of the state in the DRC. This is done by looking at the area of the modern DRC as it was before the arrival of colonialism, and secondly looking at the colonial rule of Leopold II and the Belgian government. This short introduction will provide an understanding of the context in which the post-colonial state in the DRC developed. In the second section we will be turning to the Chazan-framework. In it, each of the three phases in the Chazan-framework's trajectory of state development in Africa are applied to the DRC/Zaire consecutively. In essence each of these will consist of firstly a historical overview, followed by an analysis of the governance and development in the phase. Thus we will be able to follow the development trajectory of a case study and at the same determine the impact of governance on state development.

³ The Democratic Republic of the Congo was known as the Congo by early European explorers. Between 1885-1908 it was known as the Congo Free State under Leopold II of Belgium. From 1908 until 1960 the area was called the Belgian Congo whilst being under the authority of the Belgian government. It was called the Democratic Republic of the Congo after its independence from Belgium in 1960 and renamed to Zaire after Mobutu took power in 1965. With the fall of Mobutu in 1997, Laurent Kabila again renamed Zaire the République Démocratique du Congo, or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Clark, 1998:109; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 13).

3.2.1 The Pre-colonial Congo

The territory of the Congo is situated in central Africa in a vast area of culturally and linguistically related people. Most of these groups form part of the Bantu language cultural group. However, even though these groups share some traits, the Congo is made up out of about 250 different ethnic groups. It is interesting to note that many ethnic groups today live across national borders, a testimony to the synthetic colonial borders. Examples are, the Kongo, who are found in the DRC, Angola and Congo-Brazzaville; the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, from the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, and the Lunda who are also found in Zambia and Angola (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 14).

Bantu languages had not always been the main language and cultural group in the Congo. Recently archaeology has shown that the Bantu groups slowly moved into the Congo area over a time span of more than 4000 years. During this time they continuously interacted with the local hunter-gathers of the rainforests. Since the Bantu groups were agriculturalist they lived in relative peace with their forest neighbours as their ways of life were complementary to each other's. In time the hunter-gatherers slowly began speaking the Bantu languages (Oliver & Atmore, 2001:151,154). Agriculture was limited to yams, palm-oil and later bananas. There were thus sedentary agriculturalist societies in pre-colonial Congo, but the rainforests were not fertile enough to support larger political structures. Only when the Bantu expansion reached the lakes and fertile mountain valleys of the Western Rift and Nile-Congo divide did it become more fast-moving and dynamic (Oliver & Atmore, 2001:154). The agriculturalists of the Congo were divided into "households" and ruled by "big men". In a village there might have been many families and thus big men. These groups were originally matrilineal and had egalitarian political structures. In time they however became patrilineal and villages became competitive, often leading to conflict. This shift was due to an influx of migrants from the north during the second millennium.

With population increases and competition, new kingdoms evolved. Thus when the Portuguese arrived in 1482, they were able to make contact with the Bakongo federation, a kingdom with an elected, yet mostly hereditary king. Luxury European products such as Venetian beads and glazed china were imported, and slaves were exported. Christianity was also rather unsuccessfully implemented as a result of the

“converted” kings (Nöthling, 1989:279-280). The Boma kingdom emerged to the west of Lake Mai-Ndombe, with its climax in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Kuba kingdom, by far the most important in the region, evolved between the Kasai and Sankuru tributaries of the Congo River. The kingdom planted crops imported from America by the Portuguese, including maize, cassava and tobacco. The kingdom had well developed and unique ritual and political institutions. It was also secure enough by 1800 that it dictated with whom it traded in the Atlantic trading system, even importing slaves and exporting ivory (Oliver & Atmore, 2001:157-161).

In the 1840’s and the 1850’s the Swahili-Arabs from Zanzibar and their allies the Nyamwezi foraged into the Congo, extending the East African slave trade and ivory trade. They introduced Islam and Kiswahili. Thousands of Congo slaves were captured and then sold on the slave markets of the orient and Middle East. During the 1850’s a Nyamwezi trader by the name of Msiri, founded the Garenganze state in Katanaga with its capital at Bunkeya. Msiri would be killed in 1891 by a Congo Free State officer, and his country would be assimilated into the colonial Congo Free State (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:14-15). We now turn to the colonial era.

3.2.2 The Colonial Congo Free State 1885-1908 and the Colonial Belgian Congo 1908-1960

King Leopold II of Belgian’s⁴ interest was spiked in the Congo when he heard tales of its reported, but unproven, riches. Leopold very attentively followed the travels of African explorers. Between 1874 and 1877, Henry Morton Stanley, who famously found David Livingstone on the shores of Lake Tanganyika (“Doctor Livingstone I presume?”), travelled from Zanzibar to the mouth of the Congo River. His aim was to reclaim the Congo basin for the British throne. When Britain was uninterested, Leopold approached Stanley and made him his agent for colonising the Congo (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 14-23).

Leopold used cunning and clever statesmanship to get what he wanted. In 1876, he convened the *Association Internationale Africaine* (AIA) (International African Association). At the conference he disguised his plans for the Congo as humanitarian

⁴ The king of Belgium is officially referred to as king of the Belgians and not king of Belgium.

and scientific. Two years later he created the *Comité d'études du Haut-Congo* (The committee of the study of the High-Congo). A year later he renamed it to *Association Internationale du Congo* (AIC) (International Association of the Congo). The two organisations were cunningly confusingly named seeming to be similar. AIA however was scientific, and AIC was a company exclusively under Leopold's control. In 1879 Stanley left for the Congo, where he used duplicity and force to gather the thumb print signatures of Congo rulers, ceding their territories to the AIC flag, a blue standard with a single gold star. By secondly creating the basic infrastructure for empire, mostly by building roads, Stanley also created a justification of Leopold's claims to the Congo by 1884.

Leopold now needed to have his self-proclaimed sovereignty recognised. The United States were the first to recognise Leopold's new country on 22 April 1884. France acknowledged Leopold's claim after he signed a treaty which would cede the Congo to France if he could no longer maintain his presence. Germany accepted Leopold's claim in the hope of improving relations with France. By the time of the Berlin Conference, all parties present (only excluding Turkey) had accepted Leopold's claim (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 14-23).

After having his territory acknowledged, Leopold needed to make his new possession profitable. Leopold had invested a lot of money and now needed to repay loans. However the area was not adapted to European economics and thus seemed to be highly unproductive by Leopold's and his partners' thinking. The colonial government thus resorted to extreme measures in an attempt to increase productivity which included murder, torture, human mutilation and other "inhumane methods" to force the Congolese to leave their way of life and rather produce what the colonial authority wanted. Internationally Leopold had portrayed the Congo Free State (the name that Leopold II gave the Congo) as a humanitarian venture against the slave trade. Ivory, but especially rubber, were the main sources of Leopold's revenues. With the invention of rubber tyres, Leopold made laws forcing Congolese to supply labour, rubber and ivory to his agents. Villages that were not able to meet the daily quotas were subjected to rape, mutilation and murder (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 14-23).

By 1908 only 8.5 million of the original 30 million strong Congolese population survived. Leopold's greed had led to the death of tens of millions of people. Congo's "king-sovereign" ruled the Congo Free State for 23-years as an absentee landlord and never set foot on Congolese soil. In Europe one can still see what the millions of abused Africans were murdered, raped and mutilated for. The *Arcade du Cinquanteenaire* in Brussels, the Tervuren Museum and extensions of the Royal Palace were all paid for in blood money (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 14-23).

After Leopold's crimes in the Congo Free State became an international embarrassment, the Belgium government took over control of the territory in 1908 (MacGaffey, 1991:27). The Belgian Congo as it was now known, still however suffered from economic exploitation and political oppression. The constitution for the colony was made in collaboration between big business in Belgium, the Catholic Church and the Belgium government. The economic exploitation of the Congo continued, even though less violent. "Citizens" were forced to spend at least 60 days a year doing public construction. During the war effort of the Second World War, this was increased to 120 days. Forced into unpaid labour, Congolese suffered from starvation (they did not have time to grow enough food for themselves) and died from hardships and maltreatment. Belgium Congo also had laws institutionalising racist regulations, restricting the movement of Africans and preventing them from owning land. Due to its exploitation of the Congo, Belgium never went into debt during the World Wars. The entire Belgian war effort was funded by Congolese profits. The political system of the colony consisted out of local chiefs in the Congo who were charged with meeting the demands of the colonial government (effectively only a bureaucracy), which was overseen by the governor-general, the Belgian parliament and colonial affairs minister, residing in Belgium. Military force by the *Force Publique* (public force/colonial army) was used to suppress any resistance. (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 26-39).

3.2.3 Independence and the Congo Crisis

During the 1950's Belgium slowly began to change its policy on social and political repression and by 1957 a university was opened in Leopoldville. Peasants were now also allowed to grow cash crops for profit if they so wished. With the decolonisation of French Equatorial Africa, Uganda and Sudan, Belgium was under pressure to

relinquish its hold on the Congo. In January 1959 riots broke out alongside attacks on Europeans and European property. During 1959 and 1960 Belgian authority was in general decline especially in the rural areas. Unable to keep control of the vast Congo territory and with building international pressure as well as an incoherent policy direction, Belgium declared the granting of independence to the Congo in February 1959. By 1960 the Congo received its full independence (Freund, 1998:198-199).

The Belgium government had however not prepared the African population for governing independently. During colonialism Africans could not rise higher than clerks, in the administration. By the 1960 independence, even though the literacy rate was the highest in Africa due to Catholic schools there were no more than a few hundred people in the entire country with a secondary education. It must also be noted that the education system was academically limited, as the missionaries who operated the schools were in close alliance with the colonial power and real upliftment or enlightenment of the labour population was not desired (Coleman & Ngokwey, 1983:306).

The political elite of the Congo lacked education, wealth and administrative know-how. In the years after independence political and economic chaos erupted as could have been expected. This time of confusion after independence is known as the Congo Crisis. After the assassination of the first elected post-colonial president, Patrice Lumumba, the First Republic ended with a coup by Mobutu Sese Seko. He became the head of government and state on 4 November 1965. In 1967⁵ he formed the *Movement Populaire de la Révolution* (MPR) (The Popular Movement of the Revolution) and effectively created a single party state (Coleman & Ngokwey, 1983:307; MacGaffey, 1991:27). We will now look at the development trajectory followed by the DRC after the Congo Crisis.

3.3 The Post-colonial Development Trajectory

In the Chazan-framework there is no definite fixed timeline for when countries entered and exited certain phases of development or change (Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, and Stedman, 1999:46-68). In the case of the DRC these phases

⁵ Some sources give the date of the creation of the MPR as 1966 (Clark, 1998:110).

roughly fall into three decades. The concentration of state power, phase one, falls into the last years of the 1960's after Mobutu took power and continues until the economic woes of the late 1970's. Phase two, the elaboration of state power, falls into the last years of the 1970's and continues until the late 1990s. This is the phase up and until Mobutu began to experience serious effective local opposition. The reconsideration of state power, phase three, is from 1990/1991 onwards, and sees the state in a very weak position with Mobutu's power waning rapidly (Reno, 2006:43).

We will now look at the historic events during each of these phases. After the discussion on each phase, the paper will look at the governance found in each phase and analyse development based on political, economic and social values.

3.3.1 Phase One, 1965-1979, the Concentration of State Power

Phase one according to Chazan *et al* (1999) sees the state begin the process of centralisation. The liberation movement that led the country into independence becomes convinced that it alone has the right to rule and that consolidation and centralisation of power is the best alternative to democracy. Ethnicity in phase one gains importance as the new elites are often from one ethnic group, granting this group disproportionate benefits in power and in wealth. The state begins to expand in phase one, and also creates parastatals to dominate the economy. The governing party becomes synonymous with the state over time, completely blurring the lines of where the party ends and where the state begins. Any opposition groups that prove to be troublesome in this time are removed by means of force. For this reason both the army, paramilitary forces and the police are enlarged.

The DRC⁶ reached independence with 16 indigenous university graduates (Reno, 2006:45). Nonetheless, when it received its independence in 1960, it was seen as the second most industrialised country in Africa. However the civil war that broke out and lasted until 1967 destroyed much of the administrative, institutional and legal structures of the country whilst also ruining the economy (Fairhead, 1992:17). Order

⁶ The names Congo, Congo Free State, Belgian Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zaire are used as applicable to the timeframe referred to by the context in which these names are used. A clear explanation of the names is given in footnote 3 on page 31. To simplify it can be accepted that all of these names refer to the same geographical territory, but under different governments at different times.

was restored after intervention by Belgium, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United States of America (US) and the United Nations (UN). Direct foreign involvement is also suspected in the rise of Mobutu and the assassination of Lumumba. After creating a one party state in 1966, the name of the once army chief, Mobutu Sese Seko, became synonymous with the Zairian state (Clark, 1998:110). In 1971 he showed his power by unilaterally changing the country's name to Zaire. Mobutu would turn his post as president into a permanent position, in time becoming Africa's longest standing presidential monarch (Coleman & Ngokwey, 1983:306; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:141). Nonetheless, Mobutu came to power with a strong popular mandate. He enjoyed both the backing of the international community, who felt that a strong man could protect western business better than a weak democracy, as well as the Zaire's population who wanted stability and peace (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:145-146).

The early Zairian state could best be described as following an absolutist or corporatist model. A corporatist state is one that co-opts social groups, especially capital and labour. In Zaire's case it was large international mining corporations. The early Zairian state had clear patrimonial tendencies, and would in time evolve into a pure patrimonial state. A patrimonial state is similar to an absolutist state, which directs its attention to the state project of increasing control over its territory and people. Patrimonialism also pacifies diverse interest groups and it allows for the coordination of various clashing power brokers by buying them off. In a patrimonial state even though it is primarily concerned with extending its power, the ruler mobilises state resources and power for personal gain (Clark, 1998:111-112; Reno, 2006:47).

Mobutu's regime began as a military dictatorship with the whole of the army's high command as part of the governing junta. This was the closest Zaire would get to "democracy" for the next quarter of a century and it would not last for long (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:141). During the 1970's Mobutu centralised power on himself to such an extent that it even surpassed the centralised colonial system. He removed local authorities of almost all their power, he encouraged his own personal "cult", referred to as Mobutuism and created a state party, the MPR (the Popular

Movement of the Revolution) with compulsory membership, removing the divide between government and state (Clark, 1998:112; Coleman & Ngokwey, 1983:307).

Mobutu launched a process of unification, pacification and stabilisation. The new regime showed resilience by publically hanging enemies and limiting the power of Belgian industrial and financial companies. It followed centralisation, and concentration of power with the dissolution of parliament and suppression of the opposition. These events fall into the processes of impedance and facilitation as mentioned by Chazan *et al* (1999:47). Impedance sees the government weaken participatory institutions, whilst facilitation sees the strengthening and enlarging of bureaucratic structures. Mobutu also centralised all decision making power on himself as the president, he abolished the post of the prime minister and amended the constitution to legalise all the changes (Clark, 1998:112; Coleman & Ngokwey, 1983:307). The new Zairian constitution declared that “the president of the MPR is by right the leader of Zaire, he has full powers. He is in charge of the MPR, the Political Bureau, the Executive Council, the Judicial Council, and the Legislative Council. He appoints and dismisses Regional Commissioners, he is Supreme Commander, and appoints and dismisses officers of the armed forces and the executive level of public servants of the administration” (Coleman & Ngokwey, 1983:308).

With the party now as the only organ of state, all movements; women, labour and youth organisations were absorbed into the party. Only the Catholic Church remained somewhat autonomous. A ban was however put on all Christian names as they were declared to be foreign and banned alongside Western suits, ties, Western dresses and the wearing of trousers by women (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:172-173).

Mobutu was an autocrat in the purest form of the word. He could do whatever his heart desired. He used his newly accumulated wealth and power to suppress his opposition and terrify his subordinates. And when he felt it was needed, violent force was used at alarming regularity. Corruption, assassination, extrajudicial executions (murders), massacres of entire villages and unarmed civilians and banishment to prison colonies kept opposition forces in the country under control. Until 1980 it was impossible to imagine a local opposition to his regime and all resistance had to operate internationally. By 1978 the international media referred to Zaire as a

“kleptocracy”. A state in which the elite are only interested in accumulating as much wealth for themselves as possible, without looking after the needs of majority (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:172-173).

The early Zairian state did nonetheless have its achievements. It was able to create and maintain peace in Africa’s first failed state. It also reintroduced rational economics, making use of economists and economic specialists (Clark, 1998:111). In fact, Mobutu was seen as a relatively successful state builder by the West during the 1960’s and 1970’s even though he was known to be an undemocratic dictator. Having ended the secessionist violence that tore the country apart after independence, Mobutu’s absolutism was thought to be a useful tool of state building. For this reason he even enjoyed the express support of the US. Zaire was seen as an example of rapid modernisation. Mobutu was sympathetically called the Caesar of Africa⁷ (Clark, 1998:112). After Mobutu took power, the economy flourished for a few years due to high commodity prices on the international market. In 1974 copper prices, one of Zaire’s main exports, collapsed. This caused Zaire to default on its debt for the first time in 1975 (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:145-152).

A major characteristic of Mobutu’s regime was his network of supporters around him. It mostly consisted out of relatives of the dictator, members of his ethnic group and individuals who had proven their loyalty to him. This class first began to grow in strength when Mobutu passed the Bakajika Law of 1966 by which the Zairian state established its rights to all land and mineral rights in the country. He also played Belgian and other international interests against each other to increase his regime’s bargaining power against that of foreign capital. In 1967 the largest copper mining company was nationalised and renamed Gécamines. In 1973 the diamond mining company Miba was nationalised. Both Miba and Gécamines were then heavily taxed.

Additionally in 1973 the policy of Zairianisation was started. It consisted of the confiscation of foreign medium and small enterprises for the benefit of the political elite with the stated intent of benefiting the people of Zaire (Nzongola-Ntalaja,

⁷ This is a reference to Augustus Caesar (born Octavian, adopted by Julius Caesar) the first accepted autocratic ruler of the ancient Roman Empire who ended the Roman Republic and set it on the course of empire. He is seen as having been a very effective ruler whilst being completely autocratic.

2002:145-152). These actions amongst others such as nationalisation for private gain, inflated salaries, embezzled funds and exorbitant expense accounts all helped to enrich the new state bourgeoisie that formed around Mobutu (Nest, Kisangani & Grignon, 2006:18; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:145-152). Between 1960 and 1975 Gécamines generated between 50 and 80 per cent of state revenue. When copper prices fell in the mid 1970's, state employees were intermittently paid lower salaries; this was the first sign of decay that would become evident in the 1980's (Nest *et al*, 2006:18).

Mobutu used the riches of the country to reward and punish those he saw fit. The most lucrative way of being rewarded was by being instated as some kind of government official. Mobutu saw the country as his own property. When he travelled abroad he would always be accompanied by either one of the state companies' managing directors or by the governor of the central bank. These individuals were expected to draw money from government and parastatal accounts to cover all of Mobutu's personal expenses. At the start of the 1970's the Zairian bureaucracy, though far from efficient, still acted along rational bureaucratic lines (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:145-152). By the end of the 1970's the "rationality" of the bureaucracy had begun to wear off, and rather became redundant in many ways with unnecessary posts and red tape. The number of bureaucratic employees increased rapidly throughout 1970 and was a big drain on public funds by the end of the decade especially after the fall of copper prices in the mid 1970's (Clark, 1998:112).

Due to Zairianisation agricultural output and government revenues were put under further strain. Along with the aforementioned drop in the price of copper, the price of petroleum tripled and the cost of industrial imports increased sharply (MacGaffey, 1991:28). Simultaneously, mineral exports were disrupted by the closing of the Benguela railroad due to the Angolan civil war. Thus by late 1975 the Zairian economy had plunged into a recession from which it would never emerge. Government worsened the situation by taking over large foreign owned companies and giving them to politicians in a plan called Radicalisation, but this led to a further drop in revenues. In a new plan, Retrocession, the previously confiscated businesses were given back to their original owners but with forced political partners. In 1977 and 1978 copper production was disrupted after the invasion of Shaba. By 1978

economic output was 17 per cent lower than in 1974 and imports were half the 1974 value. Manufacturing was at 40 per cent (dropping to 25 per cent by 1979) capacity and inflation at 100 per cent by 1978. Real wages had also dropped sharply and was at 25 per cent of the 1970 level (MacGaffey, 1991:28). At this time even with the economic woes of the country the state in Zaire still seemed terrifyingly strong. It would only be by the 1980's that opposition forces began to realise that the control from the centre was in actual fact rather weak (Fairhead, 1992:20).

Mobutu used the military very skilfully to keep control of Zaire for 32 years and it definitely contributed to the longevity of his reign which was already suffering from economic strains by 1975. He used both military and paramilitary forces in an overlapping manner, always very conscious of the danger that these might hold, having had himself come to power through a military coup. Mobutu ensured that the elite units were under the command of collaborators. These were often either directly related to him by blood or by marriage or by belonging to the Ngbandi ethnic group which the president was from. Although the military would lose its power in time, it was at first heavily relied on to suppress dissent and intimidate the general population through either shows of strength or at times murderous force. (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:153-154).

Chazan-framework Summary: In summary it is clear that the Mobutu regime of the 1960's and 1970's led Zaire on a development trajectory almost perfectly described in the Chazan-framework (Chazan *et al*, 1999: 46-68). Under Mobutu the political power in the state was concentrated as never before. Mobutu's political party was not a traditional liberation movement, but it did see itself as the wager of the revolution of independence, "saving" the country from the Congo Crisis and later from foreign capital. The right of the MPR party to rule without any opposition was constitutionalised, clearly showing the belief that only the "liberation movement" had the right to govern. Ethnicity grew in importance as the members of the Ngbandi ethnic group were favoured by the powerful president. The state was enlarged to accommodate all the needs of those close to the president and his ruling elite. Parastatals were also created by means of nationalising the assets of foreign investors. And lastly, where patrimonialism did not remove opposition forces, brute force was applied by using the military and police. In the next section we will use the categories

of the Worldwide Governance Indicators to give an indication of the state of governance.

3.3.2 Governance in Phase One

Voice and Accountability: At first Mobutu had the support of his people, but for the remainder of phase one their criticisms were not allowed. There was no media freedom, no freedom of association and definitely no freedom of expression. The government was not accountable.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence: The risk of a violent transfer of power in this era was low due to effective oppression of opposition forces by the state. However this does not mean that the country was stable, since control was kept through corruption and force.

Government Effectiveness: The government at the beginning of phase one was somewhat effective. However due to subsequent failed economic policies, corruption and ineptitude government effectiveness was low. Even though the government implemented policies, these mostly failed, such as the policies of Radicalisation and Retrocession. The civil service was not independent from government at all, and the forced membership of the MPR removed the line between state and government.

Regulatory Quality: Regulatory quality of phase one was low and most policies were implemented for the enrichment of the politically connected elite. Government involvement in the economy such as through Zairianisation was catastrophic.

Rule of Law: Rule of law was maintained effectively at first, but only to the benefit of the political elite. In most cases those who were politically connected operated above the law. Thus due to a system operating on a bias based on how politically connected one was, the court system and policing lost its integrity. Violence in general was not a threat, except if one dared raise opposition to the political elite.

Control of Corruption/Terrorism: Control of corruption was non-existent. It was rampant and found in all sectors and levels of government.

Governance in Zaire in phase one can be seen as poor due to all the indicators indicating a general negative trend.

3.3.3. Development in Phase One

Political Development

During phase one there was no free electoral process, no political pluralism and very limited political participation, limited to the president and those he favoured through patrimonialism. Government functioned only to the extent that the political elite were able to accumulate wealth for themselves. Phase one saw some freedom of belief, little freedom of expression, almost no associational and organisational rights, individual rights were compromised when the political elite saw fit and rule of law existed only in the sense that the autocrat could enforce his decisions. Transparency in this one party state was low and corruption was increasing steadily. Political development as analysed by this research was neutral due to a lack of civil liberties and little political rights. Additionally Zaire during phase one can be seen to have experienced negative political development due to a lack of political freedom and participation which were reduced throughout the phase. Nonetheless with independence and the creation of a new functioning state political development was rather neutral than outright negative.

Economic Development

The government policies of Zairianisation, Radicalisation, nationalisation and Retrocession along with a drop in the price of copper, higher costs of imports and interruptions in copper exports left the Zairian economy in a recession by 1978, the end of phase one. Zaire had defaulted on its foreign debt and living standards of the poor and politically unconnected continued to plummet. In four years (1974-1978) economic output had dropped 17 per cent and Zairians were earning 25 per cent below the 1970 level in 1978. In real financial terms phase one saw the destruction of the Zairian economy. Economic development for the era was clearly negative with inflation in 1978 at 100 per cent. (MacGaffey, 1991:28).

Social Development

During the 1960's and 1970's the Zairian society benefited little from the state of the country and experienced a drop in living standards, as also seen in the aforementioned

drop in real income of 25 per cent between 1970 and 1978. Service delivery was almost non-existent, with the state unable and unwilling to provide even basic public goods such as economic stability, rule of law and healthcare. On 4 June 1969, students were protesting in favour of increased support for academic and social means which ended in a government crackdown that saw 60 students killed. In 1971 students at Lovanium held a memorial service for their fallen comrades. The gathering ended in violence and the students were forced into the military. After these incidents the MPR nationalised major Zairian universities causing terrible damage to the functionality of these institutions (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:178-179). Compared to other countries, even in Africa, the DRC by 1980 was not doing well when one considers the Human Development index (HDI) rating for 1980. The HDI for the DRC in 1980 was 0.267 compared to the sub-Saharan African average of 0.293 and the world average at 0.455 (UNDP, 2011b). Social development in phase one can thus also be seen as negative, since government services became less as government accountability and effectiveness dropped in the period.

3.4.1 Phase Two, 1979-1990, the Elaboration of State Power

Phase two in the Chazan-framework is in many ways an extension of phase one. It contains some of the same trends, but often these are happening at a faster rate or on a larger scale. Phase two sees the already large state expand even further. This leads to an even larger drop in state effectiveness. One central aspect of phase two is the loss of state legitimacy. The state has lost the support of the population and control is kept through a larger but also often a politically dangerous military and police (Chazan *et al.*, 1999:46-68). We now turn to Zaire in phase two.

The change in Zaire from the mid 1970's to 1980 was one of shocking rapid decay. From 1980 onwards there were no more attempts by government to stabilise the country's economy which was going through a major recession. In 1980 a group of thirteen parliamentarians dared to demand a multiparty system in an open letter to the president. This led to further repression from Mobutu. Even under this new drive to maintain power, regional authorities began to slowly regain their power. This was due to the fact that the Shaba invasions of 1977 and 1978 had begun to break the myth of the absolutist state (Bender, 1978:14; Clark, 1998:113). The Shaba invasions were invasions of the Shaba region in Zaire by the Front for the National Liberation of the

Congo (FNLC), possibly supported by the Angolan and Cuban governments. In both invasions Mobutu had to rely on foreign support to stop the invasions as his own military was not able to, revealing weakness. Mobutu's regime by the early 1980's had seemingly given up on the idea of governing a healthy state, but rather accepted that they would keep power through weapons. By doing this the state began to consume its own support bases, tightening the grip of poverty on the already starving society (Bender, 1978:14-15; Clark, 1998:112-113).

From 1980 onwards the Zairian state did not serve its citizens at all anymore. Government departments were utterly redundant and officials often worked with fictitious data that they made up. This was due to high levels of corruption and inadequacy. After 1980 there were no more cohesive government efforts and no more plans for government led development⁸. Rather the political elites preyed on the population. Wealth was extracted from the population through the seizure of property on the slightest pretext. This meant that phase two was characterised by chronic economic insecurity as no one knew when the little they had gathered would be taken away. The presidential court also grew ever more bizarre as presidential advisors struggled for influence, at times even making use of so called "black magic" (traditional witchery) (Clark, 1998:113-115; Reno, 2006:48).

The economy was further devastated through the levying of very high official and unofficial taxes. Imports were often taxed more than the actual price of the product. Even for individuals traveling, public places such as airports saw the levying of bribes on a range of unnecessary "services" (Clark, 1998:113-115). Mobutu did not in any way keep to the pretence of a normal society. During the 1980's when he required money, he simply ordered the central bank to print the amount that he wanted. This led to inflation of thousands of per cent. The state (Mobutu's regime) also extracted money directly from Gécamines which paid very high official and unofficial taxes. During the early Mobutu era the telephone and road networks slowly collapsed. The 1980's were no different and nothing was done to relieve the situation. Vehicles, railway stock, river boats and ferries also fell into disrepair due to a shortage of spare

⁸ There was a plan called the Mobutu Plan (1979-1981) which included ideas for economic development, foreign assistance programs and the use of expatriates to improve bureaucratic functioning, however it was never seriously considered or implemented and what it achieved was quickly sabotaged by the elite's relentless pursuit of self-interest (MacGaffey, 1991:28).

parts and fuel (MacGaffey, 1991:13). The state's need for extraction became so wide spread and desperate, that peasants were even threatened by extraction, having to pay bribes or lose their livestock (Clark, 1998:116-117,119).

Unlike the East Asian states however, where corruption occurred alongside growth even though it hurt the economy in the short term, Mobutu was not powerful enough to allow a similar process to work in Zaire. Consequently when the country began to collapse in the 1980's Mobutu and his associates had to find new ways of keeping power (Reno, 2006:49). Thus power was maintained during the 1980's through the use of the military and paramilitary forces. The presidential guard numbered 12 000, the civilian guard 14 000 and the military was between 120 000 and 170 000 strong (Clark, 1998:122). With the government staying in power but unable to maintain any form of legitimate rule of law, corruption spread throughout all sectors of government. More and more "officials" were granted the right of acting as rent seekers as the financial capacity of the state decreased (Reno, 2006:50). By the mid 1980's citizens could no longer use the roads that were still operational since it was infested by government officials demanding money and goods, more in the way of a robbery than bribing (Fairhead, 1992:22).

In real terms the economy was devastated. Debt repayments, even after two defaults in the late 1970's, had to be rescheduled in 1979, 1980, 1981 and in 1983. Debt service rose from 11 per cent of government expenditure in 1982, to an enormous 56 per cent in 1985. The country had a debt load of US\$8.5 billion by 1989 (Fairhead, 1992:18). At the start of Zaire's economic decline, in 1978, the Paris Club and International Monetary Fund placed its major financial organs under their tutelage. A distinguished German banker, Erwin Blumenthal, was appointed to manage the central bank and teams of French and Belgian experts took over control of the Ministry of Finance and Customs Agency. This was based on the idea that the Zairian economy was floundering due to some technical error. However it became evident that this was not the case. Between 50 per cent and 75 per cent of foreign exchange continued to elude both Blumenthal and the French/Belgian teams. There was not a lack of technical skills, but rather there was a problem with what these skills were used for. Mobutu and his kleptocracy were determined to protect their interests (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:152).

One of the worst effects of the 1970's economic down turn was the effect it had on the wages to price ratio. In 1983, salaries of public servants were nominally seven times higher than it was in 1975. But in actual real terms they were at lower than one-fifth of the 1975 level. If one uses 1969 as a fixed point, prices were 46 times higher in 1979 and by 1986 they were 113 times higher than in 1969. Even the civil servants were struggling by 1984. The average salary of a civil servant was 750 Z, whilst the average monthly food expenditure for a family of six amounted to 3037 Z (MacGaffey, 1991:13).

Chazan-framework Summary: State expansion during phase two was not really present in the traditional sense. The state did not create many new institutions. What it however did do was empower individuals to increasingly act as rent seekers in the name of the state for their own gain by expanding the bureaucracy of the state. This can be seen as a form of state expansion. Phase two saw the end of any government effectiveness. Even the government's ability to extract for itself was reduced due to the dismal economic state of 1980's Zaire. Zaire in the 1980's was however still at the mercy of the MPR which along with its president used the country, government institutions and parastatals such as Gécamines for personal enrichment. The country was bankrupt and unable to support the patrimonial system favoured by Mobutu's regime. Yet Mobutu and his government continued to act in such a way as to clearly show that they did not have the interest of their subjects at heart. Those who wanted wealth and power had no alternative than to enter the intrigues of the presidential court. Through exorbitant corruption, the use of excessive violence, the abuse of public offices and utter mismanagement, Mobutu's regime and the state lost most of its legitimacy. Zaire in the 1980's clearly followed the trajectory described by the Chazan-framework in phase two even though it at times even acted more corrupt than what can be expected in phase two.

3.4.2 Governance in Phase Two

Voice and Accountability: The Zairian government lost any sense of accountability in phase two. Some citizens were by now able to exercise some freedom of association in rural areas, but this was only due to the first sign of government collapse.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence: The 1980's began to see the first public signs of opposition to Mobutu. Due to political power being kept through the use of soldiers, violence and corruption, the likelihood of a non-democratic regime change was high. That is if a regime change was to occur. Violence was also used in this era to maintain order. At times massacres of unarmed civilian were orchestrated to quell opposition (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:173).

Government Effectiveness: The 1980's saw the end of government effectiveness. This process was even resilient to the support provided by institutions such as the International Monetary fund and the Paris Club.

Regulatory Quality: Regulatory quality was near non-existent and there were nearly not any policies that bettered the private sector environment.

Rule of Law: Citizens' property rights were not respected and instead of guarding them the government were the ones who violated them through expropriations. Policing was used as a way of intimidating the population, whilst the office/post of police officer was used as a means to personal self-enrichment (through bribes for example) by many who were appointed to the post.

Control of Corruption/Terrorism

By the 1980's, the interests of the elite had taken over the state. Corruption was rampant and blatant.

Governance in Zaire in phase two was poor as is evident from the indicators.

3.4.3. Development in Phase Two

Political Development

Political development was already showing negative trends in phase one. In phase two this only accelerated. There still was no electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government was limited to keeping power through force and rent taking. Political rights were as good as non-existent. Civil liberties were not promoted or protected by the state in the 1980's, rather when people expressed opposition sentiment it resulted in repression, as in the case of the thirteen

parliamentarians. With both civil liberties and political rights deteriorating during the 1980's, political development was negative.

Economic Development

Salaries in real terms lost their value in the 1980's. Government debt increased and the economic recession took on greater proportions. Debt also had to be rescheduled continuously and took up more than 50 per cent of government expenditure. Compared to the 1970's and the 1960's economic development in the 1980's was negative and the economy benefited increasingly less people.

Social Development

The 1980's saw the complete collapse of government services. Quality of life was reduced due to lower salaries and lower living standards for the majority of citizens. With the state completely incapable of delivering services, social development in the 1980's saw a clear decline. This is also reflected in the HDI rating for the Zaire. Between 1980 and 1990, the Zaire's HDI fell from 0.267 to 0.261 (UNDP, 2011b).

3.5.1 Phase Three, 1990-, the Reconsideration of State Power

By 1990, the state of Zaire had deteriorated on all levels and not even the autocrat Mobutu was able to deny this. He was forced to accept the readmission of multiparty democracy as an option. In 1991 a Sovereign National Council was called to determine the future of the country. Mobutu's power by 1990 was much less than many people assumed. He had had to spend increasingly more power and money on different sources to keep control of "his" country (Clark, 1998:113; Reno, 2006:50). The Zairian state had become highly fragmented with a loss of control over some areas and fragmented instruments of physical coercion across the rest of the country. The state experienced an inability to sustain a physical presence in its own territory and struggled to keep allegiances (Kaldor, 1999:52).

The process of democratisation was nonetheless prolonged by Mobutu who bought opposition leaders by giving them extraction rights or plainly giving them sums of money. The fact that the opposition leaders often accepted these bribes shows the extent of the corruption of by and large all the political elites in Zaire. It must also be mentioned that many of these "opposition leaders" were in fact old ministers and

prime ministers of Mobutu's regime who now founded opposition parties not based on any kind of popular support (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:186). Mobutu might not have been as powerful anymore, but he was an experienced statesman and knew how to play different interests off against one another.

The Sovereign National Council (SNC) elected a prime minister, Tshisekedi. Mobutu however named his own prime minister, which led to the creation of a dual government. Mobutu also ordered his military to prevent the new 'democratic' ministers from entering their offices for work. Thousands of people protested the failure of the SNC under the leadership of catholic priests, leaving churches with bibles in one hand and candles in the other. Mobutu ordered his troops to open fire and killed 30 protestors. The chaos that came from the "dual" government system led to the state basically becoming non-existent by the spring of 1994 (Clark, 1998:113-114; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:189; Reno, 2006:51). In 1995 there had been no improvement to the lives of citizens. In the city of Kikwit, 250 miles from Kinshasa, the 400 000 citizens still lived without electricity, sewage or running water. The judicial system had also completely collapsed and prisoners died by the hundreds from starvation as they awaited trial (Clark, 1998:116). The social safety between 1993 and 1994 was non-existent and citizens formed protection groups in an attempt to protect them from local military forces. Most crimes in this era went completely unpunished, except in the case of political crimes which were severely punished (Clark, 1998:117).

State property was sold off in phase three at such an alarming rate that there very soon was almost no state property left. State enterprises were declared unprofitable and then often bought by the very official who declared it to be unprofitable. By 1994 Mobutu had accumulated a personal fortune of between US\$5billion and US\$8billion (Clark, 1998:118). The Gross Domestic Product of Zaire declined by 7.2 per cent in 1991, 12,3 per cent in 1992 and 10,4 per cent in 1993. Copper exports between 1990 and 1994 also fell by 90 per cent⁹ with inflation going higher than 20 000 per cent (Clark, 1998:112). From the 1980's onward the economy had also slowly begun to go informal. This was an attempt to avoid the rent seeking elites. By 1990 this meant that

⁹ The fall in copper exports was due to a cave in at Kamoto mine, the biggest mine operated by Gécamines (Nest *et al*, 2006:19).

the state was receiving continuously less taxes from transactions leading to much reduced revenues (Reno, 2006:50). It is however this informal and “illegal” economy that supported millions of Zairians and supports millions of Congolese during times in which the formal economy is and was very hard to navigate (Nest *et al*, 2006:17).

By 1997 Mobutu, who had been diagnosed with prostate cancer in 1994, was forced from power. He left Zaire with the state basically gone and many regions being all but autonomous (Clark, 1998:124). Mobutu was unable to repel his opposition when he lost much international support after the end of the Cold War and the Angolan war. Mobutu was followed by Laurent Kabila. He had led the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire with Rwandan and Ugandan support against Mobutu from 1996, winning the country in 1997 (Montague, 2002:109). The DRC can currently be seen as a failed state (Reno, 2006:43). Even the old revenue sources of Mobutu’s government have not been able to recover after the chaos of the 1990’s. By 2000 Gécamines (copper) and Miba (mostly diamonds) combined only contributed three per cent to government revenues, compared to 75 per cent from taxes and customs duties (Nest *et al*, 2006:38).

The fall of Mobutu was ultimately the culmination of many factors. Mobutu ended one party rule under international pressure in April 1990 and promised democratic reforms. Later the year he however ordered the massacre of a 100 students who were protesting against his regime at the University of Lubumbashi. Between 1990 and 1993 he became unable to pay his soldiers and civil service. The unpaid soldiers engaged in widespread looting of private property in retaliation. Along with these events and his undermining of the SNC, Mobutu, his regime and his military lost what little legitimacy they had left. Control across the country was slowly lost to warlords, who were left unchallenged as long as they did not openly challenge Mobutu (Nest *et al*, 2006:18-24; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:196-198).

After the genocide in Rwanda many *génocidaires* (committees of genocide) fled possible Tutsi revenge and were allowed to remain in Zaire. From camps in Zaire these *génocidaires* launched attacks into Rwanda. In 1996 the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Zaire to capture and kill the *génocidaires*. The Ugandan’s Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) joined the RPF. The Ugandan president wanted to see

Mobutu overthrown since Mobutu had allowed Ugandan opposition forces to launch attacks against the UPDF from Zaire. The RPF and the UPDF together organised the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire* (AFDL). The Angolan government also supported the effort against Mobutu to avenge him having allowed safety to the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA) in his territory whilst opposing the Angolan government. Laurent-Désiré Kabila was chosen to lead the AFDL. The AFDL met little resistance in its campaign of eight months to claim Kinshasa. The Zairian army had by now mostly deserted. The AFDL reached Kinshasa on 17 May 1997. Mobutu fled the capital before the AFDL arrived and died in exile in Morocco in September. Kabila declared himself president and renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Nest *et al*, 2006:18-24; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:224-225).

Chazan-framework Summary: Mobutu's regime and the state in Zaire in general lost the trust of the population. The government by the 1990's in Zaire was already failing and could not expand further. However public offices had lost legitimacy alongside the state. With the regime increasingly being seen as illegitimate and fraudulent (as it clearly showed by disregarding the SNC) violence increased across the country. With resources dwindling, the government became unable to limit violence and opposition. It could no longer maintain any form of peace. The economy had also failed completely by 1994. The Zairian elite had reduced the state to such an extent that it could no longer continue to exist in any real form. Kabila inherited the idea of a state, but the DRC has yet to show that it has recovered from its second collapse.

3.5.2 Governance in Phase Three

The WGI rates the six governance indicators on a score between -2.5 and +2.5. A score of -2.5 is very poor governance and a score of +2.5 is very good governance. The six indicators for 1996 rate as follows:

Voice and Accountability	: -1.63
Political Stability and Absence of Violence	: -1.87
Government Effectiveness	: -1.54
Regulatory Quality	: -2.33
Rule of Law	: -2.31

Control of Corruption/Terrorism : -2.49

These figures show that Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Government Effectiveness rated very poorly. Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption/Terrorism rated exceptionally poor. The WGI also provide a percentage indicating the standing of the country compared to others. If the percentage is zero, the country is the worst in the world (or equally terrible as other that rate the worst with it). If the percentage is 100, the country is the best in the world for that indicator. Voice and Accountability, and Political Stability and Absence of Violence score 6.2 per cent and 5.8 per cent respectively. This shows that the country was amongst the worst in the world for these indicators. Nonetheless, Government Effectiveness scores a dismal 1.5 per cent and Regulatory Quality 2 per cent. Rule of Law and Control of Corruption/Terrorism both score zero per cent, meaning these indicators are the worst in the world. Out of these figures it is clear that governance in Zaire was poor by the end of phase three, in fact by 1996 the country was one of the worst governed states on Earth (World Bank Group, 2011).

3.5.3. Development in Phase Three

Political Development

The Freedom House, Freedom in the World survey, rates countries based on political right and civil liberties. Each country is then assigned a score based on certain indicators for the variables. Countries with scores of between 1.0 and 2.5 are rated as “Free”, between 3.0 and 5.0 as “Partly Free” and those between 5.5 and 7.0 as “Not Free”. Based on the data thus far presented this research would rate Zaire in the early 1990’s as definitely not free, with once more negative political development. Protesters were killed, the opposition was bought and demands for democracy were ignored. Freedom house rate the DRC in 2001 as “Not Free”, with Political Rights receiving the worst possible rating of 7. Civil liberties received a 6. This rating clearly supports the trajectory tracked by the research in Zaire/DRC up to this time (Freedom House, 2010; Freedom House, 2002b; Puddington, 2011:30).

Economic Development

Economic development during the 1990’s was negative. The GDP of the country between 1991 and 1993 fell on average by 9.97 per cent. Copper exports were down,

and the informal, non-taxed economy grew. Government revenues were down and control of the economy in any formal way completely collapsed.

Social Development

Social development for this era clearly went into the negative. The Human Development Index (HDI) rating fell throughout the 1990's. Zero is the lowest and represents very low social development, with 1 being the highest showing strong social (human) development. In 1990 the DRC received a rating of 0.261. This already low rating fell to 0.201 in 2000 (UNDP, 2011b). This indicates, as argued by the research, negative social development in the DRC during phase three.

3.6 Conclusion

It is not the aim of this chapter to make any direct correlations between governance and development. This chapter has however shown that Zaire clearly followed the development trajectory as presented in the Chazan-framework. In phase one, two and three governance was poor. By 1990 there was almost no form of effective governance left. The political development of the country followed the same path as governance and seemingly became worse alongside it. At the same time both economic and social development, which had almost looked promising at the end of the Congo crisis first stalled and then began to decline. Negative economic and social development was already visible in phase one, and progressively deteriorated.

Chapter 4: State Development and Governance in Botswana

4.1 Introduction

Botswana is seen as one of the few and possibly the most promising success stories in state development in Africa. Botswana today has a free and open democracy with internationally recognised elections. Its economy is seen as stable, growing between 4 and 6 per cent every year since independence; and even with its vast natural wealth, corruption is thought to be low (Englebert, 2000:10). The country is professionally managed by highly educated and competent bureaucrats (Shale, 2009:57). Botswana at a glance seems to be visibly different from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This chapter will evaluate Botswana's state development; and if it has been successful, it is important to understand what role governance had in the trajectory followed by Botswana. Thus the question that will be asked in this chapter is, how can Botswana's economic, political and social successes be accounted for and how does it contrast with the DRC?

This chapter will resemble the outline of chapter three. It will begin by giving an overview of the pre-colonial and colonial history of Botswana. Secondly the chapter will look at three development phases of the Chazan-framework as applied to Botswana. Botswana will however be shown to have followed a different path than the DRC, and for this reason it does not fit into the Chazan-framework, since the framework is based on a trajectory of state development of an unsuccessful state (negative state development). Nonetheless the ways in which it differs from the Chazan-framework, will give us insight into what is different in the case of Botswana. Due to the lack of three clear phases as described by Chazan *et al*, this research has identified three phases in Botswana development taken from academic literature. These phases are roughly based on the five elections held in Botswana between 1965 and 1989.

4.2 Pre-colonial and Colonial Botswana

Botswana is situated on an area the size of France, between the states of South Africa to the south, Namibia to the west, Zambia to the north and Zimbabwe to the east. The dominant Tswana population moved into the area in the early eighteenth century. The

Tswana were predominantly cattle herders, living in a country that was not naturally favourable to agriculture, with only four per cent of the Botswana territory being usable for cultivation (Parson, 1981:236; Seidler, 2010:3). The pre-colonial elite consisted out of the major cattle owners which comprised the aristocracy. The majority of the population were however peasants who made a living through subsistence farming (Parson, 1981:239). The peasants paid tribute to the elite with any excess production or by supplying labour and the elite in turn supplied the peasants with access to cattle for milk, occasional meat and for ploughing in later years (Parson, 1981:239-240). There existed a material bond between the classes based on cattle. Land was communally held and rights of usage were universal. The elite only controlled the specific allocation of land use. Political and social control “depended largely... upon the ownership of cattle and social relations of production in agriculture which depended on cattle” (Parson, 1981:240).

In 1885 the Bechuanaland Protectorate was proclaimed by Britain. The protectorate was created after Britain became increasingly concerned with the risk of Transvaal and/or German occupation of the Bechuanaland territory. General Sir Charles Warren had persuaded the three most important chiefs of the Tswana to accept British protection in 1876. The Tswana elite chose “colonisation over the threat of (possible) institutional extinction” by the Transvaal republic or the German colonisers to the west (Englebert, 2000:13-14; Fawcus, 2000:19). Botswana would remain a British protectorate from 1885 until independence 30 September 1966 (Shale, 2009:58).

During the colonial era, British imperial control and influence in the Bechuanaland area remained very low. The European population numbered as low as one per cent at its height, and control was indirect. This meant that Tswana political structures were left mostly intact. Britain also did not invest much in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, as they saw it as being economically unviable (Seidler, 2010:3). Britain rather than truly annex the Bechuanaland territory used indirect governance with as little as possible administration and settlement. From 1885-1895 the Bechuanaland Protectorate was governed from Vryburg, and from Mafikeng, in South Africa, between 1895 and 1966. The fact that neither of these administrative centres were in Botswana shows a clear lack of interest in Bechuanaland on the part of Britain. Until independence, Botswana never had a local capital nor a resident governor (Narayana,

Siphambe, Akinkugbe & Sentsho, 2005:19). Nonetheless the High Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate was given wide ranging executive and legislative powers by an Order of Council on the 9th of May 1891. He was however instructed to confine law making to whites only, as far as possible (Fawcus, 2000:22-24).

Britain's lack of investment in Bechuanaland was in part due to the fact that the territory had seemingly little in natural resources, and it had a large sparsely populated terrain. This meant that governing the territory directly would be costly with very little income generated in return (Fawcus, 2000:19). Britain was also reluctant to develop an area claimed by the Union of South Africa. The Union of South Africa had laid claim to the territory ever since the passing of the Act of Union in 1910 (Fawcus, 2000:19). There is however an interesting side story of Britain trying to claim the territory on a more permanent base. In July 1894 an order in Council was made which gave the Colonial Secretary the right to place the Bechuanaland Protectorate under the authority and jurisdiction of the British South Africa Company. Cecil John Rhodes tried to enable it immediately, but this caused an outcry from the Batswana (Tswana). In the August of 1895 Chiefs Khama III, Bathoen I and Sebele I travelled to England to pursue their objections to losing their sovereignty. Colonial Secretary Chamberlain at first refused to accept their complaints. This led to the three chiefs touring England raising public support with the help of a missionary, W.C. Willoughby. With public opinion in favour of the chiefs, Chamberlain was forced to enter into a written agreement with the chiefs on 6 November 1894. This agreement essentially gave the three chiefs control of their territories with only limited supervision by an agent of the crown. In time this level of control was extended *de facto* to all Tswana chiefs (Fawcus, 2000:23-24).

Even with their "new freedom" Britain imposed restrictions on economic activities of the people of Bechuanaland. It also imposed some taxes, notably the hut tax, and created administrative acts and practices that facilitated the labour recruitment and economic integration of Bechuanaland with South Africa (Parson, 1981:239). During the colonial period the Batswana elite tuned into a dependent petty bourgeois governing class. The cattle link to the peasantry was retained but capital accumulation was limited to cattle marketing in South Africa. The elite were bureaucratized and used in a supervisory role by Britain. The imposing of taxes on the peasant population

with very limited economic opportunities stimulated the acceptance of wage labour offers from South Africa and the creation of a system of migrant labour. The social situation now saw a cattle owning elite acting as supervisors for Britain with a peasantry characterised by short-employment in South Africa with a subsistence agricultural base. There was a continued existence of pre-colonial Tswana political forms and processes such as chiefs and their control over land allocation (Parson, 1981:240). The agrarian petty-bourgeoisie and a newly formed educated bureaucratically based petty-bourgeoisie together formed the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) which led the country to independence in 1966. The BDP (a party strongly marked by the cattle owning elite) were democratically supported by the peasants, another sign of pre-colonial social organisation in Botswana surviving into the post-colonial era (Parson, 1981:240-241).

The process to independence for Botswana was, compared to other colonial territories, better planned than most. During the 1950's, with local consultation, a process of constitution formation was begun in Bechuanaland. The first multi-member legislature meeting was held on 20 June 1961 in the High Court building in Lobatse. This was one of the first meetings that represented (only meaning physically looked like) an independent parliamentary session. From 1961 onwards the creation of political parties were encouraged and on 9 March 1965, Seretse Khama became the first Prime minister¹⁰. By October 1965 the Bechuanaland cabinet seemed to be mostly acting without British involvement. On 30 September 1966 the newly named Botswana became a fully independent state (Fawcus, 2000:55,69,186,196).

British colonialism left Botswana a legacy of political stability. It however also left it with very little in terms of economic development. At independence Botswana had only 12 kilometres of paved roads, 22 Botswana university graduates (educated in South Africa) and 100 secondary school graduates (Seidler, 2010:3). The rest of the Botswana economy consisted out of; one abattoir, one meat cannery, one corn mill, one malt mill, two textile plants, one leather tannery, one creamery and one bone meal and fodder plant. Due to an almost complete lack of local economic production,

¹⁰ Khama was not directly voted into power; the prime minister in Botswana is indirectly elected, however it was a popular democratic election that brought him to power (Fawcus, 2000:186).

Botswana in 1966 also relied on British grant-in-aid for 50 per cent of its budgetary requirements (Naranyana *et al*, 2005:20).

Botswana, unlike many other African countries had in many ways retained its pre-colonial form in the modern world. According to Englebert (2000:16), Botswana was one of only ten African countries to reach independence as a state in the same form as the pre-colonial “state” that existed in the territory of the modern state. In other words, it retained its own ‘natural’ sphere of influence. The presidency in Botswana after independence was assumed, with the consent of the population, by the pre-colonial aristocratic families. This made Botswana a modernised “African kingdom” based on free and fair democratic values (Englebert, 2000:14). The new political elites were the large cattle owners and the educated. The educated class were part of the cattle owning class since it was through the wealth of the cattle owners that children from aristocratic families received education to form the new educated class. Thus both the pre-colonial, colonial and the post-colonial elites were one and the same, consisting out of the aristocratic cattle owning class with an historical link to the peasant classes (Parson, 1981:241).

4.3 The Post-colonial Development Trajectory

Due to the fact that Botswana is mostly seen as a successful attempt at state development, the Chazan-framework based on a trajectory of negative state development cannot be applied directly to the case of Botswana (Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, and Stedman 1999:46-68). For this reason Botswana does also not necessarily have a development trajectory that falls into three phases. After doing a review of the literature it was decided to use elections and the time periods between and around them as the phases of development in Botswana as these seem to show the clearest changes in the state over time. The three phases are: from the first election in 1965 to the third election in 1974. This is the time period in which according to Chazan other African governments often experienced centralisation. In Botswana this was the time of the first election dilemma, and the emergence of the first signs of civil society (Chazan *et al*, 1999:46-54; Maundeni, 2005:6-7; Mfundisi, 2005:165). The second phase stretches between 1975 and 1989, thus from just after the third election until just before the sixth. This period which is a time of increasing corruption and negative state development in the Chazan framework, saw the Botswana political

system mature and civil society strengthen (Chazan *et al*, 1999:54-65; Maundeni, 2005:6-7; Mfundisi, 2005:165). The third phase for Botswana is placed between the sixth election of 1989 and the late 1990's and early 2000's. This is a time in Botswana of continued free and fair elections but also with a continuing dominance of the BDP (Maundeni, 2005:6-7; Molomo, 2005:32,40).

4.3.1.1 Phase One, 1965-1974

Botswana by 1965 was a largely homogenous¹¹ rural country very reliant on livestock for its economic wellbeing. In cruel irony it was in many ways similar to Somalia at this time, but it would not long remain this way, Botswana was due to begin its road to economic prosperity (Samatar, 1999:xiii-xiv). Homogenous societies are often more susceptible to democracy and its population composition aided Botswana in its democratic stability (Molutsi & Sebudubudu, 2008:53). The Gross National Product per capita at this time was between US\$77 and US\$80 (Seidler, 2010:4). Some sources set the GDP per capita as low as R45 to R65 (Samatar, 1999:63). Foreign reserves in 1966 were at zero. It was one of the poorest countries in the world. The country had primary education enrolment of 62 833 in 1966. In the same year the secondary school enrolment was 1036. For a country with a population of more than 550 000 at the time, this was, though an improvement from colonial times, rather low (Leith, 2005:13; Samatar, 1999:3). In all a very bleak future seemed to be set out for Botswana.

Seretse Khama, a chieftain heir, had united the Tswana tribes in the 1960's under the BDP. He was not only the heir of the largest tribe, but also the largest cattle owner¹². Khama would be president of Botswana from independence in 1966 until his death in 1980 (Robinson, 2009:1). Even though he was married to a white woman and had been forced to denounce his chieftaincy by Britain as a result, he still represented a clear continuity with the past (Robinson, 2009:10). The BDP included most of the pre-colonial chieftain families creating a unity between the old and new structures of government after independence (Samatar, 1999:6-7). By incorporating the old forms of power and the newly educated, Botswana's post-colonial government had a united

¹¹ There are other ethnic groups in Botswana but the vast majority of the population falls into the Tswana group.

¹² Seretse Khama was the grandson of Chief Khama III who had travelled to Britain to protest Bechuanaland's cession to the British South African Company (Robinson, 2009:2).

and stable leadership with little elite competition. The old elite were cattle owners and thus to some extent businessmen. In 1965 the BDP won a resounding majority of the vote, gathering 81 per cent of all ballots cast in the general election (Seidler, 2010:22). Under a united BDP the Botswana elite were able to collectively strive for development. The 'new' legitimate, stable and united leadership was foremost in developing Botswana (Samatar, 1999:8-9).

Unlike other African countries that followed Africanisation¹³ which led to economic stagnation and decline, Botswana immediately began to implement a culture of professionalism based on merit. This is even more noteworthy due to the fact that as late as 1964, 75 per cent of the senior and middle positions in the public service were still filled by expatriates. This figure would not have changed much by 1966 (Seidler, 2010:25). Post-1966 skilled foreigners were used whilst the government trained a local bureaucracy. Standards were not lowered in an attempt to localise skills. The new Botswana bureaucracy was built on three values: One, only skilled employees were hired, and only success could see one receive a promotion or higher salary. Two, the bureaucracy was made accountable to the political leaders, reinforcing professionalism; and three, the bureaucracy was given autonomy so as to create professional isolation, leading to internal coherence, discipline and stronger integrity (Samatar, 1999:10-11). Botswana's professionalism in governance goes further. Politicians and bureaucrats were given clear divisions of labour and power. Instead of becoming one unit, they cooperated as two separate entities. Government and state remained separate thereby also ensuring a separation between the dominant party and the state (Samatar, 1999:9-11).

Discipline and integrity in the governance system was further protected by an independent Auditor General. The Auditor General ensures that all public funds are accounted for and that it is used in the public good. There is also an Internal Audit Unit in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning that further counters any financial wrongdoings (Molutsi & Sebudubudu, 2008:56). From early on in Botswana's development use was made of careful planning. Funds were established to

¹³ Africanisation is a term used to describe the process of "making" post-colonial African bureaucracies and systems more African. This was a system with two goals; one, remove all expatriates (Europeans) out of positions of power; and two, to fill all positions with local inhabitants, thus black Africans.

create stabilisation reserves and to service public-debt, thereby keeping it low (Good, 2004:500).

The government created the House of Chiefs in the 1960's, but gave it no real power. Instead chiefs were given positions in government that allowed them to allocate resources. However, unlike many other African countries this did not turn into a corrupt practice. Chiefs in Tswana culture had always been the allocators of resources and thus this did not represent a break from the past. It was a position they were used to and not likely to misuse (Robinson, 2009:10). It also provided the government with much legitimacy. The BDP successfully managed the nexus between traditional and modern institutions. This relationship between old and new is of great importance according to Molutsi and Sebudubudu (2008:49-52). According to them the *Mofisa* or rather the traditional client-patron system created cohesion between pre-colonial and post-colonial times. Unlike the patrimonial system that developed in the DRC, the patron-client relationship created (in pre-colonial times) a type of welfare system in which peasants (clients) could make use of the cattle which were owned by the nobility (patrons). The patron was dependent on the client in that it was the client who looked after the patron's cattle and thus determined the wellbeing of the patron's wealth. This created an unequal yet somewhat egalitarian system (Molutsi & Sebudubudu, 2008:50). The modern political elite often still strongly rely on their clients for political support. This creates political accountability, because the patron who gets elected as an Member of Parliament must keep his side of the agreement and vote in parliament according to the needs of his clients (constituency) (Molutsi & Sebudubudu, 2008:51).

The biggest impact on the country during phase one was however the discovery of diamonds. In 1967 geologists from De Beers found a kimberlite pipe at Orapa. For Botswana diamonds were its economic saviour, unlike many other African countries. Diamonds are one of the most valuable but at the same time easily transportable products. For Botswana, a land locked country, it was a stroke of luck to find products that were easily transportable by air (Cook & Sarkin, 2010:462). The BDP in 1965 had promised to nationalise all mineral resources if it was elected. In Tswana culture the resources of the land belonged to everyone. The government entered into an agreement with De Beers from South Africa who would share mine ownership with

the government on a 50/50 basis (Hillbom, 2008:202; Poteete, 2007:550,558). Many scholars believe Botswana was saved from corruption related to mineral wealth due to the fact that the country did not have a mining company to nationalise after independence (Hillbom, 2008:201). Instead the industry in the country was created from scratch by De Beers. The Botswana government tried to mine nickel and copper on its own from 1968 onwards, but the operation was a disaster from the start, proving the importance of the De Beer's partnership. Others that look at Botswana in a negative light claim that the country also suffers from less corruption since the effective mining allows for high enough rents to be generated (Jerven, 2010:90-91). Whatever the reason might be, Botswana discovered and began to extract vast mineral wealth whilst remaining largely uncorrupted. The establishment of Debswana is a clear example of a public-private partnership that has generally worked in the interests of the state as a whole.

In 1966 Botswana's economy still relied on agriculture, with this sector comprising 40 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However by 1971/72 diamond incomes provided the government with 5 per cent of its total revenues. This number would still increase sharply but is still significant since the first mine at Orapa had only opened in 1971 (Jerven, 2010:82; Poteete, 2007:550). With the diamond wealth that slowly began to flow in, through the efforts of the Central Selling Organisation (a producer market cartel run by De Beers), the government was able to increase foreign exchange reserves from nothing in 1966 to US\$75 million in 1976 (Jerven, 2010:90; Poteete, 2007:552). Though this is still a very low number, it was significant for a newly independent state to be building up reserves rather than increasing its debt. Between 1965 and 1973/74 Botswana registered a growth rate of 13 per cent in GDP. And with sound policies the natural wealth of the country was almost never wasted. By the early 1970's the government had constructed 252 public schools with diamond wealth (Poteete, 2007:559).

Even with the new diamond economy being fostered in the 1960's and 1970's, cattle remained an important part of the Botswana economy. The cattle industry is claimed as a part of Botswana's success. Due to the importance of cattle to the elite, the elite always remained tied to the rural areas. When the Botswana Meat Corporation (BMC) was founded it did not act as a parasitic rent seeking agency, taxing the rural

populations excessively as was often the case in other African countries. Rather, possibly even due to elite interests, the BMC was run in a reasonable and economical manner (Robinson, 2009:9-10). The old tradition of tribal lands being used by the community also remained in the independent Botswana. In 1968 the Tribal Land Act was promulgated securing this tradition, but removing the power of dispensation from the chiefs to the Land Boards. In 1975 a process of allocation rights transfer was completed by the issuing of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy which in effect gave government full control over land allocation (Hillbom, 2008:203-204).

By the late 1960's cattle was however declining in importance economically and a drought had reduced the national herd by between 30 and 50 per cent (Samatar, 1999:63). The international consensus before the diamond windfall had been that Botswana would remain dependent on Britain for the foreseeable future. However after successfully increasing income by renegotiating the South African Customs Union and discovering diamonds, prospects seemed to improve. Nonetheless, other states with economic wealth such as Nigeria, Gabon and Venezuela have shown that management is important or otherwise natural resources can become ineffective. In Botswana strong leadership with a combined consciousness of the importance of institution building and sound policies for the developing of a capitalist economy came together and led to economic success (Samatar, 1999:65).

The government of Botswana succeeded strategically by retaining any Protectorate officers that were willing to stay whilst intensely training Batswana in large numbers to take over professional and managerial posts. By using this dual approach the government was able to develop its institutional capacity. Unity and legitimacy ensured that policy-making processes were managed effectively. Further policy making was insulated from society centred groups and bureaucrats of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) were kept as politically free agents able to make sober budgets, plans and monitoring calls. Thus a system of non-political technocrats was put in place (Samatar, 1999:95-96).

With the importance of technocrats, development plans became the driving forces of the Botswana economic initiative. A development plan is a set of quantitative economic targets to be achieved in a given time frame. Botswana strictly uses plans in

economic but also in social development. Plans are used in Botswana because the government stated in 1970, that the resources available are “few compared to the problems”, only very careful planning can be successful (Acquah, 2005:29). National Development Plans allow effective use of resources with priority policies, programmes and projects. It allows for the creation targets which can be evaluated objectively. Government with its development plans allows space for private sector and does not push them out. Planning responds adequately to majority’s needs (Acquah, 2005:33). With development plans, outcomes are based on the reality of available resources, time and capacity. Use is made of consultations with stakeholders, ensured coordinated implementation of various policies, creating favourable conditions for expansion, diversification, dispersion of productive activities of private sector, identifying windows of opportunity and allowing adaptability to the unexpected. National Development Plans ensure that development is consistent with long term objectives, and it provides adequate opportunity of self-evaluation to allow rapid implementation of new or improved policies where failure is found (Acquah, 2005:34). Planning in Botswana is seen as important by the government as they believe it allows the best use of the country’s resources for the benefit of the majority of Batswana.

The policies of the Botswana government seem to have worked; GDP between 1965 and 1969 increased by 10 per cent. Between 1969 and 1974 GDP increased by 22 per cent (Acquah, 2005:31). The economic growth, according to Samatar (1999:3), created widespread multi sectoral employment. Norms of good political and economic governance were also established in this era (Narayana *et al*, 2005:19).

Chazan-framework Summary: If one compares Botswana to the Chazan-framework in phase one, the dissimilarities are very clear. Botswana after independence did not experience the traditional concentration of power. The state did indeed expand and take over roles such as land allocation, but it did this in an inclusive process, always leaving democratic expression open through free and fair elections in 1965, 1969 and 1974 (Mfundisi, 2005:165). The election of 1969 was called a year earlier than needed, as president Seretse Khama wanted to ensure he had legitimacy after his government was accused of all the ills in Botswana at the time. His government won the election but his vice president and minister of development were defeated by a

former chief. Instead of outlawing opposition and creating a one party state, the government introduced electoral reforms preventing retiring chiefs from immediately entering politics and absolving the president from standing for parliamentary elections. This allowed Botswana's democracy to accommodate traditional leaders but to also protect the system against their power (Maundeni, 2005:6-7). Thus unlike the DRC where the MPR was the constitutionalised sole party of the revolution, the BDP acted in accordance with democratic principles. Ethnicity in Botswana did not play a large role, since the minorities were too small to make themselves heard. Thus even if ethnicity became more important for some, it did not have huge damaging effects on the larger political state of Botswana. Throughout phase one, Botswana made use of careful planning, management and effective negotiations to secure the wellbeing of the Botswana economy, by for example entering into an agreement with De Beers in the diamond industry (Good, 2004:500).

Resource wealth was regulated through the bureaucracy, the government and importantly an external company. Unlike other states, as described by Chazan *et al* (1999), Botswana did not become patrimonial and corrupt. It instilled professionalism and a clear independent technocratic bureaucracy, visibly separate from the government. In the sources, there is also no strong reference to any increase in military power in Botswana. With clear legitimacy, the government kept control through electoral support and had no need for using military or police force.

4.3.1.2 Governance in Phase One

Voice and Accountability: Citizens, during phase one, were able to democratically express their views, as shown by the successful democratic elections of 1969. Freedom of association was allowed along with freedom of expression. Where there were problems these were dealt with through consultation and democratic process as shown in constitutional process followed after the 1969 election crisis.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence: There seems to have been little to no chance of violent power transfers during phase one. There were no dangerous attempts at unconstitutional or destabilising actions against the government either.

Government Effectiveness: civil service was clearly independent from the government and political pressure. Policy formation was drafted and implemented with vigour by government as seen in the mining negotiations and economic upturn.

Regulatory Quality: Government in Botswana showed itself capable of implementing beneficial policies and regulations. In the case of the copper and nickel mining this was however less successful. Nonetheless government seems to have continuously worked towards creating broadly beneficial policies. It facilitated the creation of the Auditor-General and organisations such as the Internal Audit Unit in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. These show a willingness to accept policies and regulations that improve regulatory quality from independent or independently operating institutions.

Rule of Law: As shown in the case of dealing with land allocation and electoral difficulties, the government showed itself to be committed to rule of law. Property rights and adherence to the law was carefully maintained by the government.

Control of Corruption/Terrorism: Corruption where found was very low. Government did not face a problem of corruption and transparency remained high.

Even though the data does not allow exact ratings, the view that can be derived from it is that governance in Botswana in phase one was evidently good (Molutsi & Sebudubudu, 2008:56).

4.3.1.3 Development in Phase One

Political Development

Political development measures the progress made in increasing the freedoms to make economic and social choices (Todaro & Smith, 2009:20-22). Political development leads to a higher freedom to choose how progress is to take place and also to higher living standards. Political rights in phase one showed positive development. The electoral process was adapted within democratic rules and results of elections were accepted mostly without objections. Political pluralism was encouraged, and if not encouraged it was definitely not frowned upon. Government in phase one functioned well. Using open market economic policies, corporate assisted development and

National Development Plans that were based on sound ideas of management the governance of the country contributed to positive especially economic results. Freedom of expression, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights were protected through the separating of the government and the bureaucracy, the nationalisation of mineral wealth and the continuation of the communal land use policies. With both political rights and civil liberties showing positive growth, political development in phase one in Botswana can be described as having positive political development.

Economic Development

Economic development for Botswana in phase one was clearly positive. GDP in 1969 increased by 10 per cent and between 1969 and 1974 GDP increased by 22 per cent (Acquah, 2005:31; Poteete, 2007:559). The 50-50 diamond deal with De Beers, seen as one of the most successful of its type in the world also ensured Botswana economic stability for the foreseeable future (Hillbom, 2008:202; Poteete, 2007:550,558). These figures clearly indicate the positive trends in economic development.

Social Development

During phase one Botswana saw a sharp increase in the numbers of Batswana who attended school. During phase one the road system was enlarged and the 12 kilometres of tarred roads would grow to more than 1000 kilometres in 1976. By 1976 the country would also have a completed telephone network (started in phase one), as well as the foundations of a widespread power grid. With an improvement in Botswana's economy the country would also see a decrease in the migrant labour system to South Africa. Unlike other systems as described in the Chazan-framework in phase one, Botswana did not see a collapse of infrastructure. Instead it built infrastructure and improved the plight of its citizens.

4.3.2.1 Phase Two, 1975-1989

During phase two, the state in Botswana did see an elaboration of power. But unlike as described in the Chazan-framework, this elaboration does not refer to any form of increasing autocracy; rather it is the settling of normality. In the years between 1975 and 1989, Botswana matured, with high investment in human resources and

infrastructure development alongside macroeconomic stability economic returns (Leith, 2005:103).

During phase two Botswana continued to experience democratic participation by its population. In some ways the trends in voting patterns do however show that the population became accustomed to seeing the same government in place between 1966 and 1979, and we begin to see the consolidation of a dominant party system. From 1974 to 1989, eligible voter numbers increased from roughly 310 000 to 510 000. The actual numbers registered increased from roughly 240 000 in 1974 to 380 000 in 1989. However, there was a slight drop in the percentage of voters registered, from 77.4 per cent in 1974 to 74.5 per cent in 1989 (Mfundisi, 2005:165). Nonetheless the numbers remain high enough to show acceptance of the system by citizens. The percentage of voters actually casting their votes was low under Seretse Khama, measuring only around 30 per cent voter turnout in 1974. By 1989 voter turnout was at 67 per cent. After the death of Seretse Khama in 1980, there seems to be an increase in voter turnout. The first election after Khama's death saw voter turnout at the 1984 election at 79 per cent, a 49 per cent increase from 1974. This might be due to the fact that many saw Seretse Khama more as their chief than a president. Quett Masire took over the presidency after the death of Khama. Masire was Khama's chosen successor (Robinson, 2009:1). During the 1980's the cattle and chiefly elites likewise remained in power. In the year between 1966 and 1978, 57 per cent of Members of Parliament were also large scale cattle farmers (Poteete, 2007:557). The important trend to notice though is the clear continuation of democracy and an increase in voter turnout, also the visible continuation of Tswana tradition (Mfundisi, 2005:165). Participatory democracy which is traditionally strong in Botswana and in Tswana culture was thus continued through phase two (Narayana, 2005:21).

During phase two Botswana continued its road to economic self-governance. In 1976 the Pula was introduced in Botswana. This was the first local currency. Up until this time Botswana had been using the South African Rand. This had created difficulties with macro-economic management (Samatar, 1999:64). The Pula became a currency in its own right in 1980, no longer being tied to the Rand (Jerven, 2010:92). The economy was further bolstered by making use of mineral wealth for the improving of the economy. Issues such as the delivery of water, health and education to rural areas

were often covered with aid money especially from Scandinavian countries (Samatar, 1999:74). One very interesting trend is employment of Professional Officers at the MFDP. Out of 25 executive and higher employees in the Department of Economic Affairs, only 5 were local Batswana by 1978. At the department of Financial Affairs out of 19, only 6 were local (Samatar, 1999:74). In 1977, 33 per cent of all senior and middle management positions in the public service were still filled with expatriates. This is a drop of 44 per cent from 1964, but still high for a country 11 years into independence (Seidler, 2010:25). This shows a very strong trend of keeping to only appointing those that are best qualified. Botswana “acquired” many skilled expatriates by requesting the Peace Corps to send Peace Corps volunteers to Botswana. Once there they were used in all positions, even ministerial¹⁴ (Samatar, 1999:87).

Economically the years between 1974 and 1989 saw Botswana prosper. GDP grew by 11 per cent annually between 1973/1974 and 1978/1979 (Jerven, 2010:82). Total Gross National Product (GNP) in the period 1980 to 1991 for example increased by 9.3 per cent annually (Samatar, 1999:2). GNP measured between 1980 and 1989 shows an even higher GNP growth rate at 13 per cent per year (Hillbom, 2008:191). In the 1966-1971 era Botswana’s exports as percentage of GDP was 25 per cent, and its imports were 57 per cent. After the diamond wealth began to be turned into capital, in the era 1972-1976, exports increased to 43 per cent, with imports down a little to 54 per cent. In the 1982-1986 time period exports increased to 58 per cent, two per cent higher than the imports at 56 per cent of GDP (Harvey & Lewis, 1990:39). 90 per cent of economic growth in the late 1970’s was as a result of government spending, mining, trading and finance. Government also began to rely more heavily on mining, with mining bringing in 36 per cent of government revenues in 1979/1980 (Jerven, 2010:82).

In 1972/1973 Botswana ceased to receive a grant-in-aid from the British government as it was no longer needed to balance the budget. In the same year two finance institutions were created, the Revenue Stabilisation Fund (RSF), and the Public Debt Service Fund (PDSF). Both of these funds were to invest in appropriate domestic

¹⁴ The Peace Corps is an United States government organization that sends students and experts from the United States to developing nations (Peace Corps, 2011). In Botswana their expertise was used by the Botswana government to assist in the training of local Batswana (Samatar, 1999:87).

development ventures. The RSF was seen as a destination for short term surplus funds. The PDSF was for payments of foreign loans and domestic repayments. The PDSF however became the source of finance for most parastatal enterprises. In 1987 the RSF and PDSF combined had lend out 499 million Pula, compared to the national external debt of the government of 479 million Pula (Harvey & Lewis, 1990:53-54). Government also successfully increased foreign exchange reserves. By 1980 Botswana had US\$344million in exchange reserves, up from US\$75million in 1976. In 1985 the figure increased to US\$748million and in 1990 it stood at US\$3331million, up by roughly 970 per cent in one decade (Poteete, 2007:552).

By 1976 Botswana no longer had the problems associated with a fledgling state. It had achieved financial independence, it was on the way to having a full national currency and it had a working central bank. Physical and social infrastructure had been built throughout the country. The policy of maximising mining and then reinvesting profits into infrastructure and social services were also by now paying dividends with economic progress. The government spent 40 per cent of GDP on primarily infrastructure and human development, a figure comparable to Norway at the same time (Hillbom, 2008:207). By this time however it also began to show that the inequality of Botswana was not going to just fade away. Employment opportunities for example were not being created fast enough for the growing population (Harvey & Lewis, 1990:55). This problem was one found across the African continent and in this case Botswana was not unique. From the 1980's onwards it became ever harder to create equality by reversing underdevelopment (Samatar, 1999:8).

The Botswana government was nonetheless very precise when dealing with the economy and public enterprise; a trend that continued and became institutionalised during phase two. Operation in public enterprises was regulated with five main 'values': One, a clear mandate was created for every enterprise, preventing any unauthorised actions that could cause corruption or waste; two, management goes to qualified individuals with professional freedom, this keeps parastatals economically competitive and reduces corruption; three, government focussed on key sectors avoiding overstretching itself, this prevents a "bogged-down" bureaucratic system; four, public enterprises directed the economy, but on a clear commercial basis; and lastly, five, government avoided operating sectors that entrepreneurs could easily

manage (except for livestock and some other strategic sectors) (Samatar, 1999:11). Sound economic policies such as this allowed the Botswana government to always have run a budget surplus except for the 1981/1982 year (Narayana *et al*, 2005:21).

Chazan-framework Summary: The State in Botswana did expand during phase two. However the expansion was not based on a patrimonial need to create more government positions and it expanded together with the encouragement of a market economy. In contrast it was created out of need, such as the creation of the RSF and PDSF. Government and managerial positions were still continuously staffed only by qualified individuals even when this meant that the majority of a department would be expatriates. Government effectiveness and economic progress continued during phase two in Botswana. Parastatals were managed by non-political educated professionals who ensured that companies remained on their targets and keep to their mandates. The interests of both the political elite and general population was continually served with economic growth and investment in services. State legitimacy remained high even though inequality became more visible. Nevertheless, Botswana continued to grow its democracy and economy.

4.3.2.2 Governance in Phase Two

Voice and Accountability: Free and fair elections were still held in phase two. Freedom of association and the forming of opposition parties and groups were also still allowed. Yet the growing unemployment question, the continuous overlooking of minorities and their plight and the lack of choice in president remained a detractor for voice and accountability. The fact that the president was not elected directly should nonetheless not be overstated as it is a cultural phenomenon to some extent.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence: There was no risk of unconstitutional transfers of power in phase two and there were no serious instances of political violence. The presidential death and initiation of a new president did not create any significant instability.

Government Effectiveness: Government continued to implement sound policies such as the PDSF and public services were continuously extended further. The civil service remained independent and parastatals also benefited from the government's and

bureaucracy's professionalism. Both government and its institutions remained committed to sound policy implementation.

Regulatory Quality: With government's clear policy of remaining out of the areas in economics where entrepreneurs would fare better, but whilst supporting business through infrastructure and loans government created a positive growth environment with effectively implemented policies.

Rule of Law: There was clear adherence to law. The government respected the limits of its power in terms of the government/state and government/entrepreneur divide.

Control of Corruption/Terrorism: Corruption in Botswana in phase two was insignificant and no cases of terrorism occurred.

When considering the six indicators for governance a positive trend is once more clearly visible and governance for phase two can be seen to have been good.

4.3.2.3 Development in Phase Two

Political Development

The electoral process in phase two remained open, free, fair and democratic. Political pluralism was allowed with opposition parties and political participation in the era increasing, showing political development. However the fact that the opposition remained insignificant in phase two could show some lack of democratic values such as competition within homogenous groups, or suppression of minorities. Botswana in phase two had freedom of expression and belief. People were free to organise into groups. Individual and personal autonomy was respected in terms of what the majority decided in elections. Again however the minority was not visible. Nonetheless, with both political rights and civil liberties showing increased growth, political development in this era remained positive, even if it is not very competitive or inclusive. Yet we are beginning to see the impact of a dominant party system.

Economic Development

The Botswana economy in phase two experienced positive economic development. GDP and GNP each grew by roughly 10 per cent per annum for the decade between

1980 and 1990. There were some signs of economic problems such as unemployment and inequality that were emerging but these were not large enough to influence the strong economic growth figures.

Social Development

Social development in phase two increased and definitely saw positive growth with enormous percentages of GDP being invested in services and human capital. Education, healthcare and other services provided by government benefited from government spending, speeding up social development.

4.3.3.1 Phase Three, 1989-

Botswana in phase three seems to have continued the stable democratic political system also seen in phase one and two. Some scholars believe that the succession rules of the modern Botswana resemble that of the traditional Tswana culture. In Tswana culture there is a saying, *kgosi ke kgosi katswetswe*, a chief is a chief by right of birth (Maundeni, 2005b:81). Chiefs were never elected and in modern Botswana this tradition is seen as acceptable when applied to politics when looked at voter apathy. Voters do not mind that they do not elect the president directly. In Botswana today the hereditary royal family line has been replaced by the elected representatives in the parliament. However the only competition takes place amongst the elected representatives without the need for voter consent (Maundeni, 2005b:85). In actual fact MPs also do not elect a president, they sign a document before elections (and thus before they are in power) stating that they vote for the party's choice of president. This means that the president of the party with the most electoral votes automatically becomes president. The president also never stands for election in any constituency, preliminary or presidential race; rather he inherits the gains of the winning party. Thus in this fashion, President Festus Mogae who took over from Masire never stood for constituency elections (Maundeni, 2005b:85-86).

Masire, by a set of constitutional provisions implemented in 1998, was empowered to select his own vice president who would automatically succeed him if he retired. Thus when Masire retired in 1998, Mogae automatically became president (Maundeni, 2005:86-87). Botswana as a result had a less democratic system without direct presidential elections but democracy continued to operate without real disturbance.

The economy of Botswana in phase three showed continued growth and success. By 1996 GNP per capita was at US\$1,800, this was up from roughly US\$80 in 1966. By 2006 GNP per capita would have increased to US\$5,900, making Botswana an upper-middle income country (Hillbom, 2008:192). The economy also supported 224 000 jobs by 1992, up from only 25000 in 1973 (Samatar, 1999:3). Agriculture as a percentage of GDP, had dropped from 40 per cent in 1966 to only 5 per cent in 1993 (Jerven, 2010:90). This shows that the economy was maturing. In the total expanse of independence, Botswana maintained a GDP increase of 7 per cent per year (Leith, 2005:4). Inflation had never been a problem in Botswana, but in the 1990's inflation was further reduced; after a peak at above 15 per cent in 1992, inflation was reduced to around 8 per cent between 1997 and 1999 (Leith, 2005:105). This showed the ability of Botswana to effectively implement macro-economic policy; stabilising and reducing inflation to acceptable levels. In the decade leading up to 1992, Botswana had a growth rate of 8.4 per cent, which was the highest in the world for a developing country (Good, 2004:499). Foreign reserves were also enlarged during the 1990's. The US\$3331million reserves in 1990 were increased to US\$4695million by 1995 and to US\$6317million in 2000. This shows sound economic management (Poteete, 2007:552)

Education in Botswana showed clear progress in phase three. Primary school enrolment by 1994 was at 301,370 (up from 62,833 in 1966), secondary school enrolment was at 99,560 (up from 1036 in 1966) and university enrolment was at 4533 (in 1966 Botswana only had 22 university graduates) (Samatar, 1999:3). By 2008, in time a bit beyond the scope of this research, literacy in Botswana was at 81 per cent and 5 per cent of the population had tertiary educations. This shows that Botswana through phase one, two and continuing in phase three was making a large improvement in the education of the Botswana population (Hillbom, 2008:207).

By the 1990s even though there were a few more cases of corruption Botswana was still able to keep corruption in general very low, being one of the world's 35 least corrupt countries. In 1994 the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) was formed. Since their creation they have mainly dealt with petty corruption cases. Their work has led to the conviction and jailing of a former General Manager

of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Fund (MVIF), a former Director of Roads and a former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Lands. Botswana has a zero tolerance policy on corruption as it is seen as a counter to development (Malutsi & Sebudubudu, 2008:57). Disciplined and legitimate political leadership of the dominant class led to the developing of capacity in ensuring public resources and power was never (or as little as possible) used for personal gain. Disciplined and purposive state guidance of the economy led to sustained growth. Botswana had managed external influences such as De Beers superbly to generate maximised gains (Naranya, 2005:21; Samatar, 1999:12). In the field of medicine Botswana increased the number of doctors per 100,000 from 15 in 1980 to 30.2 in 2000, a doubling in the figure (Poteete, 2007:560). Education, investment and sound policy was generating positive results.

4.3.3.1.1 The Critics

Botswana by the late 1990's was in general benefiting from norms of good political and economic governance that had been established at independence (Narayana, 2005:19). There were nonetheless clear problems; high inequality, high unemployment, over reliance on non-renewables and very high HIV/Aids numbers. These showed that Botswana still had room for improvement (Narayana, 2005:22). Botswana had also failed to address problems arising with representation for the local San people, showing that its democracy was at times unresponsive to minorities and their needs (Hillbom, 2009:193). A strong reliance on consensus building in Botswana governance allows the homogenous Tswana majority to create unchallenged traditions (of the majority) (Jerven, 2010:89).

Over reliance on diamonds as a non-renewable resource is also clear when looking at 1993 figures, by 2003 diamonds represented 70 per cent of exports, 50 per cent of government revenues and a total of 30 per cent of GDP, making Botswana over reliant on diamonds (Hillbom, 2008:202). Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedi (2006) wrote an article in which they summarise Botswana's negative aspects. According to them, even though poverty dropped from 59 per cent in 1986 to 30 per cent in 2003 (down from 36 per cent in 2001), the poverty rate remains too high for a country as rich in diamonds as Botswana. They claim that if one looks at these figures and also at the rising unemployment which was at 24 per cent by 2003, then it is possible to assume that the government is not responsive enough to the needs of the majority. This in turn

shows that the lack of parliamentary opposition cannot solely be based on general happiness in the population but is possibly pointing to a lack of democratic governance and real democratic values in society in general (Sebudubudu & Osei-Hwedi, 2006: 50). Even though one cannot claim that Botswana is completely lacking in democratic governance, Sebudubudu & Osei-Hwedi, make a valid observation. Botswana is a good example in Africa, but it should not be exaggerated.

The diamond wealth in Botswana has also been in a negative light internationally in recent years. The Botswana government was accused of removing San people, indigenous to Botswana, out of certain areas so that these areas could be exploited for economic gains. This has led to some people claiming that Botswana's diamonds are in a sense conflict diamonds and should be boycotted. The Botswana government said that people who complained about the San's removal were racist and that these people only wanted the San to remain "where they are to chase wild life and wear hides". The Botswana opposition parties joined the fray and made even wilder anti-western remarks. The poor treatment of the San and the spectacle created by the government afterwards in using terms such as "racist whites" have reflected very poorly on the Botswana government (Taylor & Mokhawa, 2003:280-281).

Good (2004) further sketches a dark picture of Botswana. According to his article the high reputation of good government in Botswana has been crumbling since 1991 with the revealing of corruption in the government in organisations such as the National Development Bank and the Botswana Housing Corporation. Good argues that these are not necessarily new issues and that they developed over time but were not investigated due to lack of full transparency in the past (Good, 2004:500-501). He continues to list a range of cases of corruption, some by top officials. Elite predominance in the system is thought to be one of the main problems leading to corruption. Even though corruption has clearly not spread too greatly in Botswana, it is evident that corruption is a higher risk during phase three (and in the present) than in the past. The professionalism and discipline of the financial and bureaucratic system needs to be re-established if Botswana is to keep its good name (Good, 2004:521).

Elite politics in Botswana is also strongly felt in the powerful post of president. Presidents in Botswana have not been directly elected since the constitutional change in October 1972 which cancelled constituency elections for the president. It is claimed this was due to Seretse Khama's personal dislike of constituency politics. And it was indeed a step in the direction of autocracy (Good & Taylor, 2006:53). The elite in Botswana (in the BDP) also do not always submit to the law. It was Seretse Khama who banned chiefs from standing for public election for five years after retirement (due to his vice-president's inability to win in his constituency), however when Ian Khama became vice-president, he remained the Paramount Chief of the Bamangwato. In this case the constitution was ignored (Good & Taylor, 2006:53). In other cases of undemocratic behaviour, a special provision for the nomination of four 'specially elected' MPs, designed to include weak communities into decision making, has been blatantly misused by the BDP to get BDP members back into parliament who have been rejected by their constituencies. These un-elected members (who lost their elections) have even been included into cabinet (Good & Taylor, 2006:54). These cases show that Botswana might not be openly corrupt, but that the elite are guilty of undemocratic actions.

Chazan-framework Summary: By phase three, Botswana had had no coups, no threats of secession and low corrupt leadership, compared to the DRC which by the 1990's was already failing, with a corrupt state, and corrupt and ineffective bureaucratic structures (Nest, Grignon & Kisangani, 2006:18-24; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:196-198; Robinson, 2009:1). With elections continuing and no large cases of political unrest to be seen, the government of Botswana seems to have retained the trust of the majority of the population. Government did not partake in excessive expansion and budgetary expenses were based on sound financial decisions. Public offices were also clearly still seen as legitimate with no wide opposition being raised with the making of the president into an even less public responsive position. The Botswana economy in phase three was not dwindling and budgetary surpluses could be retained. In contrast, the DRC in phase three, as shown in chapter 3, was suffering from a collapsing economy and by 1994 the formal economy had all but ceased to exist. The DRC state also had to use what little power it had left to suppress the population and opposition with military force. In Botswana there was no comparable violent opposition, and no state wide spread violence needed to be used by the elite to keep control of the

democratic state. The state in Botswana faced real challenges such as minority discrimination and high levels of HIV/Aids, but it remained stable (Nest, Grignon & Kisangani, 2006:18-24; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:196-198; Robinson, 2009:1).

4.3.3.2 Governance in Phase Three

The WGI rates the six governance indicators on a score between -2.5 and +2.5. A score of -2.5 is very poor governance and a score of +2.5 is very good governance (World Bank Group, 2011). The figures for the DRC for the same period is listed in brackets after each score received by Botswana. The six indicators for 1996 for Botswana rate as follows:

Voice and Accountability	: 0.81 (-1.63)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence	: 0.74 (-1.87)
Government Effectiveness	: 0.26 (-1.54)
Regulatory Quality	: 0.86 (-2.33)
Rule of Law	: 0.61 (-2.31)
Control of Corruption/Terrorism	: 0.52 (-2.49)

These figures show that Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption/Terrorism are all rated as good. Government Effectiveness is also rated as good, but to a lesser extent. However, the WGI also provide a percentage indicating the standing of the country compared to others for each rating. If the percentage is zero, the country is the worst in the world (or equally terrible as others that are rated the worst with it internationally). If the percentage is 100, the country is the best in the world for that indicator. In this rating Government Effectiveness along with Rule of Law are the lowest ratings for Botswana, with 62.1 and 67.6 respectively. This figure is nonetheless high enough to still be seen as some of the better examples in the world. For this reason a lower WGI Government Effectiveness rating does not diminish the fact that Botswana can be classified as having had good governance in phase three. When one compares the figures for Botswana and the DRC the contrast is staggering. Where Botswana scored lowest in Government effectiveness at 62.1, the DRC's highest score was for Voice and Accountability at 6.2, a very low number indicating a

very poor rating. For interest sake, the DRC scored a zero for Rule of Law, indicating it was the worst in the world in that category for 1996 (World Bank Group, 2011).

4.3.3.3 Development in Phase Three

Political Development

The Freedom House, Freedom in the World survey, rate countries based on political right and civil liberties. Each country is then assigned a score based on certain indicators for the variables. Countries with scores of between 1.0 and 2.5 are rated as “Free”, between 3.0 and 5.0 as “Partly Free” and those between 5.5 and 7.0 as “Not Free”. Based on the data thus far presented this research would rate Botswana in phase three as free, with positive political development. Freedom house rates Botswana in 2002 as “Free”, with Political Rights and Civil liberties receiving a rating of 2. This rating supports the trajectory tracked by the research in Botswana up to this time (Freedom House, 2002a). The DRC in contrast was rated as “Not Free” in 2001 with Political Rights receiving a 7 and with Civil liberties being rated as 6 (Freedom House, 2002b).

Economic Development

In phase three the economy was growing with year on year increases in GDP. GNP was also rising throughout the 1990’s. Jobs were being created and macro-economic management such as inflation control was used effectively. With sound management and increases in the value of the economy, Economic Development in phase three is rated as positive. The Gross Domestic Product of the DRC (then Zaire) in contrast declined by 7.2 per cent in 1991, 12,3 per cent in 1992 and 10,4 per cent in 1993. Inflation for this period also exceeded 20 000 per cent in the DRC (Clark, 1998:112).

Social Development

Social development for this era was positive. The Human Development Index (HDI) rating, that measures both economic and social development, but with a focus on individuals rose throughout the 1990’s. The fact that the HDI focuses on individuals allows us to see social development by looking at the single units that make up a society, the individuals. The HDI rates countries and then assigns a number between 1 and zero. Zero is the lowest and represents very low social development, with 1 being the highest showing strong social (human) development. In 1990 Botswana received a

rating of 0.576. This rating is higher than the world average of 0.526 at the same time, and much higher than the African average of 0.354 for 1990 (UNDP, 2011a). Between 1990 and 2000 the HDI for the DRC fell from 0.261 to 0.201, much lower than Botswana's rating and also below the African average (UNDP, 2011b). By 2000, the HDI rating for Botswana measured higher than in 1990 at 0.572. The world average at this time was 0.57. Thus Botswana showed a positive social development trend, even though the rest of the world was now much closer to the Botswana figure. This might show a case of progress, but slowed down progress, which could actually be an indication of a negative movement taking effect. However, in the African context Botswana figures are very high. African countries in 2000 were given an average HDI rating of 0.315, 0.039 lower than in 1990 (UNDP, 2011a). Thus Botswana in the 1990's was in a general area of lowering HDI, whilst it continued to have a positive HDI. This indicates, as argued by the research, positive social development in Botswana during phase three.

4.4 Conclusion

Botswana can be seen as a success in state development; this becomes very evident when compared to the DRC. Botswana does have its negatives and these should not be underestimated. Unresponsiveness to minorities may indicate a lack of true democratisation in a mostly homogenous society. There is also a threat of the executive being out of touch with the citizens in the country since they are not directly elected and have their own interests due to the elite class they belong to. However Botswana has shown that its leadership is willing to make the decisions that safeguard the general population. Corruption is kept at a low and oversight mechanisms are allowed and empowered to operate at maximum efficiency. Organisations such as the DCEC contribute to this and they are willing to prosecute or investigate even politically connected individuals. The economy of Botswana has mostly seen positive growth, democratic free and fair elections are held regularly and the country is generally stable. Governance in Botswana has been good in all of the three phases as portrayed by the Chazan-framework. Political, economic and social development has also been positive for all three the phases.

Chapter 5: Research Overview

5.1.1 Introduction

The research presented two cases of state development in Africa. In the following chapter an overview of the research will be given, along with a summary of the key findings of the comparative analysis of Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC¹⁵) and Botswana. Both of the cases followed different trajectories of development and were governed in very different ways making for an interesting comparison. In general the DRC has been shown to have suffered from poor governance and slow to negative growth, compared to Botswana which benefited from good governance and enjoyed positive economic growth and social development. Thus, this study made use of most-dissimilar comparative cases with the DRC accounting for poor governance and Botswana accounting for good governance.

It should be stated that this study is aware of the fact that Botswana cannot be seen as a perfect example to be followed by all states and that the country does suffer from some forms of less effective and at times even corrupt governance. However this does not deter from the fact that Botswana, as an African state, does have a relatively good record in governance and has experienced positive state development.

5.1.2 Framework, Methodology, Theory and Chapter Overview

The research question, which guided this study was:

What is the influence and effect, of state institution formation and policy implementation (governance) by governments, on state development in terms of economical-, political- and social development?

The question was answered using a comparative analysis of two case studies: Botswana and Zaire/DRC.

5.1.2.1 Theoretical Framework

The analytical framework used in this study was based on the work of Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild and Stedman (1999). In the research this framework is referred

¹⁵ In this chapter the abbreviation DRC refers to all the names of the territory of modern DRC no matter the time in question. Thus instead of talking about Zaire in the 1980's, the DRC was rather used

to as the Chazan-framework. The Chazan-framework divides the time after the decolonisation of Africa into three periods. Each period has an overarching theme along with general occurrences. The Chazan-framework was especially useful for this particular study since the two main variables of the study were governance and development and the Chazan-framework looks at both governance changes in each phase as well as at changes that are development related. This study is also a historic overview and the Chazan-framework accommodated this by being retrospective in its analysis. We will now briefly review the three phases of the Chazan-framework.

Phase one: The overarching theme for phase one was the seeming predisposition of African states to experience a concentration of political power after independence. Phase one occurred in the period directly after the gaining of independence by African states; mainly in the 1950s and the 1960s. The phases in the Chazan-framework are not exclusively set to certain times and some variation does occur. For this reason phase one can still continue in the 1970s for example after starting in the 1960s as was the case with the DRC. During phase one African governments experienced independent rule for the first time after colonialism, or for the first time in history in the case of newly formed states (thus areas that were not collectively governed before colonialism).

Apart from centralisation, the first indications of partimoniaism emerged during phase one. This process ultimately distances the government (and the state) from the citizenry. Thus it was a time that saw the beginning of poor governance and also the beginning of economic and developmental exclusion of the majority of African populations.

Phase two: The main characteristic or overarching theme for phase two is the elaboration of state power. Phase two falls into the time period of the 1960s and 1970s, and sometimes into the 1980s. Phase two saw the African state overextend itself and in doing so begin to lose its effectiveness. The African bureaucracy grew rapidly during these decades. During the 1960s it grew at an average of 7 per cent per year. By the 1970s, approximately 60 per cent of all wage earners were state employees and in the 1980s, 50 per cent of state expenditure went to salaries for state employees (Chazan *et al*, 1999:55). This system created a state in which a new

empowered class, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, emerged dominant. These people were in charge of the state and had very different needs than the people in whose name they were supposed to govern. Thus this phase saw poor governance and further decline in development for the majority of the population.

Phase three: The third phase is known for the reconsideration of state power according to the Chazan-framework. This reconsideration was not necessarily due to a democratic turn of heart by the elite but due to signs of state failure and state collapse. Reforms were largely attempts by the elite to remain in power, not to truly begin sharing power. Phase three took place during the 1970s and 1980s and in other areas during the 1980s and 1990s. By phase three the government had lost the trust of the population and thus legitimacy. Its structures were overstaffed and very cost intensive. By over consuming on taxes in salaries the capacity of the government and state was further reduced and the state became almost redundant. By phase three the state was in real danger of collapse, as happened in the case of the DRC.

5.1.2.2 Key concepts

The two main variables used in this research were governance and development. Governance being the independent variable and development the dependent variable. The research assumed that the state was still in pre-eminence in the current world. Based on this assumption the research used the two most-dissimilar case studies and followed their trajectories in governance and in development through the three phases of the Chazan-framework.

Good governance in the research was defined as:

a governance style that promotes the creation of strong, open, equal and free political and economic institutions. It supports the maintenance of checks and balances on power, it is anti-corruption geared and improves and maintains the delivery of services normally associated with state governments (Ikome, 2007:147-148).

Governance was measured using the World Bank's indicators of governance.

This study further defined development as:

the political, economic and social progress made in a state by increasing the delivery of public goods and services, increasing life expectancy and by increasing the economic and political choice of its citizens and inhabitants.

Development was measured in terms of political, economic and social development. Phase one and two were mostly qualitatively analysed based on the extensive use of literary sources, whilst phase three was rated by Freedom House for political development, economic development was rated by analysing economic data such as unemployment, Gross Domestic Product, debt and trade figures and social development was measured by making use of the ratings provided by Human Development Index. We now turn to the findings of the research.

5.2 Analysis of Research

This section will provide a summary of the comparison of the DRC, and Botswana. The results of the study for the DRC and Botswana are visually represented in two tables (*table 5.1 and table 5.2*) at the beginning of each section on each of the case studies respectively. The top row indicates what each column is measuring, starting from left to right with: first, phases of the Chazan-framework; second, governance, measured as poor or good; third, political development, measured as positive, negative or neutral (this remains the same for all development measurements); four, economic development; five, social development; and six, the Chazan-framework, this is rated as to be similar to the Chazan framework with a “Yes” and dissimilar with a “No”.

5.2.1 The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Phases	Governance	Political	Economic	Social	Chazan
Phase 1	Poor	Neutral	Negative	Negative	Yes
Phase 2	Poor	Negative	Negative	Negative	Yes
Phase 3	Poor	Negative	Negative	Negative	Yes

Table 1 Summary of the DRC

The Democratic Republic of the Congo was selected as a case in the comparative study as it was expected that it would be a good example of a state that followed a

trajectory which led to state failure. Once the DRC had been analysed it became clear that this presumption was justified. The DRC provides this study with a case that can be seen as something close to being a worst case scenario. The case study clearly showed the appropriateness and accuracy of the Chazan-framework illustrating an example of a state descending into a spiral of poor governance and negative economic growth after decolonisation. Looking at table 5.1 we note that the DRC received a “Yes” in the Chazan column in all three phases, thus it followed the trajectory described by the Chazan-framework almost exactly .

5.2.2 Botswana

Phases	Governance	Political	Economic	Social	Chazan
Phase 1	Good	Positive	Positive	Positive	No
Phase 2	Good	Positive	Positive	Positive	No
Phase 3	Good	Positive	Positive	Positive	No

Table 2 Summary of Botswana

Botswana was selected as a case as it differed significantly from the DRC. Where the DRC was considered to be partly free, Botswana is hailed as a liberal democracy by Freedom House. Where the DRC experienced economic stagnation and decline, Botswana experienced development and modernisation. If one looks at the result in the Chazan column Botswana never fitted into the Chazan-framework and is always rated as “No”.

The results for Botswana are in complete contrast to that of the DRC in almost every category. In all phases Botswana experienced good governance and in all phases the DRC experienced poor governance. Except for neutral political development in phase one, the DRC also contrasts with Botswana by experiencing negative development in all development categories over all three phases, compared to Botswana’s results which show positive development in all phases in all categories. The results of the study show that in the case of the DRC, where governance was poor, development would most likely also be poor. In the case of Botswana we find that positive

development and good governance were also coexistent. We will now compare how different trajectories of development played out in the two case studies.

5.2.3 Comparison of Case studies

During phase one, immediately after independence Botswana began a process in which it tried to instil professionalism in its bureaucracy. It allowed expatriates to remain in the country and as civil servants, since Botswana saw these individuals as crucial in transferring knowledge to local Botswana. In complete contrast, the DRC after independence began a process of Africanisation. In this process, the bureaucracy was emptied of foreign civil servants and all positions were filled by local Africans, skilled or not. This seems to indicate two very dissimilar governance styles. The reasons for the differences are not evident and a range of possible reasons can be surmised. The DRC and Botswana have, for example, two very different experiences of colonialism; where Botswana was mostly left untouched by the British, the DRC was submitted to human rights abuses and other crimes by the Belgian colonisers, possibly leading to a wish to be rid of them. The DRC also did not share a pre- to post-colonial social link as was the case of elites and peasants in Botswana. Botswana was thus able to manage the nexus between traditional and modern systems of governance very well. In contrast the main aim of the government in the DRC was to gain maximum direct control over its territory.

The traditional relationships in Botswana continued and a symbiotic patron client relationship developed based on a range of mutual benefits such as land usage, electoral support, cattle, and implementation of laws. Classes in society could be seen to do what is good for other classes as this then indirectly or even directly led to personal gains, almost like a political “invisible hand”. As with Adam Smith’s example, the baker does not bake bread because he likes baking bread, but because he gets money for doing so. Politicians in Botswana who wanted power needed the support of the electorate, possibly stimulating the implementation of policies in some areas as a means to satisfy populations, thus increasing electoral support, and ability to wield power. The elite also needed to look after the interest of the peasants, since the elite were still attached to the land through their cattle, but dependent on the peasants to care for the cattle. The elites’ wealth was in the hands of the peasants.

In the DRC a completely different system emerged. After independence, the new government of Mobutu sought to gain complete control of the DRC territory. He did this through centralising power as well as through more devious means such as the public executions of rivals, constitutional changes banning opposition forces and the destruction of local authorities, the nationalisation of foreign investment and even through military attack where deemed necessary. These actions led to a system that did not have many roots in traditional power systems from the pre-colonial Congo. It also led to the loss of professionalism and expertise, since the people who at the time knew how to manage the DRC bureaucracy were removed. The DRC went through a process of impedance, during which the state turned the raising of opposition voices into acts of treason. The creation of opposition groups was limited and what could be said in opposition was restricted. Accordingly the DRC also followed the process of facilitation during which the Mobutu regime took control of the administration by centralising authority and employing loyal party members in most state positions. Due to limited delivery and a decline in legitimacy, the regime also increased the coercive apparatus such as the police and military strength.

The choices made by Botswana and the DRC after independence placed them on development trajectories that were in almost full contrast. Botswana for example began to build up foreign reserves, whilst the DRC began to build its system of patrimonialism which in time would lead to the exploitation of the population. Mobutu created a patrimonial system with himself at the apex of it. He enlarged the bureaucracy so that he could allow loyal allies and “subjects” to share in the benefits of the state. Officials were given the power to exploit the population as rewards for loyalty to Mobutu. Where Mobutu in the early 1970s allowed state control of parastatals with politically appointed managers, Botswana was in a public-private partnership with De Beers. Where Botswana experienced a continuous change in leadership, in terms of the president and cabinet, the DRC was ruled as a personal fiefdom of Mobutu. The system in the DRC led to corruption, economic stagnation and increased international debt. In Botswana foreign reserves were ever increasing and corruption was kept at a minimum.

In Botswana strong and responsible leadership, the acceptance of institution building, empowering these institutions with sound policies and keeping them non-political

with a clear separation between state and government in a capitalist economy led to development. In the DRC oppressive leadership based on personal gain led to an increase in violence and the size of the military. Where Botswana had a weak military and an improving democracy, the DRC had a relatively strong military but no real democracy. In the DRC this began to cause an increase in government insecurity and an inability to follow coherent policies as seen in first the implementation and then the cancelation of Radicalisation.

During phase two the state in the DRC increased in size due to pressure on the executive. The government needed to continuously act as the facilitator for patrimonialism and the maintenance of control through this network by Mobutu. Thus the government grew due to increased corruption. In Botswana the government was also growing, but this was due to the need for more institutions that could oversee the growing economy. These institutions were created and run in a professional and non-political manner. Both cases experienced government and state growth but due to completely different reasons. One key difference in the two systems was the alienating of the general population of the DRC by the Mobutu regime. Botswana, intended or unintended, was experiencing progress benefiting both the elite and the general population, however in the DRC a parasitic bureaucracy and president was in control of the state.

By the 1990's (phase three) the development trajectory of the DRC had led it to the point of collapse. The state was corrupt, bankrupt and failing. It was threatened by possible coups, and politicians, as described by the Chazan-framework, were trying to renegotiate the government, but unwilling to cede power. In Botswana the state was not at risk. There were no threats of violent takeovers and the state still maintained its legitimacy. Botswana was still spending its income on clearly budgeted programs. The DRC in contrast lacked the funds for even the most basic public services.

At the time where this research ends, the DRC's trajectory during all three phases is characterised by poor governance and overwhelmingly negative development. This all culminates in state collapse, civil war, local uprisings, foreign invasion and a complete loss of state legitimacy by the late 1990's. In comparison, Botswana is characterised by positive development and good governance for all three phases. By

the 1990's some new problems emerged for Botswana, such as HIV-Aids and corruption. The Botswana state's reaction to Aids, empowered through economic prosperity, is however strong and the disease does not pose a threat to its stability during the scope of the current research. And even though corruption begins to become visible, it does not threaten the survival of the Botswana state, which reacts to this threat by creating non-political institutions for overseeing government. Botswana by the late 1990's is wealthier than it was at the beginning of the 1960's, it is largely democratic (despite having a dominant party system), it is stable and free of violence. It seems possible that good governance worked for Botswana and that poor governance ruined the DRC.

5.3 Significance

This study's significance is fairly broad as the results can be applied to a wide range of areas of study. This research has contributed to the debate on the importance of the state. Government choices such as how to maintain power, determining who has access to power and especially the nature of the expansion of the bureaucracy seems to have far reaching influences for African states. States that have short term views such as rapid transformation (Africanisation) risk losing expertise, professionalism and effectiveness, and in turn, development in the long term.

The study also contributes to the debate on the importance of democracy. A democratic form of government, which includes alternative voices in the form of allowing the development and participation of opposition parties and civil society tends to lead to more legitimacy and less need for the coercive apparatus. Censoring criticisms, military expansion and intolerance to opposition forces in time leads a state on a trajectory of declining legitimacy. In this study the democratic case study, Botswana, developed and was stable, whilst the autocratic state, the DRC, stagnated, declined in all areas of development and was unstable. This study also seems to show that when a state takes a decision, the importance of this decision will be magnified in the future. Botswana implemented a professional and largely apolitical bureaucracy at independence; as a result, after diamonds were discovered, the country suffered less from corruption, and the benefits of the diamond wealth could be shared by the entire population. Botswana's mineral wealth is a blessing and not a curse, as is the case in the DRC, this may be due to the public-private partnership in the form of Debswana,

as opposed to complete state control of the mines as occurred in the DRC. Corruption increases amongst other factors contributes to the de-legitimisation of the state and its ultimate collapse as seen in the DRC.

Botswana in Southern Africa and Africa stands out not because it is a perfect example of a flawless state. It stands out because of good governance. If there are lessons for sub-Saharan states it seems to be that it is beneficial for a state in the long term to follow practices that are anti-corruption, pro-democracy, pro-competition, makes use of public-private partnerships, encourage leadership change, implement market-orientated economic policies and empower government oversight institutions. Oppression in time causes the need for more oppression; this leads to further loss of legitimacy, loss of economic opportunities and income, and in the end social unrest, which causes the cycle to repeat by the application of more stringent oppression. This cycle in turn leads a state down a spiral of state collapse during which it loses control of the economic and political spheres. States, it appears, would be wise to keep to the practice of good governance as this seems to be supportive of long-term development and legitimacy.

Some possibilities for future research have also been identified. For one it would be significant to investigate the effect or impact of the dominant party system in Botswana. Did this system contribute to stability and does or did it play a role in the almost universal, but to some extent over exaggerated, positive view of Botswana? Recently we have seen the Botswana government impose limitations on public protests after recent public service protests. Thus is democracy limited by the dominant party system?

The role of public-private partnerships in the development of countries requires further research. Botswana has shown that its relationship with De Beers has led to economic success with limited corruption. It would be beneficial to further research the importance of these public-private partnerships, and look at how they fare compared to government operations. A national comparison between projects in Botswana could be used in this case.

An interesting topic to look at would be the power structures that emerge in collapsed or failed states, thus who are in control in what areas and what are the measures used to create cohesion and support? One could also look at the role of informal economies in African states. Informal economies seem to contribute to the undermining of the state and could be important to understand in terms of state collapse. Finally this research has also served to highlight the importance of leadership and comparative studies of African leaders would be instructive. It would for example be interesting to investigate and account for the different leadership styles of Mobuto and Sereste Khama.

In conclusion, it seems that there is an important relationship between governance and development. In Africa - a continent plagued by poor social, economic and political development it is clear that governance matters.

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