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Security Threats and the Military's Domestic Political Role: A Comparative Study of South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia

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Security Threats and the Military's Domestic Political Role: A Comparative Study of South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia

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To my parents

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Security Threats and the Military's Domestic Political Role: A Comparative Study of South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia

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This dissertation constructs a structural theory of civil-military relations that identifies security threats as the primary independent variable that influences the military organization and its political role. My structural theory comprises two-stage causal connections. In the first stage, security threats as an independent variable shape the relative power of major domestic political actors: civilian leadership, military organization, and civil society. In the next, interactions among these actors are responsible for specific manifestations of the military's political role, from domination to total subordination. My thesis is that high threats provide the military with favorable conditions to be politically influential, while low threats work against army officers' involvement in politics. At the same time, domestic political dynamics are responsible for more nuanced aspects of the military's political role. This dissertation conducts a structured-focused comparative analysis of four Asian countries: South

Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The four cases are divided into four historical stages: (1) the state-building period (1940s-1950s), (2) armed forces' assumption of power (1960s-1970s), (3) the army's withdrawal from politics (1980s-1990s), and (4) civil-military relations in the post-democratization era. The empirical analysis generates four major theoretical conclusions. First, high security threats bring about the expansion of the military organization and its political influence, while low threats weaken its political presence. Second, strong civilian leadership leads to stable civilian control over the armed forces, while weak civilian leadership invites them into politics. Third, a unified and professionalized army is conducive to stable civilian control, while a factionalized military leads to the politicization of army officers. Finally, a strong civil society with moderate ideology works against the armed forces' intervention in politics, while weak or ideologically radical civil society groups deteriorate security conditions, thereby bringing the military into politics. In addition to giving deeper insights into the military's political role, my structural theory provides a good starting point for integrating international relations and comparative politics in one theoretical model. As this study shows, security threats affect the military's domestic political position; at the same time, the military organization and its political position may account for certain international security outcomes.

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Introduction

Introduction

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, one of the most significant political phenomena in developing areas was the rise and the fall of democratic regimes. During that period, more than seventy countries experienced democratization, but only a small number of them accomplished democratic consolidation; most other countries still suffer from fragile and highly unstable governance or have returned to military dictatorship.[1] Many factors—inefficiency, corruption, ill-functioning political institutions, and social unrest and violence—have been responsible for aborted democratic regime transitions and consolidation. In many cases, however, it was the armed forces that played a decisive role in the regime transition process because the military organization could directly "replace the government."[2] In this respect, newly democratized states will not endure, let alone achieve democratic consolidation, unless they establish strong civilian supervision over the armed forces.

In this dissertation, I explore the military's domestic political role in four Asian contexts. In doing this, I construct a structural theory of civil-military relations that identifies external and internal security threats as the primary independent variable that influences intervening and dependent variables at the domestic level. I

[1] Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave over?" *Journal of Democracy* 7: 3 (1996), pp. 20-37.
[2] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 217.

suggest that external and internal security threats set the basic parameters of civil-military relations, determining the rise and fall of the armed forces' relative influence in domestic politics. More specifically, I contend that high security threats provide the military with favorable structural conditions to expand its influence in domestic politics, while low security threats create unfavorable conditions for it to be engaged in politics. Therefore, security threats are largely responsible for the military's political influence.

The influence of security threats on the military's political role, however, is both indirect and indeterminate because intervening variables at the domestic level also play a role in shaping a more specific manifestation of army officers' political role. The major intervening variables are military's organizational unity, the strength of civilian leadership, and the strength of civil society, which will be defined in Chapter One. Security threats as an independent variable influence three major domestic actors—the military, civilian political leadership, and civil society. The interactions of the three political actors, in turn, determine a more specific aspect of the armed forces' role in domestic politics, such as military coup d'etat and direct appropriation of political power, officers' participation in governing process as junior partners of an authoritarian ruler, the military's exercise of veto power under democratic leadership, and democratic control of the military.

The structural theory is tested against four empirical cases: South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. I explore the military's domestic political role in each of the four countries by dividing them into four historical stages depending on

the armed forces' domestic political role: (1) security threats and the military organization during the state-building period (1940s-1960s), (2) the military's seizure of political power (1960s-1970s), (3) the withdrawal from politics during democratization (1980s-1990s), and finally (4) security threats and the problem of democratic control over the armed forces thereafter.

This dissertation brings theoretical and empirical significance to the study of civil-military relations. First, by constructing a structural theory, my dissertation overcomes inherent limitations of the institutionalist perspectives that have been predominant in the study of civil-military relations. Second, this study engages the subfields of both comparative politics and international relations by integrating security threat variables and domestic variables into one theoretical model. Third, the structural theory is tested against four significant Asian cases that have been overlooked in rigorous and comparative analysis in the major scholarly literature. Finally, this dissertation has empirical implications for other countries in which the armed forces still play a substantial political role, but which may be expected to undergo democratic regime transition in the near future.

This introduction is composed of three sections. The next section poses major research questions that will be addressed throughout the dissertation. In section two, I detail the theoretical and empirical implications of this dissertation project. The final section briefly sketches chapter plans of my dissertation.

I. Research Question

Contemporary Asia features a rich variety of civil-military relations,[3] ranging from (1) relatively long-standing democratic control of the military in Japan and India, to (2) recent consolidation of democratic control in South Korea and Taiwan, to (3) democratic regime transitions with a strong military influence in the political process in the Philippines and Indonesia, to (4) control of the military by a one-party state in China, Vietnam, and North Korea, and to (5) the armed forces' direct control of politics via coup d'etat in Thailand.[4] In addition, these countries have experienced vastly divergent historical paths of the military's domestic political role for the second half of the twentieth century.

In this dissertation, I analyze civil-military interactions in four of these countries: South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The four cases are different in almost every aspect of political and social way of life, so that the only similarity among the cases seems to be the geographical proximity and identity as "Asian" countries. One similarity among them, however, is that they faced the task of establishing sovereign statehood at the end of World War II. And, in the state-building processes, these countries had to cope with severe domestic and international

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[3] For general overview of civil-military relations in Asian context, see Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Viberto Selochan, ed, *The Military, the State, and Development in Asia and the Pacific* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

[4] In September 2006, Thailand returned to the military regime after the Royal Thai Army staged a coup d'etat and replaced Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. With the coup, the Thai military declared martial law, dissolved Parliament, and banned any political activities. Shawn W. Chrispin, "Military Coup Tumbles Thailand's Thaksin," *Asia Times* (September 21, 2006).

security threats with the onset of the Cold War and the expansion of communism throughout the Asian continent.

For the last six decades, all four countries have experienced a huge expansion of military organization and pervasive penetration of the armed forces into political processes, even though the modes of officers' involvement were very different. The four countries have witnessed politicization of the armies and their political intervention from the 1950s up until 1980s and the 1990s (in the case of Indonesia), despite differences in the political role each of these militaries played during the period. The armed forces in South Korea and Indonesia, for example, became involved in politics via military coup d'etat and military dictatorship, while the Philippine and Taiwanese militaries became deeply involved in politics under firm civilian authoritarian leadership.

Furthermore, all four countries experienced democratic regime transitions in roughly the same period. The Philippines set off democratization in 1986, followed by South Korea in 1987, Taiwan in 1988, and Indonesia in 1998.[5] The routes to democratization and the military's withdrawal from politics, however, were also different. South Korea and Taiwan went through stable and more-or-less complete democratization without serious backlash from politicized officers, while Indonesia and the Philippines suffered from highly unstable and incomplete democratization as politically assertive generals played influential roles during and after the regime transition period. As a result of divergent paths of democratic regime transition, each

of the four countries displays different patterns of civil-military dynamics in the post-democratization era: strong civilian control over the armed forces in South Korea and Taiwan, and rather weak civilian control in Indonesia and the Philippines.

In this dissertation, I address the question of what determines the rise and fall of the military's relative influence in domestic politics. Under what conditions does the military become politically influential and sometimes predominant, and vice versa? In other words, how can we explain the similarities and differences in the armed forces' engagement in and withdrawal from domestic politics among the four countries under study? Do we have a theory of civil-military relations that has satisfactory theoretical parsimony and explanatory power over the overarching pattern of the rise and fall of the military's political influence, at the same time explaining more specific manifestations of the military's political engagement and withdrawal? More specifically, I pose the following explicit questions to be addressed in this dissertation.

1. How did the armed forces come to have the ability and opportunity to become a dominant organization in a society and how did they evolve into a highly politicized institution? As I will point out later, not all the military organizations had the capacity to overwhelm a civilian administration from the time of state-building. Rather, many countries that achieved sovereign statehood had a small number of military personnel in the beginning, but later witnessed a vast increase in the manpower of the military institution

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[5] In this dissertation, I conceptually differentiate between liberalization and democratization. The definitions and measurement will be detailed in the "Research Design" section of Chapter

under specific circumstances. Therefore, we need to identify the processes in which a military organization small in size and politically neutral in its orientation turns into a principal institution that overpowers other sectors in society.

2. Once the armed forces rose to a predominant organization that has the capacity to overwhelm civilian political arena, what accounts for the different patterns of military officers' engagement in politics in each of the four cases? That is to say, how can we explain the army officers' direct seizure of political power via coup d'etat and establishment of military dictatorship as was the case in South Korea (1961) and Indonesia (1965)? On the other hand, why did the Taiwanese and the Philippine armed forces remain under the civilian authoritarian guidance even when they possessed the capacity to overshadow the civilian leadership and take over political power? There is a large literature on the study of military coup and praetorianism,[6] but most of it is not connected with a broader historical and structural context of the rise and fall of the military's political influence.

One.

[6] Some of the classical examples are, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962); Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Stanislav Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* (London: Routledge, 1968); Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977); Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Societies," *Comparative Politics* 1: 3 (1969); Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

3. How can we explain different modes of military disengagement from politics during the democratic transitions of each country? Specifically, what factors encouraged or motivated the South Korean and Taiwanese armies to depoliticize and come under firm control by democratically elected civilian leadership without significant military repercussion, while at the same time politicized army officers in the Philippines and Indonesia were unwilling to withdraw from politics, thereby making the democratization highly unstable and incomplete? Addressing the role military officers play during the democratization period should deepen the understanding of democratic regime transition process because, as in the four cases studied in this dissertation, the military plays a significant role in deciding the course of political transition.
4. Finally, what determines the consolidation of democratic civilian control of the military in each of the four cases? In other words, how have the armed forces in South Korea and Taiwan come to be placed under firm civilian control while the Philippine and Indonesian militaries still exert significant amount of political influence even after the democratic transition and formal withdrawal from politics? What constraints and opportunities will civilian leaders have in establishing democratic control of the military in the near future?

In attempting to answer all the questions posed above, we find it difficult to uncover a well-established theory of civil-military relations that addresses all aspects of it in one theoretical model. A large body of literature on civil-military relations

rests on a narrowly conceived institutionalist perspective that deals with only a part of whole civil-military dynamics.[7] To address all the questions, one needs a structural theoretical model that encompasses not only major variables that the institutionalist theories have identified, but also broader structural variables, i.e., security threats.[8]

II. Implications and Significance of the Study

This study has both substantial theoretical and empirical implications. First, I construct a structural theory of civil-military relations by modifying and improving upon Michael Desch's recent theoretical construction.[9] My structural theory of civil-military relations tries to overcome the limitation of previous institutionalist theories on civil-military relations that have dealt with only parts of the relationship, focusing either on military intervention and coup d'etat, on the strength and duration of the military rule, on military withdrawal from politics during democratization, or on democratic control over security policy-making process. The institutionalist theories have been satisfactory in explaining only part of the whole aspects of civil-military relations. Instead, my structural theory of civil-military relations aims to attain sufficient explanatory power over the wider range of civil-military relations, at the same time not losing theoretical parsimony.

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[7] Andrew, Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forester, "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society* 29: 1 (2002), p. 40.

[8] The institutionalist body of literature is grouped into three major theoretical clusters emanating from the classical works of the 1960s and 1970s: the "developmental" approach, the "military-centric" approach, and the "synthetic" approach. A more detailed discussion of these approaches will be made in Chapter One.

Second, this study aims to further bridge the gap between international relations and comparative politics by incorporating both international and domestic variables into one theoretical model. A large body of literature on civil-military relations has focused on several domestic factors to explain the armed forces' domestic political role, largely ignoring the security threat variables.[10] In turn, international relations scholars have been interested in explaining the international outcome of civil-military relations such as states' foreign policy behavior and war outcomes.[11] While international relations scholars deal with the inside-out approach, they have not been interested in the outside-in approach. I bridge this gap by adopting the outside-in approach, which explains the impacts of international/internal security threats on domestic civil-military relations.

Third, I test the structural theory of civil-military relations by conducting a rigorous comparative analysis of four Asian countries that have received less attention in the scholarly literature than other regions such as Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, and Latin America. Most of the previous literature on Asian civil-military relations is devoid of rigorous comparative analysis, focusing, instead, on detailed descriptions of

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9 Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

10 Some of the exceptions are, Desch, 1999; Wendy Hunter, *State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military's Role in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile* (United States Institute of Peace, 1996); Alfred Stepan C., *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Michael Desch, "War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?" *International Organization* 50: 2 (1996).

11 For example, see Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," *International Security* 9 (1984); Seung-Whan Choi and Patrick James, *Civil-Military Dynamics, Democracy, and International Conflict: A New Quest for International Peace* (New York: Palgrave, 2005); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," *American Political Science Review* 89: 4 (1995).

historical developments in individual countries. This dissertation takes previous research on the armed forces' domestic political role in Asian countries one step further by conducting a cross-national analysis with a parsimonious theory.

Finally, my study will provide insights into understanding and predicting some changes in the armed forces' domestic political role in other Asian countries in which army officers are highly politicized and still play substantial political and domestic security roles. Many Asian countries are still in the process of democratic regime transition or might be in the near future, and in these countries, firm civilian control of the armed forces will be one of the determining factors of democratic consolidation.

III. Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation is composed of five chapters. Chapter One develops a structural theory of civil-military relations that identifies security threats as the primary independent variable. Security threats have influence on three major domestic actors: civilian leadership, military organization, and civil society. Dynamic interactions among those domestic actors, in turn, determine the armed forces' role in domestic politics. The second half of the chapter presents a research design in which I describe selection of cases, definition and measurement of variables, and data sources and research methods.

Chapters Two to Five are empirical studies on the military's domestic political influence in the four Asian cases. The four empirical chapters are comprised of four historical stages in terms of the military's engagement in and withdrawal from politics. In Chapter Two, I explain how external and internal security threats during

the state-building process in the 1940s and 1950s shaped the military organization and its doctrine, the political incentives of civilian leaders, and the strength of civil society. Each of the four countries' security concerns since World War II was overwhelmed by the problem of building sovereign statehood and the onset of the Cold War military and ideological confrontations. Mounting security challenges in the four countries brought about the expansion of military organization, increasingly authoritarian civilian leadership that mobilized army officers into politics to govern society, and the meager role of civil society in politics.

In Chapter Three, I explain how increasingly influential army officers intervened in politics, via either coup d'etat and ensuing military dictatorship or as the junior partner of authoritarian civilian leadership. This chapter explicates how dynamic interactions among major domestic actors—civilian leadership, the military, and civil society—created different modes of military intervention in politics. The politically active officers staged coups and dominated the political arena when there was a civilian leadership failure and when, at the same time, the popularity of the army increased within a society.[12] The armed forces submitted to civilian leadership rather than overturn it when civilian leaders could maintain political order and security.

In Chapter Four, I focus on the dynamics of the military's withdrawal from politics during democratization (1980s-1990s). This chapter illustrates how security threats in the four cases influenced the three major domestic actors and, in turn, different modes of military disengagement from politics. Low level security threats set favorable conditions for a stable and far-reaching regime transition, while high

threats impeded the transition process. More specifically, a combination of strong civilian leadership supported by civil society and a unified military organization induced the armed forces' complete withdrawal from politics. On the contrary, a combination of weak civilian leadership and a factionalized army institution made democratization process high unstable. In this situation, moreover, politicized officers were unwilling to withdraw from politics during and even after democratization.

In Chapter Five, I illustrate civil-military dynamics in four cases in the post-democratization era. This chapter explains why South Korea and Taiwan were more successful in establishing firm civilian control of the military and consolidating democracy than Indonesia and the Philippines. Also, this chapter ponders how the security threats of these countries may influence the armed forces' domestic political role in the near future.

In the Conclusions, I summarize my theoretical arguments and major empirical findings. I compare the utility of my structural theory with other institutional and structural theories. In addition, this chapter considers how this structural theory of civil-military relations might be further elaborated and developed in future studies.

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12 Finer, 1962, p. 21; Nordlinger, 1977, pp. 85-86.

Chapter 1. Security Threats and the Military's Domestic Political Role: A Structural Theory of Civil-Military Relations

Introduction

As discussed in the Introduction, this dissertation addresses the factors determining the military's relative influence in domestic politics. In other words, I ask under what conditions the military becomes politically influential and sometimes predominant? In answering this question, I construct a structural theory of civil-military relations that identifies security threats as the primary independent variable that shapes relative power balance and political incentive structure among major political actors at the domestic level. At the same time, I identify causal connections between these domestic variables and the military's domestic political role.

Before specifying my structural theoretical logic, however, I briefly review, in section one, previous theoretical perspectives on civil-military interactions, including institutional theories and Michael Desch's structural theoretical logic. Based on the critical review of theoretical literature, I develop, in section two, a structural theoretical account of civil-military relations. The third section is a research design in which I explain the selection of the cases, definition and measurement of variables, and research methods and data sources.

I. Literature Review

1. Institutionalist Theories of Civil-Military Relations

Much of the existing literature on civil-military debates has focused on the problem of praetorianism,[13] military coup d'etat, and military dictatorial rule in developing areas.[14] When dealing with the problem of the armed forces' intervention in politics, moreover, scholars tend to rest on a narrowly conceived institutionalist perspectives.[15] This institutionalist body of literature can be grouped into three major theoretical clusters emanating from the 1960s and 1970s literature in comparative politics: the "developmental" approach, the "military-centric" approach, and the "synthetic" approach.[16]

1) The Developmental Approach

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13 According to Amos Perlmutter, praetorianism is one "which the military tends to intervene and potentially could dominate the political system." In a praetorian state, the military plays a predominant role in governmental institutions and policymaking processes. For the discussion of praetorianism, see Amos Perlmutter, 'The Praetorian State and Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Politics," *Comparative Politics* 1: 3 (1969), p. 384; Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977).

14 For a brief overview on the study of civil-military relations for the last five decades, see Peter Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999), pp. 211-241.

15 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Forester, "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society* 29: 1 (2002), p. 40.

16 In recent years, some works on civil-military interactions borrowed the rational choice institutionalist perspective. Some of the prominent examples are, Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Wendy Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Wendy Hunter, "Negotiating Civil-Military Relations in Post-Authoritarian Argentina and Chile" *International Studies Quarterly* 42: 2 (1998).

The developmental approach looks at socio-political conditions as the primary cause of military intervention in politics.[17] This approach focuses on the problem of weak and ill-functioning political institutions, faced with growing demands for political participation from the general public. In many developing countries at the early stage of the state-building process, weak political institutions were confronted with an increasingly mobilized citizenry, which leads to a "participation crisis."[18] This participation crisis occurs when newly established regimes have a low level of political institutionalization. The lack of political institutionalization motivates diverse socio-political actors including students, laborers, the masses, and especially the military, to take over political power. The developmental approach contends that the military comes to a decision to intervene in politics when the societal arena suffers from participation crises and political turmoil. In particular, multiparty systems and mass political participation in newly established countries destabilize the political system, increasing the possibility of the political intervention of the armed forces.[19]

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[17] See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., *Civilian Control of the Military: Theories and Cases from Developing Countries* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976); William R. Thomson, "Explanation of the Military Coup," *Comparative Politics* 7: 4 (July, 1975); Claude E. Welch and Arthur K. Smith, *Military Role and Military Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations* (North Scituate: Dexbury Press, 1974); Egil Fossum, "Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Military Coups d'Etat in Latin America," *Journal of Peace Research* 3 (Fall, 1967); Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," in John D. Martz, ed., *The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1971).

[18] Binder, et al., 1971; also see Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, "Review: Crisis and Sequences in Collective Theory Development," *American Political Science Review* 69: 3 (1975).

[19] Huntington 1968; Myron Weiner and Joseph La Palombara, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

Closely related to the idea of the participation crisis, the developmental approach notes that civilian leaders' performance failure and subsequent loss of legitimacy create favorable conditions for the army's intervention in politics. According to Eric Nordlinger, "One type of performance failure—the inability to maintain order—affects the decision to intervene insofar as it may require the officers to act as policemen while highlighting the government's total dependence upon the military."[20] Civilian leadership that suffers from a legitimacy crisis faces mounting pressure from the general public. In this situation, civilian leaders consider the armed forces as the most attractive strategic partner to maintain socio-political order. Extreme social unrest creates a situation in which "civilian dependence on the military and the military's popularity" coincide.[21] In sum, the developmental approach explains military intervention in politics by focusing on social and political unrest generated by weak and inefficient political institutions, increased social mobilization, civilian leadership's performance failures, and the resultant loss of legitimacy. According to this approach, therefore, the presence of a strong and stable civilian leadership is the key to preventing the military's political dominance.

2) The Military-Centric Approach

The military-centric approach finds the primary cause of army officers' intervention in politics inside the military, such as the armed forces' organizational character, factional struggles, military doctrine, material or corporate interests, and

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[20] Nordlinger, 1977, p. 86.

[21] Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 72.

individual officers' political ambitions.[22] According to Samuel Finer, the armed forces possess massive political advantages over civilian leadership such as "a marked superiority in organization, a highly emotionalized symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms."[23] In addition to the army's political and organizational advantages, the existence of competing factions within the military organization is considered to be detrimental to civilian control of the military officers and breed their political intervention. As Morris Janowitz suggests, factionalized militaries are more prone to plot coup d'etat.[24] Also, domestically oriented military doctrine and the army's invested corporate interests are considered to serve as major causes of military coup d'etat.[25]

Given the armed forces' high level of organizational strength and control over weapons, according to the military-centric approach, it is the military's professionalism that prevents it from intervening in the political arena. Huntington suggests that a professionalized army tends not to intervene, as it accepts the norm of civil supremacy. According to Huntington, a professional military will have "the lowest possible level of military political power with respect to all civilian groups. A highly professional officer

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22 For example, see, Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Free Press, 1960); Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); Stanislav Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* (London: Routledge, 1968); Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sage Publication, 1972); Alfred Stepan, *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., *Armies and Politics in Latin America* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976); Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Nordlinger, 1977.

23 Finer, 1962, p. 6.

24 Janowitz, 1964; also see Augustine J. Kposowa and Craig Jenkins, "The Structural Sources of Military Coups in Postcolonial Africa, 1957-1984," *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (1993).

25 Nordlinger, 1977, p. 64.

corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state."[26]

Furthermore, the military-centric approach suggests that the levels of military professionalization are determined by what kinds of control mechanism civilian leaders adopt against the army organization—either "subjective" or "objective" control, as primarily conceived by Huntington.[27] When civilian leadership adopts an objective control, the military will sustain high levels of military professionalism and subordinate themselves to civilian leadership in foreign and military-related decision-making processes. In objective control mechanism, there is a clear functional distinction between civilian leadership and the military, which assures institutional autonomy of the latter. In subjective control, however, civilian leaders manage to control the top brass of the military by politicizing them.[28] Huntington's idea of military professionalism, however, led to theoretical and empirical debates on whether professionalization is the key to preventing military intervention or professionalization itself breeds it.[29]

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[26] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 84.

[27] Huntington, 1957.

[28] More specifically, Huntington defines objective civilian control of the military as: 1) a high level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of the limits of their professional competence; 2) the effective subordination of the military to the civilian political leaders who are the basic decisions on foreign and military policy; 3) the recognition and acceptance by that leadership of an area of professional competence and autonomy for the military; and 4) as a result, the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military. Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 4.

[29] For the discussion of military professionalism and intervention, see Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalism and Political Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972); Alfred C. Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Failures* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

Notwithstanding these debates, however, the military-centric approach shares the core idea that the origin of military intervention in politics resides within the military organization itself. This approach furthermore suggests that it is the armed forces' organizational unity that discourages its political intervention.

3) The Synthetic Approach

Finally, the synthetic approach attempts to integrate both the developmental and military-centric approaches into one theoretical model.[30] This approach suggests that both societal and military factors are responsible for military intervention in politics. According to Samuel Finer, for example, the military intervenes in politics when a society provides it with both the "disposition" and "opportunity" to intervene. Here, the disposition refers to a "combination of conscious motive and a will or desire to act." The disposition is composed of the military's "motive" and "mood" to intervene in politics.[31] The presence of disposition itself is not a sufficient condition for the military intervention until the societal arena provides army officers with an opportunity to intervene, such as civilian leaders' loss of legitimacy, their dependence on the armed forces to control society, increasing social and economic crises, and most importantly a power vacuum in civilian political leadership.

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[30] For example, Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems," *American Political Science Review* 76: 4 (December, 1982); Nordlinger, 1977.

[31] Finer, 1962, p. 23.

In a similar context, Gary Wynia presents "push factors" and "pull factors" as the cause of military's political intervention.[32] In his comparative study of the cause of military intervention in Latin American countries, Wynia identifies the military's aspiration and belief regarding the nation's modernization as the push factor, while social conditions such as social disorder, economic crisis, weak political institutions, and the influence of foreign actors as the pull factor.[33]

In this synthetic approach, military intervention in politics is the result of interactions between the military's disposition to intervene and social opportunity structures, or the coexistence of the push and pull factors. Furthermore, the disposition and opportunity structures (push and fall factors) are closely connected with the level of development in political culture of a society. In a society with "low political culture" the probability of military intervention in politics is far higher than in societies with "high political culture." According to Finer, a society has a high level of political culture that hinders the military's dominance in politics (1) when "the belief or emotion by virtue of which the rulers claim the moral right to govern and be obeyed is generally accepted," or (2) where "the complex of civil procedures and organs which jointly constitute the political system are recognized as authoritative," or (3) where "public involvement in and

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32 Gary W. Wynia, *The Politics of Latin American Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 57-60.

33 For studies of Asian and African contexts, see J. Stephen Hoadley, *Soldiers and Politics in Southeast Asia: Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing, 1975); Moshe Lissak, *Military Roles in Modernization: Civil-Military Relations in Thailand and Burma* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976); Thomas H. Johnson, Robert O. Slater, and Pat McGowan, "Explaining African Military Coups D'etat, 1960-1982," *American Political Science Review* 78: 3 (September, 1984).

attachment to these civil institution is strong and widespread."[34] In sum, the synthetic approach suggests that the military's intervention in politics is an outcome of interactions between social and military factors.

4) Limitations of the Institutionalist Perspectives

These institutional perspectives on civil-military relations have contributed to our understanding of the rise and fall of the military's domestic political role in developing countries for the last half century. The synthetic approach, even though less theoretically parsimonious than the other approaches, is particularly helpful in identifying key variables and major actors in civil-military interaction. At the same time, however, the institutional theories have several shortcomings that need to be overcome.

First, most of civil-military relations scholars who adopt the institutional approaches have dealt with the problem of praetorianism, coup d'etat, and military dictatorship in developing countries. Focusing on a coup or its absence, however, is less theoretically and empirically appealing than it used to be, considering that the possibility of military-dominant regime via coup is a less frequent political phenomenon.[35] Instead, a more useful theory of civil-military relations ought to have explanatory power not only over coups and praetorian states, but also over more diverse manifestations of civil-military dynamics, such as indirect military influence over politics and policy-making

[34] Finer, 1962, p. 87.
[35] For example, Hunter, 1997.

processes, wielding a veto power against civilian leadership, and the military's total compliance to the civilian leaders.[36]

Second, most of the institutional perspectives have been designed to serve as a snap-shot theory that accounts for only part of complex civil-military interactions. As Finer pointed out, "what applies to military intervention . . . can also be played back to explicate its extrusion."[37] Since Finer's suggestion, however, little attempt has been made to develop a theoretical framework that covers the political dynamics of both the military's engagement in and withdrawal from politics. There has been a plethora of studies on the military intervention in politics. But less theoretical development has been achieved in understanding the military's withdrawal during democratization. A more useful theory of civil-military relations ought to have explanatory power over the dynamics of the rise and fall of the military's influence in domestic politics.

Third, and most important, the existing literature has paid little attention to the influence of international and domestic security threats on the military's domestic political role.[38] With a few exceptions,[39] most previous studies have largely focused on

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36 For example, see Feaver, 1999, pp. 218-222.

37 Finer, 1962, p. 23.

38 Several scholars mentioned the security threats or foreign influence in the military's political intervention. None of these studies, however, identified the security threats as the primary independent variable.

39 Brian M. Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Bruce C. Porter, *War and the Rise of the Modern State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1994); Charles Tilly, "War Making and the State Making as Organized Crime," in Peter B. Evans, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Harold Lasswell, "The Garrison State," *American Journal of Sociology* 46 (1941).

domestic variables such as weak political institutions,[40] military organization,[41] ethnic rivalries,[42] and other domestic factors. This is a significant oversight because the military is primarily a security organization that directly copes with the security threats of a state. Therefore, changes in security threats will bring about changes in military organization, doctrine, and its domestic political role. In this sense, domestic factors are not the primary independent variables but rather intervening variables largely shaped by other conditions—that is, security threats. In sum, works that ignore security threats in the study of civil-military relations are bound to have limited explanatory power.

For instance, the institutionalist theories have scrutinized what Peter Feaver called the "civil-military problematique," which is a simple paradox: "the very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity."[43] Any society needs to be protected from outside predators by having strong military organization, at the same time being protected from military intervention. All the institutionalist scholars regarded this paradox as given in any society. Historically speaking, however, not all military organizations were strong enough to dominate society from the state-building period. South Korea and the Philippines, for example, used to have very small militaries in the 1940s. But the two countries' military organizations

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[40] Huntington 1968; Perlmutter, 1969; Robert W. Jackman, "The Predictability of Coup d'etat: A Model with African Data," *American Political Science Review* 72 (1978).

[41] Stanislav Andreski, *Military Organization and Society, 2nd ed.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Nordlinger, 1977.; Finer, 1962.

[42] Jackman, 1978; Kposowa and Jenkins, 1993.

[43] Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 4; also see, Peter Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society* 23:2 (1996).

were vastly expanded through the experiences of internal and external security challenges, including interstate war and domestic insurgency movements. In many developing countries, a predominant military institution is not a given, but one that expands in size and strength under certain structural conditions.

In addition, it is true that the armed forces are likely to intervene in politics when both the civilian leaders' dependence on the military and the military's popularity coincide. However, we need to investigate the circumstances under which civilian dependence on the military and the military's popularity coincide. In sum, the domestic variables that the institutionalist literature has identified are not independent variables in themselves, but intervening variables that affect the military's domestic political role.

2. Michael Desch's Theory

I mentioned that several factors that the institutionalist perspectives have dealt with are not independent variables in themselves but intervening variables that are affected by other conditions. I suggest that international and internal security threats ought to be treated as the prime independent variable that shapes the relationship among major domestic political actors: the military organization, civilian political leadership, and civil society. In turn, divergent interactions among these domestic actors result in different manifestations civil-military relations.

Several scholars have studied the effects of security threat environments on military organization and its domestic political role. Harold Lasswell, for example, contends that severe external threats and war conditions create "garrison states" in which

militaries that are specialized in violence become the most powerful groups in society.[44] In garrison states, all the domestic resources and purposes are subordinate to war and the preparation for it. During war, "The executive and the military gain power at the expense of the legislative and civilian politicians."[45] Lasswell is right when he suggests that extremely high external security threat environments engender the rise of the military's political influence. But he does not specify how the threat environments shape the power relations among major domestic political actors, including civilian leaders, the military, and the general public.

A more influential argument has been developed by Alfred Stepan. He focuses on the military's new professionalism in which the army considers the internal security role as its primary mission in a society.[46] In his work, the major concern is the presence of internal security threat environments and their influence on the expansion of domestic roles. Subsequently, several scholars have examined the relationship between decreasing external and internal security threats with the end of the Cold War and the armed forces' reduced influence in domestic political process and democratization.[47] Even though several scholars have pointed out the influence of security threat conditions on the

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[44] Lasswell, 1941, p. 457.

[45] Huntington, 1957, p. 349.

[46] Alfred C. Stepan ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); also see, Alfred C. Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 18.

[47] For example, see, Robin Luckham, "Introduction," in Viberto Selochan ed., *The Military, the State, and Development in Asia and the Pacific* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); J. Mark Ruhl, "Changing Civil-Military Relations in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review* 33 (1998).
In contrast, Aguero argues that the presence of high-level external threat conditions was an important factor that was responsible for the successful democratic regime transitions from authoritarian rule. See, Felipe Aguero, *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

military's political influence, little attempt has been made to devise a clear and parsimonious theory that explicates the influence of international and domestic security environments on the armed forces' domestic political role.

In this respect, Michael Desch's recent work provides an appropriate starting point for constructing a structural theory of civil-military relations that treats domestic and international security threat environments as the primary independent variable.[48] Desch constructs a theory of civil-military relations that specifies external and internal security threats as an independent variable and domestic factors as intervening variables, and explains when these variables become more or less important. Moreover, Desch's framework is sufficiently flexible to cover a wider range of civil-military interactions than the institutionalist theories do.

Table 1-1: Security Threats and Civil-Military Relations[49]

	High External Threats	**Low External Threats**
High Internal Threats	Poor Civilian Control (Q1)	Worst Civilian Control (Q2)
Low Internal Threats	Firm Civilian Control (Q3)	Mixed Civilian Control (Q4)

Desch's theory predicts that a state with a structural condition of low internal threats and high external threats (Q3) will have the most desirable civil-military relations. Under high external security threats, according to his logic, civilian leadership may

48 Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Michael C. Desch, "Threat Environments and Military Missions," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner eds., *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

49 Desch, 1999, pp. 11-16 for his theoretical construction.

become experienced and knowledgeable about national security issues. In addition, high external security threats will bring the "rally 'round the flag" effect among domestic audiences so that civilian leadership becomes stronger. And, in such a threat environment, civilian leadership adopts an objective control mechanism over the military.

On the other hand, Desch predicts that a state with a structural condition of high internal threats and low external threats (Q2) will have the worst civilian control of the armed forces. In this structural condition, civilian leadership might be weak, divided, and inexperienced in national security affairs. At the same time, the military doctrine focuses on domestic security and other non-military missions. In this structural condition, the armed forces are highly likely to dominate the civilian political arena. In the structural conditions of Q2 and Q3, structural imperatives are so strong that security threat environments directly shape the civil-military relations. On the other hand, in the structural conditions of Q1 (high internal/external threats) and Q4 (low internal/external threats), structural effects are indirect so that other factors at the domestic level, especially military doctrine, play a more important role. In addition, the structural conditions of Q1 and Q4 will produce mixed results in terms of civil-military relations.

Even though Desch's theoretical framework provides a good starting point for constructing a structural theory of civil-military relations, its causal mechanisms are less convincing. First, one of Desch's strongest theoretical cases is the causal relationship between high external/low internal security threats and the most desirable civil-military relations. In reality, however, it is extremely difficult to find many empirical cases that are under high external threats and low internal threats. Considering the fact that most modern wars and interstate conflicts have been related with territorial issues, and most

wars were fought against neighboring states resulting in the territorial interpenetration, high external threats in most cases are supposed to imply high internal security threats. Thus, for a structural theory of civil-military relations to be more useful, it must have explanatory power over the cases in which both high external and internal security threats coexist.

Second, Desch's proposition about high security threats and desirable civil-military relations is problematic. He suggests that the presence of high security threats will strengthen the civilian leadership by creating the "rally 'round the flag" effect among the general public.[50] He does not consider, however, the fact that the same effect also gives civilian leaders strong incentives and opportunities to be more authoritarian and mobilize military personnel into politics. In addition, the presence of high-level security threats in both international and domestic arenas are likely to lead to the expansion of military organization compared with other sectors in society. This phenomenon has been prominent especially in developing countries where a larger portion of resources was devoted to military-related sectors. The direct outcome of war or the threat of war has been the expansion of the military institution.

Third, in addition to the expansion of the military organization, the military's experiences of international war or domestic counterinsurgency influence the value or perception of military personnel in a certain way. Wars of independence from colonial powers, for example, make soldiers perceive themselves as the only state institution that truly represents the national interest. This is especially true when civilian leaders provide weak leadership due to the loss of legitimacy and factional infightings within the ruling

circle. Thus, high external/internal security threats coupled with weak civilian leadership set in motion the military intervention in politics, as the synthetic approach suggests.

Finally, the structural condition of extremely severe threats can easily justify civilian leaders becoming more authoritarian and adopting more oppressive and coercive measures in governance. In such a situation, increasingly authoritarian civilian leaders have no choice but to invite military officers into political processes. In turn, when security threats are high, the popularity of the military also rises. According to Finer, "The military's opportunities to intervene are maximized if both—civilian dependence on the military and the military's popularity—situations coincide."[51] Such a coincidence is likely to occur under the structural condition of extremely high security threats.

In contrast to Desch's thesis about low external/internal security threats and mixed results in civil-military relations, I suggest that low security threat conditions in both the international and domestic arenas engender the most desirable civil-military relations. Under low threats, domestic audiences are less willing to accept an increasingly authoritarian and coercive rule and are likely to stand firm against military engagement in the political process.

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[50] Desch, 2003, p. 13.
[51] Finer, 1962, p. 7.

II. Security Threats and the Military's Political Role: A Structural Theory

1. Security Threats and the Military

In this section, I develop a structural theory of civil-military relations that comprises two-stage causal connection. In the first place, security threats are the primary independent variable that influences major political actors' positions in domestic politics. And, in the next, the dynamic interactions among the major domestic actors—civilian leadership, the military, and civil society—under certain security threats determine the military's relative influence in domestic politics.

In this dissertation, the primary independent variable—security threats—comes either from the domestic or international arena, or both. Also, security threats can be either high or low. The dependent variable—the military's relative influence in domestic politics—is treated as a continuum between the two extremes of military domination (military coup and dictatorship) and officers' total subordination to democratically elected civilian leadership. Elaborating on Claude Welch and Arthur Smith's classification, I identify four types of civil-military interactions: (1) control, (2) participation, (3) influence, and (4) subordination.[52] *Control* refers to a situation in which army officers stage a coup d'etat, overthrow civilian leadership, and establish military dictatorship. On the contrary, *subordination* signifies a situation in which the armed

[52] Welch and Smith categorize the military's political participation into three types: control, participation, and influence. See Welch and Smith, 1974, p. x. For another example of categorization, see Richard H. Payne, "*Military Intervention in the Politics of Developing Systems: The African Case*," Ph. D. Dissertation (University of Georgia, 1970), pp. 34-36.

forces are a politically neutral institution and controlled by democratically elected civilian leadership. *Participation* and *influence* are located in between.

Table 1-2: Summary of Causal Connections



I suggest that high security threats either in the domestic or international arena generate a structural condition for the military to be politically influential, while low security threats work against its political influence. As Finer suggested, "War conditions are among the circumstances that may provide the military with opportunities for intervention" and dominance of domestic politics.[53] This is supposed to be true because the military is first and foremost a security institution that exists primarily "to protect the interests of one political group against the predations of others."[54] Therefore, mounting security threats in a state should bring about the expansion of the military organization and its domestic political role.

There are a number of reasons why high security threats in domestic or international arena produce politically influential militaries. The first direct outcome of severe security threats is the expansion of military organization. Previous institutionalist theories simply assumed the presence of a military institution that has the organizational

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53 Finer, 1962, p. 72.

capacity to overwhelm the civilian political arena from the beginning. But the historical experience suggests that not all developing countries that attained independence during and after World War II possessed strong armed forces that could dominate society from the beginning. Most of these countries, thereafter, witnessed the vast expansion of military organization in the face of extreme security threat conditions and the experience of war or a threat of war and domestic insurgency. Thus, the presence of predominant military institutions in developing countries was not a given from the beginning but an outcome that was shaped later by worsening security environments in the context of the Cold War.

In addition to organizational expansion, high security threats—especially the experience of interstate conflicts or domestic counterinsurgencies—sculpt army officers' political beliefs and attitudes in certain ways. The experiences of war, for example, create a strong belief within the army that it is the only institution that truly represents and defends the interest of the people. Such a political belief is reinforced when civilians fail to provide strong political leadership or undergo factional-partisan infighting. The political voice of the top brass in the military is strongest in countries where the armed forces are deeply engaged in the state-building process.

Second, high security threats give civilian leaders structural incentives and opportunities to become more authoritarian and take coercive measures to rule society. Deteriorating national security conditions will also serve as a threat to the regime security of a civilian leadership. In such a challenging security condition, civilian leaders

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[54] Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 4.

recognize the armed forces as the most attractive strategic partner to secure both regime security and state security. Civilian leaders find it easier to mobilize officers into politics to expand their political power when the society faces severe threats either domestically or internationally. At the same time, the military's popularity among the general public also rises when the state gets involved in internal or external conflicts. In sum, mounting security challenges turn democratic civilian leadership into a more authoritarian one that mobilizes the armed forces into politics.

Finally, high security threats work against civil society's political role. One of the most prominent outcomes of unfavorable security threats is the expansion and strengthening of state apparatus that monopolizes the means of physical violence. Under high security threats, the power balance between the state and civil society moves toward the former, sacrificing the latter. Furthermore, the presence of a strong civil society under an intimidating security situation may breed the military's intervention in politics. This is highly probable when a democratically elected civilian leadership becomes increasingly authoritarian and rests on coercive means to deal with civil society. In this situation, civil society groups are likely to adopt radical and physically violent means to challenge the authoritarian state apparatus, resulting in socio-political crises. Such a crisis situation provides the military with opportunities and justification to intervene in domestic politics.

Table 1-3: Security Threats and Major Domestic Actors



By the same token, the decline of security threats provides structural circumstances for states to reevaluate the military's role in politics and security policymaking. More specifically, a low level of external and internal security threats creates few structural imperatives and incentives for military officers to intervene in politics. In addition, civilian leaders' attempt to mobilize the army into politics under these circumstances is extremely difficult to justify and will generally face harsh resistance from domestic audiences. At the same time, the power balance between the state and society will turn in favor of the civil society arena under advantageous security conditions. Furthermore, civil society groups' pressure against authoritarian civilian leadership becomes more and more influential. In sum, we can hypothesize that high security threats in both domestic and international arenas cause the military to be a politically influential organization, while low security threats make politicized army officers less influential, leading to stronger civilian control of the military. Security threats' influence on three major domestic actors is summarized in Table 1-3.

2. Domestic Political Dynamics and the Military

While the above statements illustrate a generalized pattern of the rise and fall of the military's relative influence in domestic politics, it does not explain or predict specific manifestations of its engagement in and withdrawal from politics.[55] That is to say, these structural conditions themselves cannot explain or predict a more specific type of military involvement in politics via coup d'etat and military dictatorial rule (*control*) or the ascension of politicized officers as junior partners in an authoritarian regime (*participation*). Furthermore, the structural conditions do not explain or predict specific modes of military disengagement from politics during democratization: stable democratization and complete military withdrawal from politics (*subordination*) or incomplete democratization with a strong military presence in politics (*influence*). For a structural theory to have sufficient explanatory power, other intervening variables at the domestic level need to be considered.

I argue, therefore, that a more detailed aspect of the military's involvement in and withdrawal from politics is determined by intervening variables at the domestic level such as the military's organizational cohesiveness, the strength of civilian leadership, and the strength of civil society. Dynamic interactions among the major political actors shape specific manifestations of the military's political role. The first intervening variable is the cohesiveness of the military organization through which structural influences are modified. A cohesive military institution is conducive to stable civilian control and

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[55] As Kenneth Waltz pointed out, a structural theory does not predict specific behaviors of individual actors (i.e., states), rather it merely shows what constraints and incentives the international political and security structure gives to states as individual actors. Waltz pointed out the need of a theory of foreign policy to explain specific state behaviors. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory*

promotes military professionalism and institutional autonomy.[56] Civilian leaders find it easier to monitor and control the armed forces when it retains organizational unity with an effective hierarchical command structure. On the contrary, a military organization that lacks institutional unity and suffers from factional struggles among the top brass in the military results in the loss of professionalism and officers' political neutrality. Civilian leaders find it hard to control army officers when the army leadership is engaged in factional competition. In sum, I hypothesize that the presence of a cohesive military organization results in stronger civilian control of the armed forces, while factionalized army leadership works against civilian control and breeds politicized officers' intervention in civilian political affairs.

The second intervening variable is the strength of civilian leadership. The pattern of civilian leadership is the most crucial intervening variable that influences both the way the military gets involved in and withdraws from politics. As suggested in the previous section, the structural condition of high security threats brings about an organizational expansion of the military institution. In addition, high threats render civilian leadership increasingly authoritarian and mobilize army officers into politics. Once military officers are invited into the political arena, however, it is the strength of civilian leadership that determines the modes of the military's engagement in politics. In other words, army officers are likely to engage in a coup d'etat and establish military dictatorship when civilian leadership loses its legitimacy or fails to maintain domestic political and security

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of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 121-122; also see Desch, 1999, p. 11.

[56] For example, see Zoltan Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military: the East European Experience," *Comparative Politics* 30: 1 (1997).

order. Given the presence of politically active military officers, the existence of crisis situations or power-vacuum in the civilian political arena makes a military coup highly probable. On the other hand, the politicized military officers will not attempt a coup but, instead, follow civilian guidance when civilian leaders exert strong leadership that gains support from civil society.

In addition, the strength of civilian leadership influences the military's withdrawal from politics. The process of military withdrawal during democratization will be highly unstable and incomplete when newly elected civilian leaders suffer from weak and divided leadership, fail to maintain political and security order, or lack support from civil society. When civilian leadership is divided, weak, and deficient in legitimacy, military officers are unwilling to withdraw from politics and instead try to exert significant political influence even after they are formally disengaged from politics. On the other hand, unified and strong civilian leadership that garners support from civil society encourages the military's complete disengagement from politics, resulting in more stable and complete democratization and the military's depoliticization.

The final intervening variable is the strength of civil society. Generally speaking, a strong and vibrant civil society works against a military role in domestic politics. Reality, however, is more complicated depending on the security threats and the strategy that civil society groups adopt. Under high level of security threats, the existence of a strong civil society itself may invite the armed forces into politics, especially when civil society groups advocate a radical ideology or adopts a strategy of physical violence, engendering socio-political chaos. On the other hand, low level of security threats with strong civil society groups that are ideologically moderate and adopt nonviolent strategy

work against the military's domestic political engagement. The influence of dynamic interactions among domestic political actors on civil-military relations is summarized in Table 1-4.

Table 1-4: Domestic Political Actors and the Military's Political Influence

	Strong civilian leadership	**Weak civilian leadership**
Unified military	Stable civilian control (Q1)	Weak civilian control (Q2)
Factionalized military	Weak civilian control (Q3)	Military domination (Q4)

3. Expected Outcomes

As is presented in my theoretical construction, there are two-stage causal connections. In the first stage, security threats determine the military's relative influence in domestic politics, as noted in Table 1-4. Civilian control is strongest and the military's political influence is weakest under the structural condition of low internal and external threats (Q4). On the contrary, high internal and external threats bring about the worst civilian control of the military (Q1). To a lesser extent, high level of security threats either in the domestic or international arena also stimulate a stronger political influence of the military (Q2 and Q3). These expected outcomes are exactly opposite to Michael Desch's logic, as is summarized in Table 1-5.

Table 1-5: Security Threats and the Military's Political Influence

	High External Threats	**Low External Threats**
High Internal Threats	Worst Civilian Control (Q1)	High Military Influence (Q2)
Low Internal Threats	High Military Influence (Q3)	Firm Civilian Control (Q4)

While security threats in the domestic and international arenas determine the military's relative influence in domestic politics, the dynamic interactions among major domestic actors—civilian leadership, the military, and civil society—are responsible for more detailed and nuanced manifestations of the military's domestic political role, as noted in Table 1-6. A combination of strong civilian leadership (backed by strong civil society) and unified military organization leads to firm civilian control of the military. On the contrary, an amalgamation of weak civilian leadership and factionalized army breeds coup d'etat and military domination of politics. In the conditions of weak civilian leadership and divided military organization, civilian control of the military is rather unstable and weak even though there is a low probability of a military coup when security threats are low.

Table 1-6: Structural Threats and the Military's Political Role: Expected Outcomes

Security Threats	**Civilian Leadership**	**Military Unity**	**Civil Society**	**Expected Outcomes**
High	Strong	United	Weak	Participation
	Weak	Divided	Weak	Control
Low	Strong	United	Strong	Subordination
	Weak	Divided	Weak	Influence

4. Summary of Hypotheses

In this section, I provide a summary of major hypotheses derived from my theoretical arguments suggested above. These hypotheses are tested in each of the following empirical chapters.

Hypothesis I: High external and internal threats cause the military to be influential in domestic politics, while low security threats produce politically weak armed forces.

Hypothesis II: The military becomes politically influential when it loses its organizational unity and suffers from factional struggles, while a cohesive military institution leads to stable civilian control.

Hypothesis III: Army officers are likely to stage a coup d'etat and establish military dictatorship when civilian leadership loses its legitimacy or fails to provide domestic political and security order.

Hypothesis III-1: The top brass in the army is discouraged to wage a coup and placed under civilian guidance when civilian leaders exert strong leadership that is supported by civil society.

Hypothesis III-2: The process of military disengagement from politics is highly unstable and incomplete when civilian leaders suffer from weak and divided leadership, fail to maintain security and political order, or lack support from civil society.

Hypothesis III-3: United and strong civilian leadership that is supported by civil society makes the military more completely disengage from politics, resulting in more stable and complete democratization and consolidation.

Hypothesis IV: The presence of strong and vibrant civil society weakens the military's domestic political influence.

Hypothesis IV-1: The military is highly likely to intervene in politics when civil society exacerbates domestic political disorder by advocating a radical ideology or adopting a strategy of physical violence.

Hypothesis IV-2: The armed forces are discouraged from engaging in politics when civil society is strong and adopts a nonviolent and moderate ideology.

III. Research Design

In this section, I present a research design, including the selection of cases, definition and measurement of major variables, and data sources and methods.

1. Cases

To test the hypotheses generated from my theoretical arguments, I conduct a comparative analysis of civil-military relations in four Asian countries. Two cases come from East Asia (South Korea and Taiwan) and two cases from Southeast Asia (the Philippines and Indonesia). The four cases selected in this research are adequate for the purpose of this dissertation. They present sufficient degrees of similarities and differences in terms of the independent, intervening, and dependent variables.

First, the four cases demonstrate divergent manifestations of security threats throughout history. South Korea and Taiwan, for example, had to deal with mounting security threats both domestically and internationally from the beginning of the state-building process in the 1940s up until the mid-1980s. The Republic of Korea (or South Korea) fought three years of the Korean War (1950-1953) and ensuing threats from communist North Korea throughout the Cold War decades. Likewise, the Republic of

China on Taiwan (or Taiwan) had been under severe threats from the Communist forces on mainland China and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Since the mid-1985 up until the late-1990s, however, security threats surrounding the two countries became lower.

Table 1-7: Security Threats in History

	High External Threats	**Low External Threats**
High Internal Threats	South Korea (1940s-1960s) Taiwan (1940s-1960s) (Q1)	Indonesia (1940s-1990s) Philippines (1970s-1990s) (Q2)
Low Internal Threats	South Korea (1970s) Taiwan (1970s) (Q3)	Philippines (1940s-1960s) South Korea (1980s-1990s) Taiwan (1980s-1990s) (Q4)

On the other hand, the other two cases demonstrate differences in terms of security threats throughout history. The Philippines, for example, benefited from low security threats during the state-building process (1940s-1960s) with strong security commitments from the United States. From the late 1960s, however, the Philippines had to fight domestic insurgency groups such as the Maoist New People's Army (NPA) and the Muslim Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Finally, Indonesia was under severe domestic security threats from the beginning of the Republic (1940s) up until the recent years. While security threats came from both domestic and international arenas in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, the threats were mainly domestic in nature in the other two cases.

Second, all the cases display different political dynamics among major domestic political actors. In terms of the strength of civilian leadership, all four countries were under strong civilian leadership (either democratic or authoritarian) in the beginning (1940s-1950s). But South Korea and Indonesia witnessed civilian leadership failure in the 1960s, while the other two cases retained strong civilian leadership during the same period. In addition, South Korea and Taiwan enjoyed strong civilian leadership during the democratization period (1980s-1990s), while the other two suffered from civilian leadership crisis.

The four cases also exhibit different patterns in terms of cohesiveness of the military organization. Taiwan, for example, successfully retained its armed forces as a professionalized and unified organization throughout its history. The Philippines is a case in which the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) maintained its organizational unity until the 1970s, but suffered from factional struggles during the 1980s and the 1990s. In Indonesia, a difficult task was to create a unified army organization with an effective and hierarchical command structure. Finally, the South Korean army failed to build a professionalized and unified institution up until the 1980s. Since then, however, it has developed the most professionalized and unified organization among the four cases.

The final domestic actor is civil society. Civil society's role was insignificant in the early years of state-building. The weakness of civil society groups is related to low levels of economic development and immature middle-class citizenry. Another reason for weak civil society is the presence of intimidating security threats and the expansion of the state-apparatus that dominated the civil society arena. Since the 1980s, however, civil society groups became influential in South Korea and Taiwan. During the period, newly

elected civilian leaders strengthened their political position by garnering supports from bourgeoning civil society groups. On the contrary, civilian leaders in the Philippines and Indonesia during the democratization period failed to gain support from civil society groups. In sum, the domestic political dynamics throughout history are summarized in Table 1-8.

Table 1-8: Domestic Political Dynamics in History

	Strong Civilian Leadership	**Weak Civilian Leadership**
Unified Military	Philippines (1940s-1960s) Taiwan (1940s-1990s) (Q1)	South Korea (current) Taiwan (current) (Q2)
Factionalized Military	South Korea (1940s-1950s) Indonesia (1970s-1990s) (Q3)	South Korea (1960s) Indonesia (1960s; 1990s) Philippines (1980s-current) (Q4)

Finally, the four cases demonstrate similarities and differences in terms of the dependent variable, the military's domestic political influence. Even though all the countries had experienced the army officers' deep engagement in domestic political process, specific aspects of the engagement were different. The Korean and Indonesian armed forces staged coups d'etat, deposed civilian leadership, and established military dictatorships in the 1960s (*control*). During the same period, however, armed forces in the Philippines and Taiwan did not attempt to oust civilian leadership but rather were placed under civilian guidance (*participation*). In addition, the four countries showed different forms of military disengagement from politics. South Korea and Taiwan enjoyed a complete military withdrawal from politics during their democratization years

(*subordination*), while the armies in the Philippines and Indonesia still exerted strong political clout during and after democratization (*influence*).

While the four cases demonstrate sufficient degrees of similarities and differences in all major variables, the four countries have gone through the rise and fall of the military's domestic political influence in roughly the same time period, thereby making it easier to control for other contextual influences.

2. Measurement of Variables

1) Dependent Variable: Military's Domestic Political Influence

The dependent variable is the military's relative influence in domestic politics. In this dissertation, I treat the dependent variable as a continuum between two extremes: from the military's political domination to its total subordination to civilian leadership. More specifically, the dependent variable covers a wide range: from military coup and dictatorship, to a less significant but still important institutional role under the civilian guidance, to an indirect but significant influence with a veto power in important political decisions, to a total subordination to democratic civilian leadership. As presented in the previous section, I classify the military's political influence into four categories: control, participation, influence, and subordination.

Table 1-9: Measuring the Dependent Variable



In measuring the armed forces' domestic political influence, I rely on two major dimensions of the military's political role: "scope" and "jurisdiction."[57] Here, scope refers to the extent to which army officers get involved in domestic politics, that is, whether the range of their participation in civilian political affairs is widening or narrowing. At the same time, the dimension of jurisdiction should be considered. The jurisdiction refers to the military's power to make certain political decisions. The military's political influence is prevalent when its political presence is widespread and when it possesses broad decision-making authority in civilian political affairs. On the contrary, the military's political influence is considered to be narrowing and inconsequential when its influence is limited within its own institutional matters, i.e., protecting the country from outside threats.

More specifically, I examine multiple indicators to measure the military's political role, such as (1) the number of active or retired military officers in key governmental positions including both executive and legislative branches, (2) civilian leaders' decision-making authority in important government policies including foreign and security affairs, (3) the military's compliance with civilian leaders' decision on key security policies and military deployment, and (4) the armed forces' self-definition of primary missions, whether externally or internally oriented. Civilian control of the military involves not only an objective control mechanism by the executive leadership but also supervision and scrutiny by the legislative body. Therefore, the role of the

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[57] Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 32.

legislative body in important security and military-related policymaking is also an important indicator of democratic control of the military.[58]

2) Independent Variable: Security Threats

The primary independent variable in this dissertation is security threats. Security threats can be either external or internal in origin, either high or low in severity. The term "threat," however, is highly elusive and difficult to measure, since it consists not only of a tangible threatening actor (both state and non-state actors in both domestic and international arenas), but also of civilian leaders' or high-ranking military officers' perception of it. Therefore, the presence of security threats can be a perception created or manipulated by civilian leaders or the top brass in the military.

To measure security threats, therefore, I examine individual historical records of international war, small-scale conflict behaviors, and domestic insurgencies and guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, I examine more specific historical contexts and the qualitative severity of security threat environments each state was faced with. In investigating the historical contexts of each state, I also consider key political actors'—both civilian leaders and the top brass in the army—perception of a threat. More emphasis, however, will be placed on the factual information about the existence of threats in both domestic and international arenas. Furthermore, the degree of security threats is dichotomized as high and low.

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58 Andrew Cottey, et al. points out that one of the significant aspects of democratic control of the military includes "the development of effective systems for parliamentary oversight of civil-military relations and defense policy." In Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forester, "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society* 29: 1 (2002).

3) Intervening Variable I: Strength of Civilian Leadership

In this study, civilian leadership is portrayed as either strong or weak; either cohesive or divisive. The strength of civilian leadership can be measured by observing various indicators such as party systems, party policy or ideological disposition, the distribution of power among major political actors, the level of legitimacy of civilian leaders, and the civilian leaders' capability to overcome domestic resistance. But the most important factor that determines the strength of civilian leadership is the civilian leaders' record of maintaining social, political, and security order, achieving good economic performance records, and obtaining support from major political actors including the military, civilian elite circle, and the general public.

Following Huntington and Weiner,[59] I assume that multiparty systems in developing countries tend to create weaker and more divided leadership than two (or one) party systems. In addition, I take into account each party's policy position and ideological orientation. If there is a general consensus on major political issues among political parties, the state may be considered as having strong leadership even with a multiparty system. Conversely, if political parties demonstrate drastically different political positions or if they have a wide spectrum of ideological disposition, the state has weak and divided leadership even though it may have a two-party system.

Related to the number of political parties and their political-ideological dispositions is the issue of the distribution of power among major political parties or political elites. I consider a state to have strong civilian leadership when the distribution

of political power is skewed toward the ruling party or to one or a small number of political elites. On the other hand, if political power is equally distributed among several parties or multiple political elites, the state is assumed to have weak and divided civilian leadership. Finally, the strength of civilian leadership is also measured by assessing civilian leaders' legitimacy, and their capacity to overcome domestic resistance such as challenges from opposition parties and mass demonstrations.

4) Intervening Variable II: Military's Organizational Unity

The second intervening variable is the cohesiveness of military organization. A cohesive army institution is conducive to a professionalized and politically neutral military, while a military organization with factional struggles is detrimental to military professionalism and officers' political neutrality. In this dissertation, I measure the military's organizational unity by looking at two major indicators. First, I investigate whether the armed forces of each country experienced factional struggles throughout history. More specifically, I look at whether there exist competing groups of officers with similar backgrounds such as hometown, military education, and economic class. Also, I survey whether these social groupings have influence in promotion systems in the army hierarchy. Second, I examine whether there is an effective and hierarchical command structure in the military organization. A military organization is cohesive when there is a well-established command structure, while it suffers from organizational disunity when army officers do not follow the hierarchical command.

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[59] Huntington, 1968; Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara, "The Impact of Parties on Political Development," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner eds., *Political Parties and*

5) Intervening Variable III: Strength of Civil Society

In spite of its significance, the role of civil society has been overlooked in major literature of civil-military relations, especially its role in the military's political disengagement during democratization. Here, the concept of civil society is used in a broad manner. Following Linz and Stepan, I define civil society as an "arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations, and advance their interests."[60] Civil society groups maintain autonomy from the state's influence and effectively articulate their members' interests. Therefore, civilian groups organized and supported by civilian political leaders or the military are not considered as civil society.

While admitting that there are numerous civil society groups that represent diverse interests and voices in the societal arena, I count civil society as a unitary actor that supports or opposes decisions inside political institutions. This assumption is relevant especially when there is a prevailing political issue in society, such as the opposition to military dictatorship and support for pro-democracy movements. The role of civil society is important especially during the period of democratic regime transition and democratic consolidation.

In examining the strength of civil society, I use various factual and proxy indicators for measurement. First of all, I count the number and size of voluntary societal organizations and, at the same time, how influential and effective these organizations are

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Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[60] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 7; also see Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 3.

in pushing the military and government to change policies in accordance with their policy preferences. I also track the records of how many civil society leaders later enter into major political positions in government. In addition, the level of economic development (measured by GDP per capita) can be another proxy indicator of the strength of civil society.

In addition to the strength and effectiveness of civil society, the strategies civil society actors employ to push government are also important for shaping civil-military relations. When civil society actors rest on radical and violent practices, the existence of strong and vibrant civil society itself can contribute to inviting the military into politics. On the contrary, when civil society adopts nonviolent and moderate strategies, the military is less likely to intervene in politics. Therefore, I examine how societal groups decide on to voice their interests and policy preferences, either through violent and radical measures or nonviolent and moderate strategies.

3. Data and Methods

Because my dissertation compares four Asian countries in a relatively long historical time frame (about six decades), some level of generalization is required. I rely mainly on library research, rather than conduct personal interviews due to the number of cases and language barriers. Instead of focusing on searching for new information about the relevant cases, I rely on already existing major findings and documentations, and sort out factors that shaped the military's domestic political influence across the four cases.

The main objective of my study lies not only in providing broad contextual knowledge about the four countries, but also constructing a rigorous theory of civil-

military relations and testing the theory against the cases. Therefore, most of the information and data come from books, journal articles, periodicals, and government and military documents. Where available, I also look into several periodicals and journal articles that are published in Asian countries in their own languages.

In conducting systematic comparisons among the four cases, I use the method of structured-focused analysis. Structured-focused analysis enables me to sort out, from numerous causal variables, key factors that have major influence on the dependent variable. In addition, structured-focused analysis enables me to apply same set of research questions, variables, and measurements to the four cases under study. This method allows me to conduct a rigorous empirical test of my theory.[61]

4. Four Stages of Civil-Military Interactions

To conduct my empirical research, I divide all the cases into four historical stages based upon the military's domestic political role: (1) security threats, state-building, and the ascent of the military as a politically influential organization (1940s-1960s); (2) army officers' involvement in politics (1960s-1980s); (3) their withdrawal from politics during democratization (1980s-1990s); and (4) the armed forces' domestic political role in the post-democratization period (1990s-present).

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61 For the discussion of the usefulness of the structured-focused analysis, see Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and the Limits of the Quantitative Worldview," in Henry Brady and David Collier, eds., *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Alexander George and Andrew Bennet, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).

1) The First Stage: State-Building, Security Threats, and the Military

In the first historical stage, I focus on the routes in which the armed forces turned into politically influential actors during the state-building process in the 1940s-1950s. The Indonesian Army (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, ABRI) was formed in the midst of waging guerrilla warfare against the Dutch forces. When the Republic gained formal independence in 1949, it began as a parliamentary democracy, and the ABRI formally withdrew from politics and was put under the guidance of civilian leadership. The fragile parliamentary democracy, however, collapsed when the nascent republic faced mounting internal security threats throughout the 1950s. In 1957, President Sukarno abolished the flagging parliamentary democracy and declared "Guided Democracy" and martial law. Guided Democracy concentrated political power in Sukarno's hands. The increasingly authoritarian Sukarno regime mobilized ABRI officers to assume broad political, administrative, and economic missions.

South Korea, meanwhile, was liberated from Japan in 1945 and became an independent state in 1948 after three years of American military occupation. In the beginning, the Korean army was small in size and politically neutral. But the Korean War (1950-1953) and subsequent military confrontation with North Korea quickly transformed the Korean army into a dominant organization with more than 700,000 soldiers consuming over 50 percent of total governmental expenditures. In addition army officers became politicized as democratically-elected President Rhee Syngman co-opted the armed forces to adopt authoritarian measures and suppressed political opposition movements during the 1950s.

Similarly, the Philippines had one of the smallest and least politicized armies in Asia when the country attained formal independence from the United States in 1946. Increasing domestic insecurity from the late-1960s, however, brought about the organizational expansion of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the dissipation of democracy. President Marcos mobilized AFP officers to strengthen his power and extend his presidential term beyond the constitutional limit in the midst of rising Communist New People's Army (NPA) and Muslim Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) insurgencies during the 1970s.

Finally, the Taiwanese military actively engaged in domestic political and administrative affairs after the Kuomintang (KMT) government lost its battle with the Communist forces on mainland China and moved to the Formosa Island in 1949. From the beginning in Taiwan, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT party relied on the armed forces to maintain external and internal security through martial law. In sum, each of the four countries was confronted with either external or internal security challenges during the state-building period (1940s-1950s), which brought about the creation of authoritarian state apparatus and increasing participation in politics by the armed forces.

2) The Second Stage: Modes of the Military's Political Involvement

In the second chronological stage, I compare different paths of political engagement by the politicized officers, whether through coups and military dictatorships (*control*) or the military's political involvement as a junior partner under civilian authoritarian control (*participation*). In South Korea, highly politicized army officers

under the Rhee presidency in the 1950s staged a military coup d'etat in 1961 and established dictatorial rule. In a similar context, the Indonesian army became highly politicized in the 1950s, when President Sukarno declared martial law and brought ABRI officers into politics. In 1965, General Suharto dethroned Sukarno with a military coup and created a military dictatorship in Indonesia.

In contrast to the cases of South Korea and Indonesia, where army officers directly controlled political power, the Philippine and Taiwanese armed forces did not attempt to overthrow the civilian leadership during the same period. In Taiwan, army officers were kept under civilian leadership even though they were highly politicized as Chiang Kai-shek brought them into domestic political, administrative, and economic affairs. Similarly, AFP officers became deeply engaged in domestic political affairs when President Marcos declared martial law in 1971 and positioned the officers in key political positions. In sum, there was military's direct control of political power in South Korea and Indonesia, while the Taiwanese and the Philippine armed forces carried out their political participation under civilian guidance throughout the 1960s and 1970s.

3) The Third Stage: Military Withdrawal and Democratization

In the third historical stage of the military's political role, I examine the dynamics of military withdrawal from politics during democratization that occurred in a similar time-frame (1980s) except for Indonesia (late 1990s). In this historical stage of military withdrawal, I address different modes of the military's withdrawal from politics during democratic regime transition. Democratization in South Korea was set in motion in the mid-1980s when opposition political leaders and civil society groups pushed the military

dictator Chun Doo-whan for extensive political reforms. Since then, the democratization process in South Korea has been stable and far-reaching, and politicized officers withdrew from politics and were placed under democratically elected civilian leadership without major resistance. Likewise, democratization in Taiwan during the 1980s and 1990s was accomplished without any backfires from the army leadership. Even with significant differences in the regime transition between the two states, South Korea and Taiwan share similarity in terms of the armed forces' attitudes during their withdrawal from politics.[62]

On the other hand, democratization in the Philippines and Indonesia was highly unstable and the military's withdrawal from politics was far from complete. In the Philippines, democratically elected President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) suffered from leadership crises when segments in the AFP staged at least twelve coup attempts during her presidential term. In Indonesia, the ABRI, which had formally withdrawn from politics after Suharto stepped down in 1998, regained its political influence after a couple of years of democratic trial in the late-1990s and early-2000s. Even though the Philippines and Indonesia did not fall into military dictatorship, the democratization process was tarnished by army officers' recapturing of political influence.

62 One of the major differences between the two cases is that democratization in Taiwan was initiated and fostered by the political elites, while the process in South Korea was initiated and forwarded by opposition leaders and civil society groups represented by college students and labor unions. Democratization in Taiwan was done from above; in South Korea, from below.

4) The Fourth Stage: Military's Political Role after Democratization

In the final historical stage of civil-military relations, I explore the armed forces' political role under the democratically elected civilian leadership. More specifically, I examine how security threats surrounding each of the four countries affect the military's domestic political influence. In this section, I also examine how interactions among civilian leadership, civil society groups, and the top brass in the military determine the military's political role in the post-democratization era. I conclude my empirical study with some prospects for civil-military relations in the four countries in the near future.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I develop a structural theory of civil-military relations that identifies security threats as the primary independent variable, three major domestic actors—civilian leadership, the military, and civil society—as the intervening variables, and the military's domestic political role as the dependent variable. In the second half the chapter, I provide a research design for the empirical test of my theory. The four empirical cases and their division into four historical stages provide sufficient variations for the empirical testing.

Some of the limitations of this research should be mentioned. First, since I construct a structural theory of civil-military relations, micro-level explanations are largely sacrificed. That is to say, this dissertation does not provide close examination of key political actors' preferences and their individual decision-making process. This is inevitable since this study's primary purpose is to identify causal factors at the structural level. In addition, this dissertation does not deliberate my theory's applicability to other

cases in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe, and Africa. Nevertheless, cross-regional comparison is possible after a rigorous empirical test is made using the four Asian cases. Finally, the empirical study of my dissertation relies mostly on secondary sources and, as such, does not aim to furnish new data.

With these limitations in mind, I conduct the empirical tests of my theory and hypotheses in the following four chapters.

Chapter 2. Security Threats, State-Building, and the Military's Domestic Political Role

Introduction

In my structural theory of civil-military relations, I suggested that external and internal security threats affect the military's relative influence vis-à-vis other sectors in the domestic political arena. Security threats influence both the army and civilian leadership. Specifically, the presence of high security threats brings about the expansion of the military organization to the detriment of other domestic sectors, as a large portion of domestic resources are shifted to the armed forces. At the same time, high security threats result in the centralization of political power within one or a small number of political leaders, usually the head of the executive branch. Unfavorable security threats of a state provide civilian leaders with structural opportunities and incentives to become more authoritarian and take coercive measures to rule society. Civilian leaders find it easier to justify mobilizing the top brass in the military into the political arena to expand their political power when society faces severe security threats either domestically or internationally.

This chapter explores the effect of high security threats on the expansion of the military organization and its political role in the four countries under study—South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Each of the four states underwent a state-building process right after World War II and, in this process, faced mounting security threats with the onset of worldwide Cold War confrontations in the 1940s and 1950s. But the origin and nature of the security threats were different from country to country. South

Korea and Taiwan, for example, suffered from severe security threats both domestically and internationally. Indonesia had difficulty establishing a sovereign statehood due to socio-political cleavages along religious, ethnic, and geographic constellations. Finally, the Philippines benefited from favorable security conditions from the time of independence up until the late 1960s when Maoist communist insurgencies and Muslim separatist movements posed threats to the state. In sum, South Korea and Taiwan had high security threats both domestically and internationally, while Indonesia and the Philippines confronted domestic security challenges.

This chapter is composed of four sections. The first section examines the security threats and the rise of the Korean army as a politically powerful institution in South Korea from the late 1940s to the late 1950s. The second section explores the role of the Taiwanese military during the civil war on the mainland and after the retreat to Formosa Island in 1949. Section three examines changes in the political role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), from a politically neutral institution to a highly politicized body under the Marcos presidency during the 1960s and 1970s. Section four explores the Indonesian army's political role in the 1940s and early 1960s. In the conclusion, I summarize and compare major findings.

I. South Korea

With the end of World War II in 1945, the Korean peninsula was liberated from 35 years of Japanese colonial rule. The peninsula, however, soon became a focal point in the worldwide military and ideological confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two superpowers divided the Korean peninsula for temporary military

occupation along the 38th parallel, since neither wanted it to come under the other's influence.[63] The allegedly temporary occupation by the two superpowers, however, resulted in the establishment of two permanent sovereign states in Korea. On August 15, 1948, after general elections for the National Assembly,[64] the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea here) was established in the southern part, while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea here) was declared on September 9, 1948.[65] In South Korea, the National Assembly elected the first president, Rhee Syngman, who was one of the prominent leaders of the independence movements during the Japanese colonial rule. President Rhee represented the conservative elements in the society and was the United States' favorite due to his staunch anti-communism.

The defense force of South Korea was created under the American occupation period (1945-1948). During this time, the first military training school was established to teach English language and basic military skills and help facilitate the operations of the United States military government in Korea. This Military English Language Institute was replaced in 1946 by the South Korean National Defense Officers Training Academy, which, in turn, was reorganized into the Korean Military Academy in 1948.[66] In the

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63 On September 12, 1945, the United States built the Army Military Government in the southern part of the peninsula and ruled the territory until the South Korean government was established.

64 The National Assembly elections were held on May 10, 1948. The first National Assembly wrote the first written Korean Constitution.

65 For detailed information about the formation of the two Koreas, see Sungchul Yang, *The North and South Korean Political Systems: A Comparative Analysis* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

66 For the detailed description of establishment and development of the Korean defense forces between 1945-1948, see John P. Lovell, "The Military and Politics in Postwar Korea," in Edward Reynolds Wright, ed., *Korean Politics in Transition* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), pp. 153-199; Sejin Kim, *The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1971).

process of establishing the South Korean armed forces, the United States had a great impact on the country's military organization, training, and its overall political orientation. The Korean army was small—around 50,000 men—in August 1948. Military officers were not involved in politics but remained politically neutral.[67] Soon, however, the Korean army witnessed an unprecedented expansion through the end of the Korean War in 1953.

From the beginning of the state-building period, South Korea faced severe security threats, both internally and externally. Soon after the South Korean government was established, North Korean guerrilla forces began to infiltrate into South Korean territory, organizing and supporting pro-Communist guerrillas and violent uprisings by impoverished citizenry in major cities and peasants in the rural area.[68] In October 1948, for instance, a South Korean Constabulary regiment, indoctrinated by communist ideology, revolted against the government and occupied the cities of Yosu and Sunchon, located in the south-western part of the Korean peninsula. Although the Korean army put down the insurrection, hundreds of guerrilla forces escaped into the mountains to continue waging guerrilla warfare. In November of the same year, another revolt by a constabulary force took place in Taegu city, the south-eastern part of Korea. Here, too, the insurrections by the Korean Constabulary forces were quickly suppressed by the

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67 The Constitution prohibited active military personnel from assuming the prime minister or minister positions in the government.

68 Even before the inauguration of the First Republic in South Korea in August, 1948, pro-communist guerrilla forces were organized in South Korea. One of the most significant incidents was Cheju uprising, in which communist guerrillas swept police stations and government buildings. The South Korean constabulary forces put down the rebels. By the end of the incident, about 60,000 people, or one-fifth of the total population in Cheju Island, were killed. Oh, 1999, pp. 34-36.; John Merrill, "The Cheju-do Rebellion," *Journal of Korean Studies* (1980).

military units, but the incident revealed that guerrilla forces from North Korea were already infiltrating into South Korean territory before the Korean War broke out in 1950.

Immediately after these domestic insurrections, the National Assembly hurriedly introduced the National Security Law on December 1, 1948, and passed the law two months later. Article 1 of the law stated that the law warrants "the national security and interests" from the "enemy" of the state.[69] The enemy was defined in Article 5 as "any association, groups or organizations" that plotted against the state. The law was at first applied against the South Korean Labor Party and other pro-Communist groups. Later, however, the law was used by Rhee Syngman to suppress any political activities against his rule, including opposition political leaders, religious organizations, labor unions, student movements, and newspapers. In sum, from the beginning of the Republic of Korea, a series of domestic rebellions provided President Rhee with structural opportunities and incentives to become increasingly authoritarian and take coercive measures to cope with those security challenges.

In addition to increasing domestic guerrilla insurgencies, two international events in East Asia further exacerbated security environments in the nascent Republic. First, Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang government lost the civil war with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and retreated to Taiwan in 1949. Victorious Mao Tse-tung and the CCP proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland. The Rhee government felt a great threat from the rising Communists on the mainland. Second, the United States National Security Council made a decision to withdraw U.S. troops from

South Korea in April 1948. By June 1949, the United States pulled out its armed forces almost completely from South Korea, except for the Provisional Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) with around 500 personnel.[70] The withdrawal of the American military forces, coupled with Chinese communization, served to deteriorate South Korea's security environment significantly.

It was the Korean War, however, that brought tremendous changes to the organization of the armed forces and its domestic political role. As early as 1949, both Koreas were launching attacks and counterattacks along the 38th parallel. With the approval from Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-tung and with all the American forces already withdrawn from the South,[71] North Korean forces embarked on a massive attack upon South Korea on June 25, 1950. Even though the Korean army already numbered slightly over 100,000 at war's outbreak, they were so unprepared to fight that North Korean forces occupied Seoul, the capital city, within just three days.[72]

The Korean War lasted for three years and ended with no winning side but rather an agreement on an armistice. Korean society made tremendous sacrifices during the three years of war. The total number of deaths during the war added up to three million,

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69 Secretariat, House of Representatives, Republic of Korea, *The National Security Law* (December 1, 1948); also see Won-sun Pak, *Kukka Poanbop Yongu (The Study of the National Security Law), Vol. 2* (Seoul: Yoksa Bipyongsa, 1992), pp. 15-16.

70 *The United Nations Document*, A/936, Add. I, Vol. II, Annexes, p. 36.

71 Secretary of State Dean Acheson's January 1950 speech signified the United States' defensive perimeter in Asia as a containment policy. South Korea and Taiwan were excluded in this containment line, which gave Joseph Stalin a signal that the Korean peninsula was not strategically important for the United States. Acheson's defensive perimeter led Stalin to give permission to the North Korean leader Kim Il-sung to liberate South Korea. Dean Acheson, *Speech on the Far East* (January 12, 1950).

72 When the Korean War began, Korean military forces numbered slightly over 100,000 but most of them were poorly trained and equipped.

equal to 10 percent of the total population of the two Koreas.[73] The war formally ended with the armistice agreement between the United Nations Command (UNC) and the Communists on July 27, 1953. Although the armistice agreement did bring a precarious peace to the peninsula, it also aggravated the military and ideological confrontation between the two Koreas.

The Korean War made a major impact on the military organization and political settings in South Korea. First of all, it caused a massive expansion of the military organization.

Table 2-1: Expansion of Military Forces in South Korea, 1947 – 1954[74]

Year	**1947**	**1948**	**1949**	**1950**	**1953**	**1954**
Number of Military Forces	12.0	50.0	64.0	113.0	650.0	620.0

a) Numbers in thousands.
b) Police forces not included.

As Table 2-1 shows, during the time of state-building in 1948, the South Korean defense forces numbered around 50,000 men. Even at the beginning of the war, this number amounted to a little over 100,000 of poorly-equipped and trained forces.[75] The war,

[73] Specifically, almost three hundred thousands of military forces were killed in the war (South Korean forces: 227,000; armed forces under the command of the United Nations: 58,000). The North Korean side suffered loss of 500,000 military forces (North Korean forces: 300,000; People's Liberation Army: 200,000). For more detailed information, see Kenneth G. Clare, et al., *Area Handbook for the Republic of Korea* (Washington DC: GPO, 1969), pp. 300-301.

[74] Hochul Sohn, "Hanguk Jeonjaeng-gua Ideology Ji-hyung (The Korean War and the Ideological Terrain)," *Hanguk-gua Gukje-Jeong-chi (Korea and International Politics)* 6: 2 (1990), p. 22; Myunglim Park, "Hanguk-eui Gukga-Hyungsung, 1945-1948 (State-building in Korea)," *Korean Political Science Review* 29: 1 (1995), p. 220.

[75] Even though South Korea had 100,000 military personnel, only about 65,000 men were equipped with guns, but without any tanks and planes. In contrast, North Korean armed forces

however, drove the country toward total mobilization of domestic resources for the military buildup. At the end of the conflict, South Korea came to have almost 700,000 of heavily-armed forces. The Korean army became the best-organized state institution, consuming almost one-half of total governmental expenditures as Table 2-2 indicates.

The war fostered the preoccupation of military officers and the general public with a strong conservative and anti-communist ideology. These ideological settings allowed the military's coup d'etat in 1961, as the country was suffering from political and social turmoil right after President Rhee was forced to resign.

Table 2-2: Composition of Government Expenditure (%)[76]

Year	Civil	Defense	Others	Total
1953	29.3	62.0	8.7	100
1954	32.7	59.6	7.7	100
1955	37.6	48.7	13.7	100
1956	44.0	42.7	13.3	100
1957	40.3	46.8	12.9	100
1958	46.7	45.8	7.5	100
Average	38.4	50.9	10.6	

During the massive military build-up process, the United States became the most crucial supporter and builder of the South Korean army. Before the outbreak of the

numbered 150,000 trained by Soviet military advisors and equipped with about 240 Soviet-made tanks, more than 200 planes, and other heavy equipment from the Soviet Union. See, Robert T. Oliver, *Why War Came in Korea* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1950), pp. 1-22.; Young-Ho Lee, "The Politics of Democratic Experiment: 1948-1974," in Edward R. Wright ed., *Korean Politics in Transition* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), pp. 19-21.

[76] The Bank of Korea, *Economic Statistics Yearbook*, 1962, pp. 24-5; Yong-Pyo Hong, *State Security and Regime Security: President Syngman Rhee and the Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea, 1953-60* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), p. 110.

Korean War, the Korean peninsula had little strategic interest for America in East Asia.[77] The war, however, pushed the United States to consider the peninsula vital for the American security strategy. Right after the armistice agreement on October 1, 1953, South Korea and the United States signed a Mutual Defense Treaty in Washington D.C. From then on, the United States became the country's major patron. American military assistance to South Korean amounted to nearly $6 billion from 1950 to 1979, which was equivalent to almost 80 percent of Korean defense spending and 10 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP) in South Korea in the given period.[78]

In addition to the organizational expansion of the armed forces, three years of war left President Rhee Syngman an almost omnipotent figure in Korean politics. During the war, Rhee strengthened his political position and centralized political power; in all these efforts, the military was used by the president for his political purposes.

In centralizing political power, the Rhee regime actively exploited the communist threat from North Korea and anti-communist ideology during and after the war, satisfying two political purposes. First, internationally, his staunch anti-communist position helped obtain continuous American military and economic support. The United States needed a prominent political leader who had the experience of fighting for independence from Japanese colonial rule and therefore had a high regard among the general public. At the same time, the leader was supposed to have a strong anticommunist ideology. President Rhee satisfied all these qualifications. Therefore, President Rhee gained continuous support from the United States even when he became an authoritarian leader in South

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[77] See, U.S. Department of State, *Department of State Bulletin* (January 23, 1950), p. 115.

Korea. Second, domestically, the threat perception and antagonism against communist North Korea served as the unifying force of the general public and the military, and became a justification for the centralization of political power in his hands. In other words, the continuous threat from the North created the so-called 'rally effect' among the general public, who showed little antipathy to the increasingly authoritarian regime.

The first stage in the process of strengthening Rhee's power came during the 1952 presidential election, when the regime attempted to revise the Constitution to make the president elected through popular referendum, not by the National Assembly vote. Rhee tried to revise the Constitution for popular election because he did not have a broad support base within the National Assembly and within his own political party. Having a hostile relationship with the Assembly, he was certain to fail in the presidential election.[79] When the bill for constitutional amendment was proposed, it was overwhelmingly rejected in the National Assembly.[80] Afterwards, President Rhee mobilized the general public for anti-National Assembly demonstrations and adopted other various tactics to intimidate the opposition Assemblymen.

After his failure to amend the constitution to create a popular presidential election, Rhee turned to more heavy-handed tactics against the opposition Assemblymen. On May 15, 1952, he declared martial law in the Busan area, the temporary capital during

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78 Sung-joo Han, "South Korea and the United States: The Alliance Survives," *Asian Survey* 20: 11 (November, 1980), p. 1076.

79 President Rhee had hostile relationship with National Assembly from the beginning of the First Republic in 1948 due to the differences in the formation of government. A dominant number of Assembly men favored a cabinet political system, while Rhee pursued a strong presidential power.

80 143 of the votes were against the constitutional amendment, while only 19 voted in favor of the amendment.

the war, claiming that communist guerrillas penetrated the area. He used the military police to arrest 50 assemblymen for allegedly receiving political bribes from the communist groups. With the military and the police encircling the Assembly building, President Rhee successfully forced the National Assembly to pass the constitutional amendment. With a new constitution, Rhee was elected as president for the second time in the August 1952 presidential election, winning about five million votes (74% of total votes). He kept hold of his presidency by using the military to suppress opposition political leaders, going so far as to move two army divisions to the Busan area even in a time of war. Worse yet, the constitutional amendment set a precedent for succeeding political leaders to revise the constitution based on political expediency.

The forced constitutional amendment in 1952 created tensions between President Rhee and the top brass in the military, as a number of high-ranking officers opposed mobilizing the army for his political ambitions. The military leadership was divided over the issue of the army's political role. One group of officers, led by General Lee Jong-chan, wanted the armed forces to maintain political neutrality. They opposed the politicization of the officer corps and Rhee's use of the military. Another group of officers, including Park Jung-hee, yearned for a deeper political involvement to overthrow corrupt civilian political leadership and establish military-led government. One thing in common of the two groups, however, was that they came to express their own political attitudes. The growing political activism among younger officers was

eventually manifested as a coup d'etat in 1961 when the civilian leadership lost political control.[81]

In the face of more politically active military officers, President Rhee felt he needed to build a mechanism to control the military leadership. In doing this, he relied on his personal charisma and political skill of manipulating factions within the military. Rhee spent 30 years in exile in the United States during Japanese rule and became the first president of the Korean Provisional Government in exile.[82] He was respected both by the general public and by many military officers for his leadership for the independence movement. Rhee was the only strong man in civilian political leadership and had charisma enough to control high-ranking officers.

In addition, Rhee strengthened his authority over the military by circulating key positions within the army to secure his personal control. He removed uncooperative officers such as General Lee Jong-chan and General Choi Kyong-rok from the army leadership and instead placed personally loyal officers in key military positions. Moreover, he created a new military police unit within the Department of Defense in

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[81] Even before the May 1961 coup d'etat, a group of young military officers led by Park Jung-hee committed failed coup attempts. The first coup attempt took place on November 20, 1959, but failed as Park's position was moved to commander of the logistics base. Another coup was planned in 1960, but was postponed as president Rhee was dethroned as a result of student revolution in April, 1960. See, Yong-won Han, "Gunbuui Jedojok Sungjanggua Jeongchijuk HaengdongJuui (The rise of the military institution and its political activism)," in Bae-ho Han, ed., *Hanguk Hyondae Jungchi Ron I (Modern Korean Politics I)* (Seoul: Orum, 2000), p. 289-292.

[82] In addition, he had highly-regarded educational background, with Masters Degree at Harvard and Doctoral degree in International Law at Princeton University.

order to oversee not only the entire armed forces but also civilian politicians.[83] All the key positions within the military were determined by Rhee's political considerations.

Most importantly, Rhee astutely exploited the factional struggles within the armed forces. From the beginning of the Republic, there were several distinctive groups within the military: (1) Chinese-origin officers who fought the Japanese army on mainland China and Manchuria, either as part of the Chinese Nationalist army or as independent guerrilla forces; (2) Japanese-origin officers who joined the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II; (3) Manchurian-origin officers from the Manchurian Defense Force under Japanese influence; and (4) North Korean-origin officers who escaped from North Korea before and during the Korean War.[84]

In the beginning of the Republic, Rhee depended mainly on Chinese-origin officers until they were overwhelmed by the Japanese- and Manchuria-origin soldiers. The Chinese faction had strong political ties with Kim Koo, a prominent political leader who had trained the Chinese-origin military officers during the independence war against Japan.[85] The faction of Chinese-origin officers, however, lost its power-base when Kim was assassinated. The next faction that Rhee chose was the officers with a Japanese background. There were two reasons that Rhee relied on the Japanese faction: first, to have a better image of a well-trained and equipped Korean Army; second, to balance the

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[83] South Korea, *History of the Department of National Defense* (Seoul: Sungkwang-sa, 1956), p. 373.

[84] Se-Jin Kim, *The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1971), pp. 40-63.

[85] Kim Koo was one of the most prominent political leaders for the anti-Japanese rule in Korea. He organized and trained Korean soldiers in mainland China to fight the Japanese forces. Kim, however, was assassinated during the early years of the state-building period in South Korea. With Kim's death, the officers of the Chinese origin also lost their political influence.

once-dominant Chinese faction.[86] The experiences of the 1952 political crisis in the constitutional amendment process and martial law led Rhee to select the third military faction, the officers with Manchurian background. Along with the Japanese-origin officers, the Manchurian-origin officers brought to Korean politics values quite contrary to democracy. These officers with Japanese and Manchurian background brought into Korean politics the military's political activism that had been cultivated in the Japanese army during the two world wars.

Rhee's control and mobilization of the military officers for his personal purposes had been so successful that he never lost his personal control over the military leadership until the last moment of his presidency. With his increasingly authoritarian and coercive political tactics, however, he isolated himself from the general public and many military officers. In addition to the constitutional amendment in 1952 for popular presidential election, Rhee proposed another amendment bill to the National Assembly on September 6, 1954, which aimed to abolish the two-term restriction on presidential tenure for the first president of South Korea. This amendment would, in effect, enable a president to hold office for life. This bill was passed in the National Assembly on November 29, 1954. Such undemocratic practices by the Rhee government, however, eventually eroded his political legitimacy.

In addition to the Rhee regime's undemocratic practices and the use of military officers for his personal purposes, the economic situation had a negative impact on his

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[86] The Japanese-origin faction within the Korean Army had tremendous impact on Korean politics mainly due to the fact that the office group brought to Korea the Japanese Army's political orientation during World War II. The 1961 coup d'etat was carried out by young military officers who had the Japanese military background.

political position. Following the end of the war, the South Korean economy showed no indication of significant improvement. After 1953, North Korea boasted an incredible record of economic recovery. By 1960, national income in North Korea reached 680 percent of the 1946 level, while gross industrial output increased 2,100 percent for the same period.[87] Even though it is difficult to accept North Korean economic indicators at face value, it was undeniable that North Korea surpassed South Korea in terms of economic performance and military buildup.

Table 2-3: Average Growth Rate in Two Koreas, 1953-60[88]

	North Korea	**South Korea**
National Income	21.0%	4.9%
Income per capita	17.1%	2.7%

In contrast to North Korea, South Korea showed few signs of economic recovery. Even with a large amount of economic assistance from the United States throughout the 1950s, the South lagged far behind mainly due to the lack of viable economic plans and rampant political corruption. The GNP growth rate in South Korea was 5.2 percent in 1954; 4.0 percent in 1955; and 0.3 percent in 1956, while the inflation rate was 26.4, 51.0, and 42.9 percent for the same years. Rhee's failure to implement a sound economic recovery plan significantly weakened his legitimacy among the general public.

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87 Since the end of the Korean War, North Korea carried out two economic plans to be accomplished by 1960. In the first plan period (the Three Year Plan, 1954-56), North Korea had a 220 percent increase in national income and 280 percent increase in gross industrial product. During the second plan period (the Five Year Plan, 1956-60), national income increased 210 percent and gross industrial product by 340 percent. See, Joseph S. Chung, "North Korea's Seven Year Plan (1961-1970): Economic Performance and Reforms," *Asian Survey* 12: 6 (1972).

To make matters worse, Rhee's main political base, the Liberal Party (LP), split between hardliners and softliners during the late 1950s. The softliners tried to recover western-style democracy and pursued more moderate measures for the political opposition, while the hardliners wanted to use more heavy-handed approaches to suppress the politically active general public, especially student demonstrations against the Rhee regime. But the decisive factor that ousted Rhee was the military's decision not to follow Rhee regime's order to put down student demonstrations. By this time, the military as an institution had already risen as a veto power against the civilian leadership. In Chapter Three, I discuss the process of President Rhee's ouster, subsequent political turmoil in the Second Republic, and the military coup d'etat in 1961.

II. Taiwan

The Republic of China was established with the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911. Afterwards, the first Chinese republic with modern statehood had to deal with severe internal and external security threats until it retreated to Formosa Island in 1949. Internally, the central government did not gain control over its territory, as influential warlords ruled most of the provinces of mainland China. According to one estimate, there existed more than 1,300 warlords and 140 regional military uprisings during the early decades of the republic.[89] In addition, the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) government had to fight a Communist revolt throughout the 1930s and the 1940s.

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[88] Pong Lee, "An Estimate of North Korea's National Income," *Asian Survey* 12: 6 (June 1972), pp. 518-526.; The Bank of Korea, *Economic Statistics Yearbook* (Seoul: The Bank of Korea, 1962), p. 12.

To make matters worse, the Japanese invasion of mainland China in 1937 in effect placed the country under total anarchy. While facing these extreme internal and external threats, the army of the Republic of China played a decisive role in the political and nation-building processes, not only on the mainland but also after the retreat to Formosa Island. Senior officers in the army became increasingly influential actors in domestic politics as the country struggled with mounting external and internal security threats.

Since the inception of the republic, the KMT government had to wage multi-front warfare. In addition to fighting burgeoning provincial warlords in the 1920s and the Japanese military in the 1930s and 1940s, the KMT government also had to wage a long battle with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and People's Liberation Army (PLA) on the mainland until its retreat to Taiwan in 1949.[90] When the KMT withdrew to Taiwan, nearly 600,000 soldiers and 600,000 civilian refugees also moved to the island.

The end of civil war between the KMT and the CCP in 1949 did not resolve the internal battles between the two Chinese governments, but became even more intense after two sovereign states were established in Taipei and Peking. The KMT government had to be concerned about constant internal and external threats and also its regime survival. Internally, it had to deal with the pressure from native Taiwanese who were not cooperative but preferred independence rather than incorporation into a nationalist China. The native Taiwanese perceived the arrival of the Kuomintang government and its rule as another form of colonialism by another external authority, as Japan had done for

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[89] Hung-mao Tien, *Government and Politics in Kuomintang China: 1927-1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 9.

[90] The Chinese Communist Party was formally established in 1921 and, later, the Party set up its own army, the Red Army, in 1927.

decades.[91] The mainland Chinese, an ethnic minority, monopolized key positions in political, economic, and military arenas. Externally, the KMT had to cope with the increasing threats from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the PLA as the latter pledged to liberate the island and truly end the civil war.

When Japan was defeated in the Pacific War in 1945, Formosa Island came under Chinese rule.[92] During September and October of 1945, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched the KMT officials and the armed forces to the island to replace the Japanese occupation forces and establish the Chinese governmental authority. The KMT government appointed General Chen Yi as the chief administrator of the Taiwan Provincial Executive Office and, at the same time, he became Taiwan Garrison Commander.[93] General Chen was entrusted with extensive powers over the areas of civil administration, judicial authority, and military command. The Chen administration showed little respect for the native Taiwanese or their living conditions that had seriously deteriorated during the Japanese occupation. Even though provincial and local elections were held in 1946, the ethnic Taiwanese did not have any decision-making power over important political issues, and virtually all the important posts were monopolized by the mainland Chinese.

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91 Taiwan had three major subethnic groups: (1) about 166,000 aborigines (non-Chinese); (2) Taiwanese Chinese who migrated during the Ming Dynasty in the 17th century; and (3) mainland Chinese who arrived to the island around 1949 along with the KMT government. As of the 1940s, mainland Chinese consisted of about 12-15 percent of total population in Taiwan. For Taiwan's ethnic distribution, see, John F. Copper, *Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

92 In 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek issued a joint declaration that Taiwan and its surrounding islands were to be placed under China. Later, this declaration was confirmed in 1945 at Potsdam. The KMT forces captured the island in October 1945.

93 Monte R. Bullard, *The Soldiers and the Citizen: The Role of the Military in Taiwan's Development* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 76.

The corrupt and incompetent Chen administration adopted heavy-handed approaches to governing the island, which provoked demonstrations for self-government by the Taiwanese natives. On February 28, 1947, they revolted against Chen's rule. A series of violent conflicts between ethnic Taiwanese and the KMT authority began when General Chen Yi decided to nationalize businesses on the island. The uprising escalated into even more violent riots against the KMT armed forces. In response, Chen Yi declared martial law and brutally put down the revolt. It is estimated that more than 60,000 people participated and, according to an official figure, more than 6,000 were killed in the uprising.[94]

Chiang Kai-shek initially defended General Chen Yi and charged that the Chinese Communist Party and the Taiwanese natives trained by the Japanese army were behind the riots. Shortly after the February 28th Uprising, General Chen stepped down as chief administrator, and civilian administrators were sent to placate the enraged Taiwanese. However, the incident left a deep schism between the native Taiwanese and the mainland Chinese for decades. This ethnic tension continued to become a major source of domestic instability as most of the key positions in the party, government, and the military continued to be monopolized by the mainlanders. Of 10 KMT Central Standing Committee members, for example, there was no member of Taiwanese origin throughout the 1950s and 1960s. There were only two Taiwanese out of 21 in CSC membership in

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94 George H. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed* (Boston: Riverside Press, 1965); Peter R. Moody, *Political Change on Taiwan: A Study of Ruling Party Adaptability* (New York: Praeger, 1992). Some records indicate that more than 10,000 Taiwanese were killed in the February 28th Uprising. See Alan M. Wachman, *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).

1970 as summarily noted in Table 2-4.[95] The situation in the legislative bodies was similar to the executive branch. Both the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, which had been originally elected in 1947 on the mainland, were dominated by the mainlanders.[96] After 1949, elections for both bodies were temporarily brought to a halt since they were assumed to represent not only Taiwan but also the entire territory of the mainland. The KMT government never imagined that it would stay in Taiwan forever but anticipated retaking the mainland territory by force in the near future.

Table 2-4: Taiwanese in the KMT Central Standing Committee, 1952-1970[97]

Year	Total CSC Members	No. of Taiwanese	% Taiwanese
1952	10	0	0%
1970	21	2	9%

The monopoly of key positions by ethnic Chinese was also conspicuous in the KMT military institution. As Table 2-5 points out, ethnic Taiwanese constituted a majority at the private soldier level. But the higher-ranking positions were dominated by the Chinese mainlanders. Mainlanders monopolized all the leadership positions in the

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95 Hung-mao Tien, "The Transformation of an Authoritarian Party-State: Taiwan's Developmental Experiences," *Issues and Studies* 25: 7 (July 1989), p. 116.

96 In addition to the National Assembly that has constitutional authority to elect the president, the Taiwanese political system consists of five governmental branches (Yuan): (1) Legislative Yuan that passes laws (The membership of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan were frozen until the KMT government retake the mainland China and hold new elections in all the provinces of China); (2) Executive Yuan that, headed by the President, holds the power to execute laws; (3) Judicial Yuan that is the highest court; and (5) Control Yuan that is responsible for evaluating the public officials; and (5) Examination Yuan that administers the recruitment and selection of civil servants. Gary M. Davidson, *A Short History of Taiwan: The Case for Independence* (Westport: Praeger, 2003), pp. 83-85.

97 Hung-mao Tien, "Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan," in Harvey Feldman, Michael Y. M. Kau, and Ilpyong J. Kim, eds., *Taiwan in a Time of Transition* (New York: Paragon House, 1988), pp. 12-14.

army until the 1970s when Chiang Ching-kuo assumed political leadership and embarked on slow but steady Taiwanization in civilian politics and in the military leadership.

Table 2-5: Ethnic Composition of the Military, 1950-1987[98]

Year	Generals		Colonels		Lieutenants		Soldiers	
	M	T	M	T	M	T	M	T
1950-65	97.7	1.3	90.4	9.6	86.2	13.8	47.2	52.8
1965-78	92.6	7.4	81.2	18.8	65.3	34.7	31.6	68.4
1978-87	84.2	15.8	67.4	32.6	51.7	48.3	21.3	78.7

a) M=Mainlanders; T=Taiwanese

Some Taiwanese activists who opposed KMT rule went abroad to form organizations for Taiwan's independence. While such groups were established in Japan and the United States from the 1940s until 1980s, their influence on the Taiwanese people was minimal due to the Chiang regime's harsh punishment on any discussion over the issue of Taiwan independence.[99] The February 28 Uprising and the ensuing ethnic tensions between ethnic Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders became major sources of internal instability and threats for the legitimacy of the KMT rule throughout the 1950s.

An even more serious security challenge for the KMT government, however, was external, that is, the Mao's Chinese Communist Party and its People's Liberation Army (PLA). On October 1, 1949, the CCP proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC)

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98 Tien, 1988, p. 14.

99 One example of punishments by the KMT was that of professor Peng Ming-min, a well-known political science professor at the National Taiwan University, who advocated the Taiwanese independence. Peng was sentenced 8 years in prison, but later was released due to international pressure. He moved to the United States to continue Taiwan's independence movement. In 1993, he returned to Taiwan to become a candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for the 1996 presidential election. See, Ming-min Peng, *A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader* (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1972).

on the mainland, with Peking as its capital. The KMT government not only lost the mainland territory, but also faced the imminent attack by PLA forces without any external support. Right after the KMT retreated to Taiwan, Chinese communists wanted to finish the civil war and prepared to "liberate" the island. The Third Field Army of the PLA planned for an amphibious attack. PLA forces preparing for the invasion were reported to have numbered more than 300,000. U.S. intelligence estimated that the PLA had organized enough troops and vessels to launch an invasion across the Taiwan Straits. The KMT government estimated the total number of PLA troops to be 585,000.[100] The CCP expected Taiwan to be liberated by 1950.

In such a difficult situation, the United States tried to distance itself from Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT government. From a strategic point of view, Washington was not concerned with whether Chiang Kai-shek or Mao Tse-tung would rule China; the U.S. simply wanted a strong and stable government that could check Japanese military expansionism in East Asia. When Chiang Kai-shek lost China, the Truman administration modified its previous China policy by terminating its security commitment to the Nationalist Chiang government and accepting the new political reality on the mainland. In August 1949, the United States was ready to develop a cooperative relationship with the CCP if the Communists terminated their relationship with the Soviet Union.[101] In reality, the Truman administration thought Mao Tse-tung "might well turn

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[100] Jon W. Huebner, "The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan," *The China Quarterly* 110 (1987), p. 272.

[101] Chiao C. Hsieh, *Strategy for Survival: The Foreign Policy and External Relations of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1949-1979* (London: The Sherwood Press, 1985), p. 81.

out to be the 'Asian Tito'."[102] So, the powerful pro-KMT China Lobby in the U.S. Congress did not improve security conditions for Taiwan. As a result, without support from the United States, the KMT government fully expected that PLA forces would attack in the Spring of 1950.

It was the Korean War, however, that changed U.S. security policy toward Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek's strategy for mainland China. The outbreak of war in June 1950 dramatically changed the American perception of Chinese Communists and their political aims.[103] In addition, the war significantly changed the United States' strategic interest in Taiwan and in the overall security of East Asia and the Pacific regions. The U.S. Joint Chief of Staff recommended resuming military assistance to the KMT government, and the U.S. Seventh Fleet was dispatched to the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. Congress also authorized the setting up of a U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group for the KMT government. In 1954, the United States and Taiwan signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, and Washington poured massive military and economic aid into the country. Under the Defense Treaty, the U.S. assisted the KMT government to modernize its weapons, equipment, and training. Likewise, the Korean War changed the American perception on Mao's communist forces and the strategic interest of Taiwan.

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[102] John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), p. 37.

[103] The People's Liberation Army was engaged in the Korean War in October 1950 under the slogan of "Resist America and aid Korea." In addition to the Korean War, the Sino (PRC)-Soviet Pact, signed in February 1950, also influenced the U.S. perception on the Communist China. With the signing of the Pact, the Soviet Union returned Soviet-held properties in Manchuria and

Table 2-6: U. S. Economic and Military Assistance, 1949 – 1962 (in U.S. $ million)[104]

	1949-1952	**1953-1956**	**1957-1960**
Economic Aid	467.8	431.6	421.0
Military Aid	48.0	1007.3	713.1
Total	515.8	1438.9	1134.1

a) Numbers include Grants and Loans

The Korean War had the effect of diverting the Chinese Communists' attention away from Formosa Island for some time. Meanwhile, the war provided Chiang's KMT government with a window of opportunity to retake the mainland. Therefore, with the outbreak of the Korean War and with help from the United States, Chiang Kai-shek developed a strategy of counter-attack against the Communist China to recover the mainland, the essential foreign policy goal of the KMT government throughout the Cold War years. Chiang Kai-shek always believed that the retreat to Taiwan was not permanent but a temporary stay. The KMT government deployed its forces closer to the south-eastern part of PRC. Military bases with about 100,000 troops were installed on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, the off-shore islands of the mainland. Furthermore, the KMT launched commando raids and reconnaissance flights over the mainland Chinese territory. They carried out bombing campaigns on south of the Changjiang (Yangtze River), including Shanghai, the most populated city in the south-eastern part of the mainland. Throughout January and February of 1950, the KMT forces dropped some

promised a $300 million loan to CCP. See, Michael B. Yahuda, *China's Role in World Affairs* (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 43-64.

104 David W. Chang, "U.S. Aid and Economic Progress in Taiwan," *Asian Survey* 5: 3 (1965), pp. 152-160.

40,000 pounds of bombshells on Shanghai, killing about 1,400 people and causing heavy property damage.[105]

The KMT government also employed guerrilla warfare tactics in the mainland during the Korean War. Chiang Kai-shek's government estimated that as of June 1950, there were about 400,000 anti-communist forces fighting on the mainland. In August of the same year, the number increased up to 1,600,000, of which over 55 percent were under the KMT command.[106] It was estimated that there were 1,800 battles on the mainland, resulting in 300,000 CCP/PLA casualties.[107] Chiang Kai-shek's strategy of guerrilla warfare to retake the mainland, however, was not successful because the United States did not want the two Chinese forces to enter into another full-blown war and because the guerrilla warfare faded away with the violent crises in Quemoy.

After the end of the Korean War, Communist China redirected its military forces and adopted more aggressive policies toward the KMT on Taiwan. Between 1954 and 1958, the PLA bombed the islands of Quemoy and Matsu where the KMT military bases had been built. During the first Quemoy crisis in 1954, the PLA fired 17,243 rounds of shells on the islands as a form of military demonstration against the Mutual Defense Treaty between the KMT and the United States.[108] In the second Quemoy crisis that broke on August 23, 1958, PLA forces launched an even heavier attack. Under such an extreme security crisis situation, the KMT government stepped up its military build-up

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105 Huebner, 1987, p. 261.
106 Hollington K. Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek* (Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1953), p. 522.
107 Hsieh, 1985, pp. 91-92.
108 *The China Yearbook* (Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1979), p. 88.

from 500,000 men to 1,000,000 by 1958.[109] For both the KMT on Taiwan and CCP on the mainland, the 1950s was a decade of the most severe security threat environments, with both entities on the verge of entering into full-scale warfare.

In such a daunting security situation, virtually all the political powers were concentrated in Chiang Kai-shek's hands and the military was mobilized by Chiang for his political purposes. His political authority had already been built up before the Nationalist forces moved to Taiwan. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China and the founder of the KMT, died in 1925, and Chiang Kai-shek was elected to the presidency three years later. In 1938, he became the Director-General of the KMT. During the intervening decade, Chiang's political power within the party was firmly established through his control of the Whampoa Military Academy. Sun Yat-sen sent Chiang to Russia to study the organization of the Soviet Army and the Bolshevik party organization. Under the guidance of the Soviet military advisors, the Whampoa Military Academy was established in Canton and Chiang Kai-shek was appointed as the first superintendent of the Academy. Chiang's connection with the Military Academy was crucial for him to have firm control over the KMT government, when political fights within the party took place right after Sun Yat-sen's death.[110]

Chiang Kai-shek consolidated his political leadership within the KMT by manipulating cliques within the party, the military and the business sector. There were

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109 For more detailed records on the Quemoy and Matsu crises, see, Tsou Tang, *The Embroilment over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang, and Dulles* (Salt Lake: University of Utah Press, 1959).

110 After Sun Yat-sen died the KMT party split along with three powerful figures, Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Han-min and Wang Ching Wei. Chiang was the most influential figure because he had control over the party army. Hu died in 1936, Wang in 1944. See, Hsieh, 1985, p. 17.

four major cliques in the party: the C.C. Clique, the Whampoa Clique, the Blueshirts, and the Political Study Clique that had dominated the KMT party politics from the 1920s. Among them, the Whampoa Clique served as Chiang's military power base, as it was made up of the graduates of the military academy that Chiang was instrumental in founding. Chiang's influence further increased as members of the Whampoa Clique moved up the ladders of the military and party hierarchies.[111]

As Chiang consolidated his leadership within the KMT during the 1920s and 1930s, the military became his most important political asset, since it had become more and more important in the governmental policy-making process. Senior army officers' influence within the KMT government had grown in the course of fighting against the warlords,[112] the Communists, and later the Japanese Army. Already in 1929, the military presence within the KMT was overwhelming as they held 280,000 memberships, while civilian membership totaled only 266,000.[113] The army's influence in the KMT party also rose as Mao's communist forces embarked on armed struggles with the KMT and as Japanese forces invaded the mainland.

The Army's political and social role further increased after the retreat to Taiwan. With the presence of serious internal and external security threats, the KMT government put key constitutional elements on hold with the declaration of martial law on May 20, 1949, which gave the military the right to intervene in the social and political arenas.

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[111] Keith Maguire, *The Rise of Modern Taiwan* (Sydney: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 19-21.

[112] When the Nationalist Army was anchored in the province of Guangdong, they had to face three major warlord groups: the Zhil faction, the Fengtien forces, and the Gouminjun. Even though the KMT forces defeated the warlords, the KMT's control was still limited to the country's south and south-eastern parts.

Furthermore, through the emergency legislation in 1950, the KMT government created the Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC) within the Ministry of National Defense to implement all aspects of martial law and maintain domestic security order.

Under martial law, political activists critical of the KMT regime and Chiang Kai-shek were tried and sentenced by military tribunals, along with those who committed criminal offenses. Between 1950 and 1986, about 10,000 criminal cases involving civilians were tried in Taiwanese military courts.[114] In addition, Military Training Offices were established in schools at all levels, including universities, to carry out military education and political studies to build support for the KMT rule. Furthermore, the army built its own network of newspapers, television and radio studios, as well as publishing company.[115] Since its retreat to Formosa Island, the KMT government mobilized virtually all its people and available domestic resources for the military buildup. As a result, Taiwanese army became the most influential and best organized institution in the country. In addition, the coercive state apparatus was extensively engaged in the governing process during the early years of the state-building in Taiwan.

In conclusion, the KMT government was under severe internal and external security threats from the beginning of the Chinese Republic in the mainland. From the 1920s until its withdrawal to Taiwan, it had to fight provincial warlords who controlled most of the territory, the Chinese Communist insurgents, and Japanese troops that invaded mainland China. The security threats were even more intimidating after the

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113 Patrick Cavendish, "The 'New China' of the Kuomintang," in Jack Gray, ed., *Modern China's Search for a Political Form* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 175.
114 Maguire, 1998, p. 34.

KMT's retreat to the Formosa Island. And, in this situation, one of the most significant consequences was the expansion of the military institution. In addition, continuing security threats resulted in the concentration of all political powers onto one political leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who brought the top brass in the military into civilian political affairs.

III. The Philippines

After centuries of colonial rule by Spain and later by the United States, the Philippine Commonwealth was established on November 1935. When World War II ended, the United States transferred sovereignty to the Philippine people so that the country started as an independent republic on July 4, 1946. The armed forces of independent Philippines were organized with heavy U.S. influence. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was originally created in 1935 under the guidance of General Douglas MacArthur and, therefore, owed significantly to the U.S. army's organization, ideology, and political orientation.[116] From its establishment in the 1940s up to the point of President Ferdinand Marcos' declaration of martial law in 1972, the Philippines had been one of the most democratic countries in Asia.[117] In addition, the AFP was the least

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115 M. Taylor Fravel, "Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan's Democratization," *Armed Forces and Society* 29: 1 (2002), p. 62.

116 In 1935, the National Defense Act was passed and an American Military Mission led by General MacArthur created the program for establishing the Philippine Armed Forces. In 1941, the AFP was incorporated into the United States Armed Forces to fight Japanese invasion. Viberto Selochan, "The Armed Forces of the Philippines and Political Instability," in Viberto Selochan, ed., *The Military, the State, and Development in Asia and the Pacific* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 85.

117 For the United States' role in the establishment of democracy in the Philippines, see Jose Veloso Abueva, "Filipino Democracy and the American Legacy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 428 (1976), pp. 114-133.

politically oriented army in the region and was placed under the control of the democratically elected civilian leaders.[118]

It was President Marcos who made AFP officers politically active and influential when he co-opted them into the domestic political arena throughout the 1970s. Under the martial law regime, Marcos became an authoritarian ruler and used increasingly oppressive measures against opposition politicians and the general public. In this process, the military had been the most crucial actor supporting Marcos's regime until he was forcefully stepped down in 1986. High levels of domestic security threat environments made possible the increasingly authoritarian Marcos and the politically influential military during the 1960s and 1970s. In this section I explain how the security threat environments as a structural cause gave rise to the centralization of political power in Marcos' hands and the expansion of the military and its domestic political role.

Mainly due to their geographic isolation from the Asian continent by seas, the Philippines faced few serious external security threats for decades after independence. Moreover, the United States became the guarantor of the Philippine security from any external aggression. The Philippines has been one of the major allies of the United States in East Asia from the beginning, cemented by two sets of military agreements, the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947 and the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951. Through the MBA, the American air and naval bases were stationed in the Philippines from 1947 until the early 1990s. In addition, the Philippines received various types of

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[118] The 1935 Constitution prohibited the active military personnel from being engaged in partisan political activity.

military assistance from the United States through the defense treaty. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. assumed the responsibility for Philippine security.

The major source of security threats came from the domestic arena from the beginning of its Republic. The first domestic threat that resulted in the AFP's role expansion was the Hukbalahap (or Huk) rebellion in the 1940s and 1950s. The Huks originally emerged as People's Anti-Japanese Army to wage guerrilla warfare against the Japanese aggression during World War II. After the war ended, however, the Huks were not recognized as a legitimate political organization, but instead were deprived of several congressional seats that had been gained by the Hukbalahap leaders at the 1946 elections. The Huks thereafter resumed their armed resistance against the Philippine government.

The Huk rebellion, however, was not a serious threat to President Ramon Magsaysay, elected to the presidency in 1953. Magsaysay's strategy of combining a military counterinsurgency program with positive economic inducements to the insurgents significantly reduced the influence of the Huks during the 1950s.[119] The experience of the Hukbalahap rebellion in the 1950s, however, resulted in the expansion of the military organization and its role. The original size of the AFP increased from 37,000 soldiers with a $70.8 million military budget in 1948 to 59,000 men with $572 million budget in 1970.[120] In addition, the AFP assumed responsibilities beyond the national security including officers' participation in local governments and economic development programs.

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[119] Carl H. Lande, "The Political Crisis," in John Bresnan ed., *Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 130.
[120] Gretchen Casper, *Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1995), p. 88.

The Philippines' internal security significantly deteriorated during the 1960s and 1970s. The most serious threats came from the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) which was formed in December 1968 and its New People's Army (NPA) organized in 1969. The CPP was qualitatively different from the previous communist party in that it adopted the strategy of Maoist guerrilla warfare in rural areas and pledged to wage armed struggle to overthrow the central government. Even though the CPP originated in the Hukbalahap movement, it was organized and led by highly educated elites and was able to build a nation-wide organization.[121] In addition, the CPP gained popularity among the general public by advocating various socio-economic reform programs, including land reform. Within five years of its establishment, the CPP opened 20 guerrilla war fronts in seven provinces outside Manila, including northern, central, and southern Luzon, Mindanao, and the eastern and western Visayas.[122] The number of clashes between the AFP and the NPA guerrillas gradually increased until martial law was declared in 1972.

Table 2-7 shows how fast the CPP and NPA increased their strength and became widespread throughout the archipelago especially after Marcos declared martial law in 1972. The CPP/NPA became most influential during the mid-1980s as it posed a serious security threat to the Marcos regime and to the newly democratically elected Corazon Aquino government during the late 1980s (see Chapter Four).

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121 Jose Maria Sison, professor of the University of the Philippines, organized the Labor Party in 1962 and the Nationalist Youth in 1964. After losing his position at the University, Sison became the leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

Table 2-7: CPP/NPA and MNLF Strengths, 1968-1986[123]

Year	CPP/NPA Strength	MNLF Strength
1968	35	
1970	245	
1972	1,320 (in 2 provinces)	14,100
1974	1,800	14,000
1976	1,200 (in 31 provinces)	6,900
1978	2,700	20,000
1980	5,621 (in 43 provinces)	16,000
1982	7,000 (in 60 provinces)	13,130
1984	10,570	9,179
1986	24,430	19,833

In the meantime, Muslim separatist movements in Mindanao, the southern provinces of the Philippines, were also increasing in size and the scope of their operations (see Table 2-7). They had centuries-old historical legacies, but the direct cause of their reappearance was rooted in the 1960s. At this time, the increasing influx of Christian Filipinos into traditional Muslim territories raised religious, cultural, and economic confrontations between the two religious groups. Violent clashes between the two began to occur: the Corregidor incident in 1968, Cotabato in 1970 over the issue of land ownership, and violence during the 1971 election campaign.[124] Both Christian and Muslim politicians mobilized their private armed bands to win elections. Grievances among the Muslim population increased as the central government sided with the Christian immigrants supporting their political and economic rights.

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[122] Richard J. Kessler, *Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 54.

[123] Larry A. Niksch, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines* (Washington DC: Library of Congress, July 1, 1985), p. 36; Office of the Minister of National Defense, Philippines, *OSND Statistical Data* (Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 1987); for MNLF Strength, see Office of the Minister of National Defense, Philippines, 1987, p. 4.

In 1968, the same year the CPP was formed, Udtog Matalam, a prominent Muslim leader in the southern part of the archipelago, announced the formation of the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) and called for the establishment of a Muslim independent state covering the provinces of Sulu, Palawan, and Mindanao.[125] While the NPA increased its size and influence throughout the islands, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) became a more serious security threat to the central government in the southern provinces during the mid-1970s. By 1972-1973, the MNLF emerged as a well-organized political and military organization and, with the declaration of martial law, engaged in full-blown armed struggle with the AFP. As noted in Table 2-7, the Moro insurgency movements posed a serious security threat to the Marcos regime throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The MNLF gained economic and diplomatic support from Muslim nations such as Malaysia, Libya, and other countries from the Islamic Conference. Violent conflict spread throughout the southern part of the Philippines and resulted in the deaths of thousands of Filipinos and over 500,000 refugees.[126] Even though the influence of the MNLF was significantly reduced after the mid-1980s, the organization was a serious threat to both the national and regime security.

The deteriorating domestic security threat environments provided President Marcos with justifications for the extension of his presidential tenure beyond the constitutional limitation and the further centralization of political authority in his hands.

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124 Lela G. Noble, "Muslim Separatism in the Philippines, 1972-1981: The Making of a Stalemate," *Asian Survey* 21: 11 (November, 1981), p. 1098.

125 Lela G. Noble, "The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines," *Pacific Affairs* 49: 3 (Autumn, 1976), p. 408.

126 Ivan Molloy, "Revolution in the Philippines: The Question of an Alliance Between Islam and Communism," *Asian Survey* 25: 8 (1985), p.825.

From the beginning of his presidency in 1965, he conducted a series of reforms in the AFP structure to strengthen his personal control over the military. During the first thirteen months of his presidency, for example, the President concurrently served as Secretary of Defense. In addition, he conducted the largest-scale military reform since the formation of the AFP and gave priority in promotions to officers from his hometown, Ilocos. The "Ilocanization" of the officer corps was especially prominent in crucial positions such as the Presidential Guard Battalion (PGB), the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA), the Metropolitan Command of the Philippine Constabulary (METROCOM), and the Manila Unit of the Integrated National Police (MUINP). Officers from Ilocos received commandership positions in those units that were concentrated around metropolitan Manila to maintain the Marcos regime security. Marcos also mobilized the AFP officers during the 1969 presidential elections, using them to mobilize and coerce voters. In this process, military officers began to actively participate in domestic political processes even before martial law was declared in 1972.[127]

Marcos actively manipulated the threat perception among the general public to justify his increasingly authoritarian rule and his presidential term beyond the constitutional limit. As early as February 1970, he mentioned the possibility of declaring martial law several times until he actually did in 1972. The early months of 1970 witnessed violent student demonstrations, targeting both Marcos and the facilities of the American government. Anti-Marcos and anti-American demonstrations created a sense

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[127] For detailed explanation about the AFP's non-military roles during Marcos administration, see Albert F. Celoza, *Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of*

of pervasive political crisis. Furthermore, the 1971 election was tainted by numerous incidents of physical violence in which 223 people were killed and 250 wounded.[128] In addition to the political turbulence, natural disasters—such as volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, severe droughts, and typhoons—further deteriorated the socio-economic conditions of the country. Kidnappings, robberies, and murders became rampant throughout the country.

Added to these crises, there were two incidents of physical violence that gave Marcos the final push to declare martial law. The first occasion was a bomb explosion during a Liberal Party rally at Plaza Miranda at the heart of Manila in August 1971, in which nine were killed and 90 injured, including eight senatorial candidates.[129] Initially, NPA guerrilla forces were reported to be responsible for the incident which provided President Marcos with the excuse to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. It was, however, speculated later that the government itself, along with the military, was responsible for the bombing. The final catalyst was the attack on the car of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile in September 1972.[130]

The day after the bombing, Marcos declared martial law—two years before his second, and constitutionally final, presidential term would end. Marcos justified the declaration of martial law by citing the 1935 Constitution which stated that presidents can declare martial law ". . . in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof." The existence of domestic violence and terrorism seemed to justify his

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Authoritarianism (Westport: Praeger, 1997), pp. 77-82.

[128] Mark R. Thomson, *The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 42.

[129] Lela G. Noble, "Politics in the Marcos Era," in Bresnan ed., 1986, p. 82.

statement. Marcos declared: “We will eliminate the threat of a violent overthrow of our Republic. But at the same time we must now reform the social, economic, and political institutions in our country . . .”[131] The first and foremost rationale of martial law was to secure the Republic from internal security threats. In addition, Marcos proposed to build a “New Society” that included removing “the inequities of that society, the cleanup of government of its corrupt and sterile elements, the liquidation of the criminal syndicates, and the systematic development of our economy.”

With the declaration of martial law, Marcos significantly increased his presidential power. Although it did not mean the installation of a military dictatorial rule, the presence and influence of army officers in domestic political process had expanded enormously. At the same time, Marcos weakened his political competitors’ political bases by abolishing Congress and imprisoning key political opponents, including Senator Benigno Aquino, the most likely successor to the presidency. He also closed several pro-opposition newspapers, radio and television stations. In addition, he prohibited any type of street demonstration and political opposition. By 1977, about 70,000 people had been imprisoned by the military tribunals.

The declaration of martial law was possible due to the military’s support. Marcos himself revealed in 1974 that he closely consulted with 12 high-ranking officers five days

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130 Enrile later admitted that the incident had been crafted. See, Noble, 1986, p. 84.

131 The Office of the President of the Philippines, September 22, 1972.

before declaring martial law.[132] The first notable outcome of the declaration of martial law was the expansion of the number of military personnel and the size of the budget.

As Table 2-8 indicates, the Philippines had relatively few armed forces until the late 1960s due to the lack of significant external threats and the security guarantee from the United States. After the declaration of martial law in 1972, however, the number of military personnel greatly increased throughout the 1970s. The AFP had slightly over 50,000 personnel at the time of Marcos' presidential inauguration. During the Marcos Presidency, however, the size of the AFP expanded three-fold. In addition, defense expenditures also greatly increased. Defense spending increased by almost ten fold in the four years after the declaration of martial law, comprising more than 30 percent of total governmental spending. The defense budget consistently increased throughout the martial law regime, culminating with 45.7 percent of governmental spending in 1986.[133] After declaring martial law, Marcos also extended other benefits to the AFP. Already in 1972, he promoted all officers one grade, raised the officers' salaries by 150 percent, and increased other benefits. The so-called "twelve disciples" who supported Marcos' decision in 1972 were promoted to the highest positions of authority and responsibility in the military establishment.[134]

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132 William E. Berry, Jr., "The Changing Role of the Philippine Military during Martial Law and the Implications for the Future," in Edward Olson and Stephen Jurika, Jr., eds., *The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p. 230.

133 Felipe B. Miranda and Ruben F. Ciron, "Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a time of Continuing Crisis," in J. Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun Cheong, eds., *Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), p. 172.

134 Some of the noteworthy officers are: Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile; AFP Chief of Staff General Romeo C. Espino; PC Chief General Fidel V. Ramos; Presidential Security Command Chief General Fabian Ver. With other disciples, these generals were influential political actors not only during the martial law regime but also the overthrow of Marcos and

Table 2-8: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 1965-1986[135]

Year	Total	Year	Total
1965	51,500	**1976**	113,000
1966	53,000	**1977**	139,000
1967	49,000	**1978**	139,000
1968	47,000	**1979**	150,000
1969	49,500	**1980**	156,300
1970	55,000	**1981**	158,300
1971	58,100	**1982**	158,300
1972	54,100	**1983**	150,300
1973	69,880	**1984**	150,300
1974	89,900	**1985**	156,800
1975	101,900	**1986**	165,000

a) Total includes Army, Navy, Air, Constabulary (PC), Local Home Defense Forces (LHD), Marines, and Coast Guard.

The AFP also performed the role of business management in state corporations, many of which had been confiscated from opposition elites. The military took control of the steel and sugar industries and all major utility companies. To reward key military officers, Marcos built two defense-related businesses: the Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea-Investment and Development Corporation, a military investment company, and the Philippine Veterans Investment Development Company for retired officers.[136] In addition, numerous senior officers were allowed to stay in office beyond the compulsory retirement period of 30 years in service. Furthermore, many of the retired officers were appointed in key positions in the central and local governments such

democratization process in the mid-1980s. See, Carolina Galicia-Hernandez, *The Extent of Civilian Control of the Military in the Philippines: 1946-1976* (State University of New York at Buffalo, Ph. D. Dissertation, 1979), p. 217.

135 International Institute Security Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: IISS, multiple years).

136 Kessler, 1989, p. 126.

as ambassadors, Presidential Regional Officers for Development (PRODs), governors, and loan collectors for land banks.[137]

In return, the AFP became the guarantor of Marcos' authoritarian regime until 1986, when a group of officers turned against him and sided with the pro-democracy civilian elites. From the declaration of martial law in 1972 until 1977, the military arrested most of political dissidents, and military tribunals replaced civilian courts until 1978. Most of these arrested were communists and their supporters, but also included opposition politicians, journalists, and college students. The martial law regime further militarized the Philippine society by organizing the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) to train 36,000 people annually. The AFP also integrated police forces into its command structure. Juan Ponce Enrile, the secretary of national defense, was concurrently chairman of the National Police Commission. The integration of the police into the AFP enabled the Marcos regime to mobilize them into local politics and elections in provincial cities and municipalities.

The politicization of the military officers, however, inevitably decreased professionalism within the AFP. During the martial law regime, a small number of military officers who graduated from the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) formed a secret organization within the military, the Reform the AFP Movement (RAM). The RAM aimed to restore professionalism and public respect for the armed forces. The RAM members played a decisive role in the downfall of Marcos' regime in 1986. Furthermore, politicized military officers posed a serious stumbling block to the

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[137] Casper, 1995, p. 95.

democratization process under the Aquino presidency in the late 1980s, in which AFP officers made more than seven major coup attempts.

IV. Indonesia

With the end of World War II, Indonesia proclaimed independence from Japanese and Dutch colonial rule, but had to fight a five-year 'revolutionary' war with Dutch forces until it gained formal independence in 1949. The experience of war and subsequent security challenges heavily influenced the military organization and its political orientation up until 1998 when President Haji Mohammad Suharto was ousted from his presidency.

In this section, I examine the relationship between Indonesia's experiences of internal and external conflicts and security threats during the state-building process on the one hand, and the organization and political orientation of the ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia,* Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces) on the other. From the time of independence in 1949 to 1968, Indonesia experienced three phases of political development: parliamentary democracy in 1949-1956, increasingly authoritarian Guided Democracy in 1957-1965, and the power transition from President Achmad Sukarno's fall to the installation of the military dictatorial rule under the leadership of General Suharto in 1965-68. This section focuses on the first two periods; the third period will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Indonesian army was founded during the Japanese occupation in the early 1940s. In 1943, the Japanese armed forces created two military organizations to mobilize the Islanders to support Japanese forces waging warfare in Southeast Asia. First, *Heiho*

was based on indigenous Indonesians in April 1943 and, by the end of the War in 1945, about 40,000 of them received military training in military transportation, road building, and defense duties. Second, the Japanese established *Peta (Pasukan Sukarela Tentara Pembela Tanash Air,* the Army of Defense of the Fatherland) in late 1943 as territorial defense forces. By the time the war ended, about 38,000 *Peta* soldiers and 1,600 *Peta* officers were being trained by the Japanese Army.[138] These groups actively cooperated with the Japanese in the hope that Japan would support Indonesia's independence. *Heiho* and *Peta*, with several other paramilitary organizations, became the foundation of the ABRI.[139]

After World War II, these organizations were integrated as the Indonesian armed forces (ABRI) during the struggle against the Dutch from 1945 to 1949.[140] The ABRI were formally established in October 1945. Most of its officers, including General Sudirman, the commander-in-chief of the army, and General Suharto, came from the *Peta*. The revolutionary war began after the Japanese withdrew from the Indonesian islands but the Dutch colonial authorities did not recognize the Indonesian declaration of independence. After negotiations with the Indonesian revolutionary forces failed, the Dutch army attacked. The Dutch, with 150,000 soldiers, were stronger in major cities but

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138 Harold W. Maynard, "The Role of the Indonesian Armed Forces," in Olson and Jurika, Jr., eds., 1986, p. 188.

139 Some of the other prominent paramilitary groups were the *Barisan Pelopor* (Vanguard Corps), Hizbullah (Army of Allah), and the *Seinendan* (Youth Corps). Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States: the Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 108.

140 The Dutch ruled the Islands of Indonesia by establishing the Dutch East Indies Company in the 1600s, but later ruled directly until the Japanese forces entered into the territory.

had little influence in rural areas.[141] Their attempts to maintain control over Indonesia brought about violent uprisings in many parts of the archipelago.

During the revolutionary war, the ABRI was inevitably involved with the domestic political processes since the civilian government was not well organized and the ABRI was the only organization that could perform administrative functions. Throughout five years of the revolutionary war, the ABRI developed into a strong and well-organized force. Not surprisingly, throughout the war, the ABRI acquired a strong belief that it was the only institution that truly represented and defended the interest of the people. When the Dutch forces attacked Jogjakarta, the capital city, and captured Sukarno and other civilian leaders in December 1948, the ABRI under General Sudirman's leadership refused to surrender and waged guerrilla warfare until Indonesia gained independence from the Dutch. The five year-long war of independence set the basic organizational structure and political orientation of the Indonesian Army. The ABRI was not originally organized by civilian politicians, but spontaneously sprang from the masses during the war. Because of this, officers in the ABRI did not consider themselves as instruments of the civilian leadership for whom enforcing their political will proved to be difficult from the beginning of the Republic.[142]

After winning independence in December 1949, Indonesia started as a parliamentary democracy with multiple parties competing for seats in the parliament. By the time President Sukarno declared "Guided Democracy" in 1957, three major parties dominated domestic politics: Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, the Indonesian Nationalist

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[141] Damien Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 45.

Party), supported by secular nationalists; Masjumi, backed by modernist Muslims from outside Java; and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), representing traditionalist Muslims based in Java.[143] Indonesian politics in the early 1950s was quite democratic; elections were relatively free and fair, the courts were independent from other governmental branches, civil society was thriving, and freedom of the press was guaranteed.[144] During the period of the parliamentary democracy, the military formally drew back to the barracks and disengaged from the domestic political process.

The parliamentary democracy with multiple parties based on ethnic and religious cleavages, however, turned out to be too weak to deal with problems springing up throughout the archipelago during the 1950s. Given the diversity in culture, religion, ideology, and ethnicity, the parliamentary system was unable to form a stable and workable long-term coalition government. Before long, the political consensus of the early period of the Republic began to fall apart, as political parties became ideologically and ethnically polarized. In seven years of the parliamentary system, seven coalition cabinets took turns to run the country.

The first major challenge to the civilian leadership occurred in October 1952. A group of military officers in Jakarta incited the general public to demonstrate in front of the Presidential Palace, when a delegation of senior officers was meeting with President

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[142] Maynard, 1986, p. 188.

[143] David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz, *Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 4.

[144] For the detailed description of the political circumstances during the parliamentary democracy period in Indonesia, see Herbert Feith, "Constitutional Democracy: How Well Did It Function?" in David Bourchier and John Legge, eds., *Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s* (Clayton: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 31, 1994).

Sukarno to call for dissolving the ill-functioning parliament.[145] This protest was a demonstration against the parliament's attempt to interfere with the ABRI's reorganization and demobilization plans. Some of the most politically active officers demanded a more influential role in governmental decision-making. They argued that they had the right to participate in determining the political fate of the Republic, since independence and state-building had been achieved largely by the ABRI's own efforts.[146] Some observers speculated that General Abdul Haris Nasution and several radical officers planned for a military coup to abolish the weak parliamentary system and create a more powerful presidential system.[147] Even though this "October Affair" did not develop into a significant political crisis, the incident shows that from the beginning of the Republic the army was ready to get involved in politics.

A more serious source of friction that threatened to worsen domestic security conditions resided within the military itself. The ABRI was composed of personnel from numerous provinces with diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. Even though orthodox Muslims were dominant in numbers at the lower positions within the army, Javanese officers were overrepresented, especially at the higher ranks. Army officers perceived the fundamentalist Muslims within the military as a serious threat to the security of the state. As early as 1945, the first Constitution spelled out *Pancasila* (or Five Principles) as the official national identity, not Islam. *Pancasila* was first devised

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145 Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 2nd ed*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 30.
146 Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 70.
147 For example, see Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 262.

by Sukarno in the 1945 Constitution, which contained five principles: belief in God, humanitarianism, the unity of Indonesia, democracy, and social justice.[148] Within the army, fundamental Muslims who refused to accept *Pancasila* principle launched the *Dural Islam* rebellion on West Java and some parts of Central Java. They were strongly committed to creating an Islamic republic in Indonesia. The *Dural Islam* uprising began in 1948 when S. M. Kartosuwirjo, the commander of the Hizbullah forces, declared the "Islamic State of Indonesia."[149] The rebellious movements later spread over to Aceh and South Sulawesi in the 1950s when the parliamentary system suffered from weak leadership.

Related to the problem of fundamentalist Muslims, the army also had to deal with intra-military fragmentation as regional commanders turned against the central command and joined local rebellions. From the revolutionary war period in the 1940s until the mid-1950s, local rebellions supported by regional military officers seriously challenged the authority of the government. These local uprisings were focused on the islands of Sumatra, East Java, and Sulawesi. The rebels in many cases were allied with local Islamic leaders to make Islam as the basic principle of the state. In addition, there were continuing tensions between the officers who were trained by the Dutch and those trained by the Japanese. While the former were better educated and more professionally trained, the latter were more patriotic with experiences of independence guerrilla warfare. Also, the Japanese-trained officers were usually well connected with local political elites and business interests. In this situation, establishing an effective and hierarchical command

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[148] Anders Uhlin, *Indonesia and the "Third Wave of Democratization": The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997), pp. 54-55.

structure by the central government turned out to be a difficult task.[150] In sum, Indonesia faced multiple sources of domestic security threats throughout the archipelago in the 1950s. The most serious security threats during the early 1950s were religious conflicts, while the late 1950s were overshadowed by ethnic and regional conflicts, both within and outside the ABRI.

Growing domestic conflicts, coupled with the ill-functioning parliamentary democracy, forced President Sukarno to declare "Guided Democracy" in 1957.[151] With the declaration of Guided Democracy, Sukarno abolished the parliamentary system and returned to a presidential one under the 1945 Constitution. At the same time, he declared martial law, bringing military officers into politics who took broad political, economic, and administrative functions under the Sukarno Presidency. Guided Democracy was originally intended to overcome national disunity and internal conflicts, but it resulted in the concentration of political power in the hands of Sukarno and army officers. Under Guided Democracy, democratic ideas with institutionalized opposition were blamed for aggravating social unrests and disunity. Western-style democratic ideas were replaced by "deliberation" to reach political consensus and, if no consensus was made, Sukarno himself, being the elderly political leader, made the final decision.[152]

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149 Steven Drakeley, *The History of Indonesia* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2005), pp. 88-94.

150 Army Chief of Staff General Abdul Haris Nasution attempted to establish a system of officer rotation and strong central command authority. This attempt was faced by resistance from local commanders, resulting in losing Nasution's leadership position in the ABRI. See Drakeley, 2005, pp. 97-98.

151 For more detailed analysis of the origins and developments of Guided Democracy in the 1950s, see Baladas Ghoshal, *Indonesian Politics 1955-1959: The Emergence of Guided Democracy* (New Delhi: K P Bagchi & Company, 1982).

152 Feith, 1962, p. 515.

Under Guided Democracy, Sukarno and the ABRI were effective in restoring domestic political and security order momentarily in the late 1950s. Regional rebellious activities were put down and political opposition activities were strictly restrained. Elections were canceled and the main opponents of Sukarno's leadership—PNI and PSI (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia*, Indonesian Socialist Party)—were banned in 1960.[153] Half of the seats in the new parliament were distributed to so-called "functional groups" that represented various occupational interests including the military.[154] With Guided Democracy, Sukarno became a stronger and increasingly authoritarian leader.

In addition to the expansion of presidential power, the immediate impact of the declaration of Guided Democracy and martial law in 1957 was the further political role of ABRI officers. The 1956 aborted coup attempt by deputy chief of staff, Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, nevertheless, set in motion a series of regional and local military commanders taking control of local governments and mobilizing popular support in Sumatra and Sulawesi. This highlighted the already existing ruptures in the army and ABRI officers' dissatisfaction with the flagging parliamentary democracy.[155] In response, Sukarno declared martial law, and all rebellious activities by local militaries were put down. However, a series of domestic unrests had the effect of expanding the army's role not only in politics, but also in administrative and economic affairs.

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[153] The PNI led the first cabinet (1953-1955). In the 1955 elections, the PNI won the largest portion of the popular votes (22.3%). See Herbert Feith, "Constitutional Democracy: How Well Did It Function?" in David Bourchier and John Legge, eds., *Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s* (Monash University, Australia: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 31, 1994), p. 18.

[154] Uhlin, 1997, p. 39.

The expansion of ABRI's political and administrative role was justified by the concept of the "Middle Way" deliberated by the army chief of staff, Major General Abdul Haris Nasution.[156] According to the "Middle Way" principle, the ABRI would neither pursue taking over the government nor remain politically inactive. Instead, the ABRI would have the right to voice its views in the government, legislature, and the state administration. General Nasution maintained that the infusion of governmental bodies with the military officers who were trained with managerial and technical skills would improve the administration of the country.[157] The principle of the Middle Way points to the fact that the civilian leaders and military officers could have equal rights and authority to take part in the governing process.

General Nasution's Middle Way doctrine provided a rational justification for ABRI's participation in politics under Guided Democracy. The Middle Way doctrine had moderate and limited political goals when it was first declared. This principle was, however, developed into the idea of *dwifungsi* (dual function) in the 1960s under the Suharto leadership. According to the *dwifungsi* doctrine, "The participation of ABRI in the political process may be seen from two angles, namely in its position as a defense and security force . . . , while as a social force it has rights and obligations as any other ordinary citizen . . . in taking part in the legislative bodies, occupying certain offices in

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155 According to Ghoshal's analysis, the aborted coup came from the historic rivalry between KNIL to which General Nasution belonged and the PETA of which Colonel Lubis was a member. See Ghoshal, 1982, pp. 64-65.
156 Damien Kingsbury, *Power Politics and the Indonesian Military* (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 51-54.
157 Sundhaussen, 1982, p. 127.

the executive and judicial branches . . ."[158] In September 1982, the doctrine of *dwifungsi* was made into law by President Suharto.

With Guided Democracy, martial law, and the doctrine of the Middle Way, ABRI officers began to expand their presence in the government in the late 1950s. Under the provisions of the state of siege, local military commanders came to have almost unrestrained powers to maintain security and order. Furthermore, the military's political presence was more prominent in the organs of central government. Among the cabinet members appointed in July 1959, over 30 percent of the ministers came from the ABRI, while there had been no military presence at the minister level before 1958.[159] The ABRI continued to implement emergency powers under martial law until 1963, when a modified form of martial law was reintroduced in 1964.

In addition to its increasingly influential presence in government, the ABRI also became involved in economic affairs. When Dutch companies in Indonesia were nationalized by the Sukarno government in the midst of violent uprisings by nationalist demonstrators in 1957, several military officers were dispatched to manage them. Army officers continued to take part in the management of the new state-owned business enterprises such as plantations, mining, banking, and trade. ABRI officers' economic role was further expanded in the 1960s when British and American companies were put under military supervision. Furthermore, the state-owned oil corporation, founded in 1957, was directly administered by the army leadership. Less significantly, local military

158 J. Soedjati Djiwandono, "The Military and National Development in Indonesia," in Djiwandono and Cheong, eds., 1988, p. 77.
159 Crouch, 1988, p. 47.

units built up their own business industries, mostly in connection with ethnic Chinese.[160] ABRI officers' engagement in local economic affairs produced a corrupt officer corps that the central government found difficult to control.

Due to the military officers' economic activities in several lucrative industries, it is almost impossible to estimate the military defense spending exactly as a percentage of the national budget. Numerically, the defense spending decreased for years, from 27 percent in the late 1960s, to about 6 percent in the 1970s up until the late 1990s.[161] The bigger portion of the military budget, however, came from industries that ABRI officers controlled. Officers' engagement in economic affairs further spread out under Suharto's New Order regime in the late 1960s.

Guided Democracy during the late 1950s seemed to maintain political stability and internal security order for a moment. But subsequent political and security crises in the early-to-mid 1960s forced military officers to assume more politically influential positions in the Sukarno government. The early 1960s witnessed increasing threats against both the state and Sukarno regime. Sukarno's endeavor to balance the three politically influential groups—the ABRI, the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Communist Party of Indonesia), and Muslims—could not last long, as antagonism between ABRI officers and the PKI intensified.

On September 30, 1965, a group of young officers launched a coup and kidnapped and killed the six highest-ranking officers. Under the leadership of General

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160 Crouch, 1988, p. 39.

161 For more detailed description of the defense spending in Indonesia, see, J. Kristiadi, "The Armed Forces," in Richard W. Baker, M. Hadi Soesastro, J. Kristiadi, and Douglas E. Ramage, eds., *Indonesia: The Challenge of Change* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 101.

Suharto, the coup attempt was put down several days later. The PKI (*Partai Kommunis Indonesia*, Indonesian Communist Party) was blamed for the coup attempt, and the army killed over a half million people suspected of communists and ethnic Chinese.[162] In this political turmoil, President Sukarno had no choice but to transfer all political power to General Suharto. The next chapter will explain in detail the process of Sukarno's step down and the installment of the military-dominant Suharto regime in the 1960s.

Conclusions

This chapter has examined the rise of the armed forces' domestic political influence during the state-building process in four countries—South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Each country had the task of building a sovereign statehood after World War II. The Republic of Korea was proclaimed after 35 years of Japanese colonial rule and additional three years of American military occupation. The Republic of China on Taiwan lost the civil war with the Chinese Communist Party on the mainland and established its government on Formosa Island in 1949. The Philippines attained independence from American colonial rule in 1935 and achieved sovereign statehood in 1946 after Japanese forces withdrew from the archipelago. Finally, Indonesia attained sovereignty in 1949 after fighting a revolutionary war against the Dutch colonial power.

In the state-building process, all four countries had to deal with extreme external and/or internal security threats. The Korean peninsula was divided into two hostile

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[162] For more detailed analysis of the massacre, see Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971); Robert Cribb ed., *The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali* (Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 21)).

camps between the South and the North in 1948. Ideological and military hostilities burst into the full-blown Korean War from 1950 to 1953. In Taiwan, the KMT government had to cope with imminent threats from the Chinese Communist Party and its Army. Internally, the KMT regime had to deal with violent uprisings by native Taiwanese. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had to fight various domestic uprisings from the 1950s until the late-1980s, such as the Hukbalahap rebellion in the 1950s, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New People's Army (NPA) from the late-1960s, and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) during the 1970s. Indonesia fought for five years against the Dutch and, after independence, the country faced religious, ethnic, and regional conflicts and rebellions by regional army commanders allied with Islamic groups. In South Korea and Taiwan, security threats came from both international and domestic arenas, while the main source of security threats in the Philippines and Indonesia resided within the domestic arena.

The first outcome of extreme internal/external security threats was the expansion of military organizations. Within five years after the opening of the Republic, the South Korean army witnessed a vast expansion of the number of military personnel (see Table 2-1). In addition, three years of war transformed the Korean army into the most cohesive and best trained organization in the country. Similarly, the AFP underwent a major expansion while fighting various rebellious forces. Armed forces in South Korea and the Philippines were originally small in size, but later underwent massive increases in personnel, training, and equipment. In contrast, the Taiwanese and Indonesian militaries were already large at the time of independence. These cases demonstrate that, unlike what the institutionalist theories of civil-military relations assume, not all the military

organizations enjoyed dominant roles society from the beginning. Rather, the armed forces expanded its size and strength under certain structural conditions, i. e., security threats. Thus, it is worth examining the processes in which the military as an institution increases its organizational strength under certain threats, rather than treating the presence of a strong military in a society as a given.

Another important outcome of the presence of extremely high security threats was the centralization of political powers within one or a small number of political leaders, usually the head of the executive branch. In this process, the military was frequently mobilized by civilian leaders into the domestic political arena for political purposes, creating highly politicized military officers. In all four cases, the presence of high security threats brought about more powerful and more authoritarian civilian leadership. Three years of the Korean War concentrated all the political powers within President Rhee Syngman's hands. Even after the war, Rhee actively exploited the North Korean threat and anti-communist ideology to expand his power and extend his presidential term. Rhee's increasingly authoritarian and oppressive rule was possible due to the military officers' involvement in domestic political processes.

Similarly, Chiang Kai-shek could monopolize power within the KMT government under extreme security threat environments on both mainland China and Taiwan. In this process, the military, especially the Whampoa Military Academy and its graduates, was vital to Chiang's rule. In the Philippines, violent domestic turmoil in the late 1960s and early 1970s enabled President Marcos to declare martial law and extend his presidential term beyond the constitutional limitation. His increasingly authoritarian and oppressive rule was backed by the AFP. Under Marcos, the AFP organization and its political role

significantly increased. Finally, extreme internal threats in the 1950s forced President Sukarno to abolish the parliamentary system and declare "Guided Democracy." With the declaration of martial law in 1957, the already influential officers expanded their political, judicial, administrative, and economic roles.

In each of the four cases examined in this chapter, the presence of high security threats resulted in the expansion of the armed forces, more authoritarian civilian leadership, and civilian leaders' co-optation of the military officers into politics to secure their political position. In all four cases, martial law was declared in the midst of domestic turmoil and the military assumed political roles in administrative, legislative, and judicial branches under the martial law regime.

Once invited into the domestic political arena, however, the military's political role was different from case to case. In South Korea and Indonesia, army officers abolished the civilian leadership and dominated the political arena via coup d'etat, while army officers in Taiwan and the Philippines were kept under civilian control even though they were politically influential. The next chapter details the dynamics of domestic political processes that made the difference between coup d'etat and the retention of political power by civilian leaders.

Chapter 3. The Dynamics of Military Intervention

Introduction

In Chapter Two, I explained the rising political role of the armed forces in the four countries during the state-building period. I explored how growing security challenges to the states contributed to the installation of civilian authoritarian regimes and army officers' participation in governing process. All four countries began with democratic political systems, including popular elections and political oppositions. Before long, however, mounting security threats brought about a concentration of political powers within one or a small number of political leaders and the expansion of military organization. Furthermore, increasingly authoritarian leaders mobilized the top brass in the military into politics to achieve the state and regime security.

Once brought into the domestic political arena, however, the way the armed forces engaged in politics was different from case to case. Army officers in South Korea and Indonesia toppled civilian leadership and established military-dominant dictatorial rule, while military leadership in Taiwan and the Philippines were kept under the supervision of civilian leadership. If we follow my classification that was elaborated in Chapter One, military's role in politics in South Korea and Taiwan was one of *control*, while the other two cases were one of *participation*.

In this chapter, I attempt to reveal structural factors that made differences in the modes of military engagement in domestic politics, whether through coup d'etat and the installment of military dictatorship (*control*) or the military's involvement in politics under the supervision of civilian leadership (*participation*). My structural theory

suggests that in order to explain different modes of military intervention in politics, one needs to look at the dynamics of the interactions among major political actors at the domestic level—the military, civilian leadership, and civil society—in a given security condition. More specifically, I argue that army officers are likely to topple civilian leadership and install a military-led dictatorship (1) when the armed forces suffer from internal factional struggles, (2) when civilian leadership loses its legitimacy or fail to maintain security and political order, or (3) when civil society groups endorse a radial ideology or a strategy of physical violence. On the contrary, soldiers are likely to come under civilian guidance (1) when the military institution secures its organizational unity and effective command structure, (2) when civilian leaders are able to sustain their political leadership and manage security order; or (3) when civil society groups do not provoke domestic disorder.

This chapter is composed of four sections. The first two sections deal with the cases of military coup and the installment of military regimes in South Korea and Indonesia. Section One focuses on South Korea from the late 1950s to early 1970s in which civilian leadership lost control, the 1961 military coup under the Park Jung-hee's leadership, and the consolidation of military dictatorial rule with the declaration of *Yushin* in 1972. Section Two examines the political history of Indonesia from the late 1950s to late 1960s, in which Sukarno's Guided Democracy failed to provide domestic order, ensuing crisis including an aborted coup occurred, and General Suharto took control of the country via coup d'etat. Section Three and Four analyze the Taiwanese and Philippine cases, where civilian leadership invented control mechanisms over

politicized army officers during the 1960s and 1970s. The final section is a conclusion in which major findings are summarized and some theoretical implications are discussed.

Coup D'etat and Military-Dominant Regime: Military's Political Control in South Korea and Indonesia

I. South Korea

President Rhee Syngman successfully mobilized power throughout the 1950s, and the Korean army was instrumental in this process. Army officers were used whenever Rhee tried to increase his power and extend his presidential tenure beyond the constitutional limit. Increasingly authoritarian rule and performance failures by President Rhee, however, eroded his legitimacy and isolated him from the general public and, in the end, from the armed forces. Officers of the Korean army played a decisive role in the process of Rhee's ouster in the midst of the *April Student Revolution* in 1960. Furthermore, a segment of the Korean army intervened in politics via coup d'etat and dominated political society in Korea by establishing military dictatorial rule in 1961. In this section, I explore the historical routes from the demise of the Rhee regime in April 1960, to the political turmoil under the short-lived parliamentary democracy by Prime Minister Chang Myon (1960-1961), to the military coup d'etat under the Park Jung-hee leadership in 1961, and to the consolidation of military dictatorship with the declaration of *Yushin* (revitalizing reform) constitution in 1972.

By the late 1950s, President Rhee and his ruling Liberal Party (LP) faced escalating resistance from both opposition political elites including the opposition

Democratic Party (DP) and the general public, especially radicalized college students. Support for the Rhee regime quickly evaporated for several reasons: deteriorating economic conditions since the end of the Korean War, the extension of his presidential tenure beyond the constitutional limitation,[163] ever more heavy-handed repression against opposition political elites,[164] and most critically, serious election fraud in the 1960 presidential election. Faced with growing opposition from domestic audiences, President Rhee and hard-liners in the ruling LP adopted more authoritarian tactics to continue the regime survival.

President Rhee at the age of 85 was running in the 1960 presidential election for his fourth term. By this time, however, his regime was certain to lose the election because it had already lost support from the general public and, at the same time, the opposition DP was gaining political strength. The DP nominated Cho Byong-ok as its presidential candidate and Chang Myon as vice-presidential candidate. Both candidates

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163 Rhee Syngman amended the constitution twice, in 1952 and 1954. The 1952 constitutional amendment changed the presidential election method from the National Assembly vote to the popular referendum. The 1954 constitutional amendment included, among other things, abolishing the two-term restriction on presidential tenure for the first president of the Republic of Korea. The bill for the second amendment was passed in November 1954. In the two constitutional amendments, Rhee used the Korean army to intimidate the opposition elites. Jungwon Kim, *Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); Baeho Han, *Hanguk-eui Jeongchigwajunggwa Byonhoa: Gwonuijueui Saengsung Gua Jeongae (Changes in Korean Political Process: Establishment and Development of the Authoritarian Regime)* (Seoul: Bupmoon-sa, 1993).

164 There was a series of incidents in which the Rhee regime used heavy-handed tactics against the opposition. In September 1956, Chang Myon, Vice President and the DP leader, was shot in the hand during the DP convention. The policed arrested the gunmen, who confessed that he was hired by the National Police Chief. In 1958, Cho Bong-am, the Progressive Party leader, was arrested and charged with espionage and subversion. Cho was sentenced to death and hanged. In 1959, the Kyungsang Shinmun (daily newspaper) was charged with the violation of the National Security Law, two reporters were arrested, and the publishing license was canceled. For the detailed description of Rhee's authoritarian rule in the 1950s, see Sungju Han, *The Failure of Democracy in South Korea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Yong-pyo Hong,

were prominent political figures who had gained widespread support from the general public. In this situation, the hard-liners in the ruling LP engaged in systemic election fraud, including the invalidation of opposition ballots, group voting, ballot stuffing, intimidation and physical terror of the opposition election campaigns.[165] Even before the election concluded, the DP candidates proclaimed that it was fraudulent and therefore not valid. The election resulted in Rhee's victory by substantial margins, in which the ruling LP candidate Rhee Syngman won 89 percent and vice-presidential candidate Yi Ki-pung won 79 percent of the vote.[166]

Irregularities in the presidential election prompted violent public demonstrations, especially among high school and university students. The anti-Rhee demonstrations started in southeastern cities but rapidly spread to Seoul and other major cities. Violent clashes between the demonstrators and the police resulted in the deaths of more than 100 demonstrators and more than 1,000 serious injuries.[167] The student demonstrations in Seoul were joined by middle class people and more than 300 university professors.

The Rhee regime declared martial law and brought heavily armed military forces to the capital, claiming that "devilish hands of communists" had infiltrated and instigated

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State Security and Regime Security: President Syngman Rhee and the Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea, 1953-1960 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).

165 For the detailed discussion about the irregularities in 1960 presidential election, see Byong-cho Suh, *Jukwonja ui chung on: Hanguk daeui chongchi'isa (A Testimony by a Sovereign: A History of a Representative Government*) (Seoul: Moumsa, 1964), pp. 297-344; David W. Reeves, *The Republic of Korea* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 49.

166 For the 1960 presidential election results, see *Daehanmin-guk Son-gosa (History of Elections in Korea)* (Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1964), pp. 481-483.

167 Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of Vortex* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 175.

commotion throughout the South Korean territory.[168] By this time, however, the coercive apparatus of Rhee's government was no longer working, as the police and the armed forces were hesitant to follow orders of the martial law commander, General Song Yo-chan.[169] Outnumbered and disheartened, many of the policemen abandoned their duties, while the dispatched military forces disregarded the martial law commander's order and tried to maintain neutrality between the Rhee regime and the demonstrators. Furthermore, several high-ranking officers, including General Song Yo-chan and Defense Minister Kim Jung-youn, personally met the President and insisted on his resign.[170] President Rhee stepped down on April 26, 1960, concluding 12 years of authoritarian rule. Rhee left Seoul and lived in Hawaii until his death.

With Rhee's departure, democracy was restored with the inauguration of the Second Republic by Chang Myon. The Second Republic adopted the parliamentary system by amending the 1948 constitution on June 15, 1960. On July 29 of the same year, a national election was held to elect a new National Assembly which would, in turn, elect a president. In the election, the Democratic Party, now the ruling party, gained 175 seats out of 233 in the House of Representatives, as well as 31 out of 58 seats in the House of Councilors.[171] In August 1960, after five months of an interim government led

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168 John Kie-chiang Oh, *Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Development* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 41.

169 During the April Student Revolution, President Rhee appointed the Army Chief of Staff General Song Yo-chan to the commander of martial law. Byong-yong Ryu, ed., *Hanguk Hyondae Jeongchi Sa (History of Korean Politics)* (Seoul: Jipmoondang, 1997), p. 107.

170 Kyung-cho Chung, *New Korea: New Land of the Morning Calm* (New York: McMillan, 1962), p. 71.

171 The Second Republic had a bicameral legislature, composed of the House of Councilors and the House of Representatives. For the 1960 election results, see Oh, 1999, p. 44.

by Heo Jung, the Second Republic was established with Chang Myon as prime minister and Yun Po-sun as president with ritual powers. In the 1960 constitution, the prime minister served as chief of executive and headed the State Affairs Council (the cabinet). The 1960 constitution drastically increased the democratic components of Korean politics by weakening presidential powers and decentralizing the powers into the executive and the legislative branches.

Even though democratic in nature, the Chang Myon government could not overcome serious challenges from both within and outside the government. The Chang regime was too weak and incompetent to deal with social and political problems that was deepened under the Rhee government, such as a deteriorating economy, factional struggles within the ruling Democratic Party, and empowered but impatient and radical student protesters. Weak political institutions combined with growing demands of wider political participation significantly exacerbated the security conditions in both domestic and international arenas, as North Korea expanded its influence in South Korea during the domestic turmoil.

The economy showed no sign of improvement but was further impaired by continuing social and political disorder and rampant corruption of the civilian government. Inflation skyrocketed, and industrial production continued to decline.[172] The Chang government's first priority was to solve its economic difficulties. As a means of improving economic conditions, Prime Minister Chang tried to reduce armed forces personnel, which numbered over 600,000 and consumed about 50 percent of

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[172] Under the Chang regime, the price of rice went up 60 percent, oil 23 percent. The industrial production dropped more than 12 percent. See Bank of Korea, *Monthly Report* (March 1961).

governmental expenditures. During the 1960 election campaign, one of Chang's pledges was to cut 200,000 military personnel, and up to 100,000 in his first year alone.[173] Chang's plan to reduce the military, however, encountered strong opposition not only from the top brass in the army but also from the Kennedy administration, which was concerned about communist expansionism in Asia. As a result, the plan to downsize the Korean army was quickly revoked, nevertheless, the incident created deep distrust among high-ranking officers against the Chang regime.[174]

A more serious and immediate challenge to Chang Myon came from politically-empowered college students. The April Student Revolution was originally against President Rhee and his Liberal Party and their undemocratic policies. Six months after Rhee's ouster, however, the students were still instrumental in deciding the direction of Korean politics. They demanded drastic and wide-ranging political reforms, including punishment of the LP members who manipulated the 1960 presidential election. When the newly elected government failed to respond to their demands, the students went to the streets to demonstrate. In one event on October 11, 1960, for example, student demonstrators occupied the parliamentary building and urged thorough punishment for

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173 Dae-kyu Lee, Kyu-hui Hwang, and In-hyuk Kim, eds., *Bikyo Goonbu Jeongchi Gaeip Ron (Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention in Politics)* (Busan: Dong-A University Press, 2001), p. 357.

174 Some explains the 1961 military coup in South Korea as a result of the military's effort to secure its corporate interest. For example, see Jinsok Jun, "South Korea: Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control," in Muthiah Alagappa ed., *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of The Military in Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 122-125; Yong-won Han, "5.16 coup d'etat eui balsaeng-kwa jeonkae kwajeong (The Genesis and Evolution of the 5. 16 Coup d'etat)," in Bae-ho Han ed., *Hankuk Hyondae Jeongchi Ron II: Je 3 Kongwhagukeui Hyongseong, Jeongchi Kwajeong, Jeongchaek (Contemporary Korean Politics II: The Genesis, Political Process, and Policies of the Third Republic)* (Seoul: Orum, 1996), pp. 46-54.

the election frauds.[175] In less than a year of the Second Republic, there were more than 2,000 demonstrations with about one million participants.[176] The student demonstrations were more widespread and frequent under the Chang regime than the previous government. In this situation, a more challenging task for the Second Republic was not about guaranteeing political freedom and participation but rather about what Huntington called "the creation of a legitimate public order."[177]

The ruling DP also suffered from factional struggles from the beginning of the Second Republic. The DP was formed as a loose coalition of diverse social forces, including intellectuals, student organizations, and anti-Rhee opposition leaders who represented both liberal and conservative elements of society. Therefore, the party did not possess clear ideological or political ideals, not to mention party discipline or integrity. The only raison d'etre for the party was the overthrow of the old regime. In Gregory Henderson's words, it was "a marriage of convenience between two interest groups, not of belief and loyalty."[178] Eventually, the ruling DP broke into two factions. Members of the new faction, representing the spirit of the April Student Revolution, challenged the older and conservative leadership and urged more extensive political reforms. The old faction, the less influential components of the ruling circle, formed the New Democratic Party (NDP), a new opposition party.

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[175] For detailed description of the college students' political role during the 1960s, see William A. Douglas, "Korean Students and Politics," *Asian Survey* 3: 12 (December, 1963); Byung-hun Oh, "Students and Politics," in Edward R. Wright, ed., *Korean Politics in Transition* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), pp. 107-152.

[176] Stephen Bradner, "Korea: Experiment and Instability," *Japan Quarterly* 8: 4 (1961), p. 414.

[177] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 7.

[178] Henderson, 1968, p. 304.

In this situation, the Chang regime's task was twofold. The first task was to create a new concrete political organization that could consolidate the ruling class, especially the DP. The next step was to find a balancing point between two extremes of political groups: left-leaning college students and intellectuals who pushed for far-reaching reforms and punishment for the old crooks under the Rhee regime, and conservative elites and army officers who were concerned more about political stability. Chang Myon, however, was successful in none of these tasks. Weak and divided, the nascent democratic regime was further damaged by political and economic turmoil. The crime rate doubled since President Rhee had resigned, and corrupt police did not obey civilian leadership. In this situation, the general public became deeply disillusioned with crumbling democracy and rampant social disorder.

A sense of national crisis was heightened further as pro-communist groups proliferated rapidly under the Chang government. The Socialist Party was formed, and a left-wing newspaper, *Minjok Ilbo (People's Daily)*, began publishing in February 1961. The newspaper was reported to receive financial support from an unknown communist organization based in Japan.[179] Another source of security challenge came from the college students' idealistic proposal for national reunification. They maintained that South Korea should pursue a foreign policy of nonalignment between the two superpowers by distancing from the United States and cultivating a closer relationship with the Soviets. Furthermore, they urged an immediate dialogue with North Korea for

179 Se-jin Kim, *The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1971), p. 30; *Hanguk Ilbo* (August 13 and 29, 1961).

peaceful reunification.[180] North Korean authorities immediately welcomed the students' proposal, demanding free election throughout the Korean peninsula and reducing both sides' military forces to 100,000. Even though Chang Myon instantly rejected the proposals, the left-leaning political groups instigated reactions from the conservative anti-communist groups, which charged the Chang leadership for its inconsistency and pro-communist policies. In effect, North Korea's political propaganda and spy infiltrations substantially increased during the Second Republic, expanding its influence in Korean society

Radical college students and growing socialist political groups offended the general public and high-ranking military officers' staunch anti-communist sentiment stemming from the Korean War. The Korean army especially perceived the burgeoning leftist groups in society as a grave security challenge to the state. Intensifying anti-communist ideology and Chang Myon's loss of regime legitimacy brought about crises in both national security and regime security, which provided a justification for the May 1961 coup d'etat. The first and foremost pledge by the military junta was that "Positive, uncompromising opposition to communism is the basis of our policy."[181] Furthermore, the coup forces justified their takeover of power by charging that the civilian leadership was incapable of carrying out economic development and maintaining political order.[182] When a group of army officers staged a coup on May 16, 1961, there was little resistance

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180 *Dong-A Ilbo* (November 2, 1960).

181 Secretariat, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, *Military Revolution in Korea* (1961), p. 11.

182 Jung-hee Park, *Uri Minjokeui Nagal Gil (Future of Our Nation)* (Seoul: Koryo Inc., 1965), pp. 174-175.

from the general public; instead, people seemed to accept the coup as an inevitable remedy for the country's political, economic, and security predicaments.

As early as 1952, when President Rhee became an authoritarian ruler and dependent upon army officers to maintain his dictatorial regime, General Park Jung-hee had conceived of a military coup d'etat. After President Rhee's election fraud in 1960, General Park and a small number of young turks in the army planned a coup on May 8, but the plan was brought to a halt due to the outbreak of the April Student Revolution. Two days later, eight officers were arrested, charged with "plotting to overthrow the government," but all of them were released a few days later.[183] General Park and his followers continued attracting supporters within the army by leading a "purification campaign" in the military. During the campaign, Park Jung-hee demanded that Army Chief of Staff Song Yo-chan resign to take responsibility of the military's engagement in the 1960 election fraud. Even though Park's coup attempt did not materialize this time, young army officers' support for Park rapidly increased during the Second Republic.

In the early hours of May 16, 1961, a group of about 250 army officers, supported by about 5,000 soldiers, undertook a speedy and bloodless coup d'etat. With the coup, the nine-month-old parliamentary democracy was overthrown. Park Jung-hee justified the coup by criticizing the Chang regime's pervasive corruption, its inability to defend the country from communist threats, and the absence of a viable plan for social and economic development. Park arrested several old politicians, college student activists, opposition politicians suspected of endorsing pro-communist ideology, and a number of corrupt businessmen. A Revolutionary Court and Prosecution was set up on July 12 to

try 697 civilians for their pro-communist activities and political and economic corruption.[184] Less than two months after the coup, Park founded the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) to support the military's dictatorial rule, with Kim Jong-pil, his brother-in-law, as the head. The KCIA possessed virtually omnipotent power, carrying out surveillance not only over army officers but also over civilian politicians, college students, intellectuals, and the press.

The Military Revolutionary Committee proposed six pledges to the people, including anti-communism as the prime national policy objective, industrial revolution, closer military alignment with the United States, fulfillment of all international agreements, and "a spiritual regeneration of the people."[185] Promises also included the transfer of the government to civilians and the coup officers' return to their original duties right after completing their revolutionary missions.

Even though the coup faced no organized resistance, the junta could not accomplish complete control over the military or win support from the general public. One of the important characteristics of the 1961 coup was that it was not staged by the military as an institution, but by a small number of young officers with similar regional, educational, and career backgrounds.[186] UN Commander-in-Chief General Carter Magruder declared that "all military personnel in his command [must] support the duly

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183 Kim, 1961, p. 78.

184 The Revolutionary Court sentenced 15 civilians to death, 16 to life imprisonment, and 276 to prison for years. See Robert Scalapino, "Which Route for Korea?" *Asian Survey* 2: 7 (1962), p. 3.

185 Republic of Korea, Military Revolutionary Committee, *A Statement by the Military Revolutionary Committee* (May 16, 1961).

186 The army officers who participated in the 1961 coup d'etat were alumni of the 8th graduates in the Korean Military Academy. Also they had the similar hometown background of Kyungnam

recognized Government of the Republic of Korea headed by Prime Minister Chang Myon," and asked President Yun Po-sun to mobilize 40,000 soldiers to suppress the coup plotters.[187] President Yun, however, did not respond to General Magruder's request and opposed carrying on a counter-coup, arguing that it could lead to civil war. In addition to the lack of recognition, the junta suffered from factional struggles within the coup leadership.[188]

Due to lack of support from within and outside the military, the junta promised to go back to the barracks as early as possible. In reality, however, Park Jung-hee planned to consolidate his dictatorial rule through what S. E. Finer termed "quasi-civilianization."[189] The junta called for presidential elections on October 15, 1963. Right before the election, General Park retired from the active military duty and ran for the presidential election as a "civilian" candidate. He organized the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) and filled the DRP with retired army officers. He won the 1963 presidential election by a close margin, garnering 42.6 percent of total votes while his competitor, Yun Po-sun, gained 41.2 percent. Park won again, four years later, in the 1967 presidential election.

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province. Yong-won Han, *Hangukeui Gunbu Jeongchi (Military Politics in Korea)* (Seoul: Daewangsa, 1993), pp. 210-211.

187 Walter Briggs, "The Military Revolution in Korea: On Its Leader and Achievements, *Koreana Quarterly* 5 (1963), p. 30. At the time of the 1961 coup, Prime Minister Chang Myon, the chief executive, went into hiding in a Catholic church in Seoul.

188 Factional struggles within the Korean military institution had existed from the time of the state-building period in the late 1940s. But the factional confrontations became ever more severe under the Rhee regime, as Rhee Syngman exploited the factional struggles to secure his control over the military institution. For detailed analysis of military factions in the Korean Army, see Kim, 1971, pp. 36-76.

189 According to Finer, the transition from direct military rule to "quasi-civilianization" is a recurring phenomenon. See, S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 176-190.

In spite of this quasi-civilianization, army officers became deeply involved in every aspect of political and economic processes under the Park presidency. As Table 3-1 shows, a number of retired generals became Congressmen throughout the Park regime. The presence of the retired officers was even more conspicuous in the executive branch. Between 1964 and 1979, the Park government's 314 ministers featured 118 with an active military background. Park Jung-hee successfully consolidated his grip on the military by appointing senior army officers in key governmental positions or sending them to foreign countries as ambassadors.[190] Korean society in general was also militarized further during the Park years. In addition to having more than 600,000 regular military personnel, Park organized all adult male civilians into militia forces and trained them for domestic defense.

Table 3-1: Military Elite in the National Assembly, 1963-1979[191]

	Total Congressmen	**Military Elite**	**Military (%)**
6th Congress (1963-67)	175	31	17.7
7th Congress (1967-71)	175	37	21.1
8th Congress (1971-72)	203	35	17.2
9th Congress (1973-78)	219	49	22.4
10th Congress (1978-79)	231	37	16.0

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190 Se-jung Kim, "Gunbu Gwonuijui Saengseonggwa Jeongae: Je 3.4-Gonghwagookeui Jeongchigwajeonge Daehan GwonryokJeongchijeok Jeopgeun (Creation and development of military authoritarianism: an approach to power politics to the 3rd and 4th republic," in Hung-soo Han, ed., *Hanguk Jeongchi Dongtae Ron (Political Behavior in Korea)* (Seoul: Orum, 1996), pp. 271-273.

191 Kwang-oong Kim, "Hanguk Mingun Gwanryo Elite ui Ideology wa Jungchi (The Korean Politics and the Ideology of the Civilian and Military Elites)," *Kyegan Kyunghyang* (Spring, 1988), p. 33.

Military dictatorial rule was firmly consolidated with the declaration of the *Yushin* (revitalization) constitution in October 1972, which substantially strengthened presidential power. On October 17, 1972, Park Jung-hee declared martial law, abolished the National Assembly, and outlawed any type of political activity. The *Yushin* constitution enabled the president to be elected not by the popular vote but by a small number of congregation selected by Park Jung-hee himself.

Several factors enabled Park Jung-hee to declare *Yushin*. First of all, the military regime was exceptionally successful in its major policies. Even though democratic values were sacrificed with the military dictatorship, South Korea restored high levels of social and political order and stability. Furthermore, the Park administration was extremely successful in economic development. Park Jung-hee's victory in three consecutive presidential elections (1963, 1967, and 1971) was possible due to remarkable economic success and social stability.

Table 3-2: Economic Growth under Park Jung-hee, 1961-1979[192]

Year	**GNP Per Capita (US $)**	**Economic Growth Rate (%)**
1961	82	5.6
1963	100	9.1
1965	105	5.8
1967	142	6.6
1969	210	13.8
1971	288	9.1
1973	395	14.0
1975	590	6.8
1977	1008	10.7
1979	1640	7.0

Another, and probably more significant, factor that motivated Park to declare the 1972 *Yushin* was the degenerating security environments around the Korean peninsula in the late 1960s. The Vietnam War and the United States' "abandonment" of Vietnam caused the Park government to rethink the credibility of the United States' security commitment to South Korea. To make matters worse, the Nixon administration announced a rapprochement policy toward communist China, at the same time revealing the news that one third of the American troops stationed in Korea would be withdrawn by 1971. In this situation, North Korea drastically increased its armed infiltration into South Korea.[193] During the late 1960s, therefore, Korean society was burdened by a sense of insecurity.

Table 3-3: North Korea's Armed Infiltration into South Korea, 1965-1971[194]

Year	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Armed Infiltration	88	80	784	985	188	181	84
Killed or Captured	114	112	785	841	156	104	119

192 Bank of Korea, *Kyongje Tonggye Nyonbo (Annual Economic Statistics)* (various volumes); Economic Planning Board, *Major Statistics of Korean Economy* (various volumes).

193 On January 31, 1968, for example, a North Korean commando unit infiltrated near to the Blue House, the presidential mansion, in Seoul to assassinate Park Jung-hee. In the next day, the U.S. Pueblo and its crew members were captured by the North Korean military. In November the same year, around 120 North Korean guerrilla forces infiltrated into the north-eastern part of South Korea, which took almost two months for the Korean army to put down the guerrilla forces. In April, 1969, a U.S. reconnaissance plane (EC-121) was shot down by North Korea. For the inter-Korean relationship, the 1960s was the most perilous moment since the end of the Korean War. See Chang-heon Oh, *Yushin Chejewa Hankuk Jeongchi (Yushin and Korean Politics)* (Seoul: Orum, 2001), p. 79.

194 Chang-hon Oh, Yushin Cheje-wa Hyundae Hangukjeongchi (Yushin and Contemporary Korean Politics) (Seoul: Orum, 2001), p. 78.

Added to these outside threats, anti-Park demonstrations also heightened domestic instability to both the state and the regime in the early 1970s. Among the demonstrators, college students posed the greatest threat to the Park regime. Their demonstrations were rooted in resistance against the lengthening of compulsory military education in universities.[195] But they also demanded the immediate termination of military dictatorship and restoration of democracy. Between March and November of 1971, about 300 demonstrations occurred. The Park government declared the Garrison Decree over Seoul and temporarily closed all of the city's universities.

With the *Yushin* constitution, Park Jung-hee consolidated the military-dominant regime in South Korea until 1979, when he was assassinated by one of his closest confidants.[196] As noted, the failure of civilian leadership—by both Rhee Syngman and Chang Myon—provided the military with an opportunity for the 1961 military coup and the installation of a military dictatorship. The extension and consolidation of the military's dictatorial rule was possible in the presence of growing security threats both domestically and internationally. In the aftermath of Park's death, there occurred another coup d'etat and military dictatorship led by Chun Doo-whan, which lasted until 1987.[197]

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195 All college students were responsible to take 711 hours of military education, which amounts to 17 percent of total education curriculum.

196 Park Jung-hee was assassinated by Kim Jae-kyu, Head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) on October 26, 1979. For detailed description of the 10. 26 assassination, see Chang-hun Oh, "Yushin Cheje Jedohwaeui Silpae Gwanhan Yeongu (Study of the Failure in the Institutionalization of Yushin: Political and Institutional Variables)," *Korean Political Science Review* 28: 2 (1994).

197 I do not detail the 1980 coup by Chun Doo-whan in this dissertation. For the 1980 coup, see Chong-sik Lee, "South Korea in 1980: The Emergence of a New Authoritarian Order," *Asian Survey* 21: 1 (January 1980), pp. 125-143; Po-sik Choi, "Je-o Gonghwaguk Jeonya: 12.12 Pyon (The Eve of the Fifth Republic: The 12. 12 Period)," *Wolgan Choson* (May 1996), pp. 497-631; Kyungkyo Seo, *Military Involvement in Politics and the Prospects for Democracy: Thailand, the*

II. Indonesia

In Chapter Two, I detailed how domestic security threats during Indonesia's state-building process led to the failure of parliamentary democracy and the installation of an authoritarian regime with Guided Democracy in 1957 and how the ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia)* became deeply involved in domestic politics. The installation of Guided Democracy was an attempt to overcome an ill-functioning parliamentary system and secure the territorial integrity of the state. With the declaration of martial law, the central military command of the ABRI was entrusted with extensive powers to suppress regional rebellions against the central government. In this context, the army became deeply engaged in civilian administration and the management of key economic sectors. As a result, Guided Democracy and martial law resulted in the army officers' deeper penetration into domestic politics and the growth of the ABRI's corporate economic interests.

Guided Democracy with strong presidential power provided the state with some level of political stability for a short time in the late 1950s. During this period, President Sukarno secured his political leadership by maintaining a delicate power balance between the two most influential and competing political actors—the PKI (*Partai Kommunis Indonesia*, the Indonesian Communist Party) and the ABRI. The Communist Party emerged as an influential political group in Indonesia in the 1950s by supporting liberal democracy and political freedom as a strategy to broaden its support base among the Indonesian people. Political freedom and free elections in the parliamentary democracy enabled the PKI to emerge as one of the most influential political groups from the

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elections, winning 17 percent of the vote in 1955 and 27.4 percent in the 1957 provincial elections in Java.[198] When Guided Democracy was proclaimed, however, the PKI turned its attitudes from supporting liberal democracy to endorsing the PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*, Indonesian Nationalist Party) and Sukarno's authoritarian leadership.

While President Sukarno strengthened his political ties with the PKI, he also developed a cooperative relationship with the ABRI as a way of counterbalancing the PKI. Originally, Guided Democracy was effective due to the army officers' active support. Guided Democracy and martial law strengthened the ABRI's political influence in central and provincial administrations by launching a territorial command structure that stretched from the central military headquarters in Jakarta down to the local levels.[199] As a result, army officers in provinces exercised executive authority equal to that of civilian administrators.

President Sukarno and central army leadership formed a strategic partnership to put down regional insurrections and strengthen the president's power by putting an end to the parliamentary democracy. In return, the ABRI extended its influence into political and economic arenas, which were legitimatized by General Nasution's "middle way"

Southern Illinois at Carbondale, 1993).

[198] In the 1955 elections, four parties won almost equal numbers of vote. Two of these were Islamist parties (Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama), the other two parties were nationalist parties (PNI and PKI). For 1957 provincial election results, see Ulf Sundhaussen, "Indonesia: Past and Present Encounters with Democracy," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries, Volume Three: Asia* (London: Adamantine Press Limited, 1989), p. 434.

[199] For more detailed analysis of the ABRI's territorial command structure, see, Damien Kingsbury, *Power Politics and the Indonesian Military* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 67-139; Thomas E. Sidwell, *The Indonesian Military: Dwi Fungsi and Territorial Operations* (Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, 1995).

doctrine.[200] The middle way doctrine declared that the ABRI would not limit its mission within its function of national defense. Rather, army officers would assume a more active role in all levels of government to safeguard the territorial integrity of the state.[201] For army officers, close relationship with Sukarno provided a justification for their engagement in domestic political, administrative, and economic affairs. For Sukarno's part, the ABRI was instrumental to preserving both state and regime security and to balancing against the growing influence of the PKI.

Since all regional insurrections were effectively put down with martial law, Sukarno and the ABRI marched together to recover West Irian which was still occupied by the Dutch and therefore was a symbol of national humiliation for both political elites and the general public. The recovery campaign could become a means to enhancing support from domestic audiences. This campaign eventually resulted in strengthening the ABRI's political position as it escalated from diplomatic disputes to an armed battle. In December 1961, Sukarno set up the Supreme Command for the Liberation of West Irian under his leadership, appointing General Nasution as his deputy and Major General Suharto as commander of the military operation.[202] The West Irian campaign, with United States' diplomatic support, succeeded in 1963.

As the ABRI gained more prestige in the Sukarno government after the West Irian campaign, Sukarno felt threatened by the ABRI's growing influence and from his own

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200 William Liddle R., "Indonesia's Democratic Past and Future," *Comparative Politics* 24: 4 (1992), p. 446.

201 For more discussion about the middle way doctrine, see C. L. M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1985).

excessive dependence upon army officers. Thus, he began to strengthen his ties with other political groups including the PKI, the NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama*, Muslim Teachers' Party, a conservative Sunni Islamic group), and the PNI to curb the increasingly influential ABRI.[203] Sukarno's alliance with these political groups led him to declare the doctrine of "Nasakom," which included nationalism, regionalism, and communism as the organizing principles of national unity. The Nasakom doctrine, the President believed, would become a channel for national unity by incorporating diverse political and religious forces into a cooperative relationship.

The unstable balance between the ABRI and the PKI until the early 1960s began to destabilize the Sukarno regime as he adopted several policy initiatives that the PKI endorsed. The PKI became more influential and challenged the ABRI's prerogatives in the government. The antagonism between the two groups further deepened with the issue of the creation of an independent Malaysia. Malaysian state-building was seen by President Sukarno and the PKI as a British project that attempted to establish a puppet regime to perpetuate neocolonial rule in the neighbor territory. Sukarno and the PKI initiated a "*Crush Malaysia*" campaign, called *Konfrontasi*, which escalated into a military campaign in August 1964.[204]

While the PKI enthusiastically supported Sukarno's *Crush Malaysia* campaign from the beginning, the ABRI was in a position to follow it only hesitantly. Army

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202 Rudolf O. G. Roeder, *The Smiling General: President Soeharto of Indonesia* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1969), p. 195.

203 Another influential political party, Muslim Masyumi (*Majdjelis Sjuro*, Muslim Indonesia), was banned after the declaration of Guided Democracy.

204 Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 2nd ed*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 57.

officers, with a strong self-image as the only organization that truly represented national interests, could not oppose the campaign openly since, like the West Irian campaign, it was closely connected with the general public's sense of national prestige. If the ABRI had opposed the campaign, its image could have been severely damaged.

In the meantime, even though the *Konfrontasi* was not popular among the moderate political groups in Indonesia, the PKI vehemently carried on a campaign to shift the Indonesians' hostility toward the PKI onto Britain and the United States.[205] At the same time, the communist forces attempted to garner support from the nationalist and anti-colonialist segments in the country. The PKI charged that the federation of Malaysia was nothing more than a "form of neocolonialism" and a British strategy to extend influence in the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).[206] In January 1964, members of the PKI occupied several British plantations in Indonesia and launched a campaign against the United States supporting the independence of Malaysia. The anti-Western demonstration reached its zenith when the U.S. military forces started massive air raids on North Vietnam. The *Konfrontasi* ended after General Suharto controlled the government with the 1965 coup d'etat. In 1966, Indonesia and Malaysia signed a peace treaty.

The PKI's influence in the Sukarno government extended further into other domestic issues, including land reform and the reduction of the size of the ABRI and its economic role. The PKI's land reform campaign (*aski sepihak*, unilateral action) began

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205 John O. Sutter, "Two Faces of Konfrontasi: "Crush Malaysia" and the Gestapu," *Asian Survey* 6: 10 (1966), p. 527.

206 Justus M. van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1965), p. 273.

in Central and East Java, but soon spread to other regions in West Java and Sumatra. Major targets of the land reform campaign were not only regional landlords who had close ties with the PNI and the NU, but also government-owned properties that were managed by ABRI officers.[207] The PKI's unilateral action caused violent conflicts between the PKI-led peasants and regional landlords who aligned with regional military units during the early 1960s. The PKI's land reform initiative, coupled with the Crush Malaysia campaign, provoked the ABRI, as the former threatened the corporate interests of the latter.

In the foreign policy area, the Sukarno regime, now under the heavy influence of the PKI, isolated itself from major Western powers by withdrawing its membership from the United Nations and moving closer to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.[208] In 1965, Sukarno announced his leadership role within the formation of an international alliance for anti-imperialist and nonalignment movements, including countries such as Indonesia, North Vietnam, Communist China, North Korea, and other left-leaning countries. At the same time, the PKI built up close ties with, and gained financial support from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Sukarno government's foreign policy during the early 1960s significantly damaged its relationship with the United States and other Western countries.

The Sukarno government's unfriendly relationship with the West and inconsistent domestic economic policies caused the economic crisis of the 1960s. The withdrawal

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[207] Crouch, 1988, p. 64.

[208] For Sukarno's foreign policy toward the Communist states and the PKI's influence in this process, see Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974).

from international organizations such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) led to an economic crisis.[209] In the aftermath of the campaign to "Crush Malaysia," the IMF put off financial credits from Indonesia. At the same time, the United States canceled its plan to provide new economic aid to the country. By 1965, inflation stood at 600 percent, the price of rice rose 900 percent, and poverty and hunger were widespread.[210] The budget deficit reached 300 percent of total governmental revenues.

By the early 1960s, Sukarno's design of political equilibrium between the PKI and the ABRI was quickly breaking down, as the president moved closer to the PKI in several political and policy issues. A series of events curtailed the ABRI's influence in the government. In June 1962, Sukarno announced extensive structural and personnel changes in the ABRI hierarchy. With these changes, Sukarno became Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, exerting more influence in the ABRI. In the area of personnel changes, Army Chief of Staff Abdul Haris Nassution was forced to hand over his position to Major General Ahmad Yani. Moreover, army officers of the Yani faction were promoted to commander positions in the ABRI hierarchy, which in turn was directly controlled by Sukarno. This relegated General Nasution to a mere administrative head of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces staff, without actual power in the army.[211]

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209 For the IMF's and the U.S' decision to withdraw economic support, see Jamie A. C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi: The Indonesian-Malaysia Dispute, 1963-1966* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).

210 David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz, *Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 6.

211 On July 1, 1962, Nasution gave up his position, Assistant Body to the Supreme War Authority, to Yani. In May 1964, Sukarno abolished the Committee for the Retooling of the State

By getting rid of General Nasution, who had been an emblematic leader among army officers since the inception of the Republic, Sukarno tried to restrain the ABRI's influence in politics.

Another critical event that enraged the ABRI was Sukarno's lifting of martial law in 1963. The installation of Guided Democracy and martial law in 1957 was quite successful in suppressing various regional rebellious components, including the Darul Islam in West Java, rebellions in Sulawesi, and the West Irian campaign. Since domestic security threats had dwindled significantly by the early 1960s, President Sukarno lifted martial law and cut defense spending by 47 percent in 1963.[212] Military budget reductions put ABRI commanders in a difficult position, since they had to downsize military personnel. Army generals, however, were not willing to reduce the number of their forces while facing growing communist threats domestically and internationally. By this time, senior army officers were determined to fight back against the PKI-dominant Sukarno regime. Rumors were spreading that a group of army generals who were receiving support from the United States were plotting coup d'etat to topple Sukarno and the PKI.

Before the coup was executed, however, a group of pro-PKI officers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung and allied with two army battalions and the air force, launched a preemptive coup during the night of September 30, 1965.[213] The coup plotters

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Apparatus which had been headed by Nasution. Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 163-164.

212 Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives," *Asian Survey* 4. (1964), p. 904.

213 For the Untung coup and the PKI's role in the coup, see Daniel S. Lev, "Indonesia 1965: The Year of the Coup," *Asian Survey* 6: 2 (1966).

kidnapped and killed six highest-ranking officers of the ABRI. They occupied part of Jakarta and declared that they seized power to protect President Sukarno and prevent a coup by army generals who were allegedly backed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.[214] It took less than 24 hours, however, for Major General Suharto to put down the Untung group and regain control over the ABRI. It was reported that the PKI was behind the coup attempt and, during the six months following the aborted coup, more than a half-million PKI members and communist sympathizers were killed by ABRI forces.[215] Army officers took a leading role in the massacre, but other civilian groups, especially Muslim youth groups, also joined in crushing the PKI.

The aborted coup attempt marked a power transition from the Sukarno-PKI coalition to a military-dominant authoritarian regime led by General Suharto, the highest-ranking general among ABRI officers. The period from 1965 to 1967 was a critical moment in Indonesian politics in which, under Suharto's leadership, the military established its political hegemony and redirected the country from the leftist orientation toward one integrated with the global capitalist system, and closely tied to major Western powers. In March 1966, President Sukarno forcefully stepped down, transferred power to General Suharto, and was put under virtual house arrest. In June 1966, the National Consultative Assembly (or Provisional People's Consultative Assembly) endorsed Suharto's authority and, one year later, it elected Suharto as Acting President. In March

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214 Anders Uhlin, *Indonesia and "The Third Wave of Democratization": The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997), p. 40.

215 During the 1960s, the PKI came to realize that there was no way but to take the total control over the government to achieve its strategic goals. See, Sutter, 1966, p. 534.

1968, Suharto became President, and was confirmed in his post by Indonesian voters in the 1971 elections.

The elimination of Sukarno and the PKI left the ABRI as the dominant political force in the post-coup period. The first thing that Suharto and the army leadership did after gaining power was to ban the Communist Party and dismiss 14 ministers from the government. In addition, Suharto reorganized the ABRI to strengthen his commandership, purged officers with pro-communist ideology and pro-Sukarnoism, and took away powers from the regional military commanders. Suharto secured his control over the ABRI by getting rid of the Chief of Staff's power to command troops and by downsizing the elite troops. Furthermore, Suharto filled key positions in the army with officers he personally trusted. There were two kinds of officers who rose to power under Suharto's rule: officers personally loyal to Suharto on the one hand, and politically inconsequential officers on the other.[216]

With the installation of Suharto's New Order, the ABRI became more deeply engaged in domestic political, administrative, and economic affairs. Suharto dispatched army officers throughout the archipelago to maintain internal security by repressing any possibility of opposition to the central government. The ABRI played a vital role in strengthening the central government's control over local governments and military units. President Suharto issued limited tours of duty for regional commanders and appointed

[216] Among the Suharto loyalists were General Leonardus Benyamin Murdani, Admiral Sudomo, and General Yoga Sugama. Politically influential officers included General Maraden Panggabean and General Mohamad Jusuf. Suharto loyalists had had close ties with the President for a long period of time; the officers of the second category came from regional military divisions outside Java. See Salim Said, "Suharto's Armed Forces: Building a Power Base in New Order Indonesia, 1966-1998," *Asian Survey* 38: 6 (1998), pp. 536-538.

officers from outside the region to the commandership positions.[217] In addition, the ABRI was automatically guaranteed 20 percent of seats in the legislative body at all levels of government. In the domestic economic area, the military officers' role further expanded under the New Order regime. Suharto extended preferential treatment to the military-owned businesses after monopolizing certain economic sectors.[218] Some officers were appointed as directors of public corporations (including the state-owned oil companies), while others founded joint ventures with civilian businessmen, predominantly of Chinese ethnicity. As a result, the ABRI's political role further increased throughout the years of the Suharto leadership from the late 1960s up until 1998 when he stepped down from his presidency.

In addition to safeguarding his political power by using the ABRI, President Suharto also organized a political party, Golkar (*Golongan Karya*, Functional Group), to have his own electoral organization. Unlike other political parties in a general sense, the Golkar was a federation of various functional groups such as youth, farmers', and women's organizations that were arranged by elites in Indonesian society. These loose organizations had existed before Suharto rose to power, but he mobilized them into a political-party type entity.[219] Suharto managed tight control over the Golkar Party by appointing party leaders from the top to the lower levels and exerting heavy influence

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217 John M. Allison, "Indonesia: Year of the Pragmatists," *Asian Survey* 9: 2 (1969), p. 132.

218 For the military's economic role under the Suharto regime, see J. Kristiadi, "The Armed Forces," in Richard W. Baker, M. Hadi Soesastro, J. Kristiadi, and Douglas E. Ramage, eds., *Indonesia: The Challenge of Change* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); Robert Lowry, *Indonesian Defense Policy and the Indonesian Armed Forces* (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Center, Australian National University, 1993).

over the decision-making process within the party. Army officers were instrumental in building the Golkar. Even though active ABRI officers were not allowed to take leadership roles in the party, an advisory council that was composed of retired generals directed the Golkar Party from behind the scenes. For Suharto's rule, the Golkar functioned as the most instrumental element to control the bureaucracy, the military, and civilian society in general, as all members of the bureaucracy and the army had to be members of the Golkar.

With the installation of a military-dominant authoritarianism, Indonesia was able to control various components of domestic instability. Major sources of domestic security threats at the local levels were effectively suppressed with a more centralized military commandership under Suharto. His seizure of power was welcomed by the non-communist world countries.[220] Suharto's cooperative relationship with major Western powers had the effect of stabilizing the domestic economy. As OPEC hiked up oil prices in the 1970s, Indonesia's economic prospects improved considerably, and its dependence on foreign aid was reduced significantly. Suharto's success in economic and security areas enabled him to maintain his authoritarian rule until 1998.

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219 The Golkar party was organized in 1964 by the Army officers to compete with the PKI. For the formation and development of Golkar, see David Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System* (London: Oxford University Press, 1985).

220 It has been presumed that the United States and other major powers actively supported the Indonesian Army's seizure of power and suppression of the PKI. See Peter D. Scott, "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno," *Pacific Affairs* 58: 2 (1985), pp. 239-264; Geoffrey Robinson, "Indonesia: On a New Course?" in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 227.

Military's Participation in Politics: Civilian Control over the Politicized Army in Taiwan and the Philippines

In the previous two sections, I examined the military coups in South Korea and Indonesia. In these cases, the armed forces overthrew fragile civilian leadership and established military dictatorships (South Korea, 1960s-1980s and Indonesia, 1960s-1990s). The remaining two cases—the Philippines (1960s-1980s) and Taiwan (1950s-1980s)—represent the military's deep penetration in governing process under the guidance of civilian authoritarian leadership. The question to be addressed in the remaining two sections is, therefore, what factors contributed to preventing the military's domination.

III. The Philippines

From the inception of the Republic to the overthrow of Marcos in 1986, the political roles of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) evolved in three distinct stages. In the first juncture, the AFP was created as a politically neutral and professional organization under American tutelage. In the next, President Marcos, with the declaration of martial law, turned politically neutral officers in the AFP into politically influential actors. In the third stage, a group of politically influential generals withdrew support from their master and played a decisive role in Marcos' downfall.

This section details the ways in which President Marcos managed his authority over politicized army officers throughout his authoritarian rule, focusing on the factors that thwarted military coup throughout the Marcos regime. This section explores how

Marcos' personalistic control over the AFP undermined army professionalism, promoted factional struggles, and in the end led to the withdrawal of officers' support for him. Even though there was no coup during Marcos' rule, his manipulation of army officers made them even more politically active, which brought about a highly unstable democratization during the late 1980s.

During the early years of martial law, Marcos and the AFP maintained a cordial and cooperative relationship. The declaration of martial law was possible only through the support of a dozen high-ranking officers, who were called the "twelve disciples." The twelve disciples included, among others, Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Romeo C. Espino, Philippine Army commanding officer Fidel V. Ramos, and Philippine Navy Commander Favian Ver.[221] President Marcos consulted with these officers concerning the declaration of martial law, and in turn, these officers helped fortify Marcos' authoritarian rule.

After all the politically influential actors—opposition parties, Congress, college students, and labor unions—were eliminated from the political scene, the military became a primary means for President Marcos to govern the country. For this reason, Marcos provided army officers with various incentives, including promotions, higher pay and military budgets, extension of tenures beyond term limits, and other economic incentives. For the AFP's part, Marcos was instrumental in guaranteeing its organizational interests and justifying its participation in domestic political and economic affairs. Thus, during

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[221] Carolina G. Hernandez, *The Extent of Civilian Control of the Military in the Philippines, 1946-1976,* Ph. D. Dissertation (State University of New York at Buffalo, 1979), p. 217.

the early years of martial law, Marcos and the top brass of the army managed an accommodating relationship.

At the same time, however, Marcos was well aware of the danger of becoming too dependent upon the armed forces to maintain his presidency. Since all opposition forces were eliminated under martial law, the AFP became the only remaining politically influential organization and, therefore, the greatest threat to his power.[222] For this reason, the first thing Marcos did after declaring martial law was to make army officers dependent upon his authority to prevent them from developing into a politically autonomous institution.

Throughout his presidential tenure, Marcos designed a delicate personalistic control mechanism over the military organization. Although all AFP officers were promoted by one grade immediately after martial law was declared, their subsequent tenure was to be renewed once every six months, depending upon a review of their allegiance to the president. President Marcos positioned the officer corps from his home Ilocos region in the highest and most important posts of the AFP. The "*Ilocanization*" of army officers had already begun in Marcos' legal presidency, when he served concurrently as Secretary of Defense for the first 13 months of his term, and stayed on during the martial law period.[223] Among officers from the Ilocos region, General Fidel Ramos and Major General Fabian Ver were the most influential figures under Marcos'

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[222] Richard J. Kessler, "Development and the Military: Role of the Philippine Military in Development," in J. Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun Chong, eds., *Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), p. 222.

[223] For detailed information about the Ilocanization of the Philippine Armed Forces, see Carl H. Lande, "The Political Crisis," in John Bresnan ed., *Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 134-136; also see Chapter Two of this dissertation.

rule.[224] Officers who either came from Ilocos or were personally connected with Marcos or his wife were promoted to the highest positions in the military hierarchy.

The personalistic control over the AFP had a destructive impact on military professionalism and increased factional struggles among army officers. While officers of the Ilocos region received enormous benefits and monopolized key commandership positions, other officers who were non-Ilocos or unclear in their loyalty to the president were assigned to areas outside Metro Manila to conduct dangerous counter-insurgency warfare with the New People's Army (NPA) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).[225] Officers outside Marcos' inner circle became increasingly frustrated as they found themselves fighting the proliferating insurgent forces without sufficient equipment or training. Many junior officers became infuriated that Marcos was not seriously concerned about state security, but instead only the security of his regime.

Marcos was able to control high-ranking army officers by instigating factional competition based on education, region, and religious-linguistic identity. The top brass was divided almost evenly between graduates of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) and four-year university graduates with ROTC commissions. The factional struggles between these two groups were emblematized by two senior officers: (1) General Ver who was a graduate of the University of the Philippines and was supported by the highly politicized ROTC officers; and (2) General Fidel Ramos who, even though not a PMA

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[224] In the martial law regime, General Ramos was appointed as the new commanding general of the Philippine Constabulary; Major General Ver became the Presidential Security Command. David Wurfel, *Filipino Politics: Development and Decay* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 147.
[225] Benjamin Muego, *Spectator Society: The Philippine Under Martial Rule* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1988), p. 148.

alumnus, graduated from West Point in the United States and gained great respect from junior-level and more professionalized army officers. As time passed, the factional struggles came to have clear-cut lines between the PMA and non-PMA officers.[226]

The power balance between the two factions, however, changed in favor of General Ver's side, while the Ramos faction became marginalized in the Marcos circle. Marcos began to distance himself from senior officers such as Defense Minister Enrile, AFP Chief of Staff Romeo Espino, and Philippine Constabulary Commander Ramos by removing them from the chain of command in the AFP.[227] On the other hand, Marcos trusted General Ver and gave him more powers, positioning him to head the Presidential Security Command (PSC) and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA). In turn, General Ver tightened his control over the PSC by placing his three sons in key positions.[228] The PSC and the NICA functioned as Marcos' secret police, responsible for eliminating any anti-Marcos movements within both the armed forces and civil society.

The rift between Marcos and a group of junior officers loyal to General Ramos became pronounced as the president faced multiple challenges in the late 1970s. Marcos struggled with a deteriorating domestic economy, intensifying opposition from Catholic Church leaders, growing domestic insurgency movements with the NPA and the MNLF strengthening their sphere of influence, and emerging political opposition from civil society groups. But the most serious blow to the legitimacy of the Marcos regime was

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226 Eva-Lotta Hedman, "The Philippines: Not So Military, Not So Civil," in Alagappa, ed., 2001, pp. 177-178.

227 In 1978, Marcos circulated Letter of Instructions No. 776, which excluded Enrile and Espino from the assignment and promotion of the military personnel. Cecilio T. Arrilo, *Breakaway* (Manila: Kyodo, 1986), p. 132.

the assassination of Benigno Aquino, the former Senator and presidential competitor to Marcos in the early 1970s.[229]

Marcos' justification for the extension of his presidential tenure and martial law relied significantly upon his economic performance during the first few years of his presidency. In the 1970s, the Marcos government was successful in improving economic conditions, with GNP growth over 6 percent per year, mainly due to sound economic policies designed by technocrats.[230]

Table 3-4: Economic Conditions under the Marcos Presidency, 1975-1983[231]

	1975-79	**1981**	**1983**
Real GNP growth	6.4	3.4	1.1
Foreign Debt (billion $US)	4.9	20.9	24.8
Trade deficit/GNP	-4.9	-5.4	-8.1
Fiscal deficit/GNP	-1.3	-4.0	-2.0

The rejuvenated economy in the early years of martial law gave rise to broad-based support for Marcos' rule. After 1979, however, the Philippine economy suffered continuous decline. The second oil shock in 1979, the worldwide recession, and domestic economic scandals were responsible for an economic decline by the early 1980s. The economic growth rate plunged drastically, while foreign debt and the

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228 General Ver's three sons in the PSC included Colonel Irwin Ver, Lieutenant Col. Rexor Ver, and Major Wyrlo Ver.

229 Albert F. Celoza, *Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of Authoritarianism* (Westport: Praeger, 1997), p. 24.

230 Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pp. 205-207.

231 Stephan Haggard, "The Political Economy of the Philippine Debt Crisis," in Joan M. Nelson, *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 235; Mark R. Thomson, *The Anti-Marcos Struggle:*

governmental budget deficit multiplied. Furthermore, the 1983 political crisis caused by the assassination of former Senator Aquino resulted in a massive flight of foreign capital. During the final two years of Marcos' rule, GNP growth dropped by 5.3 percent, inflation swelled by 50 percent, and the unemployment rate rose to 36 percent.[232]

The economic crisis of the early 1980s impaired Marcos' political standing in several ways. First of all, the continuous economic decline evaporated the support for the Marcos regime from the business communities that previously had maintained a cordial relationship with the president. Even before he became president, Marcos established a patron-client relationship with wealthy business families. These business groups received enormous benefits from Marcos' favoritism during the martial law years. In turn, these business elites provided important financial support to the Marcos regime.[233]

The Makati-based and Filipino-Chinese were hit especially hard by the economic crisis. Marcos' relationship with the business elites of Chinese ethnicity worsened as his government tried to track their currency transactions for governmental revenues. These Manila-based economic elites did not oppose Marcos' authoritarian rule as long as the president did not intervene in their economic interests. But the economic crisis of the 1980s forced Marcos to interfere in the conglomerates' corruption and tax evasion. In response, the business elite resisted Marcos' policy by organizing street demonstrations, in which more than 100,000 workers marched in the streets on September 14, 1983.

Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 120.

232 Bernardo Villegas, "The Economic Crisis," in Bresnan ed., 1986, p. 145.

233 For more information on the patron-client relationship in the Marcos regime, see John F. Doherty, *Who Controls the Philippines Economy: Some Need Not Try as Hard as Others* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1982).

Furthermore, Filipino-Chinese businesses began to secretly provide financial support to opposition political groups.[234]

More damagingly, poor economic performance also had the effect of strengthening the insurgency movements of the NPA and the MNLF. In the early years of martial law, Marcos was effective in weakening these insurgency movements through effective counter-insurgency operations in the Southern provinces. From the late 1970s, however, the NPA and the MNLF were rejuvenated in several regions as economic conditions worsened. Those insurgency groups expanded their influence as impoverished farmers joined the rebel groups. The CPP and NPA significantly expanded their membership and influence not only in provincial areas but also in the Metro Manila area, while the Muslim MNLF became somewhat weaker due to the lack of foreign support and a leadership crisis inside the organization (see Table 2-7 in Chapter Two for the CPP/NPA and MNLF strengths during the Marcos era).

While the CPP/NPA and MNLF insurgencies posed a serious threat to national security, the general public's turn against the Marcos dictatorship posed grave security crisis to the regime. The Catholic Church's leadership exerted a tremendous influence over public opinion, given that over 85 percent of the population was Catholic.[235] In the early years of Marcos' rule, Church leaders were ambivalent about martial law and tried to avoid political involvement. During this period, Church leaders formed a Church-

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234 Lewis M. Simons, *Worth Dying For* (New York: William Morrow, 1987), pp. 55-56; Sandra Burton, *Impossible Dream: The Marcoses, the Aquinos, and the Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Warner Books, 1989), p. 277.

235 For information on state-church relationship under the Marcos rule, see Richard P. Hardy, *The Philippine Bishops Speak (1968-1983)* (Quezon City: Maryknoll School of Theology, 1984); Pasquale T. Giordano, *Awakening to Mission: The Philippine Catholic Church 1965-1981*

Military Committee and focused on investigating mistreatment of political prisoners and other human rights violations by armed forces personnel.[236] The Church-Marcos relationship deteriorated as the army arrested several Church leaders who joined or secretly supported the NPA rebellion.[237] The Catholic Church provided critical leadership in the struggle that led to the fall of Marcos and the subsequent democratization process in the Philippines.

By the early 1980s, the political, economic, and security environments all were turning against Marcos and, in this situation, he became more dependent upon army officers, especially General Ver and his followers. The greatest threat to his regime arrived with the news that former Senator Benigno Aquino was returning to the Philippines from a decade-long exile in the United States. On his return to the Manila airport on August 21, 1983, however, he was assassinated by a gunman. It was suspected that the first lady, Imelda Marcos, and General Ver were responsible for the assassination. Aquino's assassination caused massive anti-Marcos demonstrations in which millions of Filipinos participated. The Catholic Church and Manila-based business elites took leading roles in organizing the so-called "Parliament of the Streets."[238]

Marcos' personalistic rule over and factionalization of the AFP ultimately resulted in the loss of control over certain segments of the army, especially with the deterioration of political, economic, and security conditions. Deeply disappointed with corruption,

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(Quezon City: New Day, 1988); Wilfredo Fabros, *The Church and Its Social Involvement in the Philippines 1930-1972* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1988).

236 Task-Force Detainees, *Philippine Human Rights Update* (Manila, monthly issues for periods covered); Kessler, 1989, p. 137.

237 Manila's Jamime Cardinal Sin took a leading role in criticizing the Marcos' dictatorial rule and human rights violations.

factional struggle, and the loss of professionalism in the AFP, a group of junior officers headed by Colonel Gregorio Honasan created a secret fraternity, named Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM).[239] Most RAM members were PMA graduates who had combat experience against Muslim and Communist insurgents throughout the 1970s but were outside Marcos' inner circle. These RAM officers were furious about the promotion system in the AFP, as they were systematically excluded from the higher ranks while Manila-based officers from the Ilocos region and responsible for the security of Marcos monopolized most of the senior generalship. The RAM officers demanded improved training, better equipment, a merit-based promotion system, and military professionalism. They stressed that professionalization of the army was the only way to restore its ability to succeed in defeating the insurgencies.[240]

After Aquino's assassination, the RAM went further to demand that Marcos step down from his presidency. At this time, RAM members devised a plan to overthrow the Marcos government and, if necessary, assassinate him and establish a military junta with a target date of mid-1987. The coup plan, however, was called off after Marcos unexpectedly announced a presidential election to be held in early 1986. In February 1986, General Ramos and General Enrile hastened the revolt plan, leading to the disintegration of army officers' rally for Marcos.[241] When the 1986 presidential election result was inconclusive with both Marcos and his competitor Corazon Aquino declaring

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238 Thomson, 1995, p. 8.

239 As early as 1978, a group of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) graduates formed a clandestine fraternity. In January 1980, a group of about 200 soldiers were arrested in charge of a coup attempt. Kessler, 1989, p. 128.

240 Rodney Tasker, "The Hidden Hand," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (August 1, 1985), pp. 10-11.

victory, the RAM under the leadership of Ramos and Enrile played a decisive role in the ouster of Marcos and establishment of a new democratic government led by Corzaon Aquino, the widow of former Senator Aquino.

Unlike the cases of South Korea and Indonesia, the AFP did not execute a coup and establish military dictatorship during Marcos' rule. The absence of a coup during this period was largely due to Marcos' ability control the political power of high-ranking officers. But his personalistic control over the AFP damaged professionalism and organizational unity while inflating factional struggles. Therefore, even though there was no coup, the AFP was further politicized during Marcos years, which became a stumbling block for the democratization process in the late 1980s, as RAM officers staged seven major coup attempts within the first four years of the Aquino presidency as will be explained in Chapter Four.

IV. Taiwan

Of the four cases under study, Taiwan demonstrates the most stable civil-military relations; the Taiwanese army was under strong civilian leadership from the 1950s until recent years. In this respect, the Taiwanese case from the 1960s to the 1980s provides a different path of historical development than the Philippine case in which politicized AFP officers turned against their civilian master and overthrew him. This section explores the factors that promoted a strong civilian guidance over the Taiwanese military even when the officers had a strong influence in domestic politics. I suggest that a confluence of several factors—changes in security environments, the strength of civilian leadership, and

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[241] Kessler, 1989, p. 130.

professionalized control of the armed forces—produced strong civilian control over the military.

After losing mainland China and retreating to Formosa Island in 1949, the Kuomintang (KMT) government's immediate task was to build a strong military capable of coping with severe domestic and international threats and, in the long run, of retaking the mainland territory. To undertake the task of building a strong state, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's first mission was to reform the KMT party with ideological indoctrination and strong leadership. The Chiang government established a single-party authoritarian state, and the military became the party's army that was directly subordinate to the KMT party. The party organization, in turn, was highly centralized and placed under the direct control of Chiang Kai-shek (1927-1975) and later his son Chiang Ching-kuo (1975-1988).[242]

It was Chiang's strong conviction that the defeat in the civil war with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was due to rampant corruption, lack of discipline, and factional struggles within the KMT party and the army. Therefore, Chiang's first priority after retreating to Taiwan was a thorough organizational restructuring of the party and the government. The factional struggle within the party had been a constant problem since Sun Yat-sen's death in 1925. The most influential factions in the party included the C.C. Clique, Whampoa Military Clique, Western Hills Group, Political Study Group, and local

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242 Monte R. Bullard, *The Soldier and the Citizen: The Role of the Military in Taiwan's Development* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 3.

military leaders.[243] The center of the party lost control over its local branches, and party elites' corruption became an easy pathway for Communist infiltration into the KMT party organization. Chiang Kai-shek strongly believed that the Nationalists' defeat on the mainland was not due to the military weaknesses but due to the Communists' organizational strength and ideological indoctrination.

As a consequence, Chiang's party reorganization plan focused on removing factions and establishing a highly centralized and ideologically-indoctrinated party.[244] In August 1950, Chiang created a Central Reorganization Commission (CRC) that consisted of 16 members who were hand-picked by Chiang himself and would supervise the direction of the KMT party reform. The first reform move was to purge the Chen brothers, who were the leaders of the C.C. Clique and responsible for endemic corruption in the party. The reform drive also removed many of Chiang's long-time political allies, such as T.V. Soong and H. H. Kung, from party leadership.[245]

The party reorganization followed six principles: the Party (1) was to be a revolutionary democratic party; (2) should spread out into various social groups such as farmers, workers, youth groups, and intellectuals; (3) was to be democratic centralist; (4) was to adopt the Leninist party's organizational structure; (5) would provide political leadership in all areas of governmental policies; and (6) should pledge allegiance to Sun

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243 For more detailed information and analysis about the KMT Party reorganization in 1950-1952, see Bruce J. Dickson, "The Lessons of Defeat: The Reorganization of the Kuomintang on Taiwan 1950-1952," *The China Quarterly* 133 (1993), pp. 56-84.

244 Chiang Kai-shek retired from the presidency when his troops lost the mainland in 1949, but still retained his leadership in the party behind the scene. In 1950, Chiang regained his presidency when the Legislative Yuan asked him to carry on his presidency.

245 Keith Maguire, *The Rise of Modern Taiwan* (Sydney: Ashgate, 1998), p. 32.

Yat-sen's *Three Principles of the People*.[246] Both Chiang Kai-shek and his son Ching Kuo had been trained in Soviet military academies and had learned the ideological and organizational advantages of a Leninist party. Chiang thus reorganized the party into one based on the principles of "democratic centralism" meaning that all the important powers were concentrated in the hands of the party chairman, Chiang himself, and the Central Standing Committee.[247]

As a crucial component of the party reorganization drive, Chiang Kai-shek also restructured party-army relations by introducing a "political commissar system," or a so-called "political warfare system," to the army. To build a political commissar system, Chiang created the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) and appointed his son Chiang Ching-kuo as the GWPD's first director. The primary function of the GWPD was to check and reinforce the political reliability of military officers, youth (high school and university students), and the general public. One of Chiang's main concerns was to prevent pro-communist infiltration into the armed forces. During the early 1950s, it was reported that several high-ranking generals were found to be agents of the CCP.[248] Thus, Chiang Ching-kuo, the GWPD head, built the party cells in the military hierarchy to indoctrinate army officers with anti-communist and anti-separatist ideologies.

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246 Simon Long, *Taiwan: China's Last Frontier* (Macmillan: Basingstoke, 1991); also see Magure, 1998, pp. 32-33.

247 For the Kuomintang Party structure, see Ching-cheng Lo, "Taiwan: The Remaining Challenges," in Alagappa, ed., 2001, pp. 145-146; Hsiao-shih Cheng, *Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control* (Boulder: Westview, 1990); Hsiao-shih Cheng, "The Polity and the Military: A Framework for Analyzing Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan," *Journal of Social Sciences and Philosophy* 5: 1 (1990).

248 The high-ranking officers who were charged with the CCP spy included the Chief of Military Conscription, the vice-minister of National Defense, and the Chief of Army Supply Services. See, George H. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed* (Boston: The Riverside Press Cambridge, 1965), p. 395.

In addition to the KMT party's penetration into the armed forces with ideological indoctrination, the Chiang government also tried to solve the problem of the military's factional struggles by adopting a universal conscription and mandatory retirement rules for politically influential senior high-ranking officers. Universal conscription was applied to all Taiwanese males on their 18th birthday. As we can see from Table 2-5 of Chapter Two, ethnic Taiwanese became predominant at the junior officership and the private soldier levels. Their integration into the military effectively reduced the problem of personal loyalty and factionalism within the army. In addition, Chiang Ching-kuo's military reform also targeted senior commanders who had been politically influential figures since the very early years of the KMT government on the mainland. The GPWD decreed that high-ranking generals at the commandership level could not keep their position for more than five years. Mandatory retirement rules were thus applied to senior officers, thereby eliminating the possibility of their political domination.[249] The party reorganization drives continued for three years, until the October 1952 Seventh Party Congress of the KMT. As a consequence, the KMT gained strong control over the state, the military, and society until the late 1980s.

With the reorganization of the party under Chiang's strong and centralized leadership, the KMT government launched a long-term economic development program beginning in the early 1950s. In 1951, the KMT government set up the Economic

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249 For more detailed information about the military reform in the early years in Taiwan, see Steve Tsang, "Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang's Policy to Reconquer the Chinese Mainland, 1949-1958," in Steve Tsang ed., *In the Shadow of China* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993); Edward W. Ross, "Taiwan's Armed Forces," in Olson and Jurika, Jr., eds., *The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); Chin-lin Yang, *Military Politics in the Transition to Democracy: Changing Civil-Military Relations in the*

Stabilization Board (ESB) to design and implement economic policies. The ESB created a series of long-term economic plans, from the first plan for Economic Rehabilitation (1953-1956), to the tenth medium-term plan (1990-1993). Those economic plans were extremely successful throughout the five decades of KMT's rule in Taiwan, with average annual GNP growth rates of 9.2 percent during this period. In addition to the fastest economic growth among the Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) in East Asia, the KMT government also achieved some of the lowest levels of unemployment and economic inequality rates in the world.[250]

Table 3-5: Taiwan's economic growth, 1953-1986[251]

Years	%Industrial Production	%GNP
1953-1962	11.7	7.5
1963-1972	18.5	10.8
1973-1986	9.6	8.1

One of the most immediate and significant effects of this rapid economic growth was the lessening of internal security threats, especially from the Taiwanese islanders who had maintained emotional antagonism against the mainlanders since the February 28th Uprising in which over 6,000 Taiwanese were massacred by KMT forces. The continued economic prosperity during the 1950s and 1960s changed native Taiwanese to

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Republic of China (Taiwan), 1949-1994, Ph. D Dissertation (State University of New York at Albany, 1996).

250 For the analysis of Taiwan's economic performance, see P. Ferdinand, "The Taiwanese Economy," in Ferdinand, ed., *Take-off for Taiwan* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996).

251 Hung-mao Tien, "Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan," in Harvey Feldman, Michael Y. M. Kau, and Ilpyong Kim, eds., *Taiwan in a Time of Transition* (New York: Paragon House, 1988), p. 5; Council for Economic Planning and Development, *Taiwan Statistical Yearbook* (Taipei: Executive Yuan, 1987), p. 2.

accept the KMT government as a legitimate authority, rather than choose the communist rule of mainland China. Within a decade of the KMT's move to Taiwan, domestic security had significantly improved mainly due to the success of the party and military reforms and the growing economic prosperity.

In addition to lower domestic threats, international structural changes from the 1960s to the 1980s revolving around Taiwan also lessened external security threats, especially from the CCP and its People's Liberation Army (PLA). At first sight, developments in the international political and security order during the 1960s and 1970s seemed to harm Taiwanese security. As soon as Richard Nixon was elected U.S. president in 1968, he announced the Guam Doctrine, which proposed a gradual de-escalation of the U.S.' military commitments abroad, particularly in East and Southeast Asia.[252] Within two years of taking office, Nixon announced his official trip to mainland China.[253] The rapprochement between the United States and Communist China produced the Shanghai Joint Communique of February 27, 1972, which declared that "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States government does not

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252 For President Richard Nixon's Presidential inaugural address, see *International Herald Tribune* (January 21, 1969), p. 4.

253 One year before Nixon's visit, Secretary State Henry Kissinger secretly visited Beijing and met Chou En-lai to facilitate the Sino-American summit meeting. For Nixon's détente policy in East Asia, see Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985); Robert D. Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Michael Herr, *Dispatches* (New York: Knopf, 1977).

challenge that position. . . the United States reaffirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan."[254]

Subsequent actions for the Joint Communique were followed by the United States' decision to reduce American military personnel with the withdrawal of two squadrons of F-4 Phantom jet fighters and the remaining installations from Taiwan by May 1975. On January 1979, the Carter administration moved its embassy from Taipei to Beijing, which resulted in an automatic termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and the official diplomatic relationship with Taiwan.[255] The United States' rapprochement with Communist China and the de-recognition of the KMT regime was a genuine shock to Chiang Kai-shek, considering that the United States had been the guarantor of Taiwan's security against the communists.

In addition to the US-China rapprochement, another serious setback for the KMT government occurred in October 1971, when the United Nations General Assembly voted by a large majority to expel the KMT delegates and, instead, seated the delegates of the PRC as the legitimate representatives of the Chinese people. At this time, the KMT regime not only lost the United States but also its diplomatic ties with other major powers.

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254 For the text of the Communique, see Congressional Quarterly, ed., *China: US Policy since 1945* (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1980), p. 323-325.

255 Even though the official diplomatic relations between the United States and Taiwan ended, unofficial ties continued under the unofficial agreements such as the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. Also the United States continued selling its weapons to Taiwan. Harvey J. Feldman, "Development of US-Taiwan Relations 1948-1987," in Harvey Feldman, Michael Y. M. Kau, and Ilpyong J. Kim, eds., *Taiwan in a Time of Transition* (New York: Paragon House, 1988), pp. 129-173.

Table 3-6: Diplomatic Recognition, 1969-1986[256]

Year	With ROC	With PRC
1969	71	48
1971	68	53
1973	31	89
1978	21	112
1986	23	134

Until the late 1960s, the KMT regime had been gaining more diplomatic support from other countries than the CCP. As time passed, however, more countries came to recognize the growing influence of communist China in the international political arena. Taiwan's strategy of providing foreign aid for developing countries to buy diplomatic support in the UN turned out to be unsuccessful.[257] As a result, Taiwan became isolated while the CCP gained more influence in international relations (see Table 3-6).

An unexpected outcome of Taiwan's diplomatic isolation, however, was the reduction of security threats from mainland China. When the KMT regime retreated to Taiwan, its biggest priority was to retake the mainland territory by means of a military counter-attack. Thus, during the 1950s, all available domestic resources were directed toward military mobilization, detailed in the previous chapter. After the 1960s, however, Chiang Kai-shek's strategy of retaking the mainland became less feasible, as the CCP on mainland strengthened control over its territory and expanded its influence in the international arena.

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256 Michael Y. M. Kau, "Taiwan and Beijing's Campaigns for Unification," in Harvey Feldman, Michael Y. M. Kau, and Ilpyong J. Kim, eds., *Taiwan in a Time of Transition* (New York: Paragon House, 1988), p. 188.

257 For detailed description and analysis of Taiwan's strategy of foreign aid during the 1960s and 1970s, see Chiao Chiao Hsieh, *Strategy for Survival: The Foreign Policy and External Relations*

Changes in international security and, more importantly, in the mainland forced the KMT government to adopt alternative foreign policy strategies. Such a change was reflected as early as 1959, when Chiang Kai-shek stated in his New Year's Message: "Now the task of mainland recovery is to be accomplished by efforts which are 70 percent political and only 30 percent military."[258] This address marked an important change in Taiwan's foreign policy priority from military to political counter-attack as Taiwan's foreign policy priority. Later, the Nixon Administration's rapprochement with the CCP and Taiwan's ejection from the United Nations made the KMT government's strategy of political counter-attack an unachievable policy option and, therefore, the KMT turned its strategic priority to the economic development of Taiwan. By this time, recovering mainland China by military means became a distant possibility and residence on the island appeared permanent.

At the same time, the CCP's approach to Taiwan also showed noteworthy changes from its strategy of armed liberation to peaceful unification. Throughout the 1970s, Beijing authorities tried to approach Taipei for a dialogue on unification, even though Taiwan repeatedly rejected Beijing's proposals for peace talks.[259] The PRC's conciliatory attitude toward Taipei continued throughout the 1980s, under the leadership of Deng Xiao-ping. Deng made a series of recommendations such as the "Nine-Point Unification Proposal." The CCP also proposed to Taiwanese authorities "three

of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1949-1979 (London: The Sherwood Press, 1985), pp. 175-229.

258 *The China Yearbook, 1959-1960*, p. 974.

259 As a gesture of appeasement, the Beijing government released Nationalist 'war criminals' in March 1975, which Taiwan refused to grant access to Taiwan. See Peter P. Cheng, "Taiwan 1975: A Year of Transition," *Asian Survey* 16: 1 (1976), p. 63.

exchanges" (postal service, trade, and tourism) and "four contacts" (academic, cultural, scientific, and sports activities).[260] The PRC publicly guaranteed that Taiwan would enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and the current socio-economic system would not be interrupted.

Likewise, structural changes in international relations during the 1960s and 1970s resulted in diplomatic isolation of the KMT regime in Taiwan, while the PRC grew to become an increasingly influential actor. These changes, however, ironically contributed to a more favorable threat environment for the Taiwan government. In turn, Taiwan's defensive position in this situation led it to abandon the military-first strategy and adopt a more peaceful economy-first approach throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

In addition to improved internal and external security environments, the KMT regime also provided strong and stable leadership for the country. First of all, the smooth transition of power from Chiang Kai-shek to his son Chiang Ching-kuo did not raise a succession problem or a power vacuum in which the armed forces would have had an opportunity to intervene in politics. In the transition period, Chiang Ching-kuo's political leadership and reform drives were the key to stability, which was made possible due to Chiang Ching-kuo's control over the armed forces as a long-time superintendent under the political commissar system.

Chiang Ching-kuo's political legitimacy was further enhanced after he began Taiwanizing the KMT party and governmental branches. As we can see in Tables 2-4 and 2-5 in Chapter Two, the minority mainlanders monopolized the seats in all the important and high-ranking positions in the party and government, as well as in the

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260 Kau, 1988, p. 182.

military organization. Once Chiang Ching-kuo assumed the presidency, however, ethnic Taiwanese slowly began to fill the membership in several governmental bodies, including the Central Standing Committee. As we can see from Table 3-7, the proportion of ethnic Taiwanese in the Central Standing Committee increased from 14 percent in 1973 to 52 percent in 1988, when Chiang Ching-kuo completed his presidential term. The situation was similar in the armed forces, where officers of Taiwanese origin began to fill the higher-ranking positions (see Table 2-5 in Chapter Two).

Table 3-7: Taiwanese in the KMT Central Standing Committee, 1973-1988[261]

Year	CSC Members	Taiwanese	Taiwanese (%)
1973	21	3	14%
1976	22	4	18%
1979	27	9	33%
1981	27	9	33%
1984	31	12	39%
1986	31	14	45%
1988	31	16	52%

Likewise, civilian control of the armed forces in Taiwan had been the most stable among the four cases during the same historical stage. A number of major causal factors thus enabled strong civilian control of the military during the 1950s through the 1980s, in which authoritarian leadership was established and army officers became deeply involved in domestic politics. To begin with, decreasing domestic and international security threats contributed to civilian leaders' strong control over the armed forces. Furthermore, rapid economic growth enabled the KMT government to strengthen its legitimacy among ethnic Taiwanese. Finally, Chiang Kai-shek's reform drives removed factional

competitions within the KMT party and the army and fortified civilian guidance over the military.

Chiang Ching-kuo's political reforms and Taiwanization of the party and the army, occurring under low security-threat environments, paved the way for successful liberalization and democratization in the late 1980s, when Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwanese native, assumed the presidency and initiated democratic political reforms. In the next chapter, I will examine civil-military relations in Taiwan during this democratization period of the 1980s and 1990s.

Conclusions

This chapter analyzed the second historical stage of the military's domestic political role in the four cases under study, that is, the dynamics and modes of the politicized officers' engagement in domestic political process. In so doing, I divided the cases into two types: *control* via the military coup d'etat and the installation of a military dictatorship in South Korea and Indonesia, on the one hand, and *participation* under civilian supervision in the Philippines and Taiwan, on the other. Furthermore, the cases of *participation* also revealed differences in the army officers' relationship with their civilian masters: a "professionalized pattern" in which civilian leaders endorsed the military's organizational unity as was the case in Taiwan, and a "politicized type" in

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261 Hung-mao Tien, "Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan," in Feldman, et al., 1988, p. 13.

which civilian leaders controlled the armed forces by manipulating factional struggles within the military as was in the Philippines.[262]

In South Korea (1961) and Indonesia (1965), a confluence of key domestic factors resulted in military coups and military dictatorial rule. That is, the significant causal elements that precipitated the coups were: (1) civilian leaders' inability to provide political and security order, (2) ideological radicalization of civil society actors, and (3) factional struggles within the military organization.

In South Korea, the Chang Myon government's inability to maintain domestic political order and ensuing political crisis caused the 1961 military coup. After Rhee Syngman resigned from his presidency in the middle of the April Student Revolution of 1960, the parliamentary democracy led by Chang Myon failed to provide effective leadership both within and outside of the government. In addition, the 1961 coup was justified by the coup leader Park Jung-hee who charged that the radical and violent civil society groups were engendering a national security crisis. Coup forces in the army were able to consolidate the military dictatorship by declaring martial law and the *Yushin* constitution in 1972 under increasing security threats from North Korea and decreasing security commitments from the United States.

Similar factors in Indonesia were also responsible for the 1965 military coup. Sukarno's Guided Democracy failed to balance the two polarizing political groups—the PKI and the ABRI—in the 1960s. Sukarno and the PKI jeopardized the national security by implementing a series of pro-communist policies in domestic and foreign policy areas.

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262 Zoltan Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military: the East European Experience," *Comparative Politics* 30: 1 (1997).

As ABRI leadership planned to get rid of the Sukarno-PKI coalition, a group of junior officers, called the Untung group, staged a preventive coup against the ABRI leadership who opposed Sukarno and the PKI, killing the six highest-ranking generals. The ABRI, led by General Suharto, put down the coup attempt, placed Sukarno under house arrest, and banned the PKI. In sum, the coups in South Korea and Indonesia arouse under the similar structural circumstances such as high security threats, civilian leadership failure, radical civil society, and factionalized military organization. The results are summarized in Table 3-8.

Table 3-8: Military's Domestic Role: Control vs. Participation.

Cases	Security	Civilian Leadership	Civil Society	Military Unity	Outcome
S. Korea	High	Weak	Radical	Divided	**Control**
Indonesia	High	Weak	Radical	Divided	**Control**
Philippines	High	Strong	Radical	Unified/Divided	**Participation**
Taiwan	High	Strong	Insignificant	Unified	**Participation**

Army officers in the Philippines and Taiwan were as politically prominent as in the previous two cases. But the armed forces of these two countries did not overturn the civilian leadership but rather were placed under civilian control. For all the differences, the two countries shared at least two similarities: strong civilian leadership and the unified military organization.

In the Philippines during Marcos' authoritarian rule (1972-1986), the absence of a coup was largely due to his ability to manipulate high-ranking army officers. Marcos positioned the officers of his hometown Ilocos region to key posts in the military institution and promoted them to the highest-ranking officerships. In addition, Marcos

tried to keep the military institution weak and divided by manipulating and elevating factional struggles between the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) graduates led by General Ramos and the ROTC officers headed by General Ver. Later, the balance between Ramos and Ver turned to Ver's favor.

Marcos' personalistic control and factionalization of the military nevertheless seriously impaired military professionalism, which led to the formation of the Reformed the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM) by a group of junior officers. In the midst of political turbulence after the assassination of Benigno Aquino, RAM members planned to overthrow the Marcos regime with a target date of mid-1987. But the coup attempt was never put into practice because of Marcos' sudden announcement of the 1986 presidential election. When the election was inconclusive with both candidates claiming victory, RAM officers sided with Corazon Aquino and played a decisive role in overthrowing Marcos. Even though there were no coup attempts during Marcos' rule, the RAM officers turned into a stumbling bloc in the democratization era, carrying out multiple coup attempts, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Finally, Taiwanese civil-military relations demonstrated the most stable civilian control over political army officers, as the armed forces developed into a unified and professional organization. Throughout this development, the presence of a strong and efficient civilian leadership was crucial. In the early years of Taiwan, President Chiang Kai-shek reformed party-army relations as a vital part of reorganizing the KMT party. He adopted the political commissar system and positioned his son Chiang Ching-kuo as the first director. With the commissar system, the Taiwanese army developed into an ideologically-indoctrinated and cohesive organization controlled by the KMT party. The

power transition from Chiang Kai-shek to his son was implemented without any major political crisis or instability. Added to strong political leadership by the KMT, favorable security conditions also contributed to stable civilian control over the armed forces in Taiwan.

Chapter 4. Security Threats, Democratization, and the Military's Political Disengagement

Introduction

As examined in the previous two chapters, the four countries under study have experienced several decades of military involvement in domestic politics, even though the ways the armed forces became involved were quite different. In South Korea (1961) and Indonesia (1965), the top brass toppled flagging civilian leadership and dominated the domestic political arena until democratization replaced the military-dominant regime with one of democratically elected civilians. In contrast, generals in Taiwan and the Philippines became deeply engaged in domestic political, administrative, and economic affairs, but did not attempt to overthrow their civilian masters.

This chapter moves on to the third historical juncture of civil-military relations in the four countries: military withdrawal from politics during democratization. The four countries underwent democratic regime transitions in a similar time-span (mid-to-late 1980s), except for Indonesia (late 1990s). However, the ways in which politicized officers withdrew from politics and relinquished their roles to newly elected civilian leadership were quite different. South Korea and Taiwan went through more stable and thorough democratizations, while the other two cases where politicized army officers still wielded influence in newly established democratic governments encountered unstable, violent, and less complete regime transitions. This chapter addresses the question of what factors contributed to the differences in the military's domestic political role during and after democratization.

Rather than relying upon a predominant literature of democratization that takes a process- or choice-oriented approach,[263] I identify structural causes that contributed to making different modes of military disengagement in the four countries. As suggested in Chapter One, my theory contends that security threats set the basic parameter of civil-military relations during the democratization period. More specifically, I expect that low threat environments at both domestic and international arenas provide favorable structural conditions for military disengagement and far-reaching democratization, while high security threats hinder political officers from going back to their barracks, making the regime transition highly unstable. In this respect, security threats create a structural condition in which major domestic political actors interact to make certain modes of democratic regime transition and the military's political role in this period.

A more complete understanding of democratization in these countries must include other intervening variables at the domestic level, namely the strength of civilian leadership, the cohesiveness of military organization, and the strength of civil society. The military's political disengagement is more complete when newly elected civilian leaders exert strong leadership with support from the general public and civil society, and vice versa. In addition, a unified and professionalized military institution is conducive to the armed forces' political disengagement, while the faction-ridden army is more prone to continue its political influence. Finally, the strength of civil society and its ideological orientation also affect the democratization process. A robust civil society with a

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[263] For example, see Juan Linz, *Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Gullermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, ed., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Prezeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and*

moderate ideology is a positive force for democratization. But the presence of an influential civil society can be damaging to a new democracy when civil society actors endorse radical ideology or create violence and disorder during the democratization period. In this chapter, I test those hypotheses against four cases.

This chapter is composed of four sections. The first section examines the military's political disengagement in South Korea between the 1980s and 1990s, which covers limited liberalization measures by the military regime in the mid-1980s, the democratic opening of the "June 29 Declaration" in June 1987, the Roh Tae-woo presidency as a quasi-civilian government (1988-1992), and Kim Young-sam's military reform drives (1993-1997). Section two looks into democratization in Taiwan, which includes liberalization under Chiang Ching-kuo in the 1980s, democratic reforms under the Lee Teng-hui presidency during the 1990s, and the inauguration of the Chen Shui-bian presidency in 2000. The third section explores the Philippines from Marcos' fall in February 1986, through the Aquino presidency and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)' coup attempts (1986-1991), and finally to the inauguration of Ramos leadership (1992). Section four discusses the Indonesian regime transition that covers Suharto's loss of support from the ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*) and the public in the late 1990s and subsequent democratization in recent years. I summarize my major findings in the conclusion.

Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University

I. South Korea

Since the inception of the Republic, South Korea experienced two military coups—one in May 1961 by Park Jung-hee, the other in December 1979 by Chun Doo-whan—and three decades of military dictatorship. The second military dictator, Chun Doo-whan, suffered from a legitimacy crisis from the beginning, since he and his followers in the army brazenly crushed democratic movements in the process of taking over power in 1980.[264] Throughout the eight years of Chun's rule, there was incessant and growing resistance from civil society, which forced the Chun regime to introduce limited political and economic liberalization measures to blur the image of his regime as a military dictatorship. Even though he did not adopt liberalization willingly, Chun Doo-whan was confident about his regime's performance, especially in economic and security policy areas.[265] Quite different from Chun's expectations, however, the limited liberalization measures provided opposition political leaders and civil society with a

Press, 1991).

264 One prominent example of the Chun regime's cruelty was his use of the military forces to put down pro-democracy uprisings in Kwangju in May 1980, in which more than 100,000 people participated. In the Kwangju Uprisings, 278 demonstrators were reported killed and about 500 were injured, even though exact numbers are not available. For more detailed information about the Pro-Democracy Uprising in Kwangju, see Sang-yong Jung, et al., *Kwangju Minju hangjaeng (The People's Struggle for Democracy in Kwangju)* (Seoul: Dolbege, 1990); *Hanguk Hyondaesa Saryo Yonguso, Kwangju 5-wol Hangjaeng Saryojip (Complete Collection of the Historical Materials on the May People's Uprising in Kwangju)* (Seoul: Pulbit Publications, 1990).

265 During the years of 1983-1987, South Korea had average annual economic growth rate of 9.5%, while average inflation rate was low 2.8%. World Bank, *World Tables 1993* (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1994).

In the security and foreign policy area, the Chun regime enjoyed the most favorable security environments since the inception of the Republic of Korea, as it surpassed North Korea in terms of military capability and strengthened its alliance relationship with the Reagan administration. Hyug-baeg Im, *Politics of Transition: Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea,* Ph. D. Dissertation (University of Chicago, 1989), pp. 206-210.

window of opportunity to push the authoritarian regime for more thorough democratization.

The democratization period in South Korea can be divided into four phases: (1) the opposition leaders' and civil society groups' push for Chun and the military elites to declare the "June 29 Declaration" for democratic reform in 1987; (2) the democratic election and the Roh Tae-woo presidency as a quasi-civilian and quasi-military government from 1988 to 1992; (3) the Kim Young-sam presidency and democratic reforms from 1993 to 1997; and (4) democratic consolidation in which opposition leader, Kim Dae-Jung, was elected to the presidency in 1997. In each phase of democratization and consolidation, a combination of structural factors—favorable security environments, strong civilian leadership backed by vibrant but moderate civil society, and professionalized and cohesive military institution—contributed to successful democratization and consolidation.

The military dictator Chun Doo-whan adopted limited liberalization measures in the mid-1980s to moderate civil society's growing resistance to his authoritarian rule.[266] These liberalization measures included, among others, the reinstatement of expelled professors and university student activists, the rehabilitation of over 200 opposition politicians, and the release of "security-related" political prisoners.[267] The Chun regime expected it could manage opposition political forces effectively by decentralizing them

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[266] For the Chun regime's limited reforms during the mid 1980s, see Hyon-deok Yeo, "Shingunbu Gwonuijueui Chejeeui Deungjanggwa Jeongchi Galdeung (Emergence of the New Military Authoritarianism and Political Conflicts)", in Heung-su Han, ed., *Hanguk Jeongchi Dongtaeron (Korean Political Behavior)* (Seoul: Orum, 1996), pp. 293-316.

[267] Seong-yi Yoon, "Democratization in South Korea: Social Movements and Their Political Opportunity Structures," *Asian Perspective* 21: 3 (1997), pp. 156-158.

and making them fight each other for hegemony among the opposition groups. Liberalization measures, however, unexpectedly unified and strengthened the opposition groups. In the 1985 National Assembly election, the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) failed to gain two-thirds majority in the legislature, which was needed for the passage of important laws, including constitutional amendments and presidential elections.[268]

The immediate impact of the 1985 election was the empowerment of opposition politicians, including Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, and civil society groups such as college students, labor unions, and dissident groups. Various opposition forces were united under the strong leadership of Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung and marched for a nationwide campaign for democracy, including a constitutional amendment for direct presidential election.[269] The opposition forces' march for democratization later included not only radical student activists and labor unions, but also middle-class citizenry. Civil society groups' demonstration reached its peak when Chun Doo-whan suspended any discussion over constitutional reform. Furthermore, Chun nominated Roh Tae-woo, one of his cohorts in the 11th Korean Military Academy (KMA) and one of the key members of the 1979 military coup, as his handpicked successor through indirect presidential election by an electoral college (the so-called "April 13 measure").

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268 In the 1985 National Assembly election (12th), the ruling DJP won 87 seats, while the opposition New Korean Democratic Party (NKDP) got 50 seats and Democratic Korea Party (DKP) 26. For more detailed analysis of the 12th National Assembly election, see B. C. Koh, "The 1985 Parliamentary Election in South Korea," *Asian Survey* 25: 9 (1985), pp. 883-897; C. I. Eugene Kim, "The Meaning of South Korea's 12th National Assembly Election," *Korea Observer* (Fall 1985); C. I. Eugene Kim, "South Korea in 1985: An Eventual Year Amidst Uncertainty," *Asian Survey* 26: 1 (1986), pp. 67-71.

From the April 13 measure up until late June, there were waves of demonstrations throughout the country. Various opposition forces united to form the National Coalition for a Democratic Constitution (NCDC), an umbrella organization that included most social sectors, from opposition politicians to religious groups and to the labor and farmers' unions. In June, the NCDC organized the "People's Rally to Denounce the Cover-up of the Torture-Murder and the Scheme to Maintain the Current Constitution" in which over 240,000 people participated.[270] In such a situation, the ruling elites, including leading army officers, had two options: making concessions to the opposition forces and furthering democratic openings, or bringing the armed forces to quell the demonstration movements and tightening the military's dictatorial rule.

This time, senior army officers were split into two groups: hardliners who endorsed a strong reaction to the opposition movements to secure the military regime, and softliners who were afraid of a nationwide political turmoil and thus preferred democratic reform. The Chun regime and the military chose the softliners' option and proclaimed the June 29 Declaration by Roh Tae-woo (discussed below). Several factors strengthened the softliners' voices in the military. To begin with, South Korea's international environments were not favorable to the hardliners. During the 1980s, external security threats significantly diminished, as the military balance favored the

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269 For the empowerment of the political opposition in the mid 1980, see Won-ki Hwang, *Developmental Dictatorship and Democratization in South Korea: The State and Society in Transformation, 1987-1997,* Ph. D Dissertation (Brown University, 2006), pp. 75-92.

270 During the first half of 1987, there were several occasions of reports on torture and death of protesters, which bolstered the public's belief that the Chun regime was nothing more than a military dictatorship. On May 26, for example, a Father of Catholic Church revealed that a Seoul National University student, named Park Jong-cheol, had been tortured to death by the police. Ji-hun Cho, *80-Nyondae Huban Cheongyeon Haksaengundong (The Youth and Student Movements of the late-1980s)* (Seoul: Hyungsung-sa, 1989), p. 16.

South over the North. Continued economic development in South Korea facilitated its buildup of military power that surpassed North Korea by the early 1980s. In addition, South Korean security was strengthened by fortifying its alliance with the United States, while North Korea lost its major allies as most of the socialist countries began to adopt a liberal democracy and a market economy. Most importantly, continued social disorder and harsh repression against civil society groups might threaten the danger of Western democracies' withdrawal from the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games.

On June 29, 1987, Roh Tae-woo, Chun's hand-picked successor and the ruling DJP's presidential candidate, announced "the Declaration of Democratization and Reforms," an eight-point democratic reform measure, including a constitutional amendment for direct presidential elections, political amnesty and a restoration of civil rights to dissident leaders, protection of human rights, freedom of the press, and social reforms for a "clean and honest society."[271] Two days later, Chun Doo-whan announced that he would accept Roh's reform proposals, which brought sudden political tranquility to Korean society. Shortly after the declaration, negotiations between Roh Tae-woo and the opposition leader Kim Young-sam reached an agreement on a constitutional revision. The draft for a new constitution was written by an eight-member working group, submitted to the National Assembly, and approved on October 12, 1987. In this respect, even though democratization movements began from the grassroots' protests, the democratization took off as a result of a negotiation between the ruling elites in the

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271 Young-whan Kihl, *Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), pp. 83-84; also see John Kie-Chiang Oh, *Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 98-102.

authoritarian regime and the pro-democracy opposition leaders, a process that Samuel P. Huntington terms "transplacement."[272]

With the new constitution, a democratic presidential election was scheduled to be held on December 16, 1987. At this time, however, opposition forces were split into two camps following two prominent opposition leaders, Kim Young-sam (Reunification Democratic Party, RDP) and Kim Dae-jung (Party for Peace and Democracy, PPD). Thanks to the opposition leaders' split, the ruling DJP candidate Roh Tae-woo won the presidential election with only 36 percent of the popular vote, while Kim Young-sam garnered 28 percent and Kim Dae-jung 27 percent.[273] Pundits speculated that, with the formation of a united front and single candidacy, the opposition would have won the election easily. As Roh Tae-woo, a former general and leading member of the 1979 military coup, became the president, democracy in South Korea seemed to be put off for another five years at least until the next presidential election in 1992.

In hindsight, however, the Roh Tae-woo presidency turned out to have a positive effect on Korea's democratization, especially the Korean army's disengagement from politics.[274] During the presidential election period, some senior generals openly declared that they would not neglect the situation if a left-leaning candidate, Kim Dae-jung, were

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272 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 124.

273 For the discussion of the 13th presidential election, see Bret L. Billet, "South Korea at the Crossroads: An Evolving Democracy or Authoritarianism Revisited?" *Asian Survey* 30: 3 (1990), p. 302; Sung-joo Han, "South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization," *Asian Survey* 28: 1 (1988), pp. 52-56.

274 For more information on Roh Tae-woo's Sixth Republic, see Robert E. Bedeski, *The Transformation of South Korea: Reform and Reconstruction in the Sixth Republic under Roh Tae Woo, 1987-1992* (London: Routledge, 1994).

elected.[275] Roh Tae-woo, a retired general, had close connections to and strong influence in the army hierarchy. Army officers, in turn, perceived his presidency as unthreatening to their own interests. They expected that President Roh would secure their organizational, financial, and political interests even after democratization. President Roh could secure his leadership in the armed forces by guaranteeing the military's institutional autonomy. As a result, even though he was democratically elected, the military's presence and influence in his government was pervasive.[276] Roh's presidency had the effect of avoiding backfire from senior officers in the early stage of democratization.

In the meantime, changes in external security environment in the late-1980s and President Roh's *Nordpolitik* discouraged the army officers' political involvement. Since the end of the Korean War, South Korea had been under constant threat from North Korea which benefited from the political, economic, and military support of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. During the 1980s, however, support from the two patron states significantly decreased as they undertook their own domestic political and economic reforms. Furthermore, North Korea became diplomatically isolated from its East European allies. In this situation, the Roh administration, with a solid security commitment from the United States, actively sought to open diplomatic relations with former communist states. Thus, South Korea significantly improved its security, while

[275] Carl J. Saxer, "Generals and Presidents: Establishing Civilian and Democratic Control in South Korea," *Armed Forces and Society* 30: 3 (2004), p. 388.

[276] For example, retired military officers constituted 20 percent in the Roh cabinet and 7 percent in the National Assembly. Aurel Croissant, "Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea," *Armed Forces and Society* 30: 3 (2004), p. 366.

North Korea lost its own diplomatic backyard. This détente mood surrounding the Korean peninsula, in turn, eliminated the military's rationale for political engagement.[277]

Another factor that prevented the armed forces from interfering into domestic politics was the role of civil society. In the early stage of the democracy movement, all civil society activities were dominated by radical groups such as college students, militant blue-collar labor unions, peasants, and the urban poor. Overall, these groups endorsed radical ideology, demanding not just liberal democracy but a far-reaching revolution in South Korea, and adopted violent tactics against the military dictatorship. Before the June 29 Declaration, all the different civil society groups, in spite of their ideological and tactical differences, were united under a common aim: ending the military dictatorship. Following the June 29 Declaration, however, these radical civil society groups were significantly weakened in their influence on the democratization process.[278]

While the radical and militant *Minjung* (people) movements lost their influence in the political scene after June 1987, other types of civil society began to thrive and led civil society movements in the post-democratization period. These new civil society

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[277] For more detailed information about Roh's *Nordpolitik*, see Byung-joon Ahn, "South Korea's International Relations: Quest for Security, Prosperity, and Unification," *The Asian Update* (New York: Asia Society, 1991); Byung-joon Ahn, "South Korean-Soviet Relations: Contemporary Issues and Prospects," *Asian Survey* 31: 9 (1991); Young-whan Kihl, "South Korea's Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activism and Policy Dilemma," *Korea Briefing* (New York: Asia Society, 1991); Hong Liu, "The Sino-South Korean Normalization: A Triangular Explanation," *Asian Survey* 33: 11 (1991).

[278] Another reason for the radical groups' weakening was the fall of communist states in Eastern Europe. As former socialist countries jettisoned their ideology and adopted liberal democracy and market economy, the radical Marxist or North Korea's "Juche" ideology also lost its popularity in Korean society. For the decline of the Minjung movement, see Gi-wook Shin, "Marxism, Anti-Americanism, and Democracy in South Korea: An Examination of Nationalist Intellectual Discourse," *Positions: East Asian Cultures Critique* 3 (1995).

groups were organized by white collar workers, professionals, intellectuals, and religious leaders. Rather than pursuing radical social changes, these groups focused on gradual institutional reforms and adopted legal and nonviolent strategies, dealing with a range of social issues such as political corruption, consumer rights, environmental degradation, and free and fair elections.[279] These civil society groups contributed to the political and social stability in the newly democratized Korea, which in turn prevented the military from intervening in politics.

At the same time, a "grand alliance" among conservative forces on January 22, 1990 provided the Roh government with political stability and strong leadership. Even though Roh Tae-woo was elected to the presidency through direct election in 1987, he failed to attain broad support from the public, winning only 36 percent of the popular vote. To make matters worse, the ruling DJP failed to secure a simple majority in the National Assembly election in 1988. In the 299-member Assembly, Roh's DJP won only 125 seats, while Kim Dae-jung's PPD captured 70 seats, Kim Young-sam's RDP took 59 seats, and Kim Jong-pil's New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP, the most conservative party) 35 seats.[280] The 1988 Assembly election result created the so-called *yosoyadae* (ruling minority and opposition majority), which led to political gridlock in the National Assembly. This stalemate, however, was broken with the conservative

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279 For moderation of civil society groups in South Korea, see Sun-hyuk Kim, *The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000); Sun-hyuk Kim, "Civil Society in Democratizing Korea," in Samuel Kim ed., *Korea's Democratization* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jang-jip Choi, "Democratization, Civil Society, and Civil Movements in Korea," in Jang-jip Choi et al., *Understanding Korean Civil Society* (Seoul: Hanul Press, 1996); Jae-chul Lee, *Deepening and Improving Democracy: Association in South Korea,* Ph. D Dissertation (University of Missouri at Columbia, 2005).

280 Hong-nack Kim, "The 1988 Parliamentary Election in South Korea," *Asian Survey* 29: 5 (1989).

grand alliance, as President Roh Tae-woo and the ruling DJP, RDP leader Kim Young-sam, and NDRP leader Kim Jong-pil announced a three party (DJP-RDP-NDRP) merger and a new Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), leaving Kim Dae-jung's PPD as the only opposition. The three-party merger broke the stalemate and restored political stability and effectiveness.[281]

Democratization in South Korea reached another turning point in the 1992 presidential election, as Kim Young-sam, the ruling DLP presidential candidate, won the election. Before the election, President Roh made two important decisions which were conducive to a stable power transition.[282] First, during the campaign, President Roh announced that he was resigning from his position as the DLP's president to demonstrate his commitment to a fair election and peaceful regime change. His resignation from DLP leadership removed the possibility for senior army officers to interfere in the election process. Second, he introduced strict election campaign laws, including a reduced campaign period and limitations on campaign spending. The campaign laws helped end secret political funds from big businesses (the so-called *Chaebol*). The Roh Tae-woo presidency thus helped to solve what Huntington called the "praetorian problem" of the military's intervention during the regime transition period. Kim Young-sam, even though he had been an opposition leader and pro-democracy activist against military dictatorship for more than three decades, was perceived by army officers as the lesser evil. He won the 1992 presidential election with 42 percent of the popular vote, while the

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[281] Jin Park, "Political Change in South Korea: The Challenge of the Conservative Alliance," *Asian Survey* 30: 12 (1990).

[282] Hong-young Lee, "South Korea in 1992: A Turning Point in Democratization," *Asian Survey* 33: 1 (1992), pp. 35-36.

opposition candidate, Kim Dae-jung, received 34 percent and Chung Ju-young, the owner of Hyundai Corporation, 16 percent.[283]

President Kim Young-sam was in a better position than his predecessor Roh Tae-woo, the leading participant in the 1979 coup and the second-most powerful man in Chun's dictatorial rule. Kim Young-sam began his presidency with a ruling majority in the National Assembly and strong support from both the general public and civil society groups.[284] As soon as he was inaugurated, President Kim embarked on wide-ranging political and economic reforms that included the armed forces, anti-corruption, financial openness, and electoral reforms. The Korean army was the first target of the reform drive. Even though Roh Tae-woo could secure allegiance from the top brass, the officers' loyalty was in return for Roh's protection of the military's corporate interest. Therefore, army officers still possessed enormous influence in politics and institutional prerogatives under the Roh government.

President Kim's first priority was to reduce the military's political power and institutionalize civilian control of the Korean army. He began the military reform by reshuffling top personnel so that he could establish firm control over senior army officers. Shortly after his inauguration, Kim Young-sam contacted several top-ranking senior officers to discuss these military reforms, and received a positive response from army leadership. He removed two officers, including Chief of Staff Kim Jin-young and Seo

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283 *Hanguk Ilbo (Korean Daily Newspaper)*, December 22 (1992).

284 In the 1992 National Assembly election, the ruling DLP won 116 seats, Kim Dae-jung's DP 75, Chung Ju-young's UPP 24 seats. The UPP represented the conservative elements in Korea and was close to the ruling DLP in its ideological orientation. For the 1992 National Assembly election results, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report, East Asia*, March 26 (1992), pp. 22-23.

Wan-su, the head of the Defense Security Command (DSC), the infamous agency headed by Chun Doo-whan during the 1979-80 coup d'etat and the backbone of military dictatorship. Furthermore, President Kim reformed the chain of command in the military intelligence agencies that were actively involved in domestic politics, including policing opposition activists and pro-democracy civil society movements.[285]

To reinforce his control over the armed forces, Kim Young-sam focused on disbanding the *Hanahoe* (one mind), a secret association created by Chun Doo-whan and Roh Tae-woo.[286] Originally organized in 1964, the *Hanahoe* increased its membership and influence under the patronage of Park Jung-hee in the 1970s. During a power-vacuum after Park's assassination in 1979, the *Hanahoe* executed a military coup and established Chun's dictatorial rule. Under the Chun regime, *Hanahoe* members rose to the apex of power both within the military hierarchy and in civilian politics.[287] President Kim weakened the *Hanahoe* by adopting several strategies, including early retirements and excluding its members from promotions. Within one year of being in office, President Kim reshuffled over 50 of the highest-ranking officers, in which eight non-*Hanahoe* officers rose to division commanders. In the reshuffling process, none of the *Hanahoe* members was included in promotion.[288]

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[285] Saxer, 2004, p. 393.

[286] Sanghyun Kim, "South Korea's Kim Young Sam Government: Political Agendas," *Asian Survey* 36: 5 (1996), p. 512.

[287] The key members of the *Hanahoe* who conspired the 1979 coup included Kim Bok-dong, Chong Ho-yong, Choi Song-taek, Kwon Ik-hyon, Son Yong-kil, Roh Chong-ki, Park Gap-yong, Nam-Chung-su. All of these members monopolized key positions in the army and the intelligence agencies during the Chun and Roh regimes. See, Eui-sop Song, "Documentary Hanahoe," *Chugan Hanguk (Weekly Korea),* June 1 (1993), p. 29.

[288] Oh, 1999, pp. 133-134.

In eliminating the *Hanahoe* elements in the army, the Kim government focused on punishing corrupt officers in the army. A bribery scandal was revealed when the wife of a navy officer publicly complained that her bribes to an admiral's wife were ineffective in her husband's promotion. When the scandal was publicized by the mass media, the Kim government grabbed the opportunity to purge politically minded high-ranking officers for collecting bribes. The result of this scandal was the arrest of more than a dozen senior officers. Another significant corruption scandal was related to the purchase of air fighters from the United States as a defense modernization plan. An investigation by the Board of Audit and Inspection revealed huge sums of secret funds in two bank accounts of two former defense ministers, which resulted in the further purge of politicized officers.

Kim Young-sam's reform also included anti-corruption drives in economic and financial sectors, which in turn targeted corrupt high-ranking officers. The Kim government enacted in 1993 the "Real-Name Financial Transaction System" to monitor financial activities and real estate deals.[289] During the three-decades-long military dictatorship, borrowed or false names were widely used for banking transactions and real estate registration, which enabled big business owners (*Chaebol*) to donate large amounts of untraceable monies to politicians. The Kim government enacted the law to stop this flow of illegal money. One unexpected outcome of the law was that it enabled prosecutors to discover a huge amount of secret funds amassed by the former president. On October 19, 1995, an opposition legislator, Park Kye-dong, disclosed that Roh Tae-woo held secret funds amounting to about $650 million under forty false-name accounts.

This incident triggered massive demonstrations throughout major cities, demanding punishment for both Chun Doo-whan and Roh Tae-woo. With the strong support of the public led by civil society groups, the National Assembly passed a special law that dealt with the bribery scandals, the 1979 coup d'etat, and the 1980 Kwangju massacre. Chun Doo-whan, Roh Tae-woo and 14 other generals were accused and found guilty of rebellion, conspiracy, and corruption. In the trial, Chun was sentenced to death, Roh to 22 years in prison, and the remaining officers to several years of incarceration. The punishment of the two military-turned-presidents and other high-ranking generals put an end to the army officers' influence in politics. With this trial and a series of other institutional reforms, firm civilian control over the armed forces was accomplished under the Kim Young-sam presidency. When Kim Dae-jung, a long-time pro-democracy activist and opposition leader, rose to the presidency in 1997, the Korean army, in contrast to the 1987 presidential election, expressed its allegiance to the new president.

Several factors enabled Kim Young-sam's success in military reform and firm civilian control. First, the Kim Young-sam presidency was strongly supported by the general public from the beginning of his term. It was hailed by people as the first legitimate civilian government since the Second Republic by Chang Myon had fallen in 1961. Even though Roh Tae-woo was elected through the popular presidential election, his legitimacy was significantly undermined by his previous career in the military—especially as the leading member of the *Hanahoe*, one of the December 12 coup plotters, and the second man in the Chun's dictatorial rule. In contrast, Kim Young-sam had a decades-long career as a pro-democracy activist and an opposition leader. At the time of

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[289] *Hanguk Ilbo*, August 13, 1993.

his inauguration, Kim enjoyed over 80 percent approval rates, and garnered support in the moderate electorate by co-opting several former opposition leaders without losing support from conservative elements. In the trial against the two previous presidents, more than 75 percent of people supported prosecuting them.[290]

Second, ideologically moderate civil society groups that focused their efforts on institutional reforms also contributed to strengthening Kim's reform drive and deterring army officers' resistance against reform. During the democratization period, civil society movements drastically changed from radical and violent street demonstrations to moderate and middle-class dominant civil groups during the late 1980s and early 1990s. These new civil groups focused on issues such as economic justice, social welfare, environmental crisis, and women's rights.[291] They strongly supported Kim's reforms, and, in turn, Kim adopted the issues they raised. The decline of the *Minjung* movements and the rise of middle-class civil groups contributed to a significant decline of physical violence both by the government and civil society groups.

Third, the existence of a cohesive and professionalized army encouraged stronger civilian control over the armed forces. During their presidential terms, Chun Doo-whan and Roh Tae-woo kept the military as a cohesive and professional institution. Even though South Korea experienced three decades of military dictatorship, the military as an

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290 Doh-chull Shin, *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 200.

291 Some of the representative civil society groups included the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU, in 1995), Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ, in 1989), Korean Foundation for Environmental Movement (KFEM, in 1993), and People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD, in 1994). For the discussion of civil society's change in the period, see Su-hoon Lee, "Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987-1992: Activation of Civil Society," *Pacific Affairs* 66: 3 (1993); Sun-hyuk Kim, "Civil Society in South Korea," *Journal of*

institution never intervened in politics. Rather, two coups were staged by a small number of army officers. When Kim Young-sam reorganized the army, the military as an institution did not exert veto power except for a small number of *Hanahoe* officers. The *Hanahoe*, in turn, was eradicated and banned under the Kim government.

Finally, low-level security threats in the 1980s provided Korea with a structural condition that was conducive to democratic reforms and military withdrawal from politics. Several decades of sustained economic growth led the country to surpass North Korea in terms of the military strength. Furthermore, South Korea's *Nordpolitik* and the end of the Cold War also significantly lessened security threat conditions in the Korean peninsula.

II. Taiwan

Throughout its rule in Taiwan, the Kuomintang government had evolved from a quasi-military government in the 1950s, to a one-party state up until the 1980s, and finally to a democratic regime with a multiparty system in the 1990s. In all the stages of its political development, the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has demonstrated very firm civilian control of the armed forces. Prior to democratization, firm civilian control of the ROC army was attributable to the presence of a strong civilian leadership by the Chiang family and to the KMT party's penetration into the military hierarchy using the political commissar system.[292] During this period, army officers were committed to the

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North East Asian Studies 15: 2 (1996); Sun-hyuk Kim, "State and Civil Society in South Korea's Democratic Consolidation: Is the Battle Really Over?" *Asian Survey* 37: 2 (1997).

[292] Some of the exemplary works on civil-military relations in one-party states are, David J. Betz, *Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Eastern Europe* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); Rowman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton: Princeton

party just as in many communist states, not to the state or to the people, as was revealed in previous chapters.

On the other hand, establishing democratic control of the military is a crucial component of democratization. In Taiwan, it had to entail the changes of army officers' loyalty from the party to the constitution and the state. Even though the fact that curbing the army's political power has been an essential element of successful democratization in Taiwan, there has been insufficient scholarly attention devoted to addressing this aspect.[293] This section explains how Taiwan successfully achieved a stable democratic transition and, in the process, realized firm civilian control over the armed forces. I suggest that a confluence of several structural factors—benevolent security environments in the 1980s, Lee Teng-hui's strong leadership, the professionalized military, and civil society's support for Lee's democratic reforms—were essential for a smooth regime transition. This section starts from Chiang Ching-kuo's liberal reforms in the 1970s and 1980s and the power transition to Lee Teng-hui, and then my focus shifts to his democratic reforms in the 1990s.

Developments in international politics during the 1970s had two contrasting consequences in Taiwan, as discussed in Chapter Three. On the one hand, the country found itself in a difficult international position during the 1970s—diplomatic de-recognition by most countries, expulsion from the United Nation, and, most importantly, loss of U.S. security commitment. These international developments harmed the position

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University Press, 1967); Zoltan D. Barany, *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1990: the Case of Hungary* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993); Jonathan R. Adelman, ed., *Communist Armies in Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982); Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, eds., *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982).

of President Chiang Ching-kuo by creating a legitimacy crisis among domestic audiences. The KMT government could not anymore claim itself as the only legitimate regime in China. At the same time, however, détente was also taking shape around the Taiwan Straits in the 1970s.[294] The diplomatic normalization between the United States and mainland China significantly reduced security threats for the KMT regime. Furthermore, generational changes in both Taiwan and the mainland (including the death of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung) diminished hostilities between the two governments.[295] In particular, Deng Xiao-ping's economic reform drives and conciliatory approach to Taiwan constructed a favorable security environment for the Island. By the 1970s, the prime objective of the KMT regime was not to retake the mainland territory by military force but to build a stable and legitimate political entity with a strong economy and robust defense.[296]

Decreasing security threats enabled Chiang Ching-kuo to embark on a slow but steady political liberalization. The focal point of Chiang's reform was the *Taiwanization* of the KMT party, legislative branches, and the army hierarchy, as detailed in the previous chapter. As a result of Chiang's reform drives in the 1970s until his death in

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[293] An exception to this statement is M. Taylor Fravel, "Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan's Democratization," *Armed Forces and Society* 29: 1 (2002).

[294] For Deng Xiao-ping's approach to Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s, see Hung-mao Tien, ed., *Mainland China, Taiwan, the U.S. Policy* (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1983); King-yuh Chang, *A Framework for China's Unification* (Taipei: Kwang Hwa, 1986); Robert G. Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy: Developments after Mao* (New York: Praeger, 1986).

[295] Generational changes and inter-ethnic marriages blurred the ethnic gap in Taiwan. About 55 percent of Chinese ethnics were born in Taiwan, which means that most of the population in Taiwan was born in the island. Hung-mao Tien, "Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan," in Harvey Feldman, Michael Y. M. Kau, and Ilpyong J. Kim, eds., *Taiwan in a Time of Transition* (New York: Paragon House, 1988), p. 6.

[296] Chiao-chiao Hsieh, *Strategy for Survival: The Foreign Policy and External Relations of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1949-1979* (London: The Sherwood Press, 1985), p. 233.

1988, KMT rule transformed Taiwan from hard-authoritarianism to soft-authoritarianism in which political oppression was significantly diminished.

While the early stage of liberal reforms was initiated by the KMT regime itself, it was the opposition political forces that pushed for a more thorough and profound democratization. Chiang Ching-kuo's liberalization brought about a rapid increase in the political opposition movement, known as *tangwai* (literally meaning "outside the party"). *Tangwai* was a grassroots coalition that was formed by ethnic Taiwanese and demanded political freedom and independence for the island.[297] *Tangwai* became a major driving force for democratization, running for the seats in local and provincial assemblies and raising numerous issues such as farmers' interests, religious rights, environmental preservation, and consumers' rights.[298] In pushing the KMT government for more reforms, *tangwai* members adopted a moderate strategy and dealt with less politically sensitive issues such as economic justice, environmental preservation, and labor rights.[299]

In September 1986, 135 members of the *tangwai* announced the formation of a new political party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), with legislator Fei Hsi-ping as the party leader. Instead of prosecuting the DPP organizers, the KMT regime took no action. On the contrary, Chiang Ching-kuo made a surprising announcement as early as 1986, when in an interview with the *Washington Post* he said he would lift martial law as

297 Yun Fan, "Taiwan: No Civil Society, No Democracy," in Alagappa ed., *Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 165.

298 For tangwai's role in Taiwan's democratization, see Fan, 2004; Yun-han Chu, "Social Protests and Political Democratization in Taiwan," in Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994); Teresa Wright, "Student Mobilization in Taiwan: Civil Society and Its Discontents," *Asian Survey* 39: 6 (1999).

soon as a new national security law could be put into place.[300] Earlier that year, President Chiang appointed an ad hoc committee for further democratic reforms. The committee recommended several important reform objectives such as ending the ban on opposition parties, reorganizing the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, and further Taiwanization and structural reform of the KMT party.[301] The committee's recommendation set the foundation for democratization in the late-1980s and early-1990s.

Following the committee's suggestion, Chiang lifted the four-decades-long martial law in July 1987, which seriously impacted Taiwan's democratization in several ways. With the lifting of martial law, opposition parties became legal and a number of opposition parties were formed, including the Social Democratic Party, the Green Party, the Workers Party, the Labor Party, and in 1993 the Chinese New Party, none of which became influential enough to offer a serious challenge to the KMT until the 1996 presidential election.[302] In addition, the KMT government lifted the ban on travel to mainland China, enabling Taiwanese businesses to invest in and trade with the mainland.

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299 During the 1983-1987 period, political issues raised by tangwai constituted just 11 percent of its initiatives, while environmental, economic, and labor issues amounted to 80 percent. In Fan, 2004, p. 167.

300 With the formation of the DPP, Taiwan had the first multi-party election in the 1986 National Assembly and Legislative Yuan elections. Shelley Rigger, *Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy* (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 126.

301 Murray A. Rubinstein, "Taiwan's Socioeconomic Modernization," in Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., *Taiwan: A New History* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 446.

302 For more information on the opposition parties in Taiwan, see Tsu-cheng Chou, "Electoral Competition and the Development of Opposition in Taiwan," *The Annals* 20 (1992); John F. Copper, "The Role of Minor Political Parties in Taiwan," *World Affairs* 155 (1993); Teh-fu Hwang, "Electoral Competition and Democratic Transition in the Republic of China," *Issues and Studies* 27 (1991); Yu-ming Shaw, ed., *Building Democracy in the Republic of China* (Taipei: The Asia and World Institute, 1984).

Finally, the ending of martial law prohibited army intelligence agencies' interference in civilian affairs.

Before lifting martial law, Chiang Ching-kuo carefully prepared for a smooth power transition by declaring that the Chiang family would never assume leadership in Taiwanese politics and appointing Lee Teng-hui as his successor upon his death.[303] The appointment of Lee as the next president was a big surprise both within and outside the KMT, since Lee was an ethnic Taiwanese who did not have a significant support base in the party. Until Chiang's death, anxiety about the power succession continued, with some apprehensions about a possible military coup. Still, several factors permitted smooth power transition. First, Chiang Ching-kuo himself made clear that there would be no military government or another "Chiang Dynasty" after his death and that Lee Teng-hui would be his successor. Second, Chiang's *Taiwanization* drive within and outside the KMT party long before his death provided Lee with a favorable condition for securing his power base in the party and the army. Third, one year before Lee rose to the presidency, martial law was lifted so that army officers could not overtly intervene in the succession process. Finally, right after rising to power, Lee appointed General Hau Pei-tsun, the most influential figure in the ROC army, as premier.[304] As a result of these factors, 24 senior army officers, including Chief of Staff General Hau, swore loyalty to Lee upon his inauguration.

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[303] Lee Teng-hui, a technocrat with Ph. D in economics from Cornell University, was appointed to Taipei City mayor and governor of Taiwan Province from 1978 to 1981. In 1982, Lee was selected by Chiang as vice president. Rigger, 1999, pp. 121-122.

[304] For General Hau's political role during democratization, see Yun-han Chu, *Crafting Democracy in Taiwan* (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1992); Fravel, 2002.

Democratic reforms were further accelerated under Lee Teng-hui's leadership. The years from 1988 to 1996, when the direct presidential election took place, were the most critical years for Taiwan's democratization. In the summer of 1990, Lee convened a National Affairs Conference (NAC)—an advisory council for the president—to create a national consensus on democratic reforms. The NAC reached an agreement on key reform issues, including: (1) lifting the "Temporary Provisions (the emergency legislation)"; (2) retiring the 'old Guards' in the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly who had been elected in mainland China before retreating to Taiwan; (3) constructing proportional representation seats in the Legislative Yuan; and most importantly (4) electing the president through direct popular election.[305]

Based on the NAC's recommendation, President Lee abolished the Temporary Provisions (or "Period of Mobilization for Suppression of Communist Rebellion"), officially ending the half-century-long civil war with the communists. The official termination of the civil war softened Taiwan's approach to the mainland. In January 1991, the KMT government founded the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) to plan and implement policies toward the mainland. In addition, the ending of the Temporary Provisions notably reduced the ROC army's domestic security roles. In 1992, the KMT regime disbanded the Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC) which had performed the army's internal security and policing responsibilities.[306] At the same time, all military training programs for university students were also eliminated, fostering further de-militarization of civilian society in Taiwan.

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[305] Hung-mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng, "Crafting Democratic Institutions in Taiwan," *The China Journal* 37 (1997), pp. 5-6.

In addition to curbing the military's political and domestic security roles, President Lee also reformed the legislative bodies. He retired the older members of the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly and reformed the electoral systems so that representatives were to be chosen through popular election. Furthermore, he announced that Taiwan would have a popular presidential election in 1996.

There are several important elements that enabled President Lee's successful democratic reforms and the depoliticization of army officers. The first and most significant factor was diminishing external security threats surrounding the island during the democratic reforms. As I mentioned above, authorities from mainland China had offered conciliatory gestures to their counterparts on the Island since Deng Xiao-ping rose to power and initiated economic reforms. In response, the KMT leadership, although slow to react, responded by permitting economic transactions and family visits to the mainland. The amount of Taiwan-PRC trade reached $1 billion in 1987, even though it was an indirect trade with the mainland via Hong Kong.[307] The subsequent economic cooperation with the mainland was led by the business community, quite free from political and security constraints.

As can be seen in Table 4-1, economic transactions across the Taiwan Straits increased rapidly, leading Taiwan and the PRC toward a deep economic interdependence. By the mid-1990s, mainland China had become the second biggest trading partner for Taiwan. In addition to trade, direct investment by Taiwanese businessmen also increased in the 1990s. Taiwan's foreign direct investment in the mainland amounted to over $1.2

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306 Fravel, 2002, p. 67.

307 James D. Seymour, "Taiwan in 1988: No More Bandits," *Asian Survey* 29: 1 (1989), p. 61.

billion in the final year of the Lee presidency. Such a rapidly forming economic interdependence was not interrupted by strained political-security relations between the two states in the mid-to-late 1990s. Rather, growing economic cooperation became the most significant factor stabilizing Taiwan-PRC relations.

Table 4-1: Taiwan-PRC Economic Exchanges, 1990-1996 (in US $ millions)[308]

Year	Taiwan's Exports to PRC	% of Taiwan's Total Exports	Taiwan's Trade Surplus with PRC
1990	4,395	6.54	3,629
1991	7,494	9.84	6,368
1992	10,548	12.95	9,429
1993	13,993	16.47	12,889
1994	16,023	17.22	14,164
1995	19,434	17.40	16,342
1996	20,727	17.87	17,668

The second element conducive to Taiwan's smooth democratic regime transition was the role of elections in Taiwanese politics. Even though free and competitive elections were not allowed for most positions in central government—including the president and other representative bodies—elections at the local and provincial levels were held from the time the KMT party moved to the island in 1949. During the democratization era, major democratic reforms revolved around the elections, both for the presidency and the legislative bodies. The effect of elections in Taiwan's democratization was twofold. On the one hand, elections at the local levels provided Taiwanese elites with an opportunity to expand their political bases at the local level. These elites later became influential political actors at the national level after organizing

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308 Tse-kang Leng, "Dynamics of Taiwan-Mainland China Economic Relations: The Role of Private Firms," *Asian Survey* 38: 5 (1998), pp. 494-509.

tangwai, which was a predecessor of the DPP, the first opposition party in Taiwan. The local elections fostered the grassroots' rise as an influential force for democratization.

Table 4-2: Distribution of Popular Votes/Seats in Legislative Elections, 1986 – 1995[309]

Year/Elections		KMT	Tangwai/DPP
1986	Popular Vote	66.9	33.1
	Percentage of Seats	77.2	22.8
1989	Popular Vote	58.5	27.2
	Percentage of Seats	71.3	20.8
1992	Popular Vote	53.0	31.0
	Percentage of Seats	62.7	31.7
1995	Popular Vote	46.1	33.2
	Percentage of Seats	51.8	32.9

Notes: In the 1986 election, the DPP candidates were identified as *Tangwai* because the DPP was not formally legalized until 1989.

On the other hand, electoral politics in Taiwan also served to legitimize KMT's rule. Chiang Ching-kuo's political reforms and the Taiwanization of the KMT government aimed at overcoming the legitimacy crisis that came from Taiwan's diplomatic setbacks in the 1970s. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the KMT's electoral success at all levels created political stability and legitimacy for its rule. Even though the *tangwai* nominated legislative candidates at all levels, its winning percentage was minimal. Even after it turned into the DPP in 1989, it was unable to challenge the KMT's dominance.

309 Discrepancies between percentage of popular vote share and percentage of seats come from the so-called "SVMM elections" (single, nontransferable voting in multi-member districts). For the SVMM's influence on Taiwanese elections during democratization, see Rigger, 1999, pp.

As we can see from Table 4-2, the KMT never lost its majority in the legislative elections, as the main opposition DPP won only a small number of seats in the Legislative Yuan during the democratic regime transition. The KMT's electoral victory from the legislative bodies at the top to the local governments presented the party with broad-based public support and legitimacy with little challenge from opposition forces. The KMT's electoral victories enabled the government to execute slow, but smooth and carefully-planned democratic reforms.

Another effect of the KMT's electoral victories was that it strengthened Lee Teng-hui's position within the party. Lee overcame the obstacles of his ethnic Taiwanese background and narrow support base in the party through electoral victories, and the careful manipulation and purging of old guards in both the party and the army. In this process, strong support from civil society groups was vital for Lee's success in implementing democratic reforms.

After Lee rose to power in 1988, the major challenges to his leadership and democratic reform came from inside of the ruling party. During the early years of his leadership, the KMT realigned itself into two factions: a mainstream group led by Lee and a non-mainstream faction represented by General Hau Pei-tsun. The two factions were differentiated by their ethnic backgrounds and foreign policy positions. The mainstream faction included ethnic Taiwanese and young and reform-minded technocrats who were ideologically moderate, while the non-mainstream faction was composed of ethnic Chinese and represented conservative elements. In foreign policy, the mainstream had taken an ambivalent position, even though it later moved closer to the opposition

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103-177; Jaushieh Joseph Wu, *Taiwan's Democratization: Forces Behind the New Momentum*

DPP's emphasis on Taiwanese independence. On the other hand, the non-mainstream was strongly attached to the "one China" principle and placed greater emphasis on unification with the mainland.[310] The ROC army was closely aligned with the non-mainstream forces in the KMT. Thus, Lee's political missions included curbing the influence of not only the non-mainstream faction but also senior army officers who had strong influence in the party.

As a way of overcoming the resistance from the non-mainstream faction, President Lee had to appoint the former Chief of Staff, General Hau pei-tsun, who represented the non-mainstream and the military, as premier in 1990. General Hau had been the most influential figure in the ROC army, having appointed 75 percent of the generals when he was on active duty. He opposed further democratic reforms and Taiwanese independence, suggesting that the army would not tolerate the independence movement even though it took place through a popular referendum.[311] Premier Hau and the non-mainstream elites demanded that President Lee take legal action against the DPP and some of the mainstream members by charging them as secessionists. The non-mainstream faction also insisted that members of foreign-based Taiwanese independence movements should be barred from entering the island. In the area of political reform, the non-mainstream faction wanted the transformation to remain at a minimum, including the

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(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 73-85.

[310] For detailed discussion over Taiwan's relationship with the mainland during the democratization era, see Muthiah Alagappa, "Introduction: Presidential Election, Democratization, and Cross-Strait Relations," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Taiwan's Presidential Politics: Democratization and Cross-Strait Relations in the Twentieth-first Century* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 30-38; Xiaobo Hu and Gang Lin, "The PRC View of Taiwan under Lee Teng-hui," in Wei-chin Lee and T. Y. Wang, eds., *Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in Taiwan, 1988-2000* (New York: University Press of America, 2003), pp. 277-297.

[311] Fravel, 2002, p. 63.

constitutional amendment that would adopt direct presidential election. Likewise, opposition to further democratic reforms revolved around the national identity and independence issues inside the ruling KMT party.

Against their backdrop, however, President Lee successfully strengthened his position in the KMT by gaining support from mainstream KMT members, the DPP moderates, and the general public, marginalizing the non-mainstream faction in the party. The non-mainstream faction lost its influence in the party after General Hau was dismissed from the premiership and Lee Teng-hui embarked on military reform and party-army split. In the 1992 Legislative Yuan election, members of the mainstream KMT party and the DPP formed a grand coalition to oust Hau from the premiership. Both the KMT mainstream faction and the DPP marshaled support from the native Taiwanese elites and the general public.

Lee Teng-hui's democratic reforms culminated in military reforms. For the first three years of his presidency, he had to appease senior army officers to secure his political position. The president diminished General Hau's influence over senior army officers by retiring him from active military service, appointing him as defense minister in 1989, and, one year later, assigning him to the premiership to silence the conservative elements in the ROC army. After the expulsion of Hau from the premiership, the army officers' political influence also declined. Lee trimmed the military budget, which led to a reduction of military personnel. Furthermore, he decreased the military's representation in the Central Standing Committee of the KMT. The Lee government established an Intelligence Committee in the Legislative Yuan to administer the National

Security Bureau and to control the armed forces.[312] While reducing the military officers' presence in civilian affairs, the KMT also withdrew its influence from the army, augmenting the military's institutional autonomy. In October 1993, the Legislative Yuan passed a law that prohibited political parties from establishing their organizations in the army.[313]

President Lee's political position was finally secured and democratic reforms reinforced with the 1996 presidential election. In this election, the ruling KMT candidate Lee Teng-hui won 54 percent of the popular vote, while the DPP candidate Peng Ming-min garnered only 21 percent.[314] Four years later in 2000, Taiwan's democratization was finally consolidated as the opposition DPP leader Chen Shui-bian was elected to the presidency. Clear evidence of the establishment of democratic control over the military was the army officers' allegiance to the new president who had radically different foreign and security policies from what the ROC army had traditionally espoused.[315]

In sum, four major structural components were conducive to the successful democratization and the army's political disengagement in Taiwan. First, decreasing security threats across the Taiwan Straits in the 1980s created favorable structural circumstances for democratic reforms. Second, strong leadership by Chiang Ching-kuo

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312 Tien and Cheng, 1997, pp. 9-11.

313 Fravel, 2002, p. 68.

314 In the 1996 presidential election, Lin Yang-kang and Hau Pei-tsun formed the New Party and garnered 14.9 percent of popular vote. For detailed analysis of the 1996 presidential election, see Eric P. Moon, "Single Non-transferable Vote Methods in Taiwan in 1996: Effects of an Electoral System," *Asian Survey* 37: 7(1997), pp. 652-668; Tun-jen Cheng, "Taiwan in 1996: From Euphoria to Melodrama," *Asian Survey* 37: 1 (1997), pp. 43-51.

315 For detailed analysis of the 2000 presidential election results and implications, see Yu-shan Wu, "Taiwan in 2000: Managing the Aftershocks from Power Transfer," *Asian Survey* 41: 1

and Lee Teng-hui facilitated a robust democratization process and the army officers' subordination to civilian leadership. Third, the presence of strong but moderate civil society groups during Lee's presidency led to a far-reaching institutionalization of democratic reforms. Finally, the presence of highly cohesive military promoted its smooth political disengagement.

III. The Philippines

In the previous two cases, I elucidated how a combination of structural factors—favorable security environments, a strong civilian leadership backed by vibrant civil society, and a cohesive military organization—brought about stable regime transition and the depoliticization of the armed forces. The remaining two cases—the Philippines and Indonesia—reveal a different pattern of democratic regime change. In contrast to the previous two cases, the remaining cases illustrate a situation in which politicized army officers became a stumbling bloc for democratization.

Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, the Philippines in the mid 1980s experienced democratic regime transition without prior liberal reforms or elite compromise under Marcos' authoritarian regime. Instead, democratization was prompted after the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) sided with Corazon Aquino to topple Marcos. The RAM's decision was vital for the end of the authoritarian rule and the installation of a democratic regime. However, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was never a pro-democracy group as RAM members or Marcos loyalists staged no less than seven major coup attempts within the first four years of the Aquino presidency. This section

(2001), pp. 40-48; T. Y. Wang, "Cross-Strait Relations after the 2000 Election in Taiwan:

details the dynamics of democratization and military depoliticization in the Philippines by focusing on Marcos' ouster and the subsequent regime transition under the Aquino leadership.

As noted in the previous chapter, the assassination of Benigno S. Aquino in 1983 marked a turning point for Marcos' downfall. The assassination provoked sweeping demonstrations by the general public for the first time since the declaration of martial law in 1972. The Aquino assassination led Filipinos to call "for justice for Aquino, national reforms, an end to the role of the U.S. in the Philippines, and Marcos' resignation."[316] The Philippine Catholic Church, under the leadership of Jaime Cardinal Sin, played a critical role in organizing anti-Marcos demonstrations that were called the "People's Power" movement.[317] Continued domestic political turmoil after the assassination caused a massive flight of foreign capital, leading to a serious economic crisis.[318] Furthermore, economic difficulties elevated the armed insurgency operations by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a Muslim separatist movement, and the New People's Army (NPA), an armed apparatus for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). As we can see from Table 2-7 in Chapter Two, the strength of the two insurgency groups

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Changing Tactics in a New Reality," *Asian Survey* 41: 5 (2001), pp. 716-736.

316 G. Sidney Silliman, "The Philippines in 1983: Authoritarianism Beleaguered," *Asian Survey* 24: 2 (1984), p. 154.

317 Jaime Cardinal Sin became a channel of communication among disorganized and competing opposition forces. Cardinal Sin persuaded Aquino to join the opposition forces and accept a joint ticket with Salavador Laurel for the 1986 presidential election. Robert L. Youngblood, *Marcos Against the Church: Economic Development and Political Repression in the Philippines* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 200.

318 Right after the Aquino assassination on August 21, over $700 million capital left the Philippines. Foreign currency reserves plunged from $2.4 billion to $600 million. Foreign debt rose to $26 billion, while GNP declined five percent in the following year. See Silliman, 1984, p. 152; Herbert S. Malin, "The Philippines in 1984: Grappling with Crisis," *Asian Survey* 25: 2 (1985), p. 203.

reached its zenith in 1986, seriously threatening both the security of the nation and that of Marcos' regime.

In such a crisis situation, the most serious blow to the authoritarian regime was Marcos' loss of support in the AFP. His personalistic control over AFP leadership gave rise to factional struggles among army officers, especially between the PMA (Philippine Military Academy) and non-PMA graduates. The PMA faction that initiated the RAM withdrew its support for Marcos and sided with the pro-democracy group represented by Corazon Aquino. As noted in the previous chapter, RAM members planned a coup against Marcos as early as October 1985. The shaky support from the AFP forced the president to declare, on November 3, 1985, a snap election to be held on February 7, 1986.

The announcement was a big surprise to the unprepared and disorganized opposition forces. Among various opposition leaders, Aquino and Salvador Laurel were the most prominent figures. Both of them were willing to run in the presidential election, creating a possibility that the opposition's vote would be split. In this situation, prominent opposition leaders such as Vincente Puyat, Francisco Rodrigo, and Cardinal Sin mediated between Laurel and Aquino to form a united front in the election. Laurel yielded to Aquino for the presidential candidacy on the condition that they run under the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), an opposition umbrella group.[319] It was almost certain that Aquino and Laurel would win the 1986 presidential election considering Aquino's tremendous popularity among the general public and united opposition forces.

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[319] Bernardo M. Villegas, "The Philippines in 1986: Democratic Reconstruction in the Post-Marcos Era," *Asian Survey* 27: 2 (1987), p. 196.

Since Marcos knew he was heading for a loss, he engaged in various kinds of electoral fraud such as vote-buying with bribery, mobilizing bureaucrats' votes, and terrorizing pro-opposition voters.[320] It is estimated that Marcos spent more than $500 million to buy votes. In addition, General Ver and the ruling Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) party devised to put AFP forces into heavy pro-opposition districts for psychological terror. Reportedly 264 people were killed and 227 injured during the election campaign period.[321]

Even with those election irregularities, the result for the 1986 presidential election was inconclusive so that both Marcos and Aquino declared a victory. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which was controlled by the ruling KBL party, declared Marcos' victory with 54 percent of the popular vote, while the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), a citizen watchdog group, announced Aquino's victory. In this situation Aquino held a 'People's Victory' rally, in which about one million people participated to support Aquino's win.[322]

The biggest momentum for democratic regime transition occurred when RAM members revolted against Marcos on February 22, 1986 and sided with Aquino. In this process, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos played leading roles. Prior to the mutiny, Marcos gave an order to arrest RAM

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320 For more information on the 1986 election frauds, see *Far Eastern Economic Review* (January 30, 1986), p. 12; Romeo Manlapaz, *The Mathematics of Deception: A Study of the 1986 Presidential Election Tallies* (Quezon City: Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines, 1986); Jennifer Conroy Franco, *Elections and Democratization in the Philippines* (New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 173-181.

321 Mark R. Thomson, *The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 142.

members including those two leaders. Before the arrest, however, Enrile and Ramos discovered the arrest order and decided to rise up against Marcos. They resigned their positions in the Marcos government and declared that the 1986 election was fraudulent and that Aquino was the legitimate winner.[323] Not long after Enrile and Ramos announced their withdrawal from Marcos at Camp Aguinaldo, over 80,000 people surrounded the Camp to protect the "rebels" from Marcos loyalists' attempt to take them into custody.[324] A massive defection of AFP officers to the RAM's side ensued. Marcos' plan to attack Camp Aguinaldo failed because of the large human blockade around the Camp and the AFP's refusal to follow Marcos' order. On February 25, Marcos fled Malacanang, the presidential palace, and Aquino and Laurel organized a provisional government.

As the first democratically elected president since 1965, Aquino faced an enormous number of reform imperatives. The first task was to purge Marcos loyalists in both the government and the AFP. The next was to rebuild democratic institutions with a new constitution that had been halted with the declaration of martial law in 1972. In addition, she had to deal with economic difficulties the Philippines had suffered throughout the Marcos rule. Closely related to the economic condition and political unrest were the rising insurgency operations by the NPA and the MNLF. Aquino could not exert a strong political leadership, however, because she failed to unite various

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[322] See, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, "On the Eve of Dictatorship and Revolution," in Aurora Javate de Dios, et al., *Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People's Power* (Manila: Conspectus, 1988), pp. 1-125.

[323] Carl H. Lande, The Political Crisis," in John Bresnan, ed., *Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 143.

[324] Cecilio T. Arillo, *Breakaway* (Manila: Kyodo, 1986), p. 117.

political forces that contributed to overthrowing Marcos. The inexperience of the Aquino leadership, therefore, thwarted democratic reform programs.

The Aquino government was composed of loosely aligned political forces with different ideologies and political interests. The political coalition included, among others, RAM officers, conservative politicians, business elites, religious groups, moderate liberal democrats, and the general public that formed the People's Power. These diverse political interests can be categorized into three major factions: (1) conservative politicians and business elites who were deprived of their political positions and economic interests under the Marcos dictatorship; (2) RAM officers led by Enrile and Ramos; and (3) progressive liberal democrats who supported Aquino's political reforms.[325] The first two factions were predominant in the Aquino government, while the liberal democrats were the weakest. While these diverse and competing forces contributed to political pluralism and democratic elements in the government, acute competition among them deepened elite fragmentation and became a source of weak and inefficient leadership.

One of the most pressing tasks for the Aquino leadership was to introduce economic reform, which in turn was closely related with the growing insurgency problem in the southern provinces of the Philippines. But economic reform was hampered by the influence of conservative politicians and business elites both in Congress and the Aquino administration. Rather than undertaking wide-ranging economic reforms, they were only

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325 For the detailed information about political factions in the Aquino regime, see David J. Steinberg, *The Philippines: A Singular and a Plural Place,* 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 148; Walden Bello, "Aquino's Elite Pluralism: Initial Reflections," *Third World Quarterly* 8: 3 (1986), p. 1020; Kyung-kyo Seo, "*Military Involvement in politics and the*

interested in recovering their properties that had been confiscated under the martial law regime. In the land reform area, for example, a new reform law was introduced by the land-owning groups led by Congressman Cojuangco, President Aquino's brother.[326] The law aimed at recovering Aquino's and other conservative land owners' agricultural estates that were confiscated under the Marcos regime. The conservative elites' influence in the Aquino government became even stronger after the 1987 congressional elections. In the elections, 130 out of 200 congressmen belonged to conservative factions called "traditional political families," while another 39 were closely related to those families. Only 37 congressmen had no electoral record prior to 1971.[327] The election resulted in a return to politics by 'dynastic' families that controlled the pre-martial law politics, and in this situation, political and economic reforms were hardly far-reaching.

A more serious stumbling block for the Aquino government was the AFP. Even though RAM's decision to turn against Marcos was perhaps the most crucial contributor to Marcos' overthrow and the installation of a democratic regime, the RAM was never a pro-democracy group. The RAM's choice in favor of pro-democracy forces was made as a way to unseat the Marcos regime that marginalized RAM officers from key positions in the AFP. Whatever its motivation, the RAM's decision to support Aquino was vital for the installation of a new government, and as such, RAM officers believed that they had the right to participate in the Aquino government as an equal partner of the civilian

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Prospects for Democracy: Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea in Comparative Perspective," Ph. D Dissertation (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 1993), p. 236.

[326] Renato S. Velasco, "Philippine Democracy: Promise and Performance," in Anek Laothamatas, ed. *Democratization in Southeast and East Asia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 94.

[327] John T. Sidel, *Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 73-78.

leadership. In Miranda and Ciron's survey of 452 AFP officers,[328] about 96% of the respondents agreed that the AFP should play an active role in national development which includes a secure political environment (72%) and sustained economic growth (71%). In the same survey, 61 percent of officers believed that army officers had more apposite capabilities in managing administrative jobs in civilian government than their civilian counterparts.

At the outset of the Aquino presidency, AFP officers pronounced their allegiance to the new president. Before long, however, those officers' support for Aquino quickly dissolved due to several reasons. The Aquino government failed to conduct major economic reforms including the land reform. In addition, Aquino failed to mobilize the People's Power into her presidential leadership. Strong and united civil society groups that had real enthusiasm for democratic reform quickly dispersed not long after Marcos stepped down. Instead, the old conservative factions hijacked the Aquino government. In this set-up, the president could not eliminate the Marcos loyalists in the government and the military. Most importantly, Aquino's defense and security policies infuriated AFP officers.

Aquino and the AFP disagreed on the counterinsurgency policy toward the CPP/NPA and the MNLF. The AFP insisted on strengthening the counterinsurgency program by adopting tough measures, while the civilian leadership preferred more peaceful means. Aquino enraged the AFP by releasing political prisoners, including the

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328 Felipe B. Miranda and Ruben F. Ciron, "Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of Continuing Crisis," in J. Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun Cheong, eds., *Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), pp. 163-211.

CPP leader Jose Maria Sison. Furthermore, the Aquino government set off a ceasefire and peace talks with the CPP and the MNLF secessionists. In the ceasefire talks, the Aquino government named only civilian representatives with no military presence. A ceasefire agreement between the government and the National Democratic Front (NDF), an umbrella organization of underground leftist groups, reached a 60-day truce effective on December 10, 1986. But the truce did not last long due to a discrepancy on key issues. The NDF demanded a share of seats in the Aquino government and the integration of the NPA militias into the AFP hierarchy. In the same way, the Aquino government's peace talks with Moro secessionists also failed, as the MNLF demanded autonomy of Mindanao and its army independent of the AFP command.[329]

After the Aquino government's peace efforts with the insurgents ended in failure, the NPA and the MNLF resumed their armed uprisings in the late 1980s. According to Jose M. Sison and the CPP Central Committee, the CPP/NPA possessed about 230,000 fighters and 10 million people who joined communist-organized groups.[330] In such a perilous security situation, the Aquino government further antagonized the AFP by cutting 14 percent of the military budget in 1986. To make matters worse, Aquino founded a Presidential Human Rights Commission to investigate human rights abuse charges against the AFP during the martial law regime. In the views of AFP officers, the Aquino government was inclined to favor the leftists.

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[329] Carolina G. Hernandez, "The Philippines in 1987: Challenges of Redemocratization," *Asian Survey* 28: 2 (1989), p. 2 (February 1988), p. 236; Alex Bello Brillantes, "Insurgency and Peace Policies of the Aquino Government," *PSSC Social Science Information* (April-September, 1987), pp. 3-9.

[330] Carolina G. Hernandez, "The Philippines in 1988: Reaching out to Peace and Economic Recovery," *Asian Survey* 29: 2 (1989), p. 159.

It was not long before segments of the AFP withdrew their support from the Aquino government and began staging coup attempts. As Table 4-3 illustrates, there were seven major coup attempts either by RAM members or by Marcos loyalists within the first four years of the Aquino presidency. There were several important reasons for those coup attempts: Aquino's decision to investigate human right abuses by the military under martial law, the cease-fire and peace negotiations with the CPP/NPA, several left-leaning members in the administration, and most importantly Aquino government's mishandling of security policies.[331]

Table 4-3: Major Coup Attempts in the Aquino Presidency, 1986-1989[332]

Date	Main Location	Military Groups
July 1986	Manila Hotel	Loyalists, supported by RAM
November 1986	Batasang Pambansa	RAM
January 1987	Television Station	Loyalists, supported by RAM
April 1987	Fort Bonifacio	Loyalists
July 1987	Airport	Loyalists
August 1987	Malacanang	RAM
December 1989	Camp Aguilando	RAM and Loyalists

In the first coup attempt on July 6, 1986, Arturo Tolentino, Marcos' running mate for the 1986 election, occupied the Manila Hotel and declared that Marcos was the legitimate president. None of the officers who joined the coup were punished. Four months later, chief of staff General Ramos discovered the second coup plan by RAM

331 Some of the left-leaning members in the administration included, among others, Labor Minister Aqusto Sanchez, Local Government Minister Aquilino Pimentel, and Executive Secretary Joker Aroyo. Gretchen Casper, *Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), p. 142.

332 Mark R. Thomson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 169.

officers. It was suspected that Juan Ponce Enrile was behind the two coup plans. After the second coup, therefore, Aquino fired Enrile. Ramos, with four other senior officers, submitted to Aquino the ten-point demands, some of which were (1) to increase the AFP's counterinsurgency power, (2) to dismiss left-leaning cabinet members, (3) to reinstitute the National Security Council (NSC), and (4) to fire corrupt officials in the government.[333] The recurring coup attempts forced the Aquino government to accept most of the AFP officers' demands. Aquino increased the military budget and payment by 60 percent and adopted the AFP's counterinsurgency plan that had been previously dismissed. In addition, she had to fire several cabinet members who were charged by the military as leftist sympathizers. Those coup attempts seriously damaged Aquino's leadership and the economic conditions in the Philippines throughout the late 1980s.[334]

Civilian control over the AFP was established only after Fidel Ramos was elected as president in the 1992 election. As the former chief of staff who gained solid support from Philippine Military Academy (PMA) graduates, Ramos successfully curbed the RAM's veto power in domestic politics. Ramos' control over the AFP, however, was secured by bringing several senior AFP officers into his government.

Even though the Philippines did not return to military-dominant dictatorial rule, its democratization process was tainted by numerous coup d'etat attempts. In this section, I identified several major factors that hampered civilian control over the armed forces during the democratic regime transition. Severe security threats from the growing

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[333] Casper, 1995, p. 143.

[334] The December 1989 coup attempt, for example, severely damaged the economy by shattering the credibility of the Aquino government among the Filipino and international business

CPP/NPA and the MNLF insurgency movements created a structural condition for the AFP to be politically influential. The country's security threats were further exacerbated by the Aquino government's inappropriate handling of security policies. Meanwhile, weak Aquino leadership provided AFP officers with opportunities to challenge civilian authority. The once-strong People's Power movement did not turn into pro-democracy forces in the Aquino government. On the contrary, conservative political and economic elites dominated the new regime. In this situation, Aquino could not accomplish far-reaching political and economic reforms. Finally, the AFP did not develop into a cohesive and professionalized military institution but suffered from factional struggles that were fostered by Marcos as a way to secure his control over the AFP. The factionalized AFP staged numerous coup attempts when the Aquino government failed to provide strong political leadership.

IV. Indonesia

Once Maj. Gen. Haji Mohammad Suharto and army officers toppled President Sukarno in 1965, the ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia*) became a dominant player in Indonesian politics, and remained so until Suharto stepped down from his presidency in 1998. Throughout Suharto's presidency, ABRI officers became deeply engaged in domestic political, administrative, and economic affairs under the *dwifungsi* (dual function) doctrine. Army officers were guaranteed seats in the National Parliament and in the People's Representative Council, an electoral college that selected the president and vice president

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communities. For the 1989 coup's effect on the Philippine economy, see David G. Timberman,

once every five years. In addition, President Suharto assigned military officers in various governmental positions at both national and provincial levels. By the mid-1990s, Suharto employed about 14,000 officers outside the armed forces.[335] Throughout 32 years of the New Order regime, the ABRI played as the backbone of Suharto's authoritarian rule.

The seemingly resilient New Order regime abruptly ended in the midst of economic crisis and ensuing social unrests in 1997 and 1998.[336] Since Indonesia launched a democratic regime transition, it faced enormous political, social, and economic reform tasks: recovering from the 1997 financial crisis, containing inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence, and building a stable democratic political institution. But the most significant mission for the new democracy in Indonesia was to reform the ABRI to become a professional and politically neutral entity. This section illustrates the way in which severe domestic threats and weak civilian leadership hampered the democratization process and the complete withdrawal of the military from politics in Indonesia. This section covers the period from Suharto's fall to the Megawati presidency.

"The Philippines in 1990: On Shaky Ground," *Asian Survey* 31: 2 (1991), pp. 158-161.

335 In addition to active duty officers, retired officers also held positions: during the final years of the Suharto presidency, about 50 percent of the provincial governors and over 30 percent of district heads had military backgrounds. See Annette Clear, "Politics: From Endurance to Evolution," in John Bresnan, ed., *Indonesia: The Great Transition* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, 2005), pp. 146-147.

336 Even though the 1997 financial crisis was the direct cause of Suharto's fall, organized opposition forces had been built up since the early 1990s. See, Kastorius Sinaga, "Number of Local NGO's Mushrooming," *Jakarta Post* (November 2, 1993); Philip Eldridge, *Non-Government Organizations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995); Edward Aspinall, *Student Dissident in Indonesia in the 1980s* (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993); Edward Aspinall, "Indonesia: Civil Society and Democratic Breakthrough," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

Until 1997, Suharto's New Order seemed to be robust as he succeeded in managing political stability and sustained economic growth of over seven percent throughout his rule. Abruptly, however, an unexpected economic crisis forced all the major domestic political actors, including the ABRI, to turn against him. The end of the Suharto's New Order started from the financial crisis that began in Thailand and soon spread over to the Philippines, South Korea, and Indonesia. Within a few months of the financial crisis, the value of the Indonesian rupia plummeted from 2,500 per U.S. dollar to around 10,000; the stock market plunged from over 700 to nearly 300; and inflation soared into double digits.[337] Right after the financial crisis hit Indonesia, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank offered a package to rescue its economy.

The IMF and the Suharto government reached an agreement for structural reforms for the economy as a precondition for the rescue package, but the agreement was not properly implemented, which only made the situation worse.[338] The government's inefficient economic policies were mainly due to the corruption of his family and cronies.[339] Suharto, at the age of 76, was quite isolated from everyday politics. At the height of the economic crisis, he was mainly interested in taking care of the interest of his

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337 Judith Bird, "Indonesia in 1997: The Tinerbox Year," *Asian Survey* 38: 2 (1998), p. 175.

338 For the IMF's economic package deal with Indonesia, see Central Banking, *Reforming the IMF: Lessons from Indonesia* (http://www.centralbanking.co.uk/publications/pdf/Hanke.pdf); Hall Hill, *The Indonesian Economy in Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Lessons* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 1999).

339 Against the economic reforms, Suharto's youngest son, Hutomo Mandala Putra, monopolized the national car project; his oldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana announced to build an expensive triple-decker road. Mohammad Hassan, one of Suharto's cronies, took back the plywood industry. R. William Liddle, "Indonesia's Unexpected Failure of Leadership," in Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris, eds., *The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), pp. 17-18.

inner-circle. The inefficiency and corruption of his government put him in a politically difficult situation, since he had identified himself as the "father of development." Corruption had been tolerated by people only so long as the economy continued thriving under Suharto's leadership.[340] With the economy in deep trouble, however, Suharto could not claim his legitimacy for his authoritarian rule any more.

The economic crisis spread over to a nationwide political crisis in early 1998, as college students organized massive anti-Suharto demonstrations. At the early stage of demonstrations, student protests were small in size and centered on economic issues such as inflation and unemployment. But the protest soon evolved into radicalized and violent anti-Suharto demonstrations as ordinary citizenry joined. The demonstrations turned into riots when lower-class people felt emboldened, committing property damage and killing over 1,000 people in Jakarta alone.[341] The riot in Jakarta was targeted on the ethnic Chinese community that comprised about 4 percent of the population but controlled up to 70 percent of the Indonesian economy.[342] Violent protests led the already flagging economy into an even deeper crisis due to a large-scale capital flight after attacks on ethnic Chinese.

In the midst of economic crisis and violent demonstrations, Suharto was unanimously reelected as president by the People's Representative Council on March 10, 1998. By this time, however, he could not carry on his presidency. Three former vice

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[340] Clear, 2005, p. 153.

[341] Violent riots were quite frequent throughout the 1990s even before the 1997 economic crisis began. Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "Indonesia: A Violent Culture?" *Asian Survey* 42: 4 (2002); Lowell Dittmer, "The Legacy of Violence in Indonesia," *Asian Survey* 42: 4 (2002); Susan Berfield and Dewi Loveard, "Ten Days that Shook Indonesia," *Asiaweek*, July 21 (1998).

presidents pleaded with him to resign and yield the power to Vice President B. J Habibie. Furthermore, Suharto could not form a new cabinet because, among the 45 people who were nominated, only three accepted the president's offer. On May 20, 1998, Suharto met General Wiranto, the army chief of staff and defense minister, and notified him that he would resign.[343] General Wiranto guaranteed that the ABRI would protect and honor him. On the next day, Suharto stepped down and turned his presidency over to Vice President Habibie.

The fall of Suharto and the subsequent power transition was so abrupt and spontaneous that the Habibie leadership was not well-prepared to carry out political and economic reforms. The interim Habibie government had to deal with numerous challenging problems such as the severe economic crisis, violent demonstrations, inter-ethnic and inter-religious clashes, and separatist movements in Aceh, Papua, and East Timor. After Suharto stepped down, the ABRI remained the most powerful and best organized political institution in Indonesia. In this respect, it is worth pondering why there was no military coup attempt by the ABRI even through Indonesia suffered from numerous security challenges and the ill-functioning civilian leadership in post-Suharto years.

To account for the ABRI's relatively passive role in the regime transition period, one needs to revisit the Suharto-ABRI relationship in the 1980s and 1990s. Although the ABRI became the key partner of Suharto's New Order and filled prominent positions in the government, its political power and its institutional autonomy were significantly

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342 Adam Schwarz, "Introduction: The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia," in Schwarz and Paris, eds., 1999, p. 2.

diminished during the latter half of the Suharto's rule. During this period, Suharto reduced his dependence on the ABRI by forming a political coalition with various groups such as the Islamic groups, economic technocrats, and his own palace clique including his family. The number of active military officers in Suharto's cabinet declined during the last ten years of his rule.[344] The ABRI's political influence further shrank after Suharto dismissed General Murdani, who wielded great power and charismatic leadership as armed forces commander (1983-1988) and minister of defense and security (1988-1993). Suharto further strengthened his grip on the army by reshuffling large numbers of senior officers and appointing as armed forces commander General Feisal Tanjung, a man personally loyal to the president. Personal ties and political loyalty were the key criteria of promotions and assignments.[345]

In addition to its diminished influence in the Suharto government, the ABRI was still far from being built up as a cohesive and professionalized institution. The lack of organizational unity came mainly from its guerrilla warfare experience against the Dutch colonial forces in the 1940s. During the war of independence, the guerrilla forces were organized as independent units that were under the leadership of local commanders, rather than a hierarchical and centralized command structure. Such a horizontal ordering of the ABRI continued until the Suharto era as a form of territorial command structure, as I explained in Chapter Three. Moreover, Suharto's manipulation of the Islamic groups created a schism along religious lines in the ABRI: the so-called red-and-white faction

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343 Judith Bird, "Indonesia in 1998: The Pots Boils Over," *Asian Survey* 39: 1 (1999), p. 29.
344 Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 25.

led by General Wiranto that represented the nationalist and secular segment, and the green faction led by Suharto's son-in-law Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto that endorsed modernist Muslims. Suharto consciously manipulated the factional struggles so that no consensus emerged within the army leadership.[346] The lack of cohesion and strong leadership in the ABRI prevented army officers from dominating the political transition of 1998.[347]

In the first stage of democratic regime transition, the ABRI itself embarked on a military reform to reformulate itself as a cohesive and professional institution. In 1999, the ABRI proposed 14 points of military reform including, among others, separation of the police from the armed forces, complete withdrawal from civilian political affairs, separation from the Golkar Party, political neutrality during elections, and focus only on its external security mission.[348] In the course of the reform, the ABRI aimed to recover from its tainted image among the general public and to be cherished as the defender of the national interest.

Even though the ABRI was not strong enough to dominate post-Suharto politics, weak and divided civilian leadership impeded the establishment of a democratic political institution and firm civilian control over the armed forces. The 1999 parliamentary

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345 Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power* (RAND: National Security Research Division, 2002), p. 38.

346 For detailed information about factions within the ABRI, see, Takashi Shiraishi, "The Indonesian Military in Politics," in Schwarz and Paris, eds., 1999, pp. 76-82.

347 Another reason for the ABRI's inability to intervene in politics after Suharto stepped down was its tainted image among the general public. Apart from rampant corruption, the ABRI enraged the Indonesian people by killing four university students who demonstrated against Suharto.

elections showed how far Indonesia's political spectrum was fragmented. Over 100 parties had been formed before the election, among which 48 political parties were eligible to participate in the election. Of the 48 parties, 19 parties were based on or had close ties with Islamic organizations, three with Christian groups, nine with socialist-oriented bands, and 17 with *Pancasila* ideology.[349] In the election, no parties were able to gain a majority as the popular votes were distributed almost evenly to five major parties.[350]

After 17 months of the interim Habibie presidency, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected as president through the General Session of the National Assembly in October 1999. Even though he was the first democratically elected leader, Wahid's presidency endured only for 20 months before he was forced to step down and hand over the leadership to vice president Megawati Sukarnoputri in July 2001. Wahid was politically weak after he alienated himself from the coalition groups that brought him to the presidency. In particular, he antagonized the two largest and most influential parties in the National Assembly: the PDI-P (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, Indonesian*

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348 Jusuf Wanandi, "Challenge of the TNI and Its Role in Indonesia's Future," in Hadi Soesastro, Anthony L. Smith, and Han Mui Ling, eds., *Governance in Indonesia: Challenges Facing the Megawati Presidency* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 94-95.

349 For detailed information about those 48 political parties, see Kathleen E. Woodward, *Violent Masses, Elites, and Democratization: The Indonesian Case*, Ph. D Dissertation (Columbus: The Ohio State University, 2002), pp. 340-342.

350 PDI-P (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan*, Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle) won 34 percent of the vote; Golkar (*Golongan Karya*, Functional Groups) won 22 percent; PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, National Awakening Party), 12 percent; PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, Development Unity Party), 10 percent; and PAN (*Partai Amanat Nasional*, National Message Party), 7 percent. See National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, *The 1999 Presidential Election, MPR General Session and Post-Election Development in Indonesia* (Washington D.C.: National Democratic Institute, November 28, 1999), p. 39; R. William Liddle, "Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored," *Asian Survey* 40: 1 (2000), pp. 32-39.

Democracy Party-Struggle) led by vice president Megawati, as well as the former ruling Golkar Party.[351]

Wahid's weak leadership provided the ABRI with an opportunity to reclaim its own political influence. In 2001, for example, Wahid's attempt to appoint Lt. General Wirahadikusumah as army chief of staff failed when 46 army generals blocked the appointment by threatening to resign. Furthermore, ABRI officers played an influential role in the impeachment of Wahid, initiated by the People's Representative Council in May 2001. After Wahid's fall, the Council elected Megawati to replace him. In this power transition, the military's withdrawal of support for Wahid and approval of Megawati played a key role.

The weakness of the civilian leadership in the post-Suharto Indonesia mainly came from the disentanglement of civilian political leaders and civil society groups. Not only were civil society groups fragmented and violent, but civilian political elites could not garner support from civil society. Civil society groups were thriving in the post-Suharto period, but they could not form a united front as a pro-democracy force. Their failure was mainly due to the fact that they were formed along ethnic and religious lines.[352] One distinctive characteristic of Indonesia's democratization was the power transition through the elite negotiation. Even though Suharto was forced to transfer power to Vice President Habibie, his resignation occurred after an agreement between

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[351] Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, p. 42.

[352] For the discussion of civil society's role in the post-Suharto Indonesia, see Edward Aspinall, "Indonesia: Transformation of Civil Society and Democratic Breakthrough," in Alagappa, ed., 2004, pp. 61-95; Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Robert Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

Suharto and the ABRI leader General Wiranto. After Habibie, Wahid's presidency was possible only due to a compromise among key political leaders. Such a power transition via elite negotiation averted any serious political crisis or power vacuum, but at the same time it inevitably alienated civil society groups. Without the support of civil society, the civilian leadership was destined to be weak.

Besides the inefficient civilian leadership, continuing internal security threats provided the ABRI with an opportunity to regain its political influence during the democratization period. Domestic security conditions progressively deteriorated in the midst of political turmoil. The domestic instability had multiple sources. The most serious disturbance came from the resurgence of Islamic political organizations and related Islamic gangs and militias. The renaissance of militant Islam in the post-Suharto period had its origins in Suharto's mobilization of Muslims to broaden his political support base and counterbalance the ABRI. During the latter years of his rule, Suharto identified himself as the defender of Islamic interests.[353] The influence of militant Muslim organizations further expanded under the Habibie presidency as he mobilized those groups to strengthen his political support base.

The resurgence of Islamic organizations inevitably intensified inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts after Suharto's fall. The inter-ethnic violence was mainly targeted on the ethnic Chinese community that controlled most economic wealth in Indonesia. It was not limited to Jakarta but spread to other regions such as the Central Sulawesi, Moluccas, and Ambon, in which Christian and Muslim groups launched attacks

353 Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, p. 84.

and counter-attacks, killing hundreds.[354] Governors in those regions declared a truce, but it did not prevent a resurgence of violence. The police were unable or unwilling to stop the inter-ethnic violence.[355]

Another source of domestic insecurity came from separatist movements in several provinces such as Papua (or Irian Jaya), East Timor, and Aceh, threatening the state's territorial integrity. All of these regions had had decades-old independence movements. The separatist movement in Aceh, which had its roots in the Darul Islam rebellion in the 1950s, resurfaced in the late 1980s when Acehnese militias, who had been trained in Libya, formed the GAM (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka,* Free Aceh Movement) and resumed the separatist movement. Even though the Suharto government could contain the Acehnese separatism in the early-1990s, the post-Suharto instability provided the GAM with another opportunity to launch pro-independence guerrilla warfare.[356] Papua militias, even though less serious than in Aceh, also formed the OPM (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka,* Free Papua Organization) and waged an independence guerrilla warfare.[357] Finally, East Timor formed an independent government after three decades of independence struggle. In sum, post-Suharto instability provided several separatist militia groups with an opportunity to resume intensified clashes with the ABRI and the regional police force.

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354 John McBeth and Oren Murphy, "Bloodbath," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (July 6, 2000), pp. 20-22.
355 R. William Liddle, "Indonesia in 2000: A Shaky Start for Democracy," *Asian Survey* 41: 1 (2001), p. 215.
356 International Crisis Group, "Ending Repression in Irian Jaya," (September, 2001), available at <http://www.crisisweb.org>.
357 Human Rights Watch, "Violence and Political Impasse in Papua," (July, 2001), available at <http://www.hrw.org>.

A direct effect of worsening domestic security threats was the ABRI's renewed political influence in newly democratized Indonesian politics. In the midst of multiple security threats from separatist movements and inter-ethnic violence, President Megawati encouraged army officers to take any step necessary to contain the regional disturbances and not to worry about human rights abuses. Megawati amended the constitution to restrict retroactive legislation, exonerating army officers of past human rights abuses.[358] Furthermore, she redirected her commandership to Army Chief of Staff General Endriartondono Sutarto, who brought into the government several ABRI officers who were influential in the Suharto's New Order regime. Hundreds of active and retired officers, in a more audacious stride, proposed a bill that allowed the ABRI leadership to take any military action without reporting to the president for one day. Even though Megawati could strengthen her presidency by establishing close ties with the ABRI, it eventually resulted in boosting army officers' influence in politics and weaker civilian control over the military.

In 10 years of democratic trial as of 2007, there have been no coup attempts or takeover of political power by the ABRI in Indonesia. It does not, however, necessarily mean that Indonesia's democratization process had been smooth and complete. The democratically elected leaders' control over the armed forces as a crucial component of democratic consolidation was far from complete in Indonesia, as once weakened army officers regained their prerogatives in a newly democratized government. The resurgence of ABRI officers' political influence in the past few years was due mainly to two reasons. First, the newly elected political leaders—Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati—could not

[358] Clear, 2005, p. 179.

exert strong political leadership, nor strengthen democratic institutions. The lack of strong civilian leadership was mainly due to the extremely fragmented political parties and civil society groups along religious and ethnic cleavages. Second, the weak civilian leadership had to deal with increasing multiple security threats, from inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence to separatist militia movements in several regions. In the midst of heightening domestic security threats, the once-constrained ABRI obtained an opportunity to regain its political influence in a newly democratized country.

Conclusions

This chapter has examined the democratization process in four Asian countries and the military's withdrawal from politics as its crucial component. Even though the armed forces' political role in the four states in general decreased, the processes and degrees of the withdrawal have been different from one country to another. On the one hand, South Korea and Taiwan went through a stable, complete democratic regime transition with democratically elected civilian leaders' control over army officers in the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, armed forces in the Philippines and Indonesia wielded strong influence in the direction and extent of the democratic regime transition. I identified three major structural causes that made a difference in the regime transition: domestic and international security threats, the strength of civilian leadership and its relationship with civil society, and the cohesiveness of military organization. In general, security threats set the basic tendency of the armed forces' relative political influence in the regime transition period. Challenging security threats during democratic regime

transition provided the armed forces with opportunities to expand their political influence, while low threats strengthened civilian leaders' control over the military.

Table 4-4: Security Threats and Military's Political Influence during Democratization

Cases	Security Threats	Military's Political Influence
S. Korea/Taiwan	Low External/Low Internal	Weak military presence in politics
Philippines/Indonesia	Low External/High Internal	Strong military presence in politics

Given the threat environments, it was the strength of a newly elected civilian leadership that determined the degree of civilian leaders' control over the army. In turn, the strength of the civilian leadership was heavily influenced by the strength and unity of civil society. Finally, organizational unity and professionalism of the armed forces had an effect on their political attitude.

South Korea went through a stable and far-reaching democratization and established firm civilian control over the army in the 1980s and 1990s. First of all, security environments in the Korean peninsula turned in favor of South Korea by the early 1980s. The South's military strength surpassed its Northern counterpart after two decades of steady and fast economic growth. In addition, dissolution of Cold War hostility and South Korea's diplomatic opening toward former socialist countries through *Nordpolitik* significantly reduced security threats in Korea. Given the low level of security threats, it was the strength of civilian leadership that played a decisive role in the regime transition. The Kim Young-sam presidency successfully conducted far-reaching democratic reforms including that of the military institution. Kim's reform was possible

due to support from a strong civil society and formation of a grand coalition that encompassed both conservative and liberal political forces. Finally, the presence of a cohesive and professionalized military enabled the civilian leadership to conduct a comprehensive military reform for strong civilian control over the armed forces.

Taiwan went through a similar path of regime transition with South Korea, even though the regime transition launched differently. While democratization in South Korea started from a mass public demand for political freedom, Taiwan's regime change was initiated and implemented by the top political leadership. In spite of the differences in the modes of regime transition, both countries underwent stable and extensive democratization. Similarly to South Korea, Taiwan enjoyed favorable security environments both domestically and internationally. Most significantly, the PRC's attitude toward Taiwan dramatically changed after Deng Xiao-ping's rise to power and the economic reforms of the late 1970s. In addition, strong leadership by Chiang Ching-kuo and his successor Lee Teng-hui implemented slow but steady liberalization and democratic reform for two decades without a major interruption. Finally, the cohesive and professionalized ROC army created a constructive environment for reforms in civil-military relations.

In stark contrast, the Philippines and Indonesia went through a difficult democratization period, and army officers played influential political roles during and after the regime transition. Democratization in the Philippines gained momentum in early 1986 when RAM officers turned against Marcos and sided with Aquino. And, given its decisive role in the democratic openings, the AFP was eager to exert an influential role in the new Aquino government. The AFP's political influence expanded

under increasing domestic security threats by the NPA and the MNLF. Furthermore, the weak and divided Aquino administration provided RAM officers and Marcos loyalists with an opportunity to stage several coup attempts. The factionalized AFP organization became a stumbling block for democratic consolidation and civilian control over the army.

Table 4-5: Domestic Politics and Military's Political Influence during Democratization

Cases	Civilian Leadership	Civil Society	Military Unity	Outcome: Military Political Influence
S.Korea(80-90s) **Taiwan (80-90s)**	Strong Strong	Strong Strong	Unified Unified	Weak under Civilian (*Subordination*)
Philippines(80s) **Indonesia (90s)**	Weak Weak	Weak Weak	Divided Divided	Strong under Civilian (*Influence*)

Finally, the Indonesian case demonstrated a path of democratization similar to the Philippines. The fall of Suharto's leadership and subsequent political turmoil deteriorated domestic security threat environments as inter-ethnic and religious violence as well as separatist movements in several provinces put the country in an unmanageable situation. In such an extreme security threats, the weak and divisive leadership was not able to carry out extensive democratic reforms. The political leadership in democratizing Indonesia came apart further as political elites mobilized civil society groups that were based on religious and ethnic cleavages. The ABRI also lacked institutional cohesiveness and professionalism due to its territorial command structure and factional struggles. The ABRI, which showed willingness to reduce its political influence, regained its political power under the Megawati presidency in the midst of severe domestic threats and ill-functioning civilian leadership.

In summary, favorable security environments were conducive to a stable and wide-ranging democratization, while mounting security challenges prevented the military from retreating from politics. Given the security threats, the strength of civilian leadership was the most crucial factor that determined the direction and extent of democratization and civilian control over the armed forces. In turn, the strength of civilian leadership was conditioned by the presence and support of civil society. Finally, the presence of a cohesive and professionalized army institution led to a more complete political disengagement of army officers.

Chapter 5. The Future of Civil-Military Relations: Security Threats, the Military, and the Prospects for Democratic Consolidation

Introduction

In the previous three chapters of empirical analysis, I examined the rise and fall of the military's domestic political role in four Asian countries in the last six decades. In the first historical stage, I explored how security threats in the state-building process (1940s-1950s) made the armed forces politically influential institution. I explained how a confluence of structural conditions—security threats, strength of the civilian leadership, and the unity of the military—resulted in different manifestations of the military's political role: *control* via coup d'etat and military dictatorship in South Korea and Indonesia, on the one hand, and *participation* under the civilian guidance in Taiwan and the Philippines, on the other in the second phase (1950s-1970s). The third stage of civil-military relations (1980s-1990s) covered different modes of the military's withdrawal from politics during democratization: army officers' *subordination* to the democratically elected civilian leadership in South Korea and Taiwan, and the officers' political *influence* during and after the regime transition.

In this final empirical chapter, I analyze the military's domestic political role in the post-democratization era and its implications for democratic consolidation in the four Asian countries. Even though the four states have undergone a democratic transition for the last two decades, the so-called "praetorian problem" is still a vital concern that they

need to overcome.[359] In light of my theoretical arguments and empirical findings in the previous chapters, this chapter identifies the current state of the military's political role in the four countries and scrutinizes major structural barriers to the democratic civilian leaders' control over the armed forces.

This chapter is composed of four sections. In the first section, I explain the political role of the Korean army in the democratic consolidation era. Even though the possibility of a military coup and a return to military dictatorship is now quite remote, South Korea still must cope with some challenges to securing stable civilian control of the military, including the North Korean threat and the problem of institutionalizing democratic norms and practices. The second section deals with the Taiwanese case, where stable democratic regime transition does not necessarily guarantee the military's subordination to the civilian leadership due to problems such as the Taiwanese identity problem, its relationship with mainland China, and ailing civilian leadership.

The third and fourth sections focus on the Philippine and Indonesian cases. While the cases of South Korea and Taiwan present a low probability of the military's influence or domination, the remaining countries have to cope with politicized armed forces, which create more daunting challenges to the newly elected civilian regimes. Both countries face higher probabilities for the military to regain political influence in the foreseeable future. In both countries, domestic security threats, weak civilian leadership, and factionalized militaries provide officers with opportunities to expand their political influence. The final section is a conclusion in which major findings are summarized.

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359 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 231-253.

I. South Korea

The democratization process that was initiated by civil society brought to an end the three-decades-long military dictatorship and installed a democratic regime in South Korea. Even though democratization in Korea began from below with demonstrations by students and labor unions in the mid-1980s, subsequent regime change was followed by negotiations at the elite level. That is, the "transplacement" mode of transition brought a stable and far-reaching democratization and consolidation.[360] Furthermore, stable democratization was conducive to reforming the armed forces toward a politically neutral and professionalized organization by the 1990s.

After two decades of democratic reforms, South Korea is now considered a consolidated democracy. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Kim Young-sam presidency (1993-1997) set the course for democratic consolidation by carrying out extensive political institutional and electoral reforms. As I noted, the most important part of consolidation was military reform. President Kim Young-sam successfully disbanded the clandestine *Hanahoe* (one mind) faction in the army, thereby getting rid of politicized officers and building up a unified and professionalized armed forces. The democratic regime transition concluded when the opposition leader and long-time pro-democracy activist, Kim Dae-jung, became president in 1998. The top brass, who had openly warned against the possibility of his becoming president in the 1988 election, now readily expressed their allegiance to the new president.

Table 5-1: Post-Democratization Civil-Military Relations in South Korea

Indicators	Status
Civilian Control Indicators	
• Military's loyalty to democratic leadership	➢ Clear pledge of the military's loyalty to the constitution and democratically elected presidents (Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun)
• Military's political neutrality	➢ No evidence of the military's partisan affiliation; no military role in the elections
• Military presence in key governmental positions	➢ Small number of retired officers in the National Assembly and the Department of Defense (no active military personnel in government)
• Defined security missions	➢ External security mission (defending the country against potential North Korean attack); no internal security missions
• Military's participation in policymaking process	➢ No military participation in domestic policymaking; military's continuing influence in foreign and security policymaking
Challenges to Civilian Control	
• Security challenges	➢ Military confrontation with North Korea (nuclear issues); widening rifts in US-ROK alliance
• Challenge to civilian leadership	➢ Ideological and regional polarization; corruption charges; decreasing public support for the civilian leadership
• Military's organizational unity	➢ Highly cohesive, professionalized military institution
• Role of civil society	➢ Strong and ideologically moderate civil society; increasing influence in government policymaking

The question remains whether the democratic consolidation in South Korea will be deepened further, and whether civilian control over the armed forces will become a given reality. I suggest that, even though the military's direct appropriation of political power is highly unlikely, there are several structural impediments to the democratic

[360] Huntington suggests that democratization through negotiation, or "transplacement," is less violent and therefore most suitable for democratic consolidation. Huntington, 1991, p. 276.

control of the armed forces, such as the increasing security challenges from North Korea, declining security alliance with the United States, rising social costs of economic restructuring in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, and weak civilian leadership. The indicators of the current civil-military relations in Korea are summarized in Table 5-1.

As Table 5-1 shows, major indicators of civilian control over the armed forces demonstrate that the military's political participation is minimal. When Kim Dae-jung became the first president from the opposition party in 1998, the army leadership pronounced its loyalty to him. Five years later, President Roh Moo-hyun also secured the military's allegiance. This is significant in that both presidents came from the far left side of the ideological spectrum in the eyes of the conservatives and the army. This indicates that the military's loyalty to the constitution and the democratically elected leaders was now firmly established. In addition, the military has never played a role in the election processes since the inception of democratization, but instead maintained political neutrality.

Even though active military officers do not participate in political affairs, retired officers hold several positions in the executive and legislative branches and have influence in policymaking process. In the executive branch, about 9.7 percent of the cabinet officials have military backgrounds, while 2.7 percent of retired military officers are positioned in the National Assembly.[361] They have close personal connections with the army leadership and often represent the institutional interests of the military. In

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[361] Carl J. Saxer, 'Generals and Presidents: Establishing Civilian and Democratic Control in South Korea," *Armed Forces and Society* 30: 3 (2004), p. 366.

addition, the top brass in the army has influence in foreign and security policymaking, given the presence of a constant threat from North Korea and civilian leaders' lack of knowledge about national security affairs.

Even though civilian control of the military is not questioned in Korean politics, there are still two major structural barriers for civilian leaders to establish a stable democratic control mechanism. They are: (1) security challenges from North Korea; (2) weaknesses of civilian leadership (ideological and regional cleavages, corruption, and the loss of public support).

As discussed in the previous chapter, South Korea benefited from favorable security environments during the years of democratic regime transition and military reform (1986-1996) more than any in other periods of its history. During the 1980s, the military balance between the two Koreas turned in favor of the South. In addition, the end of the Cold War and the ensuing détente surrounding the Korean peninsula provided South Korea with an opportunity to expand its political and economic relationship with former communist states including the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and mainland China, and to do so without losing U. S. security commitments. The favorable security conditions during this period eliminated the military's justification for political involvement and empowered civil society and pro-democracy groups.

During the Kim Dae-jung presidency (1998-2002), however, two contrasting security situations developed. On the one hand, the Kim Dae-jung government's Sunshine policy toward North Korea seemed to bring a reconciliation between the two Koreas. The Sunshine policy signifies a refutation of war or major military conflict as a

means of the reunification.[362] The Kim government's policy initiative separated political-military issues from economic cooperation and focused on economic aid to poverty-stricken North Korea. The policy gave rise to the summit meeting between Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang. The summit meeting produced the North-South Joint Declaration in June 2000, which included the roadmap to Korean reunification, reunion of separated families, and expansion of economic, social, and cultural exchanges.[363] The summit meeting concluded with a promise that Kim Jong-il would visit Seoul in the near future.

The Sunshine policy and the North-South summit meeting, however, failed to create a peace-building mechanism in the Korean peninsula, and several obstacles remain to developing peaceful relations between the two Koreas. First of all, the Sunshine policy was unsuccessful in mobilizing support from domestic audiences. The Grand National Party (GNP), the opposition conservative party, strongly criticized Kim's northern policy for its unilaterally conciliatory attitude. A series of belligerent moves by North Korea reinforced the opposition GNP's criticism. In the first year of the Kim Presidency, there were several incidents of North Korean spy submarines' infiltration into the South. To make matters worse, North Korea test-fired a multi-stage, long-range rocket missile, called *Daepodong* 1, across the northern islands of Japan with debris reaching close to

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362 Office of the President, Republic of Korea, *Government of the People: Selected Speeches of President Kim Dae-jung, vols. 1-2* (Seoul: ROK Government). For more detailed analysis of the Kim Dae-jung governemnt's Sunshine policy, see Chung-in Moon, "Between Ideals and Reality: An Interim Assessment of the Sunshine Policy," *Pyonghwa Ronchong (On Peace)* 4: 1 (2000); Chung-in Moon and David Steinberg, eds., *Kim Dae Jung Government and Sunshine Policy* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999); Chung-in Moon, "The Kim Dae Jung Government's Peace Policy toward North Korea," *Asian Perspective* 25: 2 (2001).

363 *Korea Unification Bulletin* 2: 1 (2000), p. 1; Chung-in Moon, "The Sunshine Policy and the Korean Summit: Assessments and Prospects," *East Asian Review* 12: 4 (2000), pp. 22-29.

Alaska.[364] In the following year, North Korean patrol boats crossed the Northern Limit Line of the West Sea, a U.N-demarcated borderline, causing an exchange of fire.[365]

North Korea's hostile behavior strengthened the opposition GNP and the conservatives in South Korea. The GNP's political strength grew further after it won a majority of seats in the 2000 National Assembly election, while the ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) lost its majority status.[366] The 2000 National Assembly election resulted in *yosoyadae* (ruling minority and opposition majority), a situation where the opposition GNP took offense to President Kim's northern policy by mobilizing the anti-North Korean and anti-communist ethos among the people.

While the Kim Dae-jung government was trying to muddle through its relationship with an unpredictable North Korea, the George W. Bush administration's North Korea policy dealt a heavy blow to President Kim's Sunshine policy. The United States charged that North Korea had violated the 1994 Agreed Framework and secretly continued a nuclear project.[367] In turn, North Korea perceived growing threats from the

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364 Yong-Chool Ha, "South Korea in 2000: A Summit and the Search for New Institutional Identity," *Asian Survey* 41: 1 (2001), pp. 138.

365 In this incident, one North Korean battleship was destroyed and five others were severely damaged. Young-Kwan Yoon, "South Korea in 1999: Overcoming Cold War Legacies," *Asian Survey* 40: 1 (2000), p. 165.

366 In the 2000 National Assembly election, the ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) won 35.0% of the total vote and 115 seats out of 273; the Grand National Party (GNP) won 39% of popular vote and 133 seats; and the United Liberal Democrats (ULD) won 9.8% of total votes and 17 seats. Young-whan Kihl, *Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 16.

367 In the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea pledged to freeze its nuclear development program and accept the IAEA inspection. In return, North Korea would receive crude oil and new light-water reactors from the United States until 2003. Derek McDougall, *The International Politics of the New Asia Pacific* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), pp. 141-147; C. S. Eliot Kang, "North Korea's International Relations: The Successful Failure?" in Samuel S. Kim, ed., *The International Relations of Northeast Asia* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), pp. 287-292.

Bush administration's tougher policy, since Bush's January 2002 State of the Union address included North Korea, along with Iran and Iraq, as a member of the "axis of evil" that endangers international security and promotes global terrorism.[368] The Bush administration's tough stance on North Korea is likely to have accelerated Kim Jong-il's nuclear development program.

In the midst of confrontations between the United States and North Korea, Kim Dae-jung found himself in a diplomatically difficult position. If he sided with Bush, it would isolate the North and precipitate North-South confrontation, nullifying the Sunshine policy. If the South voted for North Korea, it would infuriate the United States, which had been South Korea's long-time ally. In this situation, Kim Dae-jung tried to negotiate with both sides: keeping the Sunshine policy alive and alleviating Bush's hostility toward North Korea. When President Kim visited Washington D.C. in 2001 for a summit meeting with President Bush, Kim urged Bush to resume direct talks with North Korea, which Bush responded negatively due to the North's "lack of transparency."[369] So Kim Dae-jung's visit produced no positive results, as North Korea continued pursuing nuclear technology and the United States continued its unwillingness to negotiate with the rogue state.

The Bush administration's hostility toward North Korea contributed to strengthening anti-Americanism among the general public in Korea. Many South Koreans believed that Bush's North Korean policy destabilized the security of the Korean

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368 The White House, *2002 State of the Union Address,* January 29, 2002, (web: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/rem/7672.htm).

369 David Sanger, "Bush Tells Seoul Talks with North Won't Resume Now," *New York Times* (March 8, 2001).

peninsula. In a public opinion survey conducted in 2002, a majority of Koreans believed that the United States was more dangerous for the Korean security than North Korea.[370] Anti-Americanism was further intensified when two Korean middle school girls were killed by an American armored vehicle on duty for a military exercise. The two soldiers responsible for the accident were later acquitted by an American military court.[371]

The presidential election occurred in December 2002, at the height of anti-U.S. demonstrations in South Korea. Roh Moo-hyun, a human rights lawyer and labor movement activist during democratization, was elected by mobilizing the anti-American sentiment, along with a progressive ideology, among the younger generations.[372] President Roh widened diplomatic rifts with the United States. As a result, the current US-South Korean alliance relationship is at its lowest point in the past 50 years.

The cracks in the U.S. alliance put heavier security burdens on South Korea. The United States announced its plan to relocate its troops stationed in the DMZ farther south and left open the possibility of withdrawing its troops completely from South Korea.[373] Even though the top brass did not directly threaten the President, they began to express their concerns about the foreign and security policies. The North Korean issue and difficulties within the US-ROK alliance give burdens to the civilian leadership, and civil-military discrepancies have appeared in security policy-conceptions in recent years.

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370 Victor D. Cha, "Shaping Change and Cultivating Ideas in the US-ROK Alliance," in Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., *The Future of America's Alliances in Northeast Asia* (Stanford: Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2004), pp. 136-137.

371 Hong-young Lee, "South Korea in 2002: Multiple Political Dilemmas," *Asian Survey* 43: 1 (2003), p. 74.

372 In the election, Roh Moo-hyun won the election with 49.9% of popular votes; the opposition candidate Lee Hoi-chang garnering 46.6%. For the 2002 Presidential Election results, see Republic of Korea, *National Election Commission* (web: http://www.nec.go.kr).

While security challenges have put civilian leadership in a difficult situation, several other factors in the domestic political front have held down the strength of civilian leadership. The biggest challenge for the current civilian leadership is how to overcome society's ideological and regional polarization. In its early period of democratization, the Kim Young-sam presidency was able to incorporate diverse economic and ideological elements in the society by forming the grand conservative alliance, as discussed in the previous chapter. President Kim solved the 'praetorian problem' by forming an alliance with the conservative ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP), which represented the conservatives and included active and retired generals. In the 1997 presidential election, Kim Dae-jung became the president for the first time as an opposition leader in Korean history. President Kim represented moderate and progressive elements of the society. Furthermore, current President Roh Moo-hyun has adopted socio-economic policies that are favorable to the lower classes, which have resulted in an ideological polarization of Korean society. In the ideological confrontation, the government finds it increasingly difficult to mediate the diverging interests within society.

Another challenge to the strength of civilian leadership comes from political cleavages along regional identities. The democratic regime transition was dictated by the so-called 'three Kims', including the former presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, and the opposition leader Kim Jong-pil. These three Kims mobilized the decades-long regional animosity between *Honam* and *Youngnam* to rise to power. All the post-democratization elections were determined by the candidates' regional identities, thus

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[373] Anna Fifield, "US to Delay Troop Cuts in S Korea," *Financial Times* (October 5, 2004).

dividing the country into two political camps and significantly weakening presidents' ability to garner the nationwide support.[374]

Added to these structural constraints on President Kim's leadership, incessant corruption charges surrounding presidents further weakened their moral ground. The Kim Young-sam presidency, even with its relentless anti-corruption drives, was tainted by several corruption charges among the President's close aides.[375] The direct effect of the corruption scandals in the Kim Young-sam government was the significant decline of the public's support for the president. Kim Young-sam began his job with over 90 percent of the public's approval in 1993, but concluded with meager 10 percent of approval.[376] The Kim Dae-jung presidency followed the same path. A Nobel Peace Prize winner and decades-long pro-democracy activist, Kim Dae-jung's moral cause was also

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[374] For the discussion of regionalism in Korean politics, see Kap-yun Lee, *Hangukeui Seonkeowa Jiyeokjuui (Korean Elections and Regionalism)* (Seoul: Orum Press, 1998); Kisuk Cho, "Regionalism in Korean Elections and Democratization: An Empirical Analysis," *Asian Perspective* 22: 1 (1998); David C. Kang, "Regional Politics and Democratic Consolidation in Korea," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., *Korea's Democratization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 161-180; Byung-kook Kim, "Jiyokjuuiwa Jeongchi Gaehyuk (Regionalism and Political Reform)," in Sang-sup Park, ed., *Segyehwarul Jihyanghanun Hanguk Jeongchi (Globalization and Korean Politics)* (Seoul: Nanam: 1996), pp. 40-57; Eunjung Choi, "*Economic Voting vs. Cleavage Voting in the United States, Korea, and Taiwan*," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 2005.

[375] For example, among others, Kim Young-sam's closest advisor, Hong In-gil, was charged with his involvement in a loan scandal associated with Hanbo Steel Company. In another case, the President's second son, Kim Hyun-chul, was convicted of receiving bribes from Chaebols. Chung-in Moon and Jongryn Mo, "The Kim Young-Sam Government: Its Legacies and Prospects for Governance in South Korea," in Chung-in Moon and Jongryn Mo, eds., *Democratization and Globalization in Korea: Assessments and Prospects* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999), p. 402; B. C. Koh, "South Korea in 1996: Internal Strains and External Challenges," *Asian Survey* 37: 1 (1997), p. 6.

[376] Doh C. Shin, *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. xxxi.

lost in numerous corruption scandals involving two of his three sons and several close assistants.[377]

Despite these structural barriers to civilian control of the military, the South Korean case nevertheless promises the best prospects for stable civilian control of the military among the four Asian countries under study. That is, stable civilian control is buttressed by the presence of active and influential civil society and the unified and professionalized army organization. The military's political neutrality—even in the strained security situation and continuing corruption charges—may be a testimony to the military's near-complete depoliticization in South Korea. Future civil-military relations in the country will be shaped by the structural opportunities and constraints presented above.

II. Taiwan

Taiwan's three-decades-long liberal reforms (1970s-1990s) and subsequent democratization (1990s-current) have transformed the country from a one-party dictatorship to a multi-party democracy. Taiwanese liberalization and democratization represent an ideal case of the so-called "transformation" mode of regime transition, in which democratization was carried out by elite compromise.[378] Democratic reforms in Taiwan, although slow, were conducted under the strong political leadership of Chiang Ching-kuo (1975-1988) and Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000). The elite-initiated political reforms brought political stability with no major disruptions during the regime transition.

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377 Kihl, 2005, pp. 282-283.

378 Huntington, 1991, p. 113.

This does not, however, mean that the Taiwanese army's shift of its loyalty from Chiang Ching-kuo and his KMT party to a new constitution and the democratically elected civilian leadership can be taken for granted. This was especially the case when the new leadership had Taiwanese ethnic background. During the democratic reforms in the early 1990s, President Lee had to adopt several policies to alleviate the conservatives and the military's potential threats to the regime. Immediately after assuming the presidency, for example, Lee Teng-hui granted massive promotions to the military leadership. In addition, the President had to appoint General Hau Pei-tsun to defense minister in 1989 and as premier in the following year to moderate the conservative forces in both the KMT and the army.[379]

Against this backdrop, however, Taiwan's political and military reforms benefited from favorable structural conditions. Mainland China's conciliatory attitude toward Taiwan created a favorable security situation, which facilitated democratic reforms. Since Deng Xiao-ping rose to power in 1979, the PRC made constant efforts to expand social and economic exchanges with the island. With the easing of security challenges from the mainland, the KMT government disbanded the Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC) that enabled the military to monitor the civilian society, ending the Taiwanese army's internal policing missions in 1992. Furthermore, the expansion of economic and social exchanges between the two political entities made military and coercive pressures an unfeasible approach in dealing with each other.

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379 Hung-mao Tien and Yun-han Chu, 'Taiwan's Domestic Political Reforms: Institutional Change and Power Realignment," in Gary Klintworth, ed., *Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s* (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994), p. 14.

On the domestic political front, President Lee Teng-hui successfully strengthened his political power by building a consensus around democratic reforms with the National Affairs Conference (NAC) in the early 1990s, as discussed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, the KMT's success in presidential and legislative elections throughout the 1990s provided the Lee leadership with strength and stability. In the meantime, the Taiwanese army developed into a cohesive and professionalized institution, which precipitated army officers' depoliticization. In sum, a combination of favorable security situation, strong presidential leadership, and a professionalized army gave rise to stable democratization without major backfires from the military.

Taiwan has become a consolidated democracy with the inauguration of the Chen Shui-bian presidency. In the 2000 presidential election, Chen Shui-bian, the leader of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won the presidency by defeating Lien Chan of the ruling Kuomintang Party and James Soong, an independent candidate.[380] Chen's victory was a milestone in Taiwan's political development in that it brought to an end five decades of KMT rule. The DPP started from the *tangwai* as a grassroots organization by ethnic Taiwanese and endorsed political freedom and Taiwan's independence from the mainland. In this respect, the DPP has endorsed radically different domestic and foreign policy packages than the KMT regime has pursued.

[380] The election, however, was very close one. Chen Shui-bian won the presidency with just 39.3% of the popular vote, while James Soong registered 36.8% and Lian Chan gained 23.1%. Yu-shan Wu, "Taiwan in 2000: Managing the Aftershocks from Power Transfer," *Asian Survey* 41: 1 (2001), pp. 41-43.

After two decades of democratic reforms, the current state of civil-military relations in Taiwan signifies stable civilian control and military officers' political neutrality, as summarized in Table 5-2.

Table 5-2: Post-Democratization Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan[381]

Indicators	Status
Civilian Control Indicators	
• Military's loyalty to democratic leadership	➢ Official expression of loyalty to the constitution and democratically elected leadership (Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian)
• Military's political neutrality	➢ Military closely tied with the KMT; minimal influence in elections
• Military presence in key governmental positions	➢ No active military personnel in civilian government (several retired officers in security-related positions)
• Defined security missions	➢ Complete withdrawal from internal security mission; focus on threats from the mainland
• Military's participation in policymaking process	➢ Military's influence in foreign and security policymaking; minimal in domestic policies
Challenges to Civilian Control	
• Security challenges	➢ Externally, increasing threats from PRC; domestically, ethnic identity issues
• Challenge to civilian leadership	➢ Ethnic cleavages between Taiwanese and mainlanders; corruption charges
• Military's organizational unity	➢ Highly cohesive, professionalized military
• Role of civil society	➢ Strong but ideologically moderate civil society groups

381 For more detailed description of the Taiwanese civil-military relations in the post-democratization era, see M. Taylor Fravel, "Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan's Democratization," *Armed Forces and Society* 29: 1 (2002), pp. 63-75.

As noted in Table 5-2, two democratically elected presidents, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, both of whom are ethnic Taiwanese, secured the armed forces' loyalty to their leadership and the constitution. This is significant in that the army leadership is represented by ethnic Chinese and supports radically different foreign policy strategies from the current civilian leadership. The two presidents have endorsed Taiwan's independence from the Mainland, while the army leadership has championed the "one China" policy and reunification.[382] Even with such differences in terms of national identity and security policy, the army leadership has not officially questioned the civilian leaders' authority.

Army officers, however, have exerted influence in domestic political and security-related policymaking process during and after democratization. Retired generals occupied leadership positions in various security-related institutions such as the Ministry of National Defense, the National Security Council, and the National Security Bureau throughout the 1990s. In addition, President Lee Teng-hui appointed several active and retired generals as "special presidential advisors" or "strategic advisors" as a way of securing the control over army leadership.[383] Even though the army officers' presence in civilian administration was quite pervasive during the 1990s, their political influence has been significantly decreased.

Still the most difficult task of the military's depoliticization was how to separate the Taiwanese army from the ruling KMT party. The KMT regime tightened its control

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382 John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, "National Identity and Taiwan's Mainland China Policy," *Journal of Contemporary China* 13: 40 (2004); Yun-han Chu, "Taiwan's National Identity Politics and the Prospect of Cross-Strait Relations," *Asian Survey* 44: 4 (2004).

383 Fravel, 2002, p. 66.

over the armed forces by introducing a political commissar system right after retreating to Taiwan. The commissar system enabled the KMT to penetrate deeply into the army organization and conduct ideological indoctrination throughout the rule of Chiang Kai-shek and his son Ching-kuo. At the same time, the officers' penetration into the party hierarchy was pervasive, holding positions in key governmental bodies including the Central Standing Committee and other central and local administrative institutions. Because of the party-army interpenetration, separating the two bodies has proved to be the most difficult task during the democratic reforms of the 1990s. Even though the KMT formally disengaged from the military and the military attained institutional autonomy, informal interpenetrations are still persistent due to unofficial and personal connections between the two institutions.

What will Taiwanese civil-military relations be like in the near future? What factors will promote or obstruct democratic consolidation and civilian control over the military? The future of civil-military relations in Taiwan will be largely shaped by three major factors: (1) security challenges from the Mainland; (2) weakening civilian leadership due to ethnic cleavages and corruption; and (3) party-army relations, as summarized in Table 5-2.

The biggest challenge to Taiwan's democratic consolidation and the strong civilian hold of the military organization comes from the cross-Taiwan Straits relations that were badly strained during the last decade. Taiwanese democratization and military reforms benefited from favorable security relations with the Mainland during the 1980s and 1990s. The PRC's policy toward Formosa Island changed from tense hostility (1950s-1970s) to one of the "Peace Offensive" and mutual accommodation (1980s-

1990s).[384] Détente was followed by growing economic interdependence and social and personal exchanges, as the mainland broaden domestic economic reforms.

The decade of mutual accommodation, however, turned into mutual hostility and military intimidation, when, in the summer of 1995, the PRC test-fired missiles and carried out a massive-scale military exercise in the Taiwan Straits in protest of President Lee's visit to his *alma mater*, Cornell University. From Beijing's perspective, Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States was a clear violation of the 1972 Shanghai Joint Communique that was signed by the Chinese Communist Party and the United States recognizing the "one China" policy. When the Communique was pronounced, Chiang Ching-kuo welcomed the "one China" formula and publicly opposed Taiwan's independence. President Lee also followed Chiang's Mainland policy during the early years of his presidency by objecting to the idea of Taiwan's independence.

In the mid 1990s, however, Lee Teng-hui swiftly changed his position by openly announcing that the Republic of China was a sovereign state and making diplomatic trips to several countries.[385] The Lee government openly adopted the "two-state doctrine." Feeling betrayed, Jiang Zemin launched missile tests and military exercises in the waters near Taiwan. Furthermore, President Lee's shift in foreign policy increased tensions between the PRC and the Clinton administration.

The installation of the Chen Shui-bian presidency in 2000 further increased tensions across the Taiwan Straits. For the mainland government, Chen Shui-bian was

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[384] Cal Clark, "Taiwan's 2004 Presidential Election: The End of Chen Shui-bian's "Strategic Ambiguity" on Cross-Strait Relations," *East Asia* 21: 4 (2004), p. 26.

the last presidential candidate that it hoped to be elected to the presidency in the 2000 elections.[386] Right before the 2000 presidential election, the PRC declared in a white paper that it would embark on military attacks in any one of the three conditions, known as the "three ifs." The white paper declared that the PRC would resort to military means (1) if Taiwan declared independence; (2) if Taiwan were invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or (3) if Taiwan refused indefinitely to conduct negotiations on the issue of unification.[387] Even though the PRC's direct military attack on Taiwan remains implausible, continuing tensions across the Straits has created a troubling security dilemma between the two Chinese governments.

Chen Shui-bian's foreign policy position has created serious tensions as much in the domestic political front as in its relationship with the mainland. The Chen regime's pro-independence position and the mobilization of ethnic identity issues for political purposes have widened political cleavages and could weaken its leadership strength in the long run.[388] Identity issues are closely related to both the foreign policy controversy over

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385 Xiaobo Hu and Gang Lin, "The PRC View of Taiwan under Lee Teng-hui," in Wei-chin Lee and T. Y. Wang, eds., *Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in Taiwan, 1988-2000* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2003), p. 278.

386 T. Y. Wang, "Cross-Strait Relations after the 2000 Election in Taiwan," *Asian Survey* 41: 5 (2001), p. 716.

387 Taiwan Affairs Office, "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," *People's Daily Online* (February 21, 2000), at http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/; another available source is the Embassy of the PRC in the United States, at http://wwww.china-embassy.org/eng/7114.html.

388 For the ethnic identity's influence in the Taiwanese electoral politics in recent years, see John Fuh-Sheng Hsieh, "National Identity and Taiwan's Mainland China Policy," *Journal of Contemporary China* 13: 40 (2004); Joseph Y. S. Cheng and Camoes C. K. Tam, "The Taiwan Presidential Election and Its Implications for Cross-Strait Relations: A Political Cleavage Perspective," *Asian Affairs* 32: 1 (2005); Deborah A. Brown, ed., *Taiwan's 2000 Presidential Election: Implication for Taiwan's Politics, Security, Economy, and Relations with the Mainland* (New York: Center for Asian Studies, St. John's University, 2001); Shelley Rigger, *From Opposition to Power: Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Marie Taciana and Leila Fernandez Stembridge, eds., *China Today: Economic Reforms, Social*

the independence/reunification issue and Taiwan's relationship with the mainland. In the 2004 presidential election, for example, the incumbent Chen Shui-bian secured his second presidential term by mobilizing anti-China sentiments and the notion of Taiwanese nationalism.[389] Political elites' mobilization of identity and independence issues further exacerbated the political cleavages based on ethnic communities.[390] Furthermore, the DPP's control of government significantly constricted the possibility of diplomatic negotiations with the mainland authority.

The future of civil-military relations in Taiwan will be shaped by three major structural forces. First, cross-Taiwan Strait relations will influence the military's political role in the near future. Confrontational relations with the mainland may give senior officers political voices, as discrepancies rise between civilian leadership and the military over how to negotiate with the PRC. Second, civilian control of the military in Taiwan will also depend on how civilian leadership can overcome socio-political cleavages along the ethnic lines. Civilian leadership will find it increasingly difficult to control army officers if civilians intensify ethnic cleavages for their own political purposes. Finally, the future of civil-military relations in Taiwan will depend on establishing institutional autonomy and separation between the KMT party and the military.

Conflict, and Collective Identities (London: RoutledgeCurzon Press, 2003); Yun-han Chu, *Crafting Democracy in Taiwan* (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1992).

[389] Steve Chan, "Taiwan 2004: Electoral Contests and Political Stasis," *Asian Survey* 45: 1 (2005), p. 55.

III. The Philippines

Democratization in the Philippines began in 1986 with the overthrow of the authoritarian Marcos regime and the installation of the democratically elected Aquino regime. The so-called "People Power" was so overwhelming that President Marcos and his military forces could not control the pro-democracy movement. The People Power was also influential enough to bring spillover effects to other Asian countries' democratization movements, including South Korea, Pakistan, and Burma.

Even though the People Power provided important momentum for the downfall of the authoritarianism, it was the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) that played a decisive role in the Marcos ouster and subsequent democratization. And, as such, the AFP presumed that it would maintain powerful role in the democratically elected Aquino government. Factions within the AFP, either Marcos loyalists or the Reformed Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM), or both, staged nine major coup attempts during six years of the Aquino presidency to regain political domination. The nascent democratic regime was severely incapacitated by the fragmented and violent political forces: the Marcos loyalists and pre-martial oligarchs on the far-right, and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the National Democratic Front (NDF) on the extreme left. In such a fragmented political climate, the Aquino regime failed to mobilize the People Power for her democratic reforms. Furthermore, the growing insurgent movements by the CPP's New People's Army (NPA) and the Muslim Moro National

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[390] Cheng and Tam, (2005), p. 20.

Liberation Front (MNLF) provided the AFP with a window of opportunity to regain its political influence in the Aquino government.[391]

The AFP's threat to the regime significantly decreased after Fidel Ramos, retired general and Defense Minister in the Aquino regime, became president in 1992. President Ramos successfully secured the AFP's loyalty, but only by bringing many of the top military brass into his government. As a result, the armed forces—either active or retired officers—continue to play an influential role in politics even after two decades of democratic trials. In this section I survey the military's political role in the post-democratization period: from the Ramos presidency (1992-1997) to the current Aroyo presidency (2001-current). In doing this, I identify major barriers to the democratic control over the AFP and prospects for democratic consolidation.

The current status of civil-military relations in the Philippines can be characterized as weak civilian control over the armed forces, since officers still exert substantial influence in politics. Even with the two decades-long democratization, civilian leaders have failed to secure army officers' political neutrality and allegiance to the constitution and democratically elected leadership.

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391 For more information about the armed insurgency movements by the NPA and the MNLF/MILF, see Rosanne Rutten, "Revolutionary Specialists, Strongmen, and the State: Post-Movement Careers of CCP-NPA Cadres in a Philippine Province, 1990s-2001," *South East Asia Research* 9: 3 (2001); Mark R. Thomson, "The Decline of Philippine Communism: A Review Essay," *South East Asia Research* 6: 2 (1998); Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, "Options in the Pursuit of a Just, Comprehensive, and Stable Peace in the Southern Philippines," *Asian Survey* 41: 2 (2001); Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, "Back to War in Mindanao: The Weaknesses of a Power-based Approach in Conflict Resolution," *Philippine Political Science Journal* 21: 44 (2000); Jacques

Table 5-3: Post-Democratization Civil-Military Relations in the Philippines

Indicators	Status
Civilian Control Indicators	
• Military's loyalty to democratic leadership	➢ Lack of loyalty to the constitution and democratically elected leadership (2003/2006 coup attempts)
• Military's political neutrality	➢ Officers' personal ties with civilian politicians mobilization of soldiers to influence elections
• Military presence in key governmental positions	➢ No active military personnel in government; several retired officers in key governmental positions and the legislative branch
• Defined security missions	➢ Continued internal security and policing missions (major threats from communists and Muslims)
• Military's participation in policymaking process	➢ AFP's influence in internal security and counterinsurgency programs
Challenges to Civilian Control	
• Security challenges	➢ Increasing domestic threats from the CPP/NPA and the MNLF/MILF (armed conflicts with the insurgents; terrorist bombings and kidnappings for ransom)
• Challenge to civilian leadership	➢ Weak civilian leadership (corruption; cronyism; civil society's withdrawal of support for presidents)
• Military's organizational unity	➢ Lack of institutional unity and professionalism
• Role of civil society	➢ Strong, but minimal influence in governmental policymaking (dominated by cartelized elites); strong civil society, a burden to government

As Table 5-3 illustrates, there are multiple challenges that civilian leaders in the Philippines must overcome to attain democratic control over the AFP. The most serious challenge is posed by domestic security threats, coming from the Communist NPA insurgencies, Muslim MNLF/MILF secessionist movements, and several other groups that are engaged in bombings and kidnap Filipinos and foreign tourists for ransom.

Bertrand, "Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement is Fragile," *Pacific Affairs* 73: 1 (2000).

The communist insurgency movements reached their peak during the mid-to-late 1980s, in the midst of political turmoil and continuing economic crisis. During the Aquino presidency in the late 1980s, the NPA forces spread their armed uprisings throughout the archipelago when the peace efforts between the Aquino government and the CPP failed, as discussed in the previous chapter. At the same time, communist forces expanded their influence in the Aquino government and the general public, in which over ten million were reported to join the communist party's regional organization.

The communist and Muslim insurgency movements, however, had significantly decreased after Ramos rose to the presidency in 1992. There are several reasons that CPP and NPA's influence weakened in the early 1990s. First, the decline of communist armed insurgents was related to the broader international context of the demise of communist regimes worldwide with the end of the Cold War. Second, the communist insurgents suffered from factional infighting over leadership and differences in ideology and logistics.[392] Finally, sound economic conditions under the Ramos presidency strengthened the moderate factions' voice within the CPP and NPA. Moderates within the NPA tried to increase their influence through electoral success rather than armed fighting. At the same time, steady economic growth weakened the CPP's influence

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392 The split in the CPP and NPA throughout the 1990s had been over the issues of insurgency strategy and leadership. The CPP founder Jose Maria Sison remained faithful to the Maoist-style armed struggle, while the moderates in the Party preferred expanding its influence through the legal and electoral means. The factional struggles also significantly weakened the Muslim separatist movements. For the CPP's internal divisions, see John McBeth, "Internal Contradictions: Support for Communists Wanes as Party Splits," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 26 (August, 1993); Patricio N. Abinales, ed., *The Revolution Falters: The Left in the Philippine Politics after 1986* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Joel Rocamora, *Breaking Through: The Struggle within the Communist Party of the Philippines* (Manila: Anvil Press, 1994); Kathleen Weekley, *The Communist Party of the Philippines 1968-1993: A Story of Its Theory and Practice* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2001).

among the Filipinos. Political stability under Ramos presidency brought fast economic growth and low inflation rates.[393]

Upon assuming the presidency in 1992, Fidel Ramos formed the National Unification Commission (NUC) to initiate a peace process. The NUC brought together various insurgency groups including the RAM rebels, the National Democratic Front (NDF), and the Muslim secessionist leaders. In the NUC conference, Ramos launched his peace initiative by releasing most of the rebel leaders.[394] But the peace process did not progress because of the factional struggles inside the insurgency groups. On the one hand, factional infightings significantly diminished the rebels' influence. On the other hand, factional struggles and the lack of unified leadership made the peace negotiation process much more complicated. The communist umbrella organization NDC suffered from factional struggles between the Maoist line led by Sison and the Manila Rizal Committee, which pursued moderate approaches. Within the Muslim secessionist movements, the MNLF, led by Nur Misuari, was split into several factional lines with different strategies. A Muslim group led by Abu Sayyaf, for example, opposed the MNLF's peace negotiation with the Ramos government and pursued a more violent strategy, kidnapping foreigners and Christians and carrying out bombings.[395] Still

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[393] In 1996, for example, the Philippines GDP growth recorded 5.9%, and inflation rate 8.4%. Carolina Hernandez, "The Philippines in 1996: A House Finally in Order?" *Asian Survey* 37: 2 (1997), pp. 209-210.

[394] In August 1992, Ramos government released 65 communist leaders, 68 RAM rebel soldiers, and several other dissident leaders. Alex B. Brillantes, Jr., "The Philippines in 1992: Ready for Take Off?" *Asian Survey* 33: 2 (1993), pp. 226-227.

[395] In 1994, for example, a Muslim group led by Sayyaf kidnapped over 70 Christians and bombed the Philippine Airlines 747. Jeffrey Riedinger, "The Philippines in 1994: Renew Growth and Contested Reforms," *Asian Survey* 35: 2 (1995), p. 211.

another Muslim fragment, Muslim Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), also focused on armed struggles with the Philippine armed forces.

After five years of a long peace negotiation process, the Ramos government and the MNLF reached a peace agreement in 1996, which also precipitated peace negotiations with the MILF and the communist NDF.[396] With the peace agreement, the MNLF insurgents were integrated into the regular AFP in 1997 and Misuari became an important political supporter for President Ramos. The six years (1992-1997) of the Ramos presidency was the uniquely stable regime that secured civilian leaders' control over the AFP, reduced domestic security threats by the communist and Muslim insurgents, and achieved stable economic growth.

Political stability and economic growth, however, did not outlive the Ramos presidency. The vulnerable Philippine economy was hardest hit by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which began in Bangkok but quickly spread to other Asian countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea. The economic difficulties and changes of civilian leadership provided insurgency groups with a window of opportunity to expand their influence and armed struggles. In these circumstances, officers in the AFP began to regain their political influence in the Estrada presidency (1998-2001) and the Aroyo presidency (2001- current). Deteriorating domestic security situations caused by the revival of insurgency movements in recent years are closely related with the weak and corrupt civilian leadership.

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[396] Amando Doronila, "The MNLF Joins Mainstream Politics," *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (July 19, 1996), p. 9.

In the 1998 presidential election, Joseph Estrada, a former movie star, won the presidency with 40% of the total popular vote among eleven presidential candidates, the largest electoral victory in the history of Philippine presidential elections.[397] The Estrada presidency was radically different from his predecessor in terms of political ideology. Estrada rose to the presidency with the slogan of *Erap para sa mahirap* (Erap is for the poor).[398] His campaign pledged to narrow the grave inequality gap between the rich and poor.

Even though the populist slogan had been extremely effective in the election, the Filipinos' support for Estrada quickly evaporated due to rampant corruption and the President's favoritism to his cronies. In the "liberalization" of the airline industries, for example, the reform focused on giving benefits to Philippine Airlines, a company controlled by his close friend Lucio Tan. The same story repeated itself in banking industry reforms, which gave preferential benefits to the presidential friend George Go. During the years of the Estrada presidency, about 90% of companies were owned by the top 20 stockholders, who were often connected with one another through family ties.[399] In three years of his presidency, there were constant rumors of corruption and political scandals and, in this milieu, rumors of military coup d'etat.

President Estrada was impeached by a Senate trial on January 20, 2001. Estrada's impeachment was triggered by Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson's revelation that

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397 For the 1998 presidential election, see Claro Cortes, "*New President in the Philippines*," <web: http:www.abcnews.com/sections/world/DailyNews/philippines980529.html/>.
398 Gabriella R. Montinola, "The Philippines in 1998: Opportunity and Crisis," *Asian Survey* 39: 1 (1999), p. 67.
399 David C. Kang, *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 175-180.

he paid bribes to the president. The disclosure of bribery inflamed mass demonstrations, which were led by the Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Aroyo (who resigned from the Estrada cabinet), two former presidents (Aquino and Ramos), and civil society groups that included the Roman Catholic Church and the business community.[400] Similar to the 1986 situation in which the People Power and a segment of the AFP overthrew the Marcos dictatorship, the military played a decisive role in Estrada's resignation. In January 19, at the height of the anti-Estrada demonstration, Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Angelo T. Reyes formally declared the AFP's withdrawal of support for the president. The next day, Estrada stepped down and departed the Malacanang Presidential Palace.

After Estrada was impeached, Vice President Aroyo assumed the fourth presidency and was reelected in the 2004 presidential election.[401] The new president, however, was no better than her predecessor. The other presidential candidates charged President Aroyo with election fraud and filed a formal lawsuit for a recount of votes. The allegations led to a serious political crisis in 2004, in which former President Aquino and civil society groups organized another "People Power" movement to impeach President Aroyo. Even though the impeachment did not take place, the Aroyo regime was paralyzed by the lack of legitimacy.

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400 Mel C. Labrador, "The Philippines in 2000: In Search of a Silver Lining," *Asian Survey* 41: 1 (2001), p. 224.

401 In the 2004 presidential election, the incumbent president Aroyo won 40% of total vote, Fernando Poe, Jr, a movie actor, 36.5%, and three other candidates, 25% combined. Temario C. Rivera, "The Philippines in 2004: New Mandate, Daunting Problems," *Asian Survey* 45: 1 (2005), p. 127.

Degenerating domestic security conditions in recent years, along with the reappearance of insurgency movements and the failing civilian leadership, provided the AFP with opportunities to regain its political power. For the last decade, numerous retired officers were appointed in key governmental positions or entered the legislative body by winning popular votes. More seriously, there have been constant rumors of military coup d'etat. In 2003, for example, a group of 300 AFP officers staged a coup demanding the resignation of President Aroyo, Defense Secretary General Angelo Reyes, and AFP intelligence Chief Brigadier General Victor Corpus. This so-called "Oakwood coup" attempt ended with no major physical violence and the coup leaders were arrested. Three years later in 2006, a group of AFP officers led by Brigadier General Danilo Lim and Marine Colonel Ariel Querubin planned another coup to overthrow the corrupt civilian authority.[402] The coup attempt did not materialize because President Aroyo declared a state of emergency and co-opted senior AFP officers to secure the military's loyalty to her.

Twenty years of democratic regime transition in the Philippines did not achieve democratic consolidation. On the contrary, the country still suffers from the constant possibility of military coup d'etat. As my theory suggests, increasing domestic security threats in the coming years will make civilian control over the AFP much harder. In addition, weak and corrupt civilian leadership provides the AFP with a continuing opportunity to overthrow civilian government via coup d'etat. These three structural barriers—worsening domestic security threats, failing civilian leadership, and

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402 A. Lin Neumann, "Philippines: Military on the Move," *Asia Times* (February 28, 2006).

factionalized AFP—preclude any possibility to attain democratic control over the AFP and democratic consolidation in the Philippines in the near future.

IV. Indonesia

Democratic regime transition in Indonesia was activated with the sudden downfall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and subsequent violent demonstrations. The regime transition was so unpredictable and unprepared that the political situation was extremely volatile. Furthermore, the democratization process was tainted by numerous instances of inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence throughout the archipelago and independence movements in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua. Under such pervasive violence and degenerating domestic security conditions, the ABRI(*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*) regained its political influence in the post-democratization era, as discussed in the previous chapter.

After a decade of democratic reforms, the ABRI now plays an influential role in domestic political and economic affairs. As Table 5-4 shows, the democratically elected leadership has not secured the ABRI's loyalty to the regime or to the newly written constitution.[403] On the contrary, ABRI officers openly express their own political views and sometimes overwhelm democratically elected civilian leadership. The impeachment of President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001, for example, was an outcome of the ABRI's

403 It took four years (1999-2002) to revise the constitution in Indonesia. With the new constitution, the president is elected through the direct popular election, not by the People's Consultative Assembly that had voted to elect the president since the Suharto era. The 2004 presidential election was the first election that Indonesian people directly elected Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as their president.

withdrawal of support for the president.[404] ABRI officers played a decisive role in the impeachment process when Wahid challenged the People's Consultative Assembly's decision to remove him from the presidency due to his corruption and mishandling of violent conflicts. When President Wahid planned to declare a state of emergency, the army leadership publicly opposed it and threatened to intervene in politics.[405] The impeachment was partly a reaction from the ABRI against the Wahid government's attempt for military reforms, including the dismissal of General Wiranto from his leadership in the army and the appointment of the reform-minded officers in key positions.

The ABRI, once it conducted self-imposed reforms in the late 1990s, regained its political influence in the power transition process from Wahid to Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of the founding father and former President Sukarno and vice president in the Wahid government. President Megawati learned from the impeachment the lesson that marginalizing the ABRI in important political decisions could backfire and she brought several retired ABRI officers into key positions in her cabinet. For instance, she appointed as coordinating minister of political and security affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who had played a key role in resisting Wahid's declaration of a state of emergency in 2001. She also hired as minister of home affairs Hari Sabarno, who had been decisive in mobilizing military and police factions in the legislative body to support

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404 Aleksius Jemadu, "Democratisation and the Dilemma of Nation-building in Post-Suharto Indonesia: The Case of Aceh," *Asian Ethnicity* 5: 3 (2004), p. 325.

405 Michael S. Malley, "Indonesia in 2001: Restoring Stability in Jakarta," *Asian Survey* 42: 1 (2002), p. 125.

Megawati.[406] As a result, ABRI officers regained their political influence not only in the Megawati cabinet but also in local administrative positions.

Table 5-4: Post-Democratization Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia

Indicators	Status
Civilian Control Indicators	
• Military's loyalty to democratic leadership	➢ Lack of ABRI's loyalty to the constitution and democratically elected leaders
• Military's political neutrality	➢ ABRI officers openly express their political views; frequent civil-military conflict in internal security policy issues; keeps *dwifungsi* doctrine
• Military presence in key governmental positions	➢ Officers actively engaged in central and local administrative positions; ABRI officers automatically guaranteed seats in the Parliament
• Defined security missions	➢ Focus on domestic security missions; suppressing secessionist movements; widespread involvement in local economic affairs
• Military's participation in policymaking process	➢ Active and retired officers actively participate in several non-security policymaking
Challenges to Civilian Control	
• Security challenges	➢ Threats to the national disintegration; regional secessionist movements (East Timor, Aceh, Papua); inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts; terrorism
• Challenge to civilian leadership	➢ Weak civilian leadership (fragmentation of political parties along the religious, ethnic, and regional cleavages)
• Military's organizational unity	➢ Lack of institutional unity and professionalism; regain its political influence in the post-democratization era
• Role of civil society	➢ Violence-prone civil society groups; aggravate political fragmentation

406 Malley, 2002, p. 126.

Even though the Megawati presidency brought some level of political stability, it was achieved at the expense of democratic values and practices in Indonesian politics. Under Megawati's presidency, several former officials under the Suharto regime regained their influence in post-democratization politics. She appointed Bambang Kesowo as cabinet secretary and state secretariat, which had been the main instrument for executive power under the Suharto leadership. She also named as minister of administrative reform Feisal Tamin, who had served in the Ministry of Home Affairs under Suharto. Furthermore, Megawati reestablished a State Information Agency that was in charge of controlling the mass media.[407] The Megawati presidency seemed to go back to Suharto's New Order era by appointing numerous retired and active ABRI officers and Suharto's close acquaintances to key positions in her cabinet.

As noted, the Indonesian case presents the most difficult challenges to democratization and democratic consolidation in which civilian leaders establish firm control over the armed forces and restructure the organization into a professionalized and politically neutral body. The biggest challenge to institutionalizing democracy and civilian control over the army is the degenerating domestic security conditions in the aftermath of the authoritarian Suharto's fall. The most daunting challenge to Indonesia has been the problem of nation-building. With over 1,000 inhabited islands, over 300 ethnic groups, and several different religions, Jakarta regimes have struggled with separatist movements throughout the archipelago. National disintegration has further increased due to the Dutch colonial power's divide-and-rule policies. Sukarno's

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407 "Information Minister Ponders New Ways to Rein in Media," *Jakarta Post* (December 29, 2001).

eradication of parliamentary democracy and the installation of authoritarian Guided Democracy in the late 1950s was an attempt to overcome possible national disintegration by the Muslim separatist movements in the outer islands. Subsequently, Suharto's New Order had effectively mobilized ABRI forces to suppress any separatist movements with heavy-handed tactics. Suharto could sustain the territory as a unified nation-state by using both sticks and carrots: suppressing any independence movements and at the same time providing social and economic benefits to those provinces.

The fall of Suharto's New Order regime and the onset of a grave economic crisis, however, provided several regions with a momentum for assertion of independence. The first region that gained independence was East Timor. Under increasing international pressure, the central government gave East Timorese a referendum, in which 78.5% the voters opposed the government's offer of political autonomy and preferred total independence. The independence was achieved as U.N. troops were dispatched to control the territory. In this process, however, thousands of East Timorese were killed by the pro-Indonesia militias that were trained and equipped by the ABRI.[408]

The independence of East Timor produced three significant effects. First, President Wahid's decision to give independence to the East Timorese enraged ABRI officers who had strongly espoused the territorial integrity of the state from the beginning of the Republic. The President's decision was made without consultation with the army leadership, which made the ABRI leadership withdraw its support from the president and side with Megawati. Second, East Timorese independence sent a clear signal to other

regions that had been pursuing independence such as Aceh and Papua (or Irian Jaya), making internal security conditions much worse. Finally, degenerating security conditions provided the ABRI with windows of opportunity to regain its political influence. President Megawati formed a strategic alliance with the ABRI to secure her political position and to cope with the pro-independence movements throughout the outer islands.

The ABRI's influence in politics further expanded when Yudhoyono, a retired ABRI officer, succeeded Megawati through the first direct presidential election in 2004, by obtaining 60.6% of the votes, against the incumbent's 39.4%.[409] Under Yudhoyono's leadership, a number of retired ABRI officers held positions in the government, including the home affairs minister. At the same time, several of the old Suharto-era politicians and government officials filled important positions in the current government.[410]

Why, then, did active and retired ABRI officers and Suharto's cronies come to regain their political influence in post-democratization Indonesian politics? There are several reasons. First, degenerating domestic security conditions provided the ABRI with an opportunity to reassert its political authority. Second, all the presidents after Suharto's

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408 For more detailed information about the independence process in East Timor, see Ann Marie Murphy, "Indonesia and Globalization," *Asian Perspective* 23: 4 (1999), pp. 229-259; R. William Liddle, "Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored," *Asian Survey* 40: 1 (2000), pp. 39-40.

409 In the 2004 presidential election, there were two rounds of voting. Initially, there were five presidential candidates: (1) Partai Demokrat's Yudhoyono winning 33.6%; (2) PDI-P's Megawati, 26.6%; (3) Golkar's Wiranto, 22.2%; (4) Amien Rais of the Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party), 14.7%; and (5) the incumbent vice president Hamah Haz, 3%. Since there was no candidate who garnered an absolute majority, a runoff election was held between Yudhoyono and Megawati, in which the former candidate won the majority vote. R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, "Indonesia in 2004: The Rise of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono," *Asian Survey* 45: 1 (2005), pp. 119-121.

410 Baladas Ghoshal, "Democratic Transition and Political Development in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 26: 3 (2004), p. 514.

fall found it difficult to mobilize support from pro-democracy civil society groups. Three decades of Suharto's dictatorial rule effectively precluded any possibility to form influential civil society groups. Instead, pro-governmental groups such as the Golkar Party and military organizations dominated the societal arena. Moreover, civil society groups in the post-democratization era pose a heavy burden to the civilian leadership. They are divided along the ethnic and religious cleavages and, because of that, produce conflicts and violence.[411] Therefore, civil society groups are not the source of strengthening civilian leadership but rather the source of political liability.

Finally, but equally important, political parties, like civil society groups, are fragmented along ethnic and religious faultlines so that no one president can secure a majority in the legislative body. In the 1999 parliamentary election, the first democratic election since 1955, there were 48 political parties in which 21 parties won at least one of the 462 seats.[412] President Wahid's ruling PKB gained only 11% of the parliamentary seats. The 2004 parliamentary election also showed extremely fragmented parties, in which 11 parties took at least 2% of the parliamentary seats. President Yudhoyono's *Partai Demokrat* (Democratic Party) won only 7.5% of the total popular votes.[413] In such an extreme fragmentation of political parties, it is almost impossible to form a stable

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411 For the discussion of civil society's role in Indonesian politics, see Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "Indonesia: A Violent Culture?" *Asian Survey* 42: 4 (2002); Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Edward Aspinall, "Indonesia: Transformation of Civil Society and Democratic Breakthrough," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

412 Liddle 1999, pp. 32-22.

413 Liddle and Mujani, 2005, p. 120.

coalition government. In this situation, the ABRI is perceived by civilian leaders as the most attractive and effective coalition partner to govern the society.

In sum, democratization in Indonesia represents the most difficult case for democratic consolidation and stable civilian control over the armed forces. Extremely precarious internal security conditions provide the ABRI with justification for its continued role in civilian political affairs. In domestic politics, fragmented political structure weakens civilian leaders' power vis-à-vis the military leadership. At the same time, incapacitated civilian leaders find the ABRI as a strategic partner to govern the country. Because of these circumstances, the ABRI will continue to exert its political influence, and institutionalizing democratic control of the military in Indonesia will be unlikely in the near future.

Conclusions

This chapter addressed the civil-military dynamics in the four countries after democratic regime transitions. Furthermore, in light of my theoretical arguments and empirical findings in the previous chapters, this chapter presented prospects for the military's political role in the near future. Currently, South Korea and Taiwan demonstrate stable and firm civilian control over the armed forces and further democratic consolidation. On the other hand, the Philippines and Indonesia suffer from the lack of civilian control of the military, making post-democratization politics complicated.

For the four cases under study, one major barrier to establishing firm civilian control of the military is, as my theory suggests, challenging security threat environments. For the South Korean and Taiwanese cases, favorable security conditions

in the early years of democratization facilitated far-reaching democratic reforms including the army's depoliticization. On the contrary, democratization in the Philippines and Indonesia was tarnished by mounting internal conflicts and violence: the communist insurgents and Muslim separatist movements in the Philippines and inter-ethnic/religious conflicts and separatist movements in Indonesia. In the latter two cases, intimidating domestic threats provided politicized officers with justifications for regaining their political influence.

Even though South Korea and Taiwan benefited from favorable security environments during the early years of democratization, the ensuing security challenges now pose a significant hurdle for the civilian leaders' control over the army. Internationally, South Korea faces threats from North Korea, a regime that suffers from a devastated economy and isolation from the international community. Taiwan's current and future security conditions are even more unpredictable. President Chen Shui-bian's mobilization of Taiwanese ethnic identity and independence issues for his political purposes provokes belligerent attitudes from Beijing. Civilian control of the military in the two cases will be dependent upon how these countries deal with the international security challenges. In the meantime, internal threats in the Philippines and Indonesia pose even more direct and grave challenges to civilian leaders' control of the politicized officers. In the Philippines, domestic insurgency movements make civilian control of the military increasingly difficult, as it focuses on internal security and non-military missions. Similarly, the ABRI's internal security roles and non-military missions enable it to assume more active positions in political, administrative, and economic affairs.

While the security threats set the general patterns of the military's political influence, two major domestic factors—strength of civilian leadership and unity of military organization—determine a more specific aspect of civil-military relations. In terms of the strength of civilian leadership, all four countries are still struggling with building democratic institutions and norms in replacement of old authoritarian regimes. South Korea and Taiwan demonstrate a more stable and institutionalized democratic leadership, while the other two cases are still struggling with the lack of workable political institutions. The strength of civilian leadership directly affects the civilian leaders' ability to control army officers. Extremely weak civilian leadership in the post-democratization Philippines and Indonesia makes it difficult to attain the military's obedience.

At the same time, the unity of the military organization impinges on army officers' political orientation. Unified and professionalized armed forces promote army officers' depoliticization and political neutrality, making civilian control easier. Otherwise, civilian elites find it difficult to control a factionalized military, and officers' struggles often precipitate political participation. Armed forces in South Korea and Taiwan developed into a unified and professionalized body during the early years of democratization, which in turn led to the army's political neutrality. In contrast, armed forces in the Philippines and Indonesia suffer from the lack of the military's organizational unity and professionalism, which makes civilian leaders difficult to control to this day.

The empirical evidence suggests that future civil-military relations in the four countries will be shaped by major structural preconditions, such as security threats, the

strength of civilian leadership, and the unity of the armed forces. Considering these structural compositions, South Korea and Taiwan are more likely to secure democratic consolidation and control over the armed forces. Indonesia and the Philippines, meanwhile, will continue to struggle with constructing viable democratic regimes and controlling politically assertive officers.

Conclusions

I. Empirical Findings

The purpose of this dissertation is to explain the rise and fall of the military's domestic political role in four Asian countries: South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. I analyzed army officers' domestic political roles by dividing the four countries into four historical stages: (1) army organization during the state-building process (1940s-1950s); (2) modes of military intervention in politics (1960s-1970s); (3) armed forces' withdrawal from politics during democratization (1980s-1990s); and (4) civil-military relations in the post-democratization era (1990s-current). In comparing the cases in each historical stage, I first examined how domestic and international security threats influenced three major domestic political actors: civilian leadership, the military, and civil society. I then analyzed how dynamic interactions among these domestic political actors shaped a more specific manifestation of the army's political influence.

This dissertation attempts to overcome the limitations of previous institutionalist theories on civil-military relations that focus on domestic political conditions such as societal factors, military factors, or both. Instead, this project started from the proposition that security threats, whether domestic or international, affect army officers' domestic political actions. This should be the case because the military is first and foremost an institution concerned with security that directly responds to internal and external security threats to the state. Security threats as the primary independent variable shape the relative power relationship between the military organization, civilian leadership, and civil society. In turn, divergent interactions among these domestic

political actors account for different manifestations of civil-military relations. In this respect, these actors do not signify independent variables by themselves but intervening variables that are shaped by security threats.

My structural theory suggests that high security threats in the domestic or international arena generate a structural condition for the military to be politically influential, while low security threats run counter to its political influence. The first effect of growing security threats is the expansion of the military organization. High threats, moreover, give civilian leaders structural incentives to become more authoritarian and take coercive measures to rule society, because general security threats in many cases coincide with security threats to regime survival. In this situation, civilian leaders mobilize armed forces into politics to cope with security challenges to both the regime and the state. As a result, one outcome of high security threats is the expansion and strengthening of the state apparatus that monopolizes the means of physical violence. In this situation, civil society's political role becomes minimal. By the same logic, then, low security threats also force a reevaluation of the military's role in politics. In this condition, civilian leaders' attempts to bring army officers into politics generally meet strong resistance from domestic audiences. When security threats are low, civil society groups' pressure against authoritarian regimes and the military becomes more and more influential.

While security threats set the basic tendencies of the military's political influence, a more detailed aspect of civil-military relations is determined by intervening variables at the domestic level. The first intervening variable at the domestic level is the cohesiveness of the military organization. A unified military institution is conducive to

stable civilian control and promotes military professionalism and institutional autonomy, while a factionalized army is detrimental to professionalism and officers' political neutrality. The second intervening variable is the strength of civilian leadership. Strong civilian leadership overall generally translates into strong civilian control of the military, while weak and divided leadership breeds the armed forces' intervention in politics. The final intervening variable is the strength of civil society. A strong and ideologically moderate civil society contributes to strong civilian control of the military. On the contrary, civil society groups that advocate a radical ideology or adopt a strategy of physical violence make civilian control of the armed forces more difficult.

To test these theoretical arguments, I conducted a structured-focused comparative analysis of civil-military relations in four Asian countries by dividing them into four historical stages. Overall, empirical evidences strongly support my theoretical arguments, as summarized in Table C-1 and Table C-2.

Table C-1: Security Threats and the Military's Domestic Influence, Summary of Results

	High External Threats	**Low External Threats**
High Internal Threats	S. Korea in 1950-60s Taiwan in 1940s-60s *Outcome: Military Strong* (Q1)	Philippines in 1970-90s Indonesia in 1940-90s *Outcome: Military Strong* (Q2)
Low Internal Threats	S. Korea in 1970s Taiwan in 1970s *Outcome: Military Strong* (Q3)	Philippines in 1940-60s S. Korea in 1980-90s Taiwan in 1980-90s *Outcome: Military Weak* (Q4)

As Table C-1 summarily shows, the armed forces wielded strong political influence in the structural conditions of Q1 (High External/High Internal), Q2 (Low External/High

Internal), and Q3 (High External/Low Internal). Only in the structural condition of Q4 (Low External/Low Internal) was civilian control of the military stable and firm. Moreover, further specific features of civil-military relations were determined by three major domestic variables, as summarized in Table C-2.

Table C-2: Specific Manifestations of the Military's Engagement, Summary of Results

	Civilian Leadership	Civil Society	Military Unity	Outcome: Military Political Influence
S. Korea				
1950s	Strong	Weak	Divided	Strong under Civilian
1960s	Weak	Weak	Divided	Military Coup d'etat
1980-90s	Strong	Strong	Unified	Weak under Civilian
Taiwan				
1940-1960s	Strong	Weak	Unified	Strong under Civilian
1970s	Strong	Weak	Unified	Strong under Civilian
1980-1990s	Strong	Strong	Unified	Weak under Civilian
Philippines				
1960s	Strong	Weak	Unified	Weak under Civilian
1970s	Weak	Weak	Divided	Strong under Civilian
1980-90s	Weak	Strong	Divided	Military Coup d'etat
Indonesia				
1940s-1965	Weak	Weak	Divided	Strong under Civilian
1965-1998	Strong	Weak	Divided	Military Coup d'etat
1998-current	Weak	Strong	Divided	Strong under Civilian

1. South Korea

Civil-military relations in South Korea have evolved during the last six decades over three distinct periods: (1) the rise of the politically influential military during state-building (1950s), (2) politicized officers' domination of civilian politics (1960s-1980s),

and (3) their withdrawal from politics and subordination to democratically elected civilian leadership (1990s). In the first phase, extreme internal and external security threats during the state-building period brought about the expansion of the army organization. In particular, the Korean War (1950-1953) had tremendous impacts on the armed forces and their political roles. The war resulted in vast expansion of the army, with almost 700,000 soldiers consuming over 50 percent of total governmental spending. In addition, the war left the democratically-elected President Rhee Syngman as an almost omnipotent figure in Korean politics. During and after the war, President Rhee increased his political power by amending the constitution to become a president-for-life. On numerous occasions, he mobilized army officers into politics to suppress any political opposition. He also purposefully aggravated factional struggles within the army as a way of controlling politicized officers. Overall, extreme security threats in the state-building period in South Korea brought about an increasingly authoritarian civilian leadership, expansion of the military organization, and politicization of army officers by the authoritarian civilian leadership.

Once becoming a politically influential body under the President Rhee Syngman's rule, senior army officers played a decisive role in Rhee's downfall. President Rhee was forced out in the middle of the April 19th Student Revolution in 1960, which erupted as a demonstration to the Rhee regime's authoritarian repression, corruption, and fraud in the 1960 presidential election. The Rhee government declared martial law and brought heavily armed military forces to put down the demonstration. But the police and the military did not follow the President's order and, instead, forced him to step down.

With the ouster of Rhee Syngman, South Korea restored democracy with a parliamentary political system under the leadership of Prime Minister Chang Myon. The new regime, however, was too weak and incompetent to deal with the multiple problems that had intensified under the Rhee government such as economic corrosion, factional struggles within the ruling circle, and radical student protesters. The Chang regime was riven between two political extremes: radicalized college students and pro-communist groups on the left, and conservative anti-communist forces including senior army officers on the right. Restored political freedom provided pro-communist groups with opportunities to expand their influence in society, worsening domestic security conditions. The Korean army also continued to suffer from factional struggles fostered by Rhee Syngman's exploitation of factional competition. When the Rhee regime collapsed, a group of junior officers led by Park Jung-hee attempted to cleanse old and corrupt senior officers by organizing a 'Purification' campaign within the military.

When the Chang government failed to provide political order, General Park Jung-hee and his followers carried out a military coup on May 16, 1961. General Park consolidated his dictatorial rule in the following years by declaring the *Yushin* (revitalization) constitution in October 1972, abolishing the National Assembly and outlawing any type of political activity. The *Yushin* was justified when security conditions were grave due to North Korean armed infiltrations into the South and the Nixon Doctrine. In this historical period, the installation of a military dictatorial rule in South Korea was a combination of three structural conditions: the failure of civilian leadership, a factionalized military, and a radicalized civil society that exacerbated poor security conditions.

The military's withdrawal from politics during democratization was precipitated by improving security conditions in Korea in the 1980s. Previously, the military's dictatorial rule had been justified by the presence of constant threats from a hostile North Korea. Since the beginning of the 1980s, however, the military balance between the two Koreas turned in favor of the South, thus making anxiety about North Korea an unconvincing justification for dictatorship. Moreover, the end of the Cold War and South Korea's diplomatic ties with the former communist countries during the democratization process drastically improved the country's security conditions.

The changing security environments empowered pro-democracy political elites and civil society groups vis-à-vis the military. Even though democratization in Korea started from the radical *Minjung* (people) movements from below, subsequent democratic transition was followed by elite compromise, which led to a stable regime transition. At the same time, civil society's support for democratic reform was vital to the democratically elected leaders' military reform, as was the case in the Kim Young-sam presidency (1993-1997). President Kim mobilized civil society's support for disbanding the *Hanahoe* (one mind) faction in the military and purging politically influential senior officers, including two former presidents (Chun Doo-whan and Roh Tae-woo). Meanwhile, the existence of a cohesive and professional army encouraged stronger civilian control of the military during and after democratization. A concurrence of three major structural conditions contributed to South Korea's successful military depoliticization: favorable security environments, strong civilian leadership supported by civil society, and the unified and professionalized army.

2. Taiwan

The Kuomintang (KMT) government also faced multiple domestic and international security challenges from the beginning of its formation in the 1910s. During the stay on mainland China, the KMT had to fight influential provincial warlords and the Japanese invasion in the 1920s and 1930s as well as wage a long battle with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its revolutionary army. When World War II ended, the KMT and the CCP entered into an intense civil war (1945-1949) until the former lost and retreated to Taiwan in 1949. Due to these security challenges, army officers played important political, administrative, and economic roles in the KMT government from the earliest days of the Republic.

The KMT regime had to cope with even more daunting domestic and international security challenges after its retreat to Taiwan. Domestically, KMT forces provoked a deterioration of internal security conditions by adopting heavy-handed tactics against the native Taiwanese, leading to the violent February 28th Uprising in 1947. This incident aggravated tensions between Chinese mainlanders and ethnic Taiwanese and became a major source of domestic instability. In the meantime, more daunting security challenges came from the CCP, which wanted to conclude the civil war and achieve complete unification of the territory. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) posed grave threats to the KMT in Taiwan. At the same time, the KMT government also wanted to continue the civil war to retake the mainland territory. The nationalist government used considerable domestic resources for military buildup. To this end, it installed military bases with 100,000 troops in the islands of Quemoy and

Matsu and carried out bombing raids and guerrilla warfare in the southern part of the mainland.

In such a perilous security condition, all the political powers were concentrated in one man, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. In the early years of the KMT on the mainland, Chiang secured his political power within the party by mobilizing army officers' support. He established the Whampoa Military Academy in the 1920s and expanded his connections with senior army officers. After the retreat to Taiwan, the army assumed a more prominent political role, especially as security challenges continued to grow. The KMT regime declared martial law in 1949 and created the Taiwan Garrison Command in the following year, which gave the military the right to intervene in social and political affairs. Similar to the South Korean case, domestic and international security challenges for the KMT regime resulted in the organizational expansion of the Taiwanese army and its political role. At the same time, security threats created an autocratic regime in Taiwan, concentrating political powers within Chiang Kai-shek's hands.

In contrast to the South Korean case, however, the Taiwanese army never attempted to overthrow the civilian leadership, even though army officers' penetration in civilian political arena was almost omnipresent. The first structural condition that precluded the military's political domination was the strength of civilian leadership by Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo. Strong civilian leadership came from Chiang's successful reforms of the KMT party and the army. In the area of party reform, he focused on removing age-old factions and establishing a highly centralized and ideologically indoctrinated organization. In the area of military reform, he focused on

eliminating factional competitions and strengthening the party's control over the army by introducing a political commissar (or warfare) system.

Changing security environments surrounding Taiwan enhanced political liberalization during the 1970s and 1980s. Changes in international relations during the 1970s resulted in diplomatic isolation of the KMT regime, while the PRC became an increasingly influential actor. Ironically, these changes had two contrasting effects: (1) the KMT was forced to give up a military means to deal with PRC, and (2) the KMT encouraged political liberalization as a way of solving the legitimacy crisis both domestically and internationally. Chiang Ching-kuo's political reforms focused on "Taiwanizing" the KMT party and the army. From the early 1970s, ethnic Taiwanese began to fill important positions in the party, including the Central Standing Committee. They also began to occupy higher-ranking positions in the military.

The two decades of Taiwanization under Chiang's leadership precluded any succession problem during the power transition from Chiang to Lee Teng-hui, an ethnic Taiwanese. The biggest challenge for Taiwan's democratization, however, was to reform KMT party-army relations. Prior to democratization, the KMT became deeply engaged in military affairs with the political commissar system, while senior army officers held prominent positions in the party, including the Central Standing Committee. Lee Teng-hui curbed senior officers' influence with adept political skills: appointing General Hau Pei-tsun as premier and, at the same time, mobilizing political support from the opposition Democratic Progressive Party and civil society groups. Lee Teng-hui conducted military reforms without facing any backfire from army leadership, because the Taiwanese army had developed into a cohesive and professionalized body long before

democratic reform began. In short, the military's withdrawal from politics during democratization in Taiwan was facilitated by three major structural conditions: lessening internal and external security threats, strong civilian leadership, and the unified and professionalized Taiwanese army.

3. The Philippines

In 1946, the Philippines achieved sovereign statehood after years of American tutelage. The Philippines began its republic with a democratic political regime and a politically neutral military. From the 1940s up until the late 1960s, the Philippines did not face any serious security challenges mainly due to its geographic isolation from the Asian continent and the security commitment from the United States. During this period, democratically elected presidents firmly controlled the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which was small in size and politically neutral.

Beginning in the late 1960s, however, two domestic insurgency movements became influential and posed threats to the Ferdinand Marcos government: the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New People's Army (NPA) which aimed at overthrowing the regime and establishing a communist government, as well as the Muslim Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which fought to create an independent Muslim state in Mindanao. Rising domestic insurgency movements provided President Marcos with justification for the declaration of martial law in 1972. Marcos soon extended his presidential tenure beyond the constitutional limit and centralized political power within his hands. At the same time, mounting security threats led to the expansion of the AFP and its political role. AFP officers assumed important

political, administrative, judicial, and economic positions in the Marcos regime. During the 1970s, rising internal security challenges stirred the expansion of the AFP organization, an increasingly authoritarian civilian leadership, and army officers' deep penetration into civilian political affairs.

Even though the Marcos government did not face any coup attempt throughout years of martial law, his personalistic control over army officers seriously damaged professionalism and aggravated factional struggles in the AFP. Officers who either came from Ilocos or were personally connected to the President or his wife were promoted to the highest positions in the AFP hierarchy. While these officers received enormous benefits and monopolized key commandership positions, other officers who were non-Ilocos or unclear in their loyalty to the President were assigned to areas outside Metro Manila, where they conducted dangerous counter-insurgency warfare with the communist NPA and the Muslim MNLF. A group of junior officers outside Marcos' inner circle formed a clandestine fraternity, Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM).

RAM officers led by General Fidel Ramos and General Juan Ponce Enrile played a decisive role in ending the Marcos dictatorship and instituting a democratic regime. When both Marcos and Corazon Aquino declared victory in the inconclusive 1986 presidential election, RAM members revolted against Marcos and sided with Aquino. Even though the "People Power" rally created a momentum for democratization, it was the AFP that enabled the democratic regime transition. Because of their prominent role in Marcos' ouster, RAM officers became influential in the Aquino government.

As the first democratically elected president since 1965, President Corazon Aquino tried to enact a number of important reforms: purging Marcos loyalists in both the government and the AFP, rebuilding a democratic institution with a new constitution, and recovering from severe economic crisis. She was successful in none of these tasks due to her weak and inefficient leadership. Still, the leadership crisis in the Aquino government centered on disagreements with the AFP over the counterinsurgency programs regarding the NPA and the MNLF. The AFP insisted on rough measures against the rebels, while the Aquino government preferred peaceful means. Aquino incited the AFP by releasing political prisoners, including the CPP leader Jose Maria Sison, and initiating a ceasefire and peace talks with the CPP and the MNLF. Negotiations between the government and the National Democratic Front (NDF), an umbrella organization of underground leftist groups, resulted in a 60-day truce effective December 10, 1986. But the truce agreement did not last long due to a discrepancy on key issues. The NDF demanded a voice in the Aquino government and the integration of NPA militias into the AFP organization. Similarly, the Aquino government's peace talks with the Moro secessionists also failed when the MNLF demanded the autonomy of Mindanao and the integration of its army into the AFP organization. Security conditions significantly deteriorated after Aquino government's peace efforts with the insurgents ended in failure, and the NPA and the MNLF expanded their armed uprisings in the late 1980s.

It was not long before segments of the AFP withdrew their support from Aquino. RAM members or Marcos loyalists staged seven major coup attempts within the first four years of the Aquino presidency. The recurring coup attempts forced the Aquino

government to accept most of the AFP officers' demands, increasing the military budget by 60 percent and accepting the AFP's counterinsurgency plan.

Civilian control over the AFP was established only after Fidel Ramos was elected president in 1992. As a former chief of staff with strong support from Philippine Military Academy (PMA) graduates, Ramos curbed the RAM's influence in domestic politics. His control over the AFP, however, was secured by bringing in several senior AFP officers to his government. Even though the Philippines did not return to military rule, its democratization process was tainted by numerous coup attempts and handicapped by a weak civilian leadership.

4. Indonesia

Indonesia also had to cope with extreme domestic security threats from the beginning of its independence in 1949. After five years of war with Dutch forces, Indonesia started as a parliamentary democracy with multiple parties. This parliamentary democracy, however, did not last long due to its inability to deal with multifaceted security challenges, coming from ethnic and religious conflicts as well as threats of territorial disintegration. One of the major security threats was the Darul Islam uprisings, aimed at creating an Islamic Republic in Indonesia and later spread to other regions such as Aceh and South Sulawesi.

Faced with the possibility of national disintegration, President Achmad Sukarno abolished the parliamentary system and declared "Guided Democracy" in 1957, concentrating political authority within the President. At the same time, he declared martial law and brought the ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, Republic of

Indonesia Armed Forces) into politics and let them play key administrative and economic roles. In this situation, the ABRI, led by General Abdul Haris Nasution, declared the "Middle Way" doctrine that justified ABRI's political participation as an equal partner alongside civilian leadership. In sum, the state-building period witnessed growing internal threats, which resulted in the installation of authoritarian "Guided Democracy" and the expansion of ABRI's political influence.

President Sukarno's Guided Democracy successfully contained major internal security threats by declaring martial law and bringing ABRI officers into politics. Under Guided Democracy, the ABRI exercised strong political power so that President Sukarno felt threatened by politically influential officers. He formed a political coalition with the PKI (*Partai Kommunis Indonesia*, the Indonesian Communist Party) to curb ABRI's political dominance in his government. The Sukarno-PKI coalition made several important political decisions that intensified the ABRI's concern for national security. First, the "Crush Malaysia" campaign, or so-called *Konfrontasi*, created diplomatic disputes with major Western powers, including the United States and Britain. Second, the PKI-initiated land reform (*aski sepihak*, unilateral action) raised violent conflicts between PKI-led peasants and regional landlords aligned with regional military units. Third, the Sukarno regime's foreign policy isolated itself from major Western powers, which in turn caused an economic crisis in the early 1960s. Finally, Sukarno-PKI lifted martial law in 1963 and planned to downsize the ABRI and its budget.

When generals in the ABRI were plotting a coup d'etat to topple Sukarno, a group of pro-PKI officers launched a preemptive coup in 1965, killing most of highest-ranking officers. Out of this situation, Major General Haji Mohammad Suharto contained the

coup forces and best controlled the political crisis. The ABRI took over political power from President Sukarno and put him under house arrest. Suharto declared a "New Order," in which the ABRI played an extensive role in Indonesian politics until 1998. In sum, the ABRI coup and establishment of military dictatorial rule in Indonesia was an outcome of the convergence of three major factors: civilian leadership's failure to provide political and security order, influential but violent civil society, and the ABRI's *dwifungsi* (dual function) doctrine.

Suharto's New Order regime (1968-1998) abruptly ended in the middle of an economic crisis and ensuing social unrest, and the Vice President B. J. Habibie succeeded the presidency. The power transition was so unexpected that the Habibie leadership was not prepared to carry out political and economic reforms. Various problems that had been dormant under the New Order began to surface, forcing the new government to deal with violent demonstrations, inter-ethnic and inter-religious clashes, and separatist insurgency movements in Aceh, Papua, and East Timor. The democratically elected leaders, plagued by weak leadership, failed to control these crises.

Multiple internal security threats provided the ABRI with an opportunity to regain political influence. Immediately following Suharto's fall, the ABRI was accused of corruption and human rights abuses during the authoritarian rule. ABRI leadership therefore attempted to reformulate the institution as a cohesive and professionalized body and limit its political role in the early years of democratization. Before long, however, the ABRI began to regain its political influence, when President Abdurrahman Wahid, the successor to Habibie, was forced to step down after less than two years of his presidency. The ABRI withdrew its support for Wahid due to the differences between

the president and the military leadership in dealing with the domestic insurgency movements in the outer islands.

The ABRI recovered its political influence under the Megawati presidency (2001-present). President Megawati found the ABRI to be an attractive political ally to face political, economic, and security problems. The President lacked support from political parties and civil society groups, which were highly fragmented along ethnic and religious cleavages. Therefore, she brought ABRI leadership to her government to compensate for her political weakness. The ABRI's voice has become even bigger as the new democratic regime has faced increasing inter-communal violence, separatist movements, and terrorist threats in recent years.

II. Security Threats and the Future of the Military's Political Role

In light of my theoretical arguments and empirical analyses for the first three historical stages, the final empirical study illustrates the current status and future prospects of civil-military relations. Among the four empirical cases, South Korea represents the most stable civilian control of the military in the post-democratization period, followed by Taiwan. In contrast, the Philippines and Indonesia have highly unstable civil-military relations, as army officers wield enormous political influence in the post-democratization political scene.

After two decades of democratic reforms, South Korea is now entitled to be called a consolidated democracy. The most crucial part of democratic reform was rebuilding the military into a professionalized and politically-neutral body by disbanding the clandestine *Hanahoe* (one mind) faction. Three major structural conditions in South

Korea reinforce stable civilian control of the military in the post-democratization era: (1) favorable security conditions, (2) strong civilian leadership backed by civil society groups, and (3) a cohesive and professionalized army. In the meantime, challenges for civil-military relations in the near future will come from highly unpredictable North Korea, whose instability has the potential to create serious political and security crises.

Taiwan successfully reached democratic consolidation when the Taiwanese army withdrew its influence in the KMT party and central and provincial governments in the 1990s. The key to military reform was the splitting of the institutional interpenetration between the KMT party and the army, as well as the redirection of the army's allegiance away from the KMT and toward the constitution and democratically elected civilian leadership. Unlike the South Korean case, however, Taiwan will face barriers to institutionalizing democratic control of the military. Major complexity in Taiwanese civil-military relations comes from two major structural constraints. The first is weakening civilian leadership that comes from ethnic cleavages between Chinese mainlanders and ethnic Taiwanese. The second is growing security threats from the mainland government revolving around the Taiwanese independence issue.

In the case of the Philippines, the AFP wields enormous political power even after two decades of democratic government. Civilian leaders in the Philippines have failed to secure army officers' political neutrality and allegiance to the government and constitution. There have been several coup attempts against current President Gloria Macapagal-Aroyo (2001-present). Prospects for civilian control of the military in the Philippines are pessimistic in all structural conditions. First, growing internal security threats by communist insurgents and Muslim separatist movements provide the AFP with

opportunities to expand its political influence. Second, civilian leadership suffers from corruption, cronyism, and the failure to build workable democratic institutions. Finally, the AFP is still divided into factions based on school and regional background, which make civilian control and monitoring over the military even more difficult.

Indonesia features the most pessimistic scenario for future civil-military relations. The ABRI, which once conducted self-imposed institutional reforms, reclaimed its political authority during the impeachment of President Wahid in 2001. Like the Philippines, Indonesia faces many structural barriers in establishing civilian control of the military. First, post-democratization Indonesia is plagued by growing internal security threats arising from inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence, secessionist movements in Aceh and Papua, and terrorist bombings by extremist Muslim organizations. Second, civilian leaders find it hard to reach political consensus due to extremely fragmented political parties and civil society groups. Finally, the ABRI lacks organizational unity and effective command structure, which makes civilian control extremely ineffective.

III. Theoretical Conclusions

As the summary of empirical findings demonstrates, my theoretical arguments provide a better explanation of civil-military relations in the four countries under study than the perspectives of institutionalist theories and Michael Desch's structural theory. All the institutional theories—developmental, military-centric, and synthetic—take for granted a predominant military organization in society. The empirical evidence, however, reveals that not all developing countries possessed a strong military organization that could overpower the civilian political authority. Rather, this study

showed that many developing countries' armed forces, originally small in size, turned into a predominant institution under growing security threats, especially in the cases of the Philippines (1940s-1960s) and South Korea (1940s-1950s). Thus, examining changes in military organization under certain security conditions provides a deeper understanding of historical roots of the military's political role.

The major limitations of institutionalist theories come from the fact that they identify domestic variables—civilian leadership, military organization, and civil society—as primary independent variables that directly shape the military's political role. Instead, this empirical study proved that these domestic factors are not independent variables by themselves but rather intervening variables that are affected by another independent variable: security threats. The empirical studies confirmed that security threats determine these domestic actors' relative power position and their political incentives and constraints, which in turn shape the military's domestic political role.

At the same time, the empirical results showed that the causal relationships in my theory are more convincing than Michael Desch's theoretical arguments. The empirical study illustrated that Desch's causal statements are reversed or inconclusive at best. Desch's theory has explanatory power over only parts of the third stage of the empirical analysis: the military's withdrawal from politics during democratization. Desch's theory has explanatory power over the cases of the Philippines in the 1980s-1990s and Indonesia in the 1990s, which suffered from high internal/low external threats during democratization. But his theory is inconclusive in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s, both of which attained strong civilian control of the military under favorable internal and external security environments.

All other empirical cases except for the third historical stage disprove Desch's causal logic, which suggests that high external/low internal threats produce the strongest civilian control of the military while low external/internal threats produce mixed results. The empirical analysis demonstrates that high threats either in internal or external arena make the military politically influential, as can be seen in South Korea (1950s-1970s), Taiwan (1950s-1970s), the Philippines (1960s-1990s), and Indonesia (1950s-1990s). In addition, the results show that low threats in both arenas produce the strongest civilian control of the military, as were the cases in South Korea (1980s-1990s), Taiwan (1980s-1990s), and the Philippines (1940s-1960s).

This study shows that bringing the variable of security threats into the study of civil-military relations provides us with a deeper understanding of the military's political role. At the same time, since the army is a security institution uniquely positioned at the intersection between domestic politics and international relations, the security-threat variable can provide a road through which international relations and comparative politics can meet. As this study demonstrates, security threats shape the military organization and its political influence (outside-in). In turn, we can consider the military factor as the independent variable that influences a state's security policymaking and its international outcomes (inside-out).

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