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STUDIES IN HOLLAND FLOOD DISASTER 1953
Volume IV

STUDIES IN HOLLAND FLOOD DISASTER 1953

- Volume I Introduction
Communications in the Stricken Area in February 1953
- Volume II Survey of Evacuation Problems and Disaster Experiences
- Volume III Community studies:
A Study of Community Re-integration
A Study of the Destruction of a Community
A Study of Social Disorganization in a Community
- Volume IV General Conclusions

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STUDIES IN HOLLAND FLOOD DISASTER 1953

Volume IV

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

**INSTITUUT VOOR SOCIAAL ONDERZOEK VAN HET NEDERLANDSE VOLK
AMSTERDAM**

**COMMITTEE ON DISASTER STUDIES OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES – NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C.**

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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

by

J. E. Ellemers

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

A. General Observations

After the completion of the various reports about the sociological and psychological effects of the flood-disaster of February 1953 in the southwestern Netherlands, the necessity arose to compile the most important information obtained from these various sources.

Before we proceed to organize the material from the studies, we want to give the reader some indication of the problems which arose from the composition of the reports in general and of this Central Conclusions in particular.

First, it should be pointed out that the reports are very heterogeneous in topic, set-up and content. The subjects under study were:

- an examination of the communication system during and shortly after the flood;
- a survey of evacuation problems and disaster experiences;
- a survey of three communities which were all struck by the disaster in varying degrees and ways ¹.

Although these studies throw light on important aspects of the disaster and its effects, we must keep in mind that other important facets had to be entirely or partially left out of consideration. The project had to be limited and did not permit of, for example, a separate study about the methods and organization of rescue work and assistance. However, we have some information about this and other aspects, e. g. about the reactions and attitudes of the non-affected areas, from the existing reports.

There are also differences in the set-ups of the studies. This is most clearly shown by a comparison of the statistical analysis of the Survey on the one hand and the case-study approach of the community-studies on the other ².

An unavoidable handicap for all the work was the speed with which fieldwork had to be started due to the rapidly changing situation, which created the danger of losing trace of important factors. Resulting from this was the short time possible for preparation, which was a

1) The reports are:

- J. Haveman, Introduction, Vol. I (Introduction);
- K. van Dijk and J. Pilger, Communications in the Stricken Area in February 1953, Vol. I (Communications);
- C. J. Lammers, Survey of Evacuation Problems and Disaster Experiences, Vol. II (Survey);
- L. W. Nauta and P. J. van Strien, A Study of Community Re-integration, Vol. III (Kortgene);
- J. E. Ellemers and Henny M. in 't Veld-Langeveld, A Study of the Destruction of a Community, Vol. III (Kruiningen);
- M. Jeanne van Doorn-Janssen, A Study of Social Disorganization in a Community, Vol. III (Zierikzee).

The shortened titles are given in parantheses as they are used in this report.

2) See for a methodological comparison between the Survey and the community studies Appendix B in this volume.

definite drawback particularly for the Survey. There was, however, no alternative to this inadequate preparation and lack of hypothetical foundations except no investigation at all.

Finally, in this connection, we must state another more indirect result of the hurried preparation, i. e., that the various teams have had a large degree of independence in the compilation of the material and the composition of their reports. This had the advantage that the material has been approached in differing ways and from differing sides. The disadvantage is that the lack of uniformity has sometimes prevented the possibility of comparison.

We have come to the object of the General Conclusions. The heterogeneity of the disaster studies described above make it on the one hand more desirable to compile the important information but make this compilation, on the other hand, much more difficult. In addition to the heterogeneity of the material, there was also the problem of whether the Conclusions should be purely factual or whether these facts should be interpreted according to sociological theory. In regard to this, various reports give a rather extensive sociological and psychological interpretation of their findings.

Our sponsors had expressed the wish that the authors would limit the number of theoretical speculations, and the reader, who wishes to use the facts and not the theory, has the right to unadulterated facts. On the other hand, there is the necessity to put the results of the disaster studies into a theoretical framework based on more abstract knowledge in order to broaden the insight into these occurrences³.

Taking both these viewpoints into consideration, we have found the following solution:

In four chapters, the most important facts from the various reports are condensed. Then, in a narrative survey, in which we have attempted to make a balance between facts and the interpretation thereof, the reader is again given the main points of the disaster and its results⁴. This is based primarily on the "Studies of the Holland Flood Disaster". Some additional information has been added from other sources and observations not yet published.

Because of the mere statement of the main points with a few illustrations of extreme cases, our description will have a strong ideal-typical character. The facts are interpreted only insofar as this is done in the reports themselves.

Only in the last chapter, where we again compile the most important data, do we try to achieve a more profound abstraction. This attempt will be very unassuming and has no other intention than to give some "miniature" hypotheses⁵. Although the information contained in the reports may in some cases be suitable for more intensive interpretation according to sociological or social-psychological concepts (e. g., function, social role, reference group) we wish in general to leave this to the reader.

This however does not mean that we wish to refrain entirely

3) See for an argument hereover the articles by Williams, Janis and Killian in "Human Behavior in Disaster: A New Field of Social Research", special number of The Journal of Social Issues, vol. X (no. 3, 1954).

4) Only in the case of the most important facts shall there be a reference to the disaster report from which they are taken.

5) Cf. Janis, 1954, p. 16 (For the complete title, see the bibliography at the end of this report).

from interpretation. In addition to the interpretations actually given in the reports, the compilation of the material and the choice of what should and what should not be mentioned in the General Conclusions is in itself an interpretation-process.

Considering the limitation that the diversity of the reports, the missing information and the many aspects of the subjects have placed on us, it was decided to group the General Conclusions according to the four main occurrences: the disaster, rescue, evacuation and restoration. This manner of subdivision, although a somewhat pragmatic, is justified logically as well as chronologically. It is also sociologically and psychologically valuable – as we hope to illustrate in the following chapters – because it is based on four essential foci of the disaster and the results hereof.

In the four chapters on the disaster, rescue, evacuation and restoration, we shall try to distinguish between sociological and psychological aspects. Each chapter starts with some factual information as background to the accompanying text.

This division into disaster, rescue, evacuation and restoration also has its disadvantages. Actually the phases are not always distinguishable as clearly as might be implied. Even chronologically there are conflicting instances, as one area can have been still in the disaster period while rescue had already begun in another area. We have tried to handle this problem by the ideal-typical treatment of the subject. The differentiation between sociological and psychological aspects is more difficult, since the differences are so fluctuating; the taking of arbitrary decisions was often unavoidable.

From the above it may be clear that it is not the purpose of this paper to give a sociology or a psychology of a flood disaster – even if this were possible. An attempt is made to arrange a number of sociological and psychological data systematically and as far as possible to interpret their inter-relationships.

In this, the approach is non-historical; that is that we do not start – in contrast to several disaster reports – by giving a resumé of the situation before the disaster and using this as the basis for interpretation.

The background of the disaster reports is, as stated in the Preface ⁶, a practical one. It is their purpose to give deeper insight into the sociological and psychological processes involved in situations of extreme stress in order to apply this knowledge in handling other situations of this nature. Hence one might expect some indications here as to the most effective way of handling or limiting the influence of possible other distances, as far as the "human factor" is concerned. However, these studies are limited to a particular type of disaster, in a particular area at a particular time. In other words, the focus of our research has been too limited to be able to draw conclusions for situations of great stress in general. Furthermore, while a social scientist can do research into the results of a disaster, he is no *per se* expert in giving practical advice as to the handling of such a situation. In addition to which, the social scientist cannot foresee the results of the advice he might give.

It is therefore our opinion that the many conclusions from the disaster reports can be "translated" into practical suggestions by ex-

6) Cf. Vol. I of these studies, pp. ix ff.

perts, to be done in cooperation with the investigators. This approach is considered better than having suggestions from the latter which might be undesirable or impractical. Therefore, the practical conclusions stated in Appendix A have been made hesitantly and merely as suggestions ⁷.

B. Classification of Disasters

Before proceeding with the conclusions of research on the disaster, it is perhaps desirable to define sociologically the meaning of a disaster. Quoting Carr, we find that a situation becomes a disaster when "man becomes the victim of forces which he normally controls. The term disaster, in other words, refers to the social consequences of cultural failure to control natural forces" ⁸. Carr's definition will be used as an operational definition.

As this is a rather general definition, we must consider the possibility of distinguishing among various types of disasters and the possibility of classifying a flood disaster such as the February 1953 flood in S. W. Holland. Again we turn to Carr. He points out the necessity of distinguishing external or other disturbances. Under external disturbances he ranks four kinds of disturbances caused by natural forces: ⁹

1. Focalized-instantaneous disturbances; happening in a limited area in an instant of time (e. g., the caving-in of a mine-tunnel).
2. diffused-instantaneous disturbances, happening in a considerable area in a short-time (e. g., earthquakes, great explosions as for instance in Hiroshima).
3. focalized-progressive disturbances; happening in a small area developing over an appreciable time (e. g., shipwreck, hotel fires).
4. diffused-progressive disturbances; happening in a considerable area developing over an appreciable time (e. g., most natural catastrophes, except earthquakes).

Obviously the disaster with which we are concerned is one of the last category, i. e., one which covers a large area and which lasts a certain length of time. Having thus limited our field, we must emphasize that the conclusions which we report are valid only for the type of disaster as mentioned under (4) on the above list.

7) Finally, a bibliography is given, which includes a number of publications about situations of extreme stress. These have been referred to either directly or indirectly in the composition of these reports. Also mentioned are several publications, in which certain aspects of the effects of the February 1 disaster in Holland are given.

In the glossary technical terms concerning polders, governmental institutions and religious denominations will be explained. The glossary is followed by an index on the four volumes and a general map of the disaster area.

8) Carr, 1948, p. 59.

9) Ibid., pp. 110-111.

Chapter II

THE DISASTER

A. Introduction

The disaster which hit Southwestern Holland was the result of an unusual combination of natural forces. There was the spring-tide (an extremely high tide occurring twice a month) and the unusual driving power of the North Sea caused by a long and heavy storm¹. Though the theoretical possibility of such a calamitous interplay of natural forces had been realized by the hydraulic experts, no one however was prepared for the actual occurrence. It overwhelmed almost everyone unexpectedly.

The outsider may wonder how it is possible that one is unprepared for such a threat in a country with 38% of its land below sealevel. The fact that the disaster was so unexpected for the majority can be explained however by several factors, external as well as psychological.

First, a disaster such as occurred on February 1, 1953 had not been known for hundreds of years. Only from history books did people know of some bad floods in the Middle Ages when large parts of the country were flooded. Several bad floods since had submerged only a few polders or islands. A disaster as extensive as that of 1953 had not been experienced for centuries.

Secondly, there was unlimited faith in the "Nederlandse Waterstaat" (Netherlands Waterways authority) due to their constant activity. Thus, even though experts discussed the possibility that the Dutch dykes might be too low for calculated maximal water levels, the population believed itself completely safe behind the heavy dykes and could not conceive of the possibility of the sea washing over them.

A third important factor is that most of the areas affected by the disaster were agricultural; thought and action of the inhabitants were focussed inland rather than on the sea or on water conditions.

Last but not least it should be pointed out that neither the spring-tide (which occur approximately every two weeks) nor the wind strength gave special cause for concern during the night of January 31 - February 1.

Thus the situation in most parts of the Southwestern Netherlands during the afternoon and evening of January 31 was by no means unusual. There was no cause for concern in the fact that the water was rising, that there was a strong wind, that flood-boards had to be used where the dykes were low, that here and there the ferry-service had to be stopped temporarily (e. g., in Kortgene and Kruiningen) because the passengers and freight could not be unloaded, but none of these separately or together was disturbing. The number of people directly affected was small, the personnel of the port and ferry services and the Waterways authority. And for them, this was a routine situation

1) This version is probably somewhat oversimplified. For an extensive description of the combination of natural forces, see Tellegen, 1953, pp. 145-147. Cf. also Maris, 1954, pp. 3 ff. and the Introduction to these studies, Vol. I, pp. 7 ff.

which happened a few times every winter. As regards the rest of the population, the inconveniences (such as having to wait for boat connections) brought about by the high water level just naturally belonged to a life near the sea. The great majority of the population had no idea what was happening. In short, there was nothing disturbing, either for people who were working on or by the water or certainly for the people who had no connection with the water.

High tide had been on the afternoon of January 31 and low tide was in the evening – that this low tide was as high as the normal high tide was noticed by few and even fewer wondered about it. The normal Saturday evening activities took place; in Kortgene, there was celebrating about the opening of the new town-hall; in Kruiningen the glee-club was giving a performance.

Most people had already gone to bed when here and there gradually alarming messages began to come in. Probably it was only in a few fishing villages that men were in any way prepared for what was to come. In Ierseke, for example, work had been going on all afternoon and evening on the dyke and harbor². The work started as a protection for the ships against the high and turbulent water rather than as protection against a personal threat. Not until later, while work was still going on with the ships did people realize the danger to the dyke. It is hard to say whether the preservation of this dyke is due to the labor of the Ierseke fishermen or to the fact that the dyke broke elsewhere, thus reducing the water level there. In addition to the luck that this meant for the Ierseke fishers, there was another big advantage in that the following day, the Ierseke boats and men were ready to begin with rescue work, not only on that island and nearby Kruiningen but also on the far side of the Oosterschelde, at the islands of Schouwen-Duiveland and Tholen.

But in most of the areas which were so badly affected later on, everyone was totally unaware of the danger of that Saturday night. Not until deep in the night did it become clear to several people who were in some way dependent on the water that the level was reaching an abnormal height. People were called from their beds; authorities (such as the burgomasters) were warned so that they could check on the seriousness of the situation and take the necessary measures. But even though the situation at the dykes and in the harbors was becoming more serious, there was no realization of the extent of the approaching danger and of its imminence. People who were excited were calmed and in most cases, the inhabitants of the villages were not warned until the last moment. In most instances, the churchbells were rung, in Haamstede the town-crier went through the village, in some places, the fire-engines were sent out with screaming sirens, people warned family and neighbors, telephoned, tried to send messengers to the outlying farms, etc.

While warnings were still being given, dykes broke and water rushed in. In many cases, this immediately brought an end to these warning activities, as well as to all communications, since electricity and the telephone system were broken off. All that was left to be done was to flee to attics and roofs, and to wait from several hours to several days. For many, the arrival of the water meant death, sometimes after a short period of suffering, sometimes after days.

It must be pointed out that not all villagers nor even all of the people

2) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 82, 84.

in the same village were affected to the same degree by the disaster. In Zierikzee, for instance, only a part of the town was very badly flooded, while the water receded again rather quickly from the largest part of the town, and the amount of victims was comparatively small. In Ouwerkerk, Nieuwerkerk, Kruiningen and Kortgene, however, the disaster hit violently and unexpectedly, demanding many victims and causing immeasurable damage. The foregoing holds true for the situation in most places mentioned in the disaster reports.

The prelude to the disaster then ended. After some orientation to the new situation, everyone applied themselves to the rescue with all means. In most villages which were primarily agricultural, adequate material for this rescue work was lacking. Some attempted to work with hurriedly constructed rafts, but mostly this was made impossible by wind and weather conditions.

Some people in the lesser-affected areas found ways to take care of themselves, but most were dependent on rescue arriving from somewhere else. Being isolated, without communications, it was quite a problem to make the danger known and the necessity for rescue. Due to this lack of communications, the danger situation lasted longer than was strictly necessary. In some cases, as in Kortgene and Kruiningen, rescue could be affected by inhabitants of nearby, non-affected villages. But in those areas where whole islands or large areas were flooded, it was necessary to await help from outside.

Volunteers from far away from the disaster area and Dutch and foreign armed forces could not bring relief until days later. Where whole islands or large areas were flooded, as in Schouwen-Duiveland and Goeree-Overflakkee, many inhabitants had to undergo great hardship for days before being evacuated to safer places.

B. The Disaster as a Social Upheaval

In this section we will discuss the social processes in the communities afflicted during the disaster.

1. Warning

The first reaction of people, who happened to be on the dykes or were on duty there, was usually to warn the authorities, although this was often done at the last moment. In Kortgene, as well as in Kruiningen and Zierikzee, the burgomaster was the first to be warned, it is of course understandable that the head of a community is warned first, as he is expected to take the initiative under any circumstances. It is remarkable, however, that no one dared take measures without the burgomaster's knowledge.

From Kortgene, we know that a small group of people who were at the harbor repeatedly contacted the burgomaster and some other authorities for advice, or at least for consent to take certain measures³. From Kruiningen, we know that the burgomaster was warned from no less than six different sides during the period of threatening danger. Only after the burgomaster's consent was the fire brigade called in and general alarm made⁴.

3) Vol. III, pp. 14-15, 27.

4) Vol. III, pp. 106, 82.

It was not merely at a local level that contact was sought with superiors especially during the first phases of the disaster. From Kortgene both the burgomaster and the police tried to contact their superiors in Middelburg. From Kruijningen the Provincial Board was repeatedly called. Also in Zierikzee officials attempted to contact Middelburg⁵. Even more than the community-studies, however, does the communications report give us information concerning this. There are some typical examples. We read in this communications report how municipalities, burgomasters, local police departments, departments of Waterways, postal department etc. always tried to contact their superiors in the main towns⁶.

All institutions mentioned are bureaucratic in structure, characterized by a hierarchical constitution, division of responsibilities and extensively defined instructions for a large variety of possible occurrences⁷. The disaster, however, was an occurrence for which no instructions existed⁸ and which created problems for officials used to the bureaucratic hierarchy. The frame of reference of the hierarchy was "flooded" by the completely new situation. As there were no further instructions for such an occurrence, there was only one solution to be found within this frame of reference; and that was to contact the superior, whether this was the foreman, for the dykeworker or the Commissioner of the Province for the burgomaster. For after all the superior bears the responsibility and he is the one to make decisions or at least to consent to them.

This mechanism, which is connected with the social control mechanism, proved to be so strong that it was influential in practically all cases. A remarkable example of this is the case of a coastguard official in O. who would not execute an order given to him personally by radio because he would "only accept instructions from his own superior in Rotterdam"⁹.

2. Threat

Once the local authorities had been warned, alarm was usually sounded rapidly.

The Survey gives us the following information on the systems of alarm:¹⁰

warned by public systems (churchbells, sirens, etc.)	36%
warned privately (neighbors, relatives, etc.)	41%
taken by surprise (usually those living outside the village)	7%

We note then that the community, either via formally organized channels or via informal means, as a whole came to learn of the threat of disaster. The fact that even here an appeal is made to the hierarchical organization and the fact that the alarm was partially

5) Vol. III, pp. 19-20, 29-30 (Kortgene), pp. 84 ff (Kruijningen), pp. 181-182 (Zierikzee).

6) Vol. I, p. 34.

7) Compare also Weber, 1947, pp. 650 ff and Merton, 1951, pp. 151 ff.

8) Cf. Vol. I, pp. 73 ff.

9) Vol. I, p. 62.

10) Vol. II, pp. 175-177.

Probably there is some distortion in the data of the Survey insofar as they are concerned with the disaster experiences. See for an explanation about this note 6 of Chapter III of the present report.

made through official channels and partially privately shows that in this phase before the disaster, a number of important community patterns were still functioning.

The attempts at organized action were, however, weak. In Kruiningen the men were summoned but soon sent back to their homes ¹¹. In Kortgene, there was little or no initiative for positive action ¹². It is known only of Colijnsplaat that the situation was actually saved by a number of men who propped the floodboards at the harbor with their own bodies ¹³.

In addition to the above-mentioned hierarchical effect, social control was active in the sense that many people did not do what they wanted or could have done because they feared they would be ridiculed as exaggerators if it later turned out to be less serious than it seemed ¹⁴

3. Impact

So far we have discussed only the period of "pre-calamity". The arrival of the water, i. e., the actual disaster, totally changed the situation. People were driven to the top floors and roofs of their houses; communication-possibilities were almost non-existent. The lack of rescue and aid material made it impossible to do anything.

Although less is known of this phase, one is given the strong impression that social contacts during this phase were limited to family members and neighbors. In the community-study of Kruiningen, it is described how multiple-group membership suddenly created conflicts for members of a number of organizations such as the local authority bodies, the police, the fire brigade, the department of Waterways. As Killian points out about some other disasters, the choice of most men was to be with their families rather than fulfilling the task which they should have done in their position as members of another groups (e.g., police, fire brigade, etc.) ¹⁵. The study of Kortgene shows a similar pattern, although it is not so explicitly described. From our own observations during the first week after the disaster, we know that it was an important stimulus for the men in their rescue and aid work to know that the women and children had been evacuated and were in safety. By the same token, the presence of women and children in dangerous circumstances seemed to impede the men's activities.

Information concerning social conditions, given in the Survey, indicates that 66% of the interviewees were together with the whole family during the impact-period; 14% were with part of the family; and 11% were alone.

Furthermore, it is reported that 51% were together with none other than members of the family; 17% were together constantly with others than family members; and 22% were part of the time together with others. These others probably were mostly neighbors ¹⁶.

11) Vol. III, p. 83.

12) Vol. III, p. 15, 30, 39.

13) Vol. III, p. 16.

What took place in Colijnsplaat is also traced by Max Dendermonde, *Op zoek naar het verhaal van Colijnsplaat* (On search for the story of Colijnsplaat), *De Groene Amsterdammer* (weekly), March 21, 1953.

14) Cf. for instance Vol. III, pp. 28, 30-31.

15) Vol. III, pp. 102-105, Cf. also Killian, 1952, pp. 309 ff.

16) Vol. II, p. 184.

The total impression left on us is one of a very impoverished society where only one motif played a role, that of rescue; a community in which the major social pattern is that of the family and in a lesser degree the neighborhood and the village as a whole. The disaster implies a kind of social regression in the originally so complex village community. Besides the village as a whole, only the most primary group, the family, is left intact. No longer is any significant meaning attached to the implications of other social positions, such as profession, age or sex. At least, definitely not in the heavily affected communities to which our information relates.

There is almost no question in this phase of any regular form of leadership. We do find only some forms of situational leadership; that is to say that there have been people who took charge in certain cooperative actions. This held only for this one situation of doing-something-together. Soon after such an action, however, the leadership usually disintegrated quickly ¹⁷,

Only in the report about Kruiningen do we find some mention of leadership in the family. It is pointed out, however, that due to probable distortions brought about by the soliciting of the information, this information is not reliable enough to elaborate on ¹⁸.

That the values and norms during the disaster have seriously altered did not appear anywhere. However, class differences disappeared to a great extent, as did many social inhibitions (for instance, undressing in the presence of others). But this was only a temporary change of some secondary norms, and it did not imply a breach of fundamental norms ¹⁹.

C. The Disaster as a Personal and Group Experience

1. Warning and Threat

In the first section of this chapter, it was shown how nearly all the people of the disaster area were taken by surprise, by the arrival of the water. How can this be explained, especially if we consider that a period of threat, lasting several hours, preceded the disaster itself?

The factors mentioned were that such an extensive flood had not occurred in the Netherlands for hundreds of years. The Department of Waterways enjoyed a legendary reputation for infallibility. Furthermore, a primarily agrarian population was involved, which was not very familiar with the sea as an enemy. Finally, neither the spring-tide nor the wind gave very serious cause for concern. (It was the combination of the two that turned out to be so treacherous.)

The fact of not being very familiar with water conditions is illustrated clearly in a case brought in the Kortgene report. A (municipal) workman, charged with placing floodboards in the dyke at high tide, did not notice that the water at the subsequent ebb-tide that evening of the disaster was at the same level as a normal high tide. When told of

17) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 26 ff, and pp. 105-108.

Compare also Vol. II, p. 160, where it is stated that only 7 of the more than 900 respondents (less than one percent!) reported that they had personally seen someone in charge of community affairs during the disaster.

18) Vol. III, pp. 109-110. Compare also Vol. II, p. 189.

19) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 35 ff, 108-109. Cf. also Haverda, 1953 (a), pp. 190-191, and Kruijer, 1951, pp. 285, 290.

it later, he said: "After all, my appointment is in connection with the high tide; I am not expected to watch the low tide as well" 20.

Strangely enough, the fact that many people in the area had experienced an inundation during the last war contributed to the element of surprise. These inundations, however, had been artificial – except for Walcheren 21 –, during which the water did not rise as high as during the February 1 disaster. It is reported from many parts of Zeeland – e.g., West-Schouwen, Ouwere- and Nieuwerkerk, Kruiningen, Zierikzee, and Tholen, – that many people knowing that the water was rising, nevertheless did not expect any serious danger, since the water had not come very high during the war either 22. The great mistake these people made however was that during the war, the waterlevel of the artificial inundation had been controlled (the purpose of the German occupiers was merely to make the land very soggy). On February 1, there was a dyke-break which allowed the water to rise as high as the sea. This had occurred during the second World War only on the island of Walcheren, which was luckily spared, except for a small area, during the February disaster.

This time, many inhabitants of Southwestern Netherlands believed that they knew all the implications of having "water in the polder". They took action accordingly, for instance, by just taking things off the floor, "because in 1944 we only had 10 cm. of water in the house". But at a certain moment, they discovered that their former experiences with the war's inundations were drastically insufficient, because the water rose much higher than in 1944 or 1945.

In reverse, we found that people who had experienced the Walcheren inundation during the war, immediately focussed their behavior more upon high water than those who had only experienced artificial inundation 23.

In one of the disaster reports, this behavior during the period of threat, based on former experience, has been elaborated upon. In this elaboration, the concept of the "frame of reference" has been applied 24. This frame of reference helps people to define a situation 25 and to determine their behavior. The frame of reference, or at least dominating elements in it 26, is largely socially determined and offers the advantage of explaining a number of different reactions from one theoretical viewpoint.

In the above-mentioned cases, the frame of reference was based on membership in a group which had experienced the threat of water before, be it a limited threat (artificial inundation of Schouwen-Duiveland, Kruiningen, etc.) or a serious one (dyke-breaks in Walcheren 1944-

20) Vol. III, p. 24-25.

21) On Walcheren in the autumn of 1944 (in the second world war thus) the dykes had been bombed by the allies for military reasons. Because of this, large parts of the island were placed under the influence of the ebb and flood of the tide.

22) Cf. Vol. I, p. 51 (West-Schouwen), p. 65-66 (Ouwere- en Nieuwerkerk), Vol. III, pp. 83 and 88 ff (Kruiningen), pp. 182-184 (Zierikzee), and Broersen & Koopman, p. 104 (Tholen). This tendency to base one's actions, in the warning-phase, on former similar experiences is also reported about a flood disaster in Miami and about the atom bombing of Hiroshima (cf. Hudson, 1954, p. 57).

23) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 91, 113.

24) Vol. III, pp. 89 ff.

25) Cf. Thomas & Znaniecki, 1947, pp. 76-77.

26) Unfortunately we do not know precisely what this implies. In most of the textbooks on social psychology, this concept – in spite of intensive application – is rather vaguely defined.

1945) 27. Judgement of the danger of the floods was either underestimated or rightly estimated according to whether the frame of reference was based on former limited experiences or former serious experiences.

Furthermore, there seemed to be a third category, consisting of people who, though they had not come to live in Kruiningen until after the war, thought and reacted as the majority of the villagers did, believing that it would not turn out to be too bad. They had heard what level the water had reached during the war's inundation; consequently, they did not believe themselves to be in danger. Of their frame of reference, it can be said that it was not based on personal experience, but borrowed from the experiences of a group to which they did not belong at the time of occurrence 28. One could speak here of a sort of "derived frame of reference".

Unfortunately, we do not know of the reactions of people who had lived on Walcheren for a long time but who did not experience the inundation there in the war and now experienced the disaster elsewhere. Such a category could have formed a control group, with which we could have tested in addition to the concept of the frame of reference, the reference-group theory 29.

It has been supposed that the national character or mentality has influenced reactions 30. This is given as a reason why people behaved so calmly and resignedly. It is however hard to prove this, because social sciences have advanced but little - theoretically as well as in research technique - on this complicated problem of national character.

For a further explanation of the differences in reaction, we must distinguish "occurrence" and "experience" (*Geschehnis und Erlebnis*). By this we mean to say that a certain occurrence is not experienced by everyone in the same way. In other words, there need not be a causal connection between an objective occurrence and an inner experience 31.

Returning to our starting point, we establish that most of the people with their experience were in general completely surprised by the water, even though careful observation of the actual occurrence could have shown them differently. Never before had anything like this been experienced, and previous threats had been of a much less serious nature. Besides, they had occurred during a time of war, a time that was abnormal for them anyway.

In addition to the afore mentioned, rather specific factors, there is another factor, which is probably applicable in every extreme situation. It is the fact that people can never accept the worst immediately. From personal experience we know, for instance, that during the war, the people in the Wieringermeer could not and would not believe the unambiguous announcements of the German occupiers that their polder

27) Also from the Survey (Vol. II, pp. 75 ff) it appears that a high percentage of the interviewees (more than 70%) reported that they had been evacuated before.

It is very probable that many of these cases were in connection with the inundations during the war.

28) Vol. III, pp. 89-90, 113.

29) Cf. Merton & Kitt, 1951.

30) Cf. Vol. I, p. 85.

31) For a definition and application of these two concepts of Erwin Straus, see Vroom, 1946, pp. 44 ff.

would be flooded as a measure of retaliation. Such was apparently the case with the people of Walcheren before the inundation ³².

Summing up, people were taken completely by surprise by the water because:

- a) such an extensive flood had not occurred within history;
- b) the behavior of the water and wind did not cause immediate concern;
- c) the psychological misuse of the experience with wartime inundation; and
- d) the psychological inability to accept the possibility of a completely devastating disaster.

In addition, the relatively gradual arrival of the disaster, in contrast for instance with an earthquake or bombardment, contributed to the fact that the people were unprepared. An American investigator remarks in this connection: "In disasters with a 'more subtle approach', the tendency to assimilate to normal experience may be even more marked" ³³.

This was also the case with the flood disaster in the Netherlands, as appears from the following: 14% of those interviewed for the Survey reported of their own accord that they believed that there was fire or war at the first alarm. In other words, no consideration was given to a flood disaster ³⁴.

At a certain moment, the actual facts erased all expectations and people were simply faced with the arrival of the water. Action was required with risk to life. The most frequent family-group reactions during the period of threat were: (1) escape; (2) bringing furniture and dishes to safety; (3) taking clothes and blankets upstairs; (4) carrying up food and drink; (5) taking stock of the situation; (6) taking protection measures; (7) helping others; (8) warning others; and (9) caring for livestock ³⁵. This information of the Survey gives some idea about the ways of reacting, once the threat had become reality.

It is remarkable that furniture was often one of the first things to be saved. One of the reports speaks of the saving of "capital goods" in this connection ³⁶. In another report, the question is raised whether value as a status-symbol might have been of influence ³⁷; e.g., the rich farmer who tries to take his car to safety; the laborer who tries his utmost to take his radio upstairs. It is also a question of whether saving furniture can be explained as rescuing something of "home life"; based on the idea 'without a cozy Dutch living room, family life is impossible'. Whatever the case, the items concerned were items of great worth to the owner, either financially or as a status-symbol (a car can then be "socially" equal to the radio or the buffet) or as a symbol of family life.

32) For a report on the people and their experiences in this respect after the dykes on Walcheren had been bombed, see Annie M. G. Schmidt, *Zilveren streep in de verte* (Silver stripe in the distance), *Het Parool* (daily newspaper), October 1, 1954.

33) Fritz & Marks, 1954, p. 36. Compare also Hudson, 1954, p. 57. In the Kortgene report is stated: "Once again we meet the tendency to repress the reality of the danger for as long as possible, to minimize alarming reports and to calm people who are exposed to a direct threat" (Vol. III, p. 26).

34) Vol. II, pp. 176-177. See also Vol. III, p. 180.

35) Vol. II, pp. 178-181.

36) Vol. III, p. 31.

37) Vol. III, pp. 108-109.

2. Impact

The period of threat – at least the period in which the threat as such was undergone – did not last long for most people. Then the water poured into the homes.

The physical circumstances under which the impact of the disaster was experienced are illustrated by the following data from the Survey: 56% of the interviewees had been isolated on the top floors of houses; 25% were on rooftops, in trees, on rafts or had to wade through the water; 5% had been in open spaces in the village or in a boat; 6% had been able to move more or less freely about their whole house ³⁸.

Insofar as was possible to check afterwards, no signs of panic were mentioned. Only occasionally were people badly upset ³⁹. In general, people felt forsaken and subject to fear. Little is known about the form and content of these fears. However, it seems that having to wait, isolated, without being able to do anything, must have intensified the fear.

The period of isolation before rescue came varied considerably. The Survey gives the following information concerning the 'length of exposure' ⁴⁰.

less than six hours	12%
six to twenty-four hours	27%
more than twenty-four hours	38%
indefinite	19%

After an initial phase of hopelessness and not-knowing-what-to-do, which many interviewees mentioned, most of the people probably succeeded in formulating a re-definition of the situation. The nature of this definition depended largely on the objective and subjective aspects of the circumstances which one had to face. One might also have gone through a development of reactions at different stages of the disaster. Predominating was, however, the objective of being rescued, as has been described in the foregoing section.

Also the most orthodox religious people, whose frame of reference taught them that this disaster was punishment from God ⁴¹ and whose behavior might thus have been more acquiescent had as prime objective for their thoughts and deeds that of rescue. Several newspapers reported people who would not allow themselves to be rescued due to religious reasons. However, almost nothing of this has appeared to the investigators, although they gave special attention to it. Hence we do not believe that religious motives played a major role in refusal to leave homes or not wishing to be rescued. True, according to the Survey, 10% of the interviewees reported an unwillingness to leave their homes, but contributed this to not wanting to leave their property unattended or to not recognizing the need for rescue and evacuation. But religious motives were hardly ever given ⁴².

38) Vol. II, pp. 182-183.

39) Cf. Vol. I, pp. 62, 66, Vol. III, pp. 35, 183.

Panic seems to be less prevalent in disasters than popular ideas seem to indicate; compare Fritz & Marks, 1954, pp. 30 ff.

40) Vol. II, p. 185.

41) In the Survey, the interviewees were asked about their ideas about the cause of the disaster. The answers to this were: disaster was inevitable, because it was the will of God: 33%; disaster was inevitable natural catastrophe: 54%; disaster could be prevented (dykes were not high enough, etc.): 12%; (Cf. Vol. II, pp. 160-162.

42) Cf. Vol. II, p. 191. Even though it can be taken for granted that the members of the orthodox denominations, who are very active in their belief, would certainly not be shy about stating their opinions. Compare also for instance Vol. III, p. 90.

According to several reports, it was psychologically of enormous positive importance to have been together with others⁴³. This illustrated by the strong attempts to be together with families. As mentioned in the foregoing section in relation to multiple-group membership, fathers wished to be with their families and children with their parents⁴⁴. One can aptly quote here the Dutch saying: "To suffer together is to suffer less". The wish to be together was intensified by the fact that many were in the dark (electric lights had broken down) and as we just mentioned, more than 50% awaited rescue for more than 24 hours, while much cold, hunger and thirst were suffered. Bearing these hardships together definitely made the situation more bearable for many⁴⁵.

Subjects for conversation were completely characterized by the prevailing circumstances: the disaster, its possible causes and the anxiously awaited rescue⁴⁶. Much of the information interchanged must have been based on rumors. There were rumors of people who had supposedly drowned and who later appeared to be still alive. However, the opposite also occurred! Very often there was no clear conception of the position of one's own village in relation of the rest of the island, the province or the whole country. Originally people often believed that only their village had been affected⁴⁷. But when rescue did not come for a long time, rumors started that the whole province or even all of the Netherlands had been inundated⁴⁸. Rumors also existed concerning whether one would or would not be evacuated⁴⁹.

One of the most pronounced conclusions of some of the reports, however, is that these rumors would disappear as soon as good information was available⁵⁰. Not only did this information (usually via the radio) limit rumors, it also taught people in places like Colijnsplaat, Kortgene, Kruiningen, Ouwer- and Nieuwerkerk that their village was not the only one which was threatened or affected. Furthermore, it proved to people in isolated villages in Schouwen-Duiveland that the outside world was not yet informed of their precarious situation and this stimulated them in their attempts to contact the outside world for help.

The data about the presence of humor during the disaster does not suggest that there was no place and no need for humor during the disaster. The forms in which it appeared even indicate that there was a great need to reduce tension by humor, except perhaps during the most critical situations of deadly danger.

The humor was, however, of a marked tragicomical nature⁵¹.

43) Vol. I, p. 66, Vol. III, p. 94.

44) Vol. III, pp. 96, 102-105.

45) This has also been established by other authors: cf. *Disaster Research Newsletter*, Vol. I, no. 1 (March 1954), Bernert & Iklé, 1952, pp. 134 ff. Haverda 1953 (a), p. 192, Janis 1954, p. 21, Killian 1954, p. 69, Tyhurst 1951, p. 767, and Vroom 1946, p. 79.

46) Cf. Vol. III, p. 97. Compare also Kruijer, 1951, pp. 283 ff, Sherif, 1948, p. 82 ff. and Sorokin, 1943, pp. 28 ff.

47) Cf. for instance Vol. I, p. 66.

48) Vol. I, p. 71, Vol. III, pp. 35, 52, 97.

49) Vol. I, pp. 55, 63.

50) Vol. I, pp. 63, 71, 85, Vol. III, p. 98.

51) Vol. I, p. 56, Vol. III, pp. 98-99. Cf. also Cohen, 1952, p. 151, who speaks in this respect about a "liberation".

Finally we forward the question – which is raised in some publications – of whether women behaved more bravely than men during the extreme situations. Nothing of this has appeared in the disaster reports, although it is necessary to remember that: (a) there are few criteria by which this "pluckiness" can be judged; (b) there were probably phases during the disaster in which women could act more concretely, for instance, preparing food, tending the children, etc. 52 (however men often went out to help or warn others); (c) the seriousness of the disaster was of great influence – at a certain point, the degree of bravery was of no importance 53; (d) it may be a point of question whether such reported "pluckier" behavior of one of the sexes is not based on some sort of "image-formation" 54.

D. The Disaster as a National Event 55

The unaffected part of the Dutch population was informed of the happenings in S. W. Netherlands via extra radio bulletins and extra newspaper editions during Sunday, February 1. The terrible news brought a wave of emotion over the country. These emotions followed from the fact that this was a disaster to one's own country, affecting one's own countrymen, often one's family and friends. This in contrast to many other disasters of which one hears and which are given but little attention.

But, in our own opinion, there is another particular basis for this sympathy; the fact that this was not a violent act of war, a hurricane nor any other kind of disaster, but a flood. For many, especially foreigners, Holland is the country "wrestled from the sea" This fact has often unconsciously influenced national sentiment, even though few living Dutchmen have actually had anything to do with "fighting the sea".

The foreigner's image of Holland 56 as a country of tulips but especially of wooden shoes, windmills and dykes (as in the United States, with its story of the little boy who put his finger in the hole in the dyke and thus prevented a flood) was remembered by the Dutch and they reacted accordingly. We got the impression that an especially strong emotion resulted from the realization of the Dutch people that the formerly unrealistic idea of "fighting the sea" had suddenly become fact. One of the most striking resulting emotions was probably that of unity. The feeling of having a cooperative fight with an enemy, in this case the water. Very strikingly did this come to the fore in the insulted, almost aggressive attitude of the majority of the Dutch in regard to two

52) Compare Haverda, 1953 (a), pp. 187 ff.

53) Although they were repeatedly questioned on this point, no one in the heavily affected village of Kruiningen had noticed any larger degree of bravery in either sex. Cf. Vol. III, pp. 95, 110.

54) However, it should be mentioned here, that in an American report it is stated that the men during a disaster showed a relatively more controlled behavior than women (Fritz & Marks, 1954, pp. 30 ff.).

55) The reactions of the Dutch people outside the disaster area during and after the flood were not an object of research in the "Studies in Holland Flood Disaster 1953". Still we wish to make some remarks about this which are based on personal observations, analysis of newspapers, and a number of interviews. Included in this interviews was one group interview with university students shortly after the flood about their own reactions. A number of these students had taken part in the rescue work in the disaster area as volunteers.

56) See for "image", Den Hollander, 1946.

organizations which for a moment gave the impression of not intending to cooperate. One was a broadcasting company which would at a certain moment not make its time available for sending messages to the stricken areas. The other was the Dutch Communist Party, which before any action should be taken, wanted to hold the government responsible for the disaster and its results. There was also a general feeling of disgust throughout the country when some cases of looting and theft were reported from the flooded area.

In this connection, it would be interesting to learn whether the foreign press and radio paid more attention to this disaster in Holland than to other disasters of its caliber in other parts of the world⁵⁷. This might give us an indication of the image of Holland in other countries.

During the first days after the disaster, all of Holland felt great unity. On the roads, in streetcars, trains, everywhere, the subject of conversation was the disaster. Strangers spoke to each other and exchanged information. Emotions were not merely expressed by speech-reactions, but also by deeds. Everyone was prepared for action.

On the first day the "Nationaal Rampenfonds" (National Disaster Fund) was founded, with a sponsoring committee composed of many prominent Dutchmen, among whom were members of the Royal family. The examples of spontaneous actions on every scale are innumerable. We mention only a few: On the first Sunday, someone in Amsterdam had already made his house and telephone available for a collection-center. Volunteers began arriving in the stricken area Sunday afternoon from all over the country. Student organizations rented buses to bring their members to the area. All Dutch universities were closed the first week so that students could go and help. In fact, the stream of people to the disaster area was so great that already on the day of the disaster itself, the press and radio had to request people urgently not to go anymore, as there were enough volunteers and there was danger of overcrowding the roads.

Motives other than that of helping affected countrymen may have been present. Was there social pressure, making one feel obliged to go, or an unconscious guilt feeling because of not being affected oneself? Some people also must have been driven by desire for adventure; a change to break with the rut of daily routine. Last but not least, helping in the disaster, regardless of the type of work gave a special feeling of satisfaction. Satisfaction not only through the realization that the work was softening the suffering of those affected but also due to the extremely comradely atmosphere of cooperation.

So far we were concerned merely with direct help. But great sympathy was also expressed by collection by Netherlanders of clothes, furniture and funds which added up to millions of guilders. Several newspapers have mentioned the man who took off his coat immediately when asked to donate something. The exact truth of this is not known to us, but it is characteristic of the atmosphere that such was reported in the papers. In fact, so much was donated that it was feared for a moment that it might upset the Dutch economy. "A disaster within a disaster" was even mentioned.

During the first days after the disaster, there was also a great thirst for news outside the affected areas. Extraordinary attention was paid to newspapers, films and radio programs giving news about the disaster area.

57) This could actually only happen on a basis of an extensive content-analysis of a representative number of foreign newspapers.

Chapter III

THE RESCUE

A. Introduction

Once a polder or village was flooded, there was usually little that could be done. The isolation was in most cases complete and there was generally no way of establishing contact. Only during the low tide on Sunday was it possible here and there to reach some safer location by wading through the water or by use of rafts. But, apart from these cases, the more affected communities were completely dependent on outside assistance. This help was originally limited to help from inhabitants of surrounding unaffected villages. For Kortgene the help came from Colijnsplaat and Wissekerke. Kruiningen was aided by Ierseke and Hansweert.

The first day rescue work and the setting up of communications were done by those living in the immediate vicinity of the stricken areas. Measures were hurriedly taken and organizations established. Gradually the area covered by rescue-actions was enlarged. Assistance was given by unaffected people of the disaster area as well as by those outside this area. The area stricken by the disaster slowly increased as well, which is clear when comparing the maps of affected communications as shown in the communications report ¹

Even though newspapers already spoke of a "national disaster" on the first day, there was not yet a clear conception of its extent. This is apparent from the fact that the national authorities remained partially inactive this first day. True, several Ministers visited the disaster area personally on Sunday, but the whole central governmental apparatus was not yet completely activated. One gets the impression that, especially in the beginning, it was feared the centralization and coordination would cut off spontaneous local actions.

During Monday and Tuesday, however, the extent of the disaster became quite clear. It then appeared that other areas – such as the islands of Schouwen-Duiveland and Goeree-Overflakkee, about which practically nothing was known the first day – were also extremely heavily affected. Then rescue work and the rendering of assistance was started on a larger scale with the cooperation of several organizations, including Dutch and foreign army units, ships, airplanes, helicopters and various means of telecommunication, etc. ² Rescuing victims and avoiding an expansion of the disaster were the primary aims during the early days. At some places a start was even made at temporary repairs of the dykes. But the rescue of victims came first; closing gaps, building emergency dykes and roads were second. Authorities and organizations occupied with this work multiplied tremendously; much was left up to the local initiative, but coordination of all these activities was quite a problem.

The growth of the entire organization which was concerned with the disaster can to a certain degree be traced geographically. In the first

1) See Vol. I, maps on pp. 22, 27, 35, 38, 40, 42, 44, and 46.

2) Compare Introduction to these studies, Vol. I, pp. 7 ff.

hours the centers of action were the flooded villages themselves, with gradually the assistance of the nearby, less-stricken villages; by the end of the first day, however, the local centers, such as Goes, Middelburg and Bergen op Zoom, were directly involved in the happenings. In the course of the following days there were centers entirely outside the disaster area which were immediately concerned, such as The Hague (the central government), 's Hertogenbosch (provincial capital and headquarters for military action) and Utrecht (center of police-communications). Gradually an emergency communication-net was established and the various services and organizations began to cooperate.

Several places within the disaster area itself also developed into centers of activity. Zierikzee, for instance, became an important center for the activities on Schouwen-Duiveland 3.

In this chapter, we wish to organize our data about the rescue. It must be remembered, however, that none of the investigations was concentrated especially on this aspect. The information which we have is thus fragmentary; hence we shall not reach the detailed conclusions which were achieved with respect to the disaster and the evacuation. The periods of rescue and disaster, as discussed in the previous chapter, are hard to separate. In fact, separation is not always justified, as the transition was often very gradual. Hence repetition is occasionally unavoidable.

In the present report, we shall define rescue as: transportation of victims from the worst affected areas to a relatively safe place in or in the immediate vicinity of the disaster area.

The evacuation is taken to mean the whole process of transporting victims from these relatively safe places to places where the victims could remain until they were allowed to return to their own homes.

The evacuation-period covers the period which the victims spent away from their homes. This period will be discussed in the next chapter.

B. Social Aspects of the Rescue

1. Incompetence and Leadership in the Stricken Communities

In the previous chapter, we have seen how, after the great shock caused by the disaster, everything, in psychological as well as sociological respect, focussed on the rescue. Individual and group action had one and the same goal.

As far as badly stricken villages were concerned, it seemed quite legitimate to speak of a social regression. Various organizational sub-units were dislocated. In the struggle to be rescued, in fact, only the family, neighbor-relations and the village still operated more or less functionally. Organizations such as the police, the fire brigade, Red Cross units and municipal services functioned only partially. But, as has been noted before, their operations were seriously hampered by the critical circumstances. Two factors can be pointed out which prevented a reasonable functioning of these organizations, namely (a) the nature of the disaster was such that efficient action was virtually

3) Vol. I, pp. 79 ff, Vol. III, pp. 186-189.

impossible; communications had broken down and no technical facilities were available; and (b) the nature of the disaster was such that people dropped all other tasks in order to assist their own families, or just to be together with them.

Another point was that actually none of these organizations had received special training. They did not even have instructions for acting on occasions of a flood of this character. It may be said of organizations like the municipality or the police that they should take action in any circumstances. As for other organizations like the fire brigade and the first-aid units, it could be argued that acting in an emergency is their specific task. None of these organizations, however, was able to cope with a flood of these dimensions.

Furthermore, it is remarkable that we have few data concerning the only organization which could legitimately be expected to act especially during floods, namely the polder-organizations. Generally one gets the impression that these organizations have played an active role in the restoration and repair-work after the disaster rather than during the disaster itself. At Kortgene as well as at Kruiningen, there has been little evidence of activities of the polder board ⁴. These organizations have often become administrative institutions focussed on internal interests. Agrarian interests usually superceded the hydraulic interests. The whole hydro-technical sector is delegated to technical supervisors employed by the polder-board. The interests of the members, farmers and landowners in hydraulic problems was largely confined to the financial aspects. The positions of the "dyke-reeve" and "sworns" (chairman and members of the board of the polder-organization) have tended to become more and more prestige symbols for well-to-do farmers. Action of the polder organizations during the disaster often implied the individual activities of the hydraulic supervisor concerned.

The initiative to undertake rescue and other activities was mainly to be found among a few people who by chance or circumstances were enabled to do so. And often these were people from outside, who had the technical means with which to help.

The Survey reports that half of the interviewees had not been able to help others. Almost 30% answered that during the period of emergency they had given assistance to other people in one way or another. About the rescue, the Survey provided the following information: one-third of the interviewees had been rescued by fellow-villagers or islanders; one-third had been able to escape without assistance; whereas slightly less than one-third had to be rescued by other people ⁵. The picture shown by these percentages is probably a little too "favorable" ⁶. A separate analysis of the 133 questionnaires of the Survey,

4) Vol. III, pp. 26, 104.

5) Vol. II, pp. 185-189, 190-191.

6) With regard to the Survey, it should be noted that:

- a. The reference is to a sample which is representative only as far as it concerns those evacuated in April 1953 and not with respect to all victims of the flood.
- b. Although the category of evacuees who had suffered very little had probably returned home by April, the Survey sample still comprises a number of people who come close to this category. Among the latter are people from Zierikzee. (The majority of the inhabitants of this town had not been badly hit and consequently they resisted evacuation in the beginning, as will be noted further on.) Among these are also people from a few other places, the population of which, although not badly hit, had been evacuated for safety

concerning the population of the badly-stricken village of Kruiningen, shows the following figures: 4 reported that they had assisted others and 5 people stated that they had been rescued by fellow-villagers.

Taking everything into consideration, it seems justified to say that in the badly stricken areas, little rescue action, whether individual or organized, had been taken by the people themselves. The formerly wide-spread community organization functioned only to a very limited degree. Only in one respect did there appear to be a common group-goal. Everyone viewed rescue as the foremost aim. In this respect, however, people were to a high degree dependent on outside assistance.

Once a start had been made, however, with large-scale rescue work and evacuation, and communication – although often with primitive means – had once more become possible, problems of leadership, organization and coordination arose. Problems which, for that matter, were clearly prevalent also outside the stricken areas right from the beginning of the relief-work.

For the emergency of leadership, three conditions have to be fulfilled. First of all, there should be a situation where leadership is required; in other words there has to be something to lead. Furthermore, followers are needed; people, thus, who feel a need for leadership and are ready to submit to it. Finally, there should be people who are able to assume leadership.

During the time people were waiting for the rescue in small isolated groups and could do nothing further, leadership was not prevalent, although it has probably appeared in those circumstances also. As we have noted before, little is known with regard to this. During the rescue-work and the evacuation, however, these were situations clearly demanding leadership.

In a large majority of cases, it was quite clear that people were ready to accept leadership. Circumstances had been critical to such a degree that people were willing to follow anyone who could offer a solution.

Finally, the potential leaders. Who were they? From the reports we learn that three categories can be distinguished:

- a. executive members of formal organizations, such as burgomasters, aldermen, superintendents of fire brigade, police, etc.
- b. persons, who for reasons of technical ability or only the possession of certain means (boats and other means of communication) were particularly marked out to lead people in their search for safety.
- c. Persons who, although not connected with a formal organization, already enjoyed personal prestige for some reason or other.

reasons mainly. That a considerable number of interviewees originated from places of the above category appears also from the fact that one-third of them stated that they had escaped from the flood without outside help. In badly stricken areas, this generally would not have been possible.

- c. The question "Have you been rescued by fellow-villagers or islanders?" is not correctly formulated, since fellow-islanders can also include people from outside one's own village who had not suffered any damage themselves.
- d. With such questions, asked a few months after the disaster, rationalization is not imaginary. At any rate, the possibility of unreliability is greater than with the community studies. In the latter case, the data could be checked to a great extent, for example, with those of others (see also Appendix B in this volume).

Especially during the first stages of the rescue-work, situational leadership was quite common; in other words, the man who was able to lead the group in the given situation towards its immediate aim, i.e., the rescue, was the leader. He might be someone who formerly occupied a formal leader's position, but if such a man was not available or not willing, it might just as soon be someone else who possessed insight, the means or the ability to lead the group in its struggle to be rescued. In the Kortgene report, it is said of this situational leader: "Its holder need not be a dominant personality. In many cases it will be the man who is the most active, or who has the best insight into the situation, so that his example and advice are automatically followed" ⁷. Such leadership was sometimes even forced upon a person.

The availability of someone who was able and willing to assume leadership was, however, a decisive factor. In a few cases, as mentioned in one of the disaster reports, there was lack of leadership, or at least the arising of more or less chaotic situations. The Kruiningen report, which attempts an analysis of leadership deficiency, tells us that in such cases, an explanation should be sought in the first instance in the lack of individuals able and willing to take the lead ⁸.

Such forms of situational leadership, usually also of an informal character, sometimes expanded to a dominant leadership. An inn-keeper at Kortgene, for example, had played an important role in the rescue work during the disaster. Afterwards his dominant leadership was recognized by the authorities ⁹. It has even happened sometimes that such a kind of leadership was formally acknowledged and legalized. A characteristic illustration is offered by the situation in Noordgouwe. Here, for various reasons, a clergyman had got control of the activities. His leadership expanded to such an extent that when, for certain reasons, the burgomaster was temporarily unable to carry out his duties, he, the clergyman, was appointed acting burgomaster by the provincial governor in the presence of the Minister of the Interior ¹⁰. An initially situational and informal leadership thus developed into a dominant and later into a dominant-formal leadership. Analogous cases are known also from elsewhere. For instance it happened in a place where two municipalities were under one burgomaster. The burgomaster could not be present in both places at once. In one of these municipalities, an initially situational-informal leadership was formalized by an official appointment ¹¹.

2. The Development of the Rescue Activities

So far we have examined the rescue as seen from the point of view of the stricken areas themselves. We shall now attempt to arrange our – even more fragmentary – data on relief work carried on by outside agencies.

At first the rescue was a matter of individual, spontaneous incidental actions. The main aim was to rescue people. Soon, however, this relief work developed in various ways:

7) Vol. III, p. 23. Cf. also Vol. I, pp. 68, 71. For situational leadership, compare Gouldner, 1950, pp. 25 ff., Killian, 1954, p. 69, and Murphy, 1941, pp. 674 ff.

8) Vol. III, pp. 105-108.

9) Vol. III, pp. 28, 33, 37, 45 ff.

10) The facts are taken from reports in newspapers and from personal information received from the clergyman involved.

11) Vol. I, p. 71.

- a. it was no longer a matter of individual actions:
- b. the activities, which were carried out, were no longer limited to the rescue of people; they also were concerned with the evacuation of these people, the establishment of connections, the supply of food, clothing, sandbags, the disposal of carcasses, etc.
- c. these activities were no longer local affairs, but they were included into a larger system of organizations, which spread over a much larger area.

In short, the whole relief action became more institutionalized and began to cover a larger area, geographically as well as in terms of the nature of these activities.

This development was naturally very unbalanced. Improvisation was necessary. On the one hand, there was centralization and coordination, on the other, there was specialization as well. Coordination took place not only at the top, but it has to be carried down through to the bottom of the hierarchy. Organizations, which formerly had little or no contact with each other, were suddenly compelled to cooperate very closely. Misunderstandings, intrigues and conflicts for power occurred. Unfortunately, the disaster reports as noted earlier give us few specific data on these points. We shall nevertheless try to bring a few cases more to the fore, although we can only do so hypothetically.

It is, to some extent, possible to trace a process of development with regard to the form of these relief activities as well as to the place where leadership was localized. In the first stage of the spontaneous rescue activities, i. e., the rescue of people from their precarious positions, leadership was characteristically of a situational and often also of an informal nature. Work was carried out in small groups and everyone did whatever he was able to do and in the way he considered best. Direction was given in the area of action itself. The leader also took part in the work personally.

While in the stricken areas relief work was carried on, various kinds of spontaneous activities were also prepared and carried on outside. Here, however, action was no longer initiated by persons individually but by organizations or, better perhaps, by persons supported by an organization. At one place it was a Red Cross section which constituted such an organization, at another it was a fire brigade, at still another an institute for social work. Here, it was not so much a case of people being forced into the position of a leader, but people who purposefully took charge in some kind of action or even took it over from others. The location of this kind of leadership is not determined by the place of the disaster, but primarily by the presence of the prospective leader or of facilities (office, telephone) available for the execution of leadership. These spontaneous activities of organizations however did not spring from governmental organizations; these were because of their instructions much more tied down to an existing hierarchy. It was the semi-governmental organizations consisting of volunteers which did much of the work that had to be done. There was, however, contrary to the behavior found at the spontaneous rescue activities in the stricken areas, often evidence of an attempt to use this opportunity to emphasize the importance or usefulness of the organization concerned. We know of leaders of at least two organizations in important towns in the disaster area who personally declared that they had seen and also experienced this disaster as an opportunity to give their organizations the acknowledgement and reputation which, before the disaster, they had not had.

Finally, in the periphery of the disaster area, there were also governmental organizations involved. Not the municipalities, since they are restricted to their autonomous territory, but organizations such as the state police, governmental and provincial services, the postal services, and, the Army and Navy. With these groups, it was not primarily a desire for acknowledgement which acted as the guiding principle but simply a case of government services put into action by hierarchical techniques. Within this category, more than within the two categories of relief work mentioned above, problems like the delimitation of competencies, over-organization and the like emerged.

Thus it came about that informally organized individuals, non- or semi-governmental organizations and governmental organizations all acted at the same time, each category with a differently-oriented intention with regard to the work. Seen in terms of ideal-types, the intentions were directed as follows:

People belonging to the first category aimed at giving help where and when needed and they considered their work finished when that task had been completed. The second category tried, as a matter of principle, to take as many tasks as possible upon their shoulders. The third category then did what constituted their duty or what had been assigned to them.

While these three categories cut across one another, due to their different principles, the many individual variations made the whole situation even more complicated. This came out clearly in Zierikzee, where the situation created by the departments working at cross-purposes became so confused that the authorities had to take the matter in hand. A distribution of tasks was established in which no less than 17 sub-committees took part¹². Here too we see that at a given moment a legalization of an informal situational leadership takes place. A very typical example is the case of a number of Urk fishermen who, since their ships were equipped with wireless radios, were able to contribute very considerably to the establishment of a communication circle around Schouwen-Duiveland. One of these fishermen evidently was the (informal) leader and he constituted with his ship the central point of this emergency communication net. His function expanded to such an extent that the naval commander who conducted various actions in Zierikzee gave him a semi-official function within the organization of his naval unit. He gave him a naval officer as adjutant and gave orders to address him with the military title of "Colonel"¹³

As we learn from the communication report, such a penetration of an informal group into a formal organization often facilitated a smoother functioning of the formal organization concerned¹⁴.

Another aspect which in conclusion we would like to touch upon briefly is the problem of the coordination of the hierarchies. Most governmental, but also many non-governmental, organizations in the Netherlands have a predominantly vertical hierarchical structure. Orders and assignments are given from the top downward. The disaster however broke off most of the possibilities for communication between the central authority at the top and the local departments and services at the bottom of the hierarchy. After a phase of helplessness and vain

12) Vol. III, p. 188.

13) Vol. I, pp. 79 ff.

14) Cf. Vol. I, pp. 80, 81, 85.

attempts to refer to superiors – as we have seen in the previous chapter – gradually old contacts were re-established and new ones made. These contacts however were more than previously of a horizontal nature, that is with other services and organizations at the same level. Formerly there had been hardly any contact among these services. Now the contacts took place at the top as well as at the bottom of the various hierarchies. It is especially clear from the communication report that in the process of coordination frictions occurred, not so much at the top level of various hierarchies where people proved willing to give mutual help and where people and material were generously put at the disposal of others, but mainly at the local level¹⁵. It was here that often an enormous amount of friction occurred, caused by a rigid attitude and a lack of understanding for other people. The bureaucratic relations, with their aspects of authority and competition, were at the bottom of the hierarchy much more tenacious and less penetrable than at the top. An important source of hierarchical conflicts was also that in general people preferred to deal with their own authorities. Similarly the cancelling of orders and the occurrence of confused hierarchical situations created various difficulties, as shown very clearly in the Zierikzee report¹⁶.

An important factor in solving these frictions was whether it was possible to find a more informal attitude also at the bottom of the hierarchical organization. Such an informal attitude could, as we have seen before, be facilitated by the penetration of informal groups into the formal organization.

C. Psychological Aspects of the Rescue

After an initial period of confusion and bewilderment, people in the flooded areas arrived at a reorientation and redefinition of their situation. This led, as we have seen, psychologically as well as sociologically, to a focus on the rescue. For many people, however, the rescue did not materialize very soon. In the case of some people it took half a day before they were rescued. Many others had to wait one, two or even three and more days. In the meantime, they were swinging between hope and fear¹⁷.

Strong feelings of expectation were constantly present among the people: "It cannot last much longer now". If nevertheless help still failed to come, there was often occasion for all kinds of rumors to spread. It also happened sometimes that people saw the boats approaching. And even then it might be hours before they could be picked up, because the boats had become too crowded or because, owing to the weather, some places were difficult to reach.

Consequently it is not surprising that people were willing to follow anyone who somehow could offer a way out. Here we find the complementary situation with regard to leadership, to the one mentioned in the previous section: the readiness to accept leadership from anyone. Accordingly, many rescuers emphasize in their reports that

15) Vol. I, pp. 72, 75 ff.

16) Vol. III, pp. 184-186.

17) This fear was intensified by the enforced inability to do anything; cf. Vroom, 1946, p. 73.

people were quiet as lambs. They followed all instructions accurately 18. They waited impatiently for the moment of rescue. As soon as this moment had arrived, they hurried to the boat or whatever vehicle it was, often without realizing that from the point of view of safety these boats were sometimes as risky as the attics or the roofs they were leaving. All this did not matter. They were ready to take almost any risk if it meant that they were being rescued.

About the means applied for the rescue, the Survey gives us some information. About half of the interviewees stated that they had been rescued by means of a boat; 30% of them had been rescued without means of transport and 7% by motor-vehicles. Helicopters, DUK's, etc., were mentioned only by a very small number 19.

One of the things repeatedly mentioned by rescuers as well as rescued was the predominance of strong feelings of happiness once they had arrived at a place of safety. After the disaster and all the hardships they had suffered, people were suddenly overwhelmed by an extreme feeling of relief and well-being 20. This caused the disaster to be immediately relegated far into the background.

This feeling of euphoria has been incorporated also into the picture formed afterwards of the disaster and the rescue. This is evident from the praise and the very few criticisms with regard to the rescue and especially to the whole organization of the evacuation. It is reported, not only in some community studies 21 but also in the Survey, that people were generally very enthusiastic about the organization of the evacuation. Especially the food, the reception and the transport were favorably commented on 22. When we realize, as has appeared from the foregoing sections, that this whole organization of the evacuation was not perfect and that it could not have been so due to its improvised character, the favorable opinion of the victims reveal something of the feeling of well-being experienced after the rescue and transport to a place of safety.

Also, perhaps particularly, at this stage of the disaster, there was a great demand for news 23. People wanted to know how the situation actually was, not only in their own area but also in the other flooded

18) Compare Vol. III, pp. 37 ff, 92, 99, 106.

In this respect Janis speaks of an "almost automatic obedience to the demands of the persons in leadership roles, coupled with a child like seeking for attention and direction from others" (Janis, 1954, p. 19) Also Tyhurst speaks of a "child like attitude of dependency" (Tyhurst, 1951, p. 767).

19) Vol. II, pp. 189-190.

These percentages shed light also on the 10% of the interviewees mentioned in the preceding chapter, who reported that they initially did not want to leave their possessions unattended or because they did not realize the necessity for evacuation. Many of these 10% are probably from the less heavily affected areas. That this category of evacuees had been sampled by the Survey was revealed by the fact that they had been rescued without any transportation means other than their legs (see also note 6 of this chapter). This, although - see the community studies of Kortgene and Kruiningen - we have to take for granted that in the really badly stricken areas, a very large majority of the people strived for rescue as soon as possible and therefore were present on such rescue means as boats, trucks, etc.

20) This is actually primarily concerned with the overt reactions of the victims after their rescue. For a classification of types of reactions to the disaster, see Janis, 1954, pp. 18 ff.

21) Vol. III, pp. 38, 100. Compare also Haverda, 1953 (a), pp. 193-194.

22) Vol. II, p. 192.

23) Cf. for instance Vol. I, p. 55.

districts of the country. It was stated by various reporters that the news was very eagerly read. Could this possibly be an indication of a need to compare one's own situation with that of others and thus get a fuller comprehension and definition of one's own situation?

It was also at this stage that the fresh experiences of the disaster were being fixed into a mental picture. As soon as they were in safety the people felt a strong need for reporting extensively just what they had gone through ²⁴. Everyone who has had anything to do with victims of a disaster can testify to this uninterrupted stream of talk about experiences. Only of those who had suffered very much – people who had to wait for days before being rescued, or who had lost relatives – it is reported that they were very depressed and talked very little during the first days after the disaster. After some time, however, most of them began to feel the need to tell about their own experiences. Months after the disaster, investigators noticed this need to still exist ²⁵. Again and again people were ready and eager to tell about their own experiences.

Repeated many times, these stories assumed a fixed pattern. Certain points were emphasized, others receded into the background. As far as could be ascertained, the contents of these stories did not change essentially in the course of time. The pattern, however, became increasingly dramatized and stylized and only specific aspects of the experiences were presented. During interviews, these fixed stories sometimes constituted a handicap. Asked to tell about their experiences, people took a deep breath and began a story which made the impression of having been learned by heart. In order to avoid these "ready-made" stories, the investigators, by interrupting continually and by putting probing questions, forced the interviewee to abandon his original story and to think again about his experiences ²⁶.

This image-formation appeared also collectively; in other words, the mental picture of certain events or aspects of the disaster was sometimes shared by the collective members of a group. A striking example of such a collective picture was the concept of "the forgotten island" among the inhabitants of the island of Schouwen-Duiveland. Some explanation is necessary here. Schouwen-Duiveland is one of the most isolated islands of the Zeeland-Zuid Holland archipelago. For a long time the inhabitants have felt themselves neglected in various respects. People complained about poor communications with the surrounding islands, with the mainland and also on the island itself. Rightly or wrongly – this is difficult to decide – people entertained the idea that their part of the province did not get the attention it deserved. Some incidents seemed indeed to justify this idea. At the end of the war, the German occupation troops had withdrawn from Zeeland. The British radio announced that the whole province of Zeeland had been liberated--- but at the same time, German military forces still terrorized Schouwen-Duiveland. They apparently were at that time also "a forgotten island". Indeed, during the flood, several days went by before it was known to the outside world how badly Schouwen-Duiveland had been ravaged. During the first days of the flood, people on Schouwen-Duiveland heard the radio news on the situation in the flooded area. From personal experience they knew how bad the situation

24) Tyhurst speaks of a "need to talk or 'ventilate'" (Tyhurst, 1951, p. 767)

25) Vol. II, p. 174; Vol. III, pp. 57, 69, 109.

26) Vol. III, p. 109.

was on their island. Yet in none of the news-reports was that island mentioned. They were again the "forgotten island" ²⁷. For a considerable time this concept of neglect continued to play a role in various respects.

Another aspect of the collective conceptualization were the numerous scape-goat rumors going around in the area. Feelings of guilt apparently often arising when extreme situations are experienced ²⁸ sought a way out. Through the process of stereotypes and rumors, prejudices were expressed with regard to certain individuals or bodies. In one place it was the burgomaster of whom it was told that he had been drunk during the flood. This was alleged to be the reason for his lack of efficiency. In another place, a hydraulic supervisor was alleged to have made mistakes, this aggravating the situation, and so on ²⁹. It is hardly necessary to say that practically all these scape-goat rumors were false and were based on prejudice. An interesting point is, however, that for most of the rumors, certain phenomena in the emotional as well as in the cognitive sphere indicated why such accusations were directed at one specific individual and why they had one specific contents rather than another.

A fixed image of the disaster also occurred among rescuers. This was apparent, for example, in cases where the inhabitants of one village were rescued by the inhabitants of another. In such cases, all kinds of village-antagonisms came to light. Rescuers sometimes blamed the rescued for being "ungrateful" and "careless" (because their village had been stricken) ³⁰.

In the whole area - including those places which were not directly stricken by the disaster - a kind of in-group-out-group phenomenon developed, sometimes called "disaster-chauvinism". This was expressed positively in a kind of solidarity associated with a certain pride implicit in statements like: "we are the unfortunate province, but we'll manage". Negatively, a somewhat defensive attitude was assumed towards the outsider. This applied to the population of the Netherlands generally ("the others don't understand anyway") as well as to the authorities, indicated by "Middelburg" (the capital of the province) and "The Hague" (the residence of the central government). In some cases, this group-prejudice was decidedly strong, involving aggressive tendencies towards outsiders ³¹.

Finally, we want to point out that the "disaster-atmosphere", experienced not only by those within the flooded area but also by people outside, gave rise to strong associations with the war. First of all, there was the previously described association of "water-in-the-polder" and the war. Secondly, there were all kinds of phenomena which reminded people of the war: collapsed houses, airplane droppings, helicopters, soldiers, and also food rationing, curfew and more regulations similar to those in wartime. But moreover, the association was especially prominent in subjective experiences. There was an "emergency situation" People spoke of a "national disaster". The rescue

27) Vol. I, p. 54.

28) Cf. Haverda, 1953 (a), p. 198, Meerloo, 1947, p. 336, Oerlemans, pp. 157 ff. Poslavsky & Akkerhuis, 1953, p. 157, Powell, 1953, pp. 4-5, Vroom, 1946, pp. 109, 147.

29) Cf. for instance Vol. III, pp. 48, 61, 110-111. Compare also Vol. II, p. 156.

30) Vol. III, p. 110.

31) Janis speaks about "aggressive irritability" (Janis, 1954, p. 19).

was experienced as a "liberation" ³². As in wartime, people fought jointly for a good cause against a common enemy. This gave the whole Dutch population a "warm" feeling of belonging together.

Many members of rescue parties have described how they derived a special feeling of satisfaction from joining the warm atmosphere of comradeship and disinterested cooperation which existed in many of the improvised relief organizations. When the restoration started and all work was taken over by official bodies, many volunteers had a feeling of frustration at their return to a workaday life ³³.

Soon afterwards, for the majority of the Dutch population, the flood was no more than a news item. Life went on – other news and other events drew the attention again. For the victims themselves, however, it would be a long time before a "normal" life would return. A long evacuation period in connection with the restoration of the ravaged districts was still to come ³⁴.

32) Cf. Vol. I, p. 51; Vol. III, pp. 49, 184.

33) This also came to the fore in the group interview with students mentioned in note 55 of chapter II. A good description of these feelings can be found in a newspaper article by S. Carmiggelt, *Ze zijn weer terug, hoor* (They are back again), *Het Parool*, February 9, 1953.

34) Remarkable was the relative absence of sickness of the evacuees in the first weeks after the disaster. In this respect, the psychologists of the research-teams speak of a "stress-factor"; cf. Vol. III, pp. 36, 69. See for a similar phenomenon, Cohen, 1952.

Chapter IV

THE EVACUATION PERIOD

A. Introduction

As has been noted in the previous chapter, the organization of the evacuation had been completely improvised; that is, there was nothing to refer back to. On the one hand, victims from the flood-area were brought in and on the other, many of those not stricken by the flood spontaneously offered them accommodation.

The organizations in charge of the evacuation played only a mediating role. The victims brought in from the flood-area were taken to hurriedly arranged reception centers. Such centers had been set up in larger towns such as Goes, Bergen op Zoom, and Rotterdam, situated at the periphery of the stricken areas. In these centers, meanwhile, addresses had been collected in various ways of people willing to put up evacuees. Fortified by a short rest and a meal, the victims were then taken as quickly as possible to the assigned address. Here they were further entrusted to the care of their hosts.

In one of the reports, this evacuation has been called a completely "unplanned" evacuation¹. Without regard to the adaptability of evacuees or hosts, the families were brought together. The consequences were rather unpleasant in some cases. Many people had spontaneously put their house at the disposal of evacuees without considering the fact that they had to live in the house themselves also. Situations of this kind often gave occasion to tensions after some time, as we shall note further on.

Generally speaking, the evacuation came off smoothly, in spite of its improvised character. This was due firstly to the willingness of the victims to accept unconditionally the arrangements made for them and secondly, to the readiness of the large number of people not hit by the flood to accommodate the evacuees. We know of only one case in which the evacuation entailed serious difficulties. This happened in Zierikzee. The situation here had a very specific character, and a brief description will be given later. However, this situation was an exception to the smooth progress of the evacuation everywhere else.

During these first few days after the disaster, tens of thousands of victims were evacuated to various places. After a short time already, a number of them were allowed to return to their former places of residence. For many people, however, the evacuation period lasted some months, and in a few cases for more than a year.

On March 1, 1953, over 72,000 inhabitants of the flood area had been evacuated to other places. In the spring of 1954, approximately 5000 people had not yet returned to their former places of residence². Table 1 shows the dispersion of evacuees over the provinces on March 1, 1953.

1) Vol. III, p. 116.

2) Cf. Vol. I, p. 8.

Table 1

The Distribution of the Evacuees over the Provinces of the Country,
on March 1, 1953 ³.

Zuid-Holland	29,778
Noord-Brabant	19,082
Zeeland	10,992
Utrecht	6,262
Noord-Holland	2,540
Gelderland	2,283
Overijssel	690
Groningen	267
Limburg	240
Drente	200
Friesland	196
total	72,530

We note that the majority of the evacuees had been accommodated in places not too far away, in the provinces of Zuid-Holland, Noord-Brabant and Zeeland. The flood area actually extended over parts of these provinces. A number of evacuees had been accommodated in the immediate vicinity of their own - in most cases rural - district of origin. Many of them, however, found themselves in a different environment. 54% of the total number of evacuees on March 1 had been accommodated in municipalities with a population of more than 20,000; that is to say in places of a predominantly urban character ⁴.

People who had been accommodated in the immediate vicinity of their former places of residence, as, for example, the inhabitants of Kortgene and Kruiningen, often still had the possibility of maintaining contact with their village and their fellow-villagers. This was much more difficult, of course, for those who had been taken further away and had become more isolated from their fellow-villagers.

Shortly after the disaster, intensive planning and activity in connection with the reconstruction started practically everywhere. Meanwhile, the evacuees had been, as it were, shunted on to a siding. The unusual situation in which they had found themselves after the disaster, was prolonged for a considerable time. They had little participation in the routine of daily life.

B. The Evacuated Community

In this section we shall summarize our data on the significance of former units of social structure in the evacuation-situation. First, however, we want to describe briefly a conflict which arose in one of the distressed communities in connection with the evacuation.

3) These figures are derived from Zeegers, 1954 (a), p. 67.

4) Ibid., p. 68.

1. The Evacuation-conflict 5.

In comparison to other parts of the flood-area, the majority of the population of Zierikzee had been less severely hit. Yet, especially in the center of the town, a large number of houses had been destroyed. Some parts of the town, moreover, remaining for months affected by the tides, suffered from water-damage. There had been a large influx of flood victims from neighboring areas. Water and gas supplies had stopped. Communications with the outside world were inadequate. Since there were many holes in the dyke, the harbor threatened to silt up. There was still the danger of subsequent floods, so that the situation was far from normal. For the sake of the restoration, the health of the people and for safety measures in general, evacuation of the population of this small congested area was considered desirable.

Around this evacuation serious tensions arose. Although the authorities concerned agreed to a large extent on the desirability of evacuation, they did not, at first, agree on the way in which it ought to be carried out. There was considerable disagreement about the question whether the evacuation would have to be carried out on a voluntary basis or would have to be made compulsory. This issue appeared first within the Municipal Council and later on between municipal authorities on the one side and the provincial board and central government on the other. The policy adopted was not very consistent. The decision to make evacuation compulsory was reversed to make it voluntary. Nevertheless, on the 13th of February, it was decided by the local and provincial authorities to make evacuation compulsory after all.

The already existing dissatisfaction among the population and the tensions increased by this bickering, now burst into open conflict. In this so-called evacuation-conflict, it was the tradesmen (mostly shopkeepers) who especially opposed the evacuation order given by the authorities. This opposition by the tradespeople, who felt themselves economically injured by the evacuation, became quite serious. They attempted twice to wreck the evacuation policy of the municipal authorities by means of a legal action. Although they were not successful, the situation has been characterized as a "rise against authority". The case drew the attention of the national press for weeks.

What is the explanation for this evidence of unusually strong resistance on the part of the citizens against the government? First of all, it should be noted that the evacuation was considered desirable for reasons of an almost exclusively preventive nature. The evacuation was not a matter of personal safety like elsewhere in the disaster area. Many people had not been badly affected. In some cases, they had suffered hardly any loss at all. And yet, they had to be evacuated. For most people this was difficult to accept. The more so, because during a previous evacuation in wartime, they had had rather unpleasant experiences; there had been cases of theft from unoccupied homes among other things. The earlier frequent changes of policy – evacuation, no evacuation, voluntary, compulsory – did not promote a favorable disposition either.

All this may explain dissatisfaction and a potential resistance. It does not explain the open conflict, let alone a rebellion against authority. The Zierikzee report shows that underlying factors also played

5) This sub-section is based on the Zierikzee-report, Vol. III, pp. 161-209, especially chapter IV, pp. 190-199.

a role. The clash between administrative authority and private interests – leading to open conflict for reasons of prestige on both sides – was caused by controversies already existing. The "rise against authority" had been preceded by a crisis of confidence ⁶.

The social structure of the small town of Zierikzee still had various features reminiscent of the 19th century. The emancipation of social groups like shopkeepers, craftsmen, and laborers had been retarded. This had caused the accumulation of antagonisms and tensions which found a way out in the evacuation-conflict (the shopkeepers, etc.) and appeared later on in the controversy about the distribution of clothing (laborers). In the next chapter, we will touch briefly on this controversy.

Antagonisms of long standing became acute after the disaster. We shall note further on that this phenomenon occurred more often. Why these antagonisms became so unusually serious in Zierikzee and why they were expressed in terms of the evacuation had to be explained by a number of historical, social, local and "incidental" factors. These factors have been extensively described in the Zierikzee report.

2. The Old Community in a New Situation

Because of the disaster and the evacuation, the most essential prerequisite for the functioning of a local community, that of the communal life in a geographical setting, was no longer met. Actually most of the other communal ties were broken, since they could bind only because of the geographical proximity.

In most cases, the evacuation had been carried out on a family basis. The family, therefore, was practically the only social unit still manifest. Other patterns of relationship, such as neighbor-relations and associations had often lost their relevance. Membership of certain social groupings such as social class had lost much of its significance. It no longer served as a means of differentiation. The system of social control of the old local community had disappeared for the most part. One cohesive factor was, paradoxically, still strongly active: the feeling of belonging to the district or village which had been struck. By this feeling of being victims together, but also by the shared desire to return as soon as possible, a special kind of solidarity was created. Paradoxically, we said, because the village community as a whole had actually disappeared.

So far the abstract, ideal-typological picture shared more or less by all evacuees. Evacuation not only implied that people were derived of former social contacts. It implied also the admittance to a new social environment. At least a minimum of new contacts would have to be made. The latter shall be dealt with in a following section. We shall first examine the significance of traditional social institutions in the new situation.

Only one report gives accurate information about the function of the traditional institutions in the changed circumstances. The following is therefore based mainly on the data from this report; the community study of Kruiningen ⁷. It should be noted, however, that we are dealing here with a rather exceptional case. The inhabitants of this village had been evacuated on the island itself to places in the neighborhood of

6) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 196, 198-199.

7) Vol. III, Kruiningen chapter IV, pp. 115-152.

their former village. The picture given in this report will therefore not be quite representative for the situation of evacuees further away and more dispersed.

Successively we shall discuss the data on the family, the municipality, the church, the informal contacts and on social control. Finally a few remarks will be made on the group which remained behind in the inundated village.

The family

About the role, during the evacuation-period, of the basic social institution, the family, we know unfortunately least of all. We do not actually know how the family as a social group has borne up against the difficulties of this period. Neither do we know whether functional changes or developments have taken place. This gap in our knowledge is not due to an underestimation of the importance of this subject. It is due rather to a relatively short period of investigation and to technical difficulties which still block the approach to the sociological aspects of family problems in general ⁸.

A few simple statements will have to suffice. The family was actually the only unit of the former community which in most cases possessed the potential to keep operating as before. A great need for the family atmosphere was revealed by the importance attached to keeping the family together ⁹. It remains an open question whether family relations became closer after many other regular contacts had dropped out. It could perhaps be argued that the change of environment actually hampered the family relations in the process of becoming closer. The situational factors of living together with another family, usually involving a lack of room and a continual consideration of other people's feelings, should be kept in mind in this respect.

In this context, we have been able to ascertain that the burden of the evacuation was carried for the most part by the mothers of the families. Being deprived of a great number of "normal" contacts applied to the mother more than to the other members of the family (compare also the problem of the mother in emigrant families). Apart from this, she had to put up with most of the inconveniences of the evacuation and of the living together with another family ¹⁰.

The municipality

The official duties of the Municipal Councils had been reduced considerably, because the care for the evacuees had been delegated to the municipalities where they had been accommodated. These latter municipalities attended to evacuation-allowances, accommodation, etc. provided no special bodies had been created for these purposes. The official task of the authorities in the municipalities which had been struck by the flood was actually limited to the restoration of the municipality in order to make it inhabitable again. The responsibility for these activities usually had been taken over by special bodies - as in the case of rebuilding the dykes. Little was therefore left of the former official task of governing the municipality.

Yet the majority of the municipal councils were not idle. As far as possible, meetings were held regularly to consider the situation and

8) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 119-120.

9) This need is also reported after the flood disaster in England on February 1, 1953, Cf. Young, 1954.

10) Vol. III, p. 119.

to make plans for the future. Apart from this, attempts were made to keep the widely dispersed inhabitants informed about the course of events and to re-establish and maintain contacts with all means available. In the news bulletins, circulated by various Municipal Councils, the citizens were informed of the development of the restoration activities, opportunities for work, the numerous regulations concerning the evacuation-allowances, compensations, and so on. Many burgo-masters and other municipal officials frequently made a tour of visits to their evacuated citizens. In the evacuation centers, special evenings were sometimes organized to give the people a chance to meet one another. From authorities present they could hear about the many new regulations and the latest news about the restoration.

By the municipality or by other bodies, special committees were sometimes established to deal with certain aspects of the restoration. Some of these committees extended their activities to the evacuees as, for example, the distribution of clothing which had been collected for the victims (both by Netherlanders and by foreigners).

Municipal Councils generally – as far as they were able to do so – did not take a narrow view of their task of giving information to and maintaining contact with their evacuated citizens. An extension of their activities naturally depended on factors like distance and dispersion. In the case of the Kruiningen population, for example, contacts were facilitated by the fact that people lived fairly close together in the same area.

The church

For the evacuees from various places, the church – in some cases even more than the municipality – has fulfilled an important function. The important role played in this respect by the "Nederlands Hervormde Kerk" of Kruiningen and by its minister offers a striking example¹¹. The contact-evenings organized by this church constituted for the people of Kruiningen perhaps the most important social gatherings of fellow-villagers. Later on, these evenings completely replaced the meetings organized in the beginning by the Municipal Council.

Originally they had been planned as religious services by which contacts between church members would also be promoted. The religious character of the meetings is apparent from the addresses by the minister, the hymns and the prayers opening and closing the evening. Announcements on behalf of the Municipal Council were also made. Although these meetings never quite lost their religious character, they soon outgrew their original purpose. They were frequently attended by non-denominationals, members of other churches and even by members of the "Gereformeerde Gemeente", a sect the members of which usually keep very much to themselves.

Church services conducted by the minister of the "Nederlands Hervormde Kerk" of Kruiningen had more than an exclusively religious character. In these services, the solidarity of the Kruiningers as a village community became manifest. Every time the minister conducted a service in one of the evacuation-centers, all Kruiningers accommodated there used to attend. People sometimes started queueing up a long time before the beginning of the service in order to secure a good seat. We ourselves attended a church service in Goes, the capital of the island of Zuid-Beveland, where the majority of the Kruin-

11) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 132-136.

ingers had been evacuated. From near and far, Kruiningers had come on bicycle or by car. People had even hired a bus together in order to be able to attend. The service was attended by members of other churches as well as by people who as a rule never went to church at all. Nobody wanted to miss this manifestation of village fellowship.

We note then that the primary function of the gathering of the faithful was superseded by other secondary functions of a sociological and social-psychological character; opportunity for informal contact, display of solidarity.

The Kruiningen case is perhaps exceptional with regard to the role played by the church during the evacuation. Yet elsewhere also, churches probably had an important function; ministers usually made frequent pastoral visits where evacuees were widely dispersed. This appears among other things from the Survey, where it is reported that among the organizations rendering assistance the church is mentioned very frequently ¹².

Associations

Apart from the church, some associations also tried to re-establish contact among their members. This was hampered not only by the fact of the dispersion, but also by a lack of accommodation for meetings and a lack of the necessary instruments; musical associations for example had in most cases lost their instruments during the flood. Yet as we learn from the community-study of Kruiningen ¹³, a number of associations managed to start operating again in some way or other. We refer to women's associations, musical associations, and church associations such as young people's clubs. As in the case of the church services, the functions of these gatherings were often quite different from the original ones. The functions of these secondary institutions and the specific character of these functions depended for the most part on the leaders. Why, during the evacuation period, in one case the church played an important role and in another case the Municipal Council, should be explained in terms of the activities of the leaders in this respect ¹⁴. With regard to leadership, there was a difference between disaster- and rescue-situations on the one hand and the evacuation situation on the other. Exaggerating slightly, we can say that during disaster and rescue, leadership was determined by the situation; while, on the contrary, during the evacuation, the situation was, in many cases, created by the leader.

External influences often stimulated purposive activity and sometimes gave occasion to a revival of associations. Many women's associations found their existence justified again when a task was assigned to them with the distribution of goods and clothing among flood victims.

Informal contacts

From the Kruiningen community-study, it appears that the number of contacts among fellow-villagers did not increase considerably during the evacuation ¹⁵. Few new acquaintances were made among fellow-villagers sharing the same evacuation center. The already-existing relations with relatives, friends and acquaintances became, however - insofar as geographical distance allowed - much closer. How-

12) Vol. II, p. 156.

13) Vol. III, pp. 140-143.

14) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 135, 141-142, 145 ff, 151.

15) Vol. III, pp. 127-129.

ever, a large number of casual contacts were made with fellow villagers with whom no previous intercourse had existed. People stopped each other in the street and shook hands, which formerly had never happened. Status differences were no longer an obstacle for addressing each other. The contacts, though, had no other aim than the exchange of information (usually about the flooded village) ¹⁶. Because of their casual character, these contacts can hardly be interpreted as an extension of informal social relations. At best they may be viewed as an expression of solidarity among victims of the same village.

New contacts among fellow-villagers, who formerly had been strangers to each other, were probably made mostly in those cases where their interaction during the evacuation period had been very intensive. This happened, for example, among those who worked together for months in the newly created relief organizations in charge of the distribution of goods. This possibility of extending contacts among fellow-villagers should not be overestimated, however. Most of the relief organizations were based on formerly existing formal and informal relations.

From the Kruijningen report, it is also apparent that few new contacts were made. At "contact-meetings", specifically aiming at the promotion of contacts among fellow-villagers, people associated as much as possible with old friends and acquaintances.

The flooded village itself was also an important meeting place. Either by boat or wading at low tide, many evacuees went regularly to try to secure some of their possessions or to look at the conditions of their houses. In some cases, a beginning was made with clearing up and cleaning. Especially if they had found accommodations near by, they would pay regular visits. On Sundays, usually large numbers of evacuees could be seen on the dykes or around their flooded village. Certain spots became fixed meeting places where fellow-villagers exchanged their experiences ¹⁷.

In passing, we want to point out at this juncture another note-worthy phenomenon. In the course of the evacuation period, a trend towards the old village could be noted among the evacuees. On the occasion of a change of their evacuation-address, people always tried to get somewhere nearer to their own villages ¹⁸. There were, of course, practical reasons. Visits to the flooded village would take less time and this became increasingly important when with the progress of the restoration, these visits became more and more frequent. Yet this had a social implication also. Former social units gradually started operating again and at the same time, the idea of living-together was slowly being realized again.

Social control

Although not a social institution as the above-mentioned phenomena, we should say something about social control. We have little information. It is however worth noting that for victims evacuated to rural surroundings similar to their own, there were only minor changes involved. The social control of the home village was substituted by a similar social control of another village.

16) Vol. III, p. 127.

17) Vol. III, p. 120. Compare also Vol. II, pp. 164-165.

18) Vol. III, p. 118. Young reported this phenomenon also after the flood disaster in England (Young, 1954, pp. 387 ff.).

For people evacuated to towns, as some authors assume¹⁹, the temporary withdrawal of the social control of the old village community has had important consequences in a positive as well as in a negative sense. Positively, because they came into contact with the "good" aspects, negatively because of the contact with the "bad" aspects of town life. It is implied that especially the younger generation has been influenced by these contacts. This, in turn, could affect, either favorably or unfavorably, the old village community, where they would return after the evacuation period²⁰. Apart from the fact that such arguments would lead us too far into the field of qualitative judgements, we can do no more than suggest tentatively that social control may have been a factor in this context.

The group that stayed behind

Before passing on to the discussion of the contact made by the evacuees with their new environment, we want to draw attention briefly to the strongly reduced "miniature" communities still existing in most of the flooded villages. We refer to those who had stayed behind in the village for guard duties and urgent jobs. The small group usually consisted of policemen (sometimes assisted by colleagues from elsewhere) and volunteers for the recovery of bodies, the destruction of carcasses and so on. In an elevated part of the village, they had arranged their simple quarters often on the top floor of a house. From the few data available²¹, we get the impression that social relations in these usually very isolated groups had a very intensive character – positively and negatively. A strong group-feeling, often with an heroic undertone ("We are the heroes living in the water and taking care of the dirty jobs"), was expressed especially in extreme in-group and out-group reactions. The possession of a much larger power-position and responsibility added to this definitely positive evaluation of the communal ties. Typical in this context is the remark made by a policeman when the last gap in the dyke near Kruiningen was closed: "Our empire is over here; now I'm just an ordinary policeman again". Another aspect of the intensive relations in these small groups appeared when conflicts occurred. Although these conflicts were often caused by trifles, people became very much involved emotionally.

C. Contacts with the New Environment²²

In the first part of this chapter we have discussed the extent to which former social relations were still relevant during the evacuation. An attempt has also been made to establish their function in this situation. We shall now examine the data on the relations of the evacuees with their new environment.

19) Compare Haverda, 1953 (a), 1953 (b) and 1954; Zeegers, 1954 (a) and 1954 (b). Compare also Vol. III, p. 204.

20) Cf. Haverda, 1954, Zeegers, 1954 (b).

21) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 40-50, and personal observations of the present author.

22) This section is written by Mr. C. J. Lammers, and is based on Vol. II, Part I and II.

1. Relations between Evacuee- and Host-family

a. Introduction

In contrast to our lack of information on internal family relations, we are relatively best of all informed on the contacts of the family with its new environment. This applies only to one aspect. The Survey confines itself to information on the factors which gave rise to tensions between host- and evacuee-families.

First we want to recall the fact that evacuees and host families were brought together during the evacuation without respect of persons. The factor of available room had not been taken into account either. We mentioned in this context the problem of hosts who had spontaneously offered to put up evacuees although actually they did not have the facilities to do so. Such cases usually gave rise to tensions very quickly. In other cases it could be foreseen that difficulties would be inevitable in a situation of living together. For such families, attempts were made to find a way out as soon as possible. We know that the "problem cases" among the evacuees from Zuid-Beveland at least were dealt with in this manner²³. We note furthermore that in most of the cases the tensions culminated between the 6th and 8th week of the evacuation period²⁴. It is significant in this respect that the interviews for the Survey took place in April. There is some reason therefore to assume that the nature of the tensions reported by the Survey had not a decidedly "pathological" character.

Three months after the flood, a sample of about 900 evacuees and about 600 hosts was interviewed primarily to assess the nature of inter-family adjustment. By means of a statistical analysis, in the Survey the role of various factors with respect to inter-family adjustment was studied²⁵.

Several months later, a mail-questionnaire was sent to hosts in an attempt to gauge the later development of inter-family tension; with aid of these data (return of the questionnaire was rather high after a follow-up had been sent out), correlations with tension-increase were obtained.

On the basis of the results of these analyses and also of some case study material (particularly letters received upon request from several hundred hosts), the conclusions of the Survey are formulated in terms of a frame of sociological concepts. It should be clear, therefore, that the following description of the inter-family adjustment cycle is a scheme of tentative interpretations only, for the benefit of kindred research.

b. The inter-family adjustment cycle

(i) Spontaneous reception: Feelings of pity for the flood victims on the part of the hosts and of gratitude about the extended hospitality on the part of the evacuees characterized the first few days. Mutual relations, consequently, were of quite harmonious a nature, and latent incompatibilities between the two groups did not come to the fore.

(ii) Occasional frictions: When these frames of reference began to wear after a few days, and the exigencies of everyday living re-

23) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 117, 120.

24) Cf. Vol. III, p. 117.

25) Cf. Vol. II, Part I, pp. 5-114. For the following, see especially chapter XIII of this part, pp. 95 ff.

asserted themselves, friction-zones in the situation of inter-family living came to the surface and problems arose in regard to the necessity to share the same quarters and to coordinate the activities of both families.

(iii). Trial-and-error: A period then ensued in which on both sides the need was felt for mutual adjustment of group-interactions. Rather rational collaboration schemes were worked out in many cases; often they consisted of a sort of partial "withdrawal to autonomy", when families decided to assign quarters to each party and have separate cooking facilities and meals. In other cases, negative tendencies prevailed in connection with psychic and social circumstances; frequent clashes occurred and often incompatibilities became "prestige-issues", where cooperation was blocked, as neither party wanted to "give in".

(iv). Modus vivendi established: After a period, which may vary from only a few days to several weeks, the two groups reached a mode of integration of their respective activities. The two families were more or less mutually geared with respect to their common physical milieu and have found ways of coping with the difficulties of the situation.

A whole array of such modes of living together can be found. As more or less "typical tendencies", we can discern, for example: Sympathetic cooperation, where mutual sympathy prevailed and where the activities of both families have become successfully interlocked.

Various conditions may also have tipped the balance of adjusting and maladjusting forces to the other side, so that the situation grew to be one of Antipathetic opposition, where the tensions mounted to the point of insupportability for all concerned. Such extreme situations were usually terminated rather soon by the departure of the evacuee family.

In most cases, probably, neither such positive nor such negative adjustment took place; integration was of an intermediate type, where people had rather ambiguous feelings towards each other, cooperated on a minimum of points and found it rather hard to bear.

(v). Evacuation-fatigue: After the evacuation had lasted several months, a gradual deterioration of the state of inter-family relations set in. The loss of privacy was felt more and more keenly, and, in general, the necessity to live in rather straitened circumstances took its toll on both sides.

c. Social influences operative after three months

What sort of factors started to operate in the trial-and-error period inductive to several sorts of maladjustment and, finally, resulted in some kind of modus vivendi?

Needless to say, the emphasis on social conditions does not imply that no psychic factors played a role; it is just that it was not very feasible to collect data about these aspects of the situation.

As could be expected, given the complicated entanglements of social phenomena, no simple cause-effect relationships were found. Since it would carry us too far to elaborate on the precise details of the inter-dependencies discerned, we will present the main points only.

(i). The role of social status ²⁶:

In table 2, we present a summary which contains the most important information regarding this factor. With the aid of a scale of occupa-

26) Cf. Vol. II, pp. 36 ff. pp. 99 ff.

tional prestige level (as an index of social status) we divided the evacuee-host situations into three groups:

- (a) situations where both families are of lower class status;
- (b) situations where one family is of lower status while the other family (usually the host's) is of higher class status;
- (c) situations where evacuee- and host-families are both of higher class status ²⁷.

Furthermore, the interaction of this factor with subsequently three other factors as to their effects on tension is indicated by the percentages in the body of the table, which refer to the percentage of tension reported by either host or evacuee.

Table 2
 Tension Reported by Evacuee and Host in April, according to various Social Status Combinations, Presence of Children in Evacuee-family, Employment Status of Head of Evacuee-family and Evacuation-experience of Evacuee-family (percentages of tension)

	presence of children		employment status		evacuation experience	
	no children	children	unemployed	employed	experience	no experience
lower/ lower	19%(10/52)	16%(10/63)	18%(8/44)	16%(9/57)	17%(13/76)	18%(7/39)
lower/ higher	16%(18/113)	19%(26/134)	17%(14/83)	17%(20/116)	18%(33/183)	16%(10/63)
higher/ higher	14%(17/121)	32%(35/110)	8%(7/90)	34%(35/104)	14%(23/170)	47%(28/59)

Clearly, the phenomenon of inter-family maladjustment seems a function of a combination of two factors. Presence of children, employment status nor lack of evacuation-experience in their own right are conducive to tension. They are only effective in situations where higher class evacuees stay with people of their own social status.

Why this higher vulnerability of higher/higher class combinations for the operation of other factors associated with tension? The explanation given runs as follows: the way of life of a higher class family may include a large emphasis on privacy, a strong attachment to a certain amount of independence and various values of neatness, etc., with respect to the physical maintenance of the home.

Lower class families, on the other hand, may tend to live a less "introverted" family life, may be used to a great deal of dependence and live in such poor and crowded housing conditions on the whole that with them "proper" care of house and furnishings does not rate so high.

Consequently, the transition from a normal situation to that of shar-

27) The lower class consists of unskilled and semiskilled laborers, peddlers and hucksters. The category "higher" contains primarily middle class people as skilled laborers, handicraftsmen, retailers, etc. Since the number of upper class people (managerial and artistic professions, semi-intellectuals and intellectuals) was exceedingly small, upper and middle class are combined into the residual category "higher". Compare also Vol. II, Appendix D, pp. 220-221.

ing a dwelling with another family may constitute less of a deprivation relative to their habitual way of life for a lower class family than for that of a higher social level.

The presence of children can be a friction-zone due to the relative noise, the lack of orderliness and cleanliness which usually accompanies the activities of children. While this may not be perceived as very annoying among lower class people, those of higher class status may feel more keenly the intrusion on their privacy, their lack of autonomy under such circumstances, and be anxious about the state of their property. This would make understandable that in situations of higher class people among one another a percentage of tension would be reported significantly higher than in the case of evacuee-host combinations where both parties belong to the lower class.

Regarding the combined effects of employment status and social class combinations, we reasoned that perhaps unemployment would have serious psychic impacts particularly on higher class men who probably have never been unemployed before. A relative loss of status, the idleness, the feeling of dependency could be accountable for rather reticent, submissive attitudes on the part of the evacuee, which made him rather easily comply with the demands of the host. Due to this, unemployment would tend to repress various sources of incompatibilities, so that situations where the evacuee was unemployed and where both parties were of the higher class status would have a significantly lower percentage of tension. The above-mentioned psychic effects would not be so prevalent among lower class people, since they are mostly farmhands, who experience seasonal unemployment in these areas rather frequently.

Along the same lines, an attempt was made to interpret the fact that previous evacuation experience seemed to reduce the incidence of inter-family maladjustment notably among people of the higher social levels. Such experience implies a certain amount of familiarity with evacuation problems, a certain "know-how", which may facilitate adjustment. Therefore, previous experience with the exigencies of inter-family living can be a sort of preventive check on all sorts of friction, which as we tried to demonstrate were in general more bound to arise in the case of a higher/higher class situation than in the case of families of lower class status.

While this all could render understanding to the differential effects of various factors on lower/lower and higher/higher class combinations, the question arises as to why no effects are to discern in the case of lower/higher combinations.

One would suspect that inter-class differences in way of life, perhaps fortified by class antagonisms, do not seem to make for a high percentage of tension, or at least provide a tension-generating atmosphere in which factors like presence of children become operative.

It was pointed out that in situations where lower class evacuees were staying with higher class hosts, tension could be reduced because of the fact that these evacuees come from rural areas where rather patriarchal relations still prevail. These people may be rather accustomed to comparatively lenient, submissive behavior towards their employers, with whom they still stand in a face-to-face relationship of a subordinate character.

In the second place, it may be that, at least initially, the very divergencies of way of life of the families involved made for more tolerance on both sides. Activities which one would resent in the case of "equals" may be more easily tolerated in the case of lower or upper

class people, whose backgrounds do not enable them to know the proper way of doing things.

Somewhat generalized we might recast this hypothesis in terms of the social distance concept as follows: in certain circumstances relations between socially less distant groups are apt to be more maladjustive than relations between comparable more distant groups.

(ii) The role of "volksdeel" 28:

In the Netherlands, one can discern certain subdivisions of society with rather differing ways of life based chiefly on religious grounds. Both Roman Catholics and Calvinists have separate institutions for almost any sort of social activities from political parties to soccer associations, from newspapers to institutes for social research. These are called "volksdelen" (literally "parts of the populace").

As an index for "volksdeel" affiliation, in the Survey denominations and political preferences are used. We have no place here to go into the manifold complications of this index, but suffice it to say that we were able to make very crude distinctions only, since we had not expected this factor to play such a remarkable role beforehand.

The sample, then, was divided in terms of three categories: the Roman Catholic "volksdeel", the Calvinist "volksdeel" and as a residual category, the nondenominational "volksdeel".

Depending on the affiliation of both evacuation-partners, as a consequence, we have several combinations of "volksdeel" in evacuee-host situations. It appeared that, on the one hand, the Calvinist/nondenominational combinations had an exceptionally high percentage of tension, while on the other hand, Roman Catholic/non-denominational combinations showed a relatively low percentage of tension.

From table 3, we can learn the interdependence with respect to tension effects of "volksdeel"-combinations with the same three factors dealt with relative to the role of social status.

Table 3

Tension reported by Evacuee and Host in April according to various "Volksdeel"-combinations, Employment Status of Head of Evacuee-family, Presence of Children in Evacuee-family, and Evacuation-experience of Evacuee-family (percentages of tension)

	non-denominational/ Roman Catholic	both families non-denominational, Roman Catholic, or Calvinist	non-denominational/ Calvinist
<u>presence of children:</u>			
no children	5%(1/19)	13%(38/295)	33%(14/43)
children	13%(3/24)	23%(58/251)	29%(18/63)
<u>employment status</u>			
unemployed	5%(1/19)	11%(18/166)	29%(12/41)
employed	10%(2/19)	25%(58/234)	24%(10/42)
<u>evacuation-experience:</u>			
experience	7%(2/30)	16%(64/408)	19%(14/75)
no experience	15%(2/13)	23%(31/137)	61%(17/28)

28) Cf. Vol. II, pp. 47 ff, 103 ff.

When we focus attention primarily on the last two columns, it appears in the first place that presence of children does not exert its influence on tension in the case of situations where Calvinists are staying with non-denominationals, while on the other hand, the "volksdeel"-factor does not seem to operate in situations where children are present.

In the second place, it is indicated that also employment and "volksdeel"-combinations of non-denominational/Calvinist are mutually exclusive sources of tension.

We find in the third place that those with evacuation experience have a lower percentage of tension regardless of the "volksdeel"-combination concerned, while, on the other hand, differences between these "volksdeel"-combinations appear especially in the case of those who lack evacuation experience.

We suggested that the explanation for these relationships may have something to do with the circumstance that particular friction-zones are more subject to checks than others. When inter-family contacts are focussed to a great extent on the children, it may be much harder to avoid frictions than in case most inter-family contacts consist of conversations in which ideological controversies can come to the fore. Thus, the hypothesis is that difficulties between host and evacuee families because of different "volksdeel"-adherence arise only when no other zones of inter-family adjustment, which are potentially tension-generating, are present.

Therefore, absence of children would clearly be a condition facilitating talks about religious or socio-political issues which can reveal incompatibilities in Calvinist/non-denominational "volksdeel"-combinations. Likewise, it would stand to reason, given these propositions, that previous evacuation experience would eliminate this kind of inter-"volksdeel" tension. Such evacuation experience may consist primarily of the knowledge of what to avoid in such situations!

Regarding the inter-relation of the "volksdeel"-factor with employment status, we want to point to the circumstance that in cases where the head of the evacuee family is employed, the man is not around the house so often. This may imply a lessened likelihood that both parties will engage in tension-generating conversations, provided, of course, that adult men tend to initiate such conversations involving ultimate values to a larger extent than women do.

We finally have to deal briefly with the problem that inter-"volksdeel" contacts are apt to lead to tension in the case of non-denominationals with Calvinists, while inter-family adjustment between Roman Catholics and non-denominational families seem to be characterized by an unusual amount of harmony.

It is argued that mentality differences between the "volksdelen" in themselves cannot serve as explanatory devices, since whether or not certain temperament- or personality-characteristics will lead to clashes does not depend in the first place on inherent incompatibilities between the different sorts of mentalities. The total situation, the structure of inter-"volksdeel" relations in society at large has to be considered.

We come to the conclusion then that more mutual sympathy may prevail between Roman Catholics and non-denominationals than between the latter and Calvinists. The history of the "volksdelen" can have something to do with it, but in addition we mention the fact that the very dissimilarity of beliefs between Roman Catholics and Protestants may make it easier for both parties to accept and tolerate the other's

peculiarities. The fact, namely, that they have certain values in common, but derive wholly divergent views of life from them may prove quite a strain in the relations between Calvinists and non-denominationalists; while no such common basis to disagree upon exists between Roman Catholics and non-denominationalists. In other words this again may be an instance of the above stated hypothesis that a comparatively great amount of social distance can facilitate the mutual adjustment between two groups.

It is also stated in this context that the presence of marginal groups between the two non-Catholic "volksdelen" may constitute many bones of contention in terms of the desired allegiances of these groups for all kinds of organizations. Both non-denominational and Calvinist political, recreational and other organizations, namely, strive to obtain the membership of orthodox protestants, who so to speak have the choice between two in joining almost any organization. On the other hand, in practice no such choice exists to a considerable extent for sizable groups between Roman Catholic and non-Catholic associations. Accordingly, the presence of more competing interests between the two non-Catholic "volksdelen" could foster more negative mutual attitudes than between the Roman Catholic and the non-denominational "volksdeel".

(iii) The role of other factors

In previous sections, we have already mentioned the fact that both with respect to social status combinations and to "volksdeel" combinations, the factor "evacuation experience of the evacuee family" appeared to be a relevant factor affecting tension ²⁹.

We can add to this that it was also found that this factor seemed to have more differentiating power in case no children were present than in situations where children were present. This checks entirely with our foregoing hypothesis: if children's activities constitute relatively unavoidable sources of tension, it would follow that a certain "evacuation know-how" would imply more opportunities to provide preventive checks on tension in cases where friction-zones other than presence of children were prominent.

Finally, a certain interaction with respect to tension of evacuation experience with employment status was found to exist, the factor evacuation-experience being much more effective in situations where the head of the evacuee family was unemployed than in cases where he was employed. We are pretty much in the dark as to this inter-dependence. With great hesitancy the idea was forwarded that again the higher frequency of being at home of unemployed men could be responsible for the effects found; the underlying assumption is that it is particularly the men who apply the prescriptions derived from their evacuation experience and who act in the frame of reference of such evacuation expectations.

There remains the role of the factors "presence of children" and "employment status" ³⁰. It is superfluous to repeat the information on these factors which is to be found above.

d. Social influences on tension-increase operative later on

Some measures of tension increase were computed on the basis of

29) Cf. Vol. II, pp. 75 ff, 106 ff.

30) Cf. Vol. II, pp. 71 ff, 44 ff.

a comparison between hosts' responses to the mail-questionnaire in October and their statements in the April interviews.

The "net increase" is computed by subtracting the total number of tension-reports in October from the total number of tension-reports by hosts in April and taken as a percent on the total number of reports. One should realize that only reports are considered of hosts who responded to the relevant question in both instances. The total net-increase was about 10%, so that there is reason to assume a tendency towards inter-family maladjustment as the evacuation continued.

From all factors correlated with tension-increase, "similarity of income level" and "similarity of occupational prestige level" showed a significant correlation. In the following table (table 4), this is summarized, while also the various net increases are given for various combinations of income groups and for combinations of occupational groups.

Table 4

Hosts' April and October Reports of Tension, according to Similarity of Social Status and various Social Status Combinations

<p>A. income level as an index:</p> <p><u>same income level</u></p> <p>low/low medium/medium high/high</p> <p><u>different income level</u></p> <p>low/medium low/high medium/high</p>	<p><u>net increase</u></p> <p><u>6%(10/170)</u></p> <p>7%(9/122) 2%(1/45) - (0/3)</p> <p><u>14%(19/140)</u></p> <p>13%(12/90) 0%(0/29) 33%(7/21)</p>
<p>B. occupational prestige level as an index:</p> <p><u>same occupational prestige level</u></p> <p>lower/lower middle/middle upper/upper</p> <p><u>different occupational prestige level</u></p> <p>lower/middle lower/upper middle/upper</p>	<p><u>1%(2/139)</u></p> <p>5%(2/43) 1%(1/95) - (0/1)</p> <p><u>19%(28/145)</u></p> <p>18%(19/104) 0%(0/19) 41%(9/22)</p>

Table 4 indicates that in cases where evacuation-partners differed as to social status, inter-family relations deteriorated to a larger extent in the long run than in situations where both families were of the same status. The specification shows that particularly lower/middle and middle/upper combinations were apt to experience tension increase. Whether or not this exceptionally low tension increase in low/high and lower/upper situations again points to the operation of the mechanism of social distance being inversely associated with presence of inter-group tension cannot be ascertained. The groups concerned are so small that accidental factor can very well be responsible for this result.

It is not unlike that after the evacuation had lasted several months the supply of mutual positive sentiments gradually became exhausted; gratefulness for the offered hospitality and concern for the unfortunate flood victims were no longer dominating people's perspectives, so that there was less and less tolerance on both sides, less and less willingness to put up with peculiarities which correspond to differing social milieux.

2. The Integration of the Evacuee into the Reception Community

a. Introduction

The contacts of the evacuee with his new environment comprised more than his relations with the host family. The significance of contacts with the new environment should not however be overestimated. Among the evacuees of Kruiningen – accommodated in a socially similar environment nearby – comparatively few lasting relations with the new environment resulted from the use of associational channels as well as from informal contacts ³¹. Yet especially in the evacuation-centers, many associations went out of their way to make the evacuees participate in their activities. Special invitations were repeatedly circulated, without much effect however.

With regard to church attendance, we have information only about those who had been evacuated to rural districts. On the whole, they went to church as regularly as before ³². We note here again the important function of the church during the evacuation period. We learn further that church-councils in various evacuation centers appointed a representative in order to promote congenial relations. In a number of cases, welfare work on behalf of the evacuees was supervised by the church. This was done in some cases by the church to which the evacuees belonged, in other cases by the church of the reception community.

In conclusion to this section, we shall summarize the Survey data on the adjustment of the evacuees in the reception community.

b. The data about evacuees' "at-homeness" ³³

More or less as a by-product of the survey in April, some information was collected concerning people's adjustment into the community where they were temporarily staying.

The analysis of their integration in the reception community – a question pertaining to their "at-homeness" being used as an index – remained rather inconclusive for several reasons.

In the first place, lack of time prohibited a satisfactory solution for some statistical problems, so that the ambiguous procedure had to be adopted to give alternative fiducial probabilities for every correlation.

In the second place, the questionnaire did not have data concerning several independent variables which could have been more relevant than the ones on which we had information.

In the third place, as to some of the apparently most important explanatory variables (e. g., informal social contacts) the material gathered was not sufficient in several respects.

Finally, the hypothetical starting point in the frame of which the an-

31) Vol. III, pp. 127-129, 140 ff.

32) Vol. III, pp. 132 ff.

33) For the following, see Vol. II, Part II, pp. 117-152.

alysis was put seemed a bit impractical. It was assumed that the evacuee would have a rather stable set of attitudes with respect to his reception community, so that his "integration" could be studied. Since the evacuees' frame of reference, however, may have been dominated by their expected return to their home community, this need not have been the case at all. It is also possible that the subjective dispositions of an individual have so much influence on his relations with a community that it is not very sensible to deal with this sort of phenomena in terms of "integration".

c. The findings

In connection with the obstacles mentioned above, the results of the analysis should be conceived of as suggestions only, and in no way as conclusive evidence.

(i) Differences of community-milieu: As was to be expected, the predominantly rural evacuees felt much less at home in outspokenly urban than in relatively rural reception communities. Obviously, a town both as a physical and as a socio-cultural milieu shows features so divergent from evacuee's home environment that he finds it hard to adjust himself to the new situation.

(ii) The family setting: On several points, it is indicated that an individual evacuee is influenced very much by his family relations with respect to his community adjustment.

In the first place, evacuees from families who are reported to have inter-family tension with the host-family are probably less well adjusted than those who maintain comparatively positive relations with their hosts.

The importance of inter-family contacts with the host family is also suggested by the finding that "family of the host" was the most frequently mentioned way in which evacuees reported to have acquired new friends in the reception community.

In the second place, the material suggests that persons from families which are relatively intact have better chances to get adjusted than evacuees who are not together with their whole family at their evacuation address.

Finally, the findings concerning inter-family contacts presented in the next section may also indirectly point to the relevance of the family context for the individual evacuee's integration in the reception community. It appears likely that here we had to do not so much with friendships or kinship relations between individuals as between families.

(iii) Informal social contacts:

(a) Relatives and/or friends in the reception community and evacuee-host relationship: There appears to be a relation between evacuees' integration scores and presence of friends or relatives, whom the evacuee knew prior to the flood in the community in which he is now evacuated, and also an association between average integration scores and the fact whether or not evacuee and host are related to one another through kinship or friendship (Table 5).

This table (5) shows that the vast majority of those evacuees who are staying with strangers have no relatives or friends in the reception community, while those who have moved in with relatives or friends tend to have a lot of other acquaintances or friends in the community as well. This suggests that actually the variable "prior acquaintance

Table 5

Evacuees' Integration in Reception Community by Evacuee-Host Relationship and Number of Relatives and/or Friends of Reception Community

evacuee-host relationship: neither relatives nor friends				relatives or friends		
number of relatives and/or friends	average integration score	per cent	number of cases	average integration score	per cent	number of cases
none	65	66%	(174)	65	15%	(51)
1-3	50	18%	(48)	39	22%	(72)
4 or more	47	16%	(43)	74	63%	(208)
		100%			100%	

with reception community" lies back of both of these factors and is perhaps more relevant with respect to the evacuee's integration.

Furthermore, we see that in the case where evacuee and host are relatives or friends to each other, those with four or more relatives and friends have a much higher integration score than evacuees with from one to three relatives or friends (the difference is statistically significant). It stands to reason that the more relatives and friends one has in a community, the easier it is to adapt oneself, but why should this not be the case for evacuees staying with strangers? The simplest explanation is that when one is staying with strangers despite the presence of a good deal of relatives or friends, apparently one's relations with those relatives and friends are not particularly cordial! Naturally, only if relations of a rather positive nature are sustained with relatives and friends, will they prove to be of aid in one's adjustment to the reception community.

Finally, it is conspicuous that evacuees who report to have no relatives or friends in the reception community show as good as or an even higher integration score than those who have a few only. From this, the hypothesis can be derived that lack of relatives and friends in such a situation can constitute a challenge inducing the evacuee to apply all his efforts to come to terms with his new environment. The upshot could be that such a fresh start enables one to adjust just as well if not better than people who are a little bit familiar with the community. These latter may to a lesser extent succeed in orienting their lives to the new environment, as the presence of those relatives and friends continuously keeps their frame of reference on the "pre-flood-situation" functioning.

(b) Relatives and/or friends of home community present in reception community and frequency of contact with them

Although statistical indications that significant associations exist are so ambiguous that no reliable conclusions are justified, certain suggestions may be derived as to the role of fellow-evacuees from back home in the same reception community for one's integration.

As in the case of relatives and friends of reception community, it appears that people without such relatives or friends from the home community are better adjusted than those who have a few of them. This

Table 6

Evacuees' Integration in Reception Community according to Number of and Frequency of Contact with Friends and Relatives from Home Community present in Reception Community

(average integration scores)

no friends:	66 (254)	
frequency of contacts:	daily or weekly	none or rare
number of friends:		
1-3	40 (50)	67 (27)
4 and more	59 (124)	75 (24)

could mean that those without such relatives or friends are more or less forced to stop perceiving the reception community in the frame of reference of the home community. Consequently, they may more easily feel at home in the new environment than people who perpetuate their orientation to the home-community and the problems of return because of the opportunity to associate with relatives or friends who are in the same spot.

The same is suggested by the fact that evacuees who maintain frequent contacts with fellow-evacuees from the home-community seem less well adjusted than evacuees who have none or rare contacts with their fellow-evacuees from back home. We do not know what is cause and what effect, it may well be that those who are maladjusted seek association with their old friends and relatives, while it is equally conceivable that they associate for other reasons and subsequently start feeling maladjusted. The data also vaguely suggest that people with more relatives and friends from the home community manage more often to feel at home rather well in the reception community than evacuees with a few such relatives and friends only.

We could sum up these hypotheses in the following way. Perhaps in an evacuation situation an individual family all on its own has comparatively good chances to replace its old frames of reference by new ones under the impact of demands of the new situation. When fellow-evacuees are present, in other words in the case of "collective" evacuation to a certain community, evacuees may tend to cluster together and form a sort of "substitute" home community in the reception community. This may imply a sort of "marginal" position for the individual evacuees who participate also in the life of their temporary community. When no frequent contacts are maintained with others from one's home community, or when so many others are present that one may live relatively isolated from the new environment, no particularly maladjusting effects may follow. Those evacuees, however, who have rather intensive contacts with a small group of fellow-evacuees may find it hardest to adjust as they can neither abandon their old frame of reference nor orient themselves to their new environment satisfactorily.

D. Psychological Aspects of the Evacuation

The ties with the old community

As noted earlier, the evacuation implied to a certain extent that people had been shunted on to a sidetrack. It is said, for the evacuees, "life came to a standstill on February 1st" ³⁴. This is apparent also from fairly undifferentiated conception of time - events had happened either before or after the disaster; no further specification was given ³⁵. This undifferentiated time conception was kept alive by the uncertainty with regard to the duration of the evacuation.

The thoughts of the evacuees were focussed mainly on the flooded village and the possessions left there. The village appealed strongly to them and whenever possible people tried to move on to an address as close as possible to it.

Some phenomena illustrate clearly this focussing on the old village. In the first few weeks after the disaster, persistent rumors were heard about thefts in the flooded village ³⁶. Actually only very few thefts had taken place. The emotions of the people, however, were focussed so strongly on the possessions that had been left behind that the slightest cognitive indication, as for example, not being able to tract something which actually was due to forgetfulness, or noticing someone who might have in mind to steal something (as happened in Kruiningen), gave occasion to a "flood" of rumors. This focussing of emotions was also apparent from the frequent visits to the village and the idealization of the old village and its inhabitants in retrospect. Most of the evacuees wanted to return to the old village as soon as possible. In the Survey, about 80% of the interviewees state that they intend to go back, 7% do not yet know, approximately 6% would like to settle in the place of evacuation and only 3% want to emigrate or to settle elsewhere in Holland ³⁷.

The significance of contacts with members of the old community

The attempts to maintain old social relations as far as possible should be viewed in terms of a continuous referring back to the old community. This was enhanced by the fact that in spite of attitudes of sympathy and hospitality usually prevalent among the inhabitants of the reception centers, people kept a feeling of "the others do not understand us".

The contact evenings and the meetings of the old associations had a significance far beyond the obvious sociological function of bringing together people with similar aims and interests. This was superseded by the social-psychological function of being among friends and acquiring information.

It had been pointed out that there was a need to feel oneself as belonging to a larger whole. In the conceptual framework of Krech and Crutchfield, a need is mentioned of "dominance", "belongingness" and "security" ³⁸. This strongly emotional ties with the past was expres-

34) Vol. III, p. 119.

35) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 56, 59.

36) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 43, 111-112. Compare also Haverda, 1953 (a), p. 195, Young, 1954, p. 387. For an analysis of such a wave of rumors, see the Kruiningen-report, Vol. III, pp. 111-112.

37) Vol. II, pp. 163-164.

38) Vol. III, pp. 134, 141-143.

sed also in the added significance of leadership and the father-role often assumed by leaders of groups in the evacuation period ³⁹. It is apparent also from the emotional value attached to all kinds of superficial contacts with almost any fellow-villager ⁴⁰.

These feelings which emerged as feelings with a positive value for the individual concerned, originated from a contrasting state of mind characterized by discomfort, loneliness, insecurity with regard to the future, and the feeling of not being understood by those who were not victims of the flood. The apparent solidarity characterizing many evacuee meetings was valid only for the actual situation of being evacuated. Such meetings often served only as a substitute for all contacts that were missed. As soon as people were able to return to the old village, the interest for these meetings and the feeling of solidarity generally disappeared fairly soon. Many old antagonisms reappeared and sometimes even more acutely than before.

The attitude towards the new environment

The evacuees who still had the opportunity of maintaining old relations more or less had adjusted themselves accordingly. They lived in their own little world, separated from the new environment. The situation was different for those who had been abruptly cut off from all their old relations. They were compelled to establish new contacts with their environment. From the Survey, we learn that their adjustment to the new environment was satisfactory. Adjustment to the new environment was most difficult for those who could not temporarily discard altogether the old relations because they still met fellow-villagers occasionally. On the other hand, these contacts did not fully satisfy their needs because they did not take place frequently enough.

A real integration of the evacuees into the new environment could obviously not be expected. In the case of isolated evacuees also, although they seemed to feel themselves at home in the place of evacuation, adjustment was superficial and temporary. Adjustment was made less urgent by the knowledge that the evacuation would after all be temporary. The possibility is suggested that the ambivalent character of the correlations with regard to the "at-homeness" should perhaps be explained by the doubtful character of the adjustment.

Various psychological aspects of the contact of the evacuees with their new environment have been described already in the previous section, so there is no need to repeat them here. The inter-family adjustment cycle, for example, is more than just a sociological framework. It also indicates a psychological development.

Among the numerous variables tested in the Survey, only a few showed a significant correlation with regard to inter-family tension. This implies that in many cases, tension was caused not only by social factors but also by factors of an individual-psychological character ⁴¹. The aspects of the evacuation belonging to the field of individual psychology, however, fall outside the scope of our research.

39) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 135, 142, 147-148.

40) Vol. III, pp. 127, 151.

41) Compare also Vol. II, pp. 98-99.

Chapter V

THE RESTORATION

A. Introduction

In this chapter we shall deal with a few aspects of the restoration of the flooded areas. The term restoration will be used in its widest sense indicating everything done to make the area inhabitable again.

Actually we should distinguish restoration of direct and indirect damage, the improvement of undesirable conditions existing before the disaster and all measures taken to prevent or to lessen the effects of future disasters.

First of all, then, the direct restoration. Material restoration on a large scale was a matter for the government. Bodies responsible for this, or organizations created especially for this purpose, started to rebuild dykes and roads and to recondition agricultural land. The latter implied, in some cases, reallocation of property.

In addition to this there was the relief work with regard to individual victims. The immediate needs of clothing, and furniture were often met by the various relief organizations. Damage to houses, household effects and business was partly or wholly compensated by the government. The government also contributed to the restoration in the socio-cultural sphere. This required that all sorts of measures be taken. The execution of these measures sometimes differed according to each case and location.

We note, then, that the government took a large share in the restoration in the executive sphere as well as by means of financial support. Yet there was still a lot of direct and indirect damage not covered by these arrangements. A wide field remained for private and semi-official welfare activities. In this respect, indeed, a great deal has been done. The system of "adoption", for example, was widespread. Places or districts in the flood area were adopted by towns outside. In this way, Kruiningen was adopted by Apeldoorn, Schouwen-Duiveland by Amsterdam. Foreign countries also participated in this adoption. Stavenisse, for example, was adopted by Sweden. These adoptions should certainly not be viewed as purely symbolic gestures. Personnel of the Amsterdam municipality took part in the restoration work in Schouwen-Duiveland for a considerable time. Apeldoorn organizations cooperated with sister organizations in Kruiningen and so on.

The field of action was extended even further. Projects were initiated which were not directly connected with the restoration. Restoration was considered a matter of national concern. Attention was directed on the disaster area. Proposals, which before the disaster would not even have been considered, were promptly accepted. Requests by local official and non-official bodies for cooperation and financial support often received an appreciative hearing from the government.

Governmental bodies not only supported initiatives; they also started planning themselves. Committees were formed and plans were made to include also projects aimed at changing conditions that needed a change. In places where the allotment of agricultural land was con-

sidered rather unsatisfactory, re-allotment was decided upon. With the restoration of the badly stricken areas, an examination was made of the extent to which a revision of the spatial-, economic-, traffic-, technical and social structure (Schouwen-Duiveland ¹) or of the municipal divisions (Goeree-Overflakkee ²) would be necessary and desirable.

Technical, economic and social problems, which otherwise perhaps could not have been solved for years, were now promptly taken up. For a considerable time, there had been a plan to connect the islands of Walcheren, Noord-Beveland and Zuid-Beveland permanently: the so-called three-island plan. This plan had dragged on for years and had never reached the stage of actuality. Soon after the flood, however, a start was made on its preparation.

A spectacular example of the development is the Delta-plan: the plan to close the estuaries of the Zuid-Holland and Zeeland islands. In a small circle of experts, this plan had already been a topic of discussion before the flood. It had however remained a plan of academic interest only. After the disaster, however, it became evident that the project would considerably increase the safety of the southwestern part of the Netherlands. Moreover, through the experience gained by the rebuilding of the dykes after February, 1953, many technical difficulties hitherto considered insurmountable could now be solved. Therefore, the execution of the project was soon given priority. Increase of safety, limitation of the effects of possible future floods and a number of important economic and technical advantages settled the matter ³. Otherwise it might have been decades before these plans were given proper attention by the government and by the public. Now they were worked out in detail. Shortly after the disaster, the Delta-commission was set up and in the summer of 1955, the first extensive plans will be submitted to Parliament for approval.

In other respects, the pervention or at least the limitation of the disastrous effects of possible future floods is being aimed at. On a national as well as on a local level, the hydraulic situation of the flood area and of the areas outside it has been carefully examined. An elaborate alarm-system for high water levels has been set up.

In short, the disaster occasioned extensive restoration activities, which were often extended to projects aiming at the improvement of conditions in the flood-area.

This implied that, in the period of restoration, the disaster was no longer the concern of only the victims and the local authorities. It had become a national affair. Numerous bodies and individuals from outside concerned themselves with it. People from the area themselves were not even involved in some of the facets of the problem any more.

The aspects of the restoration presented above did not constitute a part of our research. They have not been dealt with in the reports either. Yet we wanted to describe this development briefly in order to provide a background for the subsequent analysis of sociological and psychological phenomena among the people concerned during the period of restoration.

1) See "Rapport inzake de reconstructie van Schouwen-Duiveland".

2) Groenman, 1954.

3) Compare Maris, 1954, Tinbergen, 1954, Verburg, 1955.

B. Social Restoration

After the disaster, many people had been evacuated and they had, thereby, been shunted on to a siding as it were. The restoration started shortly after the disaster. At the outset this implied that these activities were not in the first place the concern of the evacuee. A lot was done in which they played no part. During the evacuation, they were in many respects the objects of a large number of measures. They no longer participated actively in the events.

After having been evacuated for some time, however, people returned to their villages or they started preparing for their return. This meant that they were no longer exclusively the objects of the action. They now started to participate in it themselves. This meant also that various social units began to function again.

People who, during the evacuation, had formed an idealized picture of former conditions, were now confronted with the numerous changes caused by the disaster. All sorts of things had been exposed and many weak spots and concealed tensions had now become manifest. A great number of bodies and individuals viewed the restoration as a chance to bring about various changes. Other people, though, had a different opinion. Viewpoints were sometimes widely divergent. Various points of controversy arose which caused tensions and could easily develop into conflicts.

There were various foci around which old and new controversies concentrated. First of all, there was the distribution of goods. Shortly after the flood, from the mainland and abroad, large quantities of clothing, food and furniture had been sent to the victims. These had to be distributed among the people. But by whom? And on what principle? Ought the criterion to be the proportion of losses suffered? Or individual needs? Or again, should there be a uniform allotment per individual or per family? ⁴ Often the distribution was taken care of by local or regional organizations such as Red Cross units, women's organizations or organizations especially created for the purpose. If the distribution was in charge of non-local people, there was a certain guarantee that it would take place impartially. Such persons, on the other hand, had difficulty in checking whether damage or requirements were stated truthfully. Since fellow-villagers usually knew each other's particulars, conflicts sometimes arose when certain people had been allotted more than they had lost or more than they strictly needed ⁵.

This element of social control made it necessary that the distribution of goods usually had to be assigned to local people or organizations. This in turn gave occasion to accusations of discrimination. Those who were in charge of the distribution were alleged to favor themselves, their acquaintances and the members of their clique. This sometimes led to group-antagonisms. If the distribution was in the hands of members of the elite, the lower classes sometimes offered resistance. In one case, such antagonisms even assumed the character of class-antagonisms, as, for example, the occasion of a conflict about the clothing distribution in Zierikzee ⁶. In other places, Kruiningen for example, these distributions went smoothly and without arousing serious controversies.

4) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 60, 64 ff.

5) Vol. III, pp. 63-67.

6) Vol. III, pp. 200-203.

Such controversies could also arise between municipalities; people of one municipality thought that those of another municipality had received too much or the other way round. The same sometimes applied to people belonging to the same municipality. The controversy then arose between the group of people who had suffered heavy losses on the one side and those who had been hit less severely and those who had not suffered any loss at all, on the other side ⁷.

The compensation proposed by the government constituted another subject for heated argument. Certain categories of victims considered themselves to come off worse than others. Especially the compensation for the business losses was strongly disputed. Although inter-group differences appeared here also – upper class people, for example, thought that the working class was being favored – criticism was generally directed collectively against the government.

Feelings also ran high with regard to the technical and economic restoration of the area. Apart from individual criticisms of the bodies concerned – if reconstruction plans did not coincide with personal interest – social antipodes sometimes became prominent. From newspaper reports and personal observation, we have evidence about the re-allotment in the municipality of W. in Zuid-Beveland. In July and August of 1953, this controversy assumed a pronounced character in some places. The small farmers blamed the big ones for letting their self-interest come first. The big farmers, on the other hand, blamed the small ones for losing sight of the importance of a proper economic development of municipality and polder. A number of farmers in Schouwen-Suiveland opposed the Ministry of Waterways and Transport with regard to plans for the building of an inner dyke in the fall of 1954.

Finally we want to mention the problem concerning the people coming from outside. The disaster caused a stream of people from the outside coming into the area. Among them were the numerous workers for the restoration and the officials entrusted with the execution of various measures. Their presence in large numbers and their activities sometimes aroused the resentment of the autochthonous population.

We see then that the disaster, but more especially the restoration, entailed a number of social tensions. The main feature of these tensions was that they were largely expressed in terms of controversies already existing under the surface. As has been noted in one of the reports: "the disaster exposed all sorts of weaknesses and tensions which in normal times might have remained latent" ⁸. Elsewhere it is stated in this connection: "the disaster served as a detector of all sorts of hidden tensions" ⁹. A characteristic example is shown by the evacuation-conflict at Zierikzee described in the preceding chapter.

It would however be wrong to assume that the flood and the subsequent restoration had produced only tensions. Neither did these tensions have merely negative effects. Tensions, as long as they remain latent, are difficult to get a hold on and therefore difficult to solve. With open conflicts there is at least a possibility of solution.

The settling of such a latent antagonism of long standing has been

7) Vol. I, p. 58, Vol. III, p. 67. Compare also Vol. III, p. 133.

8) Vol. III, p. 62.

9) Vol. I, p. 71

described in one of the community studies ¹⁰. Because of this antagonism which had existed for years, one potential leader had continually lacked the scope in which to show his ability. With the flood and its aftermath, an opportunity was offered to give full scope to his abilities as a leader, which had been frustrated for so long. This entailed also the (temporary?) removal of the split existing in the upper stratum of the village community. And this closing of ranks made possible a number of important initiatives.

With the exception, perhaps, of the temporary situation in Zierikzee, the conflicts should not be viewed as a dominant feature of the restoration. The attention paid to the conflict situations is possible due to the fact that the really positive changes were much less evident, while their effect extended over a much longer period.

With the restoration, former leaders who had lost their prestige during the flood, attempted to reestablish their prestige ¹¹. Apart from this we see that a number of new people and new ideas were given a chance. Sometimes new forms of cooperation were established between individuals or bodies which formerly had hardly any contact with each other. These processes often promoted social integration.

The emergence of "strong men" – sometimes entailing a shift in the composition of the municipal councils at subsequent elections ¹² – might contribute to the removal of old controversial issues. A "dormant" leadership had been aroused to the advantage of the community. Also in the period of the restoration, the penetration of outsiders into the formal organization had a stimulating effect.

After the most pronounced conflicts had burst forth, we see such a positive process at work also in Zierikzee. A number of individuals who had managed to keep out of the conflicts took the initiative for the founding of a new organization: The "Stichting Nieuw Schouwen-Duiveland", an organization of island interests advocating the improvement of certain conditions ¹³.

An important aspect of the restoration was the gain in prestige of a number of institutions. We have seen in the previous chapter that institutions like the municipality, the church, and certain associations in various stricken places temporarily assumed additional functions during the evacuation period. Although most of these additional (psychological) functions disappeared after the people returned, a greater prestige remained attached to these institutions. Some indication of this is given by the answers to a few Survey questions. In connection with the question about assistance offered, the churches were praised most frequently. About half of the interviewees stated that they would not mind having the same burgomaster in case of a future disaster. Only 11% stated explicitly that they would not prefer him as a leader in these circumstances ¹⁴. Yet many municipal councils and burgomasters have been accused of lacking firmness during the disaster. It seems to us that the above results indicate somewhat of a prestige-gain after the disaster.

The establishment of new institutions such as social-welfare, community centers and a beginning of community-organization constituted other elements of change introduced by the restoration ¹⁵. Various

10) Vol. III, pp. 125-126, 128, 144 ff.

11) Compare also Killian, 1954, p. 69.

12) Cf. Vol. I, p. 69; Vol. III, p. 62.

13) Vol. III, pp. 205, 208-209. Cf. also Haverda, 1954, p. 181.

14) Vol. II, p. 160.

15) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 145 ff. Compare also Haverda 1954.

changes, finally, were due to the contact with strangers during the evacuation period and the restoration.

Summarizing, we note two developments after the disaster. On the one hand, an aggravation of antagonisms, in some cases leading to open conflicts. On the other hand, there was a tendency towards innovation, cooperation and more supple relations. These two developments merged at a certain moment and influenced each other accordingly. The conflicts in Zierikzee lost their severe character; representatives of old vested interests occupied positions in the organizations of the innovators. In Kruiningen, however, cooperation established in an atmosphere of harmony brought forth new controversies; especially when, by returning to their village, people personally experienced the actual restoration. Relations were consolidated, previously existing tendencies and new developments merged.

The two developments of mounting antagonism on the one hand and a strong urge for change and innovation on the other had been clearly noticeable in the initial stage of the restoration. They are now becoming less pronounced. Although a further investigation would certainly be desirable, it is possible to make a tentative conclusion. The most important tendency seems to be the acceleration of an already existing process of social change. This finds expression in faster emancipation of the lower classes (Zierikzee) and in the introduction of a number of innovations on a limited scale.

Of course the possibility remains that their process will at a certain moment be accelerated again as an indirect consequence of the disaster. Official bodies pay a great deal of attention to the flood area. More money has been made available and the intended technical and economic changes, among which especially the execution of the Delta plan, will certainly have their social implications ¹⁶.

C. Emotions involved with the Restoration

The initial stage of the restoration was characterized by an intense ardour for cleaving up and repair. People wanted to see everything fixed up again as quickly as possible. This urge to restore everything gave scope to several novel initiatives. Some people started to clear their possessions in the evacuation period in order to have everything run as quickly and smoothly as possible.

After some time, however, there was a breakdown. Initially people had the idea that everything would soon return to former conditions. They were ready to make concessions with regard to changes which were obvious improvements, but on the whole they expected the re-establishment of former conditions. During the evacuation period, people had lived on these images of the past. After a while, however, it became clear that the repair of private property as well as the repair of the dykes were matters less simple than originally visualized. It became apparent that not everything going to revert to this wished-for former state.

16) After this chapter has been written, we received a publication from M. C. Verburg about several aspects of the Deltaplan and the consequences thereof. Verburg also noted that the technical and economic changes which will take place will in the long run have a great deal of social implications.

Strong reactions against this realization sometimes diverted the attention from the cleaning up and repair work, which had been started so optimistically. It became manifest in various tensions and controversies. Not only with regard to Zierikzee but also from Kortgene – where the process of re-integration actually had been running smoothly – a temporary though strong opposition between the classes is reported 17.

We have seen further that the scapegoat phenomenon occurred in many places. There were a lot of things people were not satisfied about. The restoration did not make enough headway. Compensations were considered insufficient. It was alleged that "other people" had been favored. In short, there were many feelings of dissatisfaction. The burgomaster or the municipal council often constituted the objects towards which these negative feelings were directed 18. About the Zierikzee council, it has been said that it served as a scapegoat for the whole flood-area. This is also indicated by numerous reports in local and national newspapers. In Kruiningen, one of the prominent residents had become the scapegoat 19.

These emotions also found their objects outside the immediate environment. After most of the gaps in the dykes had rapidly been closed, there followed a period in which plans were made and materials collected to close the very large gaps. In this period of few outwardly apparent restoration activities, the Ministry of Waterways and Transport was often blamed. In connection with the compensation for damage, "The Hague" also belonged to this category of more or less abstract objects of scapegoat projection. In April, this became apparent in the Survey in a preponderance of criticisms of government relief 20. An interesting point in this respect is the following correlation which came up in connection with the question of expected government relief: those who expected much government help were of the opinion that they would be worse off in the future than they were before the flood 21.

We note that negative emotions were partly internalized – sometimes creating inner conflicts – and partly externalized, in which case they brought about a temporary feeling of unity. On more positive grounds, also, emotions were externalized. This was often expressed in local sentiment. The motto of the Zeeland coat of arms "Luctor et Emergo" (I struggle and emerge) was often quoted in this connection. In one of the previous chapters we already mentioned a "disaster chauvinism".

In relatively only few cases did the flood cause changes on the individual level. Earlier vague plans to change one's trade, to emigrate or to improve one's position were sometimes put into effect 22.

Finally we want to draw attention to one more psychological aspect of the restoration, although this has not been explicitly stated in any of the disaster reports. That is that as a matter of course the government extended its activities so as to comprise the restoration of everything. Likewise as a matter of course, the victims counted on the government to carry the full burden of the relief.

17) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 66, 200 ff.

18) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 48, 61, 190 ff.

19) Vol. III, pp. 128, 147 ff.

20) Vol. II, pp. 156-158. N. B., in April, compensation regulations were not yet known in detail.

21) Vol. II, pp. 158-159.

22) Cf. Vol. III, pp. 62-63. Compare also Vol. II, pp. 163-164.

With regard to the first point, the government has, as far as we could establish, not even considered in any way whether the extremely difficult reclamation and restoration of heavily damaged areas was economically justified. It might have been more convenient to look for another solution for the people concerned, such as, for example, the reclamation of other lands. As a matter of course, however, it was assumed that everything would be restored again.

The second point is still more significant. Although the flood of February 1953 was one of exceptional proportions, floods had occurred before. The rule has always been "Those who are injured by the water are those who will turn the water back into its place". In the past, damage to private property had not been compensated by the government. At best, this had been a matter for private relief organizations. It is surprising therefore that in this case, suddenly, the full responsibility and cooperation of the government was tacitly assumed²³.

A number of factors contributed to the fact that government compensation for damages was taken for granted. First of all the exceptional proportions of the flood; secondly, the fact that insurance companies in most cases did not remunerate for damage caused by this flood; thirdly the fact that the government had also compensated for war damages; and finally the extension of State-welfare into various fields. In this connection it should be noted also that nowadays "the government" is more than a governing body in the strict sense. By the modern political development the government has more and more become a medium between a people and its actions. What the government does – and this is what is expected and the way in which it is experienced by the people – constituted the expression of the collective effort of the whole people.

Everyone took for granted that the government would pay for the damages caused by this disaster. Actually, however, this was the first time in Dutch history that the government took the responsibility for damages caused by natural disaster to such an extent.

It seems to us that this attitude of expecting the government to safeguard its subjects from all calamities is a typical product of the sense of social security in modern West-European society. The compensation for war damages served in this case as a specific frame of reference for that expectation. Noteworthy is also that the settlement of flood damages generally took place on the same basis and by means of the same administrative apparatus as the settlement of war damages. Here again we note the appearance of an association with the war.

The fact that compensation by the government was taken for granted had some remarkable consequences. One, already mentioned in a foregoing section, concerned the correlation between counting on government assistance and the expectation of being worse off in the future. On the one hand, people thought that the government should carry the burden and on the other hand, they did not expect that the matter would be dealt with in a generous way.

Another aspect of this attitude appeared in prejudices, sometimes widely held, that certain categories of people had been favored. Especially in the upper and middle classes it was often alleged that many workers had gained by the compensations. In short, it was not the fact of the compensation itself that was questioned. The point was rather how much they would get and this point was frequently discussed, as we have seen.

23) The dissertation of Ten Doeschate (1954) about Government and disaster damage does not treat this aspect.

This issue appeared quite clearly in connection with the Disaster Fund, a fund under the supervision of the government. All financial contributions from Holland and abroad were paid into this account. When the amount rose to many tens of millions of guilders, the government decided to allocate this money for the compensation of damages to private property. This decision raised many protests among the victims. The government itself should compensate these private damages, it was argued. 'The Disaster Fund is our money and they should keep their hands off it'.

This newly developed mentality became clearly manifest about two years after the disaster. Again some districts had been hit by a flood. In the beginning the government took the view that this was a case of "normal" periodic damage by the sea. The farmers concerned should pay for the damage themselves. Many protests were raised. The most important argument was that by the flood of December 1954 a number of people suffered losses equal to that of many of the victims of the 1953 disaster. It has not yet been decided whether the damage caused in December 1954 will indeed be paid for by the government. The significance lies in the fact that the claims were made.

The disaster of 1 February 1953 has formed a precedent; not only juridically but also psychologically it has led to increased expectations with regard to government relief and compensation for damages brought about by natural disasters.

Chapter VI

A FINAL ESTIMATE OF THE DISASTER

In this final chapter we shall not try to recapitulate the contents of the preceding chapters. These chapters were in themselves summaries of the results contained in the various reports. We shall merely make some brief observations on various aspects of the disaster and its aftermath. These observations could perhaps contribute to a further theoretical interpretation of the social-psychological phenomena occurring during a disaster.

In the first place, we would point out that the way in which we have arranged our material was not chosen for the sake of a satisfactory composition only. It is our opinion that the several stages: disaster, rescue, evacuation and restoration, often had a different meaning for different categories of people. In other words, the various foci of the disaster and its aftermath were experienced by different categories of people in varying ways.

The disaster itself constituted the most important focus for the distressed people. After an initial period of threat and warning, during which the seriousness of the situation was not realized – possibly because the situation was seen in the light of earlier experiences which seemed similar – people were overwhelmed by the impact of the disaster¹. The events were so all-embracing that everything that happened afterwards was viewed and interpreted by the flood victims in relation to the disaster.

It was different for the rescuers and the other workers in the relief organizations. For them it was the phase of the rescue which constituted the most important focus. They had only accidentally taken an active part in the proceedings. Only for a small number of them did the situation mean a chance to increase their prestige.

The evacuation was experienced by the victims as a more or less inevitable result of the disaster. Those, however, who had suffered no great losses submitted to it only with difficulty. For the hosts of the evacuees on the other hand, the evacuation was the most important focus.

The restoration was a point of concentration for individuals and organizations active in restoration work. Also for those who advocated new ideas or who wanted to restore or to establish their individual prestige was the restoration the focus.

If we now examine very briefly what the various phases meant psychologically as well as sociologically for the victims, we find that the disaster caused a serious conflict between the psychological need to be with one's family and the social necessity for organized resistance. The rescue meant a convergence of psychological and social desires

1) Unfortunately the investigators were unable to set up a classification of types of reactions to the disaster, as, for example, Janis has done (Janis, 1954, pp. 18 ff). Only in one of the reports an attempt is made to distinguish between several kinds of reactions; cf. Vol. III, pp. 90 ff.

for the victims. The evacuation brought a certain discrepancy between psychological adaptation and a lack of social integration with the new surroundings. The restoration, finally, shows evidence of a strong psychological need to return to one's property and to restore it. This sometimes gave rise to social tensions and antagonisms.

From another point of view, we shall now reexamine the family. A well-integrated family is generally a matter of social importance. This was shown, for example, during the evacuation period when the unity of the kin-group was felt to be socially important². It is also evident, however, that this need to gather around the most elementary group was, during the disaster phase, undesirable and even dangerous for the larger social groupings. We find here a similar dilemma as the one mentioned by Merton and Kitt, viz. small group versus organization³.

Remarkable are the changes in the functions of the municipality. The primary function disappeared during the evacuation; and a secondary function developed very strongly. This secondary function offered an opportunity to regain an element of prestige lost during the evacuation period and in some cases to establish this prestige more firmly than before.

We see a similar development with regard to the churches. Although in this case, the original primary function remained in operation, it became temporarily completely overshadowed by a secondary function, which also added significantly to the restoration and increase of its prestige.

The Ministry of Waterways and Transport and the polder organizations had played a rather insignificant role during the disaster. The event was of such a magnitude and so overwhelming that one was powerless. Soon after the disaster, many of these organizations, or at any rate their members, often were designated as scapegoats. The restoration, however, provided ample scope for the rehabilitation and reestablishment of prestige.

A number of other formal organizations changed their character during the phases of rescue and restoration due to informal infiltrations from outside. Certain procedures went more smoothly and there were more informal contacts. There was also much more horizontal communication.

There were also changes in leadership. In some cases, situational leadership which found its origin in the disaster, rescue or evacuation could grow into dominant leadership. In many other cases, the former, formal leaders who had receded into the background during the disaster used the periods of evacuation and restoration to reestablish their prestige⁴.

Here we would like to point out still two more functions of the disaster. The first is the exposure of a number of hidden antagonisms and weak spots in the community life. A second function is the acceleration of existing processes and the introduction of new processes. This second function which is best described as that of a catalyst became apparent at varying levels. At the individual level, the dis-

2) Cf. also Bernert & Iklé, 1952, and Young, 1954.

3) Merton & Kitt, 1951, p. 89.

4) Compare also Killian, 1954, p. 69.

aster sometimes meant the opportunity to carry out plans for a change of occupation, for emigration or an attempt to better one's position. We already mentioned changes which occurred at the social level; of particular significance are the recent cooperative trends (e. g., between churches of different denominations) and the introduction of social-welfare, community centers and so on. At the economic level, we see plans for the development of islands like Schouwen-Duiveland, Tholen, and Goeree-Overflakkee. More emphasis has been put on industrialization, vocational guidance and technical education. Finally, there are the technical changes. The Delta project, the three-island project, the re-allocations, the revisions concerning the system of roads and traffic and of the polder-system, all these plans imply radical changes, though in varying degree. These changes will again have effects on the personal, social and economic level.

Finally, we wish to mention one change in particular, namely the radical change in the warning- and safety-systems in the south-western Netherlands. Through the cooperation of the meteorological stations, the Ministry of Waterways and Transport, polder organizations and municipalities, an extensive warning-system has been established. By means of this system, people are better informed about high water levels and dangerous situations and are better prepared for them. On the basis of existing organizations - polders, Red Cross, Civil defense and others - an organization has been set up for the protection of the dykes, for relief, rescue and evacuation in case of emergencies.

In December 1954, the new warning- and safety-system proved its usefulness when people were warned in time about the high water levels (which came near to those of February 1953), so that the necessary measures could be taken to prevent dyke-breaks and floods.

Appendix A

SOME PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS

As we brought to the reader's attention in the Introduction, it cannot be our primary task to give all sorts of practical suggestions. As social scientists, we cannot consider the implications of many of such suggestions, since these are frequently of a much too technical nature.

Therefore, we will make a few suggestions only about the most obvious points. We begin with the assumption that the measures to be taken in case of a flood disaster are: a) defense against the water-danger; b) rescue and restoration after the impact of the flood; and c) maintaining the largest possible degree of communal unity.

A problem inherent in the preparation of preventive measures is that disasters occur very seldom. Special organizations for fighting natural catastrophies would be too expensive to maintain and are subject to becoming outdated. Hence it might be advisable to combine or incorporate such organizations with existing social institutions.

It is important, in areas which run a reasonable risk of being stricken by natural disaster, to have a good warning system in existence which: a) prepares the population when there is a natural situation which might lead to a disaster; b) can warn the threatened population when the threat becomes actual; c) can inform central governmental and relief organizations of the extent and intensity of the disaster as soon as possible.

A very serious handicap, not only by the February disaster in the Netherlands but which appears to be true of many other disasters, is that the people do not realize the danger in the warning-and-threat phase or at least assume that they themselves are not in danger. The tendency to refer to former similar experiences, which actually were of another nature or less serious, can be a great disadvantage. Hence the importance of good information about the seriousness and possible dangers of any disaster cannot be underestimated¹. Actually, one must be aware that too much information can also be harmful. Instructions given too often and too intensively can achieve the result of confusion in a slightly suspiciously appearing situation; and when such situations repeat themselves frequently, people are no longer able to react adequately to a genuinely dangerous situation (a case of crying "Wolf" too often)².

It is important that the people involved know which places are particularly dangerous and which relatively safe in case of a disaster³.

In case of a relatively extensive disaster, too much must not be expected of the local organizations, whose members are uncertain of the fate of their own families. The tendency exists in such circum-

- 1) See with regard to the importance of instruction Schwartz & Winograd, 1954, pp. 42-52.
- 2) From various municipalities in S. W. Netherlands, we have received reports of near-panic whenever the tide was slightly higher than normal or when there was a strong wind after the February disaster.
- 3) Compare for instance Vol. I, p. 60.

stances to desert everything in the need for being together with the family. Also the presence of tensions in and among organizations in the stricken area can obstruct effective and adequate action⁴. Therefore it is perhaps better in the case of a natural catastrophe to call in the assistance of organizations from nearby, non-affected areas.

The social control mechanisms can impede activation of organizations built on a strictly hierarchical basis. Hence it may be advisable to give special instructions, not only for war situations but also for natural disasters, to local authorities, police, fire brigade, Red Cross, and civil defense. The functions and responsibilities must be determined beforehand. Such instructions must have the necessary suppleness to avoid any misunderstanding about the delegation of responsibility when the possibility of contact with others no longer exists.

It is important that it is known from the beginning who are the responsible persons and which are the organizations for particular tasks. This avoids the appearance of small groups which demand a share in the assistance and which tend to have an independent existence.

In case of difficult and/or exceptional circumstances, it is important to know where and how to get in touch with special organizations or experts.

Indecision and the repeal of orders by officials can be dangerous, since many tend in any case to criticize or to refuse to cooperate.

Unpleasant measures are not easily taken by local authorities. It is therefore sometimes desirable to have outside authorities who can be designated as the scapegoats, thus sparing the local officials from the complaints.

Sometimes it can be useful and desirable that non-official leaders are vested with official powers. In principle, however, this must be limited as much as possible since it can cause tension and rivalry.

Too many unorganized volunteers and the presence of inquisitive onlookers can form a serious hindrance for the rescue work⁵.

It is of great importance that an emergency communications net exists; transmitters, receivers, and mobilophones. Even more important is that the presence and possibilities thereof are known and that there are people who can use the equipment. When using the emergency net, there should be no possibility of a misunderstanding about the meaning of the messages or about their origin and destination.

Rumors can be efficiently dealt with only by quick and accurate reporting.

Extreme expressions of criticism, scapegoat-rumors, etc. should not cause too much concern, as they are frequently the inevitable result of feelings of fear, guilt and aggression and usually have the character of harmless speech-reactions. However, whenever these are symptoms of a manifestation of latent tension and uncooperativeness, they should be immediately tackled as problems for the authorities.

With the evacuation of disaster victims, one must remain aware of the fact that, due to the initial wave of sympathy felt by the non-affected populace, frequently much more help offered than is possible to give. Therefore it is advisable to check on the proffered facilities to as-

4) Cf. Killian, 1954, pp.69-70.

5) Compare also Disaster Research Newsletter, vol. 1, no. 2. (March 1954), p. 2.

certain if they are suitable for longer time evacuation purposes before accepting them.

In addition to the factor of physical space, it is possible that difference in social status, or presence of children or certain combinations of religious denominations can increase the chances of tension, particularly in the long run: in the southwestern Netherlands, it appeared that especially the combination of Calvinists with people of another or no denomination, made for a greater amount of tension. Elsewhere this factor may be present in another form.

In the long run, the evacuation will become a burden for everyone concerned, and it is unjustified to depend too much upon the original feelings of sympathy (on the part of the host) and gratitude (on the part of the evacuee).

It is essential to keep the family as a unit together during the evacuation⁶.

It is also very important to maintain to as great an extent as possible the normal social ties. The great value of the presence of informal and institutional contacts is a strong argument in favor of concentrated evacuation of the inhabitants from the same local environment.

As regards the care of evacuees, the old institutions of authority and the churches have an important task, because they appear to be the most acceptable organizations for the maintenance of the former communal ties.

Evacuation to a comparable environment, both socially and geographically, is most advisable. One should not, however, have high expectations of a thorough social integration with the new environment.

There is no need to be too much concerned about serious degeneration of norms and morals during and after a disaster. The mechanism of self-control can be trusted in this regard.

6) As regards the importance of primary groups and the results of dissolution, compare Merton & Kitt, 1951, pp. 95 ff.

Appendix B

A COMPARISON OF THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SURVEY AND THE COMMUNITY STUDIES *

The question whether in general the survey form is as a tool of research superior to that of the community study (or vice versa) seems senseless. The purpose of this comparison is to derive from the differences between these approaches for what research-objectives the one and for what objectives the other appears most satisfactory.

It will be convenient to distinguish three aspects of the methodology of a study:

a. **Theoretical approach:** the conceptual framework from which hypotheses are derived and in terms of which the analysis is made.

b. **Investigation techniques:** the tools used to gather data pertinent to the questions inferred from the theoretical starting points.

c. **Verification tests:** the means adopted to determine the extent to which the propositions investigated are confirmed or contradicted by the collected data.

In the scheme below, the main points of difference are summarized. We will briefly discuss each of these points. It should be understood that the list is not claimed to be exhaustive. On the basis of our experience in the Disaster Study projects, we contrast the more or less "pure" anthropological, participant-observer study with the "pure" statistical, sample-survey. In practice, both approaches are merged to a greater or lesser extent.

	community study	survey
<u>theoretical approach</u>		
1. unit of study:	small groups, in face to face contact	large groups, latent processes
2. theory required:	general problem-orientation	specific hypotheses
3. kind of analysis:	dynamic, historical	"situational"
<u>investigation techniques</u>		
4. quality of interviewing:	profound, evaluation in social context	superficial, not considered in group-setting
5. sample taken:	implicit, biassed	explicit, representative
6. observation:	crucial	secondary
7. documentary material:	important	negligible
<u>verification tests</u>		
8. correlation analysis:	based on common sense	systematic, statistical
9. controls:	absent	applicable

* This Appendix is written by Mr. C. J. Lammers.

1. Units of study. Whenever a group's members are in frequent face-to-face interaction, this circumstance enables the research-worker present to see the actual processes of which the group's life consists. By the same token, he will study primarily the "kinetic", overt social processes.

In a survey, which of course can be applied to small groups as well, information can be obtained about non-observable groups. Such large units as "nations" or "socio-economic strata" are made "visible" by means of symbolic manipulation of the group's members who are not to any extent in each other's spatial proximity. Since the survey is primarily concerned with attitudes, opinions and reports of behavior, this sort of study emphasizes covert processes and latent relationships.

2. Theory required. A general study-focus suffices for a community study. When knowledge about the problems under investigation is scarce, it is better to engage in a "piloting" community study, where the student can "sense" the field, is free to follow leads and clues, and in general can be content with a comparatively vague working hypothesis only.

The survey, on the other hand, yields maximum results only when questionnaire designing, coding and tabulation are guided by specific hypothesis, so that the data can provide one with definite answers. Like a microscope which is not sharply focussed, a survey starting from loosely conceived questions shows an ambiguous picture.

3. Kinds of analysis. Apart from the application of panel-techniques, a surveyor never gets such a complete view of the development of a situation as the community student does, who continuously follows the course of events.

While the field worker can deepen his study in the historical dimension, the one engaged in the survey is likely to stress a group's present structure and functions. The main drawback of this sort of situational analysis is that one never knows how "representative" it is for a longer time span, and that historical determinants can only be approached via the dubious way of people's memories.

4. Quality of interviewing. In a survey, the interviewer is a complete stranger to the respondent. As long as the information solicited is of a rather impersonal character, he can obtain satisfactory answers. But whenever more intimate questions come to the fore, one is never sure that the established "rapport" suffices to overcome resistances towards telling the truth. He also lacks the opportunity to cross-check the responses.

When the participant-observer, on the other hand, is known to the respondent and has his confidence, he may have access to more intimate information. It may be true that certain things are perhaps more apt to be revealed to an interviewer, whom one never expects to see again, on the whole, it seems that the participant has more chances to get "the details".

In addition, the community student has the enormous advantage of being able to assess the answers of a respondent in the context of his social position. His familiarity with the situation not only provides him with a check on the accuracy of the statements, but also with the opportunity to see them in the perspective of the respondent's activities, his reputation in the community, etc.

5. Sample taken. Unless the community or group studied is so small that all inhabitants can be interviewed, the community student gets in touch with part of the group only, so that he must rely on a

sample as much as the surveyor; usually this sample is taken without many safeguards regarding its representativity. In community studies, research-expediency requires that one interviews and meets primarily "relevant" people, who certainly will not be a cross-section of the population.

Next to the over-representation of those who have comparatively much to do with the problems investigated, there is also the problem that the more the field worker is a participant, the more social distance there will be between him in his temporary status and certain strata and groups which are not in his "social neighborhood". These, therefore, may be less accessible for his explorations.

In the survey, however, all sorts of statistical tricks are employed to ensure the sample's representativity.

6. Observation. A conspicuous advantage of "living with the subject matter" is that observation of people's interactions and of their material culture constitutes a source of data closed to a survey. The observer registers group-life as it operates, and as it changes. This also enhances the value of his interview-data, since here he has a chance to study the inter-relations between "belief" and "action".

Only occasionally does observation play a role in a survey; e.g., in some indices of social status, it is sometimes required to note the presence of furniture, degree of cleanliness, etc.

7. Documentary material. In connection with the often more historical orientation of the community study, vital statistics, minutes of various associations, newspapers, etc. form an essential part of the research.

In a survey, documents (as "case study material") form an accessory source of information only. They are mostly used to illustrate certain hypotheses, to exemplify certain relations found, or to offer suggestions concerning new lines of research.

8. Correlation analysis. The main purpose of a survey is to elicit comparable responses in order to study co-occurrences of social phenomena, for which these responses supposedly stand. The whole procedure of formulating the questions, coding the answers, tabulating the results and applying statistical tests aims at a systematic determination of association between factors.

The participant-observer actually arrives at correlations as well. He infers from the observed peculiarities of certain people the existence of a relation between certain social categories and certain types of behavior. However, these inferences are done in common sense fashion, lacking uniformity and dependability of procedure, so that they remain of a tentative nature only. There are few opportunities in a community study to eliminate chance-factors or to ascertain the degree of association present.

9. Controls. From the foregoing, it follows that the final step in empirical research cannot be taken in a community study. Only when the actual existence of a correlation is relatively sure can one proceed to the final inquiry into the nature of this correlation. Does it refer to a real relationship or is it a "spurious correlation"? When after cross-checking with possibly intervening variables it appears likely that an actual relation is present, on what conditions does it depend, what is cause and what effect? These are all questions which by no means can be answered with the degree of validity reached in most physical and biological sciences, even in the most extensively analysed surveys.

Still until the present, the statistical method is the only one available

in social research, which offers some means with which to attempt to cope with these problems of verification and, therefore, in this respect a survey provides better opportunities than a community study where controls are out of the question.

Conclusions

Our comparison entirely confirms the notion that survey and community study are complementary approaches, which render maximum returns as successive steps in a continuing process of social research. The community study seems best fit as the first exploration of a hitherto unknown sector of social life. Its flexibility of focus when used with discretion will yield a good crop of hypotheses, while the attention to the details of observable behavior can result in a tentative of the most prominent factors.

Repeated free interviews, continuous observation and the study of documents provide opportunities to trace the dynamics of the situation and to avoid "biased" emphasis on past or present determinants.

In the next stage, the survey is to be applied to ascertain more precisely the extent of associations between various phenomena. Sampling techniques ensure relative representativity, while correlation analysis and controls yield the best approximation of verified generalizations. In turn, this analysis will upset much of the theory derived from the community study; many questions regarding the role of other factors, the exact nature of the relationships found are raised. Then new exploration of the community study type is imperative and the cycle starts anew.

Of course, for the study of very large social entities, consisting of people who are not in actual contact, the community study stage is impossible, which just means that progress in these fields of social science is rather hard to obtain.

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GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY

POLDERS

A polder is a piece of land surrounded by dykes, or sometimes by dunes, the waterlevel of which can be controlled, by artificial drainage.

A large part of the Netherlands (about 38% of its surface) lies below sea level. Water has to be drained off from this part. Windmills formerly furnished power, now supplied by steam, electric motor or Diesel pumping stations.

The low lying part of the Netherlands consists of hundreds of polders the size of which varies from a few to thousands of acres. The most extensive polder to date is the North-East Polder which has an area of 120,000 acres (48,000 ha) in the former Zuiderzee.

The lowest polder in the Netherlands lies 6.61 meters (about 21½ feet) below sea level.

Polders differ exceedingly: a common type is made by draining a lake or a part of a or the sea. One type is formed originally by alluvial deposits which, when reaching above sea level, are encircled by dykes.

Sometimes when a road crosses a dyke (for instance near harbors) there is a gate in the dyke called a floodgate, that can be closed with planks if the waters come above a certain level.


The polders are supervised by powerful "waterschappen" or polder bodies.

POLDER BODIES


Polder bodies are a particular Dutch phenomenon. Each polder has its Board, elected by and from the owners of land in the polder, according to regulations which are sometimes rather complicated. The members of the Board are called "gezworenen" (sworn) and the chairman has the title of "dijkgraaf" (dyke-reeve) or dyke-count.

Polder bodies have a long history and tradition. Their main tasks are to take care (also in financial respects) of the dykes, roads and waterways, where this care is not given by other bodies such as the municipality (for local roads), the province or the Ministry of Waterways. The interrelationship among these several bodies is rather complicated. When specific knowledge of this relationship is necessary at certain points, it will be fully explained in the next.

Among the several functions of the bodies that are responsible for the hydraulic situation there is one that is often mentioned in the reports. This function is performed by the "dijkwacht" (dyke-guard), usually appointed by the State Waterways Commission for taking care of the dyke and entrusted with the special task to see that the dyke remains intact. Usually it is a part-time job and the man concerned has mostly his main income from other sources (i. e. owner of some land, some cattle, or is a laborer, etc.) Sometimes this man is also "peiler" of the Waterstaat, which means that once or twice a month he goes out with the boat and sounds the depth of the water near the dykes.



Land below the sea-level
From "The Netherlands and the Water", by courtesy of the
Ministry of Transport and Waterways, The Hague



Cross-section showing the level of the reclaimed land below the sea-level
From "Physical Planning in the Netherlands" (August 1950), by courtesy of the Government Physical Planning Service, The Hague

GOVERNING BODIES OF THE NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy. Executive power is vested in the Crown, in fact the Sovereign, currently Queen Juliana, and the Council of Ministers, called the Cabinet. The President of the Cabinet is usually referred to as Prime Minister. All Ministers are responsible to Parliament.

Parliament consists of two Chambers, both elected – the Second Chamber directly, the First Chamber indirectly – under a system of proportional representation.

The Netherlands is divided into eleven provinces. Each province is administered by the "Provinciale Staten" ("Provincial States") which is the Provincial Council, the "Gedeputeerde Staten" (Deputed States) which is the Provincial Board, and the "Commissaris van de Koningin" (Governor of the Province).

The Provincial Council, which is elected on the basis of proportional representation, constitutes the governing body of the province. From its members, the Provincial Council elects the Provincial Board to act as the Executive Committee of the Province.

The Governor is chairman both of the Provincial Council and the Provincial Board. He is appointed by and representative of the Crown in the province; his official title is, "Commissaris van de Koningin in de Provincie" (Governor or Commissioner of the Queen in the Province).

By virtue of the constitution, the Provincial Council has the right to make decisions on measures concerning the interests of the province. Primarily, this concerns questions of roads, waterways, etc., insofar as it does not conflict with national (central governmental) or local (municipal, polder) interests.

The approximately 1,000 municipalities have the Municipal Council as their highest administrative organ. Members are directly elected by the local inhabitants on a basis of proportional representation. The number of members in the different communities varies from 45 in the largest community to 7 in the smallest. The Municipal Council's size more or less depends on the number of inhabitants.

The executive powers of the municipality are entrusted to a Board (in the reports sometimes referred to as Corporation) consisting of the Burgomaster and the Aldermen. The Aldermen, 2 to 7 depending on the size of the municipality, are elected by the Municipal Council from its own membership. The Burgomaster, head of the municipality and chairman of the Municipal Council, is appointed by the Crown.

RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS *

Religious denominations in the part of the Netherlands where the disaster took place are according to 1947 Census:

* Cf. also Vol. II, pp. 50 ff.

	% in The Netherlands	% in Zeeland
Rooms-Katholieke Kerk (Roman Catholic Church)	38,5	25,7
Nederlands Hervormde Kerk (Netherlands Reformed Church)	31,1	45,5
Gereformeerde Kerken (Reformed Churches)	7,0	10,4
Gereformeerde Kerken onderhoudend art. 31 van de Kerkelijke Orde (Reformed Churches observing article 31 of the Church Order (Statue))	0,9	1,2
Christelijk Gereformeerde Kerk (Christian Reformed Church)	0,7	1,1
Gereformeerde Gemeenten (Reformed Congregations)	0,9	6,3
Oud-Gereformeerde Gemeenten (Old-Reformed Congregations)	0,2	1,2
Other denominations	3,7	2,0
No denomination	17,0	6,6
	<u>100,0%</u>	<u>100,0%</u>

Although these are not all the denominations extant in the Netherlands, they suffice to indicate the large number of Protestant denominations wherein the names show minimal difference. The differences in name, however, do not portray the existing differences among these denominations.

A literal translation into English may also cause confusion. For instance in the Netherlands there is a denomination named "Christelijk Gereformeerde Kerk" (Christian Reformed Church), but the "Christian Reformed Church" in the U. S. A. has more similarity with the denomination that is called in the Netherlands "Gereformeerde Kerken" (Reformed Churches). The name "Reformed Church" in the U.S.A. however, is used for the groups that in the Netherlands has the most similarity with the "Nederlands Hervormde Kerk" (Netherlands Reformed Church).

To avoid terminological confusion in this respect the Dutch names are used in the reports as far as is necessary and herein will be given some – sometimes oversimplified – explanation regarding major Protestant denominations.

"Churches"

The term "Churches" delineates local religious congregations of the presbyterial type, which enjoy a great deal of autonomy, are united on federal lines in regional and national synods, and carry decisive power in doctrinal matters.

Nederlands Hervormde Kerk

The "Netherlands Reformed Church" is the largest Protestant Church in the Netherlands. Within it are found several groups of different doctrinal leanings ranging from severe orthodoxy to an almost individualistic Protestantism.

A large majority of the active members of the Netherlands Reformed Church, who live in Zeeland and on the islands of Zuid-Holland, belong to the so-called middle-orthodoxy and or to the extreme right-wing orthodoxy. Those of the extreme right-wing orthodoxy are known as the "Gereformeerde Bond" (the Reformed Leage) within the Nederlands Hervormde Kerk.

However, it should be noted that also in Zeeland a large part of the members of the Nederlands Hervormde Kerk are only nominal members and mostly very "free" in their ideas.

Gereformeerde Kerken

The "Reformed Churches" are an orthodox Protestant denomination which sprang by secession from the Netherlands Reformed Church in 1834 and 1886 as a consequence of certain controversies. Although in doctrinal respects they do not differ much from the orthodox right-wing of the Netherlands Reformed Church, the members of this denomination show a more active type of social and cultural behavior. They have their own schools, university, newspapers, cultural associations, etc.

Gereformeerde Kerken onderhoudend art. 31 K. O.

These Churches originated in 1944 from a theological dispute in the Gereformeerde Kerken (Reformed Churches). They have much similarity with the Churches from which they sprang, aside from specific differences in social and cultural outlook.

Christelijk Gereformeerde Kerk

The Christian Reformed Church also split off from the Nederlands Hervormde Kerk in 1834. Members of the Christian Reformed Church are mostly of a strictly orthodox turn and their religious life has a more puritanical slant. In certain respects, they are more conservative, and stricter Calvinists than members of the Gereformeerde Kerken.

Gereformeerde Gemeenten Oud-Gereformeerde Gemeenten

With slight differences these two denominations show much the same type of religious, social and cultural behavior. Their religious life is of a pietistic-quietistic type and shows a tendency toward a certain form of orthodox Protestant mysticism. They belong to the extreme orthodox wing of Dutch Protestantism, and what has been said of the

Christian Reformed Church also applies to a large extent to these denominations.

The slight differences between them mostly go back to historical development and to some point of dogmatic interpretation.

POLITICAL PARTIES

The main Dutch political parties, following 1952 elections, are:

	% in The Netherlands*	% in Zeeland*
Partij van de Arbeid (P. v. d. A.)** (Labor Party)	29,0	28,0
Katholieke Volkspartij (K. V. P.) (Catholic People's Party)	28,7	18,5
Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (A. R.) (Anti-Revolutionary Party)	11,3	13,8
Christelijk-Historische Unie (C. H. U.) (Christian Historical Union)	8,9	15,8
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (V. V. D.) (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy)	8,8	8,0
Communistische Partij Nederland (C. P. N.) (Netherlands Communist Party)	6,2	0,9
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (St. G. P.) (Political Reformed Party)	2,4	9,5
Katholieke Nationale Partij (K. N. P.) (Catholic National Party)	2,7	1,1

* The % are of the valid votes
** Abbreviations are given between brackets

The organization of a large part of the electorate along lines of membership in different religious groups is typical for Dutch life.

A great majority of the Roman Catholics are united in the Catholic People's Party. A small number of them voted for the more conservative Catholic National Party.

The Anti-Revolutionary Party finds its electorate among orthodox Protestants, embracing mostly members of the Gereformeerde Kerken, the Gereformeerde Kerken art. 31 K. O. and the extreme right-wing of the Nederlands Hervormde Kerk.

The Christian Historical Union consists mainly of members of the middle orthodoxy and the right-wing of the Nederlands Hervormde Kerk.

The Political Reformed Party consists mainly of members of var-

ious extreme right-wing orthodox denominations wherein the Gereformeerde Gemeenten form the main part.

A number of Catholics and Protestants, however, belong to or at least vote the (socialist) Labor Party, or, to a lesser extent, the (liberal in the European sense of the term-) People's Party for Freedom and Democracy.

The two last mentioned parties find their electorate, however, mostly among that part of the population that does not belong to any religious denomination, as is also the case with the Netherlands Communist Party.

- Adjustment**, see evacuation; evacuee-host relations
Agression, III, 110, 194; IV, 18-19
Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (A.R.), IV, 89-90
Assistance to others, see impact
Associations, III, 136-143; IV, 38
"At-homeness", evacuee, II, 126 ff.; IV, 49-52, 54
Authorities, see also evacuation, municipality during; leadership
Authority, rise against, III 196-199; IV, 35
- Behavior**, see warning; threat; impact; rescue; evacuation;
of children, III, 95-97;
of sexes, III, 95, 110; IV, 18
Belongingness, III, 132, 134, 140, 142; IV, 53-54
Bureaucracy, I, 19, 20, 34, 72-83; IV, 10, 26-27
- Catholic National Party**, IV, 89-90
Catholic People's Party, IV, 89-90
Change,
pattern of culture, III, 121, 126, 129, 131, 136, 139, 143, 144, 150, 151-152
social, III, 204-209; IV 59-60, 65-66
Children, see behavior; traumatic effects
Christelijk Gereformeerde Kerk, IV, 87, 88
Christelijk Historische Unie (C. H. U.), IV, 89-90
Church, III, 129-136; IV, 37-38, 86-89
Class, social, III, 7, 9, 66-70, 102, 124-125, 166-179, 194-196, 200-203, 205-209; IV, 57-60
Cohesion, intimate, III, 118
Colijnspaat, III, 15-16; IV, 11
Communications, I, 10, 13, 19-86; III, 17, 40-41, 44, 83, 97-98; IV, 68;
amateur radio network, I, 37-39;
breakdown, I, 30-33; III, 40;
broadcast-psychosis, I, 86;
conflict, I, 78
fisher fleet network I, 39;
military radio network, I, 39-41;
mobilophone, I, 43;
police, I, 43-45;
P. T. T. I, 13, 21, 41-43;
telecommunications, I, 25-29
Communistische Partij Nederland (C.P.N.), IV, 89-90
Conflict,
after disaster, III, 55-56, 62-70; IV, 57-63;
communications, I, 78;
distribution of clothing, III, 200-203; IV, 57;
evacuation, III, 190-199; IV, 34-35
Contact-evenings, III, 127, 135; IV, 37, 39
- Coordination**, I, 72-83; III, 145-147, 188; IV, 24-27, 68
Cultural pattern, see change, pattern of culture
- Damage**, I, 8; II, 169
Deltaplan, IV, 56
Deprivation, relative, II, 101, 157
Disaster,
"chauvinism", IV, 30, 61;
definition of, IV, 6;
function of, IV, 64-66;
image of, III, 109-110; IV, 18-19; 29-30;
judgement on, I, 63; II, 160-162; III, 91, 97, 110, 112; IV, 16;
structure, III, 186-189.
- Disintegration**,
personal, IV, 60-61;
social, III, 115 ff., 208; IV, 57-59
Dominance, III, 134; IV, 53-54
Dyke, I, 4-5; IV, 83
Dyke-guard, IV, 83
Dyke-reeve, IV, 83
- Economy**, barter, III, 43, 108-109
Emergency community, III, 42-49;
leadership, III, 45-49, 54-56;
social structure, III, 42-45
Evacuation (-period), I, 8, 11, 51-52, 60, 67, 70; II, 5-152, 191-193; III, 20-22, 36-39, 86, 115-152; IV, 32-54, 64, 68-69
adjustment during, II, 5-152; III, 116-121, 150; IV, 41-52, 54;
associations during, III, 140-143; IV, 38;
church during, III, 132-136; IV, 37-38;
conflict, III, 190-199; IV, 34-35;
employment during, III, 121-123;
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*The Hague

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DATE LOANED	BORROWER'S NAME	DATE RETURNED

