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TOWARD an UNDERSTANDING of METROPOLITAN AMERICA

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Social Science Panel
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Department of Housing and Urban Development
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National Academy of Sciences–National Academy of Engineering
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The members of the committee selected to undertake this project and prepare this report were chosen for recognized scholarly competence and with due consideration for the balance of disciplines appropriate to the project. Responsibility for the detailed aspects of this report rests with that committee.

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Preface

The Advisory Committee to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (ACHUD) of the National Academy of Sciences–National Academy of Engineering requested that the Division of Behavioral Sciences of the National Research Council, superseded in February 1973 by the Assembly of Behavioral and Social Sciences, initiate a "study of the significance of community in the metropolitan environment." The Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Harold B. Finger, concurred in the necessity for scientific and technical advice to assist HUD in rationalizing housing policy with urban growth patterns and objectives.

To provide the assistance requested, the Division of Behavioral Sciences in December 1971 established a Panel on the Significance of Community in the Metropolitan Environment, which undertook to set forth in the clearest way possible the present knowledge of urban organization and life. Recognizing the deficiencies in knowledge relating to the task, the Panel sought to reduce them by commissioning a series of state-of-knowl-

edge papers. These papers, to be published separately under the title *Metropolitan America in Contemporary Perspective,* are:

"Governance in a Metropolitan Society," by Alan K. Campbell, Dean, and Judith A. Dollenmayer, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University.

"Beyond the Suburbs: The Changing Rural Scene," by Rex R. Campbell, Professor of Rural Sociology, University of Missouri.

"The Metropolitan Experience," by Claude S. Fischer, Lecturer in Sociology, University of California at Berkeley.

"Fiscal and Productive Efficiency in Urban Government Systems," by Lyle C. Fitch, President, Institute of Public Administration, New York, N.Y.

"Accessibility for Residents in the Metropolitan Environment," by Donald L. Foley, Professor of City Planning and of Architecture, University of California at Berkeley.

"Toward an Understanding of Community Satisfaction," by Robert W. Marans and Willard Rodgers, Senior Study Directors, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.

"Urban Concentration and Deconcentration," by Jerome Rothenberg, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Matthew Edel, Professor of Urban Studies, Queens College, and John R. Harris, Professor of Urban Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

"Community Design: The Search for Participation," by Gerald D. Suttles, Professor of Sociology, State University of New York at Stony Brook.

"The Urban Centrifugal Drift," by Basil G. Zimmer, Professor of Sociology, Brown University.

"The Patchwork Approach: Adaptive Responses to Increasing Urbanization," by Joseph F. Zimmerman, Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Albany.

The Panel drew heavily on these state-of-knowledge papers in the course of its deliberations and in the preparation of this report. Moreover, it profited from the participation of the papers' authors in its discussions and from the comments by these individuals on earlier drafts of this report. However, the authors of the papers bear no responsibility for the final outcome of the Panel's work; that is the Panel's alone.

From the outset, the Panel sought to understand the policy context of HUD and to secure relevant information from HUD representatives. Throughout the course of the study, ACHUD was kept informed of the Panel's progress. The state-of-knowledge papers were made available to ACHUD, and its comments on selected papers provided helpful guidance to the Panel.

The Panel is indebted to the following HUD officials and to many of their associates in the Department for their generous cooperation: Harold B. Finger, Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology; Theodore R. Britton, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology; and Wyndham Clarke, Director, Division of Community Planning, Development and Conservation, Office of Research and Technology.

Vincent P. Rock, the Panel's Executive Secretary, was a tower of strength throughout the course of the study and played a key role in the preparation of the successive drafts of this report. Benjamin Caplan, who served as consultant, provided a valuable critical perspective. Kay C. Harris provided indispensable administrative support throughout the undertaking, and Linda J. Ingram, the Panel's Research Associate, was outstanding in assisting in the final preparation of the manuscript. The Panel also acknowledges the assistance provided by Henry David, Executive Director of the Assembly of Behavioral and Social Sciences, and by John A. Laurmann, Executive Secretary of the ACHUD. Finally, the Panel wishes to express its appreciation for the critical comments and suggestions made by the group of reviewers established by the Executive Committee of the Assembly of Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Amos H. Hawley
Chairman

September 1973

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TOWARD an UNDERSTANDING of METROPOLITAN AMERICA

1

Introduction: The Problem of Defining Community

The question "What is the significance of community in the metropolitan environment?" stemmed from the recognition by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that the municipal scale is too limited a basis on which to deal with the urgent needs of urban America. The department, in effect, had concluded that it would have to work on a metropolitan scale. In posing the question, it sought to obtain both a better understanding of what is happening in urban organization and urban life, broadly conceived, and to gain a better appreciation of whether the neighborhood or local community continues to serve any significant needs of the urban population.

The meaning of community has been greatly affected by the increasing predominance of urbanization as the common way of life for Americans. In the two centuries since the American Revolution, the population has grown from 4 million to over 200 million people. In 1790, perhaps 5 percent of the population lived in urban areas. By 1880, more than 25 percent were urbanized, and one place, New

York, had reached the million mark. By 1920, for the first time, a majority of the people lived in urban areas. Today, three out of four Americans live in an urban setting and the proportion continues to grow. The farm population is less than 5 percent of the total. Of the 20 percent still classified as "rural nonfarm," a large portion have been drawn into the expanding orbit of urban centers. Indeed, 95 percent of the population lives within the commuting areas of the nation's metropolitan centers. As the urbanization of modern life has proceeded, the term *community* has taken on a variety of meanings.

A community consists of a population carrying on a collective life through a set of institutional arrangements. Common interests and norms of conduct are implied in this definition. However, because of the many different connotations attached to the word *community,* many social scientists find the term to be less and less useful.

Of the many meanings of community, two continue to be widely used. Traditionally, the rural village or small town has been the model of community.. The traditional view has assumed that members of a community are united by sentimental bonds and that an important virtue of community is its contribution to the development of personal identity in individual members of the group. It is assumed that the village model of a detached and singular residential group exists in urban areas, only in a weakened form. As will be seen, the weight of the evidence points in other directions. Yet, the traditional idea is still popular, and it continues to influence public policy at many points. *One use of the word community then is to refer to a grouping of people who live close to one another and are united by common interests and mutual aid.* In this sense, a community is small numerically, consisting of, at most, a few hundred people, and the connotation is one of solidarity.

On the other hand, the term may be used in the broader sense to refer to any population that carries on its daily life through a common set of institutions. In this sense, it may apply to a population aggregate of any size, for example, one in which the members participate in the division of labor within a particular socioeconomic system. The emphasis, in this instance, is on the interdependence that stems from specialization and exchange.

Whether used with the first meaning, in a micro sense, or with

the second meaning, in a macro sense, community commonly refers to a territorially bounded social group. The geographic area may range from a few neighboring families on a single street to a sector of the city in the case of a micro community, and from the local municipality through the metropolitan area to the nation in the case of a macro community. As a territorial reference, the term tends to be open-ended.

It also should be noted, however, that community is used increasingly to refer to interest groups whose common activities are relatively independent of location factors. The source of the common interest may be artistic or scientific, commercial or governmental, religious or ethnic. Obviously, the importance in urban life of these and many other different interest groups is growing.

The multiple meanings of community reflect the changing life styles that result from the ongoing processes of urbanization. The pattern of human transactions from which a sense of community derives is growing in scope and complexity and changing in content. Technological advances over the past century are the main source of these changes, and improvements in transportation and communications appear to be the most critical and strategic.

Improvements in transportation and communication facilities modify the costs of and opportunities for human interaction, the pursuit of common interests, and the conduct of collective enterprise. They influence the pattern of societal activity and provide the milieu for the emergence of common interests. As transportation and communications change the significance of time-space, they tend to influence:

1. The number of people who can live together, for example, the sizes of groups, how extensive a territory can be included in local commerce
2. The variety and abundance of available materials
3. The residential land use patterns that develop in settled areas
4. The extent to which division of labor can take place
5. The spread of new ideas
6. The extent of economic and political centralization
7. The stability or instability of a social unit

As transportation and communications have improved, the complexity of society has increased. This increasing complexity has occurred at several levels during this century. These levels include:

1. Increase in individual mobility. On a daily basis individuals circulate over a wider area. They have access to a wider range of facilities and groups. The significance of proximity declines.
2. Territorial expansion of urban institutions. Industrial and commercial activity is distributed over a wider area. Residential development is dispersed. Governmental services seek to respond to the needs of a more diffused population. Adjacent rural areas are drawn into the orbit of the metropolitan region.
3. Growing interdependence among all urban settlements. As capital and wealth, information and knowledge accumulate, large-scale institutions develop that are national and international in scope. These institutions make large investments that have major consequences, both intended and unintended, for the process of urbanization. At the same time, a multiplication of functional links among individuals and firms takes place. As investments, information, institutions, and individuals become more integrated, there is a tendency for towns, cities, and metropolitan areas to lose their unitary identities. All increasingly interconnect in an integrated, national urban system.

The continuing growth of the economy's service sector in relation to industrial production also imparts new characteristics to urban life. The service industries now account for over half of all employment. Some service activities (for example, computer centers) may be tied less to particular locations than industrial activities. Other services may require central locations within urban settlements. In either case, the location, density, and composition of the urban population may differ from previous patterns. The knowledge industries, a major source of economic growth within the service sector, depend on a national and international information system. As these industries reinforce the communications and educational role of metropolitan areas, they increase the interdependence of such areas.

Improvements in transportation and communications also provide for a growing diversity in urban society. Since America's popula-

tion has been drawn from many nations and cultures, American society can be termed *pluralistic*. Even though immigrants have accepted urban styles of behavior and thought rather quickly, ethnic differences have persisted and provided a basis within each group for common interests. At the same time, social mobility and rapid communication have provided and continue to provide in greater and greater measure, the opportunity to experiment with new modes of thought; new forms of religion, family structure, music, and art; and with new life styles. The pattern of interests and activities associated with the various stages in the family life cycle is also changing. Finally, of course, a growing number of scientific, technical, and professional groups are organized around one or another functional set of interests. Many of these groups are loosely organized on a national scale; few have strong attachments to a particular place.

In sum, there is increasing ambiguity in the term *community* because of the increasing size of urban areas and complexity of urban life. Individuals participate in a number of interest groups and move considerable distances to take advantage of urban opportunities. And to a great extent everyone shares a common urban culture. Early in the century, when city limits could be rather clearly demarcated, the country came up to the city's edge and the city began. This is no longer the case. In place of a rural–urban dichotomy, all areas are drawn into the orbit of metropolitan regions. Within these regions, collective activities are no longer wholly bound to any particular location. The measure of community is not so much how close together people live, but the availability and cost of timesaving means of communication and transportation. The primary focus of this report, therefore, is the expanding scale of urban life and the progressive decline of the local neighborhood as a social unit.



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Twentieth Century Metropolitanization

Although small towns and densely packed cities still persist and even though an integrated national system of settlements may emerge in the future, urbanization in the twentieth century has been dominated by the rise of metropolitan communities. These communities include the old central cities and suburbs, new suburbs and satellite towns, and an urban fringe of growing importance. Common economic and social institutions serve to link the various elements. Such communities appear to represent the early stage of a uniquely modern form of regional urban settlement. Increasingly, the citizens of the metropolis move about the entire region to take advantage of the many choices it provides for work, residence, shopping, and recreation.

Government at all levels was unprepared for the growth of urban settlements on a metropolitan scale; indeed, for many decades it was largely oblivious to the emergence of the metropolis. As metropolitan population spread over a wide area and economic and social institutions expanded in scope, governmental units and programs

proliferated. Two important consequences flowed from this proliferation. On the one hand, the provision of governmental services on a fragmented geographical basis, though generally successful in meeting urgent immediate needs, unduly reinforced the tendency toward population dispersion in metropolitan regions. On the other hand, the proliferation of units aggravated the fiscal and social inequities within the metropolitan community as a whole.

THE RISE OF METROPOLITAN COMMUNITIES

The nineteenth century in America was primarily a period of interregional and regional expansion based on advances in the efficiency of long-distance bulk haul transportation. Early in the nineteenth century, urban centers were primarily pedestrian in character; cities were confined to a radius of not more, and usually less, than three miles. Facilities for local movement and exchange in industrial cities began to improve somewhat around the middle of the century, increasing the radius over which centralized activities could extend their influence. Although the scale of organization increased correspondingly, the radius of local influence rarely exceeded ten miles.

In contrast, local expansion in the twentieth century has been characterized by dramatic improvements in short-distance transportation and communication. As these improvements occurred and the cities continued to increase in size, an outward movement of population activities and organization was set in motion.

Two basic trends, the second in part a function of the first, have given shape to metropolitan communities. First, there was the trend toward concentration of population. As the country's population increased and became more urban, it tended to concentrate in larger aggregates—most notably in the rapidly growing industrial cities of the Northeast in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The tendency is still discernible in the urban areas of the South and the West. The second trend, toward deconcentration of urban settlements, is peculiarly a twentieth-century phenomenon. This is the drift of population and economic activity toward and beyond the periphery of population aggregates.

The present settlement pattern in metropolitan areas is the con-

sequence of the two overlapping growth trends, aggregation and dispersal. In the first phase, settlements and new increments to the existing population congregated increasingly in the center of an area at the expense of absolute losses in its outermost zones. Before this phase of central growth was concluded, the second, or deconcentrating, phase began. While population redistribution still has a concentrating effect in that people continue to move toward urban centers, metropolitan settlement patterns are increasing in territorial scope.

The rate of metropolitan population growth first exceeded the growth rate of the total population at the turn of the century, and it has continued to do so. As a result, the metropolitan proportion of the total population of the United States had increased from only one-third at the turn of the century to two-thirds by 1970. A large part of the increase in the metropolitan population has been accounted for by a relatively small number of urban centers, even though the total number of metropolitan areas continues to increase. In recent decades, however, the large centers in the North and Northeast have accounted for a declining proportion of metropolitan growth, and the most rapid growth has occurred in the metropolitan areas of the South and Southwest.

The Time-Distance Factor

For urban man, being near the places he travels to regularly is a value only in terms of the time it may save him in meeting his needs. In a modern technological society, however, access to opportunities of all kinds is determined less and less by how near they are and more and more by time-distance, that is, by distance in relation to the availability and costs of timesaving means of transportation and communication. In the twentieth century, the automobile and the truck, the telephone and other changes in communications have significantly reduced the time-distance factor and increased the frequency of interaction within metropolitan communities.

The distance that can be traveled in 60 minutes provides one measure of change. Prior to the arrival of the automobile, the 60-minute radius of the cities seldom exceeded 6 miles. In principle that

limit afforded the urban centers a scope of 100 square miles, but in actuality very few were larger than 20 square miles. The automobile extended the hour's travel distance to approximately 25 miles and opened a zone of accessibility amounting to some 2,000 square miles. Within the expanded area, the frequency of interactions multiplied severalfold as a result of increasing access to improved transportation and communications.

The automobile and the truck, for example, could move in any direction at any time, could be used for door-to-door pickups and deliveries, and could be employed in small lot or small passenger cargoes. Similarly, the increasing scale of metropolitan life was both mirrored and facilitated by the expansion of the telephone network and the area within which communication was possible without a toll charge. In recent decades, such areas of "free" communication have expanded rapidly: to illustrate, in the case of Providence, Rhode Island, the number of phones that could be contacted toll-free increased from 73,000 to over 400,000 between 1940 and 1970, and the area of toll-free service increased fourfold to 1,000 square miles in a comparable period. The mass media (newspapers, radio, and television) also increasingly provide common communications linkages for the entire population of metropolitan communities.

With the advent of freeways and other highway improvements, the 60-minute commuting distance to major places of employment and recreation has risen to approximately 35 miles in most metropolitan communities. Moreover, since there are many job locations, commuting areas overlap. As a consequence, in parts of the United States where the metropolitan areas are relatively close together, almost all the so-called rural population is within this 60-minute time-distance. Berry (1967), using the 1960 population distribution, calculated that 95 percent of the country's population lived within the daily commuting field of a metropolitan city.

Major transportation routes open up the metropolitan area and hence additional employment opportunities for the nonmetropolitan population. Interstate highways have fostered development clustering at major freeway interchanges and access points. These small villages and towns have experienced population increases as they have become suburban centers. Although in previous decades the

open country near metropolitan centers was losing population, there is now a population increase in the periphery.

As improvements in transportation have led to increases in the size of metropolitan areas, they have also led to increases in their spheres of influence. For example, in the past, distant merchants could compete effectively in local markets, but for many products, the truck has a competitive advantage over alternative forms of transport within a radius of 150 to 250 miles. Consequently, since the advent of the truck, local metropolitan outlets have had an advantage in local markets over their remote competitors. Thus, large urban centers have gradually carved out tributary regions over radial distances as great as 250 miles.

Within the metropolitan community there is an overall pattern of openness that is understandable only in terms of automobile travel. Metropolitan residents "walk" in their cars. As of 1970, some 80 percent of the households in the nation owned automobiles. Automobiles now have become so prevalent and have been predominant as a mode of personal transportation for so long in the lower-density portions of metropolitan areas that it has become the common presumption that residents will have and rely on them. This, in turn, has affected the very design of these residential environments, including community facilities and their accessibility and, of course, the transportation channels.

On a national scale, especially since World War II, the growing web of communications capabilities has tended to increase interdependence among urban areas. Further changes in urbanization as a result of improvements in communications will continue to unfold in the coming decades. As these improvements enhance the access to ideas, foster a diversity of activities, and modify the comparative advantages of centralization, the metropolitan communities of the present may give way to some new urban form in the future.

The Pattern of Growth

The industrial cities that developed in the nineteenth century were of necessity compact aggregates located by ports or railroad terminals. As economic activity grew, the intensive users of space—busi-

ness offices, retail establishments, and the like—increased in number at the center, crowding extensive space users—particularly residential users—toward outer zones. Around the core business district, an area in transition from residential to industrial use developed. For nearly a hundred years after 1820, as industry expanded and the urban population grew, abetted by migration first from Europe and then from rural America, the older, more centrally located residential areas tended to be taken over by more intensive industrial and commercial users.

With the passage of time, population growth in the innermost zones of the central city slowed and then population declined, as residences were replaced by industrial and commercial uses. The zone of negative population growth surrounding the business core has widened steadily. Population moved outward, spilling over the boundaries of central cities and invading even the outer zones that had experienced earlier population declines. Today, however, effective demand for intensive land use in the inner zones of the central cities has decreased, and as housing in the central city loses its usefulness, there may be no adequate industrial and commercial demand for its conversion to more intensive uses.

Demand for intensive use of inner cities stimulated the deconcentration of urban areas. Effective transportation and communications facilities made it possible. As access within the metropolitan community improves, increasing numbers are drawn from the entire region into the orbit of its activities. Meanwhile, the number of those engaged in intermetropolitan transactions also rises. As scale increases, patterns of transaction become more complex, localities merge, boundaries become blurred, and a multicentered, multiassociational form of urban aggregate takes shape.

What is involved is a series of deconcentrating and often mutually reinforcing tendencies in metropolitan areas. Transportation improves. People move. Industry moves. As industry moves, changes in technology encourage further moves. Retailing follows the movement of population; but then, as increased facilities are made available, large modern retail centers may attract population and influence suburban growth. Demand for public services rises, stimulating the proliferation of local governments, which in turn leads to

an acceleration of deconcentrating movements. As different users of land select dispersed locations, spatial interdependencies among users come into play, and thus a move by one affects future location decisions by others. As facilities are dispersed outward, they increase the relative advantage of subsequent peripheral locations for the firm and for the resident. Eventually there is a relative decline of radial movement and a complex web of crisscross movement becomes commonplace throughout the metropolitan area. A change in one part reverberates rapidly throughout the whole because of the new systemic integrity of the parts.

Findings

Thus far in the twentieth century, metropolitan communities have increased in scale and become more multicentered.

DEMOGRAPHIC AND GOVERNMENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF METROPOLITAN COMMUNITIES

As metropolitan communities have grown in scale, they have come to share, in varying degree, a number of common attributes or tendencies. In some cases these tendencies are simply a part of the processes of urban settlement, but on a larger scale. In other instances, they reflect the inequities resulting from the fact that various segments of the metropolitan population have differing degrees of mobility and access to opportunity. Since the process of metropolitanization is still under way and research tends to lag behind events, the current strength as well as the future consequences of some of these tendencies is not fully known.

Decline in Density

Despite the increase in the population of metropolitan communities, the rapid rate of movement toward the periphery has resulted in a general decline in population density. At first the deconcentration in

the central cities was merely relative to the outside areas. However, after 1950, an absolute decline in density occurred. All age classes of central cities reached their peak densities in 1950, and population densities for many central cities have been in decline for the past 20 years. Among metropolitan areas, there are substantial differences in the rate of density decline by population of urbanized area. The decline is most marked in areas with a population of one to three million. Density declined in these areas by more than one-third in the 1960–1970 period, while population grew by 40 percent and land area increased by 125 percent.

Although the wider dispersion pattern appeared first in the largest metropolitan areas, it has become common in areas of all sizes. In the newer metropolitan areas, the decline in density has begun at a much smaller total population size than in the older centers. Moreover, between 1950 and 1970 urbanized areas as a whole declined in density both outside and within the central cities. The decline for the period 1950–1970 is shown in Table 1.

For several decades, the metropolitan zones outside the central cities have been growing more rapidly than the central cities. Between 1910 and 1970 the portion of the metropolitan population living in the central cities decreased from 75 percent to 45 percent. More rapid growth of the areas outside the central cities became general after 1920. In the decade 1920–1930, the outlying zones

TABLE 1. Gross Residential Densities, All Urban Areas, 1950–1970

	Population Per Square Mile	
	1950	1970
Total Density	5,408	3,376
Inside Central Cities	7,786	4,463
Outside Central Cities	3,167	2,627

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1960*, U.S. Summary, Final Report PC(1)-1A, *Number of Inhabitants* (1961); U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1970*, U.S. Summary, Final Report PC(1)-1A, *Number of Inhabitants* (1971).

increased at rates 50 percent higher than central city rates. During the next two decades, the differential leaped to almost 3 to 1. Since 1950 outlying area growth rates have averaged 5 or more times the central city rates.

Overall, in the period 1950–1970, the metropolitan areas accounted for 85 percent of the total population increase of the United States. During the past decade, metropolitan areas grew by 17 percent, using the 1960 boundaries. However, the increase in the zones outside the central cities was 29 percent, while the central cities increased by only 5 percent, a ratio of nearly 6 to 1. Recently, in certain large SMSA's,[1] there has been a deconcentration of the area as a whole.

Findings

Since the rapid growth of metropolitan areas in the United States has been accompanied by an even more rapid deconcentrating movement of population within metropolitan areas, there has been a general decline of urban densities.

Migration Within the Metropolitan Community

Historically, migration within metropolitan areas has been influenced by socioeconomic status and the stages of the family life cycle. The result has been that those with higher incomes, more education, and higher-level occupations have been statistically overrepresented in the suburbs. On the other hand, people with lower incomes, less education, and fewer skills have been statistically overrepresented in the central cities. A similar selective process has been at work with

[1]An SMSA—Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area—is a county or group of contiguous counties which contains at least one central city of 50,000 inhabitants or more or "twin cities" with a combined population of at least 50,000. Other contiguous counties are included in an SMSA if, according to certain criteria, they are essentially metropolitan in character and are socially and economically integrated with the central city.

respect to the stages in the family life cycle, resulting in families at the child-rearing stage being overrepresented in the suburbs and young adults and older persons being overrepresented in the central cities. In periods of rapid suburban growth, these differences have tended to increase.

Segregation of urban populations by income, ethnic background, or other factors is not a new phenomenon. Warner (1969), in *Streetcar Suburbs*, noted that by 1900 the lower class was being left behind in the central city while the middle and upper classes moved to the outer ring. Within this ring, the band closest to the city contained the lower middle class, the next closest, the upper middle class, and the wealthy were found farthest out.

There is some evidence that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the growth of homogeneous residential areas was stimulated by the massive immigration into America of Europeans, which added another dimension to stratification. A greater concern arose for personal safety, prestige, and living among people similar to oneself. Gentlemen's agreements, restrictive covenants, and concentrated tenement housing all contributed to the existence of social and ethnic homogeneity in subcommunities. In recent times, rising incomes and increased availability of housing have extended freedom of choice in residential location, once enjoyed only by the upper socioeconomic levels, to the lower strata of the population. Recently, blue-collar and low-skill white-collar workers have been among the most rapidly suburbanizing groups.

A study of Detroit found that in 1940 the proportion of persons with the lowest levels of education was only slightly higher in the city than in the metropolitan area as a whole (Schnore, 1964). By 1950, however, following a period of rapid suburban growth, it became evident that the less-educated were being left behind in the city. During the next decade, 1950–1960, an even greater concentration of these people developed in the central city. This was the result of both out-migration of the better-educated to the suburbs and the settlement of immigrants in the central city. The Detroit pattern for the period examined is quite consistent with those in a number of other older large cities.

The Taeubers (1965) have reported that the net effect of migra-

tion flows has been to diminish the educational and occupational levels of the central city population and to increase these levels in the suburbs. The outcome of selective migration in any given metropolitan area, however, depends on the nature of the central city. Schnore (1967), for example, found that only in older, larger, nonexpanding cities do the suburbs consistently exceed the city in socioeconomic status. Elsewhere, both the highest and lowest classes may still be statistically overrepresented in the city. Moreover, it is important to understand that while most research has focused on central city–outside central city differences, the range of differences among suburbs is even greater. As both the evolution of multicentered metropolitan communities and patterns of selective migration continue, these differences are likely to be no less critical than those between the central cities and the suburbs which are now so salient.

Family Suburbia

For decades, American families have been settling in the suburbs to raise their children. The conventional image of the suburb has been an area made up largely of owner-occupied, single-family homes. However, there are signs that during the 1960s a shift away from this dominant pattern may have begun. During the past decade, the number of multiple-dwelling units constructed in the suburbs increased sharply. The availability of such units very probably will be reflected in a corresponding change in the stages of the family life cycle represented in the suburbs and in migrations to and from the suburbs. An increase in the number of young adults and older people, and thus an increase in heterogeneity, can be expected.

Nearly half the residential structures added to the housing inventory of the suburbs between 1960 and 1970 were multiple-dwelling units (see Table 2). Moreover, the number of multiple-dwelling units added in suburbs exceeded the number added in the central cities by one million. Indeed, more than three out of five of the total number of multiple-unit structures added in metropolitan areas were added in the suburbs. In 1960 only 22 percent of multiple units in metropolitan areas were located in the suburbs, while by 1970 the proportion had increased to 33 percent.

TABLE 2. Distribution of Housing Units Added in Metropolitan Areas by Type of Unit, 1960–1970

	Metropolitan Area		Central City		Outside Central City	
Type of Unit	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1 Unit	3,082,228	40.2	468,761	22.0	2,613,467	47.3
2 Units +	4,154,255	54.3	1,584,067	74.3	2,570,188	46.5
Mobile Homes	418,777	5.5	79,612	3.7	339,165	6.1
Total	7,655,260	100.0	2,132,440	100.0	5,522,820	99.9

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population and Housing: 1970*, U.S. Summary, Final Report PHC(2)-1, *General Demographic Trends for Metropolitan Areas, 1960–1970* (1971).

The marked increase in the number of multiple-unit structures being built in the suburbs will in turn affect the proportion of owner-occupied homes. While ownership continues to be much higher in the suburbs than in the cities, the proportion appears to have declined slightly. Between 1960 and 1970, the proportion of suburban owner-occupied housing decreased from 72.4 percent to 70.3 percent. While the decline is not large, the direction of change may be indicative in light of the number of multiple units added during the past decade. The inference to be drawn is that as the trend of construction and ownership changes, the composition of the suburban population also is likely to change. Moreover, if an effective demand for low- and moderate-income housing is maintained, the trend is likely to accelerate in the future, especially in those areas near suburban industrial and commercial expansion. Continuation of higher housing costs in the suburbs will, of course, dampen this tendency.

Findings

In the process of metropolitanization, there has been suburban selectivity of the higher socioeconomic groups. As multicentered metropolitan communities evolve, however, socioeconomic variations among suburbs will probably be of increasing significance.

different suburbs will draw disproportionately from different socio-economic classes. Construction of multiple-dwelling units in the suburbs has increased sharply. Hence, a corresponding broadening in the stages of the family life cycle represented in the suburbs may be expected, including young adults and older couples as well as families with children.

Increased Segregation of Blacks

Within metropolitan areas, the dispersion of population toward the periphery has been until quite recently almost exclusively white. Meanwhile, selective movement of nonwhite minorities to the central cities has been under way since the 1930s. As a consequence, racial segregation has been sharpened. Table 3 shows the nonwhite proportion of metropolitan population since the turn of the century.

The probability is that nonwhite concentration in central cities will continue to increase for the foreseeable future. During the 1960–1970 decade, a number of central cities underwent a major racial

TABLE 3. Nonwhite Proportion of United States and Metropolitan Population, 1900–1970

	Nonwhite Population as a Percentage of:			
Year[a]	Total U.S. Population	Total SMSA[b] Population	Total Central City Population	Total Outside Central City Population
1900	12.1	7.8	6.8	9.4
1910	11.1	7.3	6.9	8.1
1920	10.3	7.2	7.3	7.0
1930	10.2	8.1	9.0	6.4
1940	10.2	8.6	10.1	6.0
1950	10.7	10.0	13.1	5.7
1960	11.4	11.7	17.8	5.2
1970	12.3	13.7	21.9	5.5

[a]Data for 1900–1960 refer to the coterminous United States, whereas data for 1970 include Hawaii and Alaska.

[b]Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1960*, PC(3)-1D, *Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas* (1963).

change, particularly in the Northeast, where the white central city population declined by 9.3 percent while the black population increased by 35.5 percent. For all metropolitan areas of one million or more, nearly 80 percent of the black population live in central cities, as compared to 36 percent of the whites. In metropolitan areas with a population below one million, nearly 75 percent of the blacks and about 40 percent of the whites live in central cities. Washington, D.C., where seven out of ten residents are black, is an extreme example of increasing segregation of the central cities, but in 16 other central cities, blacks outnumber whites.

Nevertheless, in the 1960s many blacks did participate in the deconcentrating movement of the metropolitan population. During this period, the black percentage increase in suburbs was slightly larger than the white—29 percent compared with 27.5 percent—although the numerical increase was relatively small—820,000 as compared to 15.3 million.

These figures reflect the residential stratification by income that exists within as well as among racial groups. While a decade ago the hope of the city was thought to be the middle-income black, today it is this group that is moving to the suburbs. Selective black migration to the suburbs, like the white migration that preceded it, may leave a concentration of dependent families in the central cities, thus intensifying their fiscal and social problems.

However, racial selectivity in the deconcentrating movement of population is more critical and important than socioeconomic differences. In moving to the suburbs, the greatest number of blacks move to large black areas adjacent to the city, in effect forming a segregated overflow from the black area of the central city they left behind. The next largest number move into more distant all-black subcommunities—racial enclaves. Finally, a small number move into predominantly white neighborhoods. As the previous report of the National Academy of Sciences–National Academy of Engineering, *Freedom of Choice in Housing,* found, "while the low-income status of blacks is a factor in their segregation, race prejudice exerts a strong independent influence on the separation of the races."[2]

[2] *Freedom of Choice in Housing: Opportunities and Constraints* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1972), p. 33.

In sum, while the impediments to free choice of residence are greater for minorities, their pattern of movement, characterized mainly by a series of advances toward the periphery, is not greatly different from that of the white groups that preceded them. What remains in doubt is whether the dispersion of blacks will gather momentum in the years ahead. The attitudes of the white population have grown steadily more favorable toward integrated residential living. However, the realization of the goal of an integrated society will continue to require the authoritative support of government at all levels.

Findings

The dispersion of population within metropolitan areas has been almost exclusively white, resulting in an increasing segregation of blacks in central cities. However, late in the 1960s there were indications that the outward movement of minorities was accelerating somewhat. There then began a trend of blacks, especially middle-class ones, moving from the central cities to the suburbs.

Mismatch in Location of Jobs and People

While the net effect of the deconcentrating movement of population is to diminish the educational and occupational levels of those living in the central cities relative to those living in the suburbs, numerous high-level occupations remain in the central city. Central office functions, specialized personal services, and specialized manufacturing demanding a mix of diverse and relatively high-quality skills have manifested a continuing preference for central locations. Cultural institutions also show a degree of centrality. Conversely, manufacturing, wholesaling, and retail establishments, historically the points of entry of the unskilled into the labor market, have tended to move to the suburbs.

Manufacturing. New industrial techniques emerged that reinforced the steady exodus of manufacturing plants away from the

central cities to suburban areas. The increased reliance on the truck for short-haul freight transfers made a peripheral location far more convenient than a central location. At the same time, in many industries horizontal layouts over large lots became more attractive for production efficiency than the older vertical layouts. Large plants, particularly those requiring specially designed buildings, found outward movement very attractive. The movement has been mainly to the fringe of urban concentrations rather than to the countryside. Labor and market considerations in the main require locations near large population aggregates. Moreover, plants can be located to take advantage of newly attractive truck expressways and suburban business areas.

The changes in the comparative advantages of city versus suburban location have resulted in a large increase in suburban manufacturing, while central city manufacturing has declined or, at best, held its own. For the nation as a whole, wage jobs in manufacturing located in central cities declined from 63 percent of the metropolitan total in 1939 to 51 percent in 1958 and 47 percent in 1967. For all regions, the rate of increase in manufacturing employment has been higher in the areas outside the central cities than inside.

Currently, there are scattered signs that manufacturing activities are being drawn to smaller urban concentrations. If so, the intrametropolitan deconcentration pattern may then repeat itself within the national network of cities, perhaps at the expense of the existing large metropolitan areas.

Retail Establishments. In the main, the outward movement of retail establishments has closely followed the outward movement of population. Moreover, distinctive suburban forms have evolved. In the past 20 years, for example, more than 2,500 integrated suburban shopping centers have been constructed, and the trend continues. Currently, shopping center decisions are sometimes made ahead of the dispersion of settlement, with the implicit intent of influencing the pace, direction, and nature of the residential settlement that follows. This important trend stems from new techniques in retailing and is in marked contrast to the traditional retail practice of making location decisions to adapt to changes in the market.

During the period 1958–1967, retail sales in the 37 largest

metropolitan areas increased eight times as fast in the zones outside the central cities as inside. Overall, central city retail trade increased by 13 percent, as compared to an increase of 106 percent in the parts of the metropolitan area outside the central city. Moreover, within the central city the retail trade of the central business district (CBD) has tended to increase much more slowly than that of the central city as a whole. Nearly half of the CBDs actually lost sales during the period 1963–1967, and only three increased sales by more than 20 percent.

Wholesale Establishments. By its nature, wholesaling must locate at the point of least cost for distribution. Historically, it was situated near the geographic center of a concentration of population. Now it, too, is on the move, since congestion and traffic patterns do not inevitably place the point of least cost at the geographic center. Thus, from 1950 to 1967 the wholesale trade in 11 large cities declined 8 percent, somewhat less than the manufacturing and retail decline in these cities.

Personal Services. In general, the location of personal services also has adapted to the outward movement of population, but the more specialized services still display considerable centrality. Physicians, for example, are still relatively more concentrated in the central cities, and among physicians, specialists are more concentrated than general practitioners. However, there is some tendency toward dispersion. A recent study in Providence, Rhode Island, (Zimmer and Cook, 1971) showed that physicians have tended to move their offices to the outer areas within the city or to the close-in suburban areas. However, physicians have located their residences in the suburban areas at a higher rate than they have their offices.

Current Status of the CBD. The CBD continues to perform crucial functions for the metropolitan community. For example, it shows considerable vitality as a location for central office functions, and there are some indications that it may grow even more important in that respect. Business and governmental services that require face-to-face contact continue to show a strong preference for office space in the core of large metropolitan areas. Further, in the early 1960s at least, public administration, wholesaling, finance, the insurance industry, and real estate were still highly concentrated. All these

activities continued to display some tendency toward centrality in terms of land occupied. In addition, central locations have retained their hold on manufacturers of unstandardized products and those dependent on a diversified mix of skills and materials. Also, despite the tendency of retail sales to decline in many CBDs, as long as the CBD continues to be a major employment center, it will continue to be an important shopping center.

At the same time, within the metropolitan area as a whole, the CBD has continued to decline in relative importance for more than a quarter of a century. Once the point of maximum accessibility as the hub of the local transportation system, it lost this advantage as the community expanded in size and a road system not completely oriented to the center developed. In manufacturing, retailing, wholesaling, and personal services, the central cores of metropolitan areas are relatively less important than they were a decade or two ago.

The traditional CBD, with its restricted radius, compactness, and fixed-route transit service, is not the only effective spatial pattern for face-to-face communication. In a more diffuse settlement pattern, of which Los Angeles may be the best example, vehicular movements consume no more time than walking in a congested place such as Manhattan. Thus, time-distance is having its effect on the character of the CBDs. For the nation as a whole, it appears that the CBDs of metropolitan areas are becoming individually more specialized and, taken together, more varied.

Labor Force Location. The movement of jobs to the suburbs enables many suburbanites to live and work in suburbia. For others, the continued location of many higher-income white-collar office jobs in the central cities has meant the maintenance of a commuting way of life. For the many job seekers in the central cities, however, finding suburban jobs is difficult because of inadequate information, lack of transportation, or discrimination, while many jobs available in the central cities do not fit the skills of those who reside there. Although reverse commuting is on the increase, labor may be short in a particular suburban area while at the same time there is a surplus in the city.

As jobs move to the suburbs, residential and employment dis-

crimination are mutually reinforcing. Segregation of the housing market affects the level and distribution of minority employment for several reasons. The difficulty of reaching certain jobs from minority residence areas imposes costs on minorities high enough to discourage them from seeking such employment. Rapid transit does not run near the new centers of economic activity in the suburbs, and many minority individuals do not have access to automobiles. Also, minorities have less opportunity to learn about jobs. Finally, employers located outside minority areas engage in de facto discrimination. Thus, for all these reasons, minorities have limited access to suburban employment.

A study of Chicago and Detroit (Kain, 1968), found a significant relationship between the distance of employment from the major ghetto areas and the level of minority employment. Meanwhile, jobs traditionally open to minorities appear to be suburbanizing at rates comparable to those of other jobs. Thus, as the suburban drift of employment continues, the effect of residential segregation may be to increase the costs of employment for minorities or to reduce job opportunities or both.

Findings

As metropolitan areas develop, there is a tendency for the jobs best suited for the labor force of the suburbs to remain concentrated in the central city, particularly the downtown central business district, while the jobs best suited to the type of labor force locked into the central city move to the suburbs.

Access to Metropolitan Opportunities

The metropolitan community offers its citizens a wide selection of services and opportunities—stores, amusements, public and private services in such areas as education and medical care, and so forth. Specialists of all kinds are congregated in the larger metropolitan areas, and large populations tend to generate a variety of occupational and common-interest groups among which individuals may

pick and choose. Most urban residents are able to benefit from the array of opportunities available. However, some elements of the urban population find it difficult to take advantage of these opportunities; they suffer from a relative deprivation of access.

Metropolitan areas are, in effect, arenas within which numerous activity systems and subsystems operate. Different households and even different members of the same household have different needs, interests, resources, and physical capabilities, and thus their travel and access to information within the metropolis for work, facility use, and socializing varies. While a greater range of choice is open to metropolitan residents, the implementation of a given choice is determined less by distance than by accessibility.

Accessibility has a number of dimensions. One is physical accessibility—the capacity for getting directly in contact with persons or activities. Another is social—psychological—cumulative experiences that enable the individual to utilize the complex urban environment. A third is income, which influences where one lives, what one can afford to do, and what travel mode is at one's disposal.

Accessibility in the metropolitan setting has been undergoing significant changes in recent decades. Among the influences at work are a rise in dependence on the automobile, reliance on the ubiquitous telephone, and the pervasive impact of television. Expectations and consumption patterns that have previously been restricted to a much smaller number of residents—the elite—have become diffused.

From the point of view of the individual citizen, the metropolitan community is a large and diverse potential environment in which to move and satisfy his needs. For the population generally, it represents a shared environment. Within this environment, rich in opportunities, each individual creates an *effective environment*. Gans (1968, p. 6) has defined the effective environment as "that version of the potential environment that is manifestly or latently adopted by users," in other words, that part of the environment that the individual either actively uses or sees as available to him. For the person with physical mobility, enough income, and knowledge of the environment, the choices in a metropolitan area are wide and varied. Conversely, the lack of these capabilities acts as a constraint.

The availability of an automobile to households or individuals may be used to measure the range of physical access now found among residents of metropolitan areas. Increasingly, metropolitan residents find themselves in an environment which is, in effect, designed for automobile users. Land-use changes reflecting automobile predominance combine with the absence of good public transportation to decrease the relative mobility of those who live in today's metropolitan environs without a car.

Since over four-fifths of the households in the United States now own an automobile, one might infer that physical mobility is no longer a factor in access to urban opportunities. In metropolitan areas, 80 percent of trips are always by automobile; taking suburban areas alone, the proportion rises to almost 90 percent (Table 4).

While dependence on the automobile is widespread, ownership and use is less than universal. There are 1.1 automobiles per household in the United States. However, a large number of households own more than one car, while more than 20 percent do not own any.

As might be expected, automobile ownership declines as in-

TABLE 4. Percentage Distribution of Regular Trips by Mode of Transportation, 1965

Mode of Transportation	All Metropolitan Areas (excluding New York)	Central Cities			Suburban Areas
		Old, Large	New, Large	Small	
No. of persons sampled	(1,534)	(89)	(129)	(454)	(862)
Walk or taxi	5	8	2	5	6
Always common carrier	8	37	15	7	4
Sometimes automobile, sometimes common carrier	7	20	18	10	3
Always automobile	80	35	65	78	87

Source: Adapted from J. B. Lansing and G. Hendricks, *Automobile Ownership and Residential Density* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, Survey Research Center, 1967) app., table 7.

come declines. Whereas in 1970 the ratio of automobiles owned to households was 1.59 for those with incomes over $15,000, the ratio was 0.83 for households with incomes between $3,000 and $5,000. For those with incomes under $3,000, the ratio was 0.47. Thus, about half of the families in the lowest income group did not own an automobile. Among families in the lowest income group, however, those living in the suburbs were almost seven times as likely to own a car as those living in the older central cities and roughly twice as likely as those living in the newer central cities. While these ratios may speak well for public transit in the central cities, they also suggest an access problem for city residents in seeking employment in the suburbs. Moreover, lacking an automobile, the poor are limited in their choice of shopping areas. Under these circumstances, as Caplovitz (1963) found, the poor pay more.

Age is also related to automobile ownership. In the age groups between 25 and 55, automobile ownership is above the national average of 1.1 per household, but for persons over 65, the ratio is only 0.64.

Although national data on primary access to an automobile are not available, data developed in a recent survey (Foley, 1972) of the San Francisco Bay Area in northern California are suggestive. The survey defined primary users of an automobile as persons who have exclusive use of a household automobile or have greater use of it than any other household member. The survey found that one-fourth of persons over 16 either did not drive or were in a household without a vehicle. Among minority households, the proportion of persons lacking primary access to an automobile was much higher than among nonminority households—50 percent as compared to 25 percent. Among working members of minority households, 38 percent lacked access to an automobile, as compared to 15 percent of the working members of other households. For all groups, more than twice as many women as men lacked primary access to an automobile, 43 percent compared to 19 percent. Access also declined among the older population, where 71 percent of women and 36 percent of men over 65 lacked primary access.

Apart from income, age, ethnic, and sex differences in access to automobiles, there are many people for whom mobility is limited

by disabilities. As of the mid-1960s, it was estimated that 6.3 million Americans had some limitation on mobility and at least one chronic ailment. As of 1969, an estimated 6.2 million people in the civilian noninstitutionalized population of the United States were reported to have one or more special orthopedic aids—aids to provide help in getting around.

Rising household incomes, lower residential densities, and the predominance of the automobile have permitted the urban population to greatly enlarge its effective environment. However, in the midst of the general trend of rising accessibility to many and diverse opportunities, certain categories of residents, by reason of their household or personal characteristics, find themselves seriously deprived with respect to access. These persons may lack financial resources, they may have physical disabilities, they may lack the knowledge and the coping abilities to get along in the complex metropolis, or they may lack the most versatile and essential transportation—the automobile. Even more likely, they may suffer from combinations of these disadvantages.

Findings

With rising incomes, more education, and greater knowledge about the metropolitan environs, most metropolitan residents are able to benefit from the array of opportunities that exists beyond the actual destinations to which they customarily travel. The aged, the physically handicapped, and the poor, however, do suffer a deprivation of access, for these are the predominant groups lacking use of automobiles, which are now necessary for metropolitan mobility, particularly in low-density suburban districts.

Proliferation of Governmental Units

As the proportion of the metropolitan population living outside the central cities has increased to well over half, governmental units have

proliferated. Outside areas have not been annexed to the central city. The response to the need for government services frequently has been to create specialized service units rather than to assign responsibility to the numerous existing general governments.

The proliferation has proceeded to the point that, excluding school districts, there are over 16,000 units of government within the

TABLE 5. SMSAs with Greatest Fragmentation of Local Government, 1967

SMSA	No. of Local Governments[a]			1970 Population (in thousands)		
	Total	Central City	Outside Central City	Total	Central City	Outside Central City
Chicago	1,113	12	1,101	6,979	3,367	3,612
Philadelphia (Pa.-N.J.)	876	5	871	4,818	1,949	2,869
Pittsburgh	704	11	693	2,401	520	1,881
New York	551	3	548	11,572	7,895	3,677
St. Louis (Mo.-Ill.)	474	6	468	2,363	622	1,741
Portland (Oreg.-Wash.)	385	17	368	1,009	382	627
San Francisco-Oakland[b]	312	18	294	2,988	956	2,032
Indianapolis[c]	282	7	275	1,110	500	610
Kansas City (Mo.-Kans.)	272	22	250	1,254	502	752
Denver	269	6	263	1,228	515	713
Seattle-Everett, Wash.[d]	268	12	256	1,238	401	837
Cincinnati (Ohio-Ky.-Ind.)	266	6	260	1,385	453	932
Peoria, Ill.	261	12	249	342	127	215

[a] Including school and special districts.

[b] Of 18 central city governments, Oakland has 11 and San Francisco has 7.

[c] These 1967 figures have been radically changed by 1969 state legislation that instituted "Unigov" for Indianapolis, drawing a far larger proportion of the population outside the central city under an umbrella metropolitan government.

[d] Of 12 central city governments, Seattle has 7 and Everett has 5.

Source: Adapted from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Governments: 1967*, vol. 5. *Local Governments in Metropolitan Areas* (1969), p. 2; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1970*, U.S. Summary PC(1)-1B, *General Population Characteristics* (1970), pp. 314-316.

existing metropolitan areas—an average of about 60 per area. For larger metropolitan areas, the average number of units is far greater. Areas suffering from acute governmental fragmentation are shown in Table 5. In this group, the range is from one governmental unit for 1,300 people, in the Peoria, Illinois, standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) to one unit for 21,000, in the New York SMSA.

While the number of general local governments has grown throughout the century, in recent years the largest increase in governmental units within metropolitan areas has been in nonschool special-purpose districts. These rose from approximately 5,400 in 1962 to 7,850 in 1972.

The reason for creating new governmental units often appeared self-evident to those involved: to meet the general or special needs of elements of the urban population spread over outlying areas. What in fact was accomplished, however, was a weakening and erosion of metropolitan communities' capacity to plan, finance, and execute the extension of public services throughout the area in an orderly and efficient manner. The stress was on providing services wherever firms chose to locate, developers to build, and people to reside. Controlled or influenced by many political units, government services such as roads, schools, water, and sewerage disposal spread out in many directions. Generally, the method of allocating costs for the extension of services tended to reinforce the outward drift of industry, commerce, and population. If the service could be acquired at all, the user's costs were likely to be similar anywhere within the domain of the particular governmental unit. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that the user might find a more desirable tax-benefit package on the periphery of a metropolitan community. Once services were initiated in response to the needs of a particular segment of the population, they attracted other elements which, in turn, led to a further extension of services.

Meanwhile, of course, various initiatives of the federal government also have had the largely unintended effect of accelerating the dispersal of metropolitan population and economic activity. Among the more significant of these initiatives were those concerned with highways and housing. For example, the federal government financed a major expansion of the urban highway system. The physi-

cal achievement is to be seen in the growth of expressways both into and through the central city and in beltways around the central city. Since their effect was to reduce the time-distance factor throughout the metropolitan area, it is not surprising that they encouraged the movement of commerce and population toward the periphery. Similarly, for many years, housing construction has been underwritten by Federal Housing Agency and Veterans Administration insured mortgages and by income tax deductions for interest and real estate taxes. Most of the mortgages have been for the purchase of new homes located in the suburbs. The availability of favorable credit packages and tax treatment for owner-occupied housing tends to reduce the relative cost of the single-family house in the suburbs and provide an incentive for suburbanization. Highways and housing are, of course, only two of the more important examples of federal activities that speed the suburban drift. The most recent candidate, and potentially the most powerful, although it is still too early for evaluation, is federal revenue sharing. At present this program accommodates the existing structure of local government no matter how fragmented it is.

In addition, state and federal government have often failed to take action that might slow down deconcentration of central cities. For example, in older cities, where institutional and market factors may deter redevelopment, there are few facilities to reduce the cost and difficulty of land acquisition and residential reconstruction. Urban renewal, of course, was an attempt to provide the tools necessary for reducing the cost of land to developers and facilitating land acquisition. Its failure to alter the deterioration process substantially is important to note.

Findings

The proliferation of governmental units in metropolitan areas and the development of urban services in suburban territory have contributed to acceleration of population scatter, as have certain federal programs.

Intergovernmental Fiscal and Social Contrasts

Within metropolitan areas, fragmentation of government has aggravated fiscal and social inequities. A mismatch between resources and social need has resulted. Both fiscal disparities and a socioeconomic gap exist between the central cities and the areas outside. Similar differences now are becoming apparent among the suburban areas. In comparing local government expenditures, it is important to keep in mind that there may be significant differences in the quality of services provided. Moreover, there is a general tendency for prices and wages to rise as the size of the urban aggregation rises. Nevertheless, such comparisons may provide an order-of-magnitude basis for inferences. For example, across all regions of the country, the per capita expenditures of central cities in the largest metropolitan areas exceed the expenditures of jurisdictions outside the central city and the differences are both substantial and persistent over time (Table 6).

In terms of effectiveness and equity in local government, the striking differences in the portion of total resources allocated for educational as compared to noneducational purposes may be even more significant. In the 1950s, suburbs spent less money than central cities on education; by the early 1960s, this situation had reversed. Central city operating expenditures per pupil in the 36 largest metropolitan areas had dropped below expenditures in the suburbs, and by 1965, central cities had a $124 per capita disadvantage. In contrast, in the same metropolitan areas, the central cities were expending $232 per capita for noneducational purposes in 1965, compared to an expenditure of $132 per capita by local governments outside the cities. One explanation for this difference is that part of central city noneducational expenditure reflects expenditures for suburban use of the central city, primarily use by commuters. Given the visible need for high-quality education in the central city, it is unfortunate that cities are compelled to emphasize noneducational expenditures.

In earlier periods, urban growth tended to favor city schools. As late as 1957 central cities in the largest SMSAs still were spending slightly more per pupil than were the suburbs. However, this situation was short-lived. The suburban resources available for schools

TABLE 6. Per Capita Total Public Expenditures of Central Cities and Outside Areas, 1957 and 1970 (Regional Averages Based on 37 Largest SMSAs)

	1957			1970		
	Central City	Outside Central City	CC/OCC Ratio	Central City	Outside Central City	CC/OCC Ratio
Northeast	$207	$165	1.25	$613	$419	1.48
Midwest	190	152	1.23	498	360	1.38
South	165	124	1.33	395	308	1.28
West	224	176	1.27	577	459	1.26
Total (unweighted average)	196	154	1.27	524	385	1.36
Total (weighted average)	213	170	1.25	600	419	1.43

Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, unpublished compilations, 1972.

increased substantially, while overall resources in the cities declined. Cities were faced with growing enrollments, largely because of the rapid increase in the number of young blacks with children. At the same time, there were heavy demands for noneducational expenditures. As the cities were losing their advantage, the suburbs were building up an inventory of school facilities and improving the quality of services.

After 1957 the central city–suburb educational expenditure gap widened. Although the 1957–1963 period was one of rapid increase in school expenditures generally, cities increased their per pupil expenditures from $312 to $449 while the suburban areas increased theirs from $303 to $573. Moreover, since the early 1960s the suburbs, with relatively new schools and equipment, have been able to spend considerably more of their resources on enriching instructional programs and improving teacher pay scales.

These educational disparities between the cities and the suburbs clearly result from the selective processes which were determining who did and who did not settle in the suburbs. Schools as well as other community institutions were profoundly affected.

While suburban school systems may continue to improve and expand, in the long run continuing migration from the central city will change the composition of the school population. The population moving out of the city increasingly will be composed of blacks and members of the white working class and lower middle class. At the same time, the higher-status groups now living in the suburbs are likely to move further out and concentrate in high-status residential areas.

One further fiscal disparity should be noted in this section—the wide variation in tax burdens among jurisdictions. The differences between central cities and suburbs are particularly important. On the average, the central city tax burden (taxes as a percentage of personal income) runs 30 to 50 percent higher than that of the suburbs. According to the latest data, local taxes on the average constitute 6.9 percent of personal income in the central cities, while they are only 5.0 percent in the suburbs. Major differences in the tax burden also are increasingly evident among the suburbs of metropolitan areas. In some cases, these differences are as great as those between the central cities and their suburbs.

The Socioeconomic Gap. During the migration from the farms to the city, large numbers of poor were left behind, stranded in rural areas and small towns with dwindling agricultural employment. A similar phenomenon is apparent today in the outward movement of population from central city to suburb. The poor remain disproportionately concentrated in the central cities of the larger metropolitan areas. Lower middle income groups of all races are locating in the older suburbs. Upper–income groups are found disproportionately in the newer suburbs. The poor who remain concentrated in the central city constitute a special charge on government not only in welfare costs but in other service sectors such as health, education, housing, and criminal justice. The upper-income groups, in contrast, represent an expanding resource with respect to taxation and also in

terms of community leadership. Frequently, however, because of the fragmentation of metropolitan government, political boundaries separate societal capacities from societal problems.

By 1970, significant differences between the central cities and the areas outside them were evident in average incomes and other socioeconomic characteristics. There are also, of course, significant differences among suburbs. The ratio of families with incomes over $10,000 to those with incomes under $3,000 provides one measure of the socioeconomic gap when computed for cities and suburbs. Table 7 shows the ratio per hundred families by size of metropolitan area. While the ratio of high to low incomes rises with size of metropolitan area, so does the difference between the central city and outside central city ratios, and at a more rapid rate. Central cities have proportionately more of the aged, the less-educated, and female-headed families (Table 8). Among the suburbs, significant differences are also found.

TABLE 7. Ratio (per 100 Families) of Families with Incomes Over $10,000 to Families with Incomes under $3,000, by SMSA Size, 1959

Population of SMSA	Entire SMSA[a]	Central City	Outside Central City	Difference in Ratio (OCC/CC)
All SMSAs	124.2	93.9	169.4	75.5
Over 3,000,000	183.0	126.7	311.5	184.8
1,000,000 to 3,000,000	160.5	97.3	238.9	141.6
500,000 to 1,000,000	95.6	73.8	129.3	55.5
250,000 to 500,000	82.8	78.6	87.4	8.8
100,000 to 250,000	70.3	73.1	66.6	-6.5
Less than 100,000	67.0	76.3	44.0	-32.3

[a] Ratios are expressed in percentages.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1960*, PC(3)-1D, *Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas* (1963).

TABLE 8. Distribution of Socioeconomic Characteristics in Metropolitan Areas, 1970

	Central City	Outside Central City
Percentage of persons below poverty level[a]	13.4	6.3
Percentage aged 25–29 with less than high school education	25.3	19.2
Percentage of population over 65	11.1	7.4
Female-headed families as a percentage of all families[b]	17.0	8.8
AFDC[c] families as a percentage of all families[b]	9.8	2.4

[a] 1969 data.

[b] 1971 data.

[c] AFDC—Aid to Families with Dependent Children.

Source: Adapted from C. L. Schultze, E. Fried, A. Rivlin, and N. Teeters, *Setting National Priorities: The 1973 Budget* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1972), p. 295.

Findings

In view of the long-run tendency toward increasing size and complexity of metropolitan communities, the fragmentation of government results in disadvantages for the community as a whole. The movement of population to the suburbs and hence to separate political units has aggravated fiscal and social inequities within metropolitan areas.

Suburban Costs to the Central City

A study (Hawley, 1951) of 76 cities of 100,000 or more population and their metropolitan areas found that per capita costs of government (computed on the population residing within the city) are more closely related to the portion of metropolitan-area population living

outside the city ($r = .554$) than to that living in the city ($r = .398$). The difference was even more pronounced if expenditures were limited to "operating costs" only. The relationships were such that when linearity was assumed, every increase of one person in the central city population was associated with a $1.30 increase in the cost of government, whereas an increase of one person in the outside area added $2.77 to the cost of government in the central city.

In other studies, this impact of the suburban population on city expenditures was still evident when controls for central city's size, age, per capita income, and the percentage of the population that is nonwhite were introduced (Kasarda, 1972). The added burden placed on the city by nonresidents who live near it is usually referred to as the "suburban exploitation of central city" hypothesis. Kasarda also showed that the number of suburbanites who commute to work in the central city has a direct impact on the total per capita operating expenditures for central city services. His detailed examination has shown that the suburban population in general and the commuting population in particular exert heavy costs on police, fire protection, highway, sanitation, recreation, and general administrative functions performed in the central cities.

In sum, the daily use of central city facilities by suburban residents is reflected in increased expenditures for municipal services in the central city. It can be argued, of course, that higher expenditures result in better-quality services that elicit greater suburban use of the city than if the quality of services were low. Suburban use may increase the value of property in the city, and commuters may pay user fees and sales taxes within the city. If so, there may be a gain to the economy of the city as well as a cost to its government. However, suburban residents may experience a net gain while avoiding a fair share of the costs.

Findings

It appears that residents who remain in the central city subsidize the suburban residents' use of public services.

URBANIZATION OF RURAL AREAS

A single urban society is emerging that includes both the metropolitan and the nonmetropolitan population. Whether a person resides in a rural or a metropolitan area is less indicative today of patterns of behavior than are a number of other characteristics, such as socioeconomic class and ethnic background. The assumption of a rural–urban dichotomy, or any other division based on the premise that residence in small villages or open country in some way results in distinctive characteristics, is unwarranted.

While differences in behavior patterns persist and will continue among communities and regions, these variations are small compared with the common elements of the shared urban culture. Geographic differences do not have the magnitude and consistency of earlier times. Differences do exist, however, among the socioeconomic classes and the ethnic groups within communities, regardless of whether the community is rural or urban.

The urbanization of rural life is evident from a number of perspectives. The farm population has declined until it is now less than 5 percent of the total United States population, while the rural nonfarm population has grown substantially. Increased off-farm employment in rural areas accounts for part of the growth. Commuting from rural communities to urban work places is another factor. A benchmark in the urbanization of rural areas was reached between 1940 and 1950, when more than half of the rural population could be classed as *rural nonfarm.* No longer were the rural areas primarily agricultural. The residents were employed increasingly in diverse occupations, and homogeneity of interests tended to disappear.

In 1970, although 27 percent of the nation's population was still classified as rural, five out of every six rural people were nonfarm. In 19 states, over 90 percent of the rural population was nonfarm. In no state was a majority of rural population in the farm category.

Urbanization of rural areas also is evident in the two-way flow of migration between urban and rural places. The outward movement from urban areas tends to bring urban value systems into rural areas. A recent study (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1971) found

that urban-to-rural migrants made up 24 percent of the white rural population, while rural-to-urban migrants made up 20 percent of the white urban population. For the black population, however, the relationship was reversed. Among blacks, urban-to-rural migrants made up only 11 percent of the rural population, while rural-to-urban migrants made up 21 percent of the black urban population.

As metropolitanization gathers momentum, it reaches out to link and absorb formerly rural areas on the periphery of a metropolitan community. Today, the country's highest growth rates are to be found in the rural areas adjacent to metropolitan areas. A recent study (McNamara, 1972) in the North Central region found that the larger the metropolitan area, the higher the level of migration into the adjacent nonmetropolitan counties. More generally, the scope of outward drift from the central cities into the "rural–urban fringes" of metropolitan areas has increased in the last decade. Urban areas, as defined in the census, increased from 25,000 square miles in 1960 to 35,000 square miles in 1970. The growth rate of communities within 50 miles of a metropolitan area has been twice that of similar places at greater distances from metropolitan areas and well above that for the nation as a whole. Moreover, a study (Sturgis, 1973) of the growth of communities with populations of over 10,000 for the decade 1960–1970 found that among the rapidly growing places within 50 miles of a metropolis, those with high interstate highway access were growing twice as fast as those with low access (28 percent growth over the decade as compared to 16 percent). During the 1960s, of course, major improvements were made in the interstate highway system.

Today, the employment radius or "labor shed" of a metropolitan area is determined by time-distance, the distance that can be traveled in a specific time. Acceptable commuting distances are determined by the time it takes to travel to the major areas of employment, not by distance per se. When the employment area is viewed in this way, one can understand the rapid growth in the areas adjacent to metropolitan communities. Taken together, of course, those daily commuting areas take in a large amount of territory. In some parts of the United States, where the metropolitan areas are relatively close together, almost all the so-called rural territory is

within a one-hour time-distance. Over one third of the counties in the United States are either metropolitan counties or adjoining counties.

The growth of agribusiness is yet another indication of the urbanization of rural areas. Farming has become a business enterprise and has declined as a family-centered way of life. Changes in the organization and the manpower requirements of agriculture have brought with them a reduction in the differences between farm and city life. Widespread ownership of automobiles, telephones, radios and television sets by farm people has given them access to news and information as complete as that enjoyed by urban residents. In virtually every sphere of daily life, the resident of the open country is served by urban-type institutions. The exceptions to this urbanization are mainly persons below the poverty line.

Findings

The deconcentrating movement of urban populations and the diffusion of urban characteristics are not confined to metropolitan areas; they have extended into the adjacent rural territory to produce there the country's highest growth rates. Ninety-five percent of the nation's population lives within the labor shed of metropolitan central cities. This labor shed may be delineated by the time required to commute to major places of employment.

BENEFITS AND COSTS OF URBAN "SPRAWL"

Suburbanization, as was noted earlier, has increased the problems of the cities. There is a growing concentration of the poor and blacks in the cities. Because of lack of mobility, there is a serious mismatch between the inner city labor supply and new jobs, which are now increasingly found in the suburbs. The costs of these problems are disproportionately borne by the cities. There are also other costs resulting from suburbanization that the suburbanite escapes because of the fragmented nature of metropolitan government. Each taxing

jurisdiction concerns itself only with the costs that bear directly on itself. In addition, federal policy has provided stimulus toward suburbanization in the form of major road systems and tax incentives to encourage home ownership. The costs of these have been borne in large part by taxpayers other than the suburbanite.

The issue these points raise is whether urban "sprawl" would have gone so far or so fast if the suburbanite had paid all the costs created by suburbanization rather than shifting them to others. Is it not possible that the social costs of suburbanization are now exceeding the social benefits?

The automobile and an increasingly wider network of roads for commuting facilitate the spread of suburbs farther and farther from the central cities. A substantial portion of journeys to work (which account for approximately one-third of automobile trips), as well as some shopping, recreation, and business-to-business trips, take place between suburbs and cities. These trips impose costs both on surrounding communities and on other road uses. Although costs of construction of the interstate highway system and some state highways are borne entirely through gasoline taxes, the collection of these taxes on a per gallon basis rather than a true cost per car mile basis involves some subsidization of the urban journey to work at the expense of intercity and other trips. Moreover, road maintenance often must be financed by local jurisdictions. This expense is especially burdensome for central cities, whose roads are heavily used by outsiders. In addition to these costs, there are the costs to other drivers caused by congestion and delay on the highways. The costs of noise, air pollution, and accidents often are imposed on neighborhoods through which heavily traveled roads pass. As land is taken for highways, relocation costs are borne largely by the residents and commercial establishments directly affected. And since automobile insurance rates are computed on a local basis, city residents may pay higher rates which are in part attributable to commuter traffic.

Quantification of many of these costs has been very limited. In the Boston area, higher road maintenance and automobile insurance costs as well as a disproportionate share of transportation assessments were found in the inner ring which is heavily used by commuters. There have been efforts to measure air pollution effects on land

values. Studies of land values in the San Diego and Chicago metropolitan areas have found lower values near the freeways. In short, the limited evidence suggests that central city residents may in effect bear a portion of the cost of suburban commuters.

Some economists, for example Tiebout (1956), have argued that the proliferation of governmental units with homogeneous constituencies provides more responsive public services and, by implication, results in greater efficiency. One finding—that more fragmented counties spend less per capita than those with fewer jurisdictions—lends some support for the thesis. However, an alternative explanation may be that fragmented districts provide fewer or poorer-quality services. More important in the present context, however, may be the incentive this fiscal fragmentation provides for moving to the suburbs to avoid some of the costs it creates.

Favorable credit arrangements and tax treatment for owner-occupied housing also may have contributed to a more decentralized urban pattern. In the older sections of the central city, it is more difficult to utilize these advantages of home ownership. However, there has been little empirical study of the extent to which these policies make a difference. A related factor is the relative ease of acquiring blocks of land for residential construction at the periphery of urban areas rather than in the older, more densely settled parts of the city. In general, developers find suburban residential construction more profitable. Speculation in essentially rural land on the urban fringe may also encourage suburbanization. However, the extent of such speculation and its effect have not been established. But whatever the incentives, suburbanization increases the distances that separate various types of land use—residential, industrial, retail, recreational, and the like. The results, as have already been noted, are higher transportation costs and, for inner city residents, more limited employment opportunities, although studies differ on the magnitude of this problem. All persons who do not have the use of an automobile—most frequently the elderly, those with physical disabilities, and the poor—suffer from the reduced accessibility associated with spatial separation.

Racial discrimination, of course, is also a powerful independent factor at work. Those who want to escape residence near racial

minorities and the poor move to the suburbs. The result of suburbanization, until very recently, has been increased segregation of blacks in the central city. The long-run costs of continuing this pattern are incalculable. Meanwhile, the negative effects on educational achievement and the reduction of positive contacts that provide a corrective for prejudice may be counted a cost of suburbanization.

In sum, given the present state of the research and the present structure of local government in urban areas, attempts to assess the overall effects of urban deconcentration produce scarcely more than an informed judgment. Inferences about the distribution of costs, however, generally move in a common direction. The costs of socioeconomic segregation and of access to metropolitan services, job opportunities, and so forth, are disproportionately borne by low-income, minority, and elderly individuals. As an offset, there may be an increased availability to the poor of old housing. In some cities, however, this has now proceeded to the point of abandonment of the older residential areas. In addition, suburban settlement, aging facilities, fiscal disparities, commuter movement, and other factors tend to lower values in older neighborhoods occupied by poor renters and moderate- and low-income homeowners. In essence, the central city and the people who continue to reside there bear costs of suburban sprawl for which they are not compensated, while suburbanites receive some benefits for which they do not pay. Suburbanization may be said to have gone too far inasmuch as the costs are not fully borne by those who suburbanize and the present structure of government does not address the distortions that result.

Findings

The benefits of urban sprawl are distributed regressively with respect to wealth. While the advantages of lowered residential densities have been obvious in the past (at least when nineteenth-century densities are considered), the current net benefits may be negative. Sprawl appears to have outrun the ability of government to meet the requirements of urban settlements. Moreover, given the present structure of government, distortions in the

distribution of costs and benefits are not readily correctable. There is reason to require more equitable sharing of costs, not only between the suburbs and the central city, but also among suburbs. There is also an argument for ending or modifying subsidies that have favored single-family, automobile-dependent, low-density suburbanization.

In summary, during the twentieth century metropolitan communities have been expanding systems. Their population has increased. Their production has grown. Wealth has accumulated and income has risen. Mobility of goods, people, and ideas has increased. As growth took place, it was accompanied by an even more rapid deconcentrating movement of population and activity within the metropolitan area. The consequences for the metropolitan population as a whole were an unprecedented rise in standards of living and improvement in the quality of life.

However, up to the present, the costs and benefits of metropolitan expansion have been unevenly distributed with respect to various sectors of the population. The segregation of blacks has increased. Employment opportunities tend to be remote from residence. Residential choice has been severely limited for moderate- and low-income groups. Access to many urban facilities is restricted for those without automobiles. Meanwhile, fragmentation of government makes it more difficult to match needs and resources. And all the while, it appears, the full costs of suburban movement may not have been borne by those suburbanizing.

The recently emergent shortage of petroleum and other sources of energy may reverse the trend toward expansion. Barring that possibility, there is still the question of whether metropolitan communities will continue to expand in the absence of the capacity to deal with the inequities that result. If that capacity is to be acquired, metropolitan people and their leaders must somehow gain a clearer appreciation of their actual interdependence and their potential common interests. This is what community, in the most useful sense, means.



3

New Meanings of Community in the Metropolitan Context

The common social and economic institutions through which urban populations carry on their daily life are now metropolitan in scale. Even governmental institutions, in which there are critical lags, are seeking to adapt to the new scale. A growing interdependence within metropolitan areas is evident in the exchange of goods and services. The degree of job specialization and the range of services in these areas increase as scale expands. Similarly, the population and its interests become more diverse. The effective daily environment for more and more urban people is the metropolitan macrocommunity. As life moves to a metropolitan scale, the term *community* takes on new meanings. This chapter attempts to answer the following questions: (1) What are the characteristics of people's experience at the macrocommunity level? Do city and suburban life differ significantly? (2) What factors influence people's satisfaction with their residential environment? What is the effective residential environment? Chapter 4 will examine what remains of the microcommunity in the metropolitan environment.

THE METROPOLITAN EXPERIENCE

Metropolitan facilities and services are varied, and metropolitan groups are diverse. A significant increase in facilities for satisfying needs and wants accompanies population aggregation. The heterogeneity of large population concentrations increases the range of options for social interaction. As transportation and communications have improved, these service and social options have been distributed over wider areas. Urban people are now able to move about an entire area to gain access to preferred facilities and groups.

Urban Facilities.

The quantity and in some cases the quality of stores, amusements, public and private services, and the like, vary to an important degree with community size. The presence of specialists of various sorts seems to require minimum levels of population. The larger the population, the more likely the individual is to find the particular good or service he seeks. The ready availability of goods and services is a characteristic of the metropolitan experience.

During phases of metropolitan deconcentration, facilities and services may be at a relative premium in suburbs, although city facilities are, of course, accessible for suburbanites. However, as population and wealth move outward, facilities (stores, meeting halls, amusement complexes) do the same, perhaps eventually leaving the central city with fewer facilities and services. A similar tendency is evident with respect to government services.

Urban Population.

Large urban population aggregates are characteristically heterogeneous. In Western societies, that is most likely because of the numerous economic opportunities offered in cities and their position on transportation paths. These features attract diverse people and activities.

As ethnic groups have settled in urban areas, urban populations have become more varied. Ethnic neighborhoods, of relatively low socioeconomic status, have been pictured as provincial villagelike units that keep to themselves and closely control their members.

However, many of these areas were never so detached from the wider community as has been assumed. For example, in Chicago only about one-half of the Italian migrants settled in Italian colonies; the other half were quite dispersed. For this dispersed population, the concentrated Italian colonies functioned as a cultural center where they could visit, buy ethnic goods, and maintain cultural connections. Many areas of the metropolis—for example, Chicago's Chinatown—continue to function as an initial settlement point for migrants and immigrants but also serve a much wider population. Even black ghettos, which frequently are genuine places of confinement, may act as cultural centers—for example, Harlem.

Diversity is internally generated by population size as well. Large cities have a variety of occupational, common-interest, and life-style subcultures (for example, bohemia, academia, various business and professional groups, criminal underworld, the "singles set"). Job specialization and diversification of life styles increase as population increases and spur the development of distinctive subgroups. At the same time, metropolitan populations provide the large numbers of people necessary to sustain these distinctive groups.

Research repeatedly finds that as urban units increase in size, their populations become less traditional and less conservative. This is true for various aspects of life, including race relations, sexual behavior, the family, religion, and law and politics. The "deviant" nature of cities is consistent historically and cross-culturally, suggesting that a more open attitude may be an intrinsic feature of urban life. Generally, it is to the urban centers that deviants of all sorts come, find supportive comrades, and maintain distinctive subcultures. These subgroups have protected their members and also affected the community by making others aware of their values. Consequently, cities historically have been the scenes of scientific, economic, social, and political innovation as well as of turbulance and dislocation.

As a result of urban diversity, one can find areas as cosmopolitan as Greenwich Village or as provincial as the Addams area on the West Side of Chicago. These contrasts expand the opportunities for varied experience. Were the population of New York City randomly distributed, the opportunities to enjoy the city's ethnic and cultural centers would be lost.

The experience of the urban resident is highly likely to involve contact with alien groups, groups whose life styles or interests are different from his. However, the various groups are not entirely separate; they overlap and intersect at many points. In the light of research on small-group processes, one could expect this situation to be accompanied by contrasts of the "us" versus "them" kind, accentuating boundaries between the groups. There are some bits of evidence that the larger the size of community, the sharper such intergroup lines are. For instance, social classes seem more distinct and more important politically in larger cities. On the other hand, the boundaries may be more rapidly eroded in large cities. Vital subcultures existing side by side may lead to positive as well as negative contacts. Thus the diffusion of beliefs and practices among culturally distinct groups is likely to be greater in large population aggregates.

In sum, urban social structure is diverse and pluralistic. Urbanism provides all types of people with the opportunity to be among people with similar interests, and the more unique the individual, the more that opportunity depends on population size. An artist, intellectual, or chess fiend might have great difficulty supporting his interests in a small community. The diversity of metropolitan subcultures and their contacts makes metropolitan areas the sites of innovations and opportunities of many kinds. Inventions start among small urban groups, spread to other urban people, and then to the nation. This process, moving forward on many fronts simultaneously, provides a wide range of options for the individual.

Findings

The metropolitan experience is manifold, and offers a great range of opportunity in terms of both facilities and social contact. It substitutes translocal for local associations and interests.

Personal Relationships

Certain types of social interaction are presumed to be more frequent in urban settings. The long-standing distinction between *primary-*

group and *secondary-group* relationships is particularly relevant in the metropolis. In primary-group relationships, people interact as whole personalities and are involved with one another in a variety of ways (for example, families or close friends). In secondary relationships, the relationship exists for a particular purpose and people know only single facets of one another (for example, store clerk and customer, teacher and pupil). In urban life, individuals presumably have more secondary relationships (one cannot know personally every clerk, customer, bus driver, and so on, as one presumably does in a small town). However, there is little if any decline in the number or the depth of primary relationships, nor are there any particular personality changes. Urban life offers a large number of potential secondary relationships in addition to, rather than in substitution for, primary ones.

One effect of urban people's mobility and wider range of social interaction may be that they are less strange to one another than is commonly believed. The proposition has been forwarded that friendships are less numerous or more shallow in the urban setting; however, there are few data to support the hypothesis and no empirical reason as yet to believe that urban life isolates people from important social relationships. Friendship ties are probably more dispersed but no less significant.

Findings

At present, the best evidence suggests that the metropolitan experience involves an increase in the number and variety of impersonal (secondary) relationships and that the frequency and quality of personal and intimate (primary) relationships has remained virtually unchanged.

Prevalence of Crime and Violence

There can be no question that crime is a major contemporary concern. There seems little doubt that the large-city resident is more

likely to encounter criminality than the person in the small town. Higher urban crime rates are reflected in city residents' awareness of danger. Fear of walking the streets alone at night is prevalent in all urban communities but highest where populations exceed one million.

Property crime and vice seem to accompany population growth in almost all cases, partly because large populations create opportunities for such crimes—consumers of vice, accumulations of property, and the aggregation of criminals fosters the rise of underworld activities and organization.

Violent crime is a different matter. In this connection, one must keep in mind that crimes against the person occur most frequently between relatives and acquaintances; in 90 percent of the cases of homicide, the victim knew his assailant. Socioeconomic and ethnic factors appear to influence the level of violence more than population size. Indeed, cross-culturally and historically, rural areas have predominated in violent lawlessness.

While the average crime rate is lower in the suburbs than in the city, it is increasing in the former at a more rapid rate. Criminals, like other urban people, are becoming increasingly mobile, and attempts to deal effectively with urban crime will have to be made at the metropolitan level, not by fragmented local governments.

Findings

When socioeconomic and ethnic factors are taken into account, it is not clear that cities per se breed violence, though they do present more opportunity for property crimes and vice.

Effects on Health

The physical nature of the city seems to be a persistent source of distress for its residents. A number of irritants, particularly noise and

pollution, increase with increases in community size. Some increase in both noise and dirt probably accompanies all population aggregation, but the levels present in the modern metropolis could probably be reduced.

A recent National Research Council examination in 1972, of children ages 6 to 11 found no association between community size and hearing sensitivity. Furthermore, there is little evidence of urban–rural differences in the presence of psychosomatic symptoms that one might expect from noise. Pollution might be expected to influence health, and cities historically have been unhealthy places because of sewage problems and epidemics. In recent times, these hazards have been reduced or erased by medical advances and modern methods of sanitation. Of course, intense recurrent smog may indeed result in substantial harm to the health, particularly for persons who already suffer from heart or lung disease. There is convincing evidence that air pollution does cause ill health and higher mortality rates (e.g., National Research Council, 1972). On the whole, some amount of noise and pollution is probably an inevitable concomitant of urban life, with pollution, at least, imposing a degree of biological damage. The psychological consequences, however, are probably negligible.

Population density is, of course, characteristic of the metropolis, and crowds are often considered to be one of the irritants of the city. We do not know to what extent people actually spend time in crowds, but the real picture can be nowhere near the stereotypic image. The assumption behind much of the current literature on urban life—that city people spend a significant part of their lives crowded—is questionable. Another popular assumption—that population density has serious negative social consequences—is also questionable. Other than a small number of animal studies with dubious relevance, there are few data to support that view. To the extent that available space does not meet their personal demands, people will feel "crowded" and psychological effects perhaps will result. But density per se seems to have little psychological effect.

Another hypothesis about urban life is that it results in stresses and tensions that are deleterious for the individual. It is doubtful that stress is a significant part of the average urbanite's experience or that

it cannot be handled. Certainly, there is little evidence that the symptoms of stress are more common in cities. For instance, one international survey (Inkeles, 1969) reported no real urban–rural differences in psychosomatic symptoms.

It is also theorized that the strain of urban life, together with the hypothesized disintegration of close supportive social ties in urban environments, should lead to psychiatric disorders. It is difficult to assess whether the incidence of such disorders increases with urbanism. One difficulty, for example, is that admissions to mental hospitals are partly a function of the availability of such institutions, and availability is greater in urban areas. Also, forthrightness about psychological difficulties is affected by potential social stigmatization, which varies by community size. One recent review (Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 1971) of nine varied and international studies of the incidence of psychological disorders concludes that neurosis tends to be more common in urban areas and psychosis is more common in rural ones. Most of the available data are mixed and generally inconclusive, especially if one seeks to isolate the specific effects of urban life per se.

Findings

There is evidence that pollution does cause some degree of biological damage. There is very little support, however, for the theory that city life impairs mental functioning in ways that can be termed psychiatric disorders.

CITY–SUBURBAN DIFFERENCES IN BEHAVIOR

City and suburban residents who are otherwise similar probably have the same degree of personal involvement in their respective communities. While the frequency of interaction among neighbors in contemporary urban areas is low, there is actually no standard of what should be expected. It may be that occasional and somewhat superficial contacts with neighbors suffice as a complement to more time-

consuming associations with friends, colleagues, and relatives. A study (Hawley & Zimmer, 1970) of six metropolitan areas found that only one-third of the suburban residents had any contact with the occupants of adjacent houses; the proportion in central cities was even less. Now as never before, people are able to choose their associates and their avocations from an area at least as broad as the metropolitan community.

Suburbanites may have more contact with neighbors, community civic groups, and the immediate family and less contact with other relatives and former friends. In comparison with a central city resident, a suburbanite may have more close and personal local interactions. However, hard data are difficult to come by, and a Los Angeles study (Seeman *et al.*, 1971) reports little evidence to support the proposition.

What city–suburban differences do exist may be largely attributable to class and ethnic differences. Suburban residents—once social class is controlled—are probably less involved politically in their communities than are central city residents, although new residents are more civically active than older residents. Perceived threats to the community, however, will stimulate political involvement. An apt conclusion about the central city–suburban experience—as much as can be said about it—is provided by Gans in his study, *The Levittowners* (1967, pp. 288–289):

> *The findings on changes* [which occur when city families move to the suburbs] *and their sources suggest that the distinction between urban and suburban ways of living postulated by the critics (and by some sociologists as well) is more imaginary than real. Few changes can be traced to the suburban qualities of Levittown, and the sources that did cause change, like the house, the population mix, and newness, are not distinctively suburban. Moreover, when one looks at similar populations in city and suburb, their ways of life are remarkably alike. For example, when suburbs are compared to the large urban residential areas beyond the downtown and inner districts, culture and social structure are virtually the same among people of similar age and class. Young lower middle class families in these areas live much like their peers in the suburbs, but quite unlike older, upper middle class ones, in either urban or suburban neighborhoods.*
>
> *The crucial difference between cities and suburbs then is that they are*

often home for different kinds of people. If one is to understand their behavior, these differences are much more important than whether they reside inside or outside the city limits. Inner-city residential areas are home to the rich, the poor, and the nonwhite, as well as the unmarried and the childless middle class. Their ways of life differ from those of suburbanites and people in the outer city, but because they are not *young working or lower or upper middle class families. If populations and residential areas were described by age and class characteristics, and by racial, ethnic, and religious ones, our understanding of human settlements would be much improved. Using such concepts as "urban" and "suburban" as causal variables adds little, on the other hand, except for ecological and demographic analyses of communities as a whole and for studies of political behavior.*

Findings

City–suburban differences in patterns of living, for example, differences in community involvement and frequency of contact with neighbors, are almost entirely explained by socioeconomic differences. The remaining differences are probably caused by self-selection; that is, those who already possess a certain characteristic elect to move to a location that attracts people of that type. The characteristic is not caused by the location.

SATISFACTION WITH RESIDENTIAL ENVIRONMENTS

During the past decade, a number of empirical studies have sought to analyze people's responses to their residential environments. Recently, survey research has been used to investigate both people's preferences and the quality of American life—one aspect of which is individual level of satisfaction with one's residential community. Going beyond sample-survey findings like those of Gallup or Harris, the Institute for Social Research has sought to develop a framework within which past and subsequent data may be analyzed. At present, the available knowledge merely suggests where further work is needed and is not conclusive. Nevertheless, the information available does indicate great variation in both the size and the attributes

of people's effective environments. It also underlines the variety of factors that affect satisfaction with one's residential environment.

One point that may seem obvious but is often neglected is that the quality of life for an individual or a group is a composite of life experiences and is influenced by many factors, such as family, friends, work, and recreation. These factors are increasingly dispersed in an urban setting. Residential environment is another factor, although its boundaries are often uncertain in the minds of the occupants. Residential satisfaction is affected, for example, by the public services provided by local governments. Determining what attributes of residence people consider relevant is a complex empirical question. In addition to the vast number of community or neighborhood attributes, there are different standards against which different people judge them. Density, access, services, and other factors that have very subjective aspects are all involved. Unfortunately for those concerned with shaping policy and programs, the empirical base required to identify the determinants of community satisfaction is at a very early stage of development. Nevertheless, the available evidence permits certain preliminary inferences that may be helpful.

Accessibility and Density

Historically, country people seem to have included the cities in their latent effective environment. The movement to large population aggregates continues in the United States and in the world at large. One reason for this pattern is the urban image—the city is a place of opportunity, largely economic opportunity, but also opportunity for entertainment and excitement. Today, surveys of public attitudes indicate that people prefer to have access to the facilities of metropolitan areas while retaining a residential location in the less densely settled portions of those areas. Although many people express a preference for places the size of those in which they reside, an increasing number of people prefer places smaller than the areas in which they currently reside. (In part, this finding may be influenced by the categories used and the lack of reference to accessibility.) With age, the preference for less densely settled areas increases moderately. Whatever the size of present place of residence, a sig-

nificant minority expresses a preference for residence in a place of different size. Size preferences should not be evaluated independently, however. In a Wisconsin survey (Zuiches & Fuguitt, 1971) a large majority expressed a preference for residing outside a city but within easy commuting distance of it. Of those now living in a metropolitan community, about 85 percent expressed a preference for such a location (within 30 miles of a large city). Similarly, about half of the nonmetropolitan population would prefer to live in a metropolitan environment (again, within 30 miles of a large city).

In short, in a metropolitan environment, people seem to seek both accessibility and space. Better transportation has increased accessibility in recent decades, and greater distance from the city center usually means lower population density and less noise, traffic, pollution, and crowding. It also may permit more housing space and more outdoor space with relatively little net loss in accessibility to the facilities of the metropolis.

Public Services

Survey research (Marans & Rodgers, 1974) indicates that residents' satisfaction with their community is affected by their assessment of specific public services and costs. These include such things as public schools, police protection, and garbage collection and the level of taxation required to support them. Eight public service attributes were investigated. The attributes all were related to general satisfaction with the community, although the strength of the relationships varied a great deal. When combined, the attributes explained a significant, though modest, fraction of the overall variance in residents' satisfaction with their communities. (The attributes included public schools, police protection, parks and playgrounds, garbage collection, police–community relations, public transportation, streets and roads, and taxation.)

Site Design

One of the paradoxes of the expansion of urban life is that as the residential neighborhood has waned as a social unit, it has gained

importance among city planners as a unit of urban design. The assumption appears to be that if a residential area is held to a given size, developed with certain distinctive architectural or design features, and built about a school or shopping center, the residents will enter into frequent associations and cultivate a relatively intense local life.

The "physical design" tradition has a long history in the United States. Its achievements include such early efforts as Pullman in South Chicago, a complete town built for company employees in 1881; Ebenezer Howard's Garden City; Forest Gardens on Long Island, designed by Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr.; Shaker Heights in Ohio, built by the Van Sweringen brothers; and, in the 1930s, three greenbelt towns, for which Rexford Tugwell was the public entrepreneur. In time, as deconcentrating movement occurred, these became elements of suburbia. Among the intellectual influences on planners' ideas of community design, Clarence Perry's concept of the "neighborhood unit" may have been the most significant. Perry not only sought to link social and physical considerations, but also argued for sharply bounded territorial units and a physical design that increases the distinctness of such units. He stressed the positive value of local unity. His concept included generating social communities by building a variety of social service agencies around a single territorial focus. Perry's influence, however, led to an emphasis on the integration of territorially defined communities at a time when how nearby a person lives was declining as a basis for preferential association. Moreover, it has been asserted that the neighborhood unit tended to crystallize or worsen existing patterns of segregation.

In recent years, a few private builders who seek to construct total communities rather than merely subdivisions of marketable homes have set new directions in urban planning. Columbia, Maryland, and Reston, Virginia, are well-known examples and seem to have been reasonably successful in meeting many of the public and private needs of their residents, who have been predominantly young and mobile. As the communities have been settled, there has been considerable social interaction, but there is no reason to believe that it has been exceptional in comparison with other suburban developments during their formative years. In Sweden, where new communities have been built with an even fuller complement of

nonresidential facilities, participation in local social activities is moderate and about the same as in older communities.

In essence, the limitation of physical design as an approach to the creation of communities is that it can only express what is present in the culture; it cannot alter it. Moreover, in the absence of a conceptual framework and empirical data for analyzing what is present in the culture, the experience and preferences of the planner and developer tend to take over. Following Gans, one can probably say that plans do not match the variability of the population and that practice commonly departs from plan. Thus, if the population is highly mobile, the residential area will be utilized in a cosmopolitan fashion rather than in the localized way envisaged in the plan. If business interests predominate, those interests will be reflected in the actual pattern of residential construction. If the price of land is cheaper on the periphery and prospective residents have transportation, the construction of new residential communities will prove more feasible beyond the boundaries of cities and further stimulate and accelerate the deconcentration of the cities.

In the past several years, research on the relationship between residential satisfaction and site design has been undertaken in both the United States and abroad. One of the early findings was that the evaluation of planners and other nonresidents was often at variance with the evaluation of people living in the community. While studies found that the individual dwelling and its social setting were of some importance in how people assessed their environment, they also disclosed that most people, including many of those living in "substandard" environments, were fairly content with the communities in which they lived. Recently, there have been efforts to assess the relationship between various degrees of site planning and resident satisfaction with the community. Levels of resident satisfaction in self-contained new towns, redeveloped central city neighborhoods, and sections of incorporated suburban communities have been compared in relation to the extent of planning. Manipulation of specific attributes of the physical environment according to accepted planning principles was the measure of the extent of planning. For instance, the amount of open space, the density of residential development, the presence of trees and water, and the time-distance

between housing and shops, schools, swimming pools, parks and other facilities are attributes of the environment that can be measured, observed, and assessed. They also can be varied by planners for economic, aesthetic, or other reasons.

In one study (Lansing *et al.,* 1970) ten communities, in which the extent of planning ranged from low to high, were selected for comparison. When residents were asked to indicate their current level of satisfaction with the area in which they lived, most indicated that it was high. Although a greater degree of planning tended to be associated with high satisfaction, some communities in which the extent of planning was great received low satisfaction ratings. A review of the reasons offered did not find any clear patterns of attributes, liked or disliked, to be associated with the extent of planning.

In sum, people's satisfaction with their residential environments may be influenced by the alternatives they believe are available in the metropolitan region, by their perceptions of the costs and effectiveness of public services, and by the characteristics they see as important in their immediate neighborhoods and dwellings. In addition, the assessment may be affected by other aspects of life.

Findings

Many factors influence people's evaluations of their residential environments. This may help to explain why, although there is a tendency for higher levels of satisfaction to be associated with a higher degree of residential planning, no clear patterns of liked or disliked attributes are associated with different levels of planning. Moreover, studies of the quality of life indicate residential satisfaction is partially based on assessments of such nonsite attributes as public schools, police–community relations, and local taxes.

Measures of Satisfaction

Objective indicators of social conditions—for example, gross national product, unemployment rates, price indexes, number of hous-

ing starts, number of high school graduates, and birth and death rates —are well known and useful in understanding our society and the changes taking place within it. However, the human significance of an objective indicator is not always obvious. Subjective indicators are needed as a supplement, because a person's satisfaction with any set of circumstances depends not only on the circumstances themselves, but on a whole set of values, attitudes, and expectations that he brings to the situation.

At least two operations occur when an individual evaluates a situation. First, he perceives the situation. Discrepancies between reality and perception often occur. Second, he assesses the situation, as perceived, against some standard. The standard not only may be composed of many elements, but also may be situation-specific, that is, applicable only to the situation under consideration and not to all situations. And, of course, the characteristics of the person influence the standard.

A person's evaluation of the quality of his life depends on a complex process of comparison. For example, objective measures of income and need are insufficient to explain satisfaction with income. Data from cross-national studies indicate that life satisfaction is related to income (Marans, 1974). Evaluation of one's standard of living seems to depend on comparison with the standard of living of a reference group that is primarily national in scope. As Cantril (1965) illustrated, by quotations from respondents in a cross-national study of life satisfaction, residents of different nations can have strikingly diverse concepts of the best possible life. Similar, though less striking, differences may occur among groups within a nation. A recent comparison of satisfaction levels of black and white respondents in 15 cities in the United States found that the blacks generally expressed considerably less satisfaction with their situation than did whites (Campbell, 1971). This is hardly surprising given the objective situation of black people in the United States. However, the discrepancies persisted even when income and education were taken into account. The data raise the question whether the major source of discontent and protest among urban blacks is really their below-average incomes and housing or rather the overall pattern of exclusion and subordination they encounter in a white society.

In evaluation of satisfaction with a residential environment, then, subjective measures may be different from traditional objective indicators. There is need for both. Each takes on further meaning as it can be related to the other. While some objective measures of residential areas may in fact have little to do with the satisfaction experienced by residents, subjective measures may in some circumstances simply reflect a lack of awareness of the range of objective alternatives available. Discrepancies between objective and subjective indicators, however, may point to the need for further evaluation, and in so doing they serve a useful purpose.

In a quality-of-life study (Marans & Rodgers, 1974) based on national survey data, multivariate analysis techniques were used to get at the relationship between objective and subjective indicators of the quality of neighborhoods. Substantial correlations were found between objective indicators and respondent perceptions regarding three aspects of the residential environment: (1) upkeep of neighborhood structures, (2) size, and (3) racial composition. Respondents also were asked to express their levels of satisfaction with the neighborhood and to assess the neighborhood in terms of a set of five items: (1) condition of housing, (2) neighbors, (3) whether it is safe to walk outside at night, (4) how important it is to lock doors when not in the dwelling unit, and (5) convenience. Multivariate analysis using both objective measures and respondent assessments leads to the conclusion that the explanatory power of the objective indicators relative to neighborhood satisfaction is modified by the intervention of subjective factors; the assessments of specific neighborhood characteristics reflect the objective characteristics, and the specific assessments in turn affect the level of expressed satisfaction with the neighborhood as a whole.

Findings

Multivariate analysis shows that the links between objective and subjective measures of environmental attributes are substantial. The impact of environmental characteristics, as measured by objective indicators, on residents' satisfaction with their neighborhoods is moderately strong, but other factors intervene.

Common Standards

Demographic characteristics such as age, race, and educational level are sometimes presumed to have a direct effect on satisfaction with one's environment. However, evidence from a quality-of-life study (Marans & Rodgers, 1974) suggests that whatever the influence of these characteristics, the individual's assessment of particular attributes of the environment has a much closer relationship to level of satisfaction than to such factors as age. The strength and direction of the relationship between assessments of particular attributes and overall satisfaction with the environment did not differ greatly by age, race, or education. Thus, these characteristics may not play as important a role in people's satisfaction with their environments as has sometimes been assumed. In most instances, the same community attributes seem to matter to people of all sorts; the sources of dissatisfaction for one type of person are likely to be sources of discontent for everyone.

The major differences in evaluations of the environment are differences between objective indicators and subjective measurements. Subjective measurements will, of course, vary, but people do share common standards, and these generally exert more influence on evaluations of the environment than do differences among people.

UNDIFFERENTIATED LIVING SPACE

Some people do not seem to differentiate much between their microneighborhoods, consisting of the houses in the immediate vicinities of their dwellings, and the macroneighborhood, by which is often meant grade school districts or areas bounded by major thoroughfares. Indeed, the various residential environments—microneighborhood, macroneighborhood, metropolitan area—may simply represent a set of interacting domains that comprise an individual's life space. Attributes that determine satisfaction with any level of the residential environment may overlap those that determine satisfaction with another level. Marans and Rodgers (1974)

were unable to find any distinction between micro- and macroneighborhoods, since both are equally indicative of community satisfaction. And, of course, for some purposes, the effective environment is metropolitan in scale.

Findings

People do not clearly differentiate between their micro- and macro-neighborhoods. The characteristics of one are often confused with those of the other.

In summary, the metropolis is characterized by a wide range of opportunities. The opportunities arise from the variety of urban facilities and from the diversity of social groups. Life at the metropolitan level substitutes mobility for nearness and translocal for neighborhood interests and relationships. It does not seem to change the ways in which people relate to one another but it does tend to increase the diversity of contacts. Whether residence is in the city or the suburbs does not affect behavior, although socioeconomic differences that are likely to exist between city and suburb do exert an influence.

In the metropolitan context, many factors influence people's evaluations of their residential environments. While urban planning seems to produce a higher level of satisfaction with the residential environment, no clear patterns of liked or disliked environmental attributes are associated with different degrees of planning. In part, this may be because people do not make clear distinctions between their micro- and macroneighborhoods. Certainly, further study and analysis of residential satisfaction are needed to provide a basis for policy in this area.



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The Microcommunity: Control of the Immediate Environment

As was noted in the Introduction, there are two common definitions of *community*. One defines a community as a population carrying on a collective life through a common set of institutions. In this sense, the term can apply to a population aggregate of any size, and it is with community in this sense that we have been concerned in the preceding chapters, where the focus was on the metropolitan macrocommunity. The second definition of community is the traditional one, for which the village has been the model: a grouping of people who live close to one another and are united by common interests and mutual aid. The members of a community of this type are presumed to be united by bonds of sentiment. It is with community in this sense that we are concerned in this chapter, which focuses on the neighborhood, or microcommunity.

There has been a tendency to view the urban neighborhood as a weakened form of the village type of community. Metropolitanization has had important consequences for the microcommunity as it

is traditionally conceived. There is general agreement that as the range of urban opportunities has widened, the level and intensity of intra-neighborhood interpersonal transactions relative to extra-neighborhood transactions has declined. Shared sentiment is no longer a distinguishing feature of the microcommunity.

In the following discussion, the available research has been drawn on to correct and amplify the traditional notion of community in an urban setting. The focus is on two related questions: What has happened to the microcommunity or neighborhood as a locus of interaction? What is the role of the microcommunity as a means of control over the immediate environment?

CHANGES IN THE MICROCOMMUNITY

The changes that have occurred in the urban microcommunity may be viewed from two complementary perspectives. On the one hand, it is useful to focus on the dispersal of the relationships and destinations of neighborhood residents outward throughout the metropolitan region and beyond—on what has departed from the microcommunity. On the other hand, it is necessary to assess what functions the neighborhood may continue to serve and the kinds of interaction that remain—on what is left in the microcommunity.

Whether one examines what is left or what has left, it is apparent that although there is more variation among neighborhoods, individually they remain homogeneous. This situation arises because the settlement patterns of the diverse metropolitan population reflect such factors as socioeconomic class, the family life cycle, and ethnic background. As compared with traditional communities—certainly the small-town version—metropolitan microcommunities show a pronounced amount of interdependence. They both require and are the object of an increasing array of public and private services. And they experience in many ways the desirable and undesirable effects of life at the metropolitan level. Of course, not all the citizens of a metropolitan area have equal access to the varied metropolitan opportunities, and this fact must be taken into account too in assessing the present significance of microcommunities.

Dispersal of Relationships and Destinations

As the urban unit increases in size, the family and friends, functions and facilities of the residents of a particular microcommunity are likely to be dispersed over a widening area. Although the resident may still spend as much of his life in the limited network of immediate family, friends, and co-workers, the spatial dispersion of the network increases and the resident's destinations are more often found beyond the microcommunity.

With the dispersal of relatives, there may be a reduction in the degree to which the family is called on to provide aid and other services, but relatives are still the major source of aid. When relatives are not available, formal urban institutions, rather than the microcommunity, provide the alternative for supplying these needs. As family members have dispersed, the urban nuclear family has come to rely on specialists to perform many household functions. There are now day nurseries, wedding and party managers, marriage and family counseling agencies, juvenile courts, financial consultants, medical specialists, and many others, and each of these may represent a potential outside destination for the microcommunity resident. Similarly, the diversity of the urban environment tends to reinforce the dispersion of friendships. People with special interests are more likely to find friends who share them in a metropolitan area, but who live beyond the confines of the neighborhood.

Meanwhile, shopping centers, places of employment, and recreation areas increasingly are to be found outside the microcommunity. Each represents a daily, weekly, or occasional destination for the microcommunity resident.

As residential densities decline and household incomes rise, the automobile becomes the predominant form of transportation. Together with other forms of improved communication, it facilitates access to opportunities located throughout the metropolitan area. As this happens and as the interests and capacities of urban residents become more diverse, traditional neighborhood patterns of interaction are diminished. The microcommunity provides simply one of many opportunities for relationships and activity.

The result of dispersion of interests and relationships is that neighbors no longer know one another as well and are less important to one another and that residents' attachment to the neighborhood decreases. While the metropolitan distribution of population may have increased the homogeneity of small areas, localized transactions and the significance of neighborhood life have declined. Indeed, urban people travel so frequently and so far that they have little time for neighborhood interaction. But the easy mobility of modern man has yet another impact on neighborhood life. It induces an indifference to environmental details. As the area of vehicular travels expands, the scope of pedestrian movement contracts. Hence, today's urban resident spends relatively little time in the prolonged association and close observation that familiarity with place demands, and, again, the significance of the neighborhood is diminished.

Microcommunities, of course, differ substantially in terms of the average incomes, educational levels, and ethnic compositions of their populations. These differences affect access to urban opportunities and thus the level and intensity of transactions in the microcommunity. For households in the upper reaches of the status scale, the place of residence may be simply that and nothing more. The transactions of a middle-class professional, for example, may take place over the whole of the metropolitan terrain and beyond. In working-class areas, too, the frequency of informal associations with occupants of adjacent residence units is not great. But in neighborhoods whose populations are poor, lack education, or are members of minority groups, the residents may be more neighborhood-oriented, because these conditions circumscribe access to urban opportunities and, in effect, compel turning inward to the microcommunity. Even so, the difference between these two is one of degree, not kind.

Findings

Lower residential densities, rising household incomes, increasing specialization, and a preponderant reliance on the automobile have contributed to the diminished importance of the more traditional neighborhood, or microcommunity, pattern.

What Remains in the Microcommunity?

Within the metropolitan environment, people sort themselves into residential areas. They choose places to live on the basis of what they can afford, the kind of people who live there, and the facilities and services available—in sum, by deciding whether the experience will suit them. Since the neighborhood no longer serves many of its traditional functions, the homogeneous settlement pattern is puzzling. What are people seeking and how important is it?

The microcommunity is no longer the arena in which people find most of their opportunities for friendship or voluntary activity, for leisure pursuits or political participation. The place of work and the place of residence are seldom both in the same neighborhood. As has been noted, families are usually dispersed in metropolitan areas, and the level of interaction among neighbors is relatively low. Then why do people choose a residential area with such apparent care? What functions do they expect the microcommunity to serve?

One thing people do not seem to expect, if their subsequent behavior is any indication, is any great amount of intimate interaction with fellow residents. However homogeneous the microcommunity, the general rule seems to be that a little neighboring goes a long way. Although the rule may be violated in newly settled areas and in certain special circumstances, neighboring subsequently tends to decline to a normally low level.

Yet the microcommunity, to the extent that it persists, must serve some purpose for its residents. The function must be important, but it must not be too demanding of time or attention, given the low level of neighborhood interaction. Ideally, perhaps, from the point of view of the residents, the microcommunity should be an instrument of environmental control requiring a rather low level of contact. In this sense, the microcommunity may serve as:

1. A community of presumed goodwill
2. A territorial subunit where residents can be mobilized, at least episodically
3. A place in which people may make significant investments, not only material but social

The idea of residential groups as communities of presumed good-will derives directly from their spatial mutual interests. No matter how cheap transportation may become, people must still continue to live together in neighborhoods. These territorial groups are important insofar as their members are vulnerable to one another. People who share space are vulnerable to one another because they are within striking distance as assailants, adulterers, noise makers, and so on. The behavior of neighbors may affect one's sense of security, comfort, or pride. However, if the residents have a measure of mutual trust and agreement on the uses of the shared features of the environment, the need for contact may be reduced.

The microcommunity also may act as a territorial subunit whose residents can be mobilized, at least episodically. It is capable of mobilizing to defend itself against perceived threats to its interests, and in times of crisis or emergency it may act to some extent as a community of last resort for residents who have exhausted the assistance of family and friends. These responses generally involve few sustained contacts. Concerted action by territorial subunits when faced with large-scale authoritative decisions about land use or service delivery is an exception, however.

Finally, the microcommunity may be the place where people have important investments, not only in terms of home ownership, but also in terms of their efforts to provide an environment that promotes the welfare of their children, the safety of their families, and their own social status. Again it is interesting to note that, with the relationships stemming from child raising excepted, only limited contacts may be required to protect these investments.

Variations in the Microcommunity's Significance

The significance of the microcommunity for a particular individual may change over time. In addition, the microcommunity may serve different purposes for different groups in society.

Family Life Cycle

During certain periods in the family life cycle, the microcommunity may be more significant and the level of interaction may increase.

The child-rearing stage is the primary example of such a period. Parental associations develop about the play patterns of children and last as long as childhood play requires supervision and guidance. Activities tend to center in the microcommunity during the child-rearing phase, disperse as children grow to maturity, and then contract again after retirement age is reached. Many adults' persistent nostalgia for the microcommunity derives from memories of early childhood, when the neighborhood was of necessity the basis of interpersonal relationships. Now the neighborhood may be a predominant center of activity only for children too young to drive.

Class and the Microcommunity

Among middle and upper socioeconomic groups, neighborhood homogeneity is the result of choice, while among the lower socioeconomic groups, it reflects resource constraints. The degree of choice or constraint is reflected in the purposes a neighborhood serves for its residents and in the extent of neighborhood interaction.

For example, in middle-income suburban neighborhoods, a perceived threat to the value of residential properties or the physical well-being of the residents seems necessary to stimulate community mobilization, and this mobilization lasts only for the duration of the crisis. Homeowners' protective associations are notorious for their short life spans. Nevertheless, although the middle-income suburban neighborhood may possess few if any permanent mechanisms for community action, when armed with subdivision restrictions, building codes, protective covenants, and other legalistic devices, it has served exclusion objectives rather effectively. Indeed, high-income residential areas now often have professionals to handle the control function for them. Residents may rarely find it necessary to see or associate with one another in order to maintain control over their residential environment.

Among lower-income microcommunities, obtaining effective and responsive public services tends to be more important than excluding perceived threats to the neighborhood. On the whole, these microcommunities have not been very successful in obtaining better-quality schools or housing or in preventing the intrusion of

highways into residential areas. Nevertheless, the microcommunity may be especially important to the poor and minorities. For these groups, access to metropolitan opportunities and political institutions may be limited. Slight changes in the national economy may affect their livelihoods. In short, the microcommunity provides the only basis for extensive reciprocal trust.

In fact, contrary to the usual description of the poor neighborhood as "disorganized," it serves as a much more effective basis for organized social life than the wealthier neighborhood does. Of necessity, underprivileged groups cultivate patterns of behavior that enable them to survive in relatively inhospitable environments. The residential areas of the poor and the ethnically distinctive are often highly organized, but, as a long series of studies has shown, not in the middle-class pattern. Organization is evident in the presence of various peer groups and gangs equipped with explicit rules and procedures, in ethnic churches, in communication networks, in clear understandings of who the neighborhood turf belongs to, and in the behavior considered proper relative to outsiders. Although these elements of organization may not be approved by the community at large, they provide a basis for regulating social life.

In sum, interaction in poor neighborhoods may compensate to some degree for lack of access to opportunities potentially available in the larger environment. Interaction in these neighborhoods tends to focus on improved public services, while in upper-income neighborhoods what interaction exists is likely to be concerned with generalized control of the immediate environment. At one end of the spectrum, the problem is to get out of the microcommunity; at the other end, the concern is likely to be keeping others out. But nowhere do traditional notions of neighboring and solidarity appear to be reflected in a high level of human interaction.

Findings

In the metropolitan context, the local neighborhood, or microcommunity, has become relatively less significant as a locus of interaction and a force in personality formation. It survives principally as

a means of control over the immediate physical environment and in that respect tends to operate as a unit only when it is threatened. Poor and minority neighborhoods are somewhat of an exception. In these neighborhoods, social interaction is more intense and community efforts are more concerned with obtaining responsive public services than with the exclusion of threats to the community.

MICROCOMMUNITY BOUNDARIES

Americans vary in their perceptions of their neighborhood boundaries, their loyalty to their microcommunities, the extent of their local participation, and in what they want out of the places in which they live. Residential areas vary as much or more in racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic composition; in life styles; in the physical features that can be used to create images and boundaries; and in claims to a distinct reputation or identity.

If a localized residential population cannot point to territorial limits that separate it from other populations, then it does not really constitute a microcommunity, except perhaps as a contrived social entity. The corporate community has its legal boundaries to define it. A microcommunity may have no legal boundaries, but it must have some definition.

Many people, however, define their neighbors by a much smaller spatial configuration than the microcommunity: neighbors are those whose property or apartments directly abut their own, who live on the same block, who are within walking distance of particular establishments, or who come out for sociability on the streets during the evening. For others, only a broadly defined neighborhood really reflects their sense of territorial placement, which includes large segments of the metropolitan community.

Still others see themselves as members of tiered community areas that extend from the smallest area to progressively larger ones. People vary considerably in their movements and their choices of social affiliation. To make these choices, however, they seem to rely on a mapping of alternatives that, for most, ranges across a set of

territories with a common center—adjacent households, "my" block, the neighborhood, a sector of the city, the corporate city, and the entire metropolitan area. This list, however, only hints at the actual terms used and the multiple choices available to map the effective environment. There are, of course, many people who give little thought to the boundaries of these areas, and there are vast areas of any large city that are irrelevant to a particular resident.

Microcommunities seldom have any official standing, they are not recognized by city governments, they are not data-gathering units for reports on social problems, and they do not have any officials assigned specifically to them. Although changes in the structure of metropolitan government may ultimately be essential, some metropolitan problems might be mitigated if governments could be induced to be more systematic and sensitive in identifying and reinforcing existing social groupings. One of the early attempts to provide a rational basis for microcommunity decision-making processes by defining community areas in Chicago was that of E. W. Burgess (1923). The areas have remained relatively intact despite great change and movement within the city. Both he and H. W. Zorbaugh (1929) were active in trying to get the city of Chicago to adapt its administrative districts and political wards to coincide with community areas, but they met with little success. Their efforts, however, represent a challenge to others in the field to find some means of making metropolitan government more responsive.

Recently, Suttles (1974) has suggested an interesting three-tiered approach to the problem of identifying and responding to urban microcommunities. The lowest tier would consist of the smallest "named" residential unit or "walking community." The second tier would be a combination of contiguous residential units and would maximize heterogeneity. The number of communities combined to form each second-level unit would be limited so that their leaders could gather easily for face-to-face negotiation. The third tier would contain a number of second level units. It should have a large enough population to support several public service agencies and to contain some prominent group (e.g., business or university elites) which provides leadership in the city or metropolitan area.

The object of the three-tier concept is to provide microcommunities with effective leadership backed by large and organized constituencies. The leaders would have influence at the top of the metropolitan political hierarchy, because this representational structure makes it possible to pyramid local preferences and unites small communities into a larger constituency. The three-tiered units would be outside the formal governmental structure of the city, but they could be recognized by officials as appropriate informal negotiating bodies. They might be particularly useful as a means of achieving more local control over the provision of public services without segmenting public service districts into uneconomical units. They also could serve as data-gathering units and thus provide reliable information for use in obtaining more equitable public services. And they could serve as superdistricts, in which administration of certain local public services and facilities (for example, schools, libraries) would be decentralized, thereby increasing the public service options of the residents of the units. However, there is a question whether or not enough qualified people could be induced to accept leadership roles in these relatively small and informal political units.

A central problem in microcommunity control of the environment, then, is the absence of any authoritative way in which residents can appeal to a single set of boundaries. It is remarkable that microcommunities exist at all in metropolitan areas, given the mobility of the urban population and lack of support by supracommunity organizations. Despite the lack of recognition, these local areas are frequently, though episodically, the base for civic associations, voluntary self-help groups, and community-action groups.

Findings

A central problem in microcommunity control of the environment is the absence of any authoritative way in which residents can appeal to a single set of boundaries.

LIMITED MICROCOMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

Americans, in the main, are not eager to participate in collective decision making regarding their numerous public services. Those who have spent some time "working for the community" know that it is a hard and relatively unrewarding task. The trend in the United States seems to be toward specialization in terms of who participates in this activity and an increasing use of professionals and formal organizations.

In working-class communities, ghettos, and ethnic centers, informal meeting places (the tavern or drug store), street-corner gangs, church groups, and precinct politics supply the means for collective communal life. It has been difficult to recruit people in such neighborhoods into formal associations closely related to public agencies (PTA, YMCA, and the like). In recent years, there seems to have been an upsurge of protest groups in low-income areas, although these are often short-lived and sporadic in their activity.

In middle-income areas, informal relations seem to be heavily shaped by the management of children—by such projects as babysitting pools, little league teams, splash parties. Formal organizations, however, are much more extensively developed than in lower-income areas. The PTA, recreational centers, community centers, civic associations, and voluntary associations find ample constituencies in these communities. Frequently, these groups are linked to national or regional structures that give residents some sense of being part of a larger social structure than their local community. Political groups manage to maintain a small cadre of activists that swells during elections.

Recently, a new trend has occurred in these middle-income areas: the use of professionals to look after microcommunity affairs, especially recreation, counseling, and communication. A number of community groups have hired specialists in these areas, and it is likely that this type of reliance on professionals will continue if the budgets of these groups hold up. This trend may mean that the number of resident participants in community affairs will diminish. The professionalization and specialization of microcommunity leadership may signal the passage of microcommunity responsibilities to a narrowing

circle of people chosen because they are apt to be effective and versatile in negotiations with supracommunity organizations.

Certainly the problem of dealing with, let alone influencing, urban institutions has grown more complex. The specialization and multiplication of metropolitan agencies force microcommunity groups to deal with a large number of administrative units. Microcommunities have no regularized relationship to the larger metropolitan community that surrounds them. The standardization of public services and the appeal of professionals to "objective" decision rules make metropolitan institutions inflexible in the face of locality group desires. The number of people an urban public agency must serve reduces the likelihood of individualized treatment and client feedback. Public meetings on agency policies may not allow the people who will be affected much voice in the final decisions. The necessity to use militant tactics to gain even the attention of agency administrations is distasteful to most people and does not necessarily increase the service orientation of public administrators. Generally, local groups have been more effective in influencing elected representatives than in changing the behavior of administrators of public service agencies, even though these agencies may have a pervasive effect on the quality of life in microcommunities. Indeed, apart from the use of professionals, local organizations have been most effective simply by support of existing institutions with which their interests correspond.

Whatever the personal attachments residents may have to the locality, urban microcommunities require some common objective as a basis for organization and action. Currently, microcommunity objectives tend to center on the residents' shared roles as (1) consumers of private and public goods and services, (2) citizens concerned with safety and security, (3) victims of environmental pollution, and (4) families seeking education and jobs that permit participation in the larger society. Despite the potentially broad range of common interests, and even when organizational structures are relatively abundant, participation is always rather limited.

Activity in the typical microcommunity is not only voluntary but partial. Residents vary in their involvement. Although the importance of local voluntary associations as a response to issues broader than

those which happen to have an immediate impact on some residents is acknowledged, only intermittent involvement for particular objectives is expected from neighbors. To illustrate, parent–teacher and civic associations may persist over long periods. At the same time, particular individuals maintain an interest in school or civic activities only so long as they have children or are socially ambitious. These associations, then, are *communities of limited liability*—communities in which people invest their efforts and resources for achievable gains within the short term, expecting that they can "pull out" on short notice without losing much. Still, these communities represent areas of continuing common interest. Indeed, this type of "community" is probably the working ideal of most social planners and the mass media.

Since the notion of a community of limited liability is so obviously a construct, it has been regarded by some as nothing more than that. Such communities are real enough, however. They have official identities and boundaries that are incorporated into the scale models of local areas used by private and public organizations. With rare exceptions, cities are divided into a mosaic of separate and sometimes competing *communities of limited liability*. Unlike the microcommunity or neighborhood, in which people may pursue a number of shared objectives, these communities are defined by particular limited interests. In this perspective the people of a single neighborhood may function in more than one community of limited liability and have many different adversaries or partners as members of various communities.

It is this mosaic of overlapping boundaries that probably gives the community of limited liability its most distinctive features. Since there are often *competing communities of limited liability,* an individual frequently finds that his interests are divided among adversaries or are different from those of his neighbors. Participation in the *community of limited liability,* then, is a voluntary choice among options rather than one prescribed on the basis of residence alone. Local community organizations, improvement associations, political interest groups, and the like attract only a portion of the local residents. In turn, action on behalf of the *community of limited liability* becomes specialized and self-consciously oriented toward limited

issues. The residents' interests, therefore, are only partially captured by groups that are narrowly specialized.

Findings

Although residents of microcommunities often share similar life styles, participation in neighborhood affairs is usually limited. There is instead a tendency to rely on professionals and formal organizations for the discharge of community responsibilities. Microcommunity action is basically determined by communities of limited liability, *that is, group activities in which people invest their efforts and resources for achievable gains with the expectation that they can "pull out" on short notice.*

ENHANCEMENT OF MICROCOMMUNITY INFLUENCE

Since low-income neighborhoods have difficulty in obtaining effective public services, a number of social reformers and social planners have been concerned with making local government more responsive to the needs of the immigrant and the working class, or, in today's terms, the poor and minorities. Although many of these efforts were in the interest of local communities, the reformers were primarily concerned with increasing access to the larger society rather than with enhancing the significance of the neighborhood.

Settlement House Movement

The efforts of Jane Addams are an early case in point. The settlement house movement, which she helped to found, stemmed partly from the view that middle-class young people like herself, having no outlet for their education, could be of value by becoming directly involved in the alleviation of social problems. The movement was concerned with the communal needs of working-class people and immigrants and with obtaining access to the wider urban environment for these

people. The settlement house was not primarily intended to change the structure of local communities but was to operate as a center around which residents could gather to develop consensus, partake in a self-defined form of social life, and mobilize either to serve their local community or negotiate with public and private bureaucracies.

The movement was successful because it maintained a continuous association with leading thinkers, social innovators, and the public media and because it was willing to challenge established power by mobilizing local groups for political purposes (that is, for access to political influence). Over time, of course, the movement lost both its "sense of mission" and, as the composition of disadvantaged groups changed, its contacts with the people it was trying to serve.

Alinsky's Efforts

Perhaps the main inheritor of the settlement house idea was Saul Alinsky, who continued to see residential groups as potential sources of social solidarity that could counterbalance the growth of big business, big labor, and big bureaucracies. The Back of the Yards Council in Chicago has been generally regarded as an effective organizational effort. However, such militant community organizations seem to work best where there is a political machine, as in Chicago, that possesses the power to deliver more or different public services to a local community. The Woodlawn Organization, also created by Alinsky, has had great difficulty in negotiating with relatively autonomous public agencies (for example, the Board of Education) or city employee unions (for example, the police). Relatively autonomous city bureaus—which Lowi (1968) calls "the new machines"—are a growing phenomenon, while city political machines are a declining one. Perhaps neither Alinsky's work nor the settlement house movement is an appropriate model any more, simply because the political institutions which must be influenced have changed.

Mobilization for Youth

R.A. Cloward and L. Ohlin (1960) based this program on the hypothesis that there is a type of lower class microcommunity which is new,

ill-formed, and anonymous and whose residents spend most of their time fighting among themselves. They felt that outside advocates would be required to take the role of indigenous leaders. These advocates would arouse the disorganized lower class groups to settle upon their natural leaders, find a consensus among themselves, and use territorial unity as a basis for negotiating with city hall.

Undertaken on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, Mobilization for Youth was one of the largest programs ever initiated privately. It included a number of projects which were aimed at community self-help and mobilization to make increasing demands on the wider community at large. However, the program's contribution to improving conditions on the Lower East Side remains uncertain. Its major impact may have been that its methods influenced the War on Poverty.

The War on Poverty

When the War on Poverty was initiated the federal government was being heavily influenced by advisers who stressed a "culture of poverty" interpretation of the nation's urban ills. The culture of poverty theory emphasized the continuity of values between generations among the urban poor and explained their predicament as self-inflicted. Outside assistance was needed to break up this "pathological cycle" and arouse local residents for neighborhood improvement and self-help ventures. The Mobilization for Youth program introduced the idea that outside help also should promote agitation for improved public services and community control. When outsiders were funded by the federal government, locally elected officials and other interest groups objected to the unilateral change in the rules of the game and developed effective means of resistance. However, programs initiated by the War on Poverty have continued in areas in which they have developed local support. Subsequently, the Model Cities program combined local involvement of citizens (especially minorities and the poor) with more coordinated city, county, and state agencies. It also stressed the need for governmental decentralization. To date, the results of the Model Cities program are mixed.

Findings

Attempts to increase the influence of the microcommunity in the wider community frequently have floundered, because adversary relationships between microcommunity groups and public agencies have developed.

In summary, an examination of the urban microcommunity fails to indicate that it is much more than an institution for control of the immediate environment. The neighborhood has become relatively less significant as a locus of interaction and a force in personality formation. Mobilization of residents is difficult and intermittent. The boundaries of activity are multiple and uncertain. Participation is voluntary and relatively restricted, and involvement is characterized by a sense of "limited liability." For the poor and minorities, microcommunity activity may provide an avenue of access to the larger society. However, such activity is unlikely to result in sustained interaction within the microcommunity. In short, the microcommunity survives principally as a means of control over the immediate physical or public service environment and in this respect tends to operate as a unit only when it is threatened. The traditional view of community is inappropriate when applied to urban neighborhoods. Their significance must be viewed in the context of the larger, multicentered, metropolitan community.

5

The Spatial Dimension of National Life

The emergence of the metropolitan community as the dominant form of urban organization resulted, as has been noted, from the interaction of many factors, including major improvements in transportation and communications. Beyond the concern with individual metropolitan areas, however, some questions remain: What is known about the present intermetropolitan network? What are the future implications of forces now at work for the spatial dimension of national life?

THE INTERMETROPOLITAN NETWORK

As has been indicated, population growth continues to concentrate in metropolitan areas, but at different rates in different parts of the country. One group of 18 states, primarily in the north central, southern, and southwestern regions, has shown continuous concentration of population since 1940. In a second group of 18 states,

population concentration has been increasing, but at a decreasing rate. Only 10 states have had either a constant or decreasing rate of concentration. These data suggest that although concentration will continue, the rate will vary and will be greatest in the southern, southwestern, and north central states, where the metropolitan unit does not account for as large a share of the population as in the northeastern or western states.

Natural increase is now the major factor in growth while rural migration is declining in importance. However, rural migration still could play a significant role in the southern and southwestern states. If the decline in birthrates continues, it could begin to slow down the rate of population growth in the metropolitan system over the next several decades. However, it is not likely to reduce the dominance of the metropolitan unit.

Although metropolitan areas share certain common characteristics, they differ not only in size and rate of growth, but also in many of their economic functions. While data and theory are limited, attempts have been made to classify metropolitan areas in a meaningful way and to identify factors that help to explain major differences among them.

Central place theory has emphasized that there is a hierachy of center cities and metropolitan areas of different sizes performing different functions. Evans (1972) has demonstrated that if there are land, labor, and service costs that vary systematically with city size, industries having different input requirements will find it advantageous to locate in cities of different size. Research is now under way at the Urban Institute to identify how particular economic activities are attracted to cities of a particular size.

Duncan and his associates (1960) have described the network of metropolitan communities, each with particular functions, that now composes a nationwide system. Duncan identified five national centers: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Detroit. These cities perform integrative functions for the metropolitan network and are aided by a number of regional metropolitan communities such as San Francisco, Minneapolis–St. Paul, Kansas City, Seattle, Portland, Atlanta, Dallas, and Denver. In addition, it is possible to

identify a number of major manufacturing centers such as Pittsburgh and St. Louis. The influence of these larger centers radiates to lesser metropolitan areas and eventually to smaller cities, towns, and the open country.

The consolidating effect of this network can be seen in the lessening of economic and social differences among various regions of the nation. At the same time, differences between large and small centers within the network have increased.

Different-sized cities may be most efficient for different functions. Clearly, high-level services that cluster with corporate and government decision-making agencies are most attracted to large metropolitan complexes. The fastest-growing metropolitan areas—Atlanta, Houston, and Denver—are emerging as major centers for corporate headquarters and specialized services in the least developed and fastest-growing regions of the country. These cities are assuming roles already held by the largest centers in the established and slower-growing eastern region. In the established regions, such as the East, the fast-growing areas are now the relatively small ones. They are attracting fabrication units and branches of established firms that have found costs and conditions in the largest areas unprofitable.

The essence of the regional control and service center is that it centralizes these functions into a single well-integrated complex serving a large area. Even if in some sense the per capita benefits of living in these large cities were maximized, it would not follow that all cities should be of that size. Historically, the Midwest was too small for both Chicago and St. Louis to be regional centers, and Chicago won. Who knows what the relative futures of Houston and Dallas will be?

A case has been made by Harris and Wheeler (1971) that, given sufficient mobility of households and businesses among centers of different sizes, aggregate land values for metropolitan areas will capture the net benefits of urban growth. In other words, it is the land market that reflects the net benefits of urban growth, so efficient growth of the metropolitan network will be seen in aggregate metropolitan land values. Land values, adjusted to reflect market prices,

are available for almost all SMSAs in the United States for 1963. These were analyzed in a multiple regression framework to identify associated variables. The metropolitan areas fall into three basic categories. The first consists of areas that are characterized primarily by manufacturing. The second, which overlaps the first to some extent, contains metropolitan centers with a high concentration of corporate headquarters and business services—the regional centers. The final category consists of the six largest clusters, which perform a large number of national and international control functions. The results of analysis are consistent with the idea that there are increasing and then decreasing economies of urban growth over a range of population up to about 3 million. Tentatively, it appears that the first group, manufacturing centers, experiences diminishing returns between 500,000 and 1 million. Beyond the million mark, total land values actually decline in cities without important regional headquarters. St. Louis and Pittsburgh are the most notable examples of places that may have grown larger than would be dictated by efficiency. In the second group of SMSAs, those with a large number of corporate headquarters, there seems to be no sign of diminishing returns until the population exceeds 1 million. At that point the net gains diminish less rapidly than is the case with manufacturing centers although beyond 1.5 million there seem to be substantial diseconomies of growth. In the largest metropolitan areas, with populations in excess of 3 million, land values rise in proportion to population increases, and there is no evidence of an eventual reversal of this relationship. These largest metropolitan areas perform the high-level coordinating functions of "world cities," and there is room for only a very few such specialized centers.

The system of urban places is best visualized as a functional network rather than a geometrical pattern. Large organizations, whether they operate in the economic sector or elsewhere, all contribute to the interrelationship among metropolitan areas, weaving a dense network of connections and interdependencies. Mergers, federations, and growth based on competitive advantage have made these organizations national in scope, with increasing division of labor between their centers and outlying elements. This pattern is in turn reflected in the interdependencies among metropolitan areas.

Findings

Each metropolitan community is itself part of a larger national, and even international, multicentered urban network or system. In this larger system, different metropolitan communities perform different roles; the relationships among the parts of the network are not so much territorial as functional. Each provides some services and goods for the others and each, in turn, is served by the others. Together, they constitute a complex web of interdependencies. The network is still growing, and the range and frequency of transactions is mounting. However, what form the future growth of this network will take remains uncertain.

THREE SIGNIFICANT TRENDS

Three tendencies seem to be at work in American society: (1) an increasing scale of activity that expands the variety of options people can exercise, (2) a shift from industrial to service occupations and enterprises, and (3) increasing interest-group and life-style diversity. None of these is a new phenomenon, but the changes they imply are likely to be cumulative.

Increasing Scale of Activity

Economic development has led over time to very large increases in total national production. Despite current concerns, over the long run these increases are likely to continue. The output in the next quarter century, assuming an annual growth rate of 3 percent, will be double the nation's total production since it was founded. Family incomes and accumulated wealth will rise accordingly.

Associated with economic growth is an increase in the size of many institutions. Large-scale universities and other educational institutions have developed. Corporations of unprecedented scale have production outputs that exceed those of many nations. (General Motors' annual product makes it eighteenth among the "nations" of the world.) Government has been expanding rapidly

throughout the world; in America, it is by far the fastest-growing institution.

These large-scale institutions have the capacity to make large investments. They are able to generate large benefits and large costs for even larger numbers of people. Big oil tankers make big oil spills. Application of DDT rapidly affects animal life throughout a wide region. Large land-development firms quickly set the pattern for urban development over broad areas for a long time to come. Big power dams, big transport systems, and big atomic bombs have large-scale effects, some of which may be long-lasting. No longer are the externalities of industrial activity mere "neighborhood effects," as they used to be called. Organizations whose activities may produce significant side effects must learn to anticipate the consequences of their actions for various publics. Otherwise, their actions may have serious consequences before corrective measures can be taken.

Specialization within and among such organizations makes for increasing interdependence among specialized strangers. Occupational and other social roles are so finely divided and their relationships so interwoven that it is only slight exaggeration to suggest that nearly everyone is, in at least some degree, dependent on everyone else. There are ever larger numbers of functional links tying individuals or firms to one another and ever more elaborate communication channels through which the business of the society is transacted. Increasing interdependency and the increasing pace of interaction have led to increasing integration of the specialized sectors and subsectors of the society. Men can communicate with one another directly wherever they are, and they can ship their commodities anywhere within hours or days.

As institutions have increased in scale and become more intertwined, regional distinctions have tended to disappear. Regional political differences are yielding to the nationalization of politics and to the expanding roles of the national government. Tastes in clothing, music, recreation, architecture, food, and so on exhibit more national uniformity. Franchised motels, restaurants, and food distributors sell standardized products or services out of identical buildings coast to coast. And the communications media transmit the same words, pictures, and sounds everywhere simultaneously.

Metropolitan communities are being linked in an urban system that is national in scale and increasingly integrated. As this happens, towns, cities, and metropolitan areas lose their unitary identities, except in the sense that each occupies a distinct geographic site. The assumption that urban settlements of the future will be like those of the past may only reflect old habits of confusing physical structures with social realities.

Service Industry Growth

The proportion of the economy devoted to service activities continues to grow relative to growth in the industrial sector. Service industries now employ about 60 percent of the work force. Because of the entire economy's growing reliance on a vast pool of information and knowledge, the service industries engaged in dispensing knowledge, the knowledge industries, are likely to become relatively more significant for the vitality of urban settlement. Since knowledge is a resource enhanced rather than exhausted by use and since there is virtually an unlimited supply to be discovered and invented, it seems likely that discovery and learning will continue to be expanding activities, despite whatever resource shortages—real or imagined—may occur elsewhere. Thus, the informational and educational service roles of urban settlements are likely to be further strengthened, supplanting the manufacture of goods as the strategic function. As a consequence, continuing changes in the location, density, and composition of urban settlements seem likely. As service becomes predominant, urban areas will have to meet new and different demands, many less constricting than those they currently face. There may, for example, be an increasing degree of flexibility in the location of urban centers.

Diversity: An Unanticipated Response

One of the unexpected responses associated with the expanding scale of society and increasing standardization of facilities and procedures is a growing diversity. This diversity is evident in the emergence of special-interest groups, which increasingly are organized on

a national or essentially nonlocal basis. It is equally evident in a revival of ethnic cultures, young people's experiments with new life styles, and the appearance of new activity groups within the adult population.

All manner of interest groups, national in scope but functionally differentiated, are forming. The obvious examples include trade associations, labor unions, religious organizations, and even local businessmen's clubs such as the Rotary (which takes pride in its internationalism). A significant feature of many of these organizations is that they tend to take on social-control responsibilities. When fully developed, interest-based communities are able to tax their members, to constrain individuals' behavior by group norms, to impose sanctions for nonconformity, and, of course, to act positively on behalf of their members' special interests. They may have legislative bodies to set policy and activate programs, executive arms to carry on the day-to-day business of the organization and represent the collective interest, and mechanisms for adjudicating differences and establishing standards of behavior. The American Medical Association, the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, and the United Auto Workers resemble governments within the specialized domains over which they are granted jurisdiction.

Today's ethnic communities blend the sentiments of solidarity that distinguish the traditional-type community and the pursuit of shared objectives that identifies the modern community. The United States, having drawn its initial population from many nations and cultures, has historical sources of diversity. Despite rapid adaptation of immigrants and their children to urban styles of behavior and thought, differences have persisted. As Glazer and Moynihan (1970) noted in describing the ethnic groups of New York, ethnic diversity is still present and is evident today in the form of interest-groups.

Similarly, experimentation and change are widespread in America's mobile, knowledge-rich, highly educated society. Many people are actively experimenting with new modes of thought, new religions, new family structures, new music, new art, new styles of governance, new moralities, and more. Others are experimenting with a variety of educational programs, art and media forms, and recreational activities. Instead of the mass society about which much

was written in the 1950s, an increasingly pluralistic one, in which each individual belongs to social groups with distinctive norms, seems to be evolving. At the same time, these groups share a common language and a great many customs that permit satisfaction of mutual interdependencies. However, in a setting of expanding knowledge and lively invention in the arts, the technologies, recreation, and religion, the possible variations in ideas, behavioral styles, beliefs, and activities are increasing. In an integrated urban system, more and more of the new beliefs and activities may become national in scope.

In sum, an increasing scale of activity is evident in the size of the economy, in the size of societal institutions and the scope of their impact, and in the specialization of labor and the multiplication of functional links among individuals and firms. The result is movement toward an integrated urban system in which the unitary identity of particular places is eroded.

Growth in the service sector of the economy is reflected in the occupational structure and in the rise of knowledge industries as significant influences on the location, density, and composition of urban settlements.

Growing interest-group diversity is reflected, on the one hand, in national interest communities with many social-control functions and, on the other hand, in widespread experimentation with new life styles and activity groups. The result is that social groups are less likely to coincide with the territorial jurisdiction of local governments.

More generally, the combined effect of the three trends may be that few of the problems existing in any given locality have their origins in that locality. Thus, locally defined governments constrained by local boundaries may find themselves impotent to deal with the problems of their jurisdictions. The point can be well illustrated. The garbage-disposal problem in New York City is not a problem spawned by New Yorkers or susceptible to solution by the mayor or city departments. It reflects modern affluence, the technologies of solid-waste management, and the consumption level of urban populations. None of these conditions is peculiar to any specific city; none has its origins in cities at all, individually or collectively. The fiscal plight of central cities is similarly a consequence of

circumstances that are not specific to any city or locality. Not the least important cause lies in the low rates of man-hour productivity in the service industries as compared with manufacturing and in the inflationary pressures by municipal employees' unions to receive salaries comparable to those in manufacturing. High welfare costs reflect conditions in the regional and national economies, deficient educational opportunities afforded children years before in other states, and various discriminatory practices with complex social histories for which no city government can rationally be held liable.

Clearly, it is not reasonable to suppose that any city agency might "solve" the problems of unemployment or underemployment; that it might, through local intervention, "resolve" the problems of poverty; that it might significantly affect income distribution; that it might get at the causes of drug addiction; that it might do anything curative about crime or, indeed, about any of a long list of social and economic difficulties that are made evident in city settings. With respect to many of these problems, there is a severe shortage of tested theory. Most of them require the attention of the largest and least territorially constrained societal organization that can be activated, and that is the national government.

METROPOLITANIZATION: SECONDARY EFFECTS OF POLICY

Metropolitanization in America has proceeded to its present stage without any sort of deliberative guidance. There has been no explicit national policy for urbanization, and neither the Congress nor any federal agency has ever enunciated guidelines regarding the location, composition, size, growth rates, or physical design of urban centers. And yet, thousands of settlements have been built, some of huge size and incredible complexity. They supply roughly the amount of housing appropriate to their various populations; urban population is distributed among them roughly in conformity with job availability; transportation and communication equipment has been installed, usually with capacities that are barely adequate; shops have ap-

peared supplying millions of different commodities in amounts just about in keeping with resident demand; and so on. Without any sort of plan or conscious intention, an elaborate and complex metropolitan system has come into being, the result of myriad cumulative decisions.

Urban development appears to have been highly ordered, to have been governed by self-sensing, self-organizing, and self-regulating processes. Of course, the results are never as good as some would like them to be. Many contend there has never been an adequate supply of decent, safe, sanitary housing; that sewerage systems have never been good enough; and that large American cities have never been as livable as they could be. If one could discover how the urbanization processes have worked—how in the absence of deliberate plan intricately complex systems have been built—the answer might provide the clues to an appropriate policy for the future.

None of the intricate urban plants and their social systems sprang forth without the willful application of purpose and intelligence. Metropolitan communities developed piece by piece, as individuals and groups constructed the segments that suited their particularistic purposes. These communities have not been designed as wholes, and no group of informed and knowledgeable decision makers has determined their locations and compositions. Nevertheless, many deliberate policies of the national government have profoundly influenced the urban settlement pattern. For example, several congressional acts in the mid-nineteenth century triggered a revolution in agricultural productivity and opened the West to development, thus influencing urban growth. Similarly, encouragement of foreign immigration led to rapidly growing urban populations at points where expanding factories found ready access to raw materials and transport. Congressional incentives for the extension of railroad lines fostered the spread of economic enterprise to additional transport junctures. Yet it would certainly be an exaggeration to view these developments as the results of a national policy to encourage urban growth.

Today, an outsider might infer that promoting suburbanization

is a deliberate national policy. And he might also infer that the national urban growth plan has been a great success, so consistent have been the outcomes of contributing federal programs. Only urban-renewal efforts to rebuild the old city centers and the earlier public housing programs aimed at making the cities habitable for the poor might appear to be incompatible with the main thrust.

Other aspects of the urban-growth policy, as perceived by an outsider, might include emptying the central regions of the nation, industrializing the Old South, intensively developing the Far West, and constructing several new major metropolitan concentrations along the crescent extending from Florida through Arizona and up the West Coast. So many federal programs have reinforced these developments that an observer would be forced to conclude that this growth pattern was consciously intended.

Among the actions affecting urban expansion in the crescent from Florida to the West Coast, federal military and space expenditures may have been the most important. It would appear that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was deliberately bent on effecting fundamental change in the culture and politics of the South, so insistent was this agency on locating key space installations and supplier plants there. New types of residents and industries have settled there, assumed leadership roles, exercised voting rights, and contributed to the modernization of the local economy, society, and political body. Similarly, the favored treatment accorded to California research and development establishments and manufacturers by the federal government in contracting for services has been a force in shaping population growth there.

If an implicit policy is embedded in the various federal actions that have affected urban growth, it nevertheless has not been a conscious policy. If there was an underlying objective, it was probably encouragement of growth per se—a diffuse sense that more is better. Through it all, American urbanization has been largely planless, unintended, and undirected. It has been the outcome of a great many private decisions and a great many governmental policies concerned with agriculture, economic development, transportation, banking, education, and so on. Never has a coherent effort been

made to deal with the effects of particular public or private policies on urban settlement patterns.

Given the deficiences of urban theory, if one had undertaken to formulate an urban-development policy in, say, the late 1940s, it very likely would have been posited on the body of economic and social doctrine current at the time. The character of the American metropolis reflects consumer choices resulting from market forces. Especially in recent years, these choices—private automobiles, single-family houses, personalized open space—have expressed individualism. They also provide for open and free association among people with like interests. The collective outcome, of course, has been continued residential segregation.

The main problems in urban development arise from two conditions. The first is inability of a particular area to attract business and industry, and it includes situations in which investment requirements are so large or risks are so great that large, compensating public investments must be made to attract private capital. The second derives from the possibility that the cumulative individual choices that result in urban development may have a wholly undesirable collective outcome or that a desired collective outcome may be attainable only through collective action. Especially in a society of increasing scale, where events in one place may intimately affect persons in distant places and where repercussions can be huge and rapidly diffused, foreseeing the overall social effects of decisions made by large public and private institutions may be of overriding importance.

Findings

Despite the expanding scale of organization to the national level there is lack of (1) a broader, more empirically based understanding of urbanization processes; (2) support for innovation and experimentation in urban development; (3) a sensitive network for information collection and analysis that can monitor the outcomes of public and private initiatives; and (4) adequate feedback of findings

The scale and pattern of the urban network of the future remain indeterminate. A better understanding of ongoing trends, future prospects, and real policy alternatives and constraints, not merely more planning, is essential. Fundamental knowledge must be obtained not only about the nature of the interdependencies among metropolitan communities but also about the spatial dynamics of the national urban society. This knowledge is needed to provide the basis for policy that is systemic, being simultaneously oriented to whole systems and their parts, to collective ends and to private ones, and to the evolutionary processes by which urban settlements emerge over time. Within this perspective, the common problems of metropolitan communities constitute an important set of issues for the national urban society.

6

Government of Metropolitan Communities

The policies and institutions of the American federal system of government have already been greatly affected by the urbanization of society. At every level of government a variety of responses has been stimulated by the urgent needs of the urban population. At the local level, the response has been a proliferation of governmental units, and at the national level, it has been a multiplicity of programs. Recently, policy has moved in the direction of reducing the number of federal programs while enhancing the effects of fragmentation at the local level by revenue sharing. Meanwhile, at the state level, interest has focused on "substate regions" that might be described as automotive-age counties. Generally, these have been defined in territorial terms, but definitions may be modified as regional economics turns from central-place theory to theories that stress patterns of interaction. Generally, the importance of integrating metropolitan institutions and activities has largely escaped those in power at any level. The overwhelming proportion of the population now lives or

works in metropolitan areas, but in most instances the authority to govern these areas remains not only dispersed, but unfocused. While central cities, suburbs, and adjacent rural areas become increasingly interdependent, debate remains centered on whether one or another should be the main target of government intervention. Meanwhile, metropolitan communities are governed inequitably and inefficiently. Somehow, the nation must find better ways to govern its metropolitan areas. The policies evolved should meet the following needs:

1. Response to the scale of metropolitan economic institutions and transactions
2. Diminishment of the fiscal externalities that now plague urban jurisdictions
3. Adequate territorial scope to apply environmental technologies for pollution control
4. More equitable distribution of public goods—notably health and social services, education, and transportation
5. Flexibility that permits changes in society's view of what services it should guarantee for all citizens
6. Economies of scale that could be attained by delivery of some urban services on a metropolitan-wide basis
7. An effective role for self-identified subcommunities in the control of their environments

Fragmentation rather than correspondence to the scale of metropolitan activity is the rule, not the exception. Administrative disabilities are widespread. Overlapping responsibility is prevalent. Fiscal externalities persist. Control of environmental pollution is impeded. Residents with higher incomes continue their migration to the suburbs. The central city finds it more and more difficult to raise necessary revenues. Differences between city and suburban tax burdens reflect inequitable distribution of metropolitan costs. Efforts to increase metropolitan unity are hampered. The state of metropolitan transportation, water supplies, and waste disposal, for example, remains precarious in many areas. Meanwhile, jurisdictions, like the small enterprises they often resemble, calculate and compete for additional sources of tax revenue. The social problems of the me-

tropolis—crime, inadequate education programs, unemployment, and inadequate housing—slowly spread. Fragmentation of government is only in small part a cause of these social problems, but it makes them much more difficult to solve.

Findings

The present system of local government fails to answer the needs of a clearly metropolitan society. Fragmented and overlapping government in metropolitan areas (1) aggravates the mismatch between resources and social needs, (2) makes the solution of metropolitan social problems more difficult, and (3) inhibits efficient administration of services.

Whatever the shortcomings of the present system, initiatives to deal with specific needs and problems generated by the increasing scale of urban life have not been lacking. Although no coordinated national policy has evolved in response to the troublesome by-products of metropolitanization, all levels of government have undertaken specific programs of action. The general drift of these initiatives, with the possible exception of revenue sharing, is toward an increase in the size of local jurisdictions and increased responsibilities for governments with more encompassing boundaries—county, state, and federal.

INTERVENTION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The federal government has attempted various combinations of substantive, structural, and fiscal initiatives. The amount of federal resources available to state and local governments has risen. The federal government has promoted a variety of state and local actions that address the social and technological difficulties within metropolitan areas. Through aid to housing, urban renewal, grants for sewerage and water systems, aid to education and manpower training, aid for mass transit, and other financial assistance, it has attempted to

enable the state–local system to be at least partially responsive. New programs with a strong city orientation were developed in the 1960s; by 1973, expenditures for these programs exceeded $4 billion.

Although the federal government occasionally has sought to influence the structure of local government, its primary efforts to cure metropolitan problems have been financial, and the inflow of federal funds has made, at best, a negligible contribution to overcoming fragmentation and fiscal disparities within metropolitan areas. Today, although state and federal aid support a higher proportion of both central city and suburban expenditures, the suburbs have pulled even farther ahead of central cities in the receipt of aid, except in the Northeast (Table 1).

In the late 1960s, the federal government began to intervene in a number of areas that had long been considered traditional state and local responsibilities. Congress acted to regulate abatement of air, water, and noise pollution, and it is continuing to establish higher standards. One regulatory area—automotive emissions—has been largely preempted by the federal government. Unless state and local governments take forceful action to solve areawide problems, it is reasonable to predict that the federal government will continue on this course. The Federal Revenue Sharing Act of 1972, which authorizes $30.2 billion in expenditures over five years, passes federal revenues to state and local governments according to a formula that

TABLE 1. State and Federal Aid as a Percentage of Total Expenditures in the 72 Largest SMSAs, 1970

	Central City	Outside Central City	CC/OCC Ratio
Northeast	35	32	1.09
Midwest	27	35	0.77
South	26	40	0.65
West	35	38	0.92
Total (unweighted average)	30	36	0.83

Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, unpublished tabulation, 1972.

supposedly recognizes need and state–local tax effort alike. If revenue sharing did overcome existing fiscal disparities, its contribution to reducing a major fault of the present system would be substantial. But even if revenue sharing corrected disparities, it would reinforce another major fault of the system, the patchwork of jurisdictions. As it is, it does not respond to the deep causes of the system's impotence to solve the substantive problems of metropolitan areas.

The program fails to correct disparities because its formula for distributing funds does not sufficiently account for the enormous fiscal disadvantage of most central cities and low-income residential suburbs. Many central cities are receiving less revenue than they originally expected. If revenue sharing really recognized need, the cities' population losses (mostly middle-income residents) would increase rather than decrease their share. Under the current formula, the suburbs receive much more than was anticipated.

Another factor also increases the inability of the local portion of shared revenue to overcome local disparities—that is, the states' use of their share of the money. State funds are now deployed in a manner that reflects the distribution of political power. Cities, because of outward population movement and provincial political characteristics, wield considerably lighter political weapons in state legislatures than do their suburbs. Since state resources now flow in channels of political power, not social need, one can fairly predict that revenue-sharing money will buttress disparities between cities and suburbs and between high-, middle-, and low-income suburbs. The disparities, rather than being alleviated, may be preserved at higher levels of expenditure.

Nevertheless, the new revenue flowing to all jurisdictions will provide a fiscal breathing space for most of them. Revenue sharing must therefore be seen as a step away from regionalization, for fiscal stringency, more than any other single pressure, has encouraged political leaders to think in regional terms. For the present, at least, that pressure is partly relieved, especially for central city mayors and to some extent for governors.

However, in the long term it is doubtful that revenue sharing can overcome the fiscal crisis of state and local governments, despite the ardor of states and localities to embrace this money now. In New

York State and New York City, the anticipated revenues from the new program were incorporated into 1973 budgets months before the checks began to arrive. For jurisdictions that perform welfare functions, the cut in social services (most dramatically in day care, services to the aged, and drug-addiction programs) that was tied to the revenue-sharing bill will severely reduce its potential contribution to local budgets.

Overall, the federal government's transfusions of money and exhortations to reorganize have made no major contribution to solving the social problems that press on central cities. Education remains inadequate, deteriorating neighborhoods are rapidly being abandoned, and the manpower training program (after skimming off the people, such as high school graduates, who are most likely to succeed) has not equipped ghetto residents for the available jobs within their commuting range.

LIMITED ROLE OF THE STATES

The role of the states in meeting the needs of metropolitan areas has been limited. The states have been characterized as ranging from indifferent to negative in their attitudes toward urban problems. In recent years, however, a few states have begun to act.

In the past, state governments, either passively or actively, have placed arbitrary limitations on local government taxes, indebtedness, powers, and administrative structure, as well as on changes related to annexation and consolidation. State (as well as federal) aid programs tend to support the inadequate local government structure by providing financial assistance to what would otherwise be uneconomical units. The states' tendency to assist specific functions results in the creation of special districts or independent islands of authority. Although states have increased their aid to local governments, such aid generally has not gone to the areas of greatest need. For example, the steepest increase in aid, that is the increase in aid going to education, has benefited suburban jurisdictions more than the central cities. Only in the case of welfare, largely a city problem, has state aid to cities risen sharply, though this has been an automatic response to the increase in the number of welfare recipients.

Although state initiatives in the areas of annexation, incorporation, and consolidation have been modest in recent years, there has been some activity. Boundary commission laws have been created in several states to make it easier for central cities to annex the surrounding suburban fringe; however, no state in recent years has seriously tackled annexation of suburbs that are already separately incorporated. A number of states are beginning to discourage separate incorporation of satellite cities, particularly those near large central cities. Texas has had a successful program of this kind for several years. Except for state action in Indiana, which consolidated the city of Indianapolis with the county of Marion, and in Minnesota, which created the Metropolitan Regional Council in Minneapolis–St. Paul, no major stimulus toward local government reorganization is visible today at the state level.

State Assumption of Urban Functions

A few states have created state-administered metropolitan authorities to deal with particular urban functions. In many states, of course, enabling legislation permits the creation of special-purpose metropolitan districts. In Massachusetts, the metropolitan-authority form is now employed to handle water service, sewerage disposal, transportation, and air-pollution control. In New York State, both statewide and regional authorities have been created for special purposes. These include the Urban Development Corporation, the Environmental Facilities Corporation, the Job Development Authority, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and four other regional transportation authorities. In heavily populated but geographically small states, such as Connecticut, state government may in effect become the metropolitan governmental unit. In abolishing county governments in 1968, Connecticut transferred their limited functions to the state level. Resource considerations played an important part in transfer of welfare responsibilities to the state in Delaware and Massachusetts in 1968. Currently, pressure is increasing in New York State for the transfer of responsibility for public welfare, the Medicaid program, and the financing of public education to the state level.

There seems to be a growing belief in state government circles

that all states should have some kind of agency for local affairs. The increase in such agencies since 1960 has been one visible indication that states are beginning to recognize their urban responsibilities. About 27 such agencies now exist, of which only 5 were established prior to 1966. Observers of the growth of these new agencies, however, warn against any easy assumption that the mere establishment of such an office means that a state is actively involved in the solution of urban problems. In fact, such agencies act more often as protectors of the present local jurisdictions than as advocates of reform.

Findings

Although no coordinated national policy has evolved in response to the unfavorable by-products of metropolitanization, all levels of government have undertaken specific programs. If the federal response has been inadequate or misconceived, the same generalization can be made with much greater force concerning the states.

IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS

Among the external forces influencing metropolitan goverment since 1962, none has had a greater impact than the federal courts. Their role in the future, however, is somewhat uncertain. On three fronts the courts have dealt with issues of equity that have important implications for metropolitan governance. These are reapportionment, public finance and services, and district consolidation.

One Man, One Vote

In 1962,[1] the United States Supreme Court ruled that federal courts have jurisdiction in malapportionment cases involving state legislatures, but it did not mandate population as the basis for apportionment. The following year,[2] the Court for the first time used the

[1] *Baker v. Carr,* 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
[2] *Sanders v. Gray,* 372 U.S. 368 (1963).

expression "one man, one vote" and ruled unconstitutional Georgia's county-unit system for electing state officials. In a 1964 case,[3] the Court disallowed the apportionment of either house of a state legislature on the basis of area (defended as analogous to the federal system), holding that it violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Henceforth, both state houses would have to be apportioned on the basis of "one man, one vote."

Since local governments are creatures of the states, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to them as well, and the Supreme Court predictably extended its "one man, one vote" principle to local governments. In 1968, the Court held that the apportionment of the Board of commissioners of Midland County, Texas, violated equal protection.[4] It stated that there must be population equality in county districts, since commissioners perform legislative functions, including setting a tax rate, equalizing tax assessments, issuing bonds, adopting budgets, and levying taxes. This principle has promoted modernization in some counties.

Unfortunately from the viewpoint of the central cities, the Court's decisions came too late. Prior to the decisions, the population of the central cities was grossly underrepresented in legislative bodies. By the time the decisions took effect, however, the population balance had shifted to the suburbs, and they, not the central cities, became the principal beneficiaries of the more representative systems. The Supreme Court, in a recent decision, has to some degree backed away from its one man, one vote dictum by allowing state legislatures more latitude in establishing districts to deviate from strict population equality.[5]

Finance and Services

In 1971, the California Supreme Court ruled that the state's system of financing public schools largely by means of local-district wealth violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because such a system "makes the

[3] *Reynolds v. Sims,* 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
[4] *Avery v. Midland County, Texas et al.,* 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
[5] *Mahan v. Howell,* 35 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1973).

quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors." The court added: "Although private residential and commercial patterns may be partially responsible for the distribution of assessed valuation throughout the State, such patterns are shaped and hardened by zoning ordinances and other governmental land use controls which promote economic exclusivity. . . . Governmental action drew the school boundary lines, thus determining how much local wealth each district would contain."[6] Although the United States Supreme Court did not uphold the test case (*Rodriguez*),[7] which would have required state governments to equalize the financing of public education throughout a state, the Court did recognize the need for reform and suggested that state governments themselves take the initiative. There currently is much state interest in this problem, and it cannot yet be said that the decision has thwarted further progress. Many states are discussing state assumption of a portion of the property tax, which would then be redistributed statewide by means of some kind of equalization formula, in order to assume greater or complete financial responsibility for education. Hawaii, which has only one school district, is currently the only state with full responsibility for financing public education.

The equitable distribution of public services within a jurisdiction was the issue in *Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Mississippi,* decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.[8] This decision requires municipalities (and, in all likelihood, other local governments) to provide equal levels of service to all parts of their jurisdiction if service inequality reveals a pattern of racial discrimination. The *Shaw* decision, however, does not address the issue of disparities in service levels among jurisdictions.

District Consolidation

In Virginia, a United States district court on January 11, 1972, ordered that a metropolitan school system be established in the Richmond area no later than September 1 by the merger of the school

[6] *Serrano v. Priest,* 5 Cal. 3d 584 (1971).
[7] *San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,* 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
[8] *Hawkins v. Town of Shaw,* F. 2d 1286 (1971).

districts of Richmond, Chesterfield County, and Henrico County.[9] The Richmond system presently has a student population that is approximately 70 percent black, and each of the county systems has a student population that is over 90 percent white. The district court ruled that "meaningful integration in a biracial community, as in the instant case, is essential to equality of education and the failure to provide it is violative of the Constitution of the United States."

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on June 6, 1972, by a vote of five to one, reversed the opinion of the district court.[10] Referring to *Spencer v. Kugler,*[11] the circuit court stated: "Because we think that the last vestiges of state-imposed segregation have been wiped out in the public schools of the City of Richmond and Henrico and Chesterfield and unitary systems achieved, and because it is not established that the racial composition of the schools in the City of Richmond and the Counties is the result of invidious state action, we conclude that there is no constitutional violation and that therefore the district judge exceeded his power of intervention."

The United States Supreme Court upheld the circuit court's decision in May 1973, making it unlikely that there will soon be any forced consolidation of central city and suburban school districts.[12]

Findings

Of the external forces influencing metropolitan government since 1962, none has had a greater impact than the federal courts. Unfortunately, from the central cities' viewpoint, the judicial requirement of one man, one vote representation in state legislatures came after the cities had already lost much of their population to the suburbs. The cities no longer had the votes to redress the balance between resources and social needs. The chief beneficiar-

[9] *Carolyn Bradley et al. v. The School Board of the City of Richmond,* 338 F. Supp. 67 (1972).
[10] *Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, Virginia,* 562 F 2d 1058 (1972).
[11] *Spencer v. Kugler,* 404 U.S. 1027 (1972).
[12] *School Board of City of Richmond, Virginia, et al. v. State Board of Education of Virginia,* 412 U.S. 92 (1973).

ies of reapportionment were suburban jurisdictions, and suburbs will gain even more as population continues to move outward. The courts, however, in issues recently and currently before them, have the potential to reduce some of the inequities caused by fragmentation.

METROPOLITAN REORGANIZATION

Since the end of World War II, 36 major metropolitan reorganizations, including city–county consolidations, have been proposed, and 10 have been adopted by referendum. All the adopted reorganizations were in metropolitan areas with populations of less than one million. Moreover, all 10 were in the South, while the major efforts in other regions failed. Further, 4 of the 10 successful attempts occurred in Virginia, whose unique annexation laws provide an especially strong motivation for reorganization.

In short, experience indicates that voter approval of metropolitan reorganization is virtually impossible to obtain outside the South. Recent rejections have been as frequent and substantial as past defeats; in fact, in some cases second or third reorganization attempts have failed by greater margins than the first proposals did. Lack of success, however, has not caused communities to stop trying. More than 60 major reorganizations are being considered in the United States today. Most of these are city–county consolidations, a good number of them in the South. In the future there may be more state-initiated reorganization if Florida, Indiana, and Minnesota can be taken as indicative. General metropolitan reorganization, if it is to come at all, will depend on federal and state initiative. Marando (1973) has attempted to pinpoint the political factors that affect the adoption of reorganization. He frequently found special factors at work where reorganization succeeded. More specifically, the study shows that the higher the city voter turnout relative to that in parts of the county outside the city, the more likely that reorganization will succeed. The exemption of municipalities within the county from inclusion in the reorganization also is helpful to adoption. As larger numbers of local governments are drawn into reorganization plans,

success becomes less likely. Also, requiring a majority in both the municipality and the surrounding county is a disadvantage.

Political parties as such normally do not participate in metropolitan reorganization campaigns, which consequently lack a moderating influence. The greatest opposition to metropolitan reform originally came from the suburbs and the right wing of American politics. Recently, severe criticism of metropolitan government has come from blacks. However, the black community is divided over the issue of metropolitan reform.

In sum, the history of local initiative to achieve metropolitan reorganization suggests that if it were ever feasible in most areas, it is less so today.

Special Service and Tax Districts

The failure of metropolitan reorganization plans to win voter approval has fostered the creation of special service and tax districts. Special districts are more politically acceptable because they are specifically designed to resolve a critical areawide service problem without disturbing existing general-purpose jurisdictions.

The number of special districts, other than school districts, has increased substantially in the past decade. The largest increase occurred in metropolitan areas—45 percent compared to 24 percent in nonmetropolitan areas. The sharpest increase within metropolitan areas occurred in the South (105 percent). Over 7,800 of the existing special districts, or 35 percent of the total, are located within metropolitan areas.

Most states have made provision for one or more types of district government. For example, 41 states report that they have special districts responsible for housing. Sewer and water districts are found in 34 states, and 29 have fire-protection districts. Special districts are assigned responsibility for areawide facilities and services such as airports, bridges, housing, tunnels, terminals, sewerage disposal, public transportation, water supply, and parks and recreational facilities. The vast majority of these districts are unifunctional, but a few have been assigned responsibility for the performance of more than one function. In total, there are now over 900 metropoli-

tanwide special districts, located primarily in the medium-sized and smaller SMSAs.

Findings

Experience indicates that voter approval of metropolitan reorganization is virtually impossible to obtain outside the South. In lieu of reorganization, a large number of special districts have been created to meet the service needs of metropolitan communities.

THE ROLE OF THE URBAN COUNTY

The role of the county in governing urban areas is increasing. In smaller metropolitan areas, the county may include not only the central city but many of the suburbs. Already in existence, the county does not raise the fear of a new unit of government. Recognition of the fact that counties can provide services over a wider area has led to efforts to modernize county governments, which in many places are archaic. These efforts aim at authorizing the county to perform additional functions such as the operation of airports, air-pollution control, civil defense, fire and police protection, industrial development, management of sewerage systems and water supply.

Municipal officials traditionally have been hostile to proposals for transferring functions to counties, but some are now found among the initiators of such proposals. Many mayors, city managers, and other municipal executives now believe that the county should play a more important role in providing services. However, they also believe that responsibility for additional functions should not be transferred to county governments until they are modernized.

Counties historically have been highly resistant to change, but the application of the United States Supreme Court's "one man, one vote" principle to county governing boards has facilitated general reform of county government in several states. The available evidence, although limited, indicates that there has been a gradual transfer of various functions to counties in a number of states during

the past decade. Recently, county responsibilities have been increased in such states as Mississippi, Pennsylvania, New York, and North Carolina. Florida, in its new constitution, adopted in 1968, provides a general grant of home rule to counties and a procedure for modernization of county government structure. In a few cases, states have cooperated in city–county consolidations. The recent consolidations in Nashville, Jacksonville, and Indianapolis and the creation of the Minneapolis–St. Paul seven-county authority are examples of positive state involvement.

Findings

Although the county seldom includes the total interactive and interdependent area of a metropolitan community, enlarging county responsibilities may improve local government for smaller metropolitan areas. Counties also may serve as effective subunits in a larger metropolitan regional system.

COUNCILS OF GOVERNMENTS: THE LIMITS OF "CARROT" VOLUNTARISM

Because of the fragmented nature of local government, rational and equitable public choice may require that the needs of several political units be taken into account at the same time. In part, this is a matter of efficiency and economy in the provision of particular services. In part, it arises from externalities, the costs imposed or the benefits conferred by the activities of one jurisdiction on the residents of other jurisdictions. Moreover, in today's complicated society, informed decisions about expenditure and investment priorities require sophisticated planning and budgeting processes that are possible only if they take into account the entire area of economic interdependence. Because of governmental fragmentation in metropolitan areas, many units cannot afford to provide such planning and budgeting services themselves. Concern for rationality in public choice

has led to the establishment of metropolitan planning and coordinating mechanisms (for example, regional planning commissions and councils of governments). The fundamental objective is to increase the benefits derived from a given level of expenditure.

Comprehensive metropolitan planning is, on the whole, a post–World War II development. Initially, metropolitan planning commissions were composed mainly of part-time commissioners and had only advisory powers. In 1961, however, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations recommended that Congress enact legislation requiring local governments' applications for federal grants for public facilities to be reviewed by a metropolitan planning agency. It also recommended a shift in membership from part-time commissioners to both elected officials of the metropolitan political units—such as mayors, councilmen, and county commissioners—and private citizens; adequate decision-making authority; and funds to employ the requisite planning staff. Subsequently, a provision of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 declared organizations of public officials in metropolitan areas eligible to receive federal grants for the preparation of comprehensive metropolitan plans. In this manner, the federal government encouraged the creation of what are now known as councils of governments.

To be eligible for a federal grant, council of governments must consist primarily of elected representatives of municipalities and counties rather than officials of special agencies and authorities. In 1966, Congress required that all local government applications for federal grants and loans for 30 specified types of program be submitted for review to a metropolitan organization responsible for area-wide planning. It also provided supplementary grants for political units that carry out projects in accordance with metropolitan planning.

In 1968, U.S. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-95 both broadened the metropolitan review process to 106 programs and required that the programs' effects on nonmetropolitan areas and the state be taken into account.[13] Currently, there is a state clearinghouse in each state, and there are over 400 substate clearing-

[13]OMB Circular A-95 implements sections of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

houses. Applicants for federal assistance must notify the clearinghouses of intent to file an application and must submit a brief description of the proposed project. The intent is to ensure that conflicts, with the assistance of a clearinghouse, will be either resolved or clearly identified.

These actions taken in the 1960s, in addition to the grant of substantial amounts of federal aid, resulted in the creation of councils of governments in most metropolitan areas. However, these remain voluntary associations of local governments, devices to facilitate the solution of areawide problems without changing the structure of local government. Today, it is often difficult to make a sharp distinction between council of governments and regional planning commissions. In only one state are councils of governments authorized to perform a traditional governmental function other than planning and training. While early studies of councils of governments were relatively optimistic about their effectiveness, by the 1970s the assessment was much less confident.

For example, Melvin B. Mogulof (1971, p. 110) of the Urban Institute concluded that "there are tasks requiring a capacity for metropolitan governance, and we are . . . convinced that the COG does not and cannot have this capacity. Given previous failures in developing regional governing structures, the COG has been a major achievement . . . *provided the COG is seen developmentally,* and not as a final form." COGs may act as catalysts for areawide programs, but as long as decision making remains disjointed, they are unlikely to be effective in solving complex areawide problems. If the problems are not of serious magnitude and complexity, the prospects of councils of governments making a contribution to their resolution are good. On the other hand, if local governments are motivated by conflicting self-interests, attempts to secure cooperative action will prove to be of no avail.

Evidence to date warrants the conclusion that COGs will concentrate on relatively noncontroversial problems and avoid social issues such as metropolitan housing problems. Moreover, it is possible that, far from being transitional organizations in a course toward unified metropolitan governance, they may become defensive

mechanisms for existing jurisdictions and the prerogatives of their elected officials, who in fact are the councils of governments. Furthermore, it is now evident that the activity of many councils of governments tends to become episodic and to decline.

Findings

Councils of governments have been put forward as one solution to the metropolitan governmental problem. Although COGs are easily organized, flexible, and adaptable governmental units, none of the large number created in the 1960s has solved a major metropolitan problem. There is no evidence to date that they are beginning to take on a metropolitan governance function.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL SERVICE AGREEMENTS

The number of governmental functions that require or lend themselves to large-scale administration is growing. In the past, intergovernmental service agreements generally related to jails and detention homes, water supply, streets and bridges, and police and fire mutual aid. Agreements today cover a much broader range of services, including health services, economic development, manpower programs, and general environmental control. Urban governments customarily have produced most of the goods and services they have delivered to the citizens. Increasingly, they are turning to other governmental and private sources for the supply of such services.

The most dramatic illustration of the intergovernmental contract approach is, of course, the Lakewood Plan in Los Angeles County. In 1954, the newly incorporated city of Lakewood contracted to have all municipal type services provided by Los Angeles County. The 32 cities incorporated in the county since 1954 have followed Lakewood's lead by contracting with the county for a package of services. Such agreements facilitate the solution of local and area-wide service problems without necessitating the structural reorga-

nization of local government. According to the agreement, a service or a product that a government cannot produce itself or could produce only at an excessively high cost is provided by another nearby government or a private firm. The provider of the service may gain the benefits of economies of scale. With very few exceptions, service agreements are entered into voluntarily by local governments.

In 1972, under the joint sponsorship of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and the International City Management Association, a questionnaire was sent to 5,900 incorporated municipalities—cities, villages, boroughs, incorporated towns—with populations over 2,500 seeking data on intergovernmental agreements involving 76 services. Returns were received from 40 percent of the total (2,375 municipalities).

Of the responding municipalities, 63 percent have entered into formal or informal agreements for the provision of services to their citizens by other governmental units or private firms. Larger units of local government generally have a greater propensity to enter into service agreements than smaller ones.

Although the majority of the service agreements involve only local governments, a significant number involve the state or private firms. Of municipalities obtaining personnel services by means of agreements, 50 percent receive them from the state. These services include training policemen and firemen, crime laboratory work, criminal-identification assistance, and water-pollution abatement work. Private firms are major suppliers of certain services. In a sample of incorporated municipalities obtaining refuse-collection service under agreements, 88 percent received the service from private firms. The percentages for other services from private firms are 85 for engineering services, 84 for legal services, 79 for street lighting, 67 for public relations services, and 64 for microfilm services.

In sum, local governments increasingly are entering into intergovernmental service agreements. This tendency is positively correlated with population size—the larger the unit, the more agreements it enters into. Economies of scale are the dominant motive for entering into agreements. The most inhibiting factor is the fear that independence will be curtailed by the agreements.

Service problems are solved by means of service agreements very slowly. These agreements complicate local government and may make it less responsive to the needs and wishes of citizens. Nevertheless, they will continue to be popular with local government officials because they allow units to take advantage of economies of scale and have a minimal disruptive impact on the structure of local government.

States have encouraged local governments to enter into service agreements and seem likely to strengthen these efforts in the future. At the same time, it is important to note that not all governmental service problems lend themselves to solution by means of service agreements. The potential of intergovernmental cooperation is limited chiefly to the solution of relatively noncontroversial problems involving a small number of local governments.

Findings

A large number of intergovernmental service arrangements have been created. Sixty-three percent of the 2,375 municipalities responding to a mailed questionnaire have entered into formal or informal agreements with other public or private units for the supply of services.

THE POLICY OF ACCOMMODATION

Despite many popular conceptions to the contrary, the present fragmented system of local government generally has been able to deliver the services demanded by the more articulate middle and upper classes. Delivery has required adaptations ranging from interlocal agreements through contractual arrangements to the more fundamental change that comes with a metropolitanwide special district that performs a single function. These adaptations have not necessarily reduced fragmentation, but they have sometimes softened its unhappy consequences for public services.

The governmental system has grown used to a policy of accom-

modation, not reform. The result is that local governments have been able to keep house—water continues to flow, sewage is disposed of (though it may pour downstream to pollute other jurisdictions), highways are built, fires are extinguished, public health is protected, children are, after a fashion, educated, and welfare checks are mailed (though delivery is another matter). While modest improvements in the efficiency of local government may have resulted from the policy of accommodation, fundamental questions of equity have seldom been addressed by metropolitan communities as a whole.

Increasingly, questions of equity have been raised by the courts. In a Mississippi case, as has been noted, the court required that municipalities provide equal services to all parts of the jurisdiction. Logically, the same reasoning might be applied to differences among jurisdictions within a metropolitan community. Several lower courts have found that the present system of educational financing, in which differences in wealth produce differences in educational expenditures, is objectionable. Although courts are drawing attention to questions of equity at the local level, the pervasive problems of externalities, fiscal disparities, and inequities cannot be solved by the courts alone.

Basic decisions about metropolitanwide issues have not been made because no institution has authority to make them. The failure of the policy of accommodation and the tactic of gradual adaptation to come to grips with the issues of equity points to the necessity for other approaches. Three have been frequently suggested: (1) increased state and federal aid; (2) development of a single tax base for the entire metropolitan region, from which all units would draw revenue on some basis of need; (3) metropolitan reorganization that would make possible both equity and rational long-range planning.

Federal and state governments hold the constitutional and fiscal resources necessary to erase the system's structural and fiscal deficiencies. The federal government has never adopted a coherent metropolitan policy with these objectives, nor has it been able to implement an integrated program of federal support, though federal grants have continued to mount.

The events of the 1960s made the states more aware of the problems of the cities. Many states demanded federal action, but a

few also tried to deal more effectively with the problems themselves. Most states have enabled local units of government to work together voluntarily. This enabling legislation has been helpful concerning problems that affect more than one jurisdiction. Many states contribute to federal-aid programs that require a local share, while single-function authorities have been created for a few activities that clearly cross local boundaries. At least two states have established a form of regional (that is, metropolitan) government for their major cities. Others are considering the possibility.

In a few metropolitan areas, major reform has been achieved by local initiative. However, the political resistance encountered does not make this a promising avenue for future change. Multiplication of interlocal agreements seems likely to continue, but they are unlikely to be very helpful in dealing with equity issues. Metropolitan government might in time be feasible in additional areas, if its expansion is supported by concerted state and federal policies.

Meanwhile, other important avenues of action are open to the states. State assumption of welfare and education financing could cut fiscal disparities, as could focusing state resources on areas of densely concentrated social ills. In addition to the chronic socioeconomic and financial gaps between central cities and suburbs, there also are growing disparities among suburbs. Legislators from low-income suburbs may find that their interests are better served by coalition with large-city legislators than by alignment with those from high-income suburbs. But before realignments like this can occur, many deep ethnic and social antagonisms must be put to rest.

The federal government, for its part, need not restrict its help to more resources. If, for example, the administration had followed the suggestion of Representative Henry Reuss of Wisconsin and tied revenue sharing to state and local government reform, the program could now be reducing rather than reinforcing the inadequacies of the system.

Councils of governments, regional planning agencies, and citizen participation have all been promoted by federal action. The councils of governments, however, are generally forums in which local officials protect the autonomy of their jurisdictions. Under councils of governments regional planning is advisory and carefully

monitored by the spokesmen for governmental units that make up the governing board. Groups of citizens, frustrated by lack of funds, also lack expert analysis on which to base their positions. The federal government stands in need of effective instrumentalities at the level of the metropolitan community if the resources it makes available are to be appropriately used to deal with the most urgent social problems. In this respect, the interests of states and the federal government frequently may coincide. Differences among the metropolitan communities, not only in size but in the urgency and complexity of the problems they face, suggest that the instrumentality must be adapted to particulate situations. The fragmented governmental units within the metropolitan community may be more receptive to federal initiatives as the social problems originally concentrated in the central city spread to other jurisdictions. If research and development ultimately can provide major improvements in important public service systems, the transiton to a common set of metropolitan instrumentalities may be facilitated.

Findings

One can state with reasonable confidence that the major problems of metropolitan areas will have to be confronted by state or federal government unless new areawide mechanisms are developed.

URBAN LOCALISM AND METROPOLITAN DECENTRALIZATION

Metropolitanization, as has been demonstrated, involves an increase in the size and complexity of urban economic and social institutions. This increase in scale also may affect the basic characteristics of such institutions, incurring a change in kind as well. Implicit in much of the discussion about governance of metropolitan areas is the question whether the increase in scale does not require fundamental changes in governmental institutions. One specific question is whether the increase in scale does not require a surrender of powers

or aspects of powers to smaller units by decentralization of government within metropolitan areas.

Controversy over decentralization, community control, and citizen participation is now commonplace in urban areas. However, a considerable part of the literature and discussion concerning submetropolitan change has been concerned with only the largest metropolitan aggregates, particularly New York and Chicago. Changes associated with scale may make decentralization in some form a more critical problem in the larger metropolitan areas than it is in others. On the other hand, clamor for a voice in government may have more complex origins. One point needs to be emphasized: none of the familiar decentralization schemes envisages revitalization of the neighborhood or microcommunity in any meaningful sense. All are concerned with much larger population groupings.

The Committee for Economic Development recently published three policy statements calling for administrative reorganization of state and local governments and the creation of new structures for metropolitan government. The metropolitan policy statement calls for two-tier governments in urban areas—metropolitan-scale government to perform metropolitan-type functions and smaller, community-scale governments to perform functions that can readily be handled at the community level. In suggesting that functions be assigned on the basis of where they can best be performed (at the areawide level or at the community level), the proposal assumes it is possible to grant functions to local communities even if those functions are already assigned to the areawide level. In other words, the local communities would be allowed to participate in decision making about such matters as transportation, pollution control, and sewage disposal. One of the difficulties in assigning functions in the abstract has been the assumption that the function must be assigned to one or another level when, in fact, it is possible to assign aspects of the same function to different levels of government. The community-level governments would range in population from 40,000 to 250,000. The objective is simply "units of government small enough to enable the recipients of government services to have some voice and control over their quality and quantity." Evidence to support the effectiveness of the community-level governments is not available.

The New York metropolitan area has perhaps been more concerned with decentralization than any other area in the country. One reason may be that today New York contains over 8 million people and there are an additional 10 to 12 million in the surrounding counties. A "command decentralization" experiment was initiated by Mayor John Lindsay. Four experimental districts varying in population from roughly 100,000 to slightly more than 200,000 are in operation. The plan is more concerned with establishing a structure for decentralized management and coordination than with the delegation of central powers to local authorities. The community advisory councils that have been established in the districts are increasingly strong voices in establishing priorities for their areas and in stipulating how services will operate there.

Beyond command decentralization, six more far-reaching decentralization schemes are currently being debated in New York City. All these plans divide the city into neighborhood units. The optimum subdistrict population varies among plans from 100,000 to 300,000. There is substantial agreement about what functions should be decentralized: sanitation, code enforcement, street maintenance, selected health services, and park and playground operation. Interestingly enough, no aspects of regional functions such as water supply and air-pollution control are included.

One other plan is of interest because in essence it represents a federated approach to local government on a metropolitan scale. In the seven-county Twin Cities area of Minnesota, a de facto form of metropolitan government has been created, initially for very limited purposes. Powers are divided between an upper-tier unit—the Metropolitan Council—and lower-tier units—counties and municipalities. The council has the authority to review and indefinitely suspend any plans of an independent commission, board, or agency that is in conflict with the council's development guide. It also may intervene before the Minnesota Municipal Commission in annexation and incorporation proceedings. To finance its activities, the council is authorized to levy a tax not exceeding seven-tenths of one mill on each dollar of assessed valuation of all taxable property. The Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Law, passed by the Minnesota Legislature in 1971, enables all local governments in the seven-county Twin

Cities region to share in the property tax revenue produced by new commercial-industrial development, regardless of where it occurs in the region. There are 300 governmental units of very unequal size in a 3,000-square-mile area providing services to 1.9 million people. It is useful to note that, while the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council is decentralized in form, the intent is clearly to centralize. Neither the Metropolitan Council nor most of the existing governments seem to be concerned with neighborhood participation in the microcommunity sense. The Twin Cities model may be viewed as an attempt to maintain what Tiebout (1956) described as "advantages of public choice" while attaining the advantages of economies of scale.

URBAN LOCALISM AND SOCIOECONOMIC STRATIFICATION

Metropolitan residents pay for the benefits they receive from their local government. Consequently, they seek maximum service at minimum cost. Urban residents utilize the facilities of the metropolis in work, recreation, shopping. At the same time, their view of their interests may be affected by socioeconomic class and place of residence.

In terms of benefits, the upper and middle classes depend on government only for basic housekeeping and protective services and for education. The latter is the largest expenditure item in most urban areas. Raymond Vernon (1962, p. 31) said of this group a decade ago, "for most people things are getting slightly better all the time." However, today there is some disenchantment with urban conditions even among the upper-middle and upper classes, who are troubled by congestion and pollution, crime and delinquency, and the ugliness of the urban-scape. Most have not made the connection between their growing discomfort and the governance of the metropolitan community. Meanwhile, the lower part of the middle class sees itself as overtaken by rising taxes and inflation. Proud of their self-reliance yet unable to fully share in the general progress, convinced that their hard-earned tax payments are going to support the idle and dissolute, these people have been spurred to more or less open revolt, in which they are joined by some of their better-off blue-collar colleagues.

Finally, there are those in the lowest income groups—the working poor, people with inadequate fixed incomes, and the unemployed. These groups in varying degree must look to government for gratification of their most elementary wants, beginning with basic subsistence, housing, education, and a viable social environment (that is, neighborhoods free of such things as violence, dope pushers, and vagrants).

A good deal of the interest in urban localism appears to stem from the stratification of residential areas along class and race lines found in virtually every metropolitan community no matter what its size. The middle and upper classes have been relatively effective in obtaining high-quality facilities and services for their residential neighborhoods. Urban localism, as it is reflected in the defense of subcommunities, in this case seeks to maintain existing social and financial advantages. In contrast, the lower-income and minority groups are seeking increased access to resources and political power in order to ensure more adequate provision of facilities and services. In short, submetropolitan units are seen by some as a means of defending what they have and by others as a means of gaining access to what they have not.

The interests of minority groups, like those of the majority, increasingly reflect class differences. While there are now middle- and upper-income minority residential areas in many central cities, the deconcentrating movement that is under way generally has not resulted in large movements of minorities across the boundaries of political jurisdictions. For the present, minority localism remains central city localism for some and residential area localism for others. Both groups seek access to political power, but opinion is divided on the adequacy of the resources that power in the central city will provide.

Decentralization at the level usually discussed would have little effect on the neighborhood, or microcommunity, which will continue to be the setting of relatively fewer and fewer urban transactions. As operative for middle- and upper-income groups, decentralization might tend to strengthen socially undesirable exclusionary practices. For the lower-class, decentralization is important only if it provides real access to power and in turn better services.

On the whole, it does not seem likely to achieve these things. As Janowitz (1961) concluded after examining the urban scene, the problem of local groups as well as that of the wider community derives less from a concentration of power than from lack of an articulated system for making decisions at all.

Throughout the country, there is a basic need for more equitable and effective metropolitan government. Informed and coherent national standards could make an important contribution toward this end. At the same time, there is need for concerted state and federal action. Most important, perhaps, local leaders and citizens must recognize the extent to which they live on a metropolitan scale and how metropolitan institutions shape their well-being and the quality of their lives. Finally, as provision is made for better governance of metropolitan communities, continuing work to identify those activities that may lend themselves to more responsive handling at a submetropolitan level will be needed. In the absence of effective metropolitan government, the states and the federal government will be obliged to assume additional responsibilities.



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Consolidated List of Findings

- Thus far in the twentieth century, metropolitan communities have increased in scale and become more multicentered.
- Since the rapid growth of metropolitan areas in the United States has been accompanied by an even more rapid deconcentrating movement of population within metropolitan areas, there has been a general decline of urban densities.
- In the process of metropolitanization, there has been suburban selectivity of the higher socioeconomic groups. As multicentered metropolitan communities evolve, however, socioeconomic variations among suburbs will probably be of increasing significance: different suburbs will draw disproportionately from different socioeconomic classes. Construction of multiple-dwelling units in the suburbs has increased sharply. Hence, a corresponding broadening in the stages of the family life cycle represented in the suburbs may be expected, including young adults and older couples as well as families with children.

- The dispersion of population within metropolitan areas has been almost exclusively white, resulting in an increasing segregation of blacks in central cities. However, late in the 1960s there were indications that the outward movement of minorities was accelerating somewhat. There then began a trend of blacks, especially middle-class ones, moving from the central cities to the suburbs.
- As metropolitan areas develop, there is a tendency for the jobs best suited for the labor force of the suburbs to remain concentrated in the central city, particularly the downtown central business district, while the jobs best suited to the type of labor force locked into the central city move to the suburbs.
- With rising incomes, more education, and greater knowledge about the metropolitan environs, most metropolitan residents are able to benefit from the array of opportunities that exist beyond the actual destinations to which they customarily travel. The aged, the physically handicapped, and the poor, however, do suffer a deprivation of access, for these are the predominant groups lacking use of automobiles, which are now necessary for metropolitan mobility, particularly in low-density suburban districts.
- The proliferation of governmental units in metropolitan areas and the development of urban services in suburban territory have contributed to acceleration of population scatter, as have certain federal programs.
- In view of the long-run tendency toward increasing size and complexity of metropolitan communities, the fragmentation of government results in disadvantages for the community as a whole. The movement of population to the suburbs and hence to separate political units has aggravated fiscal and social inequities within metropolitan areas.
- It appears that residents who remain in the central city subsidize the suburban residents' use of public services.
- The deconcentrating movement of urban populations and the diffusion of urban characteristics are not confined to metropolitan areas; they have extended into the adjacent rural territory to produce there the country's highest growth rates. Ninety-five percent of the nation's population lives within the labor shed of metropolitan central cities. This labor shed may be delineated by the time

required to commute to major places of employment.

- The benefits of urban sprawl are distributed regressively with respect to wealth. While the advantages of lowered residential densities have been obvious in the past (at least when nineteenth century densities are considered), the current net benefits may be negative. Sprawl appears to have outrun the ability of government to meet the requirements of urban settlements. Moreover, given the present structure of government, distortions in the distribution of costs and benefits are not readily correctable. There is reason to require more equitable sharing of costs, not only between the suburbs and the central city, but also among suburbs. There is also an argument for ending or modifying subsidies that have favored single-family, automobile-dependent, low-density suburbanization.
- The metropolitan experience is manifold. It offers a great range of opportunity in terms of both facilities and social contact. It substitutes translocal for local associations and interests.
- At present, the best evidence suggests that the metropolitan experience involves an increase in the number and variety of impersonal (secondary) relationships and that the frequency and quality of personal and intimate (primary) relationships has remained virtually unchanged.
- When socioeconomic and ethnic factors are taken into account, it is not clear that cities per se breed violence, though they do present more opportunity for property crimes and vice.
- There is evidence that pollution does cause some degree of biological damage. There is very little support, however, for the theory that city life impairs mental functioning in ways that can be termed psychiatric disorders.
- City–suburban differences in patterns of living, for example, differences in community involvement and frequency of contact with neighbors, are almost entirely explained by socioeconomic differences. The remaining differences are probably caused by self-selection; that is, those who already possess a certain characteristic elect to move to a location that attracts people of that type. The characteristic is not caused by the location.
- Many factors influence people's evaluations of their residential

environments. This may help to explain why, although there is a tendency for higher levels of satisfaction to be associated with a higher degree of residential planning, no clear patterns of liked or disliked attributes are associated with different levels of planning. Moreover, studies of the quality of life indicate that residential satisfaction is partially based on assessments of such nonsite attributes as public schools, police–community relations, and local taxes.

- Multivariate analysis shows that the links between objective and subjective measures of environmental attributes are substantial. The impact of environmental characteristics, as measured by objective indicators, on residents' satisfaction with their neighborhoods is moderately strong, but other factors intervene.
- People do not clearly differentiate between their micro- and macroneighborhoods. The characteristics of one are often confused with those of the other.
- Lower residential densities, rising household incomes, increasing specialization, and a preponderant reliance on the automobile have contributed to the diminished importance of the more traditional neighborhood, or microcommunity, pattern.
- In the metropolitan context, the local neighborhood, or microcommunity, has become relatively less significant as a locus of interaction and a force in personality formation. It survives principally as a means of control over the immediate physical environment and in that respect tends to operate as a unit only when it is threatened. Poor and minority neighborhoods are somewhat of an exception. In these neighborhoods, social interaction is more intense and community efforts are more concerned with obtaining responsive public services than with the exclusion of threats to the community.
- A central problem in microcommunity control of the environment is the absence of any authoritative way in which residents can appeal to a single set of boundaries.
- Although residents of microcommunities often share similar life styles, participation in neighborhood affairs is usually limited. There is instead a tendency to rely on professionals and formal organizations for the discharge of community responsibilities. Microcom-

munity action is basically determined by *communities of limited liability,* that is, communities in which people invest their efforts and resources for achievable gains with the expectation that they can "pull out" on short notice.

- Attempts to increase the influence of the microcommunity in the wider community frequently have floundered because adversary relationships between community groups and public agencies have developed.
- Each metropolitan community is itself part of a larger national and even international, multicentered urban network or system. In this larger system, different metropolitan communities perform different roles; the relationships among the parts of the network are not so much territorial as functional. Each provides some services and goods for the others and each, in turn, is served by the others. Together, they constitute a complex web of interdependencies. The network is still growing, and the range and frequency of transactions is mounting. However, what form the future growth of this network will take remains uncertain.
- Despite the expanding scale of organization to the national level, there is lack of (1) a broader, more empirically based understanding of urbanization processes; (2) support for innovation and experimentation in urban development; (3) a sensitive network for information collection and analysis that can monitor the outcomes of public and private initiatives; and (4) adequate feedback of findings and forecasts to provide a more reliable basis for public and private decisions.
- The present system of local government fails to answer the needs of a clearly metropolitan society. Fragmented and overlapping government in metropolitan areas (1) aggravates the mismatch between resources and social needs, (2) makes the solution of metropolitan social problems more difficult, and (3) inhibits efficient administration of services.
- Although no coordinated national policy has evolved in response to the unfavorable by-products of metropolitanization, all levels of government have undertaken specific programs. If the federal response has been inadequate or misconceived, the same generalization can be made with much greater force concerning the states.

- Of the external forces influencing metropolitan government since 1962, none has had a greater impact than the federal courts. Unfortunately, from the central cities' viewpoint, the judicial requirement of one man, one vote representation in state legislatures came after the cities had already lost much of their population to the suburbs. The cities no longer had the votes to redress the balance between resources and social needs. The chief beneficiaries of reapportionment were suburban jurisdictions, and suburbs will gain even more as population continues to move outward. The courts, however, in issues recently and currently before them, have the potential to reduce some of the inequities caused by fragmentation.
- Experience indicates that voter approval of metropolitan reorganization is virtually impossible to obtain outside the south. In lieu of reorganization, a large number of special districts have been created to meet the service needs of metropolitan communities.
- Although the county seldom includes the total interactive and interdependent area of a metropolitan community, enlarging county responsibilities may improve local government for smaller metropolitan areas. Counties also may serve as effective subunits in a larger metropolitan regional system.
- Councils of governments have been put forward as one solution to the metropolitan governmental problem. Although councils of governments are easily organized, flexible, and adaptable governmental units, none of the large number created in the 1960s has solved a major metropolitan problem. There is no evidence that they are beginning to take on a metropolitan governance function.
- A large number of intergovernmental service arrangements have been created. Sixty-three percent of the 2,375 municipalities responding to a mailed questionnaire have entered into formal or informal agreements with other public or private units for the supply of services.
- One can state with reasonable confidence that the major problems of metropolitan areas will have to be confronted by state or federal government unless new areawide mechanisms are developed.



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Research Problems in Metropolitanization and the Significance of Community

In this report, a series of important trends affecting urban organization and life have been discussed on the basis of existing research. However, much more data and analysis are needed to document the timing and quality, the causes and consequences of these changes. An expanded but sharply focused research effort is essential to provide the basic understanding required for the formulation of innovative policies. The following list of research problems deserves priority consideration for research funding.

DEMOGRAPHIC MOVEMENTS

- A careful study of population movements within metropolitan areas is required to identify patterns of residence change, what kinds of people are moving in what directions, the extent of the tendency within racial groups to cluster by socioeconomic categories, the effect of wives joining the labor force on household resi-

dential choices, and the like. For most of these purposes, a cohort or individual life history approach would be most useful.

- A full analysis of the character of rural nonfarm population growth is needed. To what extent is this population concentrating in counties adjacent to metropolitan areas; what kinds of people are involved; to what extent and in what respects are residents beyond the peripheries of metropolitan areas directly involved in metropolitan affairs? The relationship of nonmetropolitan to metropolitan areas needs to be reexamined for the purpose of establishing new methods of delineating larger functional units.
- Research is needed to discover whether one of the central cities' strengths—the location of regional and national headquarters—is being lost. If, in fact, that is happening, the redistribution outward of people and economic activity will proceed even more rapidly.

METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE

- Research should be undertaken to discover what differences exist *among* suburbs; most research in this area has dealt with city–suburban differences.
- A measurement of the need for subsidies from state governments or the federal government can be approximated by comparing a summation of all fiscal resources currently obtained in metropolitan areas from local taxation with a summation of all operating costs of local governments within metropolitan areas.
- To what extent will the decentralization of government services affect the dollar costs of service delivery? Do other noneconomic gains adequately compensate for the loss of economies of scale?
- What are the measurable effects of citizen participation in planning, zoning decisions, and so forth?
- How can local governments provide more adequate packages of services desired by their citizens while minimizing costs? How can more adequate procedures be devised for evaluating citizen demands for public services?
- Experimentation with innovative types of public service centers in local residential districts is needed. Centers would specialize in

providing information about and contacts to the larger web of nonlocal facilities.

- What are the effects of property abandonment on the land values of the property immediately affected and adjacent properties?
- Measures of public sector productivity are needed. Such measurement is essential if it is ever to be possible to say anything significant about the relative efficiency of the public as opposed to the private sector or about differences among governments.
- What is the effect of the metropolitan governmental structure on the service delivery system and on the quantity and quality of the services provided?
- What is the impact of governmental reorganization on residents' attitudes toward government, on their political behavior, and on the distribution of public resources?
- What impact is the environmental movement and the energy crisis having on housing supply and housing choice?

INTRAMETROPOLITAN CIRCULATION

- Urban mobility in all its forms warrants a substantially greater research investment. One useful but neglected approach would be the analysis of the frequency and distances of daily trips (for all purposes) of various household members, with controls on socioeconomic status, family life cycle stage, and size of urban area.
- Systematically assembled data on walking are needed: how many trips (as related to number of vehicular trips); how far; for what purposes; and by whom. How do density, land use, and other environmental factors in the urban setting affect walking? Differences in walking ability and willingness to walk as associated with such personal and household characteristics as age, sex, physical condition, income, and personal access to other transportation need to be examined.
- The impact of transportation systems on patterns of residential choice needs to be examined. How could transportation systems be adapted to achieve more desirable residential patterns within various metropolitan areas?
- Analyses of household budgets on the bases of age, type of

household, and place of residence, with special reference to the proportion devoted to transportation costs, would be useful.

- Research designed to provide a basic understanding of the effects of improved communications on the organization and interdependence of metropolitan communities is urgently needed. What social function, for example, do the 400 million daily telephone calls perform?

RESIDENTIAL CHOICE

- What are the major policy factors that affect residential choice? What factors affect residence choice for members of various socioeconomic groups in various types of neighborhoods? When people select a place to live, do they pick only a dwelling unit or also a "neighborhood"?
- What is the impact of current housing policies on local housing and residential choice? What new programs would operate more effectively and at less unit cost?
- What is the impact of the educational system on residential patterns? What are the most salient aspects of the educational system for various socioeconomic groups? What changes would have the greatest impact on patterns of residential choice?
- What are the impacts of parks, recreational facilities, clean air, streets, water, and physical safety on patterns of residential choice? What aspects of these environmental attributes are most salient for various socioeconomic groups? What changes would have the greatest impact on patterns of residential choice?

THE METROPOLITAN EXPERIENCE

- Research on urban life needs a holistic conceptualization of the issues—a model distinguishing among levels of analysis. The model's various assumptions must be tested (for example, that life in cities is really significantly more stressful than nonurban life), and they should be tested in cross-cultural contexts.
- Because of continued suburban growth, research to provide a better understanding of differences among suburbs as well as their

similarities is needed. Such work must carefully control for extraneous variables.

- A number of comparative studies of the structures and functions of communities in various parts of the United States should be made to verify the generalizations concerning the evolving nature of American culture. In particular, communitywide or larger-scale studies need to be conducted in counties adjacent to metropolitan areas to determine the extent of their changing social and economic structure.
- Some of the research on urbanism should be directed to testing for contextual effects. The character of an individual's social context (for example, size of college-educated population, number of minority group members) is critical in explaining his behavior.
- Network analysis is critical for understanding both how subcultures stay internally integrated and how the diffusion process crosses group boundaries.

COMMUNITY SATISFACTION

- Further development of measures of neighborhood characteristics that enter into resident satisfaction (for example, school quality, public service quality, and neighbor congeniality) are essential.
- Constant monitoring of people's perceptions of the environment and the objective attributes of the environment can be valuable to policymakers. The data indicate what attributes of the environment are deemed important by various segments of the population. This information would be useful in setting priorities for government services and in local legislation. Having both objective and subjective indicators could allow policymakers to lower expectations where this is more feasible than modifying the objective situation.
- A conceptual model of influences on community satisfaction should be refined and modified. This can be accomplished as data from empirical studies become available to either confirm or disprove hypothesized relationships between model elements.
- Adequate measures of objective environmental attributes must be developed. Physical, social, and economic attributes need to be defined and quantified.

- Better methods are needed for measuring the complex concept of satisfaction. What dimensions does it have?

THE MICROCOMMUNITY

- How are interest in and knowledge about one's neighborhood related to the frequency and distances of daily trips?
- Studies of the significance of the neighborhood for various categories of the population, with reference to such things as the frequency of neighboring and feelings of mutual trustworthiness and support, are desirable.
- How has the decline in the social significance of proximity affected the type and quality of social activity?
- How aware are people of their local neighborhood and its contribution to their identity?
- Is the local neighborhood best understood as a singular territory or as several more or less inclusive territorial groupings where some people define the smaller units as their neighborhoods and others define the entire grouping as their neighborhood?
- How do people weigh the significance of special interest groups in the prospects for their future as opposed to that of the local neighborhood?
- Does participation in special-interest organizations constrain or enhance the likelihood of participation in the local neighborhood?

Additional Readings List by Topic

Urban Government

General Works
Case Studies
Proposals for Structural Reform
Basic Data
Metropolitan Politics
Federalism
Neighborhood Government—Community Control

Urban Sociology

General Works
Community and Neighborhood
Residential Satisfaction
Groups and Integration
The Suburbs
Miscellaneous

Urban Economics

General Works
Municipal Expenditures
Employment
Land Values and Property Tax
Location, Agglomeration, Development

Urban Planning

Urban Demography

Urban History

Urban Problems

- Housing
- Transportation
- Race
- Crime and Violence
- Physical and Mental Health
- Effects on Rural Areas
- Education

URBAN GOVERNMENT

General Works

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